U-600461, Forwards Response to Re Fire Protection Site Audit Concern.Design Clarification for Unprotected Structural Steel Forming Part of Fire Barrier in Diesel Generator Day Tank Room Provided
| ML20154H885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1986 |
| From: | Spangenberg F ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| U-600461, NUDOCS 8603100396 | |
| Download: ML20154H885 (31) | |
Text
A U-600461 L30-86(03-07)-L B51-86(03-07)-L 1A.120 ILLIN0/S POWER COMPANY CLINTON PCAER STATION, P.O. 80s 678. CLINTON. ILLINOIS 61727 March 7, 1986 Docket No. 50-461 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Dr. W. R. Butler, Director BWR Project Directorate No. 4 Division of BWR Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Clinton Power Station Resolution of the Fire Protection Site Audit Concerns
Dear Dr. Butler:
The purpose of this letter is to respond to the Staff's concerns expressed in your October 18, 1985 letter.regarding Fire Protection Site Audit Concerns. This letter incorporates the Staff's comments as discussed in joint meetings at Bethesda on November 6-7, 1985 and January 8-9, 1986. The responses are provided in Attachments (1) through (3).
If you need any further clarification, please advise.
Sincerely yours, 6
%nc F. A. fjipanienber]g '
Manager - .icensing and Safety RPB/jkp Attachuents cc: B. L. Siegel, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety t
i 8603100396 860307 PDR ADOCK 05000461 F PDR
Page 1 of 5 ATTACHMENT (1)
- 1. Two-Hour Rating of Block Walls Concern No justification was provided for the 2-hour fire resistance rating attributed to the eight-inch thick i hollow concrete block walls serving as fire barriers.
Response
Illinois Power's investigation of this issue as a 10CFR50.55(c) is now complete, and we have determined that the condition is not safety significant. Justification for the 2-hour fire resistance rating is provided in the final report for the 10CFR50.55(e) (Letter U-600222 dated 9/19/85) and in Letter U-600360 dated 12/11/85.
- 2. Containment Airlocks Concern The Reactor Building air lock doors are not fire rated.
(Section D.l.(j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Section 4.2.2.14.1 will be added to the Safe Shutdown Analysis to address this concern.
- 3. Bus Duct Penetrations Concern Electrical bus duct penetrations through fire barriers are not scaled. (Section D.1. (j ) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Section 4.2.2.15 will be added to the Safe Shutdown Analysis to address this concern.
- 4. Unprotected Structural Steel in the Diesel Generator Rooms Concern Structural steel forming a part of the fire barrier in the diesel generator day tank room is not protected. (Section D.1. (j ) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Page 2 of 5 ATTACHMENT (1)
Response
A design clarification is provided as Attachment (2) for the unprotected steel in this area. The steel involved is not structural steel.
- 5. Ventilation Duet Fire Dampers Concern Some ventilation ducts penetrating fire barriers are not equipped with fire rated dampera. (Section D.l.(j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Illinois Power has completed a review of all HVAC duct penetrations through fire rated barriers. Based on this review, design modifications are being implemented to install fire dampers in duct penetrations located in safe shutdown areas of the plant, except where specific deviations have been identified.
- 6. Fire Damper Dirty Assembly /"S"-Hook Installation Concern The tracks and blades of fire damper assemblies are loaded with dirt and debris and "S" hooks are installed backwards.
(Section C.8 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
To establish a standard method for testing and documenting the functional ability of fire dampers, Procedure GTP-38 has been developed to ensure that fire dampers are:
a) tested and inspected in accordance with revised manufacturer's instructions.
b) free of corrosion and dirt.
c) verified to have the proper "S" hook installation.
- 7. Cable Trays Unprotected by Automatic Sprinkler Systems Concern Cable trays outside of the cable spreading room are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems. (Section D.3.(c) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
A design clarification is provided in Attachment (3) for the fire hazard associated with cable tray londing.
Page 3 of 5 1
ATTACHMENT (1)
- 8. Location of Fire Pump Flow Meter Discharge Concern The location of the fire pump flow meter discharge outlet relative to the pump intake may adversely affect the fire flow test results. (Section E.2.(c) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
The vertical fire pump has a 12" diameter intake that is located 34'-4" down the well from the top of the concrete.
The water level is 25'-4" above the bottom of the pump screen inlet. The fire pump flow meter discharge outlet has a 10" diameter that is located 3'-6" down the well from the top of the concrete. The water icvel is 5'-6" below the bottom of the discharge outlet. This equates to a vertical distance difference of 30'-10" between the pump intake and discharge outlet. The horizontal distance is 5'-8 " between the intake and outlet. Considering the difference in elevation between the inlet and outlet, we feel that this will not adversely affect the flow test results. In addition, this recirculation line will be utilized as part of the preoperational test and the results obtained will be checked against the baseline to determine if there are any adverse effects.
- 9. Fire Hydrant Spacing Concern Fire hydrant spacing exceeds 250 feet within the power block. (Section E.2.(g) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Illinois Power Company has reviewed the spacing of fire hydrants that does not meet the "approximately 250 feet" guideline of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The appropriate hydrant hose houses will have supplemental lengths of 14" and 2 " hose to provide an acceptable coverage in accordance with the intent of Appendix A and meet the requirements of NFPA-24. The total length will not exceed 500 feet of hose.
The fire brigade will be trained to handle the size and lengths of hoses involved.
- 10. Fire Hose Coverage Concern In many safety-related areas it may not be possible to reach all locations with 75 feet of fire hose due to congestion and changes in elevation. (Section E.3.(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Page 4 of 5 ATTACHMENT (1)
Response
A hose stretch test has been conducted of all fire hoses throughout the fire zones and confirmed that not all locations can be reached by 75 feet of fire hose. In order to ensure that the hose stations provide accescibility and coverage to all zones and that all areas in the alant can be reached by at least one effective hose stream, t1e following types of corrective actions will be taken:
a) Hose replacement with proper length of hose b) Relocation of hose stations c) Addition of hose stations The 100 feet maximum of 1 inch hose per Section C.6.c(4) of CMEB 9.5-1 and its associated standpipe system will conform to NFPA-14.
Additionally, FPER, Section 4.0, E.3.d will be revised to address the following deviations:
(1) Storage of an additional 50' hose to make 150' hose total, if needed, at the Control Room and the Steam Tunnel.
(2) Hose station in Drywell (Fire Area C-1) not reaching entire area of Drywell.
- 11. Control Room Protection Concern The Control Room is not adequately separated from its peripheral rooms by fire rated construction and automatic sprinkler protection is not provided in the peripheral rooms. (Section F.2 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Section 4.2.2.7 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis will be revised to address this concern.
- 12. Turbine Building Safety Related Conduit Concern The Turbine Building contains conduits identified as being safety-related. (Various sections of Ap aendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10CFR50 that apply to areas containing safety-related equipment).
Page 5 of 5 ATTACllMENT (1)
Response
Section 4.2.3.1.11 will be added to the Safe Shutdown Analysis to address this concern.
- 13. Suppression and Detection in V '+ Areas C-1 and C-2 Concern Fire protection means for the containment and drywell have not been provided in accordance with our guidelines. (Section III.G of Appendix R to 10CFR50 and Section F.1 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Sections 4.2.3.1.4 and 4.2.3.1.10 will be added to the Safe Shutdown Analysis to address this concern. Also, Section 4.2.4.1 will be revised.
ATTACID4ENT (2) t s' l The L4x4 member in the Diesel Generator Day Tank Room, as shown
, on the following Detail A21-1070-18, provided temporary support for the wet concrete of the roof slab and adds shear resistance i to the joint detail. The angle is welded to an embedment plate 4
similar to other attachments to concrete firewalls. This angle is not required to 6aintain the integrity of the roof slab, f
Additionally, the concrete wall which has the embedment plate for the angle is continuous and has no gaps and therefore provides a continuous fire barrier.
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ATTACFJENT (3)
DESIGN CLARIFICATION ON THE AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION OF CABLE TRAYS IN SAFETY-RELATED AREAS REFERENCE APCSB, Appendix A, Section D.3(c)
" Automatic water sprinkler systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. . . ."
NRC CONCERN The concern is that the level of fire protection in areas containing a high concentration of cables and cable trays (six or more cable trays in close proximity) may not be adequate without the added benefit of an automatic sprinkler in these areas. The high fuel load in the form of concentrated cable trays would lead to a severe fire exposure that may ultimately threaten safety-related cable trays in other areas.
FIRE AREAS / ZONES INVOLVED Cable Tray Figure Elevation 712 feet 0 inch Fire Zone F-la 2 CB-Ib 7 Elevation 719 feet 0 inch Fire Zone CB-Ic 8 Elevation 737 feet 0 inch Fire Zone F-tm 3 Elevation 751 feet 0 inch Fire Zone CB-le 9 Elevation 755 feet 0 inch Fire Zone F-lp 4 Elevation 762 feet 0 inch Fire Zone CB-!f 10 D-10 10 A-3d 4 A-2k 4 Elevation 781 feet 0 inch Fire Zone A-3f 5 A-2n 5 1
Cable Trav Ficure Elevation 800 feet 0 inch Fire zone CB-6d 12 CB-7 12 Elevation S03 feet 3 inches Fire Zone C-2 6 Elevation 325 feet 0 inch Fire Zone CB-li 13 DESCRIPTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND CABLE All areas were reviewed for the effect of the cable concentration on safe shutdown. The ef fects of a fire on redundant safe shutdown equipment or cable are discussed in the Safe ,
Shutdown Analysis.
ENGINEERING JUSTIFICATION General Only steel cable trays with solid bottoms are used to route cable at the Clinton site
. except for cable trays over motor control centers, which are of the ladder type for access to the equipment. All instrumentation cable trays, in addition to the solid bottom, have solid metal covers over the top. When power, control, and instrument cable trays are stacked and run horizontally, the instrument tray is closest to the floor with the power tray closest to the ceiling. Cable trays routed horizontally have a 6-inch depth whereas all cable tray risers have a 12-inch depth. The vertical separation of horizontal trays is usually I foot. Concentrated cable trays that are protected by an automatic sprinkler system were not analyzed in this design clarification.
All vertical cable tray risers, where they penetrate a floor and/or ceiling regard! css of its rating are sealed with a 3-hour, fire rated silicone foam seal. The cable risers from the fuel floor (elevation 755 feet 0 inch) in the fuel building are sealed with a silicone foam fire stop approximately 15 feet up from the floor elevation due'to the large vertical length of cable trays. Also, all vertical risers have solid metal covers up to 12 feet from the floor elevation.
The majority of the cables used in cable trays are constructed of ethylene-propylene rubber (EPR) covered with a hypalon jacket. A limited use of PVC cable for communication is installed throughout the plant. There are no concentrated areas where this type of cable is used in safety-related buildings. The flame-retardant, self-extinguishing characteristics of the IEEE-383 EPR/hypalon electrical cable have been demonstrated by a series of fire tests as summarized below.
2
3
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Tests The concern is concentrated, loaded cable trays and the resultant damage from installed or transient combustibles exposing these cable trays. Tests have proven that a fire will not propagate either horizontally or vertically along cable or between cable trays.
e Large-scale fire tests were conducted by FMRC for the Electric Power Research Institute, and they provided data on the ignition resistance and fire-retardant resistance to propagation between trays.
e The EPR/hypalon cable has also been tested in accordance with ASTM Test #E-84 and was given a flame spread rating of 15. This test was conducted by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company and submitted to the NRR in the Fire Protection Program Review for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, in response to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1. A product with no combustion has a O rating, with red oak flooring given a rating of 100. The higher the numerical rating, the greater the flammability hazard. Materials that exhibit high rates of flame spread contribute substantia (quantities of fuel to a fire. This is not the case with EPR hypalon cable.
e The E-84 test consists of a 25-foot-long horizontal tunnel in which the ends of the cable are subject to a 300,000 Btu /hr gas burner. The test was designed to provide a moderately severe exposure of approximately 1400*F in the area of flame impingement. The flame spread rating of 15 demonstrates the difficulty of propagation of flame down the cables. (NFPA Handbook - Fif teenth Edition, 5-49)
See also Table A-1, Evaluation Tests per EPR Cable.
e The presented fire testing done on EPR/hypalon cable confirms the difficulty of developing a fire with a solid bottom, either vertically er horizontally. The solid bottom tray provides a barrier to direct flame impingement, which in turn requires cables to be heated to a higher temperature to reach ignition (automatic ignition rather than pilot ignition). For EPR/hypalon cables, the automatic ignition temper-ature is greater than 1000'F.
Plant Survey A plant walkdown was performed to locate areas of six or more cable trays within a 10-foot-diameter circular area. The walkdown was limited to safety-related buildings only.
All cable tray concentrations of six or more are listed in Tables A-2 and A-3. Cable tray concentrations of six or more are defined as those cable trays in close proximity to each other that would be exposed to a fire located on or near the floor.
Two types of cable fill per tray are presented in Tables A-2 and A-3: observed fill or design index. Whenever possible, the observed percent fill of each tray was used. If cables completely filled a 6-inch tray, an observed 100% fill for that tray was used. If cables only filled 3 inches of the 6-inch tray a 50% observed fill was used. Horizontal cable trays are accessible by hose stream for manual fire fighting.
3
The design index is calculated as follows:
e The formula is. I of (cable diameter) x 100 tray widtn x usable deptn e Usable depth for a 6-inch-deep tray is :
2 inches for power cab!e 3 inches for control and instrumentation Example: A 24-inch-wide cable tray with twelve 2-inch-diameter power cables would have a design index of 100. It would also have an observed percent fill (if the cables were laid straight) of 33% (one-third of the tray would be filled with cables). A cesign index of 100 for control and instrumentation trays would have a 3-inch fill, resulting in an observed 30% fill of the actual cable tray.
For a specific location, Tables A-2 and A-3 list the number of either 2-foot- or 3-foot-wide cable trays. Immediately af ter this number is the number of instrumentation cable trays at this location. All instrumentation cable trays, in addition to having solid bottoms, are also enclosed at the top. Electrical cable in conduit, covered cable trays, or enclosed raceways are not considered as contributing to the fire load.
Taking credit for covered cable trays reduces the areas evaluated in Tables A-2 and -
A-3. Six or more concentrated cable trays are located in the following areas:
Number of Location Horizontal Trays ill Control Building Elevation 712 feet 0 inch Fire Zone CB-lb T-129 6 Elevation 751 feet 0 inch Fire Zone CB-le T-129 7
//2 Containment Building Elevation 303 feet 3 inches Fire Zone C-2 270* 6
//3 Diesel-Generater Building Elevation 762 feet 0 inch Fire Zone D-10 AE-132 6 AD-129 6 4
//4 Auxiliary Building Elevation 762 feet 0 inch Fire Zones A-2k A-3d AB-104 6 U-106 9 U-l 19 9 Z-119 6 AA-132 7 V-U/119 6 Number of Location Horizontal Trays Elevation 781 feet 0 inch Fire Zones A-2n A-3f U-V/121-123 6 AB-Z/103 6 X/103 6 U-V/123 8 The majority of the horizontal cable trays are located 10 or more feet above the floor elevation at which the exposure fire was developed, and which would not result in direct flame impingement. Also, totally enclosed instrumentation cable trays are located at the lowest elevation of a stacked horizontal tray arrangement and would prevent any fire propagation of that ' ray vertically up to the next tray.
The postulated fire event is considered to originate on or near the floor. All areas with safe shutdown high cable tray concentrations have automatic fire detection with alarm and annunciation in the control room. In general, combination nozzles on each hose station can be adjusted from straight stream to fog as the situation warrants. Utility fog nozzles are provided in areas of high-ve'tage equipment. These nozzles are able to provide manual suppression to high overhead cable trays. There are no in situ combustibles in the immediate area that would expose the concentrated cable locations.
Hose stations can be used to control and extinguish the fire at the point of origin. The capability to cover all trays with an effective hose stream was also reviewed and the results are stated in Tables A-2 and A-3. ,
CONCLUSION All fire zones in which concentrations are located contain a low fire loading, with all areas accessible for manual fire fighting. Due to the low cable tray loading, solid bottom cable trays, cable tray separation, totally enclosed instrument trays, dif ficulty in igniting the cable, general early warning by the fire detection system, and good accessibility of the trays for manual fire fighting, the existing conditions do not justify additional protection.
3
TABLE A-1 EVALUATION TESTS PER EPR CABLE (conducted by Public Service Electric & Gas Company)
Number of Tests Test Type Fire Source and Time Remarks 3 Horizontal control 100,000 Btu /hr burner, Three designs were cable 20 minutes compared:
- 1. 13-inch vertical separation.
- 2. 12-inch vertical separation.
- 3. I2-inch vertical separation, with Thermalon blanket installed.
None of these designs propagated fire horizontally or vertically.
2 Horizontal power cable 100,000 Btu /hr burner, Two designs were 20 minutes compared:
- 1. IS-inch vertical separation.
- 2. 12-inch vertical separation.
Neither design propagated fire.
5 Horizontal 100,000 Btu /hr 30 IS-inch separation -
minutes EPR/ jacketed cable; no fire propagation.
6
TABLE A-1, Cont.
Number of Tests Test Type Fire Source and Time Remarks 2 Horizontal 200,000 Btu /hr 30 12-inch separation -
minutes with and without Thermalon blanket - no fire propagation.
1 Horizontal 100,000 Btu /hr 30 12-inch separation -
minutes Thermalon blanket with 4-inch x 3/8-inch l sheets. No fire propagation.
I "5" configuration, 100,000 Btu /hr 30 EPR/ neoprene; no fire vertical with elbows on minutes propagation, both ends 10 Vertical Oil-soaked rag, ! 20 Test configuration minutes similar to IEEE 0333.
Tests confirmed EPR/ neoprene cables
. . _ _ . to be nonpropagating.
3 Vertical Oil rag, gas burner Compare burners.
3 Horizontal 100,000 Btu /hr gas Tests compared l burner,20 minutes polyethylene, FR-XLP,
! and EPR/ jacketed cables in fully loaded horizontal cable trays. Tests confirmed l EPR/ jacketed cable to
! be nonpropagating.
2 ASTM E-84 300,000 Btu /hr gas Tests of EPR/ jacketed burner,10 minutes cable. EPR/ neoprene flame spread rating of 13.
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