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| issue date = 05/08/2018 | | issue date = 05/08/2018 | ||
| title = Integrated Inspection Report 05000219-2018001 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion | | title = Integrated Inspection Report 05000219-2018001 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion | ||
| author name = Pelton D | | author name = Pelton D | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP | ||
| addressee name = Hanson B | | addressee name = Hanson B | ||
Line 9: | Line 9: | ||
| docket = 05000219 | | docket = 05000219 | ||
| license number = DPR-16 | | license number = DPR-16 | ||
| contact person = Young M | | contact person = Young M | ||
| case reference number = EA-18-007 | | case reference number = EA-18-007 | ||
| document report number = IR 2018001 | | document report number = IR 2018001 | ||
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=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:May 8, 2018 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | |||
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2018001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION | |||
==Dear Mr. Hanson:== | ==Dear Mr. Hanson:== | ||
On March 31, 2018 , the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station | On March 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. On April 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | ||
. On April 4 , | |||
NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. | NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. | ||
In addition, the NRC reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000219 | In addition, the NRC reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000219/2017-005-00, which described the circumstances associated with a failed electrical ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator. It was recognized that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a period of time that exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days detailed in Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b, and therefore, is a violation of technical specifications. Regional staff performed a risk evaluation and determined the issue was of low to moderate safety significance (White). | ||
/2017-005-00, which described the circumstances associated with a failed electrical ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator. It was recognized that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a period of time that exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days detailed in Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b, and therefore, is a violation of technical specifications. Regional staff performed a risk evaluation and determined the issue was of low to moderate safety significance (White). | |||
Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the electrical ring lug failure which caused the No. 2 emergency diesel generator to be inoperable was not within | Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the electrical ring lug failure which caused the No. 2 emergency diesel generator to be inoperable was not within Exelons ability to reasonably foresee and correct. As a result, the NRC did not identify a performance deficiency associated with this condition. The NRCs assessment considered Exelons maintenance practices, industry operating experience, vendor and industry maintenance and testing recommendations, and Exelons corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the issue. | ||
Based on the results of the | Based on the results of the NRCs inspection and assessment, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.4, Exceptions to Using Only the Operating Reactor Assessment Program, and Section 3.10, Reactor Violations with No Performance Deficiency. The Region I Regional Administrator was also consulted regarding enforcement discretion for this issue. If you contest the non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. | ||
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | |||
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | |||
-rm/adams.html and the | |||
Sincerely, | Sincerely, | ||
/RA/ David L. Pelton , Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Number: 50-219 License Number: DPR-16 | /RA/ | ||
David L. Pelton, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Number: 50-219 License Number: DPR-16 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | |||
Inspection Report 05000219/2018001 | |||
==Inspection Report== | ==Inspection Report== | ||
Docket Number: 50-219 License Number: DPR-16 Report Number: 05000219/2018001 Enterprise Identifier: | Docket Number: 50-219 License Number: DPR-16 Report Number: 05000219/2018001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-001-0078 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Inspection Dates: January 1, 2018 to March 31, 2018 Inspectors: A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector E. Andrews, Resident Inspector F. Arner, Senior Reactor Analyst J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: David L. Pelton, Director Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure | ||
I- | |||
A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector E. Andrews, Resident Inspector F. Arner, Senior Reactor Analyst J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: | |||
David L. Pelton, Director Division of Reactor Projects | |||
=SUMMARY= | =SUMMARY= | ||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelons performance at | ||
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station by conducting the baseline inspections described in this report in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. | |||
NRC identified and self-revealing findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. | Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC identified and self-revealing findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. | ||
List of Findings and Violations Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect | List of Findings and Violations Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153 05000219/2018001-01 Closed The inspectors identified a non-cited, Severity IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018. | ||
-01 Closed | |||
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Section | Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Status Section LER 05000219/2017-005-00 No. 2 emergency diesel 71153 Closed generator inoperable | ||
=PLANT STATUS= | =PLANT STATUS= | ||
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2018, operators lowered power to 70 percent due to low intake levels. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent on January 8, 2018. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period | Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2018, operators lowered power to 70 percent due to low intake levels. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent on January 8, 2018. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. | ||
==INSPECTION SCOPES== | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. | |||
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. | |||
-Water Reactor Inspection Program | |||
- Operations Phase. | |||
The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, | The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensees performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | ||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | ==REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | ==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Impending Severe Weather== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01|count=2}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for a blizzard warning issued on January 4, 2018, and for low intake levels on January 6, 2018. | |||
, and for low intake levels on January 6 | |||
== | ===External Flooding (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated protection from external flooding prior to and during high winds and heavy rain on March 2, 2018. | |||
Partial Walkdown | ==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04|count=6}} | |||
2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable on January 3, 2018 | The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: | ||
: (1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator while No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable on January 3, 2018 | |||
: (2) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018 | : (2) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018 | ||
: (3) | : (3) A isolation condenser during emergent unavailability of the B isolation condenser on February 12, 2018 | ||
: (4) Core spray system II during planned unavailability of core spray system I on February 20, 2018 | : (4) Core spray system II during planned unavailability of core spray system I on February 20, 2018 | ||
: (5) | : (5) B isolation condenser during shell side makeup on March 5, 2018 | ||
: (6) | : (6) B isolation condenser during emergent work on A isolation condenser on | ||
== | ===March 12, 2018 Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the standby liquid control system on February 15-16, 2018. | |||
Quarterly Inspection | ==71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Quarterly Inspection== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05Q|count=9}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas: | |||
: (1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018 | : (1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018 | ||
: (2) No. 2 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018 | : (2) No. 2 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018 | ||
: (3) Reactor building 95 | : (3) Reactor building 95 elevation on February 21, 2018 | ||
: (4) Reactor building 75 | : (4) Reactor building 75 elevation on February 21, 2018 | ||
: (5) Reactor building 23 | : (5) Reactor building 23 elevation on February 21, 2018 | ||
: (6) | : (6) C 125 VDC battery room on February 28, 2018 | ||
: (7) | : (7) A and B 4kV switchgear room on February 28, 2018 | ||
: (8) New cable spreading room on March 1, 2018 | : (8) New cable spreading room on March 1, 2018 | ||
: (9) Recirculation pump motor generator set room on March 1, 2018 | : (9) Recirculation pump motor generator set room on March 1, 2018 | ||
==71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures== | ==71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in turbine building switchgear area on February 22, 2018. | |||
==71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance== | ==71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance Heat Sink== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.07|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated Exelons monitoring and maintenance of B isolation condenser performance on March 5, 2018. | |||
The inspectors evaluated | |||
==71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance== | ==71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11|count=2}} | |||
The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during licensed operator requalification training on January 23, 2018, and March 13, 2018. | |||
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness | ===Operator Performance (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during the Notice of Unusual Event on January 6, 2018. | |||
==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12|count=4}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions: | |||
: (1) Periodic 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation on January 17, 2018 | : (1) Periodic 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation on January 17, 2018 | ||
: (2) Service air system on January 22, 2018 | : (2) Service air system on January 22, 2018 | ||
Line 144: | Line 136: | ||
==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | ==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=6}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=6}} | ||
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities: | The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities: | ||
: (1) Notice of Unusual Event declaration due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | : (1) Notice of Unusual Event declaration due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | ||
: (2) Planned maintenance on the | : (2) Planned maintenance on the A isolation condenser on January 9, 2018 | ||
: (3) Planned maintenance on the | : (3) Planned maintenance on the B isolation condenser on January 18, 2018 | ||
: (4) Planned maintenance on core spray system I on February 20, 2018 | : (4) Planned maintenance on core spray system I on February 20, 2018 | ||
: (5) Planned maintenance on core spray system II on March 14, 2018 | : (5) Planned maintenance on core spray system II on March 14, 2018 | ||
Line 154: | Line 147: | ||
==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | ==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=7}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=7}} | ||
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | ||
: (1) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018 | : (1) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018 | ||
: (2) Standby liquid control poison tank low level on January 29, 2018 | : (2) Standby liquid control poison tank low level on January 29, 2018 | ||
: (3) | : (3) B isolation condenser elevated temperatures on February 16, 2018 | ||
: (4) Control rod 34 | : (4) Control rod 34-43 slow five percent scram time on March 5, 2018 | ||
-43 slow five percent scram time on March 5, 2018 | : (5) B isolation condenser lowering shell side level on March 6, 2018 | ||
: (5) | : (6) A isolation condenser steam leak on March 12, 2018 | ||
: (6) | |||
: (7) No. 2 emergency diesel generator elevated lead levels in oil sample on March 15, 2018 | : (7) No. 2 emergency diesel generator elevated lead levels in oil sample on March 15, 2018 | ||
==71111.18 - Plant Modifications== | ==71111.18 - Plant Modifications== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18|count=1}} | ||
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications: | The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications: | ||
Engineering Change 620725, Refuel Bridge Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask | Engineering Change 620725, Refuel Bridge Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask | ||
==71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing== | ==71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19|count=8}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated post maintenance testing for the following maintenance/repair activities: | |||
: | : (1) A recirculation pump relay replacement on January 22, 2018 | ||
: (1) | : (2) B isolation condenser valve, V-14-37, following valve repair on February 13, 2018 | ||
: (2) | : (3) A core spray pump relay replacement on February 20, 2018 | ||
: (3) | : (4) Average power range monitor 7 restoration to an operable condition on February 22, 2018 | ||
: (4) Average power range monitor 7 restoration to an operable condition on February | : (5) B isolation condenser remote shutdown panel level indication following emergent inoperability on February 22, 2018 | ||
: (5) | |||
: (6) Main generator exciter direct current (DC) brush inspection and replacement on March 1, 2018 | : (6) Main generator exciter direct current (DC) brush inspection and replacement on March 1, 2018 | ||
: (7) 1-8 sump control logic following fuse replacement on March 27, 2018 | : (7) 1-8 sump control logic following fuse replacement on March 27, 2018 | ||
: (8) No. 2 emergency diesel generator following biannual overhaul on March 28, 2018 | : (8) No. 2 emergency diesel generator following biannual overhaul on March 28, 2018 | ||
==71111.22 - Surveillance Testing | ==71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=6}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: | |||
: (1) 636.4.013, Diesel Generator 2 Load Test on January 3, 2018 | : (1) 636.4.013, Diesel Generator 2 Load Test on January 3, 2018 | ||
: (2) 609.3.003, Isolation Condenser Automatic Actuation Sensor Calibration and Test on January 18, 2018 | : (2) 609.3.003, Isolation Condenser Automatic Actuation Sensor Calibration and Test on January 18, 2018 | ||
Line 191: | Line 183: | ||
: (4) 604.3.001, Reactor Building to Torus Power Vacuum Breaker Test and Calibration on February 8, 2018 | : (4) 604.3.001, Reactor Building to Torus Power Vacuum Breaker Test and Calibration on February 8, 2018 | ||
: (5) 602.3.004, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration on March 6, 2018 | : (5) 602.3.004, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration on March 6, 2018 | ||
: (6) 651.4.003, Standby Gas Treatment System 15 | : (6) 651.4.003, Standby Gas Treatment System 15-minute Run - System 2 on | ||
-minute Run | |||
- System 2 on March 17, | ===March 17, 2018 Inservice (2 Samples)=== | ||
: (1) 612.4.001, | : (1) 612.4.001, A Standby Liquid Control Pump and Valve Operability and In-service Test on January 9, 2018 | ||
-service Test on January 9, 2018 | : (2) 610.4.003, Core Spray Valve Operability and In-Service Test on March 12, 2018 | ||
: (2) 610.4.003, Core Spray Valve Operability and In | |||
-Service Test on March 12, 2018 | |||
==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation== | ==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Emergency Planning Drill== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency planning drill on | |||
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency planning drill on March 13, 2018. Drill/Training Evolution (1 Sample) | |||
===March 13, 2018. | |||
Drill/Training Evolution (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 23, | |||
==RADIATION SAFETY== | |||
==71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation== | ==71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation Radioactive Material Storage== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71124.08|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings and controls and that Exelon had established a process for monitoring the impact of long-term storage of the waste. | |||
The inspectors observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings and controls and that Exelon had established a process for monitoring the impact of long | |||
-term storage of the waste. | |||
===Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (1 Sample)=== | ===Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors walked down the following: | The inspectors walked down the following: | ||
Accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to | * Accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to verify current system alignment and material condition | ||
The inspectors identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult | * Abandoned in place radioactive waste processing equipment to review the controls in place to ensure protection of personnel | ||
-to-measure radionuclides. | * Changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems since the last inspection | ||
* Processes for mixing and transferring radioactive waste resin and/or sludge discharges into shipping/disposal containers | |||
* Current methods and procedures for dewatering waste | |||
===Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides. | |||
Shipment Preparations (1 Sample) | ===Shipment Preparations (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping papers provided to the driver, and | The inspectors reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping papers provided to the driver, and Exelons verification of shipment readiness. | ||
===Shipment Records (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors reviewed selected non-excepted package shipment records. | |||
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | |||
==71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors reviewed Exelons implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues: | |||
No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Ring Lug Failure | |||
== | ===71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Events === | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71153|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated response to the following events: | |||
Notice of Usual Event due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | |||
===Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following LERs which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx: | |||
LER 05000219/2017-005-00 and -01, Failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator #2, During Surveillance Testing due to a Broken Electrical Connector, on February 14, | |||
==INSPECTION RESULTS== | ==INSPECTION RESULTS== | ||
Enforcement | Enforcement Enforcement Action (EA)-18-007: No. 2 Emergency Diesel 71152 Discretion Generator Ring Lug Failure | ||
=====Description:===== | =====Description:===== | ||
On October 9, 2017, during a routine surveillance load test, the No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed approximately 5 minutes into the run due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer. Laboratory analysis of the broken ring lug determined that the ring lug failed due to fatigue cracking that was initiated due to stresses caused by bending and twisting of the electrical lug. Exelon last conducted a load surveillance on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator on September 25, 2017. | On October 9, 2017, during a routine surveillance load test, the No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed approximately 5 minutes into the run due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer. Laboratory analysis of the broken ring lug determined that the ring lug failed due to fatigue cracking that was initiated due to stresses caused by bending and twisting of the electrical lug. Exelon last conducted a load surveillance on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator on September 25, 2017. | ||
Corrective Actions: | Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included replacement on the broken ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, extent of condition inspections on the No. 1 and No. 2 emergency diesel generators for additional bent or twisted ring lug connectors, and revision to the electrical ring lug installation and emergency diesel generator procedures to include inspection for bent or twisted ring lugs. | ||
Corrective Action Reference(s): | Corrective Action Reference(s): Issue report 4060815 | ||
=====Enforcement:===== | |||
Violation: Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days. | |||
Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2017, it was recognized that one diesel generator was inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, and Oyster Creek continued power operation. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed to run during a routine surveillance test due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer, which resulted in a total inoperability time of 6.5 months. | Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2017, it was recognized that one diesel generator was inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, and Oyster Creek continued power operation. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed to run during a routine surveillance test due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer, which resulted in a total inoperability time of 6.5 months. | ||
Severity/Significance: | Severity/Significance: For violations warranting enforcement discretion, Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 does not require a detailed risk evaluation, however, safety significance characterization is appropriate. A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a best estimate analysis of the safety significance using the Oyster Creek Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, Version 8.50 and Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). The evaluation estimated the total (internal and external events risk) increase in core damage frequency (CDF) to be in the mid to high E-6/yr range, or a low to moderate safety significance. The SRA evaluated the internal events risk contribution due to the inoperability of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator for an approximate 6.5 month exposure time. The exposure time relative to when the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was no longer capable of meeting its 24 hour mission time is uncertain due to the effect of vibration induced fatigue, and therefore the method prescribed within the RASP handbook guidance was used. | ||
-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). The evaluation estimated the total (internal and external events risk) increase in core damage frequency (CDF) to be in the mid to high E-6/yr range, or a low to moderate safety significance. The SRA evaluated the internal events risk contribution due to the inoperability of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator for an approximate 6.5 month exposure time. The exposure time relative to when the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was no longer capable of meeting its 24 hour mission time is uncertain due to the effect of vibration induced fatigue, and therefore the method prescribed within the RASP handbook guidance was used. | |||
The analyst used the guidance in Section 2.5 of the Handbook, Revision 2.0, to estimate the exposure time of 6.5 months based on the cumulative 24 hour summation of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator surveillance test proven run time. This approach is appropriate for periodically operated components that degrade during operation (i.e. vibration induced fatigue only occurs while the emergency diesel generator is in | The analyst used the guidance in Section 2.5 of the Handbook, Revision 2.0, to estimate the exposure time of 6.5 months based on the cumulative 24 hour summation of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator surveillance test proven run time. This approach is appropriate for periodically operated components that degrade during operation (i.e. vibration induced fatigue only occurs while the emergency diesel generator is in-service/operating). Given this approach, the dominant internal events, loss of offsite power were evaluated for the estimated internal risk increase. This contribution was estimated at 2E-6/yr increase in CDF. The dominant sequences involved loss of offsite power events with a concurrent failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator, failure of the combustion turbines, and failure to recover offsite power or recover an emergency diesel generator prior to core damage. | ||
-service/operating). Given this approach, the dominant internal events, loss of offsite power were evaluated for the estimated internal risk increase. This contribution was estimated at 2E | |||
-6/yr increase in CDF. The dominant sequences involved loss of offsite power events with a concurrent failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator, failure of the combustion turbines, and failure to recover offsite power or recover an emergency diesel generator prior to core damage. | |||
The SRA performed various modeling changes after a review of revised calculations for DC battery life: | The SRA performed various modeling changes after a review of revised calculations for DC battery life: | ||
Analysis noted that Oyster Creek Generating Station recirculation pump seals are similar in design to those tested in reports generated for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 with the use of CAN2A seals. Therefore, the failure probability of the seals in the station blackout sequence was adjusted from 0.1 to 5E | Analysis noted that Oyster Creek Generating Station recirculation pump seals are similar in design to those tested in reports generated for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 with the use of CAN2A seals. Therefore, the failure probability of the seals in the station blackout sequence was adjusted from 0.1 to 5E-2 similar to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 SPAR model 8.50. | ||
-2 similar to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 SPAR model 8.50. | |||
The failure to load shed action (DCP | The failure to load shed action (DCP-XHE-XM-LSHED) in the model was calculated using the SPAR-H method and revised to 1.2E-2 versus being assumed to always fail (TRUE). | ||
-XHE-XM-LSHED) in the model was calculated using the SPAR-H method and revised to 1.2E | * Failure probabilities for 1, 2, or 3 stuck open electromatic relief valves were revised to be consistent with the previous model version 8.22 because of the isolation condenser design at Oyster Creek Generating Station which limits cycling and significantly reduces the probability of a failed open electromatic relief valve due to isolation condensers controlling pressure. | ||
-2 versus being assumed to always fail (TRUE). | * The depressurization function using electromatic relief valves, if required, was calculated through SPAR-H to be 1E-2 for sequences where total seal failure is assumed (DEPSEALFAIL) (conservatively assumed limited time available). | ||
* The diesel driven firewater pumps are both available and were set to calculated fault tree failure probabilities instead of always failed in the previous model. These are 2,000 gallons per minute pumps with a large supply of water and relatively simple operator actions to inject to the reactor pressure vessel. The firewater was assumed to fail at 0.1 when a total recirculation seal failure occurs due to assumed time constraints. | |||
* The offsite power and the emergency diesel generator required recovery time events were increased to 24 hours for events where DC load shedding was successful, without seal failures and isolation condenser success along with diesel driven firewater success. | |||
The SRA noted the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was recoverable. In fact, the diagnosis of the failed condition was performed in a nominal 8-10 hours from the failure. Therefore, a probability of failure to recover event for the conditional case was developed. The SRA used SPAR-H as simple guidance, which conservatively supported a reasonable assumption of a 0.10 conditional probability of failure to recover the emergency diesel generator within 24 hours. The base case utilized a calculation within SPAR of 0.33 failure to recover probability for 24 hour sequences. | |||
To estimate the external risk contribution, the SRA identified that the most significant external risk contribution was from fire events. Seismic, external flooding, and high wind events were not significant contributors for the issue. | |||
From discussions with Oyster Creek Fire probabilistic risk analysts and a review of this failure condition, the increase in CDF due to the failed No. 2 emergency diesel generator for the assumed 6.5 month exposure time was estimated at 4.5E-6/yr [(8.5E-5/yr-4.5E-5/yr) x (6.5/12 months) x 0.2]. | |||
- | The DC safety-related battery life would be at least a nominal 14 hours and longer if DC bus stripping occurred, this allows for extended isolation condenser or electromatic relief valve function, with injection from diesel driven firewater. Given the time considerations and characteristics of the failure, an assumed recovery at a failure probability of 0.2 (slightly higher than internal due to less time) was applied for the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, which was a best estimate determined through SPAR-H insights. The dominant fire sequence was a fire affecting the A and B 4kV switchgear rooms, where combustion turbine support would be lost, with failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator breaker to close, and failure of locally operating the isolation condenser due to eventual loss of power. The SRA noted that FLEX credit was not quantified and would result in a lower risk estimation likely in the low E-6/yr range. Combining internal and external risk contributions, the total increase in CDF was 6.5E-6/yr, or low to moderate safety significance. The SRA determined that Exelon uses a Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) factor value of 8E-2. This value takes into consideration operator action for those relevant high pressure vessel breach scenarios (fuel-coolant interaction, liner-melt-through, and direct containment heating). This also credits procedure strategies where other mitigating actions are taken such as flooding the drywell. | ||
The SRA review of the dominant sequences and time to core damage affirmed that LERF did not increase the risk over that determined from the increase in CDF. | |||
Basis for Discretion: The inspectors determined that the ring lug failure was not within Exelons ability to foresee and prevent. As a result, no performance deficiency was identified. | |||
The inspectors assessment considered: | |||
1. Exelons review of emergency diesel maintenance performed in 2015 checked all connections of the current transformer for tightness. The inspectors did not identify any gaps or deficiencies in the 2015 inspections. Inspectors also reviewed completed biennial inspections of the connection dating back to 1991 and did not identify any gaps. | |||
2. At the time of the failure, the current transformer connections did not have a time directed replacement frequency recommended by the Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group. The inspectors did not identify any additional vendor or industry recommendations specific to the failed component or considerations specific to the failed component that existed prior to the failure. | |||
3. Industry operating experience information available to Exelon did not identify the potential for the fatigue cracking of the bent wire ring lug that was experienced. | 3. Industry operating experience information available to Exelon did not identify the potential for the fatigue cracking of the bent wire ring lug that was experienced. | ||
4. The bent ring lug failure was not the result of a failure on the part of Exelon staff; no standards existed on bending of the lug during installation and is considered | 4. The bent ring lug failure was not the result of a failure on the part of Exelon staff; no standards existed on bending of the lug during installation and is considered skill of the craft. | ||
The NRC determined that it was not reasonable for Exelon to have been able to foresee and prevent this violation of NRC requirements, and as such, no performance deficiency existed. | |||
Therefore, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Sections 2.2.4 and 3.10 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement action for the violation of technical specifications (EA-18-007). Further, because Exelons actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment process or the NRC Action Matrix. | |||
Observation 71152 | Observation 71152 Exelons equipment corrective action program evaluation report (ECAPE) determined that the ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug beyond limits specified in industry guidelines. The inspectors noted that the ECAPE did not provide supporting information regarding how the ring lug was bent and twisted beyond industry guidelines. Specifically, industry guidance states that ring lugs can be bent up to 90 degrees. | ||
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect | The broken ring lug found in the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was bent at approximately 45-55 degrees per the ECAPE, which was within industry guidelines. Additionally, the ECAPE did not include specific guidance on twisting allowances for ring lugs. Exelon documented the inspectors observation in Issue Report 4089829. As a result of the inspectors observation, Exelon revised the ECAPE to say the ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug. | ||
-01 Opened/Closed | |||
-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018. | Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153 05000219/2018001-01 Opened/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. | ||
Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018. | |||
=====Description:===== | =====Description:===== | ||
On October 9, 2017, the No. 2 emergency diesel was operated for its bi | On October 9, 2017, the No. 2 emergency diesel was operated for its bi-weekly load surveillance. Approximately five minutes into the run, the main control room received LKOUT RELAY TRIP and EDG 2 DISABLED alarms. Following an automatic shutdown of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, Exelon staff discovered a ring lug of a current transformer had broken. The last time the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was operated for its bi-weekly load surveillance was on September 25, 2017. Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2 states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days. | ||
-weekly load surveillance. Approximately five minutes into the run, the main control room received | |||
-weekly load surveillance was on September 25, 2017. Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2 states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days. Details regarding the broken lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator can be found in Section 71152. | Details regarding the broken lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator can be found in Section 71152. | ||
On December 9, 2017, the inspectors identified that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, which is reportable to the NRC. 10 CFR 50.73 states, in part, that the licensee shall report any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Exelon had not submitted an LER within the 60 day requirement because they did not consider the inoperable No. 2 emergency diesel generator as an event that required an LER as specified in 10 CFR 50.73. | |||
Corrective Action(s): Exelon submitted the required LER on January 3, 2018. | |||
Corrective Action | Corrective Action Reference: Issue Report 4092328 | ||
=====Performance Assessment:===== | |||
__________________________________________________________________________ | |||
Performance Deficiency: | Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to report a condition which is prohibited by technical specifications within the time frame required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) was a performance deficiency. | ||
Screening: | Screening: Traditional enforcement applies because a failure to report an event in a timely manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. | ||
Significance: | Significance: The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation consistent with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | ||
Cross-Cutting Aspect | Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because it was screened under the traditional enforcement process. | ||
: | |||
Enforcement | =====Enforcement:===== | ||
Severity: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately determine non-compliance. | |||
The inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV, which is a more than minor violation, which is a concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence. The untimely LER was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NRC. | The inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV, which is a more than minor violation, which is a concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence. The untimely LER was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NRC. | ||
Violation: | Violation: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) requires, in part, that a licensee submit an LER for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event. | ||
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Contrary to the above, on December 9, 2017, Exelon failed to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days. This event occurred on October 9, 2017, and Exelon submitted the LER on January 3, 2018, which exceeded the 10 CFR 50.73(a)(11) 60 day requirement. | |||
Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program in issue report 4092328. | |||
Enforcement Action(s): | Enforcement Action(s): This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | ||
-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | |||
==EXIT | ==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | ||
Inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | Inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | ||
* On February 9, 2018, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. Michael Gillin, Plant Manager, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. | |||
* On April 4, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. | |||
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | |||
71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection | 71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection | ||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
ABN 18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7 | ABN 18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7 | ||
ABN-31, High Winds, Revision 21 | ABN-31, High Winds, Revision 21 | ||
ABN 32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision | ABN 32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision 30 | ||
OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 16 | OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 16 | ||
OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 38 | OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 38 | ||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
4110580 | 4110580 | ||
Drawings GE 885D781 | 71111.04: Equipment Alignment | ||
Sh.1, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 76 | Drawings | ||
GE | GE 885D781 Sh.1, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 76 | ||
GE 148F262 Sh.1, Emergency Condenser Flow Diagram, Revision 56 | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
1619946 4102875 4108748 4108767 4109454 | 1619946 4102875 4108748 4108767 4109454 | ||
71111.05: Fire Protection | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 73 | 101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 73 | ||
ABN 29, Plant Fires, Revision 32 | ABN 29, Plant Fires, Revision 32 | ||
ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification, Revision 4 | ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification, Revision 4 | ||
OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre | OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre-fire Plans, Revision 26 | ||
-fire Plans, Revision 26 | |||
OP-OC-201-012-1001, On-line Fire Risk Management, Revision 4 | OP-OC-201-012-1001, On-line Fire Risk Management, Revision 4 | ||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
3971381 4059012 | 3971381 4059012 | ||
71111.06: Flood Protection Measures | |||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | ||
OP-PSA-012, Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, dated May 2014 | OP-PSA-012, Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, dated May 2014 | ||
Line 367: | Line 370: | ||
71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program | 71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program | ||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
EP-AA-1010, Addendum 3, Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Levels for Oyster Creek Station, Revision 2 | EP-AA-1010, Addendum 3, Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Levels for Oyster Creek Station, | ||
Revision 2 | |||
71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness | 71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness | ||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 11 | ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 11 | ||
ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule | ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring, Revision 14 | ||
- Performance Monitoring, Revision 14 | ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7 | ||
ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule | |||
- Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7 | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
0516160 0648480 0687240 1501306 1514742 2472912 | 0516160 0648480 0687240 1501306 1514742 2472912 | ||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment from July 1, 2015 - June 30, 2017, dated November 29, 2017 | 23130 2536453 2537005 2572740 2625933 2629443 | ||
29982 2637292 2643485 2643486 2702946 2714199 | |||
2715226 2719824 3949214 3952496 4060818 4069654 | |||
4089360 4089390 4109343 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment from | |||
July 1, 2015 - June 30, 2017, dated November 29, 2017 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
4345665 4345669 4345671 4345673 | 4345665 4345669 4345671 4345673 | ||
71111.15: Operability Evaluations | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
4111295 4111496 4111518 4111506 | 4111295 4111496 4111518 4111506 | ||
71111.18: Plant Modifications | |||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | ||
EC 620725, Refuel Bridge PLC Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask, dated February 23, 2018 | EC 620725, Refuel Bridge PLC Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask, | ||
71111.19: | dated February 23, 2018 | ||
71111.19: Post-Maintenance Testing | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
4070270 4103389 4104381 4106951 4107367 4110560 | 4070270 4103389 4104381 4106951 4107367 4110560 | ||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
4745244 4745324 4745979 4748691 | |||
71124.08: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, | |||
Storage, and Transportation | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
RW-AA-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 12 | RW-AA-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 12 | ||
Line 395: | Line 408: | ||
RP-AA-600-1001, Exclusive Use and Emergency Response Information, Revision 9 | RP-AA-600-1001, Exclusive Use and Emergency Response Information, Revision 9 | ||
RP-AA-600-1005, Radioactive Material and Non Disposal Site Waste Shipments, Revision 19 | RP-AA-600-1005, Radioactive Material and Non Disposal Site Waste Shipments, Revision 19 | ||
RP-AA-600-1006, Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste (Category 1 RAMQC), Revision 11 | RP-AA-600-1006, Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste | ||
RP-AA-600-1009, Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste (Category 2 RAMQC), Revision 2 | (Category 1 RAMQC), Revision 11 | ||
RP-AA-600-1010, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Creating Containers, Samples, Waste Streams and Waste Types, Revision 2 | RP-AA-600-1009, Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste | ||
RP-AA-600-1011, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Gross Gamma Characterization and Generation of Shipping Paperwork, Revision 4 | (Category 2 RAMQC), Revision 2 | ||
RP-AA-600-1010, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Creating Containers, Samples, | |||
Waste Streams and Waste Types, Revision 2 | |||
RP-AA-600-1011, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Gross Gamma Characterization and | |||
Generation of Shipping Paperwork, Revision 4 | |||
RP-AA-601, Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | RP-AA-601, Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | ||
RP-AA-602, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | RP-AA-602, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | ||
Line 404: | Line 421: | ||
RP-AA-603, Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 10 | RP-AA-603, Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 10 | ||
RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 7 | RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 7 | ||
Quality Assurance | Quality Assurance | ||
NOSA-OYS-16-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report | NOSA-OYS-16-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report | ||
NOSA-OYS-17-06, Radiation Protection Audit Report | NOSA-OYS-17-06, Radiation Protection Audit Report | ||
Fleet Assessment T | Fleet Assessment T-18 Assessment Report, October 2016 | ||
-18 Assessment Report, October 2016 | Fleet Assessment T-6 Assessment Report, September 2017 | ||
Fleet Assessment T | Fleet Assessment Mid-Cycle Assessment Report, March 2017 | ||
-6 Assessment Report, September 2017 | |||
Fleet Assessment Mid | |||
-Cycle Assessment Report, March 2017 | |||
CFR Part 61 Scaling Factors | CFR Part 61 Scaling Factors | ||
Dry Active Waste | Dry Active Waste, Bead Resin, Sludge, CLW Composite, Cartridge Filters | ||
, Bead Resin | |||
, Sludge , CLW Composite | |||
, Cartridge Filters | |||
2016-2017 10 CFR 61 Waste Stream Analysis, December 2016 | 2016-2017 10 CFR 61 Waste Stream Analysis, December 2016 | ||
Assignment Reports | Assignment Reports | ||
23501 2620554 2608094 | 23501 2620554 2608094 | ||
NRWSHP-1000, DOT/79 | Training | ||
-19 Training for Support of Radioactive and Asbestos Shipments, Revision 4 | HAZSEC, DOT Security Awareness and Transportation Security Plan, Revision 1 | ||
Shipments OC-3001-16 OC-4003-16 OC-3001-17 OC-3002-17 OC-3003-17 | NRWSHP-1000, DOT/79-19 Training for Support of Radioactive and Asbestos Shipments, | ||
Revision 4 | |||
Shipments | |||
OC-3001-16 OC-4003-16 OC-3001-17 OC-3002-17 OC-3003-17 | |||
71152: Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 6 | PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 6 | ||
PI-AA-125-1006, Investigation Techniques Manual, Revision 3 | PI-AA-125-1006, Investigation Techniques Manual, Revision 3 | ||
MA-AA-726-620, Installation Instructions for 0 | MA-AA-726-620, Installation Instructions for 0-600 Volt EQ Related Splices, Revision 6 | ||
-600 Volt EQ Related Splices, Revision 6 | MA-OC-741-101, Diesel Generator Inspection (24 Month) - Electrical, Revision 15 | ||
MA-OC-741-101, Diesel Generator Inspection (24 Month) | |||
- Electrical, Revision 15 | |||
NO-AA-300-1001, Nuclear Oversight Independent Inspection Plan, Revision 10 | NO-AA-300-1001, Nuclear Oversight Independent Inspection Plan, Revision 10 | ||
2400-GME-3780.52, Installation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable, Revision 6 | 2400-GME-3780.52, Installation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable, Revision 6 | ||
2400-SME-3780.03, Electrical Termination Taping and Raychem Splicing, Revision 16 | 2400-SME-3780.03, Electrical Termination Taping and Raychem Splicing, Revision 16 | ||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
R2239604 R2230340 R2229008 R2207589 R2191838 R2190504 | |||
R2151723 R2111307 R2032680 R2065956 R0808797 R0522916 | |||
R0504310 R0055415 R0041081 R0029109 4695984 4695269 | |||
4697086 4694906 | |||
Issue Reports | |||
4060815 4089829 1436376 4061089 4073377 4060815 | |||
4060818 4061527 4061931 4066706 4061093 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
ES-023, Selection and Sizing of Power, Lighting and Control Cables, Revision 2 | ES-023, Selection and Sizing of Power, Lighting and Control Cables, Revision 2 | ||
SP-9000-31-213, Class 1E, Electric Cable for Power, Control & Instrumentation, Revision 9 | SP-9000-31-213, Class 1E, Electric Cable for Power, Control & Instrumentation, Revision 9 | ||
SP-9000-41-005, Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek, Revision 3 | SP-9000-41-005, Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek, Revision 3 | ||
71153: Follow | 71153: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | ||
-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | Issue Reports | ||
4091183 4091037 4091010 4090950 4090920 4090820 | |||
4090803 4091287 4091455 | |||
UNITED STATES | UNITED STATES | ||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100 | REGION I | ||
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA | 2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100 | ||
-2713 May 8, 2018 | KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 | ||
EA-18-007 | May 8, 2018 | ||
EA-18-007 | |||
Mr. Bryan Hanson | |||
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Co., LLC | Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Co., LLC | ||
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear | President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear | ||
4300 Winfield Road | 4300 Winfield Road | ||
Warrenville, IL | Warrenville, IL 60555 | ||
SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION | |||
REPORT 05000219/2018001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION | |||
Dear Mr. Hanson: | |||
Dear Mr. Hanson: | On March 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection | ||
. On April 4 , | at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. On April 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed | ||
NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level | the results of this inspection with Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of | ||
IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section | your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | ||
2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. | NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The | ||
In addition, the NRC reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000219 | NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of | ||
/2017-005-00, which described the circumstances associated with a failed electrical ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator. It was recognized that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a period of time that exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days detailed in Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b, and therefore, is a violation of technical specifications. Regional staff performed a risk evaluation and determined the issue was of low to moderate safety significance (White). | the Enforcement Policy. | ||
Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the electrical ring lug failure which caused the No. 2 emergency diesel generator to be inoperable was not within | In addition, the NRC reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000219/2017-005-00, which described | ||
maintenance and testing recommendations, and | the circumstances associated with a failed electrical ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel | ||
Based on the results of the | generator. It was recognized that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a | ||
period of time that exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days detailed in Technical | |||
B. Hanson 2 | Specification 3.7.C.2.b, and therefore, is a violation of technical specifications. Regional staff | ||
non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 | performed a risk evaluation and determined the issue was of low to moderate safety | ||
significance (White). | |||
Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the | |||
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. | electrical ring lug failure which caused the No. 2 emergency diesel generator to be inoperable | ||
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | was not within Exelons ability to reasonably foresee and correct. As a result, the NRC did not | ||
-rm/adams.html | identify a performance deficiency associated with this condition. The NRCs assessment | ||
and the | considered Exelons maintenance practices, industry operating experience, vendor and industry | ||
maintenance and testing recommendations, and Exelons corrective actions to prevent | |||
recurrence of the issue. | |||
Sincerely, | Based on the results of the NRCs inspection and assessment, I have been authorized, after | ||
: [[contact::L. Pelton ]], Director Division of Reactor Projects | consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in | ||
Docket Number: | accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.4, Exceptions to Using Only the | ||
Operating Reactor Assessment Program, and Section 3.10, Reactor Violations with No | |||
Performance Deficiency. The Region I Regional Administrator was also consulted regarding | |||
enforcement discretion for this issue. | |||
B. Hanson 2 | |||
If you contest the non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days | |||
of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear | |||
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with | |||
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC | |||
Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. | |||
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection | |||
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document | |||
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 2.390, | |||
Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | |||
Sincerely, | |||
/RA/ | |||
David | |||
: [[contact::L. Pelton]], Director | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket Number: 50-219 | |||
License Number: DPR-16 | |||
Enclosure: | |||
Inspection Report 05000219/2018001 | Inspection Report 05000219/2018001 | ||
cc w/encl: | cc w/encl: | ||
Distribution via ListServ | Distribution via ListServ | ||
ML18128A232 | |||
SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available | |||
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available | |||
OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP | |||
NAME EAndrews SShaffer MYoung DLPelton | |||
DATE 04/26/18 04/26/18 05/08/18 05/07/18 | |||
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
Inspection Report | Inspection Report | ||
Docket Number: | Docket Number: 50-219 | ||
Enterprise Identifier: | License Number: DPR-16 | ||
I- | Report Number: 05000219/2018001 | ||
Facility: | Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-001-0078 | ||
Location: | Licensee: Exelon Nuclear | ||
Inspection Dates: | Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station | ||
Inspectors: | Location: Forked River, New Jersey | ||
Inspection Dates: January 1, 2018 to March 31, 2018 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
: [[contact::A. Patel]], Senior Resident Inspector | : [[contact::A. Patel]], Senior Resident Inspector | ||
: [[contact::E. Andrews]], Resident Inspector | : [[contact::E. Andrews]], Resident Inspector | ||
: [[contact::F. Arner]], Senior Reactor Analyst | : [[contact::F. Arner]], Senior Reactor Analyst | ||
: [[contact::J. Furia]], Senior Health Physicist | : [[contact::J. Furia]], Senior Health Physicist | ||
: [[contact::J. Kulp]], Senior Reactor Inspector | : [[contact::J. Kulp]], Senior Reactor Inspector | ||
: [[contact::J. Schoppy]], Senior Reactor Inspector | : [[contact::J. Schoppy]], Senior Reactor Inspector | ||
Approved By: | Approved By: David | ||
David | |||
: [[contact::L. Pelton]], Director | : [[contact::L. Pelton]], Director | ||
Division of Reactor Projects | Division of Reactor Projects | ||
SUMMARY | SUMMARY | ||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelons performance at | |||
by conducting the baseline inspections described in this report | Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station by conducting the baseline inspections described in | ||
in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the | this report in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process | ||
for more information. | is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. | ||
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC | |||
identified and self-revealing findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the | |||
table below. | |||
List of Findings and Violations | List of Findings and Violations | ||
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator | Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 | ||
Cornerstone | Emergency Diesel Generator | ||
Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect | Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report | ||
Severity Level IV, NCV | Aspect Section | ||
05000219/2018001 | Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153 | ||
-01 Closed | 05000219/2018001-01 | ||
Closed | |||
-cited, Severity IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring | The inspectors identified a non-cited, Severity IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to | ||
submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a | |||
report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel | |||
generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a | |||
condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event | |||
until January 3, 2018. | |||
Additional Tracking Items | Additional Tracking Items | ||
Type Issue Number Title Report Section | Type Issue Number Title Report Status | ||
Section | |||
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2018, operators lowered power to 70 percent due to low intake levels. Operators returned the unit to | LER 05000219/2017-005-00 No. 2 emergency diesel 71153 Closed | ||
100 percent on January 8, 2018. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period | generator inoperable | ||
PLANT STATUS | |||
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2018, operators | |||
http://www.nrc.gov/reading | lowered power to 70 percent due to low intake levels. Operators returned the unit to | ||
-rm/doc-collections/insp | 100 percent on January 8, 2018. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the | ||
-manual/inspection | remainder of the inspection period. | ||
-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, | INSPECTION SCOPES | ||
-Water Reactor Inspection Program | Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in | ||
- Operations Phase. | effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with | ||
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at | |||
The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, | http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. | ||
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection | |||
activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor | |||
Inspection Program - Operations Phase. | |||
The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, | |||
Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and | |||
Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, | |||
and interviewed personnel to assess licensees performance and compliance with Commission | |||
rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | |||
REACTOR SAFETY | REACTOR SAFETY | ||
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection | 71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection | ||
Impending Severe Weather | Impending Severe Weather (2 Samples) | ||
The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for a blizzard | |||
a blizzard warning issued on January 4, 2018 | warning issued on January 4, 2018, and for low intake levels on January 6, 2018. | ||
, and for low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | External Flooding (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors evaluated protection from external flooding prior to and during high winds | |||
and heavy rain on March 2, 2018. | |||
The inspectors evaluated protection from external flooding prior to and during | |||
high winds and heavy rain on March 2, 2018. | |||
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment | 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment | ||
Partial Walkdown | Partial Walkdown (6 Samples) | ||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following | |||
systems/trains: | |||
(1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator while No. 2 emergency diesel generator was | |||
emergency diesel generator was inoperable on January 3, 2018 | inoperable on January 3, 2018 | ||
(2) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018 | |||
(3) A isolation condenser during emergent unavailability of the B isolation condenser on | |||
February 12, 2018 | |||
(4) Core spray system II during planned unavailability of core spray system I on | |||
February 20, 2018 | |||
evaluated system | (5) B isolation condenser during shell side makeup on March 5, 2018 | ||
(6) B isolation condenser during emergent work on A isolation condenser on | |||
March 12, 2018 | |||
on February 15 | Complete Walkdown (1 Sample) | ||
-16, 2018. | The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the standby | ||
71111.05Q | liquid control system on February 15-16, 2018. | ||
- Fire Protection Quarterly | 71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly | ||
Quarterly Inspection | Quarterly Inspection (9 Samples) | ||
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected | |||
areas: | |||
(1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018 | |||
(2) No. 2 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018 | |||
(3) Reactor building 95 elevation on February 21, 2018 | |||
(4) Reactor building 75 elevation on February 21, 2018 | |||
(5) Reactor building 23 elevation on February 21, 2018 | |||
(6) C 125 VDC battery room on February 28, 2018 | |||
(7) A and B 4kV switchgear room on February 28, 2018 | |||
(8) New cable spreading room on March 1, 2018 | |||
(9) Recirculation pump motor generator set room on March 1, 2018 | |||
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures | 71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures | ||
Internal Flooding | Internal Flooding (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in turbine building | |||
evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections | switchgear area on February 22, 2018. | ||
in turbine building switchgear area on February 22, 2018. | |||
71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance | 71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance | ||
Heat Sink (1 Sample) | Heat Sink (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors evaluated | The inspectors evaluated Exelons monitoring and maintenance of B isolation condenser | ||
on March 5, 2018. 71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance | performance on March 5, 2018. | ||
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance | |||
observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the | Operator Requalification (2 Samples) | ||
on January 23, 2018 | The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator | ||
, and March 13, 2018 | during licensed operator requalification training on January 23, 2018, and March 13, 2018. | ||
Operator Performance (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during the Notice of Unusual Event on | |||
observed licensed operator performance during the Notice of Unusual Event | January 6, 2018. | ||
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (4 Samples) | |||
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness | The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with | ||
the following equipment and/or safety significant functions: | |||
(1) Periodic 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation on January 17, 2018 | |||
(2) Service air system on January 22, 2018 | |||
(3) Start-up transformers on February 21, 2018 | |||
on February 21, 2018 | (4) Reactor recirculation system on March 5, 2018 | ||
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (6 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work | |||
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control | activities: | ||
(1) Notice of Unusual Event declaration due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | |||
(2) Planned maintenance on the A isolation condenser on January 9, 2018 | |||
due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | (3) Planned maintenance on the B isolation condenser on January 18, 2018 | ||
(4) Planned maintenance on core spray system I on February 20, 2018 | |||
(5) Planned maintenance on core spray system II on March 14, 2018 | |||
(6) Planned maintenance on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator on March 26, 2018 | |||
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (7 Samples) | |||
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments | The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality | ||
assessments: | |||
(1) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018 | |||
(2) Standby liquid control poison tank low level on January 29, 2018 | |||
(3) B isolation condenser elevated temperatures on February 16, 2018 | |||
(4) Control rod 34-43 slow five percent scram time on March 5, 2018 | |||
-43 slow five percent scram time on March 5, 2018 | (5) B isolation condenser lowering shell side level on March 6, 2018 | ||
(6) A isolation condenser steam leak on March 12, 2018 | |||
(7) No. 2 emergency diesel generator elevated lead levels in oil sample on March 15, 2018 | |||
in oil sample on March 15, 2018 | 71111.18 - Plant Modifications (1 Sample) | ||
71111.18 - Plant Modifications | The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications: | ||
Engineering Change 620725, Refuel Bridge Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel | Engineering Change 620725, Refuel Bridge Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel | ||
from a Cask | from a Cask | ||
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing | 71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing (8 Samples) | ||
The inspectors evaluated post maintenance testing for the following maintenance/repair | |||
post maintenance testing for the following maintenance/repair activities | activities: | ||
(1) A recirculation pump relay replacement on January 22, 2018 | |||
(2) B isolation condenser valve, V-14-37, following valve repair on February 13, 2018 | |||
-14-37, following valve repair on February 13, 2018 | (3) A core spray pump relay replacement on February 20, 2018 | ||
(4) Average power range monitor 7 restoration to an operable condition on | |||
February 22, 2018 | |||
February | (5) B isolation condenser remote shutdown panel level indication following emergent | ||
inoperability on February 22, 2018 | |||
(6) Main generator exciter direct current (DC) brush inspection and replacement on | |||
March 1, 2018 | |||
(7) 1-8 sump control logic following fuse replacement on March 27, 2018 | |||
(8) No. 2 emergency diesel generator following biannual overhaul on March 28, 2018 | |||
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing | 71111.22 - Surveillance Testing | ||
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: | The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: | ||
Routine (6 Samples) | Routine (6 Samples) | ||
(1) 636.4.013, Diesel Generator 2 Load Test on January 3, 2018 | |||
(2) 609.3.003, Isolation Condenser Automatic Actuation Sensor Calibration and Test on | |||
January 18, 2018 | |||
(3) 607.4.016, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System I Pump | |||
Operability and Quarterly Inservice Test on January 23, 2018 | |||
(4) 604.3.001, Reactor Building to Torus Power Vacuum Breaker Test and Calibration on | |||
February 8, 2018 | |||
(5) 602.3.004, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration on | |||
March 6, 2018 | March 6, 2018 | ||
(6) 651.4.003, Standby Gas Treatment System 15-minute Run - System 2 on | |||
-minute Run | March 17, 2018 | ||
- System 2 on | Inservice (2 Samples) | ||
March 17, | (1) 612.4.001, A Standby Liquid Control Pump and Valve Operability and In-service Test on | ||
January 9, 2018 | |||
Liquid Control Pump and Valve Operability and In | (2) 610.4.003, Core Spray Valve Operability and In-Service Test on March 12, 2018 | ||
-service Test on January 9, 2018 | |||
-Service Test on March 12, 2018 | |||
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation | 71114.06 - Drill Evaluation | ||
Emergency Planning Drill | Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency planning drill on | |||
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency planning drill on March 13, 2018. Drill/Training Evolution | March 13, 2018. | ||
Drill/Training Evolution (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on | |||
January 23, 2018. | |||
RADIATION SAFETY | |||
Radioactive Material Storage | 71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, | ||
and Transportation | |||
The inspectors | Radioactive Material Storage (1 Sample) | ||
observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings and controls and that Exelon had established a process for monitoring the impact of long | The inspectors observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings | ||
and controls and that Exelon had established a process for monitoring the impact of long- | |||
term storage of the waste. | |||
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (1 Sample) | Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors | The inspectors walked down the following: | ||
walked down the following: | * Accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to verify | ||
Accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to | current system alignment and material condition | ||
* Abandoned in place radioactive waste processing equipment to review the controls | |||
Abandoned in place radioactive waste processing equipment to review | in place to ensure protection of personnel | ||
the controls in place to ensure protection of personnel | * Changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems since the last inspection | ||
Changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems since the last inspection | * Processes for mixing and transferring radioactive waste resin and/or sludge | ||
Processes for mixing and transferring radioactive waste resin and/or sludge discharges into shipping/disposal containers | discharges into shipping/disposal containers | ||
Current methods and procedures for dewatering waste | * Current methods and procedures for dewatering waste | ||
Waste Characterization and Classification | Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample | |||
The inspectors | analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed | ||
identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult | the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure | ||
-to-measure radionuclides. | radionuclides. | ||
Shipment Preparations | Shipment Preparations (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, | |||
The inspectors | marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping | ||
reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping papers provided to the driver, and | papers provided to the driver, and Exelons verification of shipment readiness. | ||
Shipment Records | Shipment Records (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors reviewed selected non-excepted package shipment records. | |||
The inspectors | OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE | ||
reviewed selected non | 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution | ||
-excepted package shipment records. | Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (1 Sample) | ||
OTHER ACTIVITIES | The inspectors reviewed Exelons implementation of its corrective action program related | ||
to the following issues: | |||
Annual Follow | |||
-up of Selected | |||
No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Ring Lug Failure | No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Ring Lug Failure | ||
71153 - Follow-up of Events | 71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | ||
and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | Events (1 Sample) | ||
Events (1 Sample) | The inspectors evaluated response to the following events: | ||
Notice of Usual Event due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018 | |||
Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample) | |||
Licensee Event Reports | The inspectors evaluated the following LERs which can be accessed at | ||
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx: | |||
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx | LER 05000219/2017-005-00 and -01, Failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator #2, | ||
During Surveillance Testing due to a Broken Electrical Connector, on February 14, 2018 | |||
Enforcement | INSPECTION RESULTS | ||
Enforcement Action (EA) | Enforcement Enforcement Action (EA)-18-007: No. 2 Emergency Diesel 71152 | ||
-18-007: | Discretion Generator Ring Lug Failure | ||
Description: On October 9, 2017, during a routine surveillance load test, the No. 2 emergency | |||
Corrective Actions: | diesel generator failed approximately 5 minutes into the run due to a broken ring lug on a | ||
emergency diesel generators for additional bent or twisted ring lug connectors, and revision to the electrical ring lug installation and emergency diesel generator procedures to include inspection for bent or twisted ring lugs. | current transformer. Laboratory analysis of the broken ring lug determined that the ring lug | ||
Corrective Action Reference(s): | failed due to fatigue cracking that was initiated due to stresses caused by bending and | ||
Enforcement | twisting of the electrical lug. Exelon last conducted a load surveillance on the No. 2 | ||
emergency diesel generator on September 25, 2017. | |||
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included replacement on the broken ring lug on the | |||
No. 2 emergency diesel generator, extent of condition inspections on the No. 1 and No. 2 | |||
emergency diesel generators for additional bent or twisted ring lug connectors, and revision to | |||
the electrical ring lug installation and emergency diesel generator procedures to include | |||
inspection for bent or twisted ring lugs. | |||
Corrective Action Reference(s): Issue report 4060815 | |||
Enforcement: | |||
Violation: Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b states, in part, that if one diesel | |||
generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation | |||
for a period not to exceed 7 days. | |||
Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2017, it was recognized that one diesel generator was | Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2017, it was recognized that one diesel generator was | ||
inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, and Oyster Creek continued power operation. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed to run during a routine surveillance test due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer, which resulted in a total inoperability time of 6.5 months. | inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, and | ||
Severity/Significance: | Oyster Creek continued power operation. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, No. 2 emergency | ||
Analysis Programs for Hands | diesel generator failed to run during a routine surveillance test due to a broken ring lug on a | ||
-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). The evaluation estimated the total (internal and external events risk) increase in core damage frequency (CDF) to be in the mid to high | current transformer, which resulted in a total inoperability time of 6.5 months. | ||
E-6/yr range, or a low to moderate safety | Severity/Significance: For violations warranting enforcement discretion, Inspection Manual | ||
significance. The SRA evaluated the internal events risk contribution due to the inoperability of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator for an approximate 6.5 month exposure time. The exposure time relative to when the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was no longer capable of meeting its 24 hour mission time is uncertain due to the effect of vibration induced fatigue, and therefore the method prescribed within the RASP handbook guidance was used. | Chapter 0612 does not require a detailed risk evaluation, however, safety significance | ||
characterization is appropriate. A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a best | |||
The analyst used the guidance in Section 2.5 of the Handbook, Revision 2.0, to estimate the exposure time of 6.5 months based on the cumulative 24 hour summation of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator surveillance test proven run time. This approach is appropriate for periodically operated components that degrade during operation (i.e. vibration induced fatigue only occurs while the emergency diesel generator is in | estimate analysis of the safety significance using the Oyster Creek Standardized Plant | ||
-service/operating). Given this approach, the dominant internal events, loss of offsite power were evaluated for the estimated internal risk increase. This contribution was estimated at 2E | Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, Version 8.50 and Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-On | ||
-6/yr increase in | Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). The evaluation estimated the total (internal and | ||
external events risk) increase in core damage frequency (CDF) to be in the mid to high | |||
The SRA performed various modeling changes after a review of revised calculations for DC battery life: | E-6/yr range, or a low to moderate safety significance. The SRA evaluated the internal events | ||
Analysis noted that Oyster Creek Generating Station recirculation pump seals are similar in design to those tested in reports generated for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 with the use of CAN2A seals. Therefore, the failure probability of the seals in the station blackout sequence was | risk contribution due to the inoperability of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator for an | ||
adjusted from 0.1 to 5E | approximate 6.5 month exposure time. The exposure time relative to when the No. 2 | ||
-2 similar to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 SPAR model 8.50. | emergency diesel generator was no longer capable of meeting its 24 hour mission time is | ||
The failure to load shed action (DCP | uncertain due to the effect of vibration induced fatigue, and therefore the method prescribed | ||
-XHE-XM-LSHED) in the model was calculated using the SPAR-H method and revised to 1.2E | within the RASP handbook guidance was used. | ||
-2 versus being assumed to always fail (TRUE). | The analyst used the guidance in Section 2.5 of the Handbook, Revision 2.0, to estimate the | ||
Failure probabilities for 1, 2, or 3 stuck open electromatic relief valves were revised to be consistent with the previous model version 8.22 because of the isolation condenser design at Oyster Creek Generating Station which limits cycling and significantly reduces the probability of a failed open electromatic relief valve due to isolation condensers controlling pressure. | exposure time of 6.5 months based on the cumulative 24 hour summation of the No. 2 | ||
The depressurization function using electromatic relief valves, if required, was calculated through SPAR | emergency diesel generator surveillance test proven run time. This approach is appropriate | ||
-H to be 1E | for periodically operated components that degrade during operation (i.e. vibration induced | ||
-2 for sequences where total seal failure is assumed (DEPSEALFAIL) (conservatively assumed limited time available). | fatigue only occurs while the emergency diesel generator is in-service/operating). Given this | ||
The diesel driven firewater pumps are both available and were set to calculated fault tree failure probabilities instead of always failed in the previous model. These are 2,000 gallons per minute pumps with a large supply of water and relatively simple operator actions to inject to the reactor pressure vessel. The firewater was assumed to fail at 0.1 when a total recirculation seal failure occurs due to assumed time constraints. The offsite power and the emergency diesel generator required recovery time events were increased to 24 hours for events where DC load shedding was successful, without seal failures and isolation condenser success along with diesel driven firewater success. The SRA noted the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was recoverable. In fact, the diagnosis of the failed condition was performed in a nominal 8 | approach, the dominant internal events, loss of offsite power were evaluated for the estimated | ||
-10 hours from the failure. Therefore, a probability of failure to recover event for the conditional case was developed. The SRA used SPAR-H as simple guidance, which conservatively supported a reasonable assumption of a 0.10 conditional probability of failure to recover the emergency diesel generator within | internal risk increase. This contribution was estimated at 2E-6/yr increase in CDF. The | ||
hours. The base case utilized a calculation within SPAR of 0.33 failure to recover probability for 24 hour sequences. | dominant sequences involved loss of offsite power events with a concurrent failure of the | ||
To estimate the external risk contribution, the SRA identified that the most significant external risk contribution was from fire events. Seismic, external flooding, and high wind events were not significant contributors for the issue. | No. 1 emergency diesel generator, failure of the combustion turbines, and failure to recover | ||
offsite power or recover an emergency diesel generator prior to core damage. | |||
From discussions with Oyster Creek Fire probabilistic risk analysts and a review of this failure condition, the increase in CDF due to the failed No. 2 emergency diesel generator for the assumed 6.5 month exposure time was estimated at 4.5E | The SRA performed various modeling changes after a review of revised calculations for DC | ||
-6/yr [(8.5E | battery life: | ||
-5/yr-4.5E-5/yr) x (6.5/ | Analysis noted that Oyster Creek Generating Station recirculation pump seals are similar in | ||
design to those tested in reports generated for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 with the use of CAN2A | |||
seals. Therefore, the failure probability of the seals in the station blackout sequence was | |||
adjusted from 0.1 to 5E-2 similar to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 SPAR model 8.50. | |||
The failure to load shed action (DCP-XHE-XM-LSHED) in the model was calculated using the | |||
SPAR-H method and revised to 1.2E-2 versus being assumed to always fail (TRUE). | |||
* Failure probabilities for 1, 2, or 3 stuck open electromatic relief valves were revised to | |||
be consistent with the previous model version 8.22 because of the isolation condenser | |||
design at Oyster Creek Generating Station which limits cycling and significantly | |||
reduces the probability of a failed open electromatic relief valve due to isolation | |||
condensers controlling pressure. | |||
* The depressurization function using electromatic relief valves, if required, was | |||
calculated through SPAR-H to be 1E-2 for sequences where total seal failure is | |||
assumed (DEPSEALFAIL) (conservatively assumed limited time available). | |||
* The diesel driven firewater pumps are both available and were set to calculated fault | |||
tree failure probabilities instead of always failed in the previous model. These are | |||
2,000 gallons per minute pumps with a large supply of water and relatively simple | |||
operator actions to inject to the reactor pressure vessel. The firewater was assumed | |||
to fail at 0.1 when a total recirculation seal failure occurs due to assumed time | |||
constraints. | |||
* The offsite power and the emergency diesel generator required recovery time events | |||
were increased to 24 hours for events where DC load shedding was successful, | |||
without seal failures and isolation condenser success along with diesel driven firewater | |||
success. | |||
The SRA noted the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was recoverable. In fact, the diagnosis | |||
of the failed condition was performed in a nominal 8-10 hours from the failure. Therefore, a | |||
probability of failure to recover event for the conditional case was developed. The SRA used | |||
SPAR-H as simple guidance, which conservatively supported a reasonable assumption of a | |||
0.10 conditional probability of failure to recover the emergency diesel generator within | |||
hours. The base case utilized a calculation within SPAR of 0.33 failure to recover | |||
probability for 24 hour sequences. | |||
To estimate the external risk contribution, the SRA identified that the most significant external | |||
risk contribution was from fire events. Seismic, external flooding, and high wind events were | |||
not significant contributors for the issue. | |||
From discussions with Oyster Creek Fire probabilistic risk analysts and a review of this failure | |||
condition, the increase in CDF due to the failed No. 2 emergency diesel generator for the | |||
assumed 6.5 month exposure time was estimated at 4.5E-6/yr [(8.5E-5/yr-4.5E-5/yr) x (6.5/12 | |||
months) x 0.2]. | months) x 0.2]. | ||
The DC safety | The DC safety-related battery life would be at least a nominal 14 hours and longer if DC bus | ||
-related battery life would be at least a nominal 14 hours and longer if DC bus stripping occurred, this allows for extended isolation condenser or electromatic relief valve function, with injection from diesel driven firewater. Given the time considerations and characteristics of the failure, an assumed recovery at a failure probability of 0.2 (slightly higher than internal due to less time) was applied for the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, which was a best estimate determined through SPAR | stripping occurred, this allows for extended isolation condenser or electromatic relief valve | ||
-H insights. The dominant fire sequence was a fire affecting the | function, with injection from diesel driven firewater. Given the time considerations and | ||
estimation likely in the low | characteristics of the failure, an assumed recovery at a failure probability of 0.2 (slightly higher | ||
E-6/yr range. Combining internal and external risk contributions, the total increase in CDF was 6.5E-6/yr, or low to moderate safety significance. The SRA determined that Exelon uses a Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) factor value of 8E | than internal due to less time) was applied for the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, which | ||
-2. This value takes into consideration operator action for those relevant high pressure vessel breach scenarios (fuel-coolant interaction, liner | was a best estimate determined through SPAR-H insights. The dominant fire sequence was a | ||
-melt-through, and direct containment heating). This also credits procedure strategies where other mitigating actions are taken such as flooding the drywell. The SRA review of the dominant sequences and time to core damage affirmed that LERF did not increase the risk over that determined from the increase in | fire affecting the A and B 4kV switchgear rooms, where combustion turbine support would | ||
be lost, with failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator breaker to close, and failure of | |||
Basis for Discretion: | locally operating the isolation condenser due to eventual loss of power. The SRA noted that | ||
1. | FLEX credit was not quantified and would result in a lower risk estimation likely in the low | ||
E-6/yr range. Combining internal and external risk contributions, the total increase in CDF | |||
was 6.5E-6/yr, or low to moderate safety significance. The SRA determined that Exelon uses | |||
a Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) factor value of 8E-2. This value takes into | |||
3. Industry operating experience information available to Exelon did not identify the potential for the fatigue cracking of the bent wire ring lug that was experienced. | consideration operator action for those relevant high pressure vessel breach scenarios | ||
4. The bent ring lug failure was not the result of a failure on the part of Exelon staff; no standards existed on bending of the lug during installation and is considered | (fuel-coolant interaction, liner-melt-through, and direct containment heating). This also credits | ||
The NRC determined that it | procedure strategies where other mitigating actions are taken such as flooding the drywell. | ||
was not reasonable for Exelon to have been able to foresee and prevent this violation of NRC requirements, and as such, no performance deficiency existed. Therefore, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Sections 2.2.4 | The SRA review of the dominant sequences and time to core damage affirmed that LERF did | ||
and 3.10 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement action for the violation of technical specifications (EA | not increase the risk over that determined from the increase in CDF. | ||
-18-007). Further, because | Basis for Discretion: The inspectors determined that the ring lug failure was not within | ||
Exelons ability to foresee and prevent. As a result, no performance deficiency was identified. | |||
Observation | The inspectors assessment considered: | ||
1. Exelons review of emergency diesel maintenance performed in 2015 checked all | |||
45-55 degrees per the ECAPE, which was within industry guidelines. Additionally, the ECAPE did not include specific guidance on twisting allowances for ring lugs. Exelon documented the inspectors | connections of the current transformer for tightness. The inspectors did not identify | ||
Issue Report 4089829. As a result of the inspectors | any gaps or deficiencies in the 2015 inspections. Inspectors also reviewed completed | ||
as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug. | biennial inspections of the connection dating back to 1991 and did not identify any | ||
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator | gaps. | ||
Cornerstone | 2. At the time of the failure, the current transformer connections did not have a time | ||
Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect | directed replacement frequency recommended by the Emergency Diesel Generator | ||
Severity Level IV, NCV | Owners Group. The inspectors did not identify any additional vendor or industry | ||
05000219/2018001 | recommendations specific to the failed component or considerations specific to the | ||
-01 Opened/Closed | failed component that existed prior to the failure. | ||
3. Industry operating experience information available to Exelon did not identify the | |||
potential for the fatigue cracking of the bent wire ring lug that was experienced. | |||
-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018. | 4. The bent ring lug failure was not the result of a failure on the part of Exelon staff; no | ||
Description: | standards existed on bending of the lug during installation and is considered skill of | ||
-weekly load surveillance. Approximately five minutes into the run, the main control room received | the craft. | ||
the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, Exelon staff discovered a ring lug of a current transformer had broken. The last time the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was operated for its bi | The NRC determined that it was not reasonable for Exelon to have been able to foresee and | ||
-weekly load surveillance was on September 25, 2017. Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2 states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days. Details regarding the broken lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator can be found in Section 71152. | prevent this violation of NRC requirements, and as such, no performance deficiency existed. | ||
On December 9, 2017, the inspectors identified that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, which is reportable to the NR | Therefore, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with | ||
: [[contact::C. 10 CFR 50.73 states]], in part, that the licensee shall report any operation or condition which was prohibited by the | Sections 2.2.4 and 3.10 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement | ||
Corrective Action(s): | action for the violation of technical specifications (EA-18-007). Further, because Exelons | ||
Exelon submitted the required LER on January 3, 2018. | actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment process | ||
Corrective Action Reference: | or the NRC Action Matrix. | ||
Observation 71152 | |||
Performance Assessment | Exelons equipment corrective action program evaluation report (ECAPE) determined that the | ||
ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator as a result of fatigue cracking, which | |||
Performance Deficiency: | was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug beyond | ||
limits specified in industry guidelines. The inspectors noted that the ECAPE did not provide | |||
supporting information regarding how the ring lug was bent and twisted beyond industry | |||
guidelines. Specifically, industry guidance states that ring lugs can be bent up to 90 degrees. | |||
The broken ring lug found in the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was bent at approximately | |||
45-55 degrees per the ECAPE, which was within industry guidelines. Additionally, the ECAPE | |||
did not include specific guidance on twisting allowances for ring lugs. Exelon documented the | |||
inspectors observation in Issue Report 4089829. As a result of the inspectors observation, | |||
Exelon revised the ECAPE to say the ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator | |||
as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending | |||
and twisting of the ring lug. | |||
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 | |||
Emergency Diesel Generator | |||
Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report | |||
Aspect Section | |||
Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153 | |||
05000219/2018001-01 | |||
Opened/Closed | |||
The inspectors identified a Severity IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure | |||
to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. | |||
Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel | |||
generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a | |||
condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event | |||
until January 3, 2018. | |||
Description: On October 9, 2017, the No. 2 emergency diesel was operated for its bi-weekly | |||
load surveillance. Approximately five minutes into the run, the main control room received | |||
LKOUT RELAY TRIP and EDG 2 DISABLED alarms. Following an automatic shutdown of | |||
the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, Exelon staff discovered a ring lug of a current | |||
transformer had broken. The last time the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was operated | |||
for its bi-weekly load surveillance was on September 25, 2017. Oyster Creek Technical | |||
Specification 3.7.C.2 states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during | |||
power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days. | |||
Details regarding the broken lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator can be found in | |||
Section 71152. | |||
On December 9, 2017, the inspectors identified that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator | |||
was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, which | |||
is reportable to the NR | |||
: [[contact::C. 10 CFR 50.73 states]], in part, that the licensee shall report any | |||
operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Exelon | |||
had not submitted an LER within the 60 day requirement because they did not consider the | |||
inoperable No. 2 emergency diesel generator as an event that required an LER as specified | |||
in 10 CFR 50.73. | |||
Corrective Action(s): Exelon submitted the required LER on January 3, 2018. | |||
Corrective Action Reference: Issue Report 4092328 | |||
Performance Assessment: | |||
__________________________________________________________________________ | |||
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to report a condition | |||
which is prohibited by technical specifications within the time frame required by 10 CFR | |||
50.73(a)(1) was a performance deficiency. | 50.73(a)(1) was a performance deficiency. | ||
Screening: | Screening: Traditional enforcement applies because a failure to report an event in a timely | ||
Significance: | manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. | ||
Cross-Cutting Aspect | Significance: The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation consistent with | ||
: | Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | ||
Enforcement | Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because it was | ||
screened under the traditional enforcement process. | |||
The inspectors determined that the violation | Enforcement: | ||
was a Severity Level IV, which is a more than minor violation, which is a concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence. The untimely LER was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NR | Severity: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the | ||
regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is | |||
necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using | |||
traditional enforcement to adequately determine non-compliance. | |||
The inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV, which is a more than | |||
minor violation, which is a concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential | |||
safety or security consequence. The untimely LER was not used to make an unacceptable | |||
change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NR | |||
: [[contact::C. | : [[contact::C. | ||
Violation: | Violation: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) requires]], in part, that a licensee submit an LER for any event | ||
CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition prohibited by the | of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event. | ||
Enforcement Action(s): | CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition | ||
-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Contrary to the above, on December 9, | ||
EXIT | 2017, Exelon failed to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery that the No. 2 | ||
emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed | |||
outage time of 7 days. This event occurred on October 9, 2017, and Exelon submitted the | |||
LER on January 3, 2018, which exceeded the 10 CFR 50.73(a)(11) 60 day requirement. | |||
Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program in issue report 4092328. | |||
Enforcement Action(s): This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited | |||
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | |||
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS | |||
Inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | Inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | ||
On February 9, 2018, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. Michael Gillin, Plant Manager, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. | * On February 9, 2018, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to | ||
On April 4, 2018, the | Mr. Michael Gillin, Plant Manager, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. | ||
* On April 4, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results | |||
staff. | to Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. | ||
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | ||
71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
ABN 18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7 | ABN 18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7 | ||
ABN-31, High Winds, Revision 21 | ABN-31, High Winds, Revision 21 | ||
ABN 32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision | ABN 32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision 30 | ||
OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 16 | OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 16 | ||
OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 38 | OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 38 | ||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
4110580 | 4110580 | ||
Drawings GE 885D781 | 71111.04: Equipment Alignment | ||
Sh.1, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 76 | Drawings | ||
GE | GE 885D781 Sh.1, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 76 | ||
GE 148F262 Sh.1, Emergency Condenser Flow Diagram, Revision 56 | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
1619946 4102875 4108748 4108767 4109454 | 1619946 4102875 4108748 4108767 4109454 | ||
71111.05: Fire Protection | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 73 | 101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 73 | ||
ABN 29, Plant Fires, Revision 32 | ABN 29, Plant Fires, Revision 32 | ||
ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification, Revision 4 | ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification, Revision 4 | ||
OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre | OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre-fire Plans, Revision 26 | ||
-fire Plans, Revision 26 | |||
OP-OC-201-012-1001, On-line Fire Risk Management, Revision 4 | OP-OC-201-012-1001, On-line Fire Risk Management, Revision 4 | ||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
3971381 4059012 | 3971381 4059012 | ||
71111.06: Flood Protection Measures | |||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | ||
OP-PSA-012, Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, dated May 2014 | OP-PSA-012, Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, dated May 2014 | ||
Line 844: | Line 1,011: | ||
71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program | 71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program | ||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
EP-AA-1010, Addendum 3, Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Levels for Oyster Creek Station, Revision 2 | EP-AA-1010, Addendum 3, Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Levels for Oyster Creek Station, | ||
Revision 2 | |||
71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness | 71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness | ||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 11 | ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 11 | ||
ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule | ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring, Revision 14 | ||
- Performance Monitoring, Revision 14 | ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7 | ||
ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule | |||
- Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7 | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
0516160 0648480 0687240 1501306 1514742 2472912 | 0516160 0648480 0687240 1501306 1514742 2472912 | ||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment from July 1, 2015 - June 30, 2017, dated November 29, 2017 | 23130 2536453 2537005 2572740 2625933 2629443 | ||
29982 2637292 2643485 2643486 2702946 2714199 | |||
2715226 2719824 3949214 3952496 4060818 4069654 | |||
4089360 4089390 4109343 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment from | |||
July 1, 2015 - June 30, 2017, dated November 29, 2017 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
4345665 4345669 4345671 4345673 | 4345665 4345669 4345671 4345673 | ||
71111.15: Operability Evaluations | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
4111295 4111496 4111518 4111506 | 4111295 4111496 4111518 4111506 | ||
71111.18: Plant Modifications | |||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | ||
EC 620725, Refuel Bridge PLC Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask, dated February 23, 2018 | EC 620725, Refuel Bridge PLC Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask, | ||
71111.19: | dated February 23, 2018 | ||
71111.19: Post-Maintenance Testing | |||
Issue Reports | Issue Reports | ||
4070270 4103389 4104381 4106951 4107367 4110560 | 4070270 4103389 4104381 4106951 4107367 4110560 | ||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
4745244 4745324 4745979 4748691 | |||
71124.08: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, | |||
Storage, and Transportation | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
RW-AA-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 12 | RW-AA-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 12 | ||
Line 872: | Line 1,049: | ||
RP-AA-600-1001, Exclusive Use and Emergency Response Information, Revision 9 | RP-AA-600-1001, Exclusive Use and Emergency Response Information, Revision 9 | ||
RP-AA-600-1005, Radioactive Material and Non Disposal Site Waste Shipments, Revision 19 | RP-AA-600-1005, Radioactive Material and Non Disposal Site Waste Shipments, Revision 19 | ||
RP-AA-600-1006, Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste (Category 1 RAMQC), Revision 11 | RP-AA-600-1006, Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste | ||
RP-AA-600-1009, Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste (Category 2 RAMQC), Revision 2 | (Category 1 RAMQC), Revision 11 | ||
RP-AA-600-1010, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Creating Containers, Samples, Waste Streams and Waste Types, Revision 2 | RP-AA-600-1009, Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste | ||
RP-AA-600-1011, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Gross Gamma Characterization and Generation of Shipping Paperwork, Revision 4 | (Category 2 RAMQC), Revision 2 | ||
RP-AA-600-1010, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Creating Containers, Samples, | |||
Waste Streams and Waste Types, Revision 2 | |||
RP-AA-600-1011, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Gross Gamma Characterization and | |||
Generation of Shipping Paperwork, Revision 4 | |||
RP-AA-601, Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | RP-AA-601, Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | ||
RP-AA-602, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | RP-AA-602, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20 | ||
Line 881: | Line 1,062: | ||
RP-AA-603, Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 10 | RP-AA-603, Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 10 | ||
RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 7 | RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 7 | ||
Quality Assurance | Quality Assurance | ||
NOSA-OYS-16-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report | NOSA-OYS-16-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report | ||
NOSA-OYS-17-06, Radiation Protection Audit Report | NOSA-OYS-17-06, Radiation Protection Audit Report | ||
Fleet Assessment T | Fleet Assessment T-18 Assessment Report, October 2016 | ||
-18 Assessment Report, October 2016 | Fleet Assessment T-6 Assessment Report, September 2017 | ||
Fleet Assessment T | Fleet Assessment Mid-Cycle Assessment Report, March 2017 | ||
-6 Assessment Report, September 2017 | |||
Fleet Assessment Mid | |||
-Cycle Assessment Report, March 2017 | |||
CFR Part 61 Scaling Factors | CFR Part 61 Scaling Factors | ||
Dry Active Waste | Dry Active Waste, Bead Resin, Sludge, CLW Composite, Cartridge Filters | ||
, Bead Resin | |||
, Sludge , CLW Composite | |||
, Cartridge Filters | |||
2016-2017 10 CFR 61 Waste Stream Analysis, December 2016 | 2016-2017 10 CFR 61 Waste Stream Analysis, December 2016 | ||
Assignment Reports | Assignment Reports | ||
23501 2620554 2608094 | 23501 2620554 2608094 | ||
NRWSHP-1000, DOT/79 | Training | ||
-19 Training for Support of Radioactive and Asbestos Shipments, Revision 4 | HAZSEC, DOT Security Awareness and Transportation Security Plan, Revision 1 | ||
Shipments OC-3001-16 OC-4003-16 OC-3001-17 OC-3002-17 OC-3003-17 | NRWSHP-1000, DOT/79-19 Training for Support of Radioactive and Asbestos Shipments, | ||
Revision 4 | |||
Shipments | |||
OC-3001-16 OC-4003-16 OC-3001-17 OC-3002-17 OC-3003-17 | |||
71152: Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
Procedures | Procedures | ||
PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 6 | PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 6 | ||
PI-AA-125-1006, Investigation Techniques Manual, Revision 3 | PI-AA-125-1006, Investigation Techniques Manual, Revision 3 | ||
MA-AA-726-620, Installation Instructions for 0 | MA-AA-726-620, Installation Instructions for 0-600 Volt EQ Related Splices, Revision 6 | ||
-600 Volt EQ Related Splices, Revision 6 | MA-OC-741-101, Diesel Generator Inspection (24 Month) - Electrical, Revision 15 | ||
MA-OC-741-101, Diesel Generator Inspection (24 Month) | |||
- Electrical, Revision 15 | |||
NO-AA-300-1001, Nuclear Oversight Independent Inspection Plan, Revision 10 | NO-AA-300-1001, Nuclear Oversight Independent Inspection Plan, Revision 10 | ||
2400-GME-3780.52, Installation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable, Revision 6 | 2400-GME-3780.52, Installation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable, Revision 6 | ||
2400-SME-3780.03, Electrical Termination Taping and Raychem Splicing, Revision 16 | 2400-SME-3780.03, Electrical Termination Taping and Raychem Splicing, Revision 16 | ||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
R2239604 R2230340 R2229008 R2207589 R2191838 R2190504 | |||
R2151723 R2111307 R2032680 R2065956 R0808797 R0522916 | |||
R0504310 R0055415 R0041081 R0029109 4695984 4695269 | |||
4697086 4694906 | |||
Issue Reports | |||
4060815 4089829 1436376 4061089 4073377 4060815 | |||
4060818 4061527 4061931 4066706 4061093 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
ES-023, Selection and Sizing of Power, Lighting and Control Cables, Revision 2 | ES-023, Selection and Sizing of Power, Lighting and Control Cables, Revision 2 | ||
SP-9000-31-213, Class 1E, Electric Cable for Power, Control & Instrumentation, Revision 9 | SP-9000-31-213, Class 1E, Electric Cable for Power, Control & Instrumentation, Revision 9 | ||
SP-9000-41-005, Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek, Revision 3 | SP-9000-41-005, Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek, Revision 3 | ||
71153: Follow | 71153: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | ||
-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | Issue Reports | ||
4091183 4091037 4091010 4090950 4090920 4090820 | |||
4090803 4091287 4091455 | |||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 22:27, 18 December 2019
ML18128A232 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Oyster Creek |
Issue date: | 05/08/2018 |
From: | David Pelton Division Reactor Projects I |
To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
Young M | |
References | |
EA-18-007 IR 2018001 | |
Download: ML18128A232 (18) | |
Text
May 8, 2018
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2018001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. On April 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
In addition, the NRC reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000219/2017-005-00, which described the circumstances associated with a failed electrical ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator. It was recognized that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a period of time that exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days detailed in Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b, and therefore, is a violation of technical specifications. Regional staff performed a risk evaluation and determined the issue was of low to moderate safety significance (White).
Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the electrical ring lug failure which caused the No. 2 emergency diesel generator to be inoperable was not within Exelons ability to reasonably foresee and correct. As a result, the NRC did not identify a performance deficiency associated with this condition. The NRCs assessment considered Exelons maintenance practices, industry operating experience, vendor and industry maintenance and testing recommendations, and Exelons corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Based on the results of the NRCs inspection and assessment, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.4, Exceptions to Using Only the Operating Reactor Assessment Program, and Section 3.10, Reactor Violations with No Performance Deficiency. The Region I Regional Administrator was also consulted regarding enforcement discretion for this issue. If you contest the non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David L. Pelton, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Number: 50-219 License Number: DPR-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000219/2018001
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 50-219 License Number: DPR-16 Report Number: 05000219/2018001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-001-0078 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Inspection Dates: January 1, 2018 to March 31, 2018 Inspectors: A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector E. Andrews, Resident Inspector F. Arner, Senior Reactor Analyst J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: David L. Pelton, Director Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelons performance at
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station by conducting the baseline inspections described in this report in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC identified and self-revealing findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153 05000219/2018001-01 Closed The inspectors identified a non-cited, Severity IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Status Section LER 05000219/2017-005-00 No. 2 emergency diesel 71153 Closed generator inoperable
PLANT STATUS
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2018, operators lowered power to 70 percent due to low intake levels. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent on January 8, 2018. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase.
The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensees performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Impending Severe Weather
The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for a blizzard warning issued on January 4, 2018, and for low intake levels on January 6, 2018.
External Flooding (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated protection from external flooding prior to and during high winds and heavy rain on March 2, 2018.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator while No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable on January 3, 2018
- (2) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018
- (3) A isolation condenser during emergent unavailability of the B isolation condenser on February 12, 2018
- (4) Core spray system II during planned unavailability of core spray system I on February 20, 2018
- (5) B isolation condenser during shell side makeup on March 5, 2018
- (6) B isolation condenser during emergent work on A isolation condenser on
March 12, 2018 Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the standby liquid control system on February 15-16, 2018.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018
- (2) No. 2 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018
- (3) Reactor building 95 elevation on February 21, 2018
- (4) Reactor building 75 elevation on February 21, 2018
- (5) Reactor building 23 elevation on February 21, 2018
- (6) C 125 VDC battery room on February 28, 2018
- (7) A and B 4kV switchgear room on February 28, 2018
- (8) New cable spreading room on March 1, 2018
- (9) Recirculation pump motor generator set room on March 1, 2018
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in turbine building switchgear area on February 22, 2018.
71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance Heat Sink
The inspectors evaluated Exelons monitoring and maintenance of B isolation condenser performance on March 5, 2018.
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during licensed operator requalification training on January 23, 2018, and March 13, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during the Notice of Unusual Event on January 6, 2018.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Periodic 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation on January 17, 2018
- (2) Service air system on January 22, 2018
- (3) Start-up transformers on February 21, 2018
- (4) Reactor recirculation system on March 5, 2018
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Notice of Unusual Event declaration due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018
- (2) Planned maintenance on the A isolation condenser on January 9, 2018
- (3) Planned maintenance on the B isolation condenser on January 18, 2018
- (4) Planned maintenance on core spray system I on February 20, 2018
- (5) Planned maintenance on core spray system II on March 14, 2018
- (6) Planned maintenance on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator on March 26, 2018
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018
- (2) Standby liquid control poison tank low level on January 29, 2018
- (3) B isolation condenser elevated temperatures on February 16, 2018
- (4) Control rod 34-43 slow five percent scram time on March 5, 2018
- (5) B isolation condenser lowering shell side level on March 6, 2018
- (6) A isolation condenser steam leak on March 12, 2018
- (7) No. 2 emergency diesel generator elevated lead levels in oil sample on March 15, 2018
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
Engineering Change 620725, Refuel Bridge Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated post maintenance testing for the following maintenance/repair activities:
- (1) A recirculation pump relay replacement on January 22, 2018
- (2) B isolation condenser valve, V-14-37, following valve repair on February 13, 2018
- (3) A core spray pump relay replacement on February 20, 2018
- (4) Average power range monitor 7 restoration to an operable condition on February 22, 2018
- (5) B isolation condenser remote shutdown panel level indication following emergent inoperability on February 22, 2018
- (7) 1-8 sump control logic following fuse replacement on March 27, 2018
- (8) No. 2 emergency diesel generator following biannual overhaul on March 28, 2018
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine
- (1) 636.4.013, Diesel Generator 2 Load Test on January 3, 2018
- (2) 609.3.003, Isolation Condenser Automatic Actuation Sensor Calibration and Test on January 18, 2018
- (3) 607.4.016, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System I Pump Operability and Quarterly Inservice Test on January 23, 2018
- (4) 604.3.001, Reactor Building to Torus Power Vacuum Breaker Test and Calibration on February 8, 2018
- (5) 602.3.004, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration on March 6, 2018
- (6) 651.4.003, Standby Gas Treatment System 15-minute Run - System 2 on
March 17, 2018 Inservice (2 Samples)
- (1) 612.4.001, A Standby Liquid Control Pump and Valve Operability and In-service Test on January 9, 2018
- (2) 610.4.003, Core Spray Valve Operability and In-Service Test on March 12, 2018
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Emergency Planning Drill
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency planning drill on
===March 13, 2018.
Drill/Training Evolution (1 Sample)===
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 23,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation Radioactive Material Storage
The inspectors observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings and controls and that Exelon had established a process for monitoring the impact of long-term storage of the waste.
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors walked down the following:
- Accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to verify current system alignment and material condition
- Abandoned in place radioactive waste processing equipment to review the controls in place to ensure protection of personnel
- Changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems since the last inspection
- Processes for mixing and transferring radioactive waste resin and/or sludge discharges into shipping/disposal containers
- Current methods and procedures for dewatering waste
Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample)
The inspectors identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides.
Shipment Preparations (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping papers provided to the driver, and Exelons verification of shipment readiness.
Shipment Records (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed selected non-excepted package shipment records.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
The inspectors reviewed Exelons implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Ring Lug Failure
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Events
The inspectors evaluated response to the following events:
Notice of Usual Event due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018
Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following LERs which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
LER 05000219/2017-005-00 and -01, Failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator #2, During Surveillance Testing due to a Broken Electrical Connector, on February 14,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Enforcement Enforcement Action (EA)-18-007: No. 2 Emergency Diesel 71152 Discretion Generator Ring Lug Failure
Description:
On October 9, 2017, during a routine surveillance load test, the No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed approximately 5 minutes into the run due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer. Laboratory analysis of the broken ring lug determined that the ring lug failed due to fatigue cracking that was initiated due to stresses caused by bending and twisting of the electrical lug. Exelon last conducted a load surveillance on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator on September 25, 2017.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included replacement on the broken ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, extent of condition inspections on the No. 1 and No. 2 emergency diesel generators for additional bent or twisted ring lug connectors, and revision to the electrical ring lug installation and emergency diesel generator procedures to include inspection for bent or twisted ring lugs.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Issue report 4060815
Enforcement:
Violation: Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days.
Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2017, it was recognized that one diesel generator was inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, and Oyster Creek continued power operation. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, No. 2 emergency diesel generator failed to run during a routine surveillance test due to a broken ring lug on a current transformer, which resulted in a total inoperability time of 6.5 months.
Severity/Significance: For violations warranting enforcement discretion, Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 does not require a detailed risk evaluation, however, safety significance characterization is appropriate. A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a best estimate analysis of the safety significance using the Oyster Creek Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, Version 8.50 and Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). The evaluation estimated the total (internal and external events risk) increase in core damage frequency (CDF) to be in the mid to high E-6/yr range, or a low to moderate safety significance. The SRA evaluated the internal events risk contribution due to the inoperability of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator for an approximate 6.5 month exposure time. The exposure time relative to when the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was no longer capable of meeting its 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission time is uncertain due to the effect of vibration induced fatigue, and therefore the method prescribed within the RASP handbook guidance was used.
The analyst used the guidance in Section 2.5 of the Handbook, Revision 2.0, to estimate the exposure time of 6.5 months based on the cumulative 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> summation of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator surveillance test proven run time. This approach is appropriate for periodically operated components that degrade during operation (i.e. vibration induced fatigue only occurs while the emergency diesel generator is in-service/operating). Given this approach, the dominant internal events, loss of offsite power were evaluated for the estimated internal risk increase. This contribution was estimated at 2E-6/yr increase in CDF. The dominant sequences involved loss of offsite power events with a concurrent failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator, failure of the combustion turbines, and failure to recover offsite power or recover an emergency diesel generator prior to core damage.
The SRA performed various modeling changes after a review of revised calculations for DC battery life:
Analysis noted that Oyster Creek Generating Station recirculation pump seals are similar in design to those tested in reports generated for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 with the use of CAN2A seals. Therefore, the failure probability of the seals in the station blackout sequence was adjusted from 0.1 to 5E-2 similar to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 SPAR model 8.50.
The failure to load shed action (DCP-XHE-XM-LSHED) in the model was calculated using the SPAR-H method and revised to 1.2E-2 versus being assumed to always fail (TRUE).
- Failure probabilities for 1, 2, or 3 stuck open electromatic relief valves were revised to be consistent with the previous model version 8.22 because of the isolation condenser design at Oyster Creek Generating Station which limits cycling and significantly reduces the probability of a failed open electromatic relief valve due to isolation condensers controlling pressure.
- The depressurization function using electromatic relief valves, if required, was calculated through SPAR-H to be 1E-2 for sequences where total seal failure is assumed (DEPSEALFAIL) (conservatively assumed limited time available).
- The diesel driven firewater pumps are both available and were set to calculated fault tree failure probabilities instead of always failed in the previous model. These are 2,000 gallons per minute pumps with a large supply of water and relatively simple operator actions to inject to the reactor pressure vessel. The firewater was assumed to fail at 0.1 when a total recirculation seal failure occurs due to assumed time constraints.
- The offsite power and the emergency diesel generator required recovery time events were increased to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for events where DC load shedding was successful, without seal failures and isolation condenser success along with diesel driven firewater success.
The SRA noted the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was recoverable. In fact, the diagnosis of the failed condition was performed in a nominal 8-10 hours from the failure. Therefore, a probability of failure to recover event for the conditional case was developed. The SRA used SPAR-H as simple guidance, which conservatively supported a reasonable assumption of a 0.10 conditional probability of failure to recover the emergency diesel generator within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The base case utilized a calculation within SPAR of 0.33 failure to recover probability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> sequences.
To estimate the external risk contribution, the SRA identified that the most significant external risk contribution was from fire events. Seismic, external flooding, and high wind events were not significant contributors for the issue.
From discussions with Oyster Creek Fire probabilistic risk analysts and a review of this failure condition, the increase in CDF due to the failed No. 2 emergency diesel generator for the assumed 6.5 month exposure time was estimated at 4.5E-6/yr [(8.5E-5/yr-4.5E-5/yr) x (6.5/12 months) x 0.2].
The DC safety-related battery life would be at least a nominal 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> and longer if DC bus stripping occurred, this allows for extended isolation condenser or electromatic relief valve function, with injection from diesel driven firewater. Given the time considerations and characteristics of the failure, an assumed recovery at a failure probability of 0.2 (slightly higher than internal due to less time) was applied for the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, which was a best estimate determined through SPAR-H insights. The dominant fire sequence was a fire affecting the A and B 4kV switchgear rooms, where combustion turbine support would be lost, with failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator breaker to close, and failure of locally operating the isolation condenser due to eventual loss of power. The SRA noted that FLEX credit was not quantified and would result in a lower risk estimation likely in the low E-6/yr range. Combining internal and external risk contributions, the total increase in CDF was 6.5E-6/yr, or low to moderate safety significance. The SRA determined that Exelon uses a Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) factor value of 8E-2. This value takes into consideration operator action for those relevant high pressure vessel breach scenarios (fuel-coolant interaction, liner-melt-through, and direct containment heating). This also credits procedure strategies where other mitigating actions are taken such as flooding the drywell.
The SRA review of the dominant sequences and time to core damage affirmed that LERF did not increase the risk over that determined from the increase in CDF.
Basis for Discretion: The inspectors determined that the ring lug failure was not within Exelons ability to foresee and prevent. As a result, no performance deficiency was identified.
The inspectors assessment considered:
1. Exelons review of emergency diesel maintenance performed in 2015 checked all connections of the current transformer for tightness. The inspectors did not identify any gaps or deficiencies in the 2015 inspections. Inspectors also reviewed completed biennial inspections of the connection dating back to 1991 and did not identify any gaps.
2. At the time of the failure, the current transformer connections did not have a time directed replacement frequency recommended by the Emergency Diesel Generator Owners Group. The inspectors did not identify any additional vendor or industry recommendations specific to the failed component or considerations specific to the failed component that existed prior to the failure.
3. Industry operating experience information available to Exelon did not identify the potential for the fatigue cracking of the bent wire ring lug that was experienced.
4. The bent ring lug failure was not the result of a failure on the part of Exelon staff; no standards existed on bending of the lug during installation and is considered skill of the craft.
The NRC determined that it was not reasonable for Exelon to have been able to foresee and prevent this violation of NRC requirements, and as such, no performance deficiency existed.
Therefore, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Sections 2.2.4 and 3.10 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement action for the violation of technical specifications (EA-18-007). Further, because Exelons actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment process or the NRC Action Matrix.
Observation 71152 Exelons equipment corrective action program evaluation report (ECAPE) determined that the ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug beyond limits specified in industry guidelines. The inspectors noted that the ECAPE did not provide supporting information regarding how the ring lug was bent and twisted beyond industry guidelines. Specifically, industry guidance states that ring lugs can be bent up to 90 degrees.
The broken ring lug found in the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was bent at approximately 45-55 degrees per the ECAPE, which was within industry guidelines. Additionally, the ECAPE did not include specific guidance on twisting allowances for ring lugs. Exelon documented the inspectors observation in Issue Report 4089829. As a result of the inspectors observation, Exelon revised the ECAPE to say the ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug.
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153 05000219/2018001-01 Opened/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report.
Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018.
Description:
On October 9, 2017, the No. 2 emergency diesel was operated for its bi-weekly load surveillance. Approximately five minutes into the run, the main control room received LKOUT RELAY TRIP and EDG 2 DISABLED alarms. Following an automatic shutdown of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, Exelon staff discovered a ring lug of a current transformer had broken. The last time the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was operated for its bi-weekly load surveillance was on September 25, 2017. Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2 states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days.
Details regarding the broken lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator can be found in Section 71152.
On December 9, 2017, the inspectors identified that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, which is reportable to the NRC. 10 CFR 50.73 states, in part, that the licensee shall report any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Exelon had not submitted an LER within the 60 day requirement because they did not consider the inoperable No. 2 emergency diesel generator as an event that required an LER as specified in 10 CFR 50.73.
Corrective Action(s): Exelon submitted the required LER on January 3, 2018.
Corrective Action Reference: Issue Report 4092328
Performance Assessment:
__________________________________________________________________________
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to report a condition which is prohibited by technical specifications within the time frame required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: Traditional enforcement applies because a failure to report an event in a timely manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function.
Significance: The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation consistent with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because it was screened under the traditional enforcement process.
Enforcement:
Severity: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately determine non-compliance.
The inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV, which is a more than minor violation, which is a concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence. The untimely LER was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NRC.
Violation: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) requires, in part, that a licensee submit an LER for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event.
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Contrary to the above, on December 9, 2017, Exelon failed to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days. This event occurred on October 9, 2017, and Exelon submitted the LER on January 3, 2018, which exceeded the 10 CFR 50.73(a)(11) 60 day requirement.
Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program in issue report 4092328.
Enforcement Action(s): This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
Inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On February 9, 2018, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. Michael Gillin, Plant Manager, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff.
- On April 4, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
ABN 18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7
ABN-31, High Winds, Revision 21
ABN 32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision 30
OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 16
OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 38
Issue Reports
4110580
71111.04: Equipment Alignment
Drawings
GE 885D781 Sh.1, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 76
GE 148F262 Sh.1, Emergency Condenser Flow Diagram, Revision 56
Issue Reports
1619946 4102875 4108748 4108767 4109454
71111.05: Fire Protection
Procedures
101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 73
ABN 29, Plant Fires, Revision 32
ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification, Revision 4
OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre-fire Plans, Revision 26
OP-OC-201-012-1001, On-line Fire Risk Management, Revision 4
Issue Reports
3971381 4059012
71111.06: Flood Protection Measures
Miscellaneous
OP-PSA-012, Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, dated May 2014
OC-PSA-022, Internal Flood Walkdown Notebook, dated May 2014
71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
EP-AA-1010, Addendum 3, Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Levels for Oyster Creek Station,
Revision 2
71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 11
ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring, Revision 14
ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7
Issue Reports
0516160 0648480 0687240 1501306 1514742 2472912
23130 2536453 2537005 2572740 2625933 2629443
29982 2637292 2643485 2643486 2702946 2714199
2715226 2719824 3949214 3952496 4060818 4069654
4089360 4089390 4109343
Miscellaneous
Oyster Creek Generating Station Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment from
July 1, 2015 - June 30, 2017, dated November 29, 2017
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
4345665 4345669 4345671 4345673
71111.15: Operability Evaluations
Issue Reports
4111295 4111496 4111518 4111506
71111.18: Plant Modifications
Miscellaneous
EC 620725, Refuel Bridge PLC Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask,
dated February 23, 2018
71111.19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Issue Reports
4070270 4103389 4104381 4106951 4107367 4110560
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
4745244 4745324 4745979 4748691
71124.08: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage, and Transportation
Procedures
RW-AA-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 12
RW-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 8
RP-AA-600, Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments, Revision 16
RP-AA-600-1001, Exclusive Use and Emergency Response Information, Revision 9
RP-AA-600-1005, Radioactive Material and Non Disposal Site Waste Shipments, Revision 19
RP-AA-600-1006, Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste
(Category 1 RAMQC), Revision 11
RP-AA-600-1009, Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste
(Category 2 RAMQC), Revision 2
RP-AA-600-1010, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Creating Containers, Samples,
Waste Streams and Waste Types, Revision 2
RP-AA-600-1011, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Gross Gamma Characterization and
Generation of Shipping Paperwork, Revision 4
RP-AA-601, Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20
RP-AA-602, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20
RP-AA-602-1001, Packaging of Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments, Revision 17
RP-AA-603, Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 10
RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 7
Quality Assurance
NOSA-OYS-16-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report
NOSA-OYS-17-06, Radiation Protection Audit Report
Fleet Assessment T-18 Assessment Report, October 2016
Fleet Assessment T-6 Assessment Report, September 2017
Fleet Assessment Mid-Cycle Assessment Report, March 2017
CFR Part 61 Scaling Factors
Dry Active Waste, Bead Resin, Sludge, CLW Composite, Cartridge Filters
2016-2017 10 CFR 61 Waste Stream Analysis, December 2016
Assignment Reports
23501 2620554 2608094
Training
HAZSEC, DOT Security Awareness and Transportation Security Plan, Revision 1
NRWSHP-1000, DOT/79-19 Training for Support of Radioactive and Asbestos Shipments,
Revision 4
Shipments
OC-3001-16 OC-4003-16 OC-3001-17 OC-3002-17 OC-3003-17
71152: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 6
PI-AA-125-1006, Investigation Techniques Manual, Revision 3
MA-AA-726-620, Installation Instructions for 0-600 Volt EQ Related Splices, Revision 6
MA-OC-741-101, Diesel Generator Inspection (24 Month) - Electrical, Revision 15
NO-AA-300-1001, Nuclear Oversight Independent Inspection Plan, Revision 10
2400-GME-3780.52, Installation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable, Revision 6
2400-SME-3780.03, Electrical Termination Taping and Raychem Splicing, Revision 16
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
R2239604 R2230340 R2229008 R2207589 R2191838 R2190504
R2151723 R2111307 R2032680 R2065956 R0808797 R0522916
R0504310 R0055415 R0041081 R0029109 4695984 4695269
4697086 4694906
Issue Reports
4060815 4089829 1436376 4061089 4073377 4060815
4060818 4061527 4061931 4066706 4061093
Miscellaneous
ES-023, Selection and Sizing of Power, Lighting and Control Cables, Revision 2
SP-9000-31-213, Class 1E, Electric Cable for Power, Control & Instrumentation, Revision 9
SP-9000-41-005, Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek, Revision 3
71153: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Issue Reports
4091183 4091037 4091010 4090950 4090920 4090820
4090803 4091287 4091455
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713
May 8, 2018
Mr. Bryan Hanson
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Co., LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000219/2018001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. On April 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed
the results of this inspection with Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of
your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The
NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of
the Enforcement Policy.
In addition, the NRC reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000219/2017-005-00, which described
the circumstances associated with a failed electrical ring lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel
generator. It was recognized that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a
period of time that exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days detailed in Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b, and therefore, is a violation of technical specifications. Regional staff
performed a risk evaluation and determined the issue was of low to moderate safety
significance (White).
Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the
electrical ring lug failure which caused the No. 2 emergency diesel generator to be inoperable
was not within Exelons ability to reasonably foresee and correct. As a result, the NRC did not
identify a performance deficiency associated with this condition. The NRCs assessment
considered Exelons maintenance practices, industry operating experience, vendor and industry
maintenance and testing recommendations, and Exelons corrective actions to prevent
recurrence of the issue.
Based on the results of the NRCs inspection and assessment, I have been authorized, after
consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in
accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.4, Exceptions to Using Only the
Operating Reactor Assessment Program, and Section 3.10, Reactor Violations with No
Performance Deficiency. The Region I Regional Administrator was also consulted regarding
enforcement discretion for this issue.
B. Hanson 2
If you contest the non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days
of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC
Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 2.390,
Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David
- L. Pelton, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Number: 50-219
License Number: DPR-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000219/2018001
cc w/encl:
Distribution via ListServ
SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP
NAME EAndrews SShaffer MYoung DLPelton
DATE 04/26/18 04/26/18 05/08/18 05/07/18
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 50-219
License Number: DPR-16
Report Number: 05000219/2018001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-001-0078
Licensee: Exelon Nuclear
Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Location: Forked River, New Jersey
Inspection Dates: January 1, 2018 to March 31, 2018
Inspectors:
- A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector
- E. Andrews, Resident Inspector
- F. Arner, Senior Reactor Analyst
- J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist
- J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector
- J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By: David
- L. Pelton, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelons performance at
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station by conducting the baseline inspections described in
this report in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process
is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC
identified and self-revealing findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the
table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2
Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153
Closed
The inspectors identified a non-cited, Severity IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to
submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a
report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel
generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a
condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event
until January 3, 2018.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Status
Section
LER 05000219/2017-005-00 No. 2 emergency diesel 71153 Closed
generator inoperable
PLANT STATUS
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2018, operators
lowered power to 70 percent due to low intake levels. Operators returned the unit to
100 percent on January 8, 2018. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the
remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection
activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor
Inspection Program - Operations Phase.
The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D,
Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and
Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities,
and interviewed personnel to assess licensees performance and compliance with Commission
rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for a blizzard
warning issued on January 4, 2018, and for low intake levels on January 6, 2018.
External Flooding (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated protection from external flooding prior to and during high winds
and heavy rain on March 2, 2018.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator while No. 2 emergency diesel generator was
inoperable on January 3, 2018
(2) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018
(3) A isolation condenser during emergent unavailability of the B isolation condenser on
February 12, 2018
(4) Core spray system II during planned unavailability of core spray system I on
February 20, 2018
(5) B isolation condenser during shell side makeup on March 5, 2018
(6) B isolation condenser during emergent work on A isolation condenser on
March 12, 2018
Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the standby
liquid control system on February 15-16, 2018.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly
Quarterly Inspection (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected
areas:
(1) No. 1 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018
(2) No. 2 emergency diesel generator room on January 24, 2018
(3) Reactor building 95 elevation on February 21, 2018
(4) Reactor building 75 elevation on February 21, 2018
(5) Reactor building 23 elevation on February 21, 2018
(6) C 125 VDC battery room on February 28, 2018
(7) A and B 4kV switchgear room on February 28, 2018
(8) New cable spreading room on March 1, 2018
(9) Recirculation pump motor generator set room on March 1, 2018
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Internal Flooding (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in turbine building
switchgear area on February 22, 2018.
71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance
Heat Sink (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated Exelons monitoring and maintenance of B isolation condenser
performance on March 5, 2018.
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Operator Requalification (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator
during licensed operator requalification training on January 23, 2018, and March 13, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during the Notice of Unusual Event on
January 6, 2018.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with
the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
(1) Periodic 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation on January 17, 2018
(2) Service air system on January 22, 2018
(3) Start-up transformers on February 21, 2018
(4) Reactor recirculation system on March 5, 2018
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work
activities:
(1) Notice of Unusual Event declaration due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018
(2) Planned maintenance on the A isolation condenser on January 9, 2018
(3) Planned maintenance on the B isolation condenser on January 18, 2018
(4) Planned maintenance on core spray system I on February 20, 2018
(5) Planned maintenance on core spray system II on March 14, 2018
(6) Planned maintenance on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator on March 26, 2018
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality
assessments:
(1) Emergency service water pumps during low intake level on January 6, 2018
(2) Standby liquid control poison tank low level on January 29, 2018
(3) B isolation condenser elevated temperatures on February 16, 2018
(4) Control rod 34-43 slow five percent scram time on March 5, 2018
(5) B isolation condenser lowering shell side level on March 6, 2018
(6) A isolation condenser steam leak on March 12, 2018
(7) No. 2 emergency diesel generator elevated lead levels in oil sample on March 15, 2018
71111.18 - Plant Modifications (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
Engineering Change 620725, Refuel Bridge Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel
from a Cask
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated post maintenance testing for the following maintenance/repair
activities:
(1) A recirculation pump relay replacement on January 22, 2018
(2) B isolation condenser valve, V-14-37, following valve repair on February 13, 2018
(3) A core spray pump relay replacement on February 20, 2018
(4) Average power range monitor 7 restoration to an operable condition on
February 22, 2018
(5) B isolation condenser remote shutdown panel level indication following emergent
inoperability on February 22, 2018
(6) Main generator exciter direct current (DC) brush inspection and replacement on
March 1, 2018
(7) 1-8 sump control logic following fuse replacement on March 27, 2018
(8) No. 2 emergency diesel generator following biannual overhaul on March 28, 2018
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Routine (6 Samples)
(1) 636.4.013, Diesel Generator 2 Load Test on January 3, 2018
(2) 609.3.003, Isolation Condenser Automatic Actuation Sensor Calibration and Test on
January 18, 2018
(3) 607.4.016, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System I Pump
Operability and Quarterly Inservice Test on January 23, 2018
(4) 604.3.001, Reactor Building to Torus Power Vacuum Breaker Test and Calibration on
February 8, 2018
(5) 602.3.004, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration on
March 6, 2018
(6) 651.4.003, Standby Gas Treatment System 15-minute Run - System 2 on
March 17, 2018
Inservice (2 Samples)
(1) 612.4.001, A Standby Liquid Control Pump and Valve Operability and In-service Test on
January 9, 2018
(2) 610.4.003, Core Spray Valve Operability and In-Service Test on March 12, 2018
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency planning drill on
March 13, 2018.
Drill/Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on
January 23, 2018.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings
and controls and that Exelon had established a process for monitoring the impact of long-
term storage of the waste.
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors walked down the following:
- Accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to verify
current system alignment and material condition
- Abandoned in place radioactive waste processing equipment to review the controls
in place to ensure protection of personnel
- Changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems since the last inspection
- Processes for mixing and transferring radioactive waste resin and/or sludge
discharges into shipping/disposal containers
- Current methods and procedures for dewatering waste
Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample)
The inspectors identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample
analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed
the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure
radionuclides.
Shipment Preparations (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling,
marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping
papers provided to the driver, and Exelons verification of shipment readiness.
Shipment Records (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed selected non-excepted package shipment records.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed Exelons implementation of its corrective action program related
to the following issues:
No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Ring Lug Failure
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Events (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated response to the following events:
Notice of Usual Event due to low intake levels on January 6, 2018
Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following LERs which can be accessed at
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
LER 05000219/2017-005-00 and -01, Failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator #2,
During Surveillance Testing due to a Broken Electrical Connector, on February 14, 2018
INSPECTION RESULTS
Enforcement Enforcement Action (EA)-18-007: No. 2 Emergency Diesel 71152
Discretion Generator Ring Lug Failure
Description: On October 9, 2017, during a routine surveillance load test, the No. 2 emergency
diesel generator failed approximately 5 minutes into the run due to a broken ring lug on a
current transformer. Laboratory analysis of the broken ring lug determined that the ring lug
failed due to fatigue cracking that was initiated due to stresses caused by bending and
twisting of the electrical lug. Exelon last conducted a load surveillance on the No. 2
emergency diesel generator on September 25, 2017.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included replacement on the broken ring lug on the
No. 2 emergency diesel generator, extent of condition inspections on the No. 1 and No. 2
emergency diesel generators for additional bent or twisted ring lug connectors, and revision to
the electrical ring lug installation and emergency diesel generator procedures to include
inspection for bent or twisted ring lugs.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Issue report 4060815
Enforcement:
Violation: Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2.b states, in part, that if one diesel
generator becomes inoperable during power operation, the reactor may remain in operation
for a period not to exceed 7 days.
Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2017, it was recognized that one diesel generator was
inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, and
Oyster Creek continued power operation. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, No. 2 emergency
diesel generator failed to run during a routine surveillance test due to a broken ring lug on a
current transformer, which resulted in a total inoperability time of 6.5 months.
Severity/Significance: For violations warranting enforcement discretion, Inspection Manual
Chapter 0612 does not require a detailed risk evaluation, however, safety significance
characterization is appropriate. A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a best
estimate analysis of the safety significance using the Oyster Creek Standardized Plant
Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, Version 8.50 and Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-On
Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). The evaluation estimated the total (internal and
external events risk) increase in core damage frequency (CDF) to be in the mid to high
E-6/yr range, or a low to moderate safety significance. The SRA evaluated the internal events
risk contribution due to the inoperability of the No. 2 emergency diesel generator for an
approximate 6.5 month exposure time. The exposure time relative to when the No. 2
emergency diesel generator was no longer capable of meeting its 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission time is
uncertain due to the effect of vibration induced fatigue, and therefore the method prescribed
within the RASP handbook guidance was used.
The analyst used the guidance in Section 2.5 of the Handbook, Revision 2.0, to estimate the
exposure time of 6.5 months based on the cumulative 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> summation of the No. 2
emergency diesel generator surveillance test proven run time. This approach is appropriate
for periodically operated components that degrade during operation (i.e. vibration induced
fatigue only occurs while the emergency diesel generator is in-service/operating). Given this
approach, the dominant internal events, loss of offsite power were evaluated for the estimated
internal risk increase. This contribution was estimated at 2E-6/yr increase in CDF. The
dominant sequences involved loss of offsite power events with a concurrent failure of the
No. 1 emergency diesel generator, failure of the combustion turbines, and failure to recover
offsite power or recover an emergency diesel generator prior to core damage.
The SRA performed various modeling changes after a review of revised calculations for DC
battery life:
Analysis noted that Oyster Creek Generating Station recirculation pump seals are similar in
design to those tested in reports generated for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 with the use of CAN2A
seals. Therefore, the failure probability of the seals in the station blackout sequence was
adjusted from 0.1 to 5E-2 similar to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 SPAR model 8.50.
The failure to load shed action (DCP-XHE-XM-LSHED) in the model was calculated using the
SPAR-H method and revised to 1.2E-2 versus being assumed to always fail (TRUE).
- Failure probabilities for 1, 2, or 3 stuck open electromatic relief valves were revised to
be consistent with the previous model version 8.22 because of the isolation condenser
design at Oyster Creek Generating Station which limits cycling and significantly
reduces the probability of a failed open electromatic relief valve due to isolation
condensers controlling pressure.
- The depressurization function using electromatic relief valves, if required, was
calculated through SPAR-H to be 1E-2 for sequences where total seal failure is
assumed (DEPSEALFAIL) (conservatively assumed limited time available).
- The diesel driven firewater pumps are both available and were set to calculated fault
tree failure probabilities instead of always failed in the previous model. These are
2,000 gallons per minute pumps with a large supply of water and relatively simple
operator actions to inject to the reactor pressure vessel. The firewater was assumed
to fail at 0.1 when a total recirculation seal failure occurs due to assumed time
constraints.
- The offsite power and the emergency diesel generator required recovery time events
were increased to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for events where DC load shedding was successful,
without seal failures and isolation condenser success along with diesel driven firewater
success.
The SRA noted the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was recoverable. In fact, the diagnosis
of the failed condition was performed in a nominal 8-10 hours from the failure. Therefore, a
probability of failure to recover event for the conditional case was developed. The SRA used
SPAR-H as simple guidance, which conservatively supported a reasonable assumption of a
0.10 conditional probability of failure to recover the emergency diesel generator within
hours. The base case utilized a calculation within SPAR of 0.33 failure to recover
probability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> sequences.
To estimate the external risk contribution, the SRA identified that the most significant external
risk contribution was from fire events. Seismic, external flooding, and high wind events were
not significant contributors for the issue.
From discussions with Oyster Creek Fire probabilistic risk analysts and a review of this failure
condition, the increase in CDF due to the failed No. 2 emergency diesel generator for the
assumed 6.5 month exposure time was estimated at 4.5E-6/yr [(8.5E-5/yr-4.5E-5/yr) x (6.5/12
months) x 0.2].
The DC safety-related battery life would be at least a nominal 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> and longer if DC bus
stripping occurred, this allows for extended isolation condenser or electromatic relief valve
function, with injection from diesel driven firewater. Given the time considerations and
characteristics of the failure, an assumed recovery at a failure probability of 0.2 (slightly higher
than internal due to less time) was applied for the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, which
was a best estimate determined through SPAR-H insights. The dominant fire sequence was a
fire affecting the A and B 4kV switchgear rooms, where combustion turbine support would
be lost, with failure of the No. 1 emergency diesel generator breaker to close, and failure of
locally operating the isolation condenser due to eventual loss of power. The SRA noted that
FLEX credit was not quantified and would result in a lower risk estimation likely in the low
E-6/yr range. Combining internal and external risk contributions, the total increase in CDF
was 6.5E-6/yr, or low to moderate safety significance. The SRA determined that Exelon uses
a Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) factor value of 8E-2. This value takes into
consideration operator action for those relevant high pressure vessel breach scenarios
(fuel-coolant interaction, liner-melt-through, and direct containment heating). This also credits
procedure strategies where other mitigating actions are taken such as flooding the drywell.
The SRA review of the dominant sequences and time to core damage affirmed that LERF did
not increase the risk over that determined from the increase in CDF.
Basis for Discretion: The inspectors determined that the ring lug failure was not within
Exelons ability to foresee and prevent. As a result, no performance deficiency was identified.
The inspectors assessment considered:
1. Exelons review of emergency diesel maintenance performed in 2015 checked all
connections of the current transformer for tightness. The inspectors did not identify
any gaps or deficiencies in the 2015 inspections. Inspectors also reviewed completed
biennial inspections of the connection dating back to 1991 and did not identify any
gaps.
2. At the time of the failure, the current transformer connections did not have a time
directed replacement frequency recommended by the Emergency Diesel Generator
Owners Group. The inspectors did not identify any additional vendor or industry
recommendations specific to the failed component or considerations specific to the
failed component that existed prior to the failure.
3. Industry operating experience information available to Exelon did not identify the
potential for the fatigue cracking of the bent wire ring lug that was experienced.
4. The bent ring lug failure was not the result of a failure on the part of Exelon staff; no
standards existed on bending of the lug during installation and is considered skill of
the craft.
The NRC determined that it was not reasonable for Exelon to have been able to foresee and
prevent this violation of NRC requirements, and as such, no performance deficiency existed.
Therefore, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with
Sections 2.2.4 and 3.10 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement
action for the violation of technical specifications (EA-18-007). Further, because Exelons
actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment process
or the NRC Action Matrix.
Observation 71152
Exelons equipment corrective action program evaluation report (ECAPE) determined that the
ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator as a result of fatigue cracking, which
was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending and twisting of the ring lug beyond
limits specified in industry guidelines. The inspectors noted that the ECAPE did not provide
supporting information regarding how the ring lug was bent and twisted beyond industry
guidelines. Specifically, industry guidance states that ring lugs can be bent up to 90 degrees.
The broken ring lug found in the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was bent at approximately
45-55 degrees per the ECAPE, which was within industry guidelines. Additionally, the ECAPE
did not include specific guidance on twisting allowances for ring lugs. Exelon documented the
inspectors observation in Issue Report 4089829. As a result of the inspectors observation,
Exelon revised the ECAPE to say the ring lug failed on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator
as a result of fatigue cracking, which was initiated due to excessive stress caused by bending
and twisting of the ring lug.
Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2
Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Not Applicable Severity Level IV, NCV Not Applicable 71153
Opened/Closed
The inspectors identified a Severity IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure
to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report.
Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel
generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a
condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event
until January 3, 2018.
Description: On October 9, 2017, the No. 2 emergency diesel was operated for its bi-weekly
load surveillance. Approximately five minutes into the run, the main control room received
LKOUT RELAY TRIP and EDG 2 DISABLED alarms. Following an automatic shutdown of
the No. 2 emergency diesel generator, Exelon staff discovered a ring lug of a current
transformer had broken. The last time the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was operated
for its bi-weekly load surveillance was on September 25, 2017. Oyster Creek Technical Specification 3.7.C.2 states, in part, that if one diesel generator becomes inoperable during
power operation, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days.
Details regarding the broken lug on the No. 2 emergency diesel generator can be found in
Section 71152.
On December 9, 2017, the inspectors identified that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator
was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time of 7 days, which
is reportable to the NR
- C. 10 CFR 50.73 states, in part, that the licensee shall report any
operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Exelon
had not submitted an LER within the 60 day requirement because they did not consider the
inoperable No. 2 emergency diesel generator as an event that required an LER as specified
in 10 CFR 50.73.
Corrective Action(s): Exelon submitted the required LER on January 3, 2018.
Corrective Action Reference: Issue Report 4092328
Performance Assessment:
__________________________________________________________________________
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to report a condition
which is prohibited by technical specifications within the time frame required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: Traditional enforcement applies because a failure to report an event in a timely
manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function.
Significance: The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation consistent with
Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because it was
screened under the traditional enforcement process.
Enforcement:
Severity: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the
regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is
necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using
traditional enforcement to adequately determine non-compliance.
The inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV, which is a more than
minor violation, which is a concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential
safety or security consequence. The untimely LER was not used to make an unacceptable
change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NR
- C.
Violation: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) requires, in part, that a licensee submit an LER for any event
of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event.
CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition
prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Contrary to the above, on December 9,
2017, Exelon failed to submit an LER within 60 days after the discovery that the No. 2
emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than its technical specification allowed
outage time of 7 days. This event occurred on October 9, 2017, and Exelon submitted the
LER on January 3, 2018, which exceeded the 10 CFR 50.73(a)(11) 60 day requirement.
Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program in issue report 4092328.
Enforcement Action(s): This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
Inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On February 9, 2018, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to
Mr. Michael Gillin, Plant Manager, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff.
- On April 4, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results
to Mr. Timothy Moore, Site Vice President, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
ABN 18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7
ABN-31, High Winds, Revision 21
ABN 32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision 30
OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 16
OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 38
Issue Reports
4110580
71111.04: Equipment Alignment
Drawings
GE 885D781 Sh.1, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 76
GE 148F262 Sh.1, Emergency Condenser Flow Diagram, Revision 56
Issue Reports
1619946 4102875 4108748 4108767 4109454
71111.05: Fire Protection
Procedures
101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 73
ABN 29, Plant Fires, Revision 32
ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification, Revision 4
OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre-fire Plans, Revision 26
OP-OC-201-012-1001, On-line Fire Risk Management, Revision 4
Issue Reports
3971381 4059012
71111.06: Flood Protection Measures
Miscellaneous
OP-PSA-012, Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, dated May 2014
OC-PSA-022, Internal Flood Walkdown Notebook, dated May 2014
71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
EP-AA-1010, Addendum 3, Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Levels for Oyster Creek Station,
Revision 2
71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 11
ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring, Revision 14
ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7
Issue Reports
0516160 0648480 0687240 1501306 1514742 2472912
23130 2536453 2537005 2572740 2625933 2629443
29982 2637292 2643485 2643486 2702946 2714199
2715226 2719824 3949214 3952496 4060818 4069654
4089360 4089390 4109343
Miscellaneous
Oyster Creek Generating Station Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment from
July 1, 2015 - June 30, 2017, dated November 29, 2017
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
4345665 4345669 4345671 4345673
71111.15: Operability Evaluations
Issue Reports
4111295 4111496 4111518 4111506
71111.18: Plant Modifications
Miscellaneous
EC 620725, Refuel Bridge PLC Software Modification to Allow Offloading Fuel from a Cask,
dated February 23, 2018
71111.19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Issue Reports
4070270 4103389 4104381 4106951 4107367 4110560
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
4745244 4745324 4745979 4748691
71124.08: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage, and Transportation
Procedures
RW-AA-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 12
RW-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 8
RP-AA-600, Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments, Revision 16
RP-AA-600-1001, Exclusive Use and Emergency Response Information, Revision 9
RP-AA-600-1005, Radioactive Material and Non Disposal Site Waste Shipments, Revision 19
RP-AA-600-1006, Shipment of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste
(Category 1 RAMQC), Revision 11
RP-AA-600-1009, Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or Waste
(Category 2 RAMQC), Revision 2
RP-AA-600-1010, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Creating Containers, Samples,
Waste Streams and Waste Types, Revision 2
RP-AA-600-1011, Use and Operation of WMG Software for Gross Gamma Characterization and
Generation of Shipping Paperwork, Revision 4
RP-AA-601, Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20
RP-AA-602, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 20
RP-AA-602-1001, Packaging of Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments, Revision 17
RP-AA-603, Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments, Revision 10
RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 Program, Revision 7
Quality Assurance
NOSA-OYS-16-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report
NOSA-OYS-17-06, Radiation Protection Audit Report
Fleet Assessment T-18 Assessment Report, October 2016
Fleet Assessment T-6 Assessment Report, September 2017
Fleet Assessment Mid-Cycle Assessment Report, March 2017
CFR Part 61 Scaling Factors
Dry Active Waste, Bead Resin, Sludge, CLW Composite, Cartridge Filters
2016-2017 10 CFR 61 Waste Stream Analysis, December 2016
Assignment Reports
23501 2620554 2608094
Training
HAZSEC, DOT Security Awareness and Transportation Security Plan, Revision 1
NRWSHP-1000, DOT/79-19 Training for Support of Radioactive and Asbestos Shipments,
Revision 4
Shipments
OC-3001-16 OC-4003-16 OC-3001-17 OC-3002-17 OC-3003-17
71152: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 6
PI-AA-125-1006, Investigation Techniques Manual, Revision 3
MA-AA-726-620, Installation Instructions for 0-600 Volt EQ Related Splices, Revision 6
MA-OC-741-101, Diesel Generator Inspection (24 Month) - Electrical, Revision 15
NO-AA-300-1001, Nuclear Oversight Independent Inspection Plan, Revision 10
2400-GME-3780.52, Installation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable, Revision 6
2400-SME-3780.03, Electrical Termination Taping and Raychem Splicing, Revision 16
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
R2239604 R2230340 R2229008 R2207589 R2191838 R2190504
R2151723 R2111307 R2032680 R2065956 R0808797 R0522916
R0504310 R0055415 R0041081 R0029109 4695984 4695269
4697086 4694906
Issue Reports
4060815 4089829 1436376 4061089 4073377 4060815
4060818 4061527 4061931 4066706 4061093
Miscellaneous
ES-023, Selection and Sizing of Power, Lighting and Control Cables, Revision 2
SP-9000-31-213, Class 1E, Electric Cable for Power, Control & Instrumentation, Revision 9
SP-9000-41-005, Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek, Revision 3
71153: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Issue Reports
4091183 4091037 4091010 4090950 4090920 4090820
4090803 4091287 4091455