W3F1-2021-0035, Technical Requirements Manual Update
ML21139A122 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Waterford ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/18/2021 |
From: | Wood P Entergy Operations |
To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
W3F1-2021-0035 | |
Download: ML21139A122 (42) | |
Text
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093 Tel 504-464-3786 Paul Wood Regulatory Assurance Manager Waterford 3 W3F1-2021-0035 10 CFR 50.71(e)
May 1, 2021 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Technical Requirements Manual Update to the NRC Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Docket No. 50-382 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 Pursuant to Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 (Waterford 3) Technical Specification (TS) 6.16, Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) hereby submits an update of all changes made to the Waterford 3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) since the last submittal per letter W3F1-2019-0066 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19253F311) dated September 10, 2019.
Additionally, this update satisfies the submittal frequency required by TS 6.16, which indicates that the TRM will be submitted at a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e) and exemptions thereto.
Plant changes made under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 are reported to the NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2) by separate submittal.
There are no new commitments associated with this submittal. Should you have any questions or comments concerning this submittal, please contact the Regulatory Assurance Manager, Paul Wood, at (504) 464-3786.
Respectfully, Digitally signed by Paul Wood Paul Wood Date: 2021.05.18 14:13:41 -05'00' PW/llb Attachments:
- 1. Waterford 3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Change List.
- 2. Waterford 3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revised Pages.
W3F1-2021-0035 Page 2 of 2 (w/Attachments) cc: NRC Region IV Regional Administrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 NRR Project Manager
Attachment 1 to W3F1-2021-0035 Waterford 3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Change List to W3F1-2021-0035 Page 1 of 4 Waterford 3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Change List TRM Implementation Affected TRM Topic of Change Amendment Date Pages No.
151 3/7/2019 3/4 8-3 Amendment 151 -EC 81560 provides an 3/4 8-3a evaluation on the impact of loss of B 3/4 5 rectifier control boards in the Waterford 3 Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) units, allowing two (2) battery chargers to be in service with two (2)
SUPS rectifiers out of service, with instructions for determining the acceptability of allowing one (1) battery charger to be in service with one (1)
SUPS rectifier out of service (LBDCR 19-011).
152 9/19/2019 3/4 8-2 Amendment 152 - Technical Requirements Manual section 4.8.1.2.1.
regarding the required frequency for the performance of inspections of the Emergency Diesel Generators in accordance with MM-003-015. Currently the required frequency of inspection is stated as 4.5 years. Per EC 82736 it has been approved to extend this frequency to 6 years. (LBDCR 19-006).
10/23/2019 Amendment 153 - Editorial Correction to 153 3/4 6-3 restore Penetration 44 information to Table 3.6-1 that was inadvertently removed when implementing TRM Amendment 79. (CR-WF3-2019-6871).
This information was previously contained in the TRM; therefore, no PAD is required. (LBDCR 19-030).
154 11/21/2019 3/4 3-7b Amendment 154 - This activity clarifies (Table 3.3-6) the operability requirements in TRM Table 3.3-6 to state one Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) per Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Ventilation system train is required to satisfy the TRM 3.3.3.1 LCO.
This change is to prevent confusion that two functional ARMs on a single train would satisfy the TRM 3.3.3.1 LCO.
(LBDCR 19-031).
to W3F1-2021-0035 Page 2 of 4 TRM Implementation Affected TRM Topic of Change Amendment Date Pages No.
155 12/3/2019 Amendment 155 -Change SR 4.0.3 and 3/4 0-2 the bases to allow SR 4.0.3 to be applied B 3/4 0-3 (when appropriate) to missed B 3/4 0-3a surveillances that have never been B 3/4 0-4 performed. (b) Change LCO 3.0.5 bases B 3/4 0-5 to clarify that it should not be used if B 3/4 0-5a there are other alternatives to B 3/4 0-6 demonstrate that an LCO is met and maintain compliance with actions. This includes addition of new examples and also deleting the example of reopening a containment isolation valve since the containment isolation valve TS contains an action note that eliminates the need to use LCO 3.0.5 to un-isolate a penetration to perform operability testing.
(LBDCR 19-032) 156 2/4/2020 3/4 7-13a Amendment 156 - deletes TRM Surveillance 4.7.11.2.b (daily fire door tests) and clarifies the 24-hr check for obstructions only applies to open fire doors with hold-open/auto closure mechanisms. (LBDCR 20-001) 157 4/7/2020 3/4 7-2 Amendment 157 - Under TRM section 4.7.10.1.1(g) change reference from chapter 5 section 11 of the FP handbook 14 edition to allow the latest edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook to be used. (LBDCR 19-019) 158 5/7/2020 3/4 3-17 Amendment 158 - incorporated updated 3/4 3-18 industry guidance, corrective action 3/4 3-19 resolutions, and updated inputs from the 3/4 7-6 Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment 3/4 7-7 (FPRA). One of the results of this revision is several changes to the risk classification of select Fire Area detection and suppression systems. These changes are documented. (LBDCR 20-010) 159 6/29/2020 II Amendment 159 - Add TRM 3/4.7.6.1 to IV provide requirements for the Emergency B 3/4 3g Breathing Air System. TRM 3.4.7.6.1 B 3/4 3g(a1) change is allowed per attached PAD.
B 3/4 3g (a2) Change to page number in index for B 3/4 3g(1) bases section 3/4.7.5 and change "form" to "from" in bases section 3/4.7.5 are editorial changes due to typos identified.
(LBDCR 20-017) to W3F1-2021-0035 Page 3 of 4 TRM Implementation Affected TRM Topic of Change Amendment Date Pages No.
160 8/17/2020 3/4 3-39 Amendment 160 - EC-86657, updates the turbine missile probability analysis 3T1-18 with the revised analysis performed by MPR Calculation 1062-0105-CALC-001, Effect of Turbine Valve Test Interval Extension on Turbine Missile Generation Probability at Waterford Steam Electric Station. This calculation and the associated EC provide the basis for changing the Turbine Valve Testing frequency from 184 days to 12 months, and then 18 months if the requirements of EC-86657 are met. (LBDCR 20-012) 161 10/21/2020 3/4 4-1 Amendment 161 - Per the TRM Bases for B 3/4 2d 3/4.4.3, the purpose of TRM 3/4.4.3 is to specify the capacity above TS 3.4.3.1b required for the CEA Withdrawal with Dead band event since the TS requirement did not bound this one event. CN-TA-20-31 updates the analysis to show that no additional capacity beyond that in TS 3.4.3.1b is required, therefore the TRM can be deleted.
(LBDCR 20-037) 162 1/12/2021 3/4 3-39 Amendment 162 - EC-87568, documents a new analysis performed by the turbine manufacturer in support of extending the heavy low pressure turbine disk inspection interval. this engineering study supports extending the heavy low pressure turbine disk A inspection to a 101 month interval as a one-time change.
This change requires shortening the turbine valve testing interval to 6 months.
Refer to EC-87568 and the Siemens Calculation for more detail. LBDCR 20-031 will rescind this change following the heavy low pressure turbine disk A inspection being performed in RF24.
(LBDCR 20-030) to W3F1-2021-0035 Page 4 of 4 TRM Implementation Affected TRM Topic of Change Amendment Date Pages No.
163 3/23/2021 3/4 8-62 Amendment 163 EC-78595 upgrades 3/4 8-63 parts of W3 plant paging system - one part being the pre-amplifier configuration.
The pre-amp/amplifier configuration will be replaced with newer digital amplifiers and due to this new primary and backup protection is required for speakers within containment and anulus. (LBDCR 19-028) 164 3/23/2021 3/4 3-3a TRM, SG Level - High, Channel Functional Test Interval Changed to (A)
Annual, Staggered (LBDCR 20-022)
Attachment 2 to W3F1-2021-0035 Waterford 3 Technical Requirements (TRM) Revised Pages (There are unnumbered pages following this cover page)
o (DRN 02-1639)
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION o(LBDCR 15-008 Am. 135; LBDCR 15-009 Am. 135; LBDCR 16-058 Am. 142; LBDCR 16-059 Am. 142; LBDCR 16-026 Am 151; LBDCR 16-027 Am. 151) 3.8.3.1 The rectifiers for the following Static Uninterruptible Power Supplies (SUPS) shall be OPERABLE.
- a. SUPS-3MA-S*
- b. SUPS-3MB-S*
- c. SUPS-3MC-S*
- d. SUPS-3MD-S*
- e. SUPS-3A-S*
- f. SUPS-3B-S*
- g. SUPS-3AB-S
- h. SUPS-3A1-S *, **
- i. SUPS-3B1-S *, **
m(LBDCR 15-008 Am. 135, LBDCR 15-009 Am. 135; LBDCR 16-058 Am. 142; LBDCR 16-059 Am. 142; LBDCR 16-026 Am 151; LBDCR 16-027 Am. 151)
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
o(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91; LBDCR 16-026 Am 151; LBDCR 16-027 Am. 151; LBDCR 19-011 Am. 151)
- a. With any of the above listed Vital SUPS* rectifiers (e or f)** inoperable and the associated SUPS is not being supplied from the bypass AC power, restore the rectifier to operable status or verify at least one of the associated battery chargers is in service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; otherwise, enter TRM LCO 3.0.3.
- b. With any of the above listed Measurement SUPS rectifiers (a, b, c, or d)** or AB Bus Vital SUPS rectifier (g) inoperable and the associated SUPS is not being supplied from the bypass AC power, restore the rectifier to operable status or verify the two associated battery chargers are in service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; otherwise, enter TRM LCO 3.0.3.
- c. With any two of the above listed SUPS* rectifiers connected to the same DC Bus** inoperable and the associated SUPS is not being supplied from the bypass AC power, restore the rectifiers to operable status or verify the two associated battery chargers are in service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; otherwise, enter TRM LCO 3.0.3.
m(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91; LBDCR 16-026 Am 151; LBDCR 16-027 Am. 151; LBDCR 19-011 Am. 151) o(DRN 02-1639; 05-1013,07-136, Am. 111) 3/4 8-3 AMENDMENT NO. 34, 67, 91, 103, 111, 135, 142, 151 m(DRN 02-1639; 05-1013,07-136, Am. 111)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 No additional surveillance requirements other than those required by Technical Specifications 4.8.3.
m(DRN 02-1639; LBDCR 16-026 Am 151; LBDCR 16-027 Am. 151; LBDCR 19-011 Am. 151)
- When required to be OPERABLE per TS 3.8.3.1.
o (LBDCR 16-026 Am 151; LBDCR 16-027 Am. 151; LBDCR 19-011 Am. 151) o(DRN 02-1639; 05-1013,07-136, Am. 111) 3/4 8-3a AMENDMENT NO. 34, 67, 91, 103, 111, 135, 142, 151 m(DRN 02-1639; 05-1013,07-136, Am. 111)
(DRN 02-1639) 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91; LBDCR 19-011 Am. 151)
Technical Specification 3/4.8.3 requires that the SUPS be powered from their associated inverters connected to the DC bus. Each of the inverters is normally supplied though its associated rectifier from a 480 V AC MCC. Should this supply fail, the inverters are supplied automatically from a 125 V DC safety related battery. The SUPS listed in the TRM LCO each have a static transfer switch that automatically transfers the load to the bypass transformer if the inverter experiences a predetermined overload, frequency deviation (SUPS 3AB only), undervoltage or overvoltage. In addition, there is a manual transfer switch that allows the operator to connect the load to the bypass transformer if the inverter is not available. Technical Specification 3/4.8.2 requires that the battery and only one of the two battery chargers be operable. When a SUPS rectifier is out of service, the SUPS could be supplied from the DC bus for an indefinite period and still be in compliance with technical specifications. Engineering calculations indicate that battery discharging could occur if any SUPS other than Vital SUPS 3A or Vital SUPS 3B is being supplied from the DC bus during normal operations (i.e., rectifier out of service) unless the two associated battery chargers are in service. Thus, the potential exists for discharging the battery, even though all applicable technical specifications are being met. If the rectifier is not restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or two battery chargers are not in service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, TRM LCO 3.0.3 must be entered.
With any of the Measurement SUPS rectifiers (3MA, 3MB, 3MC, or 3 MD) inoperable and the associated SUPS is not being supplied from the bypass AC power, TRM 3/4.8.3, action b. requires that two associated battery chargers be placed in service. This is because the analysis shows that continued operation with only one charger in service has the potential for discharging the battery under the conditions assumed by the Engineering calculations. In the event that a Measurement SUPS rectifier becomes inoperable with only one battery charger available, continued operation may be justified by alternate calculation.
The LCO is annotated by a
- which discusses that for the Train A and Train B SUPS, the rectifiers are only required to be OPERABLE when the SUPS is required to be OPERABLE per S 3.8.3.1.
TS3.8.3.1 requires three SUPS buses per train to be OPERABLE. Since there are four SUPS per train, one SUPS will normally be de-energized (standby). TRM 3.8.3.1 does not apply to any Train A or B SUPS not being credited for TS compliance.
The LCO and Actions are also annotated by a ** which clarifies requirements for the Train A and B swing SUPS (3A1-S and 3B1-S). For example, if SUPS 3A1-S is replacing SUPS MA, then Action
- b. would apply if the rectifier for SUPS 3A1-S became INOPERABLE, and the SUPS A and MC rectifiers were OPERABLE.
(DRN 02-1639; 04-1191, Am. 91; LBDCR 19-011 Am 151)
B 3/4 5 AMENDMENT NO. 34, 67, 91, 151
(DRN 07-136, Am. 111) 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING/SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.2 Manufacturers Recommended Inspections of the Emergency Diesel Generator
Note-----------------------------------------------------
Failure to meet the surveillance requirements do not impact the ability of the emergency diesel generator to perform its safety function.
APPLICABILITY: All MODES ACTIONS:
- a. The provisions of TRM 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
(LBDCR 19-006, Am. 152) 4.8.1.2.1 At intervals of 6 years or less, subject the diesels to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturers recommendations for this class of standby service.
?(LBDCR 19-006, Am. 152)
?(DRN 07-136, Am. 111)
(DRN 07-136, Am. 111) 3/4 8-2 AMENDMENT NO. 111, 152
?(DRN 07-136, Am. 111)
TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE PATHS PENETRATION NO. SYSTEM NAME VALVE TAG NO. TEST TYPE 25 Fuel Transfer Containment Blind Flange Bypass/Type B
& Fuel Handling Building 26 Chemical & Volume Control CVCMVAAA109 Bypass/Type C Letdown Line CVCMVAAA103 CVCMVAAA1081 Type C 28 Sampling Line from Reactor PSLMVAAA107 Bypass/Type C Coolant Line PSLMVAAA105 29 Sampling Line from PSLMVAAA204 Bypass/Type C Pressurizer Surge Line PSLMVAAA203 30 Sampling Line from PSLMVAAA304 Bypass/Type C Pressurizer Steam Space PSLMVAAA303 31 Waste Management from GWMMVAAA105 Bypass/Type C Containment Vent Header GWMMVAAA104 (DRN 03-1542, Am. 79; EC-14765, Am. 121) 40 SDC Suction from RCS SI MVAAA405B & SI MVAAA4052B Bypass/Type C SI MVAAA406B Bypass/Type C SI MVAAA407B Bypass/Type C 41 SDC Suction from RCS SI MVAAA405A & SI MVAAA4052A Bypass/Type C SI MVAAA406A Bypass/Type C SI MVAAA407A Bypass/Type C (DRN 03-1542, Am. 79; EC-14765, Am. 121)
(DRN 02-0736, Am. 55) 42 Containment Sump Pump SP MVAAA106 Bypass/Type C Discharge/Post Accident SP MVAAA105 Sample Return SP MVAAA1051 Type C 43 Boron Management Reactor BM MVAAA110 Bypass/Type C Drain Tank Outlet BM MVAAA109 BM MVAAA1091 Type C (DRN 02-0736, Am. 55)
(LBDCR 19-030 Am. 153) 44 Chemical & Volume Control CVCMVAAA401 Bypass/Type C from Reactor Pump RC MVAAA606 Controlled Bleedoff RC MVAAA6061 Type C (LBDCR 19-030, Am.153 3/4 6-3 AMENDMENT NO. -
40,42,55,79,
121,
- 153
TABLE 3.3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM/TRIP MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT OPERABLE MODES SETPOINT RANGE ACTION (LBDCR 19-031, Am. 154)
- 1. AREA MONITORS
- a. Fuel Storage Pool Area Fuel Handling Building 1/train * < 100 mR/h 10 104 mR/h 24 Ventilation System Isolation (LBDCR 19-031, Am. 154)
(LBD 17-018, Am. 143)
- 2. EFFLUENT ACCIDENT MONITORS
- a. Fuel Handling Building 1
- Not Applicable 10 105 Ci/cc 27 Exhaust High Range (LBDCR 17-018, Am. 143)
- With irradiated fuel in the storage pool.
3/4 3-7b AMENDMENT NO.50, 143, 154
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
APPLICABILITY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) 4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a SR, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the SR or between performances of the SR, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a SR within the specified interval shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in 4.0.3.
Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.
4.0.2 Each SR shall be performed within its specified surveillance interval with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the specified surveillance interval.
(LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155) 4.0.3 If it is discovered that a SR was not performed within its specified interval then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of the discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified surveillance interval, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the SR. The delay period is only applicable when there is a reasonable expectation the surveillance will be met when performed. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any SR delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.
?(LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
If the SR is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable ACTION(s) must be entered.
When the SR is performed within the delay period and the SR is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable ACTION(s) must be entered.
4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the SR(s) associated with the LCO have been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. This provision will not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements.
?(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91) 3/4 0-2 AMENDMENT NO. 91, 155
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
BASES (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
LCO 3.0.5 should not be used in lieu of other practicable alternatives that comply with Required Actions and that do not require changing the MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in order to demonstrate equipment is OPERABLE. LCO 3.0.5 is not intended to be used repeatedly.
An example of demonstrating equipment is OPERABLE with the Required Actions not met is opening a manual valve that was closed to comply with Required Actions to isolate a flowpath with excessive Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) leakage in order to perform testing to demonstrate that RCS PIV leakage is now within limit.
Examples of demonstrating equipment OPERABILITY include instances in which it is necessary to take an inoperable channel or trip system out of a tripped condition that was directed by a Required Action, if there is no Required Action Note for this purpose. An example of verifying OPERABILITY of equipment removed from service is taking a tripped channel out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during performance of required testing on the inoperable channel. Examples of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment are taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of a Surveillance Requirement on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of a Surveillance Requirement on another channel in the same trip system.
The administrative controls in LCO 3.0.5 apply in all cases to systems or components in Chapter 3 of the Technical Requirements Manual, as long as the testing could not be conducted while complying with the Required Actions. This includes the realignment or repositioning of redundant or alternate equipment or trains previously manipulated to comply with ACTIONS, as well as equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS.
? (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
SR 4.0.1 establishes the requirement that Surveillances must be performed during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual Surveillance Requirements. This specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified interval, in accordance with SR 4.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.
Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated Surveillance Requirements have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when either:
- a. The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the Surveillance Requirements or
- b. The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known to be not met between required Surveillance performances.
B 3/4 0-3 AMENDMENT NO. 91, 155
BASES Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified.
Unplanned events may satisfy the requirements (including applicable acceptance criteria) for a given Surveillance. In this case, the unplanned event may be credited as fulfilling the performance of the Surveillance. This allowance includes those Surveillances whose performance is normally precluded in a given MODE or other specified condition.
Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by LCO Action Statements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the Action Statements define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 4.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.
? (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
B 3/4 0-3a AMENDMENT NO. 155
?LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
BASES Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 4.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function.
This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.
SR 4.0.2 establishes the limit for which the specified time interval for Surveillance Requirements may be extended. It permits an allowable extension of the normal surveillance interval to facilitate surveillance scheduling and consideration of plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the surveillance; e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing surveillance or maintenance activities. It also provides flexibility to accommodate the length of a fuel cycle for surveillances that are performed at each refueling outage and are specified with an 18-month surveillance interval. It is not intended that this provision be used repeatedly as a convenience to extend surveillance intervals beyond that specified for surveillances that are not performed during refueling outages. The limitation of SR 4.0.2 is based on engineering judgment and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the Surveillance Requirements. This provision is sufficient to ensure that the reliability ensured through surveillance activities is not significantly degraded beyond that obtained from the specified surveillance interval.
This extension allowed by SR 4.0.2 is also applicable to Surveillance Requirements required in TRM ACTIONS. However, the extension does not apply to the initial performance. The extension only applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance required by the ACTION, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single completion time. One reason for not allowing the extension to this completion time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
(LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
SR 4.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been performed within its specified interval. A delay period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified surveillance interval, whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 4.0.2, and not at the time that the specified interval was not met.
This delay period provides an adequate time to perform Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the performance of a Surveillance before complying with required actions or other remedial measures that might preclude performance of the Surveillance.
? (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
? (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
B 3/4 0-4 AMENDMENT NO. 91, 155
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
BASES The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements. When a Surveillance with an interval based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions, operational situations, or requirements of regulations is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 4.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified interval to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity. SR 4.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of, Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by required actions.
(LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
Surveillance Requirement 4.0.3 is only applicable if there is a reasonable expectation the associated equipment is OPERABLE or that variables are within limits, and it is expected that the Surveillance will be met when performed. Many factors should be considered, such as the period of time since the Surveillance was last performed, or whether the Surveillance, or a portion thereof, has ever been performed, and any other indications, tests, or activities that might support the expectation that the Surveillance will be met when performed. An example of the use of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.3 would be a relay contact that was not tested as required in accordance with a particular Surveillance Requirement, but previous successful performances of the Surveillance Requirement included the relay contact; the adjacent, physically connected relay contacts were tested during the Surveillance Requirement performance; the subject relay contact has been tested by another Surveillance Requirement; or historical operation of the subject relay contact has been successful. It is not sufficient to infer the behavior of the associated equipment from the performance of similar equipment. The rigor of determining whether there is a reasonable expectation a Surveillance will be met when performed should increase based on the length of time since the last performance of the Surveillance. If the Surveillance has been performed recently, a review of the Surveillance history and equipment performance may be sufficient to support a reasonable expectation that the Surveillance will be met when performed.
For Surveillances that have not been performed for a long period or that have never been performed, a rigorous evaluation based on objective evidence should provide a high degree of confidence that the equipment is OPERABLE. The evaluation should be documented in sufficient detail to allow a knowledgeable individual to understand the basis for the determination.
Failure to comply with specified intervals for surveillance requirements is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 4.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used repeatedly to extend Surveillance intervals. While up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the limit of the specified interval is provided to perform the missed Surveillance, it is expected that the missed Surveillance will be performed at the first reasonable opportunity. The determination of the first reasonable opportunity should include consideration of the impact on plant risk (from delaying the Surveillance as well as any plant configuration changes required or shutting the plant down to perform the Surveillance) and impact on any analysis assumptions, in addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and the time required to perform the
? (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
B 3/4 0-5 AMENDMENT NO. 91, 155
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
BASES Surveillance. This risk impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, 'Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.' This Regulatory Guide addresses consideration of temporary and aggregate risk impacts, determination of risk management action thresholds, and risk management action up to and including plant shutdown.
The missed Surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in the Regulatory Guide. The risk evaluation may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended methods.
The degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the importance of the component. Missed Surveillances for important components should be analyzed quantitatively. If the results of the risk evaluation determine the risk increase is significant, this evaluation should be used to determine the safest course of action. All missed Surveillances will be placed in the Corrective Action Program.
If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the allowed outage times of the required actions for the applicable LCO begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the allowed outage times of the required actions for the applicable LCO begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.
? (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
(LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
B 3/4 0-5a AMENDMENT NO. 155
? (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
BASES (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
Satisfactory performance of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the allowed outage time of the actions, restores compliance with SR 4.0.1.
? (LBDCR 19-032, Am. 155)
Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTION requirements define the remedial measures that apply. However, the Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate that inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.
SR 4.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable surveillance must be met before entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other condition of operation specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that system and component OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met before entry into a MODE or condition for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the facility. This provision applies to changes in OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions associated with plant shutdown as well as startup.
Under the provisions of this SR, the applicable Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the specified surveillance interval to ensure that the Limiting Condition for Operation are met during initial plant startup or following a plant outage.
When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the provisions of SR 4.0.4 do not apply because this would delay placing the facility in a lower MODE of operation.
? (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91)
B 3/4 0-6 AMENDMENT NO. 91, 155
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
J(DRN 02-450, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
- b. Performing a visual inspection of at least 10% sample of the fire windows / fire dampers / and associated hardware. If degradation or deficiencies are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10% sample of the fire windows / fire dampers / and associated hardware shall be made. This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no degradation or deficiencies is found. Samples shall be selected such that each fire window / fire damper /
and associated hardware will be inspected at least once per 15 years.
I(DRN 02-450)
J(DRN 02-814)
- c. Performing a visual inspection of at least 10% of each type of accessible sealed penetration.
If apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradations are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10% of that type of sealed penetration shall be made. This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradation is found. Samples shall be selected such that each accessible penetration seal will be inspected at least once per 15 years.
I(DRN 02-814) 4.7.11.2 Each of the above required fire doors shall be verified OPERABLE by inspecting the automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanism and latches at least once per 6 months, and by verifying:
J(LBDCR 20-001, Am. 156)
- a. That doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms are free of obstructions at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (only applicable to open doors of this type), and by performing a functional test of these mechanisms at least once per 18 months.
- b. Deleted.
I(LBDCR 20-001, Am. 156)
I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4 7-13a AMENDMENT NO. 138, 156
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- e. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
- f. At least once per 18 months by performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence, and:
J(DRN 07-213, Am. 114; EC-8523, Am. 126)
- 1. Verify that each fire suppression pump develops at least 1218 gpm at a system head of 108.3 psid.
I(DRN 07-213, Am. 114; EC-8523, Am. 126)
- 2. Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and
- 3. Verifying that the fire pumps start sequentially on a continued pressure drop in the fire suppression system.
(LBDCR 19-019, Am. 157)
- g. At least once per 3 years by performing a flow of the system in accordance with National Fire Protection Associations NFPA 25 (2017), Section 7.3 and the guidance of NFPA 291 (2019).
(LBDCR 19-019, Am. 157) 4.7.10.1.2 Each fire pump diesel engine shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying:
- 1. The diesel fuel oil day storage tank contains at least 170 gallons of fuel, and
- 2. The diesel starts from ambient conditions and operates for at least 30 minutes.
- b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-75, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-77 when checked for viscosity, water and sediment.
J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
- c. At least once per 18 months by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturers recommendations for the class of service.
I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4 7-2 AMENDMENT NO. 49, 114, 126, 138, 157
J(DRN 02-912, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
TABLE 3.3-11a FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS High Safety Significant (HSS)
FIRE ELEVATION HEAT SMOKE ROOM NAME AREA (ft) *(x/y) *(x/y)
REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB 1A Control Room Proper +46 28/0 RAB 1E Cable Vault +35 0/17 RAB 5 Electrical Penetration Area B +35 0/12 RAB 6 Electrical Penetration Area A +35 0/10 RAB 7 Relay Room +35 0/7 Isolation Panel +35 18/0 RAB 8A Switchgear Room A +21 1/11 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15)
RAB 8B Switchgear Room B (excludes room 210) +21 1/19 I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15)
480V Switchgear 3A32 Room, CEA M/G Set Room RAB 8C Switchgear Room AB +21 0/8 RAB 15 Emergency Diesel Gen B Room +21 0/3 RAB 16 Emergency Diesel Gen A Room +21 0/3 RAB 23 Corridor to CCW Pumps, +21 0/18 Corridor to CCW Heat Exchangers J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15) And corridor to Emergency Diesel Gen.
RAB 27 Communication Room (Room 123 Only) +7 1/0 RAB 39 EFW AB Pump Area (Room B49 Only) -35 0/1 I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15
TURBINE GENERATOR BUILDING TGB 5 Turbine Lube Oil +15 0/7 TSG Turbine Bldg Switchgear Room +15 36/0 TABLE NOTATIONS
- (x/y): X is the number of Function A (early warning fire detection and notification only) instruments Y is the number of Function B (actuation of fire suppression systems and early warning and notification) instruments I(DRN 02-912, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4 3-17 AMENDMENT NO. 03, 58 138, 15
J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
TABLE 3.3-11b FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Low Safety Significant (LSS)
FIRE ELEVATION HEAT SMOKE ROOM NAME AREA (ft) *(x/y) *(x/y)
REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB 1B Control Room H&V Room +46 0/7 RAB 1C Control Room Emergency Quarters +46 9/0 RAB 1D Computer Room (above raised floor) +46 5/0 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158) Computer Room (below raised floor) +46 7/0 RAB 2 Ventilation Equip Room +46 0/20 HVAC Fan Room +69 0/3 I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158) HVAC Filter Room +69 0/2 RAB 3 RAB Corridor to Relay Room +35 0/5 RAB HVAC Switchgear Equip Room +46 0/4 RAB 3A RAB Battery Exhaust Fan Room +69 0/3 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158) Elevator Vestibule +21 1/0 RAB 8B H&V Fan Room (room 210) +21 2/0 I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
RAB 9 Remove Shutdown Room +21 1/0 RAB 11 Battery Room B +21 1/0 RAB 12 Battery Room AB +21 1/0 RAB 13 Battery Room A +21 1/0 RAB 15A Emergency Diesel Gen B Feed Tk Room +46 0/1 RAB 16A Emergency Diesel Gen A Feed Tk Room +46 0/1 RAB 17 CCW Heat Exchanger B +21 0/3 RAB 18 CCW Heat Exchanger A +21 0/3 RAB 19 CCW Pump A +21 0/2 RAB 20 CCW Pump AB +21 0/2 RAB 21 CCW Pump B +21 1/0 RAB 22 Drumming Station / Hot Tool Room +21 0/5 RAB 24 Hot Machine Shop +21 17/0 RAB 25 Equipment Access Area Wing Area +21 12/0 RAB 27 H&V Room +7 0/4 Electrical Area and Health Physics Offices +7 0/31 I&C Room +7 0/5 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
RAB 30 Administrative Area (HP) -4 32/0 RAB 31 Corridor and Passageways -4 0/17 RAB 32 Wing Area - Auxiliary Component -35 22/0 Cooling Water Pump -4 21/0 RAB 33 S/D Cool Heat Exchangers A&B -34 0/9 I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4 3-18 AMENDMENT NO.138, 158
J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138; LBDCR 16-061, Am. 146)
TABLE 3.3-11b (Continued)
FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Low Safety Significant (LSS)
FIRE ELEVATION HEAT SMOKE ROOM NAME AREA (ft) *(x/y) *(x/y)
REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB 34 Valve Gallery Rooms A & B -15.5 5/0 RAB 35 Safety Injection Pump Room B -35 5/0 RAB 36 Safety Injection Pump Room A -35 6/0 RAB 37 Emergency Feedwater Pump A -35 0/1 RAB 38 Emergency Feedwater Pump B -35 1/0 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15
RAB 39 Corridor & General Equip Areas (excludes room B49-
-35 8/21 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15) EFW AB Pump Area)
RAB 40A Diesel Oil Storage Tank A -35 1/0 RAB 40B Diesel Oil Storage Tank A1 -31.5 2/0 RAB 41A Diesel Oil Storage Tank B -35 1/0 RAB 41B Diesel Oil Storage Tank B1 -31.2 2/0 COOLING TOWERS CTA Cooling Tower A 16/0 1/0 CTB Cooling Tower B 2/0 1/0 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING FHB Electrical Equip Room +1 1/0 REATOR CONTAINMENT BULDING**
RCB Electrical Penetration Areas A & B +21 44/0 RCB Reactor Cable Trays +46 16/0
- The fire detection instruments located within the Containment are not required to be operable during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage rate tests.
TURBINE GENERATOR BUILDING J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15
I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 15)
TGB 7 Feed Water Pump A +15 0/12 TGB 8 Feed Water Pump B +15 0/12 TRANSFORMER YARD XFMR Main Transformer A +18 0/7 XFMR Main Transformer B +18 0/8 XFMR Aux Transformer A +18 0/4 XFMR Aux Transformer B +18 0/4 XFMR Start-up Transformer A +18 0/4 XFMR Start-up Transformer B +18 0/4 I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138; LBDCR 16-061, Am. 146) 3/4 3-19 AMENDMENT NO.138, 146, 15
J(DRN 02-38, Am. 52, DRN 03-115, Am. 72, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
TABLE 3.7-2a SPRAY and/or SPRINKLER SYSTEMS High Safety Significant (HSS)
Sprinkler No. Bldg./Elev. Location Fire Area/Room Numbers FPM-3A RAB +21 Diesel Generator Area A (ONLY) RAB 16 / 221 FPM-4B RAB +21 Diesel Generator Area B (ONLY) RAB 15 / 222 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-5 TGB +15 Lube Oil Tank TGB / 256 (LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-17 RAB +35 Cable Vault Area RAB 1E / 260 FPM-18 RAB +35 Electrical Penetration Area A RAB 6 / 263A FPM-19 RAB +35 Electrical Penetration Area B RAB 5 / 263 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-23 RAB -35 EFW AB Pump Area RAB 39 / B49 (LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-24 RAB +21 Corridors & Passageways (ONLY) RAB 23 / 218 & 219 & 225A J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-25B RAB +21 Switchgear Rooms B (ONLY) RAB 8 / 212 & 225B (LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-27 RAB +7 Communication Room RAB 27 / 123 (LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-29 RAB +35 Relay Room (ONLY) RAB 7 / 262 FPM-30A RAB +21 Switchgear Rooms A RAB 8 / 212A I(DRN 02-38, Am. 52, DRN 03-115, Am. 72, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4 7-6 AMENDMENT NO. 32, 52, 72, 138, 158
J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138; LBDCR 16-061, Am. 146)
TABLE 3.7-2b SPRAY and/or SPRINKLER SYSTEMS Low Safety Significant (LSS)
Sprinkler No. Bldg./Elev. Location Fire Area/Room Numbers FPM-3A RAB +46 EDG Diesel Fuel Tank A (ONLY) RAB 16A / 328B FPM-4B RAB +46 EDG Diesel Fuel Tank B (ONLY) RAB 15A / 328A J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-7 TGB +15 Feed Water Pump A TGB / 343 FPM-8 TGB +15 Feed Water Pump B TGB / 343 FPM-11A RAB -35 Diesel Oil Storage Tank A RAB 40A / B50 FPM-11A CTA -31.5 Diesel Oil Storage Tank A1 RAB 40B / B57A FPM-12B RAB -35 Diesel Oil Storage Tank B RAB 41A / B52 FPM-12B CTB -31.2 Diesel Oil Storage Tank B1 RAB 41B / B56A RAB 31 / B101, B114, B116 &
FPM-22 RAB -4 Corridor & Passageway B145A, B145B & B150A, B150B, B150C J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-24 RAB +21 CCW Pump AB Room (ONLY) RAB 20 / 234 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-25B I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158) RAB +21 SWGR H&V Fan Room RAB 8F / 210 FPM-26 RAB +46 Control Room HVAC Room RAB 1B / 314 FPM-26 RAB +46 H & V Mechanical Room (Essential Chillers) RAB 2 / 299 J(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
FPM-30A RAB +21 Switchgear Room AB RAB 8C / 212B I(LBDCR 20-010, Am. 158)
I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138; LBDCR 16-061, Am. 146) 3/4 7-7 AMENDMENT NO. 138, 146, 158
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1.6.1 MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES AND STARTUP FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES............................................. 3/4 7-1 J(DRN 02-1683)
DELETED............................................................................................ 3/4 7-1a DELETED 3/4 7-1b I(DRN 02-1683)
J(DRN 02-1794;05-880, Am. 100) 3/4.7.1.7 DELETED.. 3/4 7-1c I(DRN 05-880, Am. 100)
J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4.7.3 DELETED... 3/4 7-1d I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
J(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124) 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION. 3/4 7-1e(a1)
I(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124)
J(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) 3/4.7.6.1 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR. 3/4 7-1e(a2)
I(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
J(EC-15515, Am. 118) 3/4.7.8 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS SNUBBERS) 3/4 7-1e I(EC-15515, Am. 118)
J(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124) 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION. 3/4 7-1e(10)(a1)
I(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124) 3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEMS............................ 3/4 7-1f I(DRN 02-1794)
SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS............................. 3/4 7-4 J(DRN 02-912, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
I(DRN 02-912, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
FIRE HOSE STATIONS......................................................... 3/4 7-8 YARD FIRE HYDRANTS AND HYDRANT HOSE HOUSES. 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.11 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES..................................................... 3/4 7-13 J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4.7.12 DELETED..................................................... 3/4 7-14 I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
J(DRN 02-912) 3/4.7.13 SWITCHGEAR AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM............................ 3/4 7-15 I(DRN 02-912)
J(DRN 02-1876) 3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM... 3/4 7-16 I(DRN 02-1876)
J(LBDCR 16-056, Am. 144) 3/4.7.15 CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT ROOM... 3/4 7-17 CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT ROOM - OPERATING 3/4 7-17 CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT ROOM - SHUTDOWN 3/4 7-18 3/4.7.16 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATION ROOM EQUIPMENT ROOM. 3/4 7-19 I(LBDCR 16-056, Am. 144) 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS J(DRN 02-912; 02-1639; 05-1013,07-136 Am. 111) 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES I(DRN 02-912)
OPERATING........................................................................................ 3/4 8-1 OPERATING/SHUTDOWN.................................................................. 3/4 8-2 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. 3/4 8-3 I(DRN 02-912; 02-1639; DRN 05-1013,07-136 Am. 111)
J(DRN 02-912; 02-1639)
II AMENDMENT NO. 15, 38, 50, 51, 58, 67, 70, 100, 103, 111, 124, 138, 144, 159 I(DRN 02-912; 02-1639)
INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT............................................................ B 3/4 3 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE............................................................... B 3/4 3 J(DRN 05-880, Am. 100) 3/4.6.1.5 DELETED.......................................................................................... B 3/4 3 I(DRN 05-880, Am. 100) 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES........................................... B 3/4 3 J(DRN 04-972, Am. 90) 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS MONITORING .. B 3/4 3a I(DRN 04-972, Am. 90) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1.6.1 MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES AND STARTUP FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES........................................... B 3/4 3b J(DRN 02-1683, Am. 65; 02-1794, Am. 69)
DELETED B 3/4 3d I(DRN 02-1683, Am. 65)
J(DRN 05-880, Am. 100) 3/4.7.1.7 DELETED... B 3/4 3e I(DRN 05-880, Am. 100, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4.7.3 DELETED.............. B 3/4 3g I(DRN 02-1794, Am. 69, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
J(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124) 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION B 3/4 3g I(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124)
J(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) 3/4.7.6.1 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR B 3/4 3g(a1)
I(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
J(EC-15515, Am. 118) 3/4.7.8 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) B 3/4 3g(1)
I(EC-15515, Am. 118)
J(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124) 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION B 3/4 7-1e(10)(a1)
I(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124) 3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS..................................................... B 3/4 4 3/4.7.11 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES............................................................. B 3/4 4 J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4.7.12 DELETED................................................................................. B 3/4 4a I(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
J(DRN 02-912, Am. 58) 3/4.7.13 SWITCHGEAR AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM B 3/4 4b I(DRN 02-912, Am. 58)
J(DRN 02-1876, Am. 70) 3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL INSTRUMENT AIR B 3/4 4c I(DRN 02-1876, Am. 70)
J(LBDCR 16-056, Am. 144) 3/4.7.15 CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT ROOM. B 3/4 4e1 3/4.7.16 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATION ROOM EQUIPMENT ROOM. B 3/4 4e1 I(LBDCR 16-056, Am. 144) 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS J(DRN 02-1639; 05-1013, Am. 103) 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES................................................................................... B 3/4 4f I(DRN 02-1639; 05-1013, Am. 103) 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.. B 3/4 5 I(DRN 02-1639) 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES...................... B 3/4 5a IV AMENDMENT NO. 38,50,51,58,67,100,103, 118,124,138, 144, 159
(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6.1 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.1 The Emergency Breathing Air (EBA) System shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Minimum air pressure of 1800 psig.
- b. Functional EBA manifolds to support minimum staffing requirements.
APPLICABILITY: All modes ACTIONS:
With the EBA System inoperable, perform the following:
- a. Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, implement an alternate air supply, and
- b. Restore the EBA System to OPERABLE within 7 days, and
- c. If the required ACTION and associated allowable outage times of ACTION a or b are not met, then immediately initiate and maintain operation of the control room ventilation system in the isolate mode.
The provisions of TRM LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
4.7.6.1.1 Verify EBA system pressure greater than or equal to 1800 psig at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4.7.6.1.2 Verify required EBA system manifolds are functional at least once every 18 months.
4.7.6.1.3 Verify maximum EBA System Leakage rate is less than 31.6 psig/hr at least once every 6 years.
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) 3/4 7-1e(a2) AMENDMENT NO. 159
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
J(DRN 02-1794) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES J(LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138) 3/4.7.3 DELETED The Limiting Condition for Operation established for the Component Cooling Water pumps A and B was associated with maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. With the transition to NFPA 805, the compensatory measure action is no longer required. Therefore, Section 3/4.7.3 of the Technical Requirements Manual has been deleted.
I(DRN 02-1794, LBDCR 16-011, Am. 138)
J(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124; LBDCR 13-001, Am. 125) 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION The Limiting Condition for Operation provides a limitation on flood protection that ensures facility protective actions will be taken in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation +27.0 ft Mean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which the levee provides protection. The nuclear plant island structure provides protection to safety-related equipment up to elevation +30 ft Mean Sea Level. The Action requirement to initiate and complete procedures ensuring that all doors and penetrations to the nuclear island are secure prior to attaining +27.0 ft Mean Sea Level establishes the nuclear plant island structure as flood protection for safety-related equipment. EC41353 determined a conservative response time to close the doors and EC39741 determined a maximum expected rate of rise in the Mississippi River using I(LBDCR 13-003, Am. 124; LBDCR 13-001, Am. 125)
(LBDCR 13-001, Am. 125), (LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) historical data. Based on the information documented in EC41353 and EC39741, the action to close the doors can be completed with 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Using a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> projection of River Level will ensure that the flood protective actions to close the doors and penetrations are achieved. The surveillance requirements to measure the water level at the levee fronting the Waterford Unit 3 site provides information to be used to establish the required configuration for the affected doors and penetrations as described in the Action statement.
EC39741 determined that the Mississippi River level would increase from 24 ft. to 27 ft. in 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> based on historical data. The surveillance requirement to ensure water level at the levee fronting the Waterford Unit 3 site at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the water level is equal to or above elevation +24.0 ft. Mean Sea Level USGS falls within the 40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> historical rise and provides a data point for determining if there is a need for increased monitoring.
(LBDCR 13-001, Am. 125), (LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
J(DRN 02-1794)
B 3/4 3g AMENDMENT NO. 69, 124, 125, I(DRN 02-1794) 138, 159
(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.6.1 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR The Emergency Breathing Air (EBA) supply system for the Main Control Room (MCR) is provided to ensure a minimum six-hour supply of air for control room and security personnel. The system is designed to provide Grade D breathable air (as defined by the Compressed Gas Association standards) at a rate of 6 scfm for each of 17 individuals. An air storage system with a capacity of 45,000 scf at 1800 psig is provided to maintain a supply of air for use upon demand.
The EBA system is considered OPERABLE when 1) the EBA banks are pressurized to greater than or equal to 1800 psig (Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.1); and 2) a minimum number of EBA manifolds to support minimum staffing requirements for Operations and Security personnel are functional.
As referenced in UFSAR 1.8.1.78 and discussed in UFSAR 2.2.3.3, "Design Basis Toxic Chemicals," Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.78, "Assumptions for Valuating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release (Revision 0, June 1974)," is applicable to Waterford 3. RG 1.78 describes assumptions to be used in assessing the habitability of the control room during and after a postulated external release of hazardous chemicals and describes criteria that are generally acceptable for the protection of the control room operators. Applying this guidance, the EBA system is assumed to be available to enable the operators to don breathing apparatus before IDLH levels are reached (reference calculation EC-S97-020, "Safety Evaluation of Replacement of Toxic Gas and Vapor Detectors"). General Design Criterion 19, "Control Room," requires that a control room be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions. Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2, "Unit Staff," specifies the minimum operations personnel shift crew composition in TS Table 6.2-1, "Minimum Shift Crew Composition." One (1) Security Officer is required at the Secondary Alarm Station in addition to the individuals identified in Table 6.2-1. This defines the basis for the requirement for the lowest functional capability of the EBA system at eight (8) hose connections. This is based on the minimum shift crew composition for Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4; however, it will be maintained at this number in all modes as a conservative measure.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.1 is met by verifying the absence of the EBA air storage system low pressure annunciator which annunciates in the MCR. This provides for continuous monitoring of EBA air storage system pressure. If this alarm is locked in, or unavailable, local pressure gauges are available, and their indication may be used to satisfy the surveillance requirement.
Alternately, measurement and test equipment may be connected locally to provide indication of pressure to satisfy the surveillance requirement.
An air compressor is manually operated to fill the storage tanks. This manual operation prevents accidental chemical contamination of the stored air. The air which leaves the tanks is reduced in pressure to approximately 100 psig prior to entering the control room. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.3 verifies maximum EBA system leakage rate to be less than 31.6 psig/hr every 6 years.
This leakage rate is based on the available air storage system pressure of 1800 psig to provide
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
B 3/4 3g(a1) AMENDMENT NO. 159
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.6.1 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR (continued) 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of air to 17 individuals (reference calculation MN(Q)637, "Air Storage Capacity for MCR Breathing Air Storage System"). The frequency of 6 years is reasonable based on the continuous monitoring (low pressure annunciator), daily monitoring (operator rounds), and testing performed on this system (functional testing performed on EBA manifolds and partial leakage testing performed on EBA system) which would detect leaks.
Air manifolds are located at strategic locations throughout the MCR envelope for easy personnel access. Air hoses, which are stored in the MCR envelope, are utilized to connect the users breathing apparatus to the air manifold. A suitable length of hose and pneumatic quick-disconnects are utilized to provide air supply. Functional checks (Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.2) are performed on at least an 18-month frequency. Operation of the manifolds is in accordance with station procedures. Eight (8) individual EBA hose connections are required to be functional in the MCR to meet minimum staffing requirements. One or more EBA manifolds being non-functional does not render the EBA system inoperable provided at least eight (8)connections are functional and a sufficient number of adequate hose lengths are available for
required personnel to perform their duties using a functional EBA connection.
The 7-day Allowed Outage Time (AOT) is acceptable due to minimal increase in risk due to EBA system unavailability. Calculation EC-S96-014, "Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Toxic Chemical Hazard," documents a sensitivity analysis that was performed on the EBA system being unavailable for approximately 100 hrs/yr compared to a nominal value of 1 hr/yr and found that the toxic chemical Core Damage Frequency (CDF) increased by about 6%. UFSAR 2.2.3.3.6, "Design Basis Toxic Chemicals/Results" states that the probability that toxic chemicals frequently transported in the vicinity of Waterford 3 could cause a radiological release in excess of 10 CFR 50.67 guidelines is 6.45 x 10-7 per year; therefore, 7 days, or 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br />, of allowed outage time would have a negligible impact on the risk of a toxic chemical release causing a radiological release in excess of 10 CFR 50.67 guidelines.
With the EBA system inoperable, a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) may be used as an alternate air supply if they are readily available for use if a valid alarm is received. Readily available means staged in close proximity such as in the hallway outside of the control room. The SCBA must use a full-face positive pressure mask approved by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). This alternate air supply reduces the potential impact to operators in a toxic chemical event and it is not meant to be equivalent to the actual EBA system (i.e., the 2-minute time requirement to don the breathing apparatus does not apply). Because of this, the
alternate air supply cannot be indefinitely credited, and the action statements require restoration of
the EBA system to an operable status within a limited time (7 days). The 7-day time limit is from
the time the limiting condition for operation is not met.
Placing the control room ventilation system in the isolate mode of operation is required if the EBA system is not restored within 7 days. The control room may also be placed in isolate prior to the 7 days and the action will be met.
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
B 3/4 3g(a2) AMENDMENT NO. 159
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
(EC-15515, Am. 118) 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS TRM BASES (LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159)
Å(LBDCR 20-017, Am. 159) 3/4.7.8 Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)
BACKGROUND Shock suppressors are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of an inoperable shock suppressor is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. It is therefore required that all shock suppressors required to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component be operable during reactor operation.
Snubbers required to be operable ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on non-safety related systems and then only if their failure, or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety related system.
ACTIONS Because this TRM envelopes snubbers located in various locations, the ACTIONS are modified by Note 1 permitting separate condition entry for each inoperable snubber.
Note 2 captures the requirements of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 372, such that the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) train not associated with the system train on which the inoperable snubber(s) resides must be available in any MODE where EFW is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with TS 3.7.1.2. During MODES where EFW is not required to OPERABLE per TSs, an alternate means of core cooling train not associated with the system train on which the inoperable snubber(s) resides must be available. These opposite train requirements are applicable only when an inoperable snubber(s) affects a single train of a given system. When the inoperable snubber(s) affects both trains of a given system, either EFW train or alternate means of core cooling train must be available, again, dependent on the MODES in which TSs require OPERABILITY of these systems. Refer to TS LCO 3.0.8 Bases for further information with respect to the intent of Note 2.
(EC-15515, Am. 118)
(EC-15515, Am. 118)
(EC-15515, Am. 118)
B 3/4 3g(1) AMENDMENT NO. 118, 125, 159
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.4 At least one turbine overspeed protection system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, and 3*.
ACTION:
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
- a. With one stop valve or one control valve per high pressure turbine steam lead inoperable and/or with one reheat stop valve or one reheat intercept valve per low pressure turbine steam lead inoperable, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or close valve(s) to isolate the affected steam lead as shown in Table 3.3-14, or isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.**
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
- b. With the above required overspeed protection system otherwise inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> isolate the turbine from the steam supply.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91) 4.3.4.1 The provisions of TRM SR 4.0.4 are not applicable.
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91) 4.3.4.2 The above required turbine overspeed protection system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140; LBDCR 16-055, Am. 140; LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149; LBDCR 20-012, Am. 160 )
- a. At least once every 12 Months # (under direct observation) each of the following valves is cycled through at least one complete cycle from the running position.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140; LBDCR 16-055, Am. 140; LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149; LBDCR 20-012, Am. 160)
- 1. Four high pressure throttle valves.
- 2. Four high pressure governor valves.
- 3. Six low pressure reheat stop valves.
- 4. Six low pressure reheat intercept valves.
- b. At least once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the turbine overspeed protection systems.
- c. At least once per 40 months by disassembling at least one of each of the above valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of valve seats, disks and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or corrosion.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
- d. At least once per 40 operating months by inspecting the installed light low pressure turbine discs, and not to exceed# at least once per 90 operating months by inspecting the installed heavy low pressure turbine discs.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
- With any main steam isolation valve and/or any main steam line isolation valve bypass valve not fully closed.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
- Separate entry allowed for each inoperable steam lead.
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
(LBDCR 16-034, Am. 137; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140)
(LBDCR 16-034, Am. 137; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140)
(LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149)
(LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149)
AMENDMENT NO. 91,107, 137, 140, 147, 3/4 3-39 149, 160
(DRN 04-1244, Am. 99) 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (LBDCR 20-037, Am. 161) 3/4.4.3 Deleted 4.4.3 The Limiting Condition for Operation for the Pressurizer Heaters has been deleted.
(LBDCR 20-037, Am. 161) 3/4 4-1 AMENDMENT NO. 99, 109, 126 161
(DRN 03-1808, Am. 80) 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES (DRN 04-1244, Am. 99) (LBDCR 20-037 Am. 161) 3/4.4.3 Deleted The Limiting Condition for Operation for Pressurizer Heaters has been deleted from the TRM.
(DRN 04-1244, Am. 99) (LBDCR 20-037 Am. 161)
(DRN 07-201, Am. 112) 3/4.4.5 LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION
Background
This specification is applicable to the containment gaseous radioactivity monitor and the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches and is based upon the regulatory requirements in Reg. Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems. The position of Reg. Guide 1.45 is that at least three different leakage detection methods should be employed. The containment gaseous radioactivity monitor and the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches constituted the third leakage detection method and were contained in the original Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 as the third Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection system.
With the improved integrity of the reactor fuel and the resultant reduced RCS radioactivity levels, the containment gaseous radioactivity monitor became less effective for RCS leakage detection. The containment gaseous radioactivity monitor may not detect a one gallon per minute Reactor Coolant System leak within one hour. In Amendment 197, the NRC granted removal of the containment gaseous radioactivity monitor from Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 due to the equipment inability to detect a one gallon per minute Reactor Coolant System leak within one hour.
Subsequently, it was recognized that the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches were not capable of detecting a one gallon per minute Reactor Coolant System leak within one hour.
The containment fan cooler condensate flow switches monitor condensate flow from individual containment fan coolers and do not sum the condensate flow from all containment fan coolers.
The containment fan cooler condensate flow switches assist in detecting the source of leakage into the containment sump. In Amendment 212, the NRC granted removal of the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches from Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 due to the equipment inability to detect a one gallon per minute Reactor Coolant System leak within one hour. In the Amendment Request, Waterford 3 committed to maintaining the containment gaseous radioactivity monitor and the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches functional and available.
(DRN 07-201, Am. 112)
( DRN 03-1808, Am. 80,07-201, Am. 112)
B 3/4 2d AMENDMENT NO. 80, 99, 107, 108, 112, 161 (DRN 03-1808, Am. 80,07-201, Am. 112)
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.4At least one turbine overspeed protection system shall beOPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, and 3*.
ACTION:
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
- a. With one stop valve or one control valve per high pressure turbine steam lead inoperable and/or with one reheat stop valve or one reheat intercept valve per low pressure turbine steam lead inoperable, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or close valve(s) to isolate the affected steam lead as shown in Table 3.3-14, or isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.**
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
- b. With the above required overspeed protection system otherwise inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> isolate the turbine from the steam supply.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (DRN 04-1191, Am. 91) 4.3.4.1 The provisions of TRM SR 4.0.4 are not applicable.
(DRN 04-1191, Am. 91) 4.3.4.2 The above required turbine overspeed protection system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140; LBDCR 16-055, Am. 140; LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149; LBDCR 20-012, Am. 160; LBDCR 20-030, Am 162)
- a. At least once every 12 Months++ # (under direct observation) each of the following valves is cycled through at least one complete cycle from the running position.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140; LBDCR 16-055, Am. 140; LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149; LBDCR 20-012, Am. 160)
- 1. Four high pressure throttle valves.
- 2. Four high pressure governor valves.
- 3. Six low pressure reheat stop valves.
- 4. Six low pressure reheat intercept valves.
- b. At least once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the turbine overspeed protection systems.
- c. At least once per 40 months by disassembling at least one of each of the above valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of valve seats, disks and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or corrosion.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
- d. At least once per 40 operating months by inspecting the installed light low pressure turbine discs, and not to exceed# at least once per 90++ operating months by inspecting the installed heavy low pressure turbine discs.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
- With any main steam isolation valve and/or any main steam line isolation valve bypass valve not fully closed.
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
(DRN 06-723, Am. 107)
(LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)
- Separate entry allowed for each inoperable steam lead.
++A one time extension of the heavy low pressure turbine disk inspection for low pressure turbine A from 90 operating months up to 101 operating months in 4.3.4.2.d from the previous inspection is allowed with a corresponding valve test interval (4.3.4.2.a) of 6 months (184 days), provided the turbine inspection surveillance is completed by the end of Refueling Outage 24.
LBDCR 16-030, Am. 137)(LBDCR 16-034, Am. 137; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140) (LBDCR 16-034, Am. 137; LBDCR 16-035, Am. 140)
(LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149) (LBDCR 18-010, Am. 147; LBDCR 18-011, Am. 149; LBDCR 20-030, Am. 162)
AMENDMENT NO. 91,107, 137, 140, 147, 3/4 3- 149, 160 162
TABLE 3.8-1 (contd)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVER-CURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES OVER-CURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES WITHIN EACH VOLTAGE LEVEL (ROMAN) MODES BREAKER IDENTIFYING TIME INTEG. INSP & FOR PROTEC./ NUMBER CURRENT FUNC. CHANNEL FUNC. PREV. WHICH AFFECTED OR CHARAC- TEST CALIB. TEST MAINT. SURV IS COMPONENTS DRAWING DESCRIPTION TYPE TERISTIC 4.8.4.1.a.2 4.8.4.1.a.1.a 4.8.4.1.a.1.b 4.8.4.1.b REQD 107 CEDM COOLING UNITS VIBRATION SWITCHES*
a Primary 289-110A Fuse FB NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 NO BKR 424-771 &
2028 b Backup 289-110A Fuse FB NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 424-771 &
2028 108 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE EXHAUST SOLENOID VALVE CAR-ISV-200B (2HV-228A) a Primary 289-147 Circuit 18 Breaker Note VI.2 10% of Type NA NA See SFCP 1,2,3,4 CD Per R CAREBKR90A-18 b Backup 289-147A Circuit 18 Fuse NA NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 FRN 109 RADIATION REMOVAL UNIT E-13 (3A) DRAIN SOLENOID VALVE ARR-ISV-0103A a Primary 5817- F3 Fuse NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 10186 313002 b Backup 5817- F2 Fuse NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 10186 313002 110 RADIATION REMOVAL UNIT E-13 (3B) DRAIN SOLENOID VALVE ARR-ISV-0103B a Primary 5817- F3 Fuse NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 10186 313002 b Backup 5817- F2 Fuse NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 10186 313002 (LBDCR 17-012, Am. 141 LBDCR 19-028, Am. 163) 111 PLANT PAGING SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 ZONE E SPEAKERS (CMPAMP 1) **
a primary 5817-10199 Fuse 1 FUSE ATM-5 NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 b backup 5817-10199 Fuse 2 FUSE ATN-5 NA NA NA NA 1,2,3,4 3/4 8-62 AMENDMENT 17,37,93,141, 163
TABLE 3.8-1 (contd)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVER-CURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES OVER-CURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES WITHIN EACH VOLTAGE LEVEL (ROMAN) MODES BREAKER IDENTIFYING TIME INTEG. INSP & FOR PROTEC./ NUMBER CURRENT FUNC. CHANNEL FUNC. PREV. WHICH AFFECTED OR CHARAC- TEST CALIB. TEST MAINT. SURV IS COMPONENTS DRAWING DESCRIPTION TYPE TERISTIC 4.8.4.1.a.2 4.8.4.1.a.1.a 4.8.4.1.a.1.b 4.8.4.1.b REQD 112 PLANT PAGING SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 ZONE E SPEAKERS (CMPAMP 3) **
a primary 5817-10199 Fuse 1 FUSE ATM-5 NA NA NA NA 1,2,3.4 b backup 5817-10199 Fuse 2 FUSE ATM-5 NA NA NA NA 1,2.3.4
- This circuit has a Westinghouse Trip ac two pole breaker which contains fuses in each pole (positive and negative) of the breaker.
Since this circuit is a DC ungrounded circuit, the fuses are in series and provide primary/backup protection.
- Two sets of two fuses, one set on each + and - poles 3/4 8-63 AMENDMENT 17,37,93,141, 163
TABLE 4.3-1 (EC-22790, Am. 119 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS LBDCR 20-022, Am 164)
MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL SURVEILLANCE IS UNIT CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION FUNCTIONAL TEST REQUIRED Steam S R A* 1, 2 Generator Level - High (EC-22790, Am. 119
- Annual Implementation shall be performed with a staggered approach of 1 channel per quarter.
LBDCR 20-022, Am 164) 3/4 3-3a AMENDMENT NO. 119, 164