IR 05000352/2007004: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Adams|number = ML073180045}} | {{Adams | ||
| number = ML073180045 | |||
| issue date = 11/13/2007 | |||
| title = IR 05000352-07-004, 05000353-07-004; on 07/01/07-09/30/07; Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report | |||
| author name = Krohn P G | |||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB4 | |||
| addressee name = Pardee C G | |||
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear | |||
| docket = 05000352, 05000353 | |||
| license number = NPF-039, NPF-085 | |||
| contact person = KROHN, PG | |||
| document report number = IR-07-004 | |||
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter | |||
| page count = 25 | |||
}} | |||
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000352 | year = 2007 | report number = 004 }} | {{IR-Nav| site = 05000352 | year = 2007 | report number = 004 }} | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 November 13, 2007Mr. Charles G. PardeePresident and CNO Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 | ||
SUBJECT: LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000352/2007004 AND 05000353/2007004 | SUBJECT: LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000352/2007004 AND 05000353/2007004 | ||
Line 27: | Line 38: | ||
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | ||
....... | IR 05000352/2007-004, 05000353/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Limerick GeneratingStation, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by reactor inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A. | ||
===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings=== | |||
No findings of significance were identified. | |||
===B. Licensee-Identified Violations=== | |||
None. | |||
=REPORT DETAILS= | =REPORT DETAILS= | ||
.......... | Summary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began this inspection period operating at full rated thermal power. On August 16, 2007,reactor power was reduced to 20 percent and the main generator was removed from service to repair the generator output number 11 disconnect switch. On August 17, 2007, the disconnect switch repairs were completed and the main generator was returned to service. Unit 1 returned to 100 percent power on August 18, 2007. With the exception of a planned end of summer load drop to 85 percent power on September 8, 2007, Unit 1 remained at full power for the remainder of the period. | ||
Unit 2 began this inspection period operating at full rated thermal power. On August 6, 2007, reactor power decreased to 75 percent due to an unplanned speed reduction on the 2B reactor recirculation pump. The pump speed change was due to a recirculation motor generator electronic card failure. The card was replaced and Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power later in the day. With the exception of a planned end of summer load drop to 60 percent power on September 15, 2007, Unit 2 remained at full power for the remainder of the period. | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | ==REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 system sample) | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
The inspectors evaluated Exelon's preparations and protection for summer weather. OnJuly 10, 2007, the inspectors walked down Unit 1 and Unit 2 main generators and main transformers during hot weather and a grid heavy load voltage condition. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | |||
====b. Findings==== | |||
No findings of significance were identified. | |||
{{a|1R04}} | {{a|1R04}} | ||
==1R04 Equipment Alignment . | ==1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)== | ||
{{ | ===.1 Partial Walkdown=== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04Q|count=4}} | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
== | The inspectors performed four partial walkdowns of plant systems to verify the operabilityof redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment in the opposite train was either inoperable, undergoing surveillance testing, or potentially degraded. The inspectors used plant Technical Specifications (TS), Exelon operating procedures, plantpiping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USFAR) as guidance for conducting partial system walkdowns. The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures and drawings. | ||
2Enclosure During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated material condition and generalhousekeeping of the system and adjacent spaces. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the following systems:*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system;*Unit 1 D-13 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG); | |||
*Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System; and | |||
*Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)..2Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample)The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control RodDrive (CRD) systems to verify functional capability of the system. The inspectors used plant TS, Exelon operating procedures, P&IDs, the UFSAR, and past surveillance tests as guidance for conducting the complete system walkdown. The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves, position of electrical breakers and settings of the system flow controller to ensure proper system configuration as described in plant procedures and drawings. During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and general housekeeping of the system and open issue reports associated with the system. | |||
The walkdown also included an evaluation of system piping, supports, and component foundations to ensure they were not degraded. The documents reviewed are listed in the | |||
. | |||
====b. Findings==== | |||
No findings of significance were identified. | |||
== | {{a|1R05}} | ||
==1R05 Fire Protection.1Fire Protection - Tours== | |||
(71111.05Q - 8 samples) | |||
== | |||
. | |||
== | |||
. | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
The inspectors conducted a tour of the eight areas listed below to assess the materialcondition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with Exelon's administrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use, and that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment in accordance with Exelon's fire plan. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed the following samples:*Main Control Room and peripheral rooms;*Unit 1 Refuel Floor; | |||
combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with Exelon's | |||
administrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for | |||
use, and that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The | |||
inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for | |||
out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment in accordance with | |||
Exelon's fire plan. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors | |||
performed the following samples:*Main Control Room and peripheral rooms;*Unit 1 Refuel Floor; | |||
*Unit 2 Refuel Floor; | *Unit 2 Refuel Floor; | ||
*Unit 1 220 KV Switchyard; | *Unit 1 220 KV Switchyard; | ||
*Unit 1 and Unit 2 Static Inverter compartments; | *Unit 1 and Unit 2 Static Inverter compartments; | ||
*Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment system filter compartments and accessarea; | *Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment system filter compartments and accessarea; 3Enclosure *Control Room Structure fan room, Elevation 304; and*Unit 1 D14 Diesel Generator Room..2Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample) | ||
3Enclosure *Control Room Structure fan room, Elevation 304; and*Unit 1 D14 Diesel Generator Room..2Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample) | |||
storage tank area on September 26, 2007. The inspectors observed the drill to evaluate | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The documents reviewed are listed in | The inspectors observed one unannounced fire drill conducted in the Unit 1 aircompressor, electro-hydraulic control (EHC) power unit, and turbine lubricating oil storage tank area on September 26, 2007. The inspectors observed the drill to evaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Specific attributes evaluated were:*Proper donning of fire fighting turnout gear and self-contained breathingapparatus (SCBA); *Proper use and layout of fire hoses; | ||
the Attachment. Specific attributes evaluated were:*Proper donning of fire fighting turnout gear and self-contained breathingapparatus (SCBA); *Proper use and layout of fire hoses; | |||
*Employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques; | *Employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques; | ||
*Sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; | *Sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; | ||
Line 136: | Line 98: | ||
*Utilization of pre-planned strategies; | *Utilization of pre-planned strategies; | ||
*Adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and | *Adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and | ||
*Drill objectives. | *Drill objectives. | ||
====b. Findings==== | |||
room. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the relevant areas to verify the adequacy | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
of flood mitigation doors and barriers, drainage systems, and other flood protection | {{a|1R06}} | ||
features. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ==1R06 Flood Protection Measures== | ||
4Enclosure On August 28, 2007, the inspectors observed a licensed operator requalificationsimulator scenario. The scenario included a simulated spurious Division 1 Loss of | (71111.06 - 1 sample)Internal Flooding | ||
Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal with failure of the D11 EDG to start and an unisolablereactor water cleanup leak, which resulted in a manual scram and emergency blowdown. | |||
The inspectors observed the performance of two operating crews responding to the | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
same scenario. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, including | The inspectors reviewed documents and inspected structures, systems, and components(SSCs) relative to the adequacy of internal flood protection measures for the Unit 1 HPCI room. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the relevant areas to verify the adequacy of flood mitigation doors and barriers, drainage systems, and other flood protection features. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
operator critical tasks that measure operator actions required to ensure the safe | |||
operation of the reactor and protection of the nuclear fuel and primary containment | ====b. Findings==== | ||
barriers. The inspectors observed the training evaluators' critiques at the conclusion of | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
each simulation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | {{a|1R11}} | ||
activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of risk significant SSCs and | ==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 sample)Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (1 sample)== | ||
assessed Exelon's extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential | |||
common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of the station's | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Exelon's problem identification and | 4Enclosure On August 28, 2007, the inspectors observed a licensed operator requalificationsimulator scenario. The scenario included a simulated spurious Division 1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal with failure of the D11 EDG to start and an unisolablereactor water cleanup leak, which resulted in a manual scram and emergency blowdown. | ||
resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether Exelon had appropriately | |||
monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with Exelon | The inspectors observed the performance of two operating crews responding to the same scenario. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, including operator critical tasks that measure operator actions required to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and protection of the nuclear fuel and primary containment barriers. The inspectors observed the training evaluators' critiques at the conclusion of each simulation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the | |||
Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC | ====b. Findings==== | ||
classifications, performance criteria and goals, and Exelon's corrective actions that were | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
taken or planned, to evaluate whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. The | {{a|1R12}} | ||
documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed the | ==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness== | ||
following samples:*1A post | (71111.12 - 3 samples) | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
*Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection maintenance rule (a)(1) determination. | The inspectors evaluated Exelon's work practices and follow-up corrective actions forSSCs and identified issues to assess the effectiveness of Exelon's maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of risk significant SSCs and assessed Exelon's extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of the station's corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Exelon's problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether Exelon had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with Exelon procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classifications, performance criteria and goals, and Exelon's corrective actions that were taken or planned, to evaluate whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed the following samples:*1A post LOCA recombiner maintenance rule (a)(1) determination;*2B Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water heat exchanger system outage window; and | ||
operators and risk analysis personnel regarding the use of Exelon's on-line risk | *Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection maintenance rule (a)(1) determination. | ||
monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation, daily | {{a|1R13}} | ||
work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain assurance that the actual plant | ==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 8 samples)== | ||
configuration matched the assessed configuration. Additionally, the inspectors verified | |||
that Exelon's risk management actions, for both planned and emergent work, were | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
5Enclosure consistent with those described in Exelon procedure, | The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Exelon's maintenance risk assessmentsrequired by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). This inspection included discussion with control room operators and risk analysis personnel regarding the use of Exelon's on-line risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation, daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain assurance that the actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration. Additionally, the inspectors verified that Exelon's risk management actions, for both planned and emergent work, were 5Enclosure consistent with those described in Exelon procedure, ER-AA-600-1042, "On-Line RiskManagement." The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Inspectors reviewed risk assessments for the following issues:*Incorrect interpretation of ASME Code Case N-435-1;*Unit 1 HPCI room temperature high; | ||
AA-600-1042, "On-Line RiskManagement." The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Inspectors | |||
reviewed risk assessments for the following issues:*Incorrect interpretation of | |||
HPCI room temperature high; | |||
*Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator runback to minimum speed; | *Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator runback to minimum speed; | ||
*Unit 1 Main Generator Disconnect high temperatures; | *Unit 1 Main Generator Disconnect high temperatures; | ||
*Unit 1 Main Generator Disconnect phases A and C jumper installation; | *Unit 1 Main Generator Disconnect phases A and C jumper installation; | ||
*Large | *Large VAR (Volt-Ampere Reactive) swings during EDG run; | ||
EDG run; | |||
*Unit 2 placing alternate steam jet air ejector in service; and | *Unit 2 placing alternate steam jet air ejector in service; and | ||
*Unit 1 "D" Safety Relief Valve position indicator converter module replacement. | *Unit 1 "D" Safety Relief Valve position indicator converter module replacement. | ||
operability and verified that the subject component or system remained available such | |||
that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | |||
{{a|1R15}} | |||
verify that the system or component remained available to perform its intended safety | ==1R15 Operability Evaluations== | ||
function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to | (71111.15 - 5 samples) | ||
ensure that the measures worked and were adequately controlled. The inspectors also | |||
reviewed a sample of issue reports (IRs) to verify that Exelon identified and corrected | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. The documents reviewed are listed | For the five operability evaluations described below, the inspectors assessed thetechnical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that Exelon properly justified TS operability and verified that the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to verify that the system or component remained available to perform its intended safety function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to ensure that the measures worked and were adequately controlled. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of issue reports (IRs) to verify that Exelon identified and corrected deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations for the following components:*Unit 2 HPCI HV-055-2F006;*Unit 1 HPCI Room Cooler; | ||
in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations for the following | |||
components:*Unit | |||
*Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Suction High Pressure Alarm; | *Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Suction High Pressure Alarm; | ||
*Unit | *Unit 2 HPCI Oil Pressure; and | ||
*Unit 2B Reactor Circulation Pump mechanical seal. | |||
*Unit 2B Reactor Circulation Pump mechanical seal. | ====b. Findings==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's test procedures to verify that the procedures | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
6Enclosure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenanceactivity, and that the applicable criteria in the procedures were consistent with information | {{a|1R19}} | ||
in the licensing and design basis documents. The inspectors also witnessed the test or | ==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)== | ||
reviewed test data to verify that the results adequately demonstrated restoration of the | |||
affected safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
inspectors reviewed post-maintenance tests for the following systems and components:*"C" Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump;*"2A" RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Valve; | The inspectors reviewed the eight post-maintenance tests (PMTs) listed below to verifythat procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. | ||
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's test procedures to verify that the procedures 6Enclosure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenanceactivity, and that the applicable criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the licensing and design basis documents. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance tests for the following systems and components:*"C" Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump;*"2A" RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Valve; | |||
*"D" Emergency Diesel Generator; | *"D" Emergency Diesel Generator; | ||
*D21 Diesel Generator; | *D21 Diesel Generator; | ||
Line 215: | Line 166: | ||
*Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Flow Controller; | *Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Flow Controller; | ||
*Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Outboard Steam Isolation Valve; and | *Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Outboard Steam Isolation Valve; and | ||
*Unit 2 Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS). | *Unit 2 Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS). | ||
Exelon personnel followed TS requirements and that acceptance criteria were | |||
appropriate. The inspectors also verified that the station established proper test | ====b. Findings==== | ||
conditions, as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. The documents reviewed are listed | {{a|1R22}} | ||
in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests for the following | ==1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 samples)== | ||
systems and components:*Unit 2 D24 EDG;*Unit 2 Division 2 Lower Pressure Coolant Injection; | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
The inspectors witnessed the performance and reviewed test data for five surveillancetests that are associated with selected risk-significant SSCs. The review verified that Exelon personnel followed TS requirements and that acceptance criteria were appropriate. The inspectors also verified that the station established proper test conditions, as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests for the following systems and components:*Unit 2 D24 EDG;*Unit 2 Division 2 Lower Pressure Coolant Injection; | |||
*Unit 2 Control Rods; | *Unit 2 Control Rods; | ||
*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump; and | *Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump; and | ||
*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection. b. | *Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection. | ||
the Unit 1 reactor recirculation motor generator. The inspectors ensured that station | |||
7Enclosure personnel implemented the modification in accordance with the applicable temporaryconfiguration change process. The inspectors also reviewed the impact on existing | ====b. Findings==== | ||
procedures to verify appropriate revisions were made to reflect the temporary | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
configuration change. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of proposed | {{a|1R23}} | ||
testing upon removal of the change. The documents reviewed are listed in the | ==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications== | ||
(71111.23 - 1 sample) | |||
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 2 samples).1General Emergency Classification due to Simulated Fuel Failure Coincident with FailedOpen Main Steam Line Isolation Valves | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
ERO) | The inspectors reviewed and compared the temporary modification listed below with theUFSAR and TS to verify that the modification did not affect operability or availability of the Unit 1 reactor recirculation motor generator. The inspectors ensured that station 7Enclosure personnel implemented the modification in accordance with the applicable temporaryconfiguration change process. The inspectors also reviewed the impact on existing procedures to verify appropriate revisions were made to reflect the temporary configuration change. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of proposed testing upon removal of the change. The documents reviewed are listed in the | ||
implementation of the Limerick emergency plan and implementing procedures, and the | . The inspectors performed the following sample:*TRT-D7-164, Install 1B Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Generator TemporaryMechanical Stop. | ||
ERO's response to simulated degraded plant conditions to identify weaknesses and | |||
deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) | ====b. Findings==== | ||
development activities. In addition, the inspectors assessed licensed operator | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
performance required to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and the protection of | |||
the nuclear fuel and primary containment barriers. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's | ===Cornerstone:=== | ||
training evaluators' critiques and the formal critique report, dated July 31, 2007, | Emergency Preparedness (EP)1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 2 samples).1General Emergency Classification due to Simulated Fuel Failure Coincident with FailedOpen Main Steam Line Isolation Valves | ||
associated with the EP drill, to evaluate Exelon's identification of weaknesses and | |||
deficiencies. The inspectors compared inspector observed weaknesses with those | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
identified in Exelon's formal drill critique to verify whether Exelon adequately identified | On June 19, 2007, the inspectors observed an EP training drill in the control roomsimulator. The inspectors assessed Exelon's emergency response organization's (ERO)implementation of the Limerick emergency plan and implementing procedures, and the ERO's response to simulated degraded plant conditions to identify weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR)development activities. In addition, the inspectors assessed licensed operator performance required to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and the protection of the nuclear fuel and primary containment barriers. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's training evaluators' critiques and the formal critique report, dated July 31, 2007, associated with the EP drill, to evaluate Exelon's identification of weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors compared inspector observed weaknesses with those identified in Exelon's formal drill critique to verify whether Exelon adequately identified weaknesses and deficiencies at an appropriate threshold. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
weaknesses and deficiencies at an appropriate threshold. The documents reviewed are | |||
listed in the Attachment. | ====b. Findings==== | ||
activities. During the simulator evaluation, the inspectors reviewed checklists and forms | No findings of significance were identified..2Site Area Emergency Classification Due to a Simulated Reactor Coolant System Leak inthe Reactor Building | ||
8Enclosure used for classification and notification activities, and compared them to the criteria inExelon's Emergency Plan, | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | |||
MA-114-100-F-01, "State/Local Event Notification Form," | The inspectors observed a licensed operator requalification simulator exercise evaluationto identify the timing and adequacy of classification, notification, and PAR development activities. During the simulator evaluation, the inspectors reviewed checklists and forms 8Enclosure used for classification and notification activities, and compared them to the criteria inExelon's Emergency Plan, EP-MA-114-100-F-01, "State/Local Event Notification Form," | ||
and supporting procedures. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | and supporting procedures. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
====b. Findings==== | |||
No findings of significance were identified.2.OTHER ACTIVITIES | |||
PI) Verification | {{a|4OA1}} | ||
quarter of 2007. The inspectors utilized performance indicator definitions and guidance | ==4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification== | ||
contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=8}} | ||
Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. | 1. Inspection ScopeThe inspector sampled Exelon's submittal of the performance indicators listed below toverify the accuracy of the data recorded from the third quarter of 2006 through the third quarter of 2007. The inspectors utilized performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. | ||
The inspectors reviewed various documents, including portions of main control room | |||
logs, issue reports, power history curves, work orders, and system derivation reports. | The inspectors reviewed various documents, including portions of main control room logs, issue reports, power history curves, work orders, and system derivation reports. | ||
The inspectors also discussed the method for compiling and reporting performance | |||
indicators with cognizant engineering personnel and compared graphical representations | The inspectors also discussed the method for compiling and reporting performance indicators with cognizant engineering personnel and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify that the report correctly reflected the data. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Cornerstone: Initiating Events (2 samples)*Unit 1 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours; and*Unit 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours.Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems (6 samples)*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection system;*Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system; | ||
from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify that the report correctly reflected | |||
the data. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Cornerstone: Initiating Events (2 samples)*Unit 1 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours; and*Unit 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours.Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems (6 samples)*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection system;*Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system; | |||
*Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system; | *Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system; | ||
*Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system; | *Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system; | ||
*Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators; and | *Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators; and | ||
*Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators. | *Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators. | ||
9Enclosure As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance | |||
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a screening of all items entered into | ====b. Findings==== | ||
Limerick's CAP. The inspectors accomplished this by reviewing the description of each | No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)9Enclosure As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a screening of all items entered into Limerick's CAP. The inspectors accomplished this by reviewing the description of each new issue report and accessing Exelon's computerized database. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
new issue report and accessing Exelon's computerized database. The documents | |||
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. | ====b. Findings==== | ||
corrective action process.4OA3Event Followup (71153).1Unit 1 Main Generator Output Switchyard Disconnect Removal from Service due to HighTemperature | No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors observed that issues selectedfor review were appropriately categorized and prioritized in accordance with Exelon's corrective action process.4OA3Event Followup (71153).1Unit 1 Main Generator Output Switchyard Disconnect Removal from Service due to HighTemperature | ||
disconnect problem with operations personnel, engineering personnel, and Exelon | |||
management to gain an understanding of Exelon's response and follow-up actions. The | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
inspectors reviewed troubleshooting activities, the disconnect temperature surveillance | On August 16, 2007, the inspectors responded to the plant due to a high temperature onthe Unit 1 main generator output disconnect. The inspectors discussed the switchyard disconnect problem with operations personnel, engineering personnel, and Exelon management to gain an understanding of Exelon's response and follow-up actions. The inspectors reviewed troubleshooting activities, the disconnect temperature surveillance monitoring, and the planned actions to repair and correct the disconnect high temperature condition. The number 11 disconnect is located on the output of the Unit 1 main transformers and isphysically located in the Unit 1 220 kilovolt (kV) switchyard. The disconnect is comprised of three individual disconnects and associated bus bars. The disconnect "B" phase temperature reached a maximum value of 375 degrees Celsius and resulted in reactor power reductions to lower the temperature. The location of the elevated temperature was at the movable hinged section of the disconnect. The "A" and "C" phase temperatures were 95 to 100 degrees Celsius. The "B" phase high temperature was discovered during ongoing monthly temperature monitoring. In response to the high temperature, operators reduced reactor power from 100 percentdown to 25 percent to reduce the disconnect temperature and support removal of the main generator and disconnect from service to perform repairs. The inspectors observed "just-in-time training" in the simulator that was given to the operators prior to removing the main generator and disconnect from service. The inspectors also observed the operators' removal of the main generator and disconnect from service to support repairs. | ||
monitoring, and the planned actions to repair and correct the disconnect high | |||
temperature condition. The number 11 disconnect is located on the output of the Unit 1 main transformers and isphysically located in the Unit 1 220 kilovolt (kV) switchyard. The disconnect is comprised | After removal from service, the "B" phase disconnect was rebuilt and tested satisfactorily prior to being returned to service. The main generator was placed back in service and the plant was returned to 100 percent power. The documents reviewed are listed in the | ||
of three individual disconnects and associated bus bars. The disconnect "B" phase | . | ||
temperature reached a maximum value of 375 degrees Celsius and resulted in reactor | |||
power reductions to lower the temperature. The location of the elevated temperature | ====b. Findings==== | ||
was at the movable hinged section of the disconnect. The "A" and "C" phase | 10Enclosure No findings of significance were identified..2(Closed) LER 05000353/02007-001, Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Failed Open Due to Clearance Tagging ErrorOn March 10, 2007, Limerick Unit 2 was in hot shutdown and depressurized toapproximately 25 psig for the 2R09 refueling outage. A full scram signal was present and the scram discharge volume (SDV) was isolated, as designed. Operators were in the process of applying a clearance in preparation for planned maintenance on the Reactor Protection System and the scram air header. As part of this clearance, operators removed the Reactor Protection System backup scram fuses which ultimately resulted in the SDV vent and drain valves opening unexpectedly. Water from the SDV began to vent through these open valves into the plant drain system. Station personnel discovered the condition and closed the SDV vent and drain valves, stopping the source of the water. Further investigation by the station determined that the inadvertent opening of the SDV vent and drain valves was due to an improperly written clearance. A non-cited violation (NCV) associated with this issue was documented in Section 1R20of NRC integrated inspection report 05000352/2007002 and 05000353/2007002. The inspectors reviewed this LER and did not identify any additional findings of significance. | ||
temperatures were 95 to 100 degrees Celsius. The "B" phase high temperature was | |||
discovered during ongoing monthly temperature monitoring. In response to the high temperature, operators reduced reactor power from 100 percentdown to 25 percent to reduce the disconnect temperature and support removal of the | Exelon documented this event and associated corrective actions in IR 602042. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed..3(Closed) LER 05000353/02007-002, Valid Actuation of Main Condenser Low Vacuum Isolation Logic During OutageOn March 12, 2007, operators were in the process of lowering vacuum on Limerick Unit 2as part of refueling outage activities in accordance with procedure S07.2.A, "Shutdown of the Steam Jet Air Ejector and Breaking Main Condenser Vacuum." During this evolution, the main condenser low vacuum main steam isolation valve (MSIV) isolation logic actuated unexpectedly. Further investigation revealed that due to a procedural execution error, station personnel had only bypassed two of the required four channels of the isolation logic. Even though this resulted in actuation of two channels of logic when vacuum was lowered, no valves actually repositioned since the MSIVs and other affected valves were closed earlier as required by procedure. This failure to comply with procedure S07.2.A constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's enforcement policy. The inspectors reviewed this LER and did not identify any additional findings of significance. | ||
main generator and disconnect from service to perform repairs. The inspectors observed | |||
"just-in-time training" in the simulator that was given to the operators prior to removing | Exelon documented this event and associated corrective actions in IR 602921. This LER is closed. | ||
the main generator and disconnect from service. The inspectors also observed the | |||
operators' removal of the main generator and disconnect from service to support repairs. | ===.4 (Closed) LER 05000353/02007-003, Automatic Actuation of the Reactor ProtectionSystem at PowerOn April 24, 2007, the Unit 2 Reactor Protection System automatically actuated whenreactor water level decreased from +35 inches to +12.5 inches.=== | ||
After removal from service, the "B" phase disconnect was rebuilt and tested satisfactorily | All control rods fullyinserted. When reactor level decreased to the low-low level setpoint of -38 inches, both HPCI and RCIC systems initiated and injected into the vessel. HPCI and RCIC were placed in manual mode when flow oscillations were observed on both systems. Both systems were automatically secured when reactor level increased to +54 inches. | ||
prior to being returned to service. The main generator was placed back in service and | |||
the plant was returned to 100 percent power. The documents reviewed are listed in the | 11Enclosure Exelon's investigation determined that a circuit card in Redundant Reactivity ControlSystem (RRCS) Division 1, channel "B" spuriously actuated while channel "A" was in a tripped condition due to planned surveillance testing. This resulted in a feedwater runback. The feedwater runback reduced reactor level as expected.Exelon's investigation determined that HPCI and RCIC flow oscillations were due to flowcontrol loop tuning settings that did not properly account for differences in flow path testing conditions and vessel injection flow conditions. Station personnel replaced and successfully tested the affected RRCS circuit card. In addition the HPCI and RCIC flow controller gain and reset settings were adjusted to be consistent with Unit 1 settings, which are consistent with industry values and similar to previous Unit 2 settings when stable flow was demonstrated during Unit 2 initial startup testing. The procedure for tuning of HPCI and RCIC flow controls was revised to specify the required gain and reset settings.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's apparent cause investigation, Unit 2 TS, andnotification requirements. The apparent cause investigation determined that the HPCI and RCIC gain and reset settings were changed during system tuning in May 1999; therefore, this condition existed for approximately 8 years. This resulted in a condition that could have prevented the safety function of Unit 2 HPCI. A non-cited violation (NCV)associated with this issue was documented in Section IR19 of NRC integrated inspection report 05000352/2007003 and 05000353/2007003. Exelon documented this issue and its corrective actions in IR 620861. The review determined that Unit 1 was not affected. | ||
10Enclosure No findings of significance were identified..2(Closed) LER 05000353/02007-001, Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Failed Open Due to Clearance Tagging ErrorOn March 10, 2007, Limerick Unit 2 was in hot shutdown and depressurized toapproximately 25 psig for the 2R09 refueling outage. A full scram signal was present | The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions, including revised procedures, and found no additional findings or unresolved issues. The documents reviewed are listed in the | ||
and the scram discharge volume (SDV) was isolated, as designed. Operators were in | . This LER is closed.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn October 15, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results toMr. E. Callan and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not included in the inspection report. ATTACHMENT: | ||
the process of applying a clearance in preparation for planned maintenance on the | |||
Reactor Protection System and the scram air header. As part of this clearance, | =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= | ||
operators removed the Reactor Protection System backup scram fuses which ultimately | |||
resulted in the | ==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | ||
Exelon Generation Company | |||
SDV | : [[contact::C. Mudrick]], Site Vice President | ||
began to vent through these open valves into the plant drain system. Station personnel | : [[contact::E. Callan]], Plant Manager | ||
discovered the condition and closed the SDV vent and drain valves, stopping the source | : [[contact::D. DiCello]], Radiation Protection Manager | ||
of the water. Further investigation by the station determined that the inadvertent opening | : [[contact::R. Dickinson]], Director Engineering | ||
of the | : [[contact::J. Berg]], System Manager, HPCI and RCIC | ||
: [[contact::J. George]], System Manager, Remote Shutdown Panel | |||
NCV) associated with this issue was documented in Section 1R20of NRC integrated inspection report 05000352/2007002 and 05000353/2007002. The | : [[contact::M. Gift]], System Manager, Radiation Monitoring Systems | ||
inspectors reviewed this LER and did not identify any additional findings of significance. | : [[contact::R. Gosby]], Radiation Protection Technician, Instrumentation | ||
Exelon documented this event and associated corrective actions in IR 602042. The | : [[contact::R. Harding]], Engineer, Regulatory Assurance | ||
documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This | : [[contact::R. Kreider]], Manager, Regulatory Assurance | ||
: [[contact::D. Malinowski]], Simulator Instructor | |||
LER 05000353/02007-002, Valid Actuation of Main Condenser Low Vacuum Isolation Logic During OutageOn March 12, 2007, operators were in the process of lowering vacuum on Limerick Unit 2as part of refueling outage activities in accordance with procedure S07.2.A, "Shutdown of | : [[contact::B. Tracy]], System Manager | ||
the Steam Jet Air Ejector and Breaking Main Condenser Vacuum." During this evolution, | : [[contact::P. Tarpinian]], PRA Engineer | ||
the main condenser low vacuum main steam isolation valve (MSIV) isolation logic | : [[contact::D. Boylan]], Summer Readiness Coordinator | ||
actuated unexpectedly. Further investigation revealed that due to a procedural execution | : [[contact::R. Newmaster]], Manager - Emergency Preparedness, Limerick | ||
error, station personnel had only bypassed two of the required four channels of the | : [[contact::J. Broillet]], Operations Shift Manager | ||
isolation logic. Even though this resulted in actuation of two channels of logic when | ==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED== | ||
vacuum was lowered, no valves actually repositioned since the | |||
===Closed=== | |||
: [[Closes LER::05000353/LER-2007-001]]-0LERScram Discharge Volume Vent and DrainValves Failed Open due to Clearance | |||
: Tagging Error (Section 40A3.2) | |||
procedure S07.2.A constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to | : [[Closes LER::05000353/LER-2007-002]]-0LERValid Actuation of Main Condenser LowVacuum Isolation Logic During Outage | ||
enforcement action in accordance with Section | (Section 40A3.3) | ||
: [[Closes LER::05000353/LER-2007-003]]LERAutomatic Actuation of the ReactorProtection System at Power (Section | |||
NRC's enforcement policy. The | : 40A3.4) | ||
inspectors reviewed this LER and did not identify any additional findings of significance. | ===Discussed=== | ||
Exelon documented this event and associated corrective actions in | None | ||
A-2Attachment | |||
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | |||
==Section 1R01: == | |||
: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresOP-AA-108-107-1001, "Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions," Revision 2S32.3.A, "Main Generator Inspection During Heavy Grid Load," Revision 7Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProceduresTechnical Specification 3/4 8.1, "A.C. Sources"S92.9.N, "Routine Inspection of the Diesel Generators," Revision 53 | |||
: 1S46.1.A (COL), "Valve and Breaker Alignment for Start-up of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Supply System for Service" | |||
RCIC were | : ST-6-048-230-1, "SLC Pump, Valve, and Flow Test" | ||
placed in manual mode when flow oscillations were observed on both systems. Both | : S49.3.A, "RCIC Fill and Vent," Revision 17 | ||
systems were automatically secured when reactor level increased to +54 inches. | : Troubleshooting, Rework, and Testing Control Form, TRT No. 07-174, RCIC Fill and Vent | ||
11Enclosure Exelon's investigation determined that a circuit card in Redundant Reactivity ControlSystem (RRCS) Division 1, channel "B" spuriously actuated while channel "A" was in a | |||
tripped condition due to planned surveillance testing. This resulted in a feedwater | ==Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionProceduresARC-MCR-006 B1L, Fire Alarm Response Card, Revision 2F-A-452, "Unit 1 Static Inverter Room, Fire Area 20," Revision 7== | ||
runback. The feedwater runback reduced reactor level as expected.Exelon's investigation determined that | : F-A-453, "Unit 2 Static Inverter Room, Fire Area 20," Revision 4 | ||
: F-A-533, "Control Room 533 and Peripheral Rooms 530 to 535 (EL. 269) Fire Area 24," Revision 10F-A-619, "Control Structure Fan Room (EL. 304) Fire Area 27," Revision 6 | |||
RCIC flow oscillations were due to flowcontrol loop tuning settings that did not properly account for differences in flow path | : F-A-624, "Standby Gas Treatment Area Rooms 624 & 625, Fire Area 28," Revision 6 | ||
testing conditions and vessel injection flow conditions. Station personnel replaced and | : F-D-311D, "D14 Diesel Generator Room and Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Tank Room Rooms 311Dand 312D (EL. 217) Fire Area 82," Revision 5F-T-328, "Unit 1 Air Compressor, EHC Power Unit, and Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank AreasRooms 328, 330, and 331 (EL. 217) Fire Area 93," Revision 5OP-AA-201-003, "Fire Drill Performance," Revision 8 | ||
successfully tested the affected | : SE-8, "Fire," Revision 31 | ||
: ST-6-022-551-0, "Fire Drill," Revision 8, conducted on 9/26/07Issue Reports and Action Requests (ARs)IR | |||
: 676038, "Fire Brigade Member EO Key Ring"A1261436, "Evaluate Propping Open of Doors"MiscellaneousUFSAR Appendix 9A | |||
==Section 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProceduresSE-4, "Flood," Revision 5SE-4-1, "Reactor Enclosure Flooding," Revision 8== | |||
controller gain and reset settings were adjusted to be consistent with Unit 1 settings, | : A-3AttachmentIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR | ||
which are consistent with industry values and similar to previous Unit 2 settings when | : 634795, "Floor Drain Clogged in U/1 HPCI Room"MiscellaneousBLP-31981, "Moderate Energy Pipe Break (MEPB) Analysis," dated February 1984NPB-14, "Moderate Energy Line Break," Revision 4 | ||
stable flow was demonstrated during Unit 2 initial startup testing. The procedure for | : NPB-32, "Flooding of ECCS Compartments from the Suppression Pool," Revision 3NPB-33, "Moderate Energy Pipe Break Report," Revision 3 | ||
tuning of | |||
==Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramProceduresEOP== | |||
RCIC flow controls was revised to specify the required gain and reset | : T-101, "RPV Control," Revision 20 EOP T-103, "Secondary Containment Control," Revision 17 | ||
settings.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's apparent cause investigation, Unit | : EOP T-112, "Emergency Blowdown," Revision 12 | ||
: EOP T-270, "Terminate and Prevent injection into RPV," Revision 12 | |||
==Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessProceduresER-AA-310, "Implementation of the Maintenance Rule," Revision 6ER-AA-310-1004, "Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring," Revision 5== | |||
: ER-AA-310-1003, "Maintenance Rule - Performance Criteria Selection," Revision 3 | |||
therefore, this condition existed for approximately 8 years. This resulted in a condition | : ER-AA-310-1005, "Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)," Revision 5 | ||
that could have prevented the safety function of Unit | : ER-LG-310-1010, "Maintenance Rule Implementation," Revision 7 | ||
: ER-AA-310, "Implementation of the Maintenance Rule," Revision 6Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR | |||
NCV) | : 483496, "TECW Unavailability Issues"IR | ||
associated with this issue was documented in Section | : 637270, "Possible Maintenance Rule (a)(1) for Excessive TECW System Outage Window" | ||
: IR 642006, "2B TECW Heat Exchanger Unavailability Hours Exceeded" | |||
: IR 667927, "Document Unit 2 HPCI Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Determination" | |||
report 05000352/2007003 and 05000353/2007003. Exelon documented this issue and | : IR 506692, "Points 3 & 5 Failing" | ||
its corrective actions in IR 620861. The review determined that Unit 1 was not affected. | : IR 546231, "1A Recombiner Valve | ||
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions, including revised procedures, and found | : FV-DO-101A Failed to Open" | ||
no additional findings or unresolved issues. The documents reviewed are listed in the | : IR 551504, "1A Post LOCA Recombiner MRule FF (A)(1) Determination"MiscellaneousMaintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, dated 11/01/2006, 11/30/2006Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, dated 09/14/2000, 02/15/2001, 04/20/2006, | ||
: 06/19/2007 | |||
==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProceduresER-AA-600-1045, "Risk Assessments of Missed or Deficient Surveillances," Revision 0S07.6.A, "Placing Alternate Steam Jet Air Ejector In Service," Revision 27== | |||
information was not included in the inspection report. | : ST-2-041-661-1, "Safety Relief Valves - Safety Relief Valve Position Indicators Functional Test,"Revision 12Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR | ||
: [[ | : 598489, "D11 - Adjust Voltage Regulator Droop to 3% - 5%" | ||
: [[ | : A-4AttachmentIR | ||
: [[ | : 601471, "ISI Inspection Volume for Code Case N-435"IR | ||
: [[ | : 649698, "Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code Case N-435-1" | ||
: [[ | : IR 657596, "2B Reactor Recirculation MG Set Runback to Min Speed" | ||
: [[ | : IR 668047, "Large VAR Swings During D12 D/G/ Run"IR | ||
: [[ | : 674591, "SRV 'D' Position Indicator Functional Test Failed" | ||
: [[ | : A1456726, "Excursion in KVAR and KW" | ||
: [[ | : A1600437, "D12 Voltage Regulator VAR Swings When Paralleled to Offsite" | ||
: A1628762, "IR for Generation of Activity to Swap Unit 2 SJAE" | |||
: [[ | : A1631597, "Repair/Replace/Recal Loop Component," Dated 09/24/2007MiscellaneousOperator Logs dated 07/13/2007Limerick Generating Station On-Line Work Schedule, 09/14/2007-09/16/2007 | ||
==Section 1R15: OperabilityIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR | |||
: [[ | : 060981, "HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve Position Relay Contacts Failed"IR | ||
: [[ | : 101384, "Inappropriate Conclusions in Disp== | ||
: | : PEP I0012531/CR 00060981" | ||
: IR 641784, "HPCI Aux Oil Pump Did Not Stop per PV&F" | |||
: IR 642617, "HV-055-2F006 Failed to Stroke Open" | |||
: IR 658690, "Unit 2 RCIC OOS/Gross Fail Alarm" | |||
: IR 658931, "RCIC Pump Suction HI Press Alarm Came in While Swapping Suction Valves" | |||
: IR 658950, "HPCI Oil Pressure Lower Than Desired Band" | |||
: A1626638, "HPCI Oil Pressure Lower Than Desired Band" | |||
: IR 651187, "HPCI Higher than Normal Unit 1 HPCI Pump Room Temperature" | |||
: IR 664065, "Unit 2 Recirculation Pump #2 Seal Pressure Drop"MiscellaneousLimerick Generating Station UFSAR Section 6.3LEAM-0008, "HPCI Flow to RPV w/Single Discharge Path Open," Revision 0 | |||
: M-48-12, "SLCS Boron Injection Delay Time," Revision 4 | |||
: | : M-55-10, "HPCI Line Sizing Check," Revision 4 | ||
: M-55-26, "ATWS 3A HPCI Flow Split Calculation to Size a Flow Orifice for Branch to CoreSpray," Revision 6ECR | |||
: LG 01-01152, "HPCI Failed Injection Valve - Provide Quality Docs" | |||
: | |||
: | ==Section 1R19: Post Maintenance TestingProceduresST-2-042-638-2, "ATWS - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Functional Test," Revision 12ST-6-051-231-2, "A== | ||
: | : RHR Pump, Valve and Flow Test," Revision 52 | ||
: ST-6-012-231-0, "A Loop RHRSW Pump, Valve and Flow Test", Revision 54 | |||
: ST-6-048-230-1, "SLC Pump, Valve and Flow Test", Revision 32 | |||
: | : ST-6-107-201-0,"IST Valve Stroke for New Baseline," Revision 4 | ||
: M-C-792-001, "Fairbanks Morse Opposed Piston Diesel Engine Examination and GeneralMaintenance," Revision 4Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR | |||
: | : 338368, "Unit 2 RCIC Small Packing Leak from | ||
: HV-049-2F008 OUTBD PCIV"IR | |||
: 381319, "Unit 2 RCIC | |||
( | : HV-049-2F008 Packing Leak" | ||
: A-5AttachmentIR | |||
: 654021,"D22 Diesel Lube Oil Circ Pump Making Excess Noise"IR | |||
: 654041, "Dual Indication for | |||
: HV-51-2F024A During Stroke Close" | |||
: IR 663431, "D21: Brush Holder Cable Replacement Not Identical to Original" | |||
: IR 664060, "D21 Diesel Rapid Shutdown Due to Cylinder Leak" | |||
: IR 664291, "D21 Emergency Stop Alarm Failed to Annunciate" | |||
: IR 676024, "Indicating Lights did not Illuminate" | |||
: | : A1178453, "Disassemble and Inspection 20" Manual Check Valve, 012-0001C" | ||
: A1624433, "Replace RRCS | |||
: HPII/HPOI Cards"A1628140, "D21 Over Excitation During Break-In Run" | |||
: A1628023, "Alarms on D21 Still Annunciated and Will Not Clear" | |||
: | : A1628302, "D21 Diesel Rapid Shutdown Due to Cylinder Leak" | ||
: A1630245, "Unit 2 RCIC Steam Line Outboard PCIV"Work OrdersR1005988, "D21 24 Month Diesel Inspection Per M-C-792-001" MiscellaneousLimerick Generating Station On-Line Work Schedule 08/23/2007-08/26/2007Operator Logs dated 08/23/2007 | |||
: Safety Relief Valve Technical Specification Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Table 3.3.7.5-1 | |||
==Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingProceduresST-2-051-802-2, "Division 2== | |||
: LPCI System Response Time Testing," Revision 8ST-2-055-810-1, "HPCI System Response Time Testing," Revision 11, completed 09/18/2007 | |||
: ST-6-055-230-1, "HPCI Pump, Valve, and Flow Test," Revision 65, completed 09/18/2007 | |||
: | : ST-6-092-314-2, "D24 Diesel Generator Slow Start Operability Test Run," Revision 61,completed 07/16/07ST-6-107-790-2, "Control Rod Scram Timing," Revision 11, completed 09/20/2007Issue Reports and Action RequestsA1614302, "U2 | ||
: | : HCU 46-47 Has No Full Out Position Indication on Full Core Display"IR | ||
AA- | : 671836, "Blue Scram Light Failed to Light During ST-6-107-790-2" | ||
: | ==Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsProceduresCC-AA-112, "Temporary Configuration Changes," Revision 12S43.0.C, "Clearing an Electrical or Mechanical Stop," Revision 18MiscellaneousTRT-D7-164, "Install 1B Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Temporary Mechanical Stop"C0221920, "Install Temporary Mechanical High Speed Stop in== | ||
: | : XY-M1-1S001B" Limerick Generating Station UFSAR Section 5.4 | ||
: | : Limerick Generating Station Technical Specifications 3/4.4.1Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR | ||
: | : 631119, "1B Recirc Pump Speed Changes"IR | ||
: | : 654530, "Emergent PRA - Need New AR Created to Install Travel Limiter" | ||
: A1616738, "1B Recirc Pump Speed Changes" | |||
: A-6AttachmentA1625008, "Need New AR Created to Install Travel Limiter" | |||
: | |||
==Section 1EP6: Drill EvaluationProceduresEOP== | |||
: | : T-117, "Level/Power Control," Revision 15EOP T-104, "Radioactivity Release Control," Revision 12 | ||
: EOP T-103, "Secondary Containment Control," Revision 17 | |||
: EOP T-270, "Terminate and Prevent Injection Into RPV," Revision 12 | |||
: EP-AA-122, "Drills and Exercises," Revision 7 | |||
: | : EP-AA-122-F-01, "Drill and Exercise Evaluation Criteria," Revision B | ||
: | : EP-AA-122-1001, "Drill and Exercise Scheduling, Development, and Conduct," Revision 8 | ||
: | : EP-AA-122-1002-F-02, "Drill and Exercise Objective Evaluation Data Tables," Revision B | ||
: | : LS-AA-120, "Issue Identification and Screening Process," Revision 7 | ||
: | : T-103, "Secondary Containment Control," Revision 17MiscellaneousIR 437320IR 670538 | ||
: | : Limerick [EP] Training Drill Series Evaluation Report, dated 07-31-2007 | ||
: LSES-8020, "Licensed Operator Training Simulator Evaluation Scenario," Revision 0 | |||
: | : NRC IR 50-352&353/2005009 | ||
: | |||
: | ==Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) VerificationProceduresS92.6.N, "Diesel Oil Storage Tank Lineup to Fill Other than its Associated Day Tank," Revision 10Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR | ||
: | : 556902, "Minor Leakby of 049-2F014 Discovered During== | ||
: | : ST-2-049-601-2"IR | ||
: | : 565800, "HV-049-1F019 RCIC Min Flow Shows Dual Indication at 600 GPM" | ||
: | : IR 620861, "GP-18 Review HPCI/RCIC Oscillations" | ||
: IR 628573, "RCIC MOV Overload or Power Loss DS14" | |||
: | : IR 628579, "Inadvertent RCIC OOS Annunciator" | ||
: | : IR 628600, "2DA-09 Tripped on Thermals" | ||
: | : IR 642618, "Valve Stroke Time Outside Acceptable Range" | ||
HPCI | : IR 652846, "RCIC Overspeed Test Potentiometers Possibly Not Locked" | ||
: | : A1238085, "Determine if HPCI is Operable With Temperature Instrumentation Installed" | ||
: A1295250, "FI-49-1R600-1 Spiking" | |||
: | : A1304397, "Revise the | ||
: ML-008 Spec to Correctly Reflect the Safety Classification of the RCICMin Flow Line"MiscellaneousNEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5Reactor Oversight Program MSPI Bases Document, Limerick Generating Station, Revision 1 | |||
: | : MSPI Derivation Reports for HPCI, RCIC, and EDGs Operator Logs dated 07/01/2007 through 07/31/2007 | ||
: | : Maintenance Rule Failure Reports for HPCI, RCIC, and EDGs | ||
: LG 01-00170, "Classification of the RCIC Min Flow Line" | |||
: | ==Section 4OA2: Other== | ||
: A-7AttachmentIssue Reports and Action RequestsA16106882C-P501 Packing Leakoff Excessive (Complete)A16159402C Circ Pump Step Change in Vibration | |||
: A1620985Spray Pond Level/Temp Alarming Before Setpoints Reached | |||
: | : A16219922C-P501 Excessive Packing Leakage (Complete) | ||
: A1622672Control Rod 22-35 Temp at 305 Deg F | |||
: A1628676Spray Pond Hi Temp Alarms Early | |||
: | : C02212742C-P501-DR Inspect or Replace Motor Bearings | ||
: | : IR 6120832C-P501 Packing Leakoff Excessive | ||
: IR 612647Drive Mechanism Temperature for | |||
: HCU 30-35 is @429 Degrees F | |||
: | : IR 6275952C Circ Pump Surge Capacitor Damaged | ||
: IR 6289652C Circ Pump Step Change in Vibration | |||
: IR 639934"Spray Pond Lo Level/Hi Temp" Alarm Locked In | |||
: IR 643596Spray Pond Level/Temp Alarming Before Setpoints Reached | |||
: | : IR 6454662C-P501 Excessive Packing Leakage | ||
: IR 648107Control Rod 22-35 Temp at 305 Deg F (Completed) | |||
: IR 649388Hairline Crack Identified on Yoke | |||
: | : IR 6498062C-P501-DR Temp Cooling | ||
: | : IR 654068Hairline Crack Identified on Yoke | ||
: | : IR 654070Hairline Crack Identified on Yoke | ||
: | : IR 665262Spray Pond Hi Temp Alarms Early | ||
: | : IR 6723152C-P501 High Packing Leak OffOther DocumentsPlant Health Committee System Presentation: Circ Water, June, 2007Plant Health Committee System Presentation: Control Rod Drive Supply, June, 2007 | ||
: | : Plant Health Committee System Presentation: EDG, June, 2007 | ||
: Plant Health Committee System Presentation: RHRSW, June, 2007 | |||
: SHIP Chronic Problem Report: Circ Water, June, 2007 | |||
: | : SHIP Chronic Problem Report: EDG, June, 2007 | ||
: | : System Health Overview Report: Circ Water, June, 2007 | ||
: | : System Health Overview Report: Control Rod Drive Supply, June, 2007 | ||
: System Health Overview Report: EDG, June, 2007 | |||
: System Health Overview Report: RHRSW, June, 2007 | |||
: System Health Overview Report: Circ Water, Sept, 2007 | |||
: | : System Health Overview Report: Control Rod Drive Supply, Sept, 2007 | ||
: System Health Overview Report: EDG, Sept, 2007 | |||
: System Health Overview Report: RHRSW, Sept, 2007 | |||
==Section 4OA3: Event FollowupProceduresOP-LG-109-101-1001, "Limerick System Specific Tagging Guides," Revision 15Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR | |||
: 601910, "Drainage System Clogged"IR | |||
: 602042, "Unit 2== | |||
: SDV Vent/Drain Valves Open With Scram Signal Present" | |||
: | : IR 602921, "Division 1 and 4 MSIV Isolation Logic Alarms" | ||
: A-8AttachmentMiscellaneousLER 2007-001, "Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Failed Open Due to ClearanceTagging Error"LER 2007-002, "Valid Actuation of Main Condenser Low Vacuum Isolation Logic During Outage" | |||
: LER 2007-003, "Automatic Actuation Of The Reactor Protection System at Power" | |||
==LIST OF ACRONYMS== | |||
: | ADAMSAgencywide Documents Access Management SystemARaction request | ||
ASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers | |||
: | CAPCorrective Action Program | ||
: | CFRCode of Federal Regulations | ||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
: | |||
A-8AttachmentMiscellaneousLER 2007-001, "Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Failed Open Due to ClearanceTagging Error"LER 2007-002, "Valid Actuation of Main Condenser Low Vacuum Isolation Logic During Outage" | |||
: | |||
CRDcontrol rod drive | CRDcontrol rod drive | ||
EDGemergency diesel generator | EDGemergency diesel generator | ||
EHCelectro-hydraulic control | EHCelectro-hydraulic control | ||
EPemergency preparedness | |||
EROEmergency Response Organization | |||
HPCIhigh pressure coolant injection | |||
IRissue report | IRissue report | ||
kVkilo volt | kVkilo volt | ||
LERLicensee Event Report | |||
LOCAloss of coolant accident | |||
MSIVmain steam isolation valve | |||
NCVnon-cited violation | |||
NEINuclear Energy Institute | |||
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission | |||
OAother activities | OAother activities | ||
PARprotective action recommendation | |||
PARSPublicly Available Records | |||
PIperformance indicator | |||
P&IDpiping and instrumentation drawing | |||
PMTpost-maintenance test | |||
IDpiping and instrumentation drawing | RCICreactor core isolation cooling | ||
RHRresidual heat removal | |||
RRCSredundant reactivity control system | |||
SCBAself-contained breathing apparatus | |||
SDVscram discharge volume | |||
: [[SHIP]] [[ystem health indicator program]] | |||
: [[SSC]] [[structure, system, component]] | |||
TStechnic al specification | |||
: [[UFSAR]] [[updated final safety analysis report]] | |||
: [[ | |||
: [[ | |||
: [[ | |||
}} | }} |
Revision as of 21:32, 21 October 2018
ML073180045 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Limerick ![]() |
Issue date: | 11/13/2007 |
From: | Krohn P G Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
To: | Pardee C G Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
KROHN, PG | |
References | |
IR-07-004 | |
Download: ML073180045 (25) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 November 13, 2007Mr. Charles G. PardeePresident and CNO Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348
SUBJECT: LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000352/2007004 AND 05000353/2007004
Dear Mr. Pardee:
On September 30, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on October 15, 2007, with Mr. E. Callan and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/Paul G. Krohn, ChiefProjects Branch 4 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos: 50-352, 50-353License Nos: NPF-39, NPF-85
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000352/2007004 and 05000353/2007004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000352/2007-004, 05000353/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Limerick GeneratingStation, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by reactor inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began this inspection period operating at full rated thermal power. On August 16, 2007,reactor power was reduced to 20 percent and the main generator was removed from service to repair the generator output number 11 disconnect switch. On August 17, 2007, the disconnect switch repairs were completed and the main generator was returned to service. Unit 1 returned to 100 percent power on August 18, 2007. With the exception of a planned end of summer load drop to 85 percent power on September 8, 2007, Unit 1 remained at full power for the remainder of the period.
Unit 2 began this inspection period operating at full rated thermal power. On August 6, 2007, reactor power decreased to 75 percent due to an unplanned speed reduction on the 2B reactor recirculation pump. The pump speed change was due to a recirculation motor generator electronic card failure. The card was replaced and Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power later in the day. With the exception of a planned end of summer load drop to 60 percent power on September 15, 2007, Unit 2 remained at full power for the remainder of the period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 system sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated Exelon's preparations and protection for summer weather. OnJuly 10, 2007, the inspectors walked down Unit 1 and Unit 2 main generators and main transformers during hot weather and a grid heavy load voltage condition. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed four partial walkdowns of plant systems to verify the operabilityof redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment in the opposite train was either inoperable, undergoing surveillance testing, or potentially degraded. The inspectors used plant Technical Specifications (TS), Exelon operating procedures, plantpiping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USFAR) as guidance for conducting partial system walkdowns. The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures and drawings.
2Enclosure During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated material condition and generalhousekeeping of the system and adjacent spaces. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the following systems:*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system;*Unit 1 D-13 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG);
- Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System; and
- Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)..2Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample)The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control RodDrive (CRD) systems to verify functional capability of the system. The inspectors used plant TS, Exelon operating procedures, P&IDs, the UFSAR, and past surveillance tests as guidance for conducting the complete system walkdown. The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves, position of electrical breakers and settings of the system flow controller to ensure proper system configuration as described in plant procedures and drawings. During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and general housekeeping of the system and open issue reports associated with the system.
The walkdown also included an evaluation of system piping, supports, and component foundations to ensure they were not degraded. The documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection.1Fire Protection - Tours
(71111.05Q - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a tour of the eight areas listed below to assess the materialcondition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with Exelon's administrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use, and that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment in accordance with Exelon's fire plan. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed the following samples:*Main Control Room and peripheral rooms;*Unit 1 Refuel Floor;
- Unit 2 Refuel Floor;
- Unit 1 220 KV Switchyard;
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Static Inverter compartments;
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment system filter compartments and accessarea; 3Enclosure *Control Room Structure fan room, Elevation 304; and*Unit 1 D14 Diesel Generator Room..2Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed one unannounced fire drill conducted in the Unit 1 aircompressor, electro-hydraulic control (EHC) power unit, and turbine lubricating oil storage tank area on September 26, 2007. The inspectors observed the drill to evaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Specific attributes evaluated were:*Proper donning of fire fighting turnout gear and self-contained breathingapparatus (SCBA); *Proper use and layout of fire hoses;
- Employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques;
- Sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene;
- Effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;
- Search for victims and propagation of fire into other plant areas;
- Smoke removal operations;
- Utilization of pre-planned strategies;
- Adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and
- Drill objectives.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
(71111.06 - 1 sample)Internal Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed documents and inspected structures, systems, and components(SSCs) relative to the adequacy of internal flood protection measures for the Unit 1 HPCI room. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the relevant areas to verify the adequacy of flood mitigation doors and barriers, drainage systems, and other flood protection features. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 sample)Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
4Enclosure On August 28, 2007, the inspectors observed a licensed operator requalificationsimulator scenario. The scenario included a simulated spurious Division 1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal with failure of the D11 EDG to start and an unisolablereactor water cleanup leak, which resulted in a manual scram and emergency blowdown.
The inspectors observed the performance of two operating crews responding to the same scenario. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, including operator critical tasks that measure operator actions required to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and protection of the nuclear fuel and primary containment barriers. The inspectors observed the training evaluators' critiques at the conclusion of each simulation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
(71111.12 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated Exelon's work practices and follow-up corrective actions forSSCs and identified issues to assess the effectiveness of Exelon's maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of risk significant SSCs and assessed Exelon's extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of the station's corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Exelon's problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether Exelon had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with Exelon procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classifications, performance criteria and goals, and Exelon's corrective actions that were taken or planned, to evaluate whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed the following samples:*1A post LOCA recombiner maintenance rule (a)(1) determination;*2B Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water heat exchanger system outage window; and
- Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection maintenance rule (a)(1) determination.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Exelon's maintenance risk assessmentsrequired by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). This inspection included discussion with control room operators and risk analysis personnel regarding the use of Exelon's on-line risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation, daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain assurance that the actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration. Additionally, the inspectors verified that Exelon's risk management actions, for both planned and emergent work, were 5Enclosure consistent with those described in Exelon procedure, ER-AA-600-1042, "On-Line RiskManagement." The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Inspectors reviewed risk assessments for the following issues:*Incorrect interpretation of ASME Code Case N-435-1;*Unit 1 HPCI room temperature high;
- Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator runback to minimum speed;
- Unit 1 Main Generator Disconnect high temperatures;
- Unit 1 Main Generator Disconnect phases A and C jumper installation;
- Large VAR (Volt-Ampere Reactive) swings during EDG run;
- Unit 2 placing alternate steam jet air ejector in service; and
- Unit 1 "D" Safety Relief Valve position indicator converter module replacement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
(71111.15 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
For the five operability evaluations described below, the inspectors assessed thetechnical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that Exelon properly justified TS operability and verified that the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to verify that the system or component remained available to perform its intended safety function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to ensure that the measures worked and were adequately controlled. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of issue reports (IRs) to verify that Exelon identified and corrected deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations for the following components:*Unit 2 HPCI HV-055-2F006;*Unit 1 HPCI Room Cooler;
- Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Suction High Pressure Alarm;
- Unit 2 HPCI Oil Pressure; and
- Unit 2B Reactor Circulation Pump mechanical seal.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the eight post-maintenance tests (PMTs) listed below to verifythat procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability.
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's test procedures to verify that the procedures 6Enclosure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenanceactivity, and that the applicable criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the licensing and design basis documents. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance tests for the following systems and components:*"C" Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump;*"2A" RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Valve;
- D21 Diesel Generator;
- Unit 1 "A" Standby Liquid Control Squib Valve;
- Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Flow Controller;
- Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Outboard Steam Isolation Valve; and
- Unit 2 Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed the performance and reviewed test data for five surveillancetests that are associated with selected risk-significant SSCs. The review verified that Exelon personnel followed TS requirements and that acceptance criteria were appropriate. The inspectors also verified that the station established proper test conditions, as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests for the following systems and components:*Unit 2 D24 EDG;*Unit 2 Division 2 Lower Pressure Coolant Injection;
- Unit 2 Control Rods;
- Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump; and
- Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
(71111.23 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and compared the temporary modification listed below with theUFSAR and TS to verify that the modification did not affect operability or availability of the Unit 1 reactor recirculation motor generator. The inspectors ensured that station 7Enclosure personnel implemented the modification in accordance with the applicable temporaryconfiguration change process. The inspectors also reviewed the impact on existing procedures to verify appropriate revisions were made to reflect the temporary configuration change. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of proposed testing upon removal of the change. The documents reviewed are listed in the
. The inspectors performed the following sample:*TRT-D7-164, Install 1B Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Generator TemporaryMechanical Stop.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone:
Emergency Preparedness (EP)1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 2 samples).1General Emergency Classification due to Simulated Fuel Failure Coincident with FailedOpen Main Steam Line Isolation Valves
a. Inspection Scope
On June 19, 2007, the inspectors observed an EP training drill in the control roomsimulator. The inspectors assessed Exelon's emergency response organization's (ERO)implementation of the Limerick emergency plan and implementing procedures, and the ERO's response to simulated degraded plant conditions to identify weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR)development activities. In addition, the inspectors assessed licensed operator performance required to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and the protection of the nuclear fuel and primary containment barriers. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's training evaluators' critiques and the formal critique report, dated July 31, 2007, associated with the EP drill, to evaluate Exelon's identification of weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors compared inspector observed weaknesses with those identified in Exelon's formal drill critique to verify whether Exelon adequately identified weaknesses and deficiencies at an appropriate threshold. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Site Area Emergency Classification Due to a Simulated Reactor Coolant System Leak inthe Reactor Building
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a licensed operator requalification simulator exercise evaluationto identify the timing and adequacy of classification, notification, and PAR development activities. During the simulator evaluation, the inspectors reviewed checklists and forms 8Enclosure used for classification and notification activities, and compared them to the criteria inExelon's Emergency Plan, EP-MA-114-100-F-01, "State/Local Event Notification Form,"
and supporting procedures. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
1. Inspection ScopeThe inspector sampled Exelon's submittal of the performance indicators listed below toverify the accuracy of the data recorded from the third quarter of 2006 through the third quarter of 2007. The inspectors utilized performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.
The inspectors reviewed various documents, including portions of main control room logs, issue reports, power history curves, work orders, and system derivation reports.
The inspectors also discussed the method for compiling and reporting performance indicators with cognizant engineering personnel and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify that the report correctly reflected the data. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Cornerstone: Initiating Events (2 samples)*Unit 1 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours; and*Unit 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours.Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems (6 samples)*Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection system;*Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system;
- Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system;
- Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system;
- Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators; and
- Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)9Enclosure As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a screening of all items entered into Limerick's CAP. The inspectors accomplished this by reviewing the description of each new issue report and accessing Exelon's computerized database. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors observed that issues selectedfor review were appropriately categorized and prioritized in accordance with Exelon's corrective action process.4OA3Event Followup (71153).1Unit 1 Main Generator Output Switchyard Disconnect Removal from Service due to HighTemperature
a. Inspection Scope
On August 16, 2007, the inspectors responded to the plant due to a high temperature onthe Unit 1 main generator output disconnect. The inspectors discussed the switchyard disconnect problem with operations personnel, engineering personnel, and Exelon management to gain an understanding of Exelon's response and follow-up actions. The inspectors reviewed troubleshooting activities, the disconnect temperature surveillance monitoring, and the planned actions to repair and correct the disconnect high temperature condition. The number 11 disconnect is located on the output of the Unit 1 main transformers and isphysically located in the Unit 1 220 kilovolt (kV) switchyard. The disconnect is comprised of three individual disconnects and associated bus bars. The disconnect "B" phase temperature reached a maximum value of 375 degrees Celsius and resulted in reactor power reductions to lower the temperature. The location of the elevated temperature was at the movable hinged section of the disconnect. The "A" and "C" phase temperatures were 95 to 100 degrees Celsius. The "B" phase high temperature was discovered during ongoing monthly temperature monitoring. In response to the high temperature, operators reduced reactor power from 100 percentdown to 25 percent to reduce the disconnect temperature and support removal of the main generator and disconnect from service to perform repairs. The inspectors observed "just-in-time training" in the simulator that was given to the operators prior to removing the main generator and disconnect from service. The inspectors also observed the operators' removal of the main generator and disconnect from service to support repairs.
After removal from service, the "B" phase disconnect was rebuilt and tested satisfactorily prior to being returned to service. The main generator was placed back in service and the plant was returned to 100 percent power. The documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
10Enclosure No findings of significance were identified..2(Closed) LER 05000353/02007-001, Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Failed Open Due to Clearance Tagging ErrorOn March 10, 2007, Limerick Unit 2 was in hot shutdown and depressurized toapproximately 25 psig for the 2R09 refueling outage. A full scram signal was present and the scram discharge volume (SDV) was isolated, as designed. Operators were in the process of applying a clearance in preparation for planned maintenance on the Reactor Protection System and the scram air header. As part of this clearance, operators removed the Reactor Protection System backup scram fuses which ultimately resulted in the SDV vent and drain valves opening unexpectedly. Water from the SDV began to vent through these open valves into the plant drain system. Station personnel discovered the condition and closed the SDV vent and drain valves, stopping the source of the water. Further investigation by the station determined that the inadvertent opening of the SDV vent and drain valves was due to an improperly written clearance. A non-cited violation (NCV) associated with this issue was documented in Section 1R20of NRC integrated inspection report 05000352/2007002 and 05000353/2007002. The inspectors reviewed this LER and did not identify any additional findings of significance.
Exelon documented this event and associated corrective actions in IR 602042. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed..3(Closed) LER 05000353/02007-002, Valid Actuation of Main Condenser Low Vacuum Isolation Logic During OutageOn March 12, 2007, operators were in the process of lowering vacuum on Limerick Unit 2as part of refueling outage activities in accordance with procedure S07.2.A, "Shutdown of the Steam Jet Air Ejector and Breaking Main Condenser Vacuum." During this evolution, the main condenser low vacuum main steam isolation valve (MSIV) isolation logic actuated unexpectedly. Further investigation revealed that due to a procedural execution error, station personnel had only bypassed two of the required four channels of the isolation logic. Even though this resulted in actuation of two channels of logic when vacuum was lowered, no valves actually repositioned since the MSIVs and other affected valves were closed earlier as required by procedure. This failure to comply with procedure S07.2.A constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's enforcement policy. The inspectors reviewed this LER and did not identify any additional findings of significance.
Exelon documented this event and associated corrective actions in IR 602921. This LER is closed.
.4 (Closed) LER 05000353/02007-003, Automatic Actuation of the Reactor ProtectionSystem at PowerOn April 24, 2007, the Unit 2 Reactor Protection System automatically actuated whenreactor water level decreased from +35 inches to +12.5 inches.
All control rods fullyinserted. When reactor level decreased to the low-low level setpoint of -38 inches, both HPCI and RCIC systems initiated and injected into the vessel. HPCI and RCIC were placed in manual mode when flow oscillations were observed on both systems. Both systems were automatically secured when reactor level increased to +54 inches.
11Enclosure Exelon's investigation determined that a circuit card in Redundant Reactivity ControlSystem (RRCS) Division 1, channel "B" spuriously actuated while channel "A" was in a tripped condition due to planned surveillance testing. This resulted in a feedwater runback. The feedwater runback reduced reactor level as expected.Exelon's investigation determined that HPCI and RCIC flow oscillations were due to flowcontrol loop tuning settings that did not properly account for differences in flow path testing conditions and vessel injection flow conditions. Station personnel replaced and successfully tested the affected RRCS circuit card. In addition the HPCI and RCIC flow controller gain and reset settings were adjusted to be consistent with Unit 1 settings, which are consistent with industry values and similar to previous Unit 2 settings when stable flow was demonstrated during Unit 2 initial startup testing. The procedure for tuning of HPCI and RCIC flow controls was revised to specify the required gain and reset settings.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's apparent cause investigation, Unit 2 TS, andnotification requirements. The apparent cause investigation determined that the HPCI and RCIC gain and reset settings were changed during system tuning in May 1999; therefore, this condition existed for approximately 8 years. This resulted in a condition that could have prevented the safety function of Unit 2 HPCI. A non-cited violation (NCV)associated with this issue was documented in Section IR19 of NRC integrated inspection report 05000352/2007003 and 05000353/2007003. Exelon documented this issue and its corrective actions in IR 620861. The review determined that Unit 1 was not affected.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions, including revised procedures, and found no additional findings or unresolved issues. The documents reviewed are listed in the
. This LER is closed.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn October 15, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results toMr. E. Callan and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not included in the inspection report. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Exelon Generation Company
- C. Mudrick, Site Vice President
- E. Callan, Plant Manager
- D. DiCello, Radiation Protection Manager
- R. Dickinson, Director Engineering
- J. George, System Manager, Remote Shutdown Panel
- M. Gift, System Manager, Radiation Monitoring Systems
- R. Gosby, Radiation Protection Technician, Instrumentation
- R. Harding, Engineer, Regulatory Assurance
- R. Kreider, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
- D. Malinowski, Simulator Instructor
- B. Tracy, System Manager
- P. Tarpinian, PRA Engineer
- D. Boylan, Summer Readiness Coordinator
- R. Newmaster, Manager - Emergency Preparedness, Limerick
- J. Broillet, Operations Shift Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000353/LER-2007-001-0LERScram Discharge Volume Vent and DrainValves Failed Open due to Clearance
- Tagging Error (Section 40A3.2)
- 05000353/LER-2007-002-0LERValid Actuation of Main Condenser LowVacuum Isolation Logic During Outage
(Section 40A3.3)
- 05000353/LER-2007-003LERAutomatic Actuation of the ReactorProtection System at Power (Section
- 40A3.4)
Discussed
None
A-2Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01:
- Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresOP-AA-108-107-1001, "Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions," Revision 2S32.3.A, "Main Generator Inspection During Heavy Grid Load," Revision 7Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProceduresTechnical Specification 3/4 8.1, "A.C. Sources"S92.9.N, "Routine Inspection of the Diesel Generators," Revision 53
- 1S46.1.A (COL), "Valve and Breaker Alignment for Start-up of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Supply System for Service"
- ST-6-048-230-1, "SLC Pump, Valve, and Flow Test"
- S49.3.A, "RCIC Fill and Vent," Revision 17
Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionProceduresARC-MCR-006 B1L, Fire Alarm Response Card, Revision 2F-A-452, "Unit 1 Static Inverter Room, Fire Area 20," Revision 7
- F-A-453, "Unit 2 Static Inverter Room, Fire Area 20," Revision 4
- F-A-533, "Control Room 533 and Peripheral Rooms 530 to 535 (EL. 269) Fire Area 24," Revision 10F-A-619, "Control Structure Fan Room (EL. 304) Fire Area 27," Revision 6
- F-A-624, "Standby Gas Treatment Area Rooms 624 & 625, Fire Area 28," Revision 6
- F-D-311D, "D14 Diesel Generator Room and Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Tank Room Rooms 311Dand 312D (EL. 217) Fire Area 82," Revision 5F-T-328, "Unit 1 Air Compressor, EHC Power Unit, and Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank AreasRooms 328, 330, and 331 (EL. 217) Fire Area 93," Revision 5OP-AA-201-003, "Fire Drill Performance," Revision 8
- SE-8, "Fire," Revision 31
- ST-6-022-551-0, "Fire Drill," Revision 8, conducted on 9/26/07Issue Reports and Action Requests (ARs)IR
- 676038, "Fire Brigade Member EO Key Ring"A1261436, "Evaluate Propping Open of Doors"MiscellaneousUFSAR Appendix 9A
Section 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProceduresSE-4, "Flood," Revision 5SE-4-1, "Reactor Enclosure Flooding," Revision 8
- A-3AttachmentIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 634795, "Floor Drain Clogged in U/1 HPCI Room"MiscellaneousBLP-31981, "Moderate Energy Pipe Break (MEPB) Analysis," dated February 1984NPB-14, "Moderate Energy Line Break," Revision 4
- NPB-32, "Flooding of ECCS Compartments from the Suppression Pool," Revision 3NPB-33, "Moderate Energy Pipe Break Report," Revision 3
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramProceduresEOP
- T-101, "RPV Control," Revision 20 EOP T-103, "Secondary Containment Control," Revision 17
- EOP T-112, "Emergency Blowdown," Revision 12
Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessProceduresER-AA-310, "Implementation of the Maintenance Rule," Revision 6ER-AA-310-1004, "Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring," Revision 5
- ER-AA-310-1003, "Maintenance Rule - Performance Criteria Selection," Revision 3
- ER-AA-310-1005, "Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)," Revision 5
- ER-LG-310-1010, "Maintenance Rule Implementation," Revision 7
- ER-AA-310, "Implementation of the Maintenance Rule," Revision 6Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 483496, "TECW Unavailability Issues"IR
- 637270, "Possible Maintenance Rule (a)(1) for Excessive TECW System Outage Window"
- IR 642006, "2B TECW Heat Exchanger Unavailability Hours Exceeded"
- IR 667927, "Document Unit 2 HPCI Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Determination"
- IR 506692, "Points 3 & 5 Failing"
- IR 546231, "1A Recombiner Valve
- FV-DO-101A Failed to Open"
- IR 551504, "1A Post LOCA Recombiner MRule FF (A)(1) Determination"MiscellaneousMaintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, dated 11/01/2006, 11/30/2006Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, dated 09/14/2000, 02/15/2001, 04/20/2006,
- 06/19/2007
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProceduresER-AA-600-1045, "Risk Assessments of Missed or Deficient Surveillances," Revision 0S07.6.A, "Placing Alternate Steam Jet Air Ejector In Service," Revision 27
- ST-2-041-661-1, "Safety Relief Valves - Safety Relief Valve Position Indicators Functional Test,"Revision 12Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 598489, "D11 - Adjust Voltage Regulator Droop to 3% - 5%"
- A-4AttachmentIR
- 601471, "ISI Inspection Volume for Code Case N-435"IR
- 649698, "Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code Case N-435-1"
- IR 657596, "2B Reactor Recirculation MG Set Runback to Min Speed"
- IR 668047, "Large VAR Swings During D12 D/G/ Run"IR
- 674591, "SRV 'D' Position Indicator Functional Test Failed"
- A1456726, "Excursion in KVAR and KW"
- A1600437, "D12 Voltage Regulator VAR Swings When Paralleled to Offsite"
- A1628762, "IR for Generation of Activity to Swap Unit 2 SJAE"
- A1631597, "Repair/Replace/Recal Loop Component," Dated 09/24/2007MiscellaneousOperator Logs dated 07/13/2007Limerick Generating Station On-Line Work Schedule, 09/14/2007-09/16/2007
==Section 1R15: OperabilityIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 060981, "HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve Position Relay Contacts Failed"IR
- 101384, "Inappropriate Conclusions in Disp==
- PEP I0012531/CR 00060981"
- IR 641784, "HPCI Aux Oil Pump Did Not Stop per PV&F"
- IR 642617, "HV-055-2F006 Failed to Stroke Open"
- IR 658690, "Unit 2 RCIC OOS/Gross Fail Alarm"
- IR 658931, "RCIC Pump Suction HI Press Alarm Came in While Swapping Suction Valves"
- IR 658950, "HPCI Oil Pressure Lower Than Desired Band"
- A1626638, "HPCI Oil Pressure Lower Than Desired Band"
- IR 664065, "Unit 2 Recirculation Pump #2 Seal Pressure Drop"MiscellaneousLimerick Generating Station UFSAR Section 6.3LEAM-0008, "HPCI Flow to RPV w/Single Discharge Path Open," Revision 0
- M-55-10, "HPCI Line Sizing Check," Revision 4
- M-55-26, "ATWS 3A HPCI Flow Split Calculation to Size a Flow Orifice for Branch to CoreSpray," Revision 6ECR
- LG 01-01152, "HPCI Failed Injection Valve - Provide Quality Docs"
Section 1R19: Post Maintenance TestingProceduresST-2-042-638-2, "ATWS - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Functional Test," Revision 12ST-6-051-231-2, "A
- RHR Pump, Valve and Flow Test," Revision 52
- ST-6-012-231-0, "A Loop RHRSW Pump, Valve and Flow Test", Revision 54
- ST-6-048-230-1, "SLC Pump, Valve and Flow Test", Revision 32
- ST-6-107-201-0,"IST Valve Stroke for New Baseline," Revision 4
- M-C-792-001, "Fairbanks Morse Opposed Piston Diesel Engine Examination and GeneralMaintenance," Revision 4Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 338368, "Unit 2 RCIC Small Packing Leak from
- 381319, "Unit 2 RCIC
- HV-049-2F008 Packing Leak"
- A-5AttachmentIR
- 654021,"D22 Diesel Lube Oil Circ Pump Making Excess Noise"IR
- 654041, "Dual Indication for
- HV-51-2F024A During Stroke Close"
- IR 663431, "D21: Brush Holder Cable Replacement Not Identical to Original"
- IR 664060, "D21 Diesel Rapid Shutdown Due to Cylinder Leak"
- IR 664291, "D21 Emergency Stop Alarm Failed to Annunciate"
- IR 676024, "Indicating Lights did not Illuminate"
- A1178453, "Disassemble and Inspection 20" Manual Check Valve, 012-0001C"
- A1624433, "Replace RRCS
- HPII/HPOI Cards"A1628140, "D21 Over Excitation During Break-In Run"
- A1628023, "Alarms on D21 Still Annunciated and Will Not Clear"
- A1628302, "D21 Diesel Rapid Shutdown Due to Cylinder Leak"
- A1630245, "Unit 2 RCIC Steam Line Outboard PCIV"Work OrdersR1005988, "D21 24 Month Diesel Inspection Per M-C-792-001" MiscellaneousLimerick Generating Station On-Line Work Schedule 08/23/2007-08/26/2007Operator Logs dated 08/23/2007
- Safety Relief Valve Technical Specification Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Table 3.3.7.5-1
Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingProceduresST-2-051-802-2, "Division 2
- LPCI System Response Time Testing," Revision 8ST-2-055-810-1, "HPCI System Response Time Testing," Revision 11, completed 09/18/2007
- ST-6-055-230-1, "HPCI Pump, Valve, and Flow Test," Revision 65, completed 09/18/2007
- ST-6-092-314-2, "D24 Diesel Generator Slow Start Operability Test Run," Revision 61,completed 07/16/07ST-6-107-790-2, "Control Rod Scram Timing," Revision 11, completed 09/20/2007Issue Reports and Action RequestsA1614302, "U2
- HCU 46-47 Has No Full Out Position Indication on Full Core Display"IR
- 671836, "Blue Scram Light Failed to Light During ST-6-107-790-2"
Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsProceduresCC-AA-112, "Temporary Configuration Changes," Revision 12S43.0.C, "Clearing an Electrical or Mechanical Stop," Revision 18MiscellaneousTRT-D7-164, "Install 1B Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Temporary Mechanical Stop"C0221920, "Install Temporary Mechanical High Speed Stop in
- XY-M1-1S001B" Limerick Generating Station UFSAR Section 5.4
- Limerick Generating Station Technical Specifications 3/4.4.1Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 631119, "1B Recirc Pump Speed Changes"IR
- A1616738, "1B Recirc Pump Speed Changes"
- A-6AttachmentA1625008, "Need New AR Created to Install Travel Limiter"
Section 1EP6: Drill EvaluationProceduresEOP
- T-117, "Level/Power Control," Revision 15EOP T-104, "Radioactivity Release Control," Revision 12
- EOP T-103, "Secondary Containment Control," Revision 17
- EP-AA-122, "Drills and Exercises," Revision 7
- EP-AA-122-F-01, "Drill and Exercise Evaluation Criteria," Revision B
- EP-AA-122-1001, "Drill and Exercise Scheduling, Development, and Conduct," Revision 8
- EP-AA-122-1002-F-02, "Drill and Exercise Objective Evaluation Data Tables," Revision B
- LS-AA-120, "Issue Identification and Screening Process," Revision 7
- T-103, "Secondary Containment Control," Revision 17MiscellaneousIR 437320IR 670538
- Limerick [EP] Training Drill Series Evaluation Report, dated 07-31-2007
- LSES-8020, "Licensed Operator Training Simulator Evaluation Scenario," Revision 0
- NRC IR 50-352&353/2005009
==Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) VerificationProceduresS92.6.N, "Diesel Oil Storage Tank Lineup to Fill Other than its Associated Day Tank," Revision 10Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 556902, "Minor Leakby of 049-2F014 Discovered During==
- 565800, "HV-049-1F019 RCIC Min Flow Shows Dual Indication at 600 GPM"
- IR 620861, "GP-18 Review HPCI/RCIC Oscillations"
- IR 628579, "Inadvertent RCIC OOS Annunciator"
- IR 628600, "2DA-09 Tripped on Thermals"
- IR 642618, "Valve Stroke Time Outside Acceptable Range"
- IR 652846, "RCIC Overspeed Test Potentiometers Possibly Not Locked"
- A1295250, "FI-49-1R600-1 Spiking"
- A1304397, "Revise the
- ML-008 Spec to Correctly Reflect the Safety Classification of the RCICMin Flow Line"MiscellaneousNEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5Reactor Oversight Program MSPI Bases Document, Limerick Generating Station, Revision 1
- LG 01-00170, "Classification of the RCIC Min Flow Line"
Section 4OA2: Other
- A-7AttachmentIssue Reports and Action RequestsA16106882C-P501 Packing Leakoff Excessive (Complete)A16159402C Circ Pump Step Change in Vibration
- A1620985Spray Pond Level/Temp Alarming Before Setpoints Reached
- A16219922C-P501 Excessive Packing Leakage (Complete)
- A1622672Control Rod 22-35 Temp at 305 Deg F
- A1628676Spray Pond Hi Temp Alarms Early
- C02212742C-P501-DR Inspect or Replace Motor Bearings
- IR 6120832C-P501 Packing Leakoff Excessive
- IR 612647Drive Mechanism Temperature for
- HCU 30-35 is @429 Degrees F
- IR 6275952C Circ Pump Surge Capacitor Damaged
- IR 6289652C Circ Pump Step Change in Vibration
- IR 639934"Spray Pond Lo Level/Hi Temp" Alarm Locked In
- IR 643596Spray Pond Level/Temp Alarming Before Setpoints Reached
- IR 6454662C-P501 Excessive Packing Leakage
- IR 648107Control Rod 22-35 Temp at 305 Deg F (Completed)
- IR 649388Hairline Crack Identified on Yoke
- IR 6498062C-P501-DR Temp Cooling
- IR 654068Hairline Crack Identified on Yoke
- IR 654070Hairline Crack Identified on Yoke
- IR 665262Spray Pond Hi Temp Alarms Early
- IR 6723152C-P501 High Packing Leak OffOther DocumentsPlant Health Committee System Presentation: Circ Water, June, 2007Plant Health Committee System Presentation: Control Rod Drive Supply, June, 2007
- Plant Health Committee System Presentation: EDG, June, 2007
- Plant Health Committee System Presentation: RHRSW, June, 2007
- SHIP Chronic Problem Report: Circ Water, June, 2007
- SHIP Chronic Problem Report: EDG, June, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: Circ Water, June, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: Control Rod Drive Supply, June, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: EDG, June, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: RHRSW, June, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: Circ Water, Sept, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: Control Rod Drive Supply, Sept, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: EDG, Sept, 2007
- System Health Overview Report: RHRSW, Sept, 2007
==Section 4OA3: Event FollowupProceduresOP-LG-109-101-1001, "Limerick System Specific Tagging Guides," Revision 15Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR
- 601910, "Drainage System Clogged"IR
- 602042, "Unit 2==
- IR 602921, "Division 1 and 4 MSIV Isolation Logic Alarms"
- A-8AttachmentMiscellaneousLER 2007-001, "Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Failed Open Due to ClearanceTagging Error"LER 2007-002, "Valid Actuation of Main Condenser Low Vacuum Isolation Logic During Outage"
- LER 2007-003, "Automatic Actuation Of The Reactor Protection System at Power"
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMSAgencywide Documents Access Management SystemARaction request
ASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAPCorrective Action Program
CFRCode of Federal Regulations
CRDcontrol rod drive
EDGemergency diesel generator
EHCelectro-hydraulic control
EPemergency preparedness
EROEmergency Response Organization
HPCIhigh pressure coolant injection
IRissue report
kVkilo volt
LERLicensee Event Report
LOCAloss of coolant accident
MSIVmain steam isolation valve
NCVnon-cited violation
NEINuclear Energy Institute
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
OAother activities
PARprotective action recommendation
PARSPublicly Available Records
PIperformance indicator
P&IDpiping and instrumentation drawing
PMTpost-maintenance test
RCICreactor core isolation cooling
RHRresidual heat removal
RRCSredundant reactivity control system
SCBAself-contained breathing apparatus
SDVscram discharge volume
TStechnic al specification