Text

Forwards Response to Draft Ser/Fsar Item D 8.3-6 Re Loads on Emergency buses.Marked-up FSAR Pages Will Be Included in Future FSAR Amend.Related Correspondence
	ML20137T486
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	12/16/1985
From:	Wisenburg M; HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	Noonan V; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	CON-#186-558 OL, ST-HL-AE-1490, NUDOCS 8602180367
	Download: ML20137T486 (63)
	v • d • e

$Y .

@W ConnESPONDENct NE f flouston Lighting & Power PO. Box 1700 lloustosi. Texas 77001 (713)228-9211 MMP December 16, 1985 ST-HL-AE-1490 85 DEC 23 F2:27 File No.: G9.17 CTFu . , > i, -

00Cei.i g g"g -

Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director " '

PWR Project Directorate #5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 '

Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 g(

Responses to DSER/FSAR Items I On Chapter 8

Dear Mr. Noonan:

The enclosed provides STP's response to Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER) or Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) items.

Additional changes to Chapter 8 are included.

The item namber listed below corresponds to one of those assigned on STP's internal 1.ist of items for completion which includes open and confirmatory CSER items, STP FSAR open items and open MC questions. This list was given to your Mr. N. Prasad Kadambi on October 8, 1985 by our Mr. M.

E. Powell.

The attachment includes mark-uos of FSAR pages which will be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment unless otherwise noted below.

l The items which are attached to this letter are:

l Attachment Item No.* Subject 1 D 8.3-6 Loads on Emergency Buses Note: See Section 8.3.1.2.10.5 on page 8.3-22.

' Legend D - DSER Open Item C - DSER Confirmatory Item F - FSAR Open Item Q - FSAR Question Response Item k

E K $8 Ll/NRC/a2

,2

9 ST-HL-AE-1490 Houston Lighting & Power Company File No.: G9.17 Page 2 1

l If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. M. E. Powell at (713) 993-1328.

Very truly yours, g 1 -)

'RIWielear Manager, k Lic REP /yd Attachments: See above

-l Ll/NRC/a2

z ST-HL-AE-1490 Houston Lighting & Power Company File No.: G9.17 Page 3 cc:

Hugh L'. Thompson, Jr., Director Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Division of PWR Licensing - A Assistant Attorney General for Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the State of Texas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 Robert D. Martin Lanny A. Sinkin Regional Administrator, Region IV Christic' Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1324 North Capitol Street 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20002 Arlington,.TX 76011 Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager Hearing Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director 7920 Norfolk Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, K) 20814 Washington, DC 20555 Claude E. Johnson Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Senior Resident Inspector /STP Chairman, Atomic Safety &

c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board ,

Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 910 Washington, DC 20555 Bay City, TX 77414 Dr. James C. Lamb, III M.D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire 313 Woodhaven Road Baker & Botts Chapel Hill, NC 27514 One Shell Plaza Houston, TX 77002 Judge Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board J.R. Newman, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Washington, DC 20555 1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Mr. Ray Goldstein, Esquire 1001 Vaughn Building Director, Office of Inspection 807 Brazos and Enforcement Austin, TX 78701 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.

c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn T.V. Shockley/R.L. Range Route 1, Box 1684 Central Power & Light Company Brazoria, TX 77422 P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary.

H.L. Peterson/G. Pokorny U.S. Nir, lear Regulatory Commission City of Austin WashMgton, DC 20555 P.O. Box 1088 (3 Copies)

Austin, TX 78767 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards J.B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Public Service Board 1717 H Street P.O. Box 1771 Washington, DC 20555 San Antonio, TX 78296 Revised 12/3/85 Ll/NRC/a2

.

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE- 49 d STP FSAR PAGE / OF 6 o date of commercial operation of both the connection and the terminal facili-ties is 0::::M. ,1^03. June,198Q ) . 36 8.1.2 Onsite Electrical System The Onsite Electrical System of each unit consists of the unit auxiliary transformer, four 13.8 kV auxiliary buses, three 13.8 kV standby buses, five 13.8/4.16 kV auxilisry transformers, two balance-of-plant (BOP) 4.16 kV l 36 auxiliary buses, and three Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) 4.16 kV auxiliary l 12 buses. The three ESF 4.16 kV auxiliary buses feed the redundant Class lE ac l 36 power loads.

During normal operation, each unit's ac electrical power is supplied by its unit auxiliary transformer, with the exception of 4.16 kV ESF buses ElB and l 36 E1C, which are supplied by the standby. transformer.

Power from the utility grid -endt(the offsite. electrical system)is made availa-ble to the onsite electrical system through the respective unit auxiliary 36 Ond/ transformer +or the two plant standby transformers (no.1 and no. 2) and the i 138 kV emergency transformer (See Figure 8.2-1). Onsite standby power is provided by three standby diesel generators (DCs) for each unit. These oper-l ate at 4.16 kV. (Two BOP buses per unit are served from separate 480 V and 43 4160 V DGs. One BOP bus common to both units is served from a 480 V lighting

, D$. One standby DG is tied to one Class 1E bus per unit. The three standby DGs and their associated Class lE Power Systems make up three in-dependent systems which provide ac power to the three independent ESF load trains designated as Train A, Train B, and Train C. Each train of the Class 1E # Power System is provided with an independent Class lE 125 yde system.

Train A serves an additional Class lE 125 yde distribution system which sup-plies power to the fourth Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel. Each Class 1E 125 yde system is designed to carry all of its required loads during design basis events. The non-Class 1E J@' loads are supplied by 48 yde,125 yde, and l 12 250 yde systems supplied by the respective batteries. In addition, the plant computer is served by its own 250 yde battery system. These non-Class lE,($' l 12 systems are served from non-Class 1E 480 V motor control centers.

The ESF f( and ff Power Systems are designed with redundancy and independence of onsite power sources, distribution systems, and controls in order to pro-vide a reliable supply of electrical power to the ESF electrical loads neces-nary to achieve safe plant shutdown, or to mitigate the consequences of postu-laced accidents.

l 8.1.3 Offsite Electrical System The Offsite Electrical System consists of th: r;;;;;;in ;;i: . 111.g ::: r; f:xx , (20 10.0/12.9 50 , t"r :t:- M - tr ::f: = r., ' 0 ',0. :', - 10. 0 / 10. 0 '. ">". RE c ; ;_1. 3......iv ., i.m ,,.i.. of a.1.. ,ar :::::f:-- ::: (352.25 25 *

the _

345 kV lines connecting the main power transfctmers and the standby trans-i formers to the switchyard, the 345 kV switchyard, and the eight 345 kV trans- l 28 mission circuits from the STP 345 kV switchyard to the STP owners' intercon-necting grids, and the 138 kV line from CPL's Llessing Substation to the 138 kV emergency transformer. The eight 345 kV transmission circuits connect the l 28 STP 345 kV switchyard to the STP owner's grids as follows:

1. STP to Hill Country (CPS) 8.1-2 Amendment 44

- ATTACHMENT ST HL AE- /*t90 STP FSAR PAGE 2- OF 4-o sufficient capacity to provide power to one ESF bus of each unit. Each unit auxiliary transformer is individually connected to the 345 kV switchyard by a.

separate and independent overhead tief through the main transformer /~. These 345 kV ties are connected at separate positions on the breaker and-a-half 345 3 kV switchyard. These transformers have the capacity for startup, full-load operation and safe shutdown. Each unit auxiliary transformer has the capacity for the gsafe shutdown loads of all three of its ESF buses.rro "^P lerd- .

SoPloods out The switchyard station serv,1ce is supplied by two 4.16 kV non-Class lE feeders (one from each unit) via 4+se. local 480 V load center and is provided with two 12 independent 125 yde systems. This redundancy in power supplies assures thr.:

protective devices have a power source to maintain the reliability of the off-site supply.

The eight 345 kV transmission circuits connecting the owners' grids to the STP switchyard and the connection from the 345 kV switchyard at the STP to the southern terminal facilities of the HVDC interconnection system are routed so 28 that loss of any independent right-of-way or outage of any two circuits deeer.

21 rn h "a fNcbssl r[ 55su ioki) """NdN of bot dof

,ot sag'mhcneig reovce tee capoWGty of +he offide supply wer .

8.1.4.2 Onsite Power System. The Onsite Power System is designed to supply the power requirements of all auxiliary loads required for all modes of plant operation. Sufficient instrumentation and protective control devices are provided to ensure-reliability and availability of the system.-

A listing of safety syste=s and loads is given in Table 8.1-1 and Table 8.3-3 36 respectively. These tables indicate the redundant loads associated with Train A, Train B, and Train C safety features. Safety functions and power require-cents (ac or de) of these loads are listed for the various plant conditions.

Those portions of the Onsite Power System required for the distribution of power to Class lE electrical subsyste=s and components which are. safety- 36 related meet the following safety design bases:

1. Each r:dund:rt' safety-related electrical load group (Train A, B, or C) is provided with an onsite standby power source, electrical buses, dis-tribution cables, controls, relays, and other electrical devices separate from the other load groups.

power'

2. Each onsite standby (source has sufficient capacity to provide power to l its associated auxiliary power system to shut down and maintain the unit in a safe condition or to mitigate the consequences of a DBA in the event of a loss of the offsite power sources. l 36

3. Redundant parts of the system are physically independent to the extent that a single event, including a single electrical failure, does not cause loss of power to redundant load 53seupft safehj-related lood5 ore

. 4. In the event of the loss of all effsite power, the e n ter ie connected to l 36 the onsite standby power sources automatically and in sufficient time to safely shut down the unit or limit the consequences of a Design Basis Ac-36 cident (DBA) to within applicable regulatory limits. h --" :-" et-- M;;r.

, M f:!h tv ster:, that p a rt ' " - " - - - - - ' - - - -- ' - - - - - ' - '

j mil; te the 138 w cr:rgenc; rnMa-* _

l 8.1-4 Amendment 36

ATTACHMENT ST HL AE N90 STP FSAR PAGE 3 OF G o

5. The Class IE Electrical System (4.16 kV ESF buses, associated DGs and 480 yac, 120/208 yac and 125 yde power and control systems) is installed in Seismic Category I structures.

6. The Class IE Electrical S,' stem is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena, assuming single active fail-ure, without loss of onsite power to those safety-related electrical ~com-ponents required to shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe condi-tion or to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

7. The three offsite ac power sources (two standby ....ef;. ;r:iand tae

_ 36 respective unit auxilia G are capable of supplying power to each Class 1E electrical system bus.\ + ransformers

8. One standby DG set and one independent 125 yde system are provided for each Class lE load group. (An additional 125 yde system for the fourth RPS channel is provided using Train A as the JGPpower supply.)

9. Pnysical separation and electrical isolation are provided to maintain in-20 dependence of all redundant Class 1E circuits and equipment.

10. Manual initiation of each protective action at the system level is pro-vided in the main control room.

11. Inoperability and bypassed status indication for the safety-related sys-tems are provided at the ESF system leve1 1n the main control room. 29 9 (Re- q fer to Section 7.5.4). and congsonen,+ level 43i 0

The applicable criteria and codes, such as Regulatory Guides and IEEE stan- Q4 0. 3 dards, concerned wit'n power requirements of the safety-related electrical 01 loads are met by these systems. (See Table 8.1-2). 3e i

l i

l l

l 8.1-5 Amendment 36 i

I

, TA51.F. R.1-2 LIStipC OF APPL.lCApt.E CRl1FRI A Con f ormanc e Criterie Title Discussed in I. Regislat ory Cuides*

16

7. Institute of Electrical and F lec t r on ic e Fngineere St andards 2 Mot Ot herwise Incorporated by * *'

RC Ref erenc e: ,

IFFF Std. 470-1973 IFEE Trial-Use Guide for Class IE Control R.1.1.3 54 Swi t c hboa rds for Nuc lear rower Ceneret ing Stations IFFE Std. 4R5-1978 IFFE Recoseended Pract ice for Siring 1.orge B.3.7.1.1 49 Gl42bO. lO7 Lead Storage patteries for Generating Statione and Subetstione l 16

3. Branch Technical Posit ions 149 RTP ICSR R (FSR) Dee of Diesel Generator Sete for Pesking 8.3.1.1.4 36 7,

BTP ICSR II (PSB) Stability of Offeite Power Systree R.7.7.1 9' IO

O m 04N v 7

FTP ICSR 18 (PSB) Application of the Single Failure Criterion 6.3.1 6.3.7.7 ?

to Meneelly-Cont roIIed Elect rically operet- 6.3.5.5. 7.6.3 ?

ed Telece 7.6.7 See Figures 49 7.6.3 and 7.6-10 n4 30.

107M ETF ICSR 21 Goldence for Application of BC I.47 7.1.7.6 e ~,

BTP PSHI Adegency of Station Electric Distribution 8.3.1.1.4.6 3p g, Systes Teltages D-4 3,(

v C) W rn 3>

NTP FSRf2 Criteria for Alerne end Indicatione Associ- 8.3.1.1.4.7 . C7 sted with Diesel Generator Ifnit typassed and Inoperable Status d' f$][

g) + f wzH

[-c C) Q i

g *See Toble 3.17-1 for reelsion end STP peeltion on the following Regulatory Omideo:

. I.6.1.9 (IEEE 387-1977),1.77. I.29.1.30 (IEEE 336-1971),1.37 (IFEE 308-1974). l.40 (IEFE 334-1973). l49 n430.107N 1 1.41. l.47 (IEEE 279-1971),1.53 (IFFE 379-1977), 1.67 (IEEE 779-1971), 1.63 (IEEE 317-1976), n4 30.10Ru 2 1.73 (IFEE 397-1977), 1.75 (IEFE 384-1974). l.RI . l.R9 (IEEF. 373-le74). I .93. I .100 (IFEE 3 344-1975), l.106. 3.108 l.IIR (IfrE 338-1977) 1.178 (IEFF. 484-1975). 1.179 (IFFF. 450-1975) and 1.131 g10-e (IFFE 383-le74) 04

, e Inmu

TARLE 8.1-7 (Continued)

LISTiteC_OF_AFFI.1CARif CRITFRIA Con f ermanc e Criterie T i t_l e Discussed in

4. Cencral Design Criter.e

, A,.

(PC IF Elect rical Power Systese 3.1.7.7.8.1 R.7.1.1 8.1.8.7.1 8.1.7.7.1 (PC 18 Inspection and Test ing of Flect ric Power 3.1.7.7.9.1 Systeme 8.3.l.7 8.3.7.7.1 (PC ?! Frotection Syst ee Reliabilit y and Test abilit y 3.1.7.7.17.1 8.3.1.7.1 8.3.7.7.1 Goc So contdmoent -Design Basis 3,,

- 0 I y j Desgo Basis fe,. row AgaW - 3 r, 7. 2.1. i GDC z m us rJaioroI Phemornerl4 >H C) m >

60C 4 6nvir oneviertfGI onct Missile Dest n 3, g , 3,g g eases om

'1 '

h$zH O

l GN 6 SW) rig of %octores, & 3smo,s, and 3. o 1, compar ,ms lE2 1

ATTACHMENT STP FSAR.

ST HL AE /990 PAGE 4. OF 4 o 8.2 0FFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2.1 Description This section provides a description ~of the Offsite Power System and components and a discussion of system compliance with the design criteria indicated in Section.8.1.4.1. Compliance with applicable regulatory guides is also ad- 36 dressed in Section 8.1. The systems, circuits, and components of this section designated as "345 kV" refer to the assigned nominal value of a given voltage

class for convenient designation.

8.2.1.1 Transmission Lines. Eight 345 kV transmission circuits rated from 850 to 1,080 gVA connect the STP 345 kV switchyard to the owner's re-

~

, spective systems, as shown on Figure 8.2-4. These eight 345 kV circuits pro-vide the source of ac power to the 345 kV switchyard. The 345 kV transmission l 12 circuits terminate at seven points in the owner's respective systems as fol- 28 lows: at Velasco 345 kV Substation (Houston Lighting & Power Company [HL&P] -

existing); at W. A. Parish 345 kV Substation (HL&P - existing); at Hill Coun-try 345 kV Substation (City of Public Service Board of San Antonio [ CPS) -

existing); at Skyline 345 kV Substation (CPS - existing); at Holman 345 kV Substation (City of Austin [ COA]-Lower ~ Colorado River Authority - existing);

at Lon Hill 345 kV Substation (Central Power and Light Company [ CPL) - exist- l 28 ing); and at Blessing 345 kV Substation autotransformer (CPL - future-planned completion prior to the fuel load date of STP Unit No. 1). (The Blessing 345 l 36 kV autotransformer will.be connected to CPL's existing Blessing 138 kV Sub-station). In addition to the eight 345 kV transmission circuits there will be a cor.nection, rated 1,080 gVA, from the 345 kV switchyard at the STP to the 28 southern terminal facilities of a high voltage direct current (HVDC) inter-connection system described in Section 2.2.2.1 (the estimated date of com-mercial operation of both the connection and the terminal facilities is 36 i

0:: t 19" ") .

June, Ab9 Three rights-of-way comeence from the STP property toward the termination points described above as shown on Figure 8.2-5. The eastern right-of-way is 100 ft vide and contains two 345 kV circuits to Velasco (on double-circuit 4 structures). The western right-of-way is 100 ft wide and contains a 345 kV l circuit to Blessing. The middle or northwestern right-of-way is 400 ft wide

and contains the five remaining circuits. These circuits are carried on three sets of double-circuit towers. The W. A. Parish and a future line position are on the eastern structures, the Hill Country and Holman lines are on the middle structures, and the Skyline and Lon Hill lines are on the western structures. (There is adequate spacing between the middle and western towers to allow complete failure of one without jeopardizing the other. For the

purpose of analysis, the right-of-way has been considered as two independent rights-of-way.) This right-of-way is approximately 20 miles long and termi-nates in four separate rights-of-way varying in width from 100 to 150 ft. l36 The 138 kV emergency standby supply to STP is furnished from a radial line out of CPL's Blessing Substation. The 138 kV grid of CPL is intertied with HL&P at South Lane City Substation by the existing Blessing-South Lane City trans-mission circuit, Bay City-South Lane City circuit, and the El Campo-South Lane City circuit.

8.2-1 Amendment 36

ATTACHMENT STP FSAR ST-HL AE / 49 0 PAGE 1 OF 6o lightning flashover - ' " '-from the expected number of lightning strokes (the number of lightning strokes is assumed proportional to the number of thunderstore days per year).

The South Texas Interconnected System grid and transmission system ensures that ac offsite power is available for shutdown of STP Units 1 and 2 and for l 36 mitigating the consequences of postulated accidents at either unit.

8.2.1.2 Substation. As indicated on Figures 8.2-2 and 8.2-3, a breaker-and-a-half scheme is incorporated in the design of the 345 kV switchyard. The switchyard bus is of a 40 g3 fault duty design. O. ..a fi;;r- : ele: f r ' ' t : ". l31

^ - -- r- -

N a k ::h:: ::::ine::: :::: ri m *i n The 345 kV circuit break-ers in the switchyard are rated according to the following criteria:

1. Circuit breaker continuous current ratings are chosen such that no single contingency in the switchyard (e.g., a breaker being out for maintenance) will result in a load exceeding 100 percent of the nameplate continuous current rating of the breaker.

2. Interrupting duties are specified such that no fault occurring on the system, operating in steady-state conditions, will exceed the breaker's nameplate interrupting capability.

3. Momentary ratings are specified such that no fault occurring on the sys-tem, operating in steady-state conditions, will exceed the breaker's name-plate momentary rating.

4. Voltage ratings are specified to be greater than the expecteddmaximum operating voltage.

c: metrical inte.rrupting capability of .

All 345 kV breakers haveElec2ViCOI a maximum sy%5 tern is destgred for at future maxim 40,i4chgo sw rd shor t-000 cw- cwamperes.The Onsite,t contributton of 30 GvA.

The north and south buses of the 345 kV switchyard each have connected to it a l 36 150 pVAp shunt reactor. Each shunt reactor is connected to the bus by a 2,000 ampere circuit switcher.

The breaker-and-a-half switchyard arrangement offers the following operating flexibility:

1. Any transmission line into the switchyard can be cleared either under normal or fault conditions without affecting any other transmission line or bus. -

2. Either bus can be cleared under normal or fault conditions without inter-ruption of any transmission line or the other bus.

3. Any circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance or inspection without interruption of any transmission line or bus.

4 A fault in a tie breaker or failure of the breaker to trip for a line or generator fault results only in the loss of its two adjacent circuits un- l36 til it can be isolated by disconnect switches.

8.2-3 Amendment 36

ATTACHMENT ST HL AE /MO STP FSAR PAGE P y A O .

breakers. Cables are routed from each breaker to the respective trenches in 31 such a fashion as to maintain separation between primary and secondary cir- jo; cuits.

07-8.2.1.3 Standby Transformers. Each standby transformer has the capacity to supply all ESF buses in both units and two 13.8 kV auxiliary buses. These 30 y g transformerse shared between Units 1 and 2 and4eeethe two preferred power Ag sources (the north and south 345 kV buses). Each transformer has two low-vol- -

tage windings rated at 13.8 kV. Each of the low-voltage windings is connected to two 13.8 kV standby buses of one unit and one 13.8 kV standby bus and one auxiliary bus of the other unit. Each transformer is rated et ;;r: ' rt:17 : -

46.5/62/77.5 mVA, oil to air / forced air / forced oil and air (OA/FA/FOA) cooled at 55'c +4eeer with a 12-percent supplementary rating at 65'C s 4 6 Each low-voltage winding is rated et ;;-+:::1;- 23. 25 /31/38. 75 gVA, OA/FA/FOA at 55*C v4ee+ with a 12 percent supplementary rating at 65*C staan-Figure 8.2-1 is a schematic representation of the physical layout of the pre- l 36 ferred power supply circuits which connect the standby transformers to the switchyard.

As indicated on Figure 8.2-1, both transformers are connected to 345 kV buses l 3e in the switchyard by overhead conductors on steel structures. The no. 2 standby transformer is connected to the south bus, and no. I to the north bus.

The following separation criteria apply to the standby transformers and as-sociated leads in order to maintain their independence from each other and ensure conformance to GDC 17 and Regulatory Guide 1.32.

1.

The high-voltage circuitf of each standbg transformer routed on sep-arate steel structurep and terminatels on. separate buseen.in the 345 kV switchyard. The north bus is extended so the no. I standby transformer leads do not cross over the nouth bus. l 36

2. The separation of the steel structure is so arranged that a complete f ailure of a structure serving one standby transfctuer could not jeo-pardize the integrity of a structure or its associated high-voltage leads serving the other standby transformer. ,

offec.tirg

3. The no. I and no. 2 standby transformer are physically separated from each other to prevent a single accident ee one transformer (e.g., fire) from jeopardizing the operation of the other transformer.

4. Each transformer's low voltage windings are connected to the associated 13.8 kV switchgear of each unit by cables (15 kV insulated) routed in "

underground concrete-encased duct banks and manholes and in air by nonsegregated phase bus duct. These cables terminate at the 13.8 kV 46 switchgear of each unit.

5. The 138 kV transmission line does not cross any high-voltage lead from the 345 kV switchyard to the plant.

6. The 138 kV emergency transformer is physically separated from both the no. 36 1 and nc. 2 standby transformers by a minimum of 800 ft. This will ensure that a single accident in the 138 kV emergency transformer will not jeo-pardize the standby transformers.

8.2-7 Amendment 46 l__ _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ATTACHMENT ST HL AE MW STP FSAR PAGE 9 OF 4 o l 36 The impendances of the standby transformers have been selected to ensure sat-isfactory startup, acceleration, and operation of all safety-related motors j during the most limiting conditions considering the short circuit and voltage 36 requirements. All ESF motors are specified to start and accelerate satisfac-torily with 80 percent of the motor's rated voltsge applied at their termin-als.

Each of the standby transformers is protected by primary and backup relays.

The primary relay is of the high speed, percentage slope, harmonic restraint, 31 differential overcurrent type (87/STl or 87/ST2) to detset transformer in- Q430.

ternal faults. The backup relay is of the non-directional, inverse time over- 07N current, induction unit and instantaneous overcurrent unit type (50/51/ST1H or ,

l ST2H) to provide overload protection as well as backup protection to the transformer differential and transformer lawside relays. These relays are connected in conjunction with auxiliary relays (86/STI or ST2) to initiate the 13.8 kV standby bus supply breakers tripping and transferred tripping to 345 kV circuit breakers located in the switchyard and lockout closing of circuit breakers. The control power for these relays is supplied from the respective unit's non-Class 1E 125 vde battery system.

Normal transfer of the source of power for the 13.8 kV auxiliary buses between the no. 1 and no. 2 standby transformers is initiated by the operator from the l 36 control room.

Normal bus transfers are " live bus" trar.sfers, i.e., the incoming source feeder circuit breaker is momentarily paralleled with the outgoing source i feeder circuit breaker. This results in transfers without power interruption. l 36 h cooliov t y 8.2.1.4 138 kV Emergency Transformer. In addition to theEno. 31 +vansftwv*eq and no. 2 standby transformers, the 138 kV emergency transformer is a source of offsite power to the ESF Electrical System. This transformer has a rating equivalent 36 to the requirements of one ESF bus of each unit.

Figure 8.2-1 is a conceptual representation of a physical layout of the cir-cuit which connects the 138 kV emergency transformer to.the 138 kV transmis-rien line.

As indicated on Figure 8.2-1, this transformer is connected to a 138 kV trans-mission line which is not connected to the 345 kV switchyard transmissien line or related structures.

The following separation criteria apply to the 138 kV emergency transformer and its associated leads. 36

1. The location of the 138 kV steel structures is such that a complete fail-ure of a steel structure associated with the no. 1 or no. 2 standby trans-former leads will not jeopardize the integrity of a 138 kV structure or its associated leads.

2. The 138 kV emergency transformer low voltage windin'gs are connected to the associated motor operated switches of each unit by cables (15 kV insulated) routed in underground concrete-encased duct banks, manholes and 44 tray, and in air by non-segregated phase bus duct. h I

8.2-8 Amendment 44

ATTACHMENT STP FSAR ST HL AE- 69D PAGE /o OF go The impedance of the 138 kV emergency transformer has been selected to ensure satisfactory startup, acceleration, and operation of all safety-related motors during the most limiting conditions with preferred (offsite) power available.

This is accomplished as follows:

1. The impedance of the 138 kV emergency transformer is selected to maintain at least 80 percent ;y;;:nvoltage while starting the largest ESF motor with the transforme loaded to its rating minus this motor load.

of mo+or eafect

2. All ESF motors are specified to start and accelerate satisfactorily with 80 percent of th: am * . rated voltage applied at their terminals. 36 As indicated on Figure 8.2-2 and 8.2-3, the 138 kV emergency transformer is connected to the 138 kV transmission line through a 1,200-ampere circuit switcher. The 138 kV eme'rgency transformer is protected by primary and backup relays and a circuit switcher failure protection system. The primary relay is of the high speed, percentage slope, harmonic restraint, differential over- 31 current type (87/ET) to detect transformer internal faults. The backup relay q439 is of the non-directional, inverse time overcurrent, induction unit and in- 07N stantaneous overcurrent unit type (50/51/ET) to provide overload protection as well as backup protection to the transformer differential and transformer lowside relays. In addition, rate-of-rise pressure protection (63SP/ET) is also provided. These relays are connected in conjunction with an auxiliary relay (86/ET) to initiate tripping and lockout closing of the 138 kV circuit switcher and transformer lowside breakers.

The circuit switcher failure protection system consists of a non-directional instantaneous overcurrent relay (50/CSF) connected in conjunction with aux-111ary relays (2/CSF) and (86/CSF) utilized to control the circuit switcher failure timing interval and initiate applied fault tripping (138 kV "C" phase ground switch) of the remote terminal.

Additionally, a non-directional, instantaneous overcurrent relsy (50B) is provided to block opening of the circuit switcher and permit remote terminal backup tripping should the fault current exceed the circuit switcher current interrupting rating. Figure 8.2-3C is a schematic of the protection system for the 138 kV emergency transformer. The control power for the 138 kV emer-gency transformer protection systec is presvided by a branch circuit from the STP 345 kV switchyard 125 vde system.

The 138 kV emergency transformer may be used as a rarce of power for one ESF 36 bus of each unit by manual transfer from the control room. The normal bal-ance-of-plant 4.16 kV and 13.8 kV buses are not fed from the 138 kV emergency '

transformer.

l l 8.2.1.5 Main Generators. The main generators are rated 1,504.8 gVA, 25 36 i kV and provide power to the system grid at various loads to a maximum of Ir3He, t,56+

i MWe each. L ei. ;;;;;r :: d: : i: ;;ir:: '- '- *'" Each main genera-tor is directly connectedathrough a 25 kV, 36,600- ampere, forced-cooled, iso lated phase bus through etdisconnect links andhnain generator circuit breaker. g29l36

i::1;;c the sei.. - -- e r f v= * - ' end . mil;.., n.u.,Mee r i;ai. 430.ns The main generator's voltage is stepped up to 345 kV and then tied to one bay of the 345 kV switchyard. Each main transformer bank consists of two three-phase transformers, 700 pVA each, FOA rated at 55'c temperature rise, with a

_+ o +he mom fvcmsforrwer5 and und 00dliary fransformer-8.2-9 Amendment 36

STP FSAR ATTACHMENT ST HL AE /490 PAGE // OF 4 o 8.3 ONSITE P0k'ER SYSTEMS 8.3.1 AC Power Systems 8.3.1.1 Description. The onsite g Power Systems of Units 1 and 2 each con-sist of four major subsystems as follous.

1. 13.8 kV Auxiliary Power System (non-Class IE)

2. 13.8 kV Standby Power System (non-Class 1E) 30

3. 138 kV Emergency Transformer Systems (non-Class 1E)

4. Onsite Standby Power System (Class 1E)

The arrangement of the fig Power Distribution Systems provides sufficient switching flexibility and equipment redundancy to ensure reliable power supply to the Class IE and non-Class 1E plant loads during startup, normal operation.

<wnk shutdown O following a design basis event.

and Figure 8.3-1 illustrates the bus arrangements and interconnections of Units 1 and 2. The general arrangement of the. electrical equipment is shown on Fig- 36 ures 1. 2-4, 1. 2-5, 1. 2-10, 1. . -26, 1. 2-28, and 1. 2-29.

Normally, the Class 1E f(jf Power Distribution Systems of Units 1 and 2 operate independently of each other, each being supplied power from a separate standby i transformer. However, it is.possible to energize the 13.8 kV auxiliary buses of a anit from either of the standby transformers. Underground cable ties are provided for interconnecting the secondary windings of the standby trans-36 formers to the 13.8 kV buses of both Units 1 and 2. This permits the opera-tion of the Class 1E auxiliaries from either standby transformer.

The 138 kV emergency transformer, which is common to Units 1 and 2, een also be utilized to supply power to one train of ESF load in each unit.

The following detailed descriptions explain how the major power distribution subsystems are employed to furnish power to the plant auxiliary loads under all expected modes of operation.

8.3.1.1.1 Main Auxiliary Power Distribution: During normal plant opera-tion, auxiliary loads are energized from the main generator through the closed main generator breaker and the three-winding unit .uxiliary transformer which 36 is connected to the isolated phase bus of the main generator. Each unit aux-iliary transformer #is rated 25 kV/13.8 kV/13.8 kV, 84/112 pVA, oil-to-air l

[~(OA)/ forced oil and air (FOA), 65'C, three phase, 60 Hz. Each transformer l36 g secondary winding is rated ' 42/56 mVA,. 0A/fe.;;d ri- (?^J' . . -

was on oo4erwortic toad +op changer ad The secondary windings of the unit auxiliary transformer are loaded approxi-mately equally. The "X" vinding energizes two of the 13.8 kV auxiliary buses, and the "Y" winding energizes the remaining pair of 13.8 kV auxiliary buses of the unit, as shown in Table 8.3-1.

During plant startup, power to 13.8 kV auxiliary buses IF, 1G, 1H, and 1J of each unit is suppited from ,the unit auxiliary transformer via the main transformers with the main generator breaker open. 36 oN3h peuer sewc.es 4hvoO3h 8.3 1 Amendment 43

ATTACHMENT STP FSAR ST HL AE /Y9D PAGEiz.OF 6o The 13.8 kV auxiliary buses are standard, indoor, metal-clad,15 kV class switchgear. All circuit breakers are of the magnetic, air-interruption type with an interrupting rating of 750 gtVA. The continuous current rating of the incoming supply breakers, tie breakers, and feeder breakers is 1,200 amperes.

All circuit breakers are electrically operated utilizing 125 vde control pover.

Non-Class 1E Motors Motors rated 1500 hp and above are rated 13.2 kV; motors rated 300 to 1250 hp are rated 4 kV; and motors rated 3/4 hp to 250 hp are rated 460 V. 36 l43 Two feeders from the 13.8 kV auxiliary buses supply power to two auxiliary transformers serving non-Class 1E equipment. These transformers are of the oil-filled type, rated 13.8 kV/4.16 kV, 5,000/6,250/7000 kVA, ^A/ FA, 55'C/5.5 OA/FA/FA, W three phase, 60 Hz. Switchgear distributing power from these trans-55 t:/ssac/65't -

formers is standard, indoor, metal-clad, 5 kV class switchgear in a dou-ble-ended arrangement. Circuit breakers are of the magnetic, air-inter-ruption type with interrupting rating of 250 stVA. The continuous current rating of all breakers in'this double-ended arrangement is 1,200 amperes. l36 Other feeders from the 13.8 kV auxiliary buses are connected to low-voltage transformers supplying power through single and double-ended 480 V switchgear 136 sections to non-Class IE loads. These transformers are of the dry type rated 13.8 kV/4B0 V, 1,000 ^ ; 1,200 kVA, .i.- w .1.

three phase, 60 Hz. (AA) F^ er 500 m '0 %

The switchgear sections consist of standard, indoor, o metal-enclosed, 600 V class switchgear. All circuit breakers are of the magnetic, air-interruption type with interrupting ratiags consistent with the Q short-circuit duty at the point of application. All' circuit breakers are g$

electrically cperated with 125 vde control power. Feeders from the 480 V load A*

center buses energize non-Class 1E motors and motor control centers (MCCs)

$ r~

from which non-Class IE small motors and miscellaneous loads are furnished power. Clh

ug 3 r

err:11y :p nq us tie breakers between th i;;tsections of the double-ended 3>

rwitchgear ectiend are 7:: rid:d :: ll:: per r t^ relecti : 1::d: rr b;9 tu. ,y

'y

tirrnunder administrative control.:h:;ld e J Gm p;r:r crurrer te ^r"-

9'

-< eag-er periods . S dicalet wese tweoxers con ce closed ouvirg moMteance 80 i 8.3.1.1.2 Normal ESF Power Distribution: For startup and normal opera- Fr tion of the plant, power to the ESF buse. Is distributed from the standby g buses through the associated ESF bus transformers. ._

O O

The standby transformer of each unit is a three-winding transformer, rated O y

362.25 kV/13.8 kV/13.8 kV, 46.5/62/77.5 (87.19) mVA, OA/FA/FOA, 55'C (65'C)..

three phase, 60 Hz.

The transformer secondaries are each rated 23.25/31/38.75 g

pVA. ,

3 During startup and normal plant operation the 13.8 kV standby buses are sup- t.

plied power from the unit auxiliary and standby transformers. Standby 13.8 kV g Bus IF is supplied power from the X-winding of the unit auxiliary transformer e r::;;h M . S kV ou.111 - ; Ex: 1".with the bus tie breaker closed. Standby 36 '

13.8 kV Buses 10 e.nd lH are supplied power f rom the Y and X windings grrr;:::

I 9 tir:1 ;7of the standby transformers (see Figure 8.3-1). ~

and 0,6+ ooistiary E.3-2 Amendment 43

ATTACHMENT l ST-HL AE /490 SIP FSAR PAGE /30F (co or frsen CI+Her of +he By means of manual transfer, the 13.8 kV standby buses can be supplied from the respective unit auxiliary transformer W etandby transformers. Normal od connections and possible interconnection from the 13.8 kV standby buses to the unit auxiliary, transformers are shown on Table 8.3-1. Normally, standby sto D transformer No. I and 2 supply only Unit 1 and 2, respectively. Normal '

connections and possible interconnection from the 13.8 kV standby buses en the 36 standby transformers are shown in Table 8.3-2.

Power is supplied from 13.8 kV. standby buses IF, 1G, and 1H to 4.16 kV ESF Buses E1A, ElB, and ElC, respectively, through the associated auxiliary ESF transformers.

Switchgear constituting the standby buses is of the same type and rating as switchgear constituting the auxiliary buses.

the breakers in each standby bus is 1,200 amperes.The continuous current rating of l36 Each auxiliary ESF transformer supplying the ESF buses is rated 13.8 kV/4.16 l36 kV, 5,000/6,250/7,000 kVA, OA/FA at 55'C, FA at 65'C three phase, 60 Hz. Each transformer is connected by cable to Class 1E, 5 kV class, metal-clad switch-gear.

8. 3.1.1. 3 Additional Source ESF Power Distribution: Another offsite 36 power- source, the 138 kV emergency transformer, is capable of supplying power con-currently to one ESF bus of each unit. The 138 kV emergency transformer is a three-vinding transformer rated 138 kV/13.8 kV/13.8 kV, 12/16/20 pVA, (22.51 gVA, OA/FOA/FOA, 55'C (65*C) three-phase, 60 Hz. Each secondary winding is rated 9/12/15 (16.875) gVA, 55'C (65'C). Each of the secondary windings of 33 this transformer is connected to a separate, outdoor-type, 13.8 kV air-circuit breaker. These air-circuit breakers make it possible to supply power to the 36 Unit I or Unit 2 13.6 kV emergency buses (1L). These ore mterloc. red wth ++e normal supp:3

prevent te sopplies from toeing 6ed toge+ber.

Switchgear constituting the 13.8 kV emergency buses of Units 1 and 2 is of the same type and rating as switchgear constituting the auxiliary buses. The switchgear breakers have a continuous current rating of 1,200 amperes. Each of these breakers can supply power to one of the ESF buses, via'the associated auxiliary ESF transformer, when the standby transformers are not available and l 36 the standby Diesel-Generators (DGs) fail to start. Switching and control of this switchgear are nonautomatic and by operator action only.

8.3.1.1.4 Onsite Standby Power Supply and ESF Power Distribution: The Onsite Standby Power Supply Systems of Units 1 and 2 each consist of three l 36 independent, physically separated, standby DGs supplying power to three associated inad groups designated Train A, Train B, and Train C. Each load l,

group consists of a 4.16 kV ESF bus and the electrical loads connected to that i

bus. The Onsite Standby Power Suppiy Systems of Units 1 and 2 operate independently of each other. Each standby DC and load group of a particular unit is also physically separated and electrically independent from the other '

two standby DGs and their load groups. t Qualification of all Class 1E electrical equipment which is a part of the Onsite Standby Power Supply and EST Power Distribution System is discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11. 44 Each standby DG is located in a separate room of the Diesel-Generate Build-ing, which is a seismic Category I structure (described in Section 3.8.4).

i. Each tro'm(i.e., Lead Gvoop) d irdeperd ent bt* is ncrt Malfy redundant;two ,

trains o<e necessary to rwitigotc +6T conlepences c4 o caesign basis acc4 dent .

8.3-3 Amendment ~44-

. - ATTACHMENT STP FSAR ST.HL AE- l'/9D PAGElf OF 60 Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is provided with switching that permits energization of the bus by five alternate sources:

1. The respective unit auxiliary transformer

2. No. 1' standby transformer 36

3. No.2 standby transformer

4. Standby DG

5. 138 kV emergency transformer O.;n ..;ith:r :t;..A , ;.an;fer_.; .;r the re p:: tire : it __;ilic-/ tr---fe r r i.

1 ::;il bl:, th; :tenay 00; ; rply th: prc: re uirro by - FC' " r f r : '-

=='-!y =hn* hr. d.. s = d v s . Ti. 130 k" __. 6e ncy t r ::f r--* "a" Man =a '_

additia"=1 =*=ae f;r eupplyir.g ;:r:r 5: *'--- yet--- 4# far any **==a" th^* .

rb r ; per: ecru sc o . . u.....ilable. T** r;J2! 2225^2 if #-^'I2*^17 2""#' #-

-il:; 'rr:ver, its m . 1. w r.e;;r ::::::11;%.

g g.g y ,,, safe.t, Each standby DG is automatically started)-[a's"Me$c$ bed inn ion 8.3.1.1.4.4,

~

j 36 and the required Class 1E loads connected to that ESF bus are automatically connected in a predetermined time sequence.:ft:r :h ::: fhy M f r rrrfy ::~-

2rrr;: 1: 1 Each standby DG is ready to accept load within 10 seconds after the start signal.

The standby DGs are not used for peaking and therefore the design complies with BIP ICSB-8.

Figure 8.3-1 shows the co;. figuration of the ESF buses and the standby DCs. 36 The assignments of loads connected to each bus are shown on single line dia-grams referenced in Table 1.7-1. Emergency electrical loading requirements are addressed in Table 8.3-3.

i 8.3.1.1.4.1 ESF Buses - The three ESF buses are physically and electri-cally separaced from each other to comply with the single-failure criterion.

There are no automatic or manual interconnections between .eedundenet. load l groups.

l Switchgear constituting the ESF buses is indoor-type, metal-clad, 5 kV switchgear qualified for Class 1E service. All circuit breakers are of the magnetic, air-interruption type with an interrupting rating of 250 EVA. The continuous current rating of .eM. circuit breakers in this switch gear is 1,200 l amperes. All circuit breakers are electrically operated with 125 vde control power.

Feeders from the 4.16 kV ESF buses supply power to Class 1E actors with 36 ratings greater than 300 hp.

Two feeders from each 4.16 kV ESF bus supply power to a double-ended 480 V switchgear asser-bly. The transformer sections of this switchgear assembly consist of dry-type ' transformers rated 4.16 kV/480 V,1,000/1333 kVA, AA/FA, l 36 three phase, 60 Hz with impedence of 4.0 percent t 7.5 percent tolerance. The switchgear sections consist of indoor, metal-enclosed, 600 V class switchgear. j 44 8.3-4 Amendment 44

g,o3 62 breoxers between sectic% of the double-ended hTTACH HL ENT g lmo centers are und0r odrdnis.tvofive contvol cnct can be PAGE /d OF ( />

clo%ect doring rnointOnonce per'socis.

STP FSAR All circuit breakers are of the magnetic, air-interruption type with inter-rupting ratings consistent with the short-circuit duty at the point of appli-L cation. All circuit breakers are electrically operated with 125 vde control power.& S.: bm

f e b r::h rt er: .::::11- ;-- --A - - c i r : - -' * ^ - 1 ' a" ;: ;rt tr :1:: :' lord: cr t:d tu; ::::::n: - '-- ' '-E tr:ti : . ..a . 1 .'. . : .1 d n.,. 36 rf 9 p r:: _ ~ue s w A . u w g,. . . Ji;;t l e

Feeders from this 480 V switchgear supply power to ESF motors with ratings in the range of 150 hp to 300 hp. Other 480 V feeders supply power to Class lE MCCs from which all 460 V motors with ratings equal to or less than 1001 3p are controlled.

8.3.1.1.4.1.1 Non Class 1E Loads Connected to Class-lE Power System: l32 The non-Class lE loads that can be powered from the standby Diesel Generators (SBDGs) during loss of offsite power are included in Table,8.3-3 and include:

1. Pressurizer Heaters (R>ocX-up Groups A and B)

2. Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Cooling Fans

3. Reactor Cavity Vent Fans, and !

4 Reactor Support Exha t an M

"rheeipt 6'Mof on b hSIe'm ' @'m M mil (see 5echen i a.s.t.

frpedundant sets of pressurizer eaters are conne ed to 480 V ESF load centers 36 ElA (Train A) and Elc (Train C)y As indicated in Table 8.3-3 these heaters Q430*

g are manually Ic: - tduring loss-of-offsite power (1h0P) when a SI signal is

"

P#***"E' Q430.

connee.ted under odnamistwative_ control 30N The balance of the non Class lE loads indicated above (See detailed listing in Table 8.3 3) are connected to common MCCs. As shown in Figure 8.3-1, these non Class lE MCCs, one per train, are connected to Class lE 480 V MCCs g Tlws4.e WCC brc:nr: tare tripped upon receipt of a SI signal er.d th:::fer: tre els: :.

igig - 4 w e. & ce;se.(see Section 8.3.1.4.4.14). As incicated on Table 8.3-3, these loads are either sequenced or manually loaded onto the standby DGs during a LOOP when a SI signa is not present. In the event sequencing is initiated by a SI signal, these loa s may be manually loaded after resetting.

r the SI signalg under administvefive, auto mahcallt3

! contvol .

8.3.1.1.4.2 Equipment Capacities and Loading Basis - Each SBDG has a l continuous 8,760 hour0.0088 days 0.211 hours 0.00126 weeks 2.8918e-4 months rating of 5,500 kW. The loads are listed in Table 8.3-3. The design and continuous rating selected is consistent with the re- 36 l

l quirements of Regulatory Guide (RO) 1.9 and IEEE Standard 387-197f 7 Capac-ities of individual loads are determined on the basis of motor -----!-t _ rat- ' l 36 l ings. The diesel engine, generator,andaccessoriesarebriefhdescribedin 4 the following:

broke horsep 9439, i 1. The DG set, manufactured by Cooper Energy Services, has the following I3N l ratings: 2000 hour0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months at 5935 kW, 168-hour at 6050 kW, and 30-minute at 6050 l36 kW. These ratings are based on a cooling water inlet temperature of l ll5'T 49 k

+hrough juoli6cd isola 3 ion devices which E.3 5 Amendment 49

1 ATTACHMENT ST-HL AE- / # 0 PAGE N, OF 48 STP FSAR

2. Each diesel engine is a cold starting, compression-ignition, multi cylin-der type. Each engine is a Type KSV-20-T, four stroke, turbocharged machine.

3. The generator is a synchronous type, model HS-160 ET, 4160 V, 60 Hz,

, three phase alternating current machine, manufactured by Electric Product Division of Portec. The generator continuous rating at 80 percent power ae factor lagging is 6875 kVA. The generator and exciter are canable of a ,

operating at 110 percent of the continuousfratingsfor a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Po" l out of any 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of operation with no reduction of annual maintenance 29 interval. The generator insulation is designed for the special environ-mental conditions of the nuclear power plant. The generator has non-- Q430.

hygroscopic sealed Class F insulation in accordance with NEMA Standard 333 MG1-22.40.

4. The generator excitation system manufactured by Electric Product Division of Portec, is a static-type exciter-regulator having response character-istics and sufficient capacity to provide the generator with the required excitation to allow startup of the loads listed in Table 8.3-3. The ex- l .36 citer voltage rating is consistent with the requirements of the generator field. Regulator sensing voltage is 120 vac, three-phase, 60 Hz, and is taken from the generator output by means of potential transformers.

5. Each engine has two it. dependent air compressor skids each consisting of an air compressor, dryer, air receiver, and all piping and valves.

49 Each engine has an auxiliary skid with standby jacket water circulating pump, lube oil circulating pump. lube oil heaters, and. other equipment.

The auxiliary skids are located adjacent to the engine and generator skid.

Each engine has an engine control panel, a generator control panel, and a high voltage cubicle.

All these accessories are furnished by Cooper Energy Service (CES) but 36 much of the equipment is fabricated by subvendors contracted to CES. .

The DG units are subjected to the qualification program in accordance with RG 1.9 and IEEE 387-1977. 49 ESF motors are sized equal to or greater than the maximum horsepower required 29 by the driven load under normal running and runout condition. All notors are Q430.

suitable for running at 110 percent of the nominal voltage rating. The 4.0 kV 15N class motors have a service factor ranging from 1.0 to 1.15, whereas 460 V motors generally have a service factor of 1.15. The 4 kV ESF motors, except those that are hermetically sealed, are provided with resistance temperature 43 detectors (RTDs) in the stator windings and with thermocouples (TCs) in sleeve bearings. The RTDs and TCs are monitored by the plant computer. The effect of any overvoltage at the motor teminal is reviewed.

8.3 6 Amendment 49

ATTACHMENT ST44L AE /99b PAGE/f_OF 6 o STP FSAR 29 Motor insulation is selected on the basis of normal and design basis event 9 3,,

ambient temperatures and anticipated temperature rise resulting from maximum 155 loading conditions (Section 3.11.4). Class lE motors are seismically and en-vironmentally qualified as described in Sections 3.10 and 3.11, respectively. 36 Trouble alarms in the control room are provided for ESF motors.

Transformer impedances and standby DG voltage regulator and exciter character-istics are selected to permit starting the largest motor connected to a par-ticular bus, when all other loads connected to the bus are energized, without the voltage at the tereinals of all ESF motors falling below 80 percent of the nominal motor voltage rating.

8.3.1.1.4.3 Identification of Class lE Equipment and Circuits - See Sec-tion 8.3.1.3 for identification of Class lE equipment and circuits ar.d Section 36 6.3.1.4 for separation of Class lE equipment and circuits.

8.3.1.1.4.4 ESF Bus Load Shedding, Automatie Leading and Standby Diesel Generator Starting -The automatic loading sequence of the Class lE buses is shown in Table 6.3-3 and a typical logic for this sequence actuation is shown in Figure 8.3-4,(Snee4 z), l36 energitation in'i+iat ed Automatic (:ncrgi_ing of the Class lE buses is :::::pli: Fed;by solid state ESF Load Sequencersi t e :::rt the required Class lE loads &neprogrammed time incre-ments. wh in also connet.t "* 29 Q430 Each ESF load sequencer, one for each --d"-d--- actuation train load group, Q3N has independent sensor channels, power supplies, and actuated devices. No 3 credible sneak circuits can occur to render sensors, power supplies, or actu-ated devices ir redund:n: :hcrn:1 cr 1--A g-^"p-tinoperable. Preu;h i- ere.

rn:r - f r ::.

R:dund:- tphannel and load groups are isolated and separated in accordance 1 36 with RC 1.75 (See Section E.3.1.4). I A sequencer design deronstration test is perforced to verify that no credible l 36 common failure modes exist in the r.equencer design. The test verifies re-sponses to credible input perturbation and series of events.

l Each ESF load sequencer responds to three unique modes of operation as fol-

, lows:

t i

8.3-7 Amendment 49

ATTACHMENT

ST-HL AE. / 4/ 90 SIP FSAR PAGE4POF 4 o

1. Mode I (Safety Injection [SI] -ertr:t!-9 discussed in Sectionf '.3. 2.12 end:8.3.1.1.4.4.1.

2. Mode II (Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP]) discussed in Section 36 8.3.1.1.4.4.2.

3. 29 Mode III (SI Anuni:= Coincident With LOOP) discussed in Section Q430.

8.3.1.1.4.4.3.

333 8.3.1.1.4.4.1 Modo I (SI-A::;= ier) ESF Load Sequence Operation: Each sequencer detects the existence of Mode I abnormal operation by the simul-taneous receipt of any fcur or more of six SI eeeee44 ear. signals generated by ,

ther SI (EEFh Actuation System (k.SFAS)) discussed 'en Section 7.3.1.The SI9si SI" Engineevect Safef N Feoiores . - 'Jenerated by paont conditions as shewn on Figore 7.2 5 Upon detecting a Mode I ~conditten 4-*-n= the ESF load sequencer logic verifies the 36 non-existence of a Mode II signal. The ESF load sequencer then automatically energizes the equipment required for this emergency in programmed steps as shown in Table 8.3-3 and Figure 8.3-4 pCSheet 2).

Themanualt.reNS er re-cc- .:Mi .g n'.:= loads are also shown in Tcble 8.3-3. " a r4r r- S 3- %

Additionally, the standby DGs are started automatically by the ESF Actuation l36 System. The standby DGs run with their governors automatically set in the isochronous mode, and their voltage regulaters automatically set in the auto-matic mode. All ner-critical protection devices are bypassed as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.6. E5F fonds are fed from the off 6ite Source and With an SI signal present and no loss of preferred (offsite) power the opera-ter can reset can rhen be manually the SI returti :. signal from the control roomp 4hc standby DG shut down l 35 f rom the control room or locally. (baseo upon

+ne pion + emergency p .3 - - m , . n e 1..

operatirg procedures). After 4He si sigviol has beers rese+,

<< 3 v_nne : u-:, ie3d p eddi ; -,3 1--? ; 7=--i,; --e i-4-i "

t:d :: d e: crit:d in ::c ien S . 3.1.1. '. 4. 3=. Ho**" +"e 52 si3 not is memorited 36 69 we secttsr tooo sequence - to enobte recognition of a Mode 3IT cordition, as discosse :2 in 5heet 2 .

Simuhen ated atesting and actuat1on 3.i.e 4.5.2.Twh merne-9 of Mode I it discusse is Snom ea Fioure 8.3-4 (d in Sec) tion 8.3.1.1.4.7.

8.3.1.1.4.4.2 Mode II (Loss of Offsite Power) ESF Load Sequence Operation: The ESF load sequencer detects the existence of Mode II (LOOP) by the simultaneous receipt of any two out of four undervoltage or degraded l36 voltage signals which indicate that the normal preferred source to the <Esat.

4.16 kV, bus has dropped below acceptable limits, or has failed completely.

ess-Upon receipt of any two out of four undervoltage or degraded voltage signals, l36 the ESF load sequencer converts the recognition of these signals into a main-tained signal.

Upon detecting the existence of a Mode II(Condi+ the ESF ionload sequencer.w4Mt. checks for the non-existence of Mode I.

The ESF load sequencers then automatically implement the following: l36 (a) Shed all loads on the E+ft 4.16tsf' kV6 bus. (::::;t S: Ir:d --t-- **=a-a ferr:- However, sheddirig os +&e lead center +vonsfor eners. diSivilmitieri nets.>or-K is accorn plished +vir ping +be breQKers en tHe 480V second ary side of the transforpers ch . The breakers on 4+1e privbary side of +he

+vansfor mers ve rnoi n .3-6 Amendment 43 Co n etected .

ATTACHMENT STP FSAR ST-HL AE /99 #

PAGE /90F 63 (b) Start the standby DC with the governor in the isochronous mode and the voltage regulator in the automatic mode. Non-critical protective l 3' devices are bypassed as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.6.

(c) Trip the 4.16 kV ESF power supply-breakers to disconnect the Class lE onsite power systen from the offsite source.

(d) Energize the equipment for this emergency event in programmed steps as shown in Table 8.3-3 and on Figure 8.3-4( Csneci 2) l3 Disconnecting the Class lE onsite power system from the offsite system pre-cludes the possibility of subsequent interaction between the onsite and the offsite power systems. As each standby DG reaches rated voltage and frequen-cy, the breaker connecting it to the corresponding 4.16 kV ESF bus closes.

This automatic breaker closure is only possible when the offsite power supply breaker is open and the designed load shedding has been accomplished. Upon closure of the DG breakers, the sequencers begin sequencing the loads that are l3 required during this event in programmed steps. When the preferred offsite power source again becomes available, the reconnection of the 4.16 kV ESF busestothissourceandtheshut[downofthestandbyDGsisaccomplishedman- p ually.

'snsed V ,

Simulated testing of Mode II is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.4.7h.

29

, ,, . V. Y. t/. 4 . p'df A)1/ 95) Mtynytboy / yop's/qi/)?f919%Ageef)/56F/1$sdfj 9 39 inser4F% /r/o/e nt Nd4 /ltv *Vt!W 4W1dndd( 4x4s(.6c4 #f Avd( Y aw #!aoe, 335 ITI/cdndi(16n(/l 8.31.1.4.4.3.1 Simul +onecos E dstence of Mcde I and Mode II .

Each ESF load sequencer automatically implements the Mode III loading sequence by the simultaneous presence of four or more SI _..__.._. signals from the ESF Actuation Svstem and the presence of two out of four under@yoltage signals from the @ _.16 kVrbus undervoltage relays. The ESF load sequencer then initiates the following:

(a) Shed all loads on the 4.16 kV ESF bus. (::::p: :h: 10:d : ter trr--t l i

-fe r .: :: ) :. i n s ev-+ G *

(b) Start the standby DG with the governor in the isochronous mode and the voltage regulator in the automatic mode.; {

Note - the standby DG receives a simultaneous emergency startup sig-nal directly from the ESF Actuation System due to an SI 4:;- :f n:.

signal. Ei: cir-1 ete-t- ^- -c nahv nt: in ch, 4.nrhen :: .,M M O.; ::1:c.;; c ;;;2:::- in th: t- sti: ::f:. " d-- +h===

cand %

44enet.Jall non-critical protective devices are bypassed as describ gd

[in Section 8. 3.1.1. 4. 6. J '

(c) Trip the 4.16 kV ESF offsite power supply breaker $to disconnect the Class lE onsite power system from the offsite source. ,

(d) Energize the equipment for this emergency event in programmed steps 3 as shown in Table 8.3-3 and on Figure 8.3-4CCsheet 2)

}nser+'W >

8.3-9 Amendment 36

- - ATTACHMENT-ST HL-AE '99 0 PAGE 2 EOF 6 o

.TasoLT 'E '

f -f*he. m & .doada) m skw S Tsd=4 8. 3- 3 91 L4 sf -k , tne da. E <e.aogh~ ~d %- a.4 ~< M, if w S1 acTu& ocaus , loaJ v4cd4'y ~o' A=*/

,y n a*M nd Lllred 4. Sac C.L. 4. 3. I. I.4.+. 3.3.

-CNsex T 'F '

8. 3.1. I.9. A. 3 ploda. JE (sr cyk + t,,, / o g L p, Q .

Glo de. JE .<o na- s is k e- */ boK Mode. 1 u d moda. E c.,,d;};n,

'Th <- Esr load sepa,.- d,, A ,4g % y u a ,,,a..fko d,o /

O g 4 s- A de- IE w d.*-kw, e f L.s .

'. *fb c- sul% ex,ste,, u. ,,4 /no d 1 d irt.4.1 2 A S t- $ k i2 hkatN Alods. E,

1. Oted, E a,;sy f kJ y ate 4. r. -

4 ME T h' ESF A d ** y eu op i 4 # a. adev<. pia C*,a; a +: ,:a4 tuAca. Ry ud kw of th n%d / -a,. +L o , kan _ Ta./ 4. Q430

~ f A 20 . h i 4 in da 1 1 a.,,,

33Al

8. 3 - 3 . S;Jkd A% ./ m ds .1E dis & 4 O

l sw e. 2.1. A.1.

ATTACHMEN ST HL.AE- h-fo

?LG.E.21 or & o Zpsar 'c n

& ~ , sheda;3 J th 4../ A -k.~ 4v - disfr. % 4,. ~

uke L ~ mliskd ) h.'pp,3 tAs- be&s ~ 4- 4ev v seca d q s.*4 of s +.~ M s n y, % M s nA pr y 4:4. of % -frur4 -s n a we:W.

rpseer 'H '

6. 3. n . I. A . 4. 2. 2 /71. L I fris k y D I J in.L H a+ fene L. w T.- . gs ,, jg _ , , : . ,

pg,g 3 ( g zy g,,,

,4ig,,,,g 9 ,_,

in L E 6. cop) ,N Esr 4.~cl s y cs,., & Ar&11 g 33d

;J s 4L: q .

(r) Shed a.a a n n 4.tc. A V Esf W . 4 ~ , skadhy of W had a -/,4-s 4k;ks~ -shwL A ml.s G 9 -fr:g.q % b<&.c - tu Aro V nd*q

,; a . o f A & = = ,s = s ~9 7h 4< & z ~ 4-M m (b) se cer+olo seteced imos aJ o/ tk *-~4r-*r -a -J-W e 4 MV EsF distribuMoo g Q ce) Tr. , % 4.1t A V ESF pea f,&, ./, jm,,,,f-

l g [; % %. c G 1 e ~s.h p. w rys M f~ $ ff***k " ~<'-

umn .,w OWY ' (d) $" w -i$s. sh,d D4 % W fes&='v skled pessoruer

). N 8% 5 m/ .2, ( M of Sge,ed M % b u r ,-1, #a ,r 4 5 r_,,; s.

A +L o c br4 4 34.s A. 6 4 ~ 4 .-

1.< L. -L.

ATTACHMENT ST.HL-AE /'/96 PAGE 2.2 OF 4, d

.rusmT g* cm M W% s;&. d A load es, & % ,s y *.J L + "r Abrs % s,9=4s.

(i.) En y te. A p p J .6 4 w wA payd s & se M 4. *T*J~4 8. 3-2 ud '

m Rp B. 3-4 (stet 11 We. 4.J v AcJd;q d Jf.% (O A rw // /..cAv vOrA <=. 6 L p ad n a w ~

= t3 .t.. &.d 6p ' +.

9. 3 l.n. A. A.2. 3. inode z t,,J , sit A y a.a. r s u L = " h' - Sk k ' w iss .g (i.cos) & Aid 9 ,

w ine&.1 (srh -th Esr aJ spas .tk., 4.-- M", Dd

yl A -t h 4 Itc i q

ls) 5 k ed al.J .toado n -tk. A. I & A.V E3r % ( W fk 4-A ca.A W~> a ,d t% ~

ou<xd Aw V dask L-k sys k).

0) Shsd & s.44.J -44 n % 4to v r3p-x-. w e. u

w se g W p,g( RHR N, RCFC %, 64d wec S49'y "" L s C') Enu & b y J & tL.a abo V =7-- esssy ksA c.4.;IIv,

~ t.yf ym 4 pnyJ s& n sk- 4. m.44 9. 3- 3 ud n Rp 9. 3 -+ (. slut .D.

% .to.a sc ..id. q J n~ u,) w - i.t t.a.t;u ala ck we- 4 L y .sced n e we -

Aahd &

s.6 i

ATTACHMENT ST-HL AE- / V 90 STP FSAR PAGE 23 OF (,o Th; u nu:1 -- --- : fx ;;;. c ::ti g ether lerd: ::: dr- 11 Te h 0.2 2 2xf 29

- y i g, , . s 1 n_

Q430.

335 A -12ted tutin; ef Mede ::: ir Extie- " ' 1 1 A " 't % -

8.3.1.1.4.5 Instrumentation and Control - Automatic and manual control

of each of the SBDGs and the ESF equipment requiring automatic sequencing is provided. Controls for safety-related equipment are generally provided in the control room as well as at equipment locations. Redundant control circuitry 36 and control power sources are compatible with their associated power circuits. l2 Instrumentation is provid- to manually synchronize each SBDG with the ESF bus and to continuously monitor he status of the safety-related systems. Control power tems.

for the SBDG systems it obtained from the associated EST 125 yde sys-following The status of each SBDG is indicated in the control room, including the parameters:

1. Voltage, current, power, and frequency l3 6

2. Breaker position of each bus supply and feeder breaker 3.

Cooling water pressure and temperature, lube oil pressure and tempera-ture, starting air pressure, fuel level, and engine rpm The bypass or inoperabi1[ity status of each SBDG is automatically indicated in the control room through the ESF Status Monitoring System described in Section 7.5.4. The conditions alarmed through this system are the following:

49

1. DG not in remote mode Q430.

122N

2. Loss of starting air / starting air system malfunction

3. Loss of control power 4 Start circuit inoperable

5. Emergency stop push button not reset

6. Overspeed lockout not reset,

7. Generator differential lockout not reset Inoperability of the SBDGs may also be manually indicated through the Status Monitoring System. These conditions each have their own alarm windows. The SBDG monitoring complies.with the guidelines of Branch Technical Position (BTP) PSB-2.

These signals to the EST Status Monitoring System, as well as other annun-ciator and computer alarms for various DC conditions, are shown on Figure 8.3 4 .(Sheet 1).

8.3 10 Amendment 49

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE N90

STP FSAR PAGE2.V OF 4o AC control power for vital instrumentation and controls is supplied by six 36 solid-state inverter / rectifier systems. The inverter / rectifiers are connected as shown on Figure 8.3-3. The inverter / rectifiers supplying power to instru-mentation chant als I and II are normally energised by 480 yac feeders from separate MCCs so.weeted to different bus sections of the Train A, 480 vac switchgdar. The l werters/ rectifiers supplying power to channels III and IV l36 are normally energised by 480 yac feeders from MCCs connected to the 480 yac switchgear in Trains B and C, respectively. Upon loss of power from the 480 yac feeds, the inverter / rectifiers are automatically powered from the Class 1E 36 0"* y system. The output ofAhd inverter / rectifier is ll84vac, single phase, 60 %

az. Vital y power from the inverter / rectifier is distri6uted by the instr. t 2.%

unentation power supply buses, which consist of Class 1E distribution panel boards. Manually operated, mechanically interlocked main circuit breekers in each distribution panel permit energisation of the bus either by the corres-ponding inverter / rectifier or by an alternate 120 vac, single-phase, regu- l3E lated, backup source, as shown on Figure 8.3-3. i 8.3.1.1.4.6 Onsite Standby Power Supply System Protection - The onsite standby power system is provided with protective devices to:

e Isolate faulted equipment and circuits from untaulted equipment and cir-cuits e Prevent damage to equipment e Protect personnel e Minimize system disturbance To ensure safe and proper operation of the system, the following interlocks and lockout features are provided:

1. Both the 4.16 b VQf bus supply breakers (normal and standby generator feeds) are tripped and locked out upon the occurrence of a bus fault for that particular bus (Train A, B, or C).

2. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus supply breaker and the generator breaker for its corresponding standby DC are interlocked in such a manner that it is not possible for the DG breaker to close automatically unless the 4.16 kV ESF bus supply breaker is open. However the bus normal supply and the DC breaker can be manually closed to provide parallel operation for periodic testing of the DG sets.

i Inserf.l 4

3. n dier=:t ::ite eeeeeie+-A oh eh- - - m --- rer :.....:m_.. in

, inteeleeked te p m ..t !-4 t e m: :10: M C thus a' voiding a parallel 52 l

connection between the standby transformers and the 138 kV emergency transformer.

4. In the automatic mode, the standby DG breaker control has permissive in-terlocks to prevent closing the breaker until the standby DG attains ap-proximately 95 percent of rated frequency and voltage. tanenever' +m j St06CIby DCi it. +vipped er siopped, +we OG, breaker is actoMcDiljj ePened .

Inscri 2.

8.3-11 Amendment 52

ATTACHMENT ST HL AE N9b PAGE2SOF 6 o Insert 1 The motor operated disconnect switches on the primary side of the auxiliary ESF transformer are mechanically interlocked to prevent simultaneous closing, Insert 2

5. In the event of a normal supply breaker overcurrent trip, a signal is provided to a lockout relay which prevents closing of the generator breaker.

l l

i Ll/NRC/co

-

ATTACHMENT ST44L AE /Y90 PAGE24 0F f o STP FSAR The details of the protection system are as follows:

1. 4.16 kV ESF System Protection - The bus incoming breaker is tripped by l52 the auxiliary ESF transformer differential relay. In addition, instantaneous directional overcurrent and time overcurrent relays are provided in each phase to protect against reverse current and provide back-up protection to individual load feeders.

Outgoing feeders from the 4.16 kV ESF switchgear are provided with over-current relays in each phase which trip the circuit breakers upon sensing overload and fault.

Each motor circuit is provided with two sets of three phase e m relays. One set of relays provides theseccircuit protectionjrh;;:rr the other set provides an overload alarm rech outgoing feeder is also provided with a ground sensor relay which provides a co= mon alarm, along with the auxiliary ESF transformer ground sensing relay.

2. Diesel Generator Protection - Each standby DG is providei with the fol- 36 loving protection:

a. Generator differential

b. Reverse power flow

c. Loss of field excitation

d. Low lube oil pressure (engine and turbocharger)

e. Excess vibration

f. Turbocharger thrust bearing failure

g. Engine overspeed trip

h. High jacket water temperature

1. High engine / generator bearing temperature

j. Generator overcurrent

k. Generator underfrequency

1. Ground fault

m. Negathre SequenCC 8.3-12 Amendment 52

ATTACHMENT

. . ST-HL AE / Y90 STP FSAR PAGE27 OF 4, c . . . _

The above trips for the DC remain functional during periodic testing of the DCs. However, during emergency operation of the DCs all but the 52 following protective trips.are automatically bypassed:

a. Generator differential

b. Low tube oil pr essure (engine and tor Wo char 9Cd

c. .b4 Engine overspeed 36 Note Coincident logic is required 4. low lobe oil pressure h sp.

The bypassed protective functions are alarmed in the control room to alert the operator to take appropriate action.

In addition the normal supply *oreaker overcurrent trip provides input to a lockout relay, which locks out the DG supply breaker from closing. 49

3. Q430.

Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is provided with two levels of undervoltage detec- 107N tion as indicated in Figure 8.3-4, Sheet 5 of 5.

The adequacy of station electric distribution system voltages is in com-pliance with BTP PSE-1.

--+ in ser 4 1

4. 480 V ESF System Protection: Each 480 V ESF load center connected to the 4.16 kV ESF buses is protected against bus fault by a supply circuit breaker with a direct acting, solid state trip device having short time and long time trip functions. These breakers also provide backup protec-tion to the individual load feeders. The 480 V feeders to MCCs and sta-tic loads are each similarly protected by a circuit breaker with short time and long time trip functions.

Feeders to motors from the 480 V ESF load center breakers are provided with long time and instantaneous trips. The 480 V Class 1E system is an

ungrounded system and hence a ground fault is sensed at the switchgear bus; it is then alarmed in the control room.

! The 480 V ESF HCCs have the combination motor starters which are provided with magnetic, instantaneous trip circuit breakers for short circuit 36 protection. The static loads are provided with thermal magnetic breakers which provide overcurrent and short circuit protection. Motor circuits are provided with thermal overload devices in each of the three phases.

The overload elements are set to protect the motor and the feeder cable.

For all safety-related motor operated valves, the thermal overload de-l i i vices are used for alarm only.

5. Safety-related 120 vac ESF System: Each 120 ya: ESF systas outgoins; feeder is provided with overcurrent and short circuit piotection by a thermal magnetic breaker or fuse. Single pole breakers are used for 120 V single phase circuits. The 120 yac ESF distribution panels are provided with a main circuit breaker which provides backup protection to the feeder circuit breakers or fuses.

The 208/120 V system is solidly grounded through the 480-208/120 four b wire distribution transformers. The circuit breakers will trip on phase to phase or phase to ground fault. The 120 yac instrument (i.e., vital) g' .

bus is ungrounded. I 8.3-13 Amendment 52

ATTACHMENT ST Ht i- E /+90 PAG'hf OF 4, o I C SCr*I The voltage setting on the relays is determined from an analysis of the volt-age requirements of the safety-related loads at all distribution levels, taking into consideration the maximum and minimum voltage range of the offsite power system, various plant loading conditions and selection of appropriate tap setting of the intervening transformers. The time delays for the relays are chosen such that:

s. The allowable time delay, including margin, does not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in accident smalysis.

! b. The selected time delay minimites the ability of short duration disturbances to reduce the availability of the offsite power source..

c. The allowed time duration of a degraded voltage condition at all distribution system levels does not result in failure of safety systems or components.

i e

.l l

. . _ . - _ _ . _ . . _ . __~_ __.____ _ ____,_..___ .-,---_ _ __ ___ _ _____ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _

ATTACHMENT ST HL-AE / 990 PAGE23 OF Go STP FSAR The above described protection system for the safety-related power system is analyzed'and relay settings are coordinated so that a fault at any point in the system is isolated quickly without excessively damaging the equipment or interfering with the operation of the rest of the system. The relay settings also provide selective tripping so that the protective device closest to the fault will trip before the back-up device is actuated.

During pre-requisite testing each protective device will be tested for proper operation to verify the relay settings obtained bye.the analysis.

From Extensive use of solid state protective relays and integral solid state trip devices minimizes the set point drift on the relays. Also periodic testing of the relays and verification of their settings provida reliable operation of the power system. The protective devices provide visual indication of their operation locally (e.g. target on the protective relays an:1 trip position of the circuit breakers).

Limiting conditions for operation during the degraded ESF bus condition will be included in the plant Technical Specifications with sufficient details.

The details of the Containment electrical penetrations protection (RG 1.63) are described in the following. Both safety related and nonsafety related electrical penetrations are protected against short-circuit. The protection is provided by source and feeder breakers with c rdinated short circuit pro-tection. This protection limits the maximum I2t at the penetration to a value far less than that resulting in thermal damage to the penecration seals.

~

Details of the specific protection scheme are provided belaw:

1. The only medium voltage power circuits passing through the electrical penetrations are reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor power feeders. RCP motors are fed from 13.8 kV auxiliary buses IF,1G, lH, and lJ through a feeder breaker. This switchgear is located in the Turbine Generator Building (TGB) which is a non seismic Category I Building. Protection for the penetration conductors is provio, by coordinated primary and back-up protection using feeder and supply breakers, respectively. The feeder and supply breakers are supplied with 125 yde control power from g separate 125 V battery systems.

2. The 480 V power circuits (Class 1E/non Class lE)are fed from load centers and MCCs. Protection for the penetration conductors is provided by co-ordinated primary re:per&z:1 and backup protection using feeder and supply breakersp.

7; Protection for each circuit is reviewed and when coordin-ated protection cannot be achieved, a redundant breaker in series is provided with identical tripping characteristics.

3. 125 V de control circuits are protected by i di: ;-le fuses and the system is ungrounded. S.;r:f:r: :n.overcurrent condition is detected by two devices in series and, if one fails, the other provides the necessary protection.

Aq 8.3-14 Amendment 49

ATTACHMENT ST HL-AE- / WD STP FSAR PAGEso OF 6 0 4 120 V ac control circuits are low energy circuits and are protected by )

one fuse. The energy released by short circuits on control cable in '

general is sufficiently low that backup protective devices are not re-quired.9 gackup devices are provided where required, 43 Corrtvol civ cuits ell le ovelytect ad

5. For instrumentation circuits the possible energy release for a faulted circuit' is compared to the maximum that the penetration can withstand so 36 that redundant protective devices are not generally required. Backup

-devices are provided where required. l43 s

8.3-14a Amendment 49

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE. /WO STP FSAR PAGE & OF 6 o 8.3.1.1.4.7 Testing of Onsite Standby Power System Equipment -

Provisions are made for periodic testing of the Onsite Standby Power System 29 45 equipment in compliance with RG 1.22. IEEE 338 1977 and BTP PSB 2.

fQ Q430 Each SBDG is subjected to standard factory tests and inspections prior to 430.33N shipment to the site. In addition, prior to startup of the plant, each SBDG 333 is subjected to the field acceptance tests of starting, load acceptance with 29 design load, full load rejection, etc., in accordance with IEEE 387-1977 and Q RGs1.9 and 1.108. g' 43a 33N The ability to restart a DG by a " fast start" signal subsequent to normal shutdown of the DG is verified by functional and starting tests prior to start-up of the plant.

OnSite S+0"dD NDO*'~ 3'3*" .

The objectives and requirements of the above tests are hetailed in IEEE 387-1977 and RCe 1.9 and 1.108. Periodic testing of the*460Gd.is conducted to l4.5 verify theMt.

'h availability and capability to perform +he4ee safety functions as follows: '"

29

1. Q430.

Tests are performed to verify that each SBDG can be started manually and 33N automatically, synchronized, and loaded to nameplate rating when connect-ed in parallel with the normal power source. Each SBDG is operated under these conditions fojr one hour which is sufficie,tly long to demonstrate l3t the ability of thefequipment to perform its safety function.

a. mWirm.m of During testing, if an SI :::;; i; c. signal occurs while the SBDG is paral-1eled to the normal power source, the SI a+ewee+ eve. signal takes prece-dence. and the SBDG feeder' breaker is automatically tripped by a signal directly f rom the4M8-Actuation System. The 4.16 kV ESF bus supply break-er remains closed, and the ESF loads are connected to the 4.16 kV ESF bus 3(

by the ESF load sequencer per the design, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.4 The SBDG continues to run, its governor is automatically transferred to l3f the isochronous mode, and its voltage regulator is put in the automatic mode, thereby enabling it to respond automatically to an emergency signal without the need for any operator action. Under these conditions, all non critical protective devices are bypassed, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.6.

shuts dow1 If a non-critical trip occurs.during testing, the SBDG se+p* Upon a subsequent SI e; n:t!:n' signal, the SBDG starts up automatically and runs 3t with its governor in the isochronous mode with the non critical protec-tive devices bypassed.

If ih; eff:i: p;;;r ;;ur;: i: 1e:t d il; in per.11.1 .i;L :h: S " " t --

+ , - i~ e-**~. ^- S*" f;;d.s breaker trip. ..i. eticelly n ...u....t.". 13C Up$ndhec$1vu vi -i.d :::lteg: e- th: ' .10 kV-ESF bu;, ;; J. I'-i; ini;i".

ated by Um IST iv.d sequen m , ;; d: m ih-d i- 5:: tion 0.3.1 ' A '.2" When the local control position is selected at the SBDG local control panel to perform maintenance and testing " " " " ' " - ' * * - " ' - - - 3t i: crnunci:::d-in the main control room. An audible atarm it stu vunde.

.p,e sem t$poss e.- anoperable status 8.3 15 Amendment 49 (Jnded few. m o d e s egc Clo r- stoih not l'" '8

3t e " Pos hien is ti +

ATTACHMENT ST Ht. AE /49D PAGE,=s2.0F G O Insert X In the event the DG is operating in parallel with the offsite power source (under test conditions), and the offsite power is lost, the DG feeder breaker will automatically trip. The bus will then experience an undervoltage condition (same as loss of offsite power) and the bus feeder breaker will automatically trip.

Whether the standby DG had been operating in parallel with the offsite power source or operating but not connected to the bus, upon detection of undervoltage on the 4.16 kV ESF bus, Mode II is initiated by the ESF load sequencer, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.4.2. The load sequencing has been arranged such that adequate time is provided between the 480V load center breaker closure (allowing time for closing spring charging) in step 2 and the next significant load required during loss of offsite power (centrifugal charging pumps) in step 4.

I i

i i

l i

l l

l Ll/NRC/co l

l

E ACi1 MENT ST.HL AE N 90

. . PAGEJ53 0F 6 o STP FSAR 7/

3 . r i t , F 30

,# 1e e r io -

a o e a sa d i 1

and ESF lead seqpencher-

2. Tests are p[rformed to demonstrare the readiness and the ability of each J

standby DG5to start automatically in response to a c' " eted M:d: I474t.

rhid i: : ;ia. 1;...c.c.; 0: .,;. ;i: - * ---t*(Mode 13t and .a . .. . . . ele l30 -

,p(Mode IIf, and3 to reach rated speed and voltage within 10 seconds as fol-lows: fo,. m e g

a. Simulated SI A;;- ;i; .; Signal (Mode I):-;; ;h: 5::xfi7 M '- l30 With the ESF Actuation System in test, the standby DG start-up l30 actuation slave relay can be operated directly from the Engineered Safeguards Test Cabinet. The standby DC starts automatically in the isochronous mode. Th: EST A;;.;;is 0 7::= 1 :9 de er d::i;; .: . 2-l30

-th:t if cr : :r;:rr; ;;r; ;igr.;l ;;;ur; durin; :::t* . *b. .,

trl Evf rut- stic re tecti;r cir;.1;s,. ..;..ide; ;h; ;;;;in;;;

[93 on rext b. Simulated LOOP (Mode II)::: the St rfby M

@ With the ESF load sequencer in test position, the operators are able to actuate any one of the four undervoltage relay signals to the FSF h6 load sequencer from the 4.16 kV ESF bus. The ESF load sequencer is so designed that the signal causes a simulated actuation of Mode II (LOOP) tice delay logic and contact closures. Under these test conditions, a low current is passed through the external circuits to p6 verify circuit continuity and integrity. (Subsequent tests external to the ESF load sequencer are made to verify the operability of the h6 external loads in accordance with IEEE 338-1977.) F5 The standby DG starts up automatically in the isochronous mode with h6 the voltage regulator in the automatic mode. The ESF load sequencer , g actuation logic is so designed that if an actual M:f: !! E^^^t#sig- -

nal occurred during testing, rrre; '::3 ty ;h; ;;;.;;i;r. of ..., ;;n.

cut rf f:ur Jer.;1i.e ul., ei;r:1- the testing is overridden, 36 and the ESF load sequencer implements the proper mode of operation as described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.4.

3. Tests are performed to demonstrate the readiness and ability of each standby DGeto start automatically in response to a simulated Mode III an 36 N tood to reach rated speed and voltage within 10 seconds as follows:

seyncher- +6* M Simulated signals of Mode I and Mode II, described in 2a and 2b above, f6 are initiated eirrit r cruely . coincidentallgj.

cokeident CThe ESF load sequencer logic 18 so designed that the ;i;.1; :::;n exis-rence of Mode I and Mode II test signals causes a simulated actuation of l36 Mode III time delay logic and contact closure. Under these conditions, a low current is passed through the external circuits to verify circuit h6 continuity and integrity. (Subsequent tests external to the ESF load sequencers are made te verify the operability of the external loads ir l 36 accordance with IEEE 338-1977.)The 4estino perforawd ensores wat M ESF ;$

toad seguencer responds p7eperig to dit +Hree entry rvedes int 2430.

goce II.,as described in Secton 63.1.144.3. 14N 8.3-16 Amendment 45

ATTACHMEN

+ - ST.HL AE lyfD STF FSAR PAGE3/OF 4 o The standby DG receives start signals .... ___..____ mfrom both the ESF l.

Actuation System and the ESF load sequencer, and starts automatically in

. the isochronous mode with the voltage regulator in the automatic mode.

I The EOF Ac; ;.:i : Sy;;;r lo,,is. ...d :h:;.ESF load sequencer actuation logic isaser.so designed that if : :1 uit ::::: :::::r;.;; si.an actual SI :: tu :.

m -,+4ene signal end : '.00": occurs during testing, the testing is overridden, and the ESF load sequencer implements the proper mode of operation, as -

described in Section 8.3.1.1.4.4 m

% 30.

fWith the ESF load sequencer and the ESF Actuation System in test, the Msert operators are able to send any one out of six individual slave relay ] @

.. g actuation signals from the Engineered Safeguards Test Cabinet to the ESF load sequencer.

g 8. 3-t6 The ESF load sequencer logic is so designed that the individual test sig-i nal from the Engineered Safeguards Test Cabinet causes a simulated actua- l3t tion of Mode I (SI) time delay logic and contact closures. Under these i test conditions, a low current is passed through the external circuits to j3f verify continuity and circuit integrity. (Subsequent tests external to the ESF load sequencer are made to verify the operability of the external loads in accordance with IEEE 338-1977.) l3t c

b'A The EST load sequencer actuation logic is so designed that if an actual "

emyynca"-d; I (S!)C. signal occurred during testing, ::::,; .1;;d by th: :::::irn Jef f:ur :: =sre ';I aci .iis.,..

.el;y ;i; :1 . the testing is overridden.

3e and the ESF load sequencer begins the proper mode of operation, as descrfbed in Section 8.3.1.1.4.4.

y l

Th; EST A: urt W Syst-- le;i: 1: :: f::i; :f th: if ;; ;;;if::t a - . 6.

during th: t er:fr.g r-ih. uivm.61u . i._;i:n cir; itry ;-;rrid:: t'- ti, t

seg. 2.t thi tier, the M ::::: .o6vm.616.lly . . . ;t; i-^^ m oun -- M 3,'

g 1eno. gigggy . 4. .k- ------d, A. 4- 7;,j ;g,,;; f;7 ; * ^0 ,*

- r;--cy:

it.Sen ,

"2/ 8.3.'1.1.4.8 Optimum Emergency Diesel Generator Readiness - To assure optimum emergency diesel generator readiness and availability on demand, STP is developing a periodic testing program and a preventive maintenance program. *)C.

( The following requirements will be met:

1. Plant procedures will include provisions for loading the diesel generators t

(DG) to a level that will remove gum and varnish buildup accumulated during periods of no load or light load operation, j 2. Periodic surveillance testing will be performed in accordance with RG 1.108 with the exceptions and interpretations in Section 8.3.1.2.10.

3. Diesel generator equipment history records will be maintained and repair records will be reviewed for repeated failures which would warrant further technical investigation.

8.3-17 Amendment 45

ATTACHMEN"9 ST HL AE /+ 0 PAGE 15 OF4 o Insert 2 For normal starting operations (test mode) a timer called a " cranking limit timer", with a range of 5-50 seconds, is provided to conserve air in the starting air tanks should the engine not start. The timer is initially set by the diesel engine manufacturer at 15 seconds. The timer is located in the

" incomplete sequence" circuit of the engine control panel. When a start signal is given the starting air solenoids are energized activating the starting air valve alarm check switches, then the starting air valve relay which energizes the cranking limit timer. If the engine has not started in 15 seconds the incomplete starting sequence relay de-energizes indicating an incomplete sequence activating the unit shutdown relay and thus engine cranking stops.

The " cranking limit timer" is bypassed in the emergency mode of operation.

L1/NRC/a2

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE. N90 PAGE34 0F 4 o STP FSAR 45

4. Upon completion of repairs or maintenance and prior to an actual start, q; 30, run and load test in a final equipment check will be made to assure that :45 electrical circuits are functional. In addition, testing procedures will contain instructions to have the diesel generator returned to ready automatic standby service under the control of the control room operator.

8.3.1.1.4.9 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System - Each l 36 standby DG is provided with a fuel oil storage tank having enough capacity to operate the system with maximum connected load for a duration of at least 7 days.

The fuel oil system design and the facters considered in sizing the fuel oil l 36 storage tanks are described in Section 9.5.4. Electrical and mechanical equipment in this system are classified seismic Category I.

8.3.1.1.4.10 Diesel Generator Cooling and Heating System - The DG-jacket water cooling system is described in Section 9.5.5.

36 8.3.1.1.4.11 Diesel Generator Lubrication System - The DG Lubrication System is described in Section 9.5.7.

8.3.1.1.5 Physical Arrangement and Location of Major Electrical Ecuipment: The techanical, structural, and electrical integrity of major electrical equipment is safeFuarded by selecting locations for the equipment which reduce the likelihood of physical damage to redundant equipment simultaneously.

etiM note Class IE equi ment is separated as much as practicable from non-Class IE equipment te ini-izetthe potential for degradation of the Class 1E equipment bv+non-Class IE equipment. Separation between redundant Class IE electrical 36 f

equipment is primarily provided by physical separation as indicated by Figures 1.2-4, 1.2-5 (sheet 1), 1.2-10, 1.2-26, 1.2-28, and 1.2-29.

L fonvre ov- mot fonc. tion of The following is a general description of the separation provided between major electrical components:

1. The main transformers and the unit auxiliary transformer of each unit are located outdoors and are separated from each other by fire valls provided between the transformer 1 unit: t: crnfin: 2 'i-- da - ~j ""'t The standby transformer is located on the opposite side of the TCB from the main transf ormer and the unit auxiliary transformer.

The 138 kV emergency transformer is located near the switchyard and remote from any of the other large transformers.

Emon fdge of the above transformers except the 138 kV emergency transformer meet :5 protected by a water deluge fire protection system.

The main generator breaker is located outside the TGB. l43 A su p is provided under each oil-filled transformer to contain the transformer oil in the event of rupture of the transformer tank. Th44L 7Vu=9e sumpt draing to an oil separator pit for water removal. h6 1 8.3-18 Amendment 45

STP FSAR N'9 0 ST44L AE /9 PAGEJ7 OF (, o figbNi Eachoutdoortransformerisprotectedagainstligh;;g ,,s- and switching surges.

2. Class IE electrical equipment is located in l' structures or buildingswhich have hee-me seismic Category I classification. These buildings.or structures are so designed as to protect the Class IE electrical systems from such postulated avents as floods, hurricanes, and other natural events, as outlined in Sections 3.3. 3.4, and 3.5.

In s..... L pajor Class IE electrical power distribution equipeent located j36 in the Mechanical-Electrical Auxiliaries Building (MEAB) is arranged so that each train of the three-train EST System is located on a different floor elevation. Separate rooms or compartments are also provided within each elevation to enhance the physical and electrical independence of each redundant train. l36 The standby DCs are each located in a separate room of the Diesel-Genera-tor Building (DGB) . The associated Class IE electrical equipment located within each standby DG room is so located and protected within the room as to minimize the possibility of damage due to internally generated 8.3-18a Amendment 45

ATTACHMENT STP FSAR ST HL AE Pf 90 PAGE,33OF(.o cissilss, pip 2 ruptures, fires, etc. However. occurrence of any of these events does not affect the ability of the remaining trains of the ESF system to perform their safety function, since no two trains of Class IE equipment or cables are located in or routed through any of the other, standby DG rooms. Independent air intake and discharge air ducts for each DG room are furnished. Sufficient separation and isolation of air intake and exhaust gas ducts are provided to prevent dilution of the oxygen content to the diesel engines by the Air Exhaust System, as described in Section 9.5.8.

Non-Class IE equipment located within seismic Category I structures or buildings is arranged so that a loss of or damage to this equipment cannot prevent the Class 1E equipment from performing its safety function. This is accomplished by isolation of such equipment from the Class IE equipment by means of physical barriers, compartments, or suitable physical separation.

Separation criteria for cable and raceways are discussed in Section 8.3.1.4. 36 are Theclosest/pipingtotheelectrios2-penetrationsinsidetheContainment 2 Building 4et the component cooling water lines (10" CC -1117 WA3) at Elevation @0.4 32'-9" with approximately l'-10" metal to metal separation distance ebeve,Jhe g nearest electric +# penetration. Other piping runs including the chilled water lines, condensate lines, instrument air lines, station air lines, and fire protection water lines are in the vicinity of the electrice4_ penetrations g 3t separated by distances of at least 7 feet from the penetrations.

3. Electrioet penetration assemblies are provided for cables entering the Reactor Containment Building. Separate quadrants at three different elevations are selected for locating these penetrations. Three penetration areas are utilized for separate ESF trains and the RPS channels. In areas where penetrations for both an ESF train and an RPS channel are located, the penetration assemblies are grouped separately.

Centerline to centerline separation between adjacent electriceB-penetratiens within a given train or channel is 4 ft. l36 Control and instrueentation penetrations for RPS channels I and II are located at the same elevation. However, penetrations associated with these RPS channels are adequately separated to ensure their integrity during any possible event.

There is a total of 69 electric 43r. penetrations for each unit. l36 There are 27 electricen. penetrations loested between Elevations 19'-0" and 37'-3" inside the Containment ::d betr:: d Elevations 10'-0" and 2

35'-0" outside the Containment).

cJrtaits Q40.4 These groups of electric *3 penetrations have been assigned 'to Train A, instrumentation channels I and II, and other miscellaneous'related h circui;a si the above. (Fer 211 p:::;r.;ieu los.iivu. .u u . . . l a u m :- l36

-refer ;; Table 0.3-12 and T1 u.; 0. 2 15. h.

There are 18 electrica4r-penetrations located between elevations 37'-3" and 52'-0" inside the Containment : d betr:: dElevations 35'-0" and 60'-0" outside the Containment). These groups of electriceaepenetrations have been assigned to Train B, instrumentation channel III and all other miscellaneou elated circuit; ;S the above. (Tv. p.nsuasivu Ivs e;iaeR

_ _. m _-t refer,t: Tabic 0.3-12 :nd Figu : a . 3-y b 7 !36 dwcd+s 40 8.3-19 Amendment 43

-

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE. N 90 STP FSAR PAGE-3 90F 4 o There are 24 electriceicpenetrations located above Elevation 68'-0" ,

inside the Containment (above Elevation 60'-0" outside the Containment). "

These groups of electricek. penetrations hr.ve been assigned to Train C, instrumentation channel IV, and miscellaneous circuits related to the above. (For penetration locations and assignments refer to Table 8.3-12 and Figure 8.3-14.)

Design and qualification testing of electriceE penetrations is in accor-dance with IEEE Standard 317-1976 and RG 1.63. Note, however, that l36 electric *& penetrations ' '-- " - " for the Containment personnel airlock are ee--bec qualified to IEEE 317-1976, which is endorsed by RG 49 1.63, Rev. 2.

Protection of the electrica1. penetrations is provided to preclude a single 29 51 failure from causing excessive currents in the penetration conductors which Q430. Q430.

would degrade the penetration seals. 21 130N Power and control field cables to the electric +&c. enetrations are capable of 29 carrying the load current based on the penetre.1 conductor a=pacity as Q430.

calculated for the electriceir. penetration procaction. 21 8.3.1.2 Analysis. The following summary describes how the f tems comply with the requirements of h7C General Design Criteria (jf GDC),Power Sys-NRC RCs, and IEEE Standards.

l36 8.3.1.2.1 Compliance with CDC 17, 18, and 21 and RG 1.93: Sections 8.3.1.1.2, and 8.3.1.1.4 describe the normal power distribution system of each l43 unit, with provision for connection to the respective unit auxiliary trans-former and the standby transformers, and the onsite standby sources of each 36 unit. This arrangement affords sufficient flexibility and redundancy to en-sure the availability of power to the ESF loads in the event of -" ~~---- t l 49 edt.a design basis event. Standby DGs reestablish power to the ESF buses with-in 10 seconds. The offsite power sources comply with CDC 17 and RG 1.93.

In compliance with CDC 18 and 21, provisions are made to permit:

1. Periodic inspection and testing, during equipment shutdown, of viring, insulation, connections, and relays to assess the integrity of the systems and the condition cf co=ponents. 36

2. Periodic testing, during normal plant operation of the operability and functional performance of.onsite power supplies, circuit breakers, and associated control circuits, relays, and buses.

3. Testing, during plant shutdown, of the operability of the Class lE system as a whole. Under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operation sequence that brings the system into operation, including opera-tion of signals of the EST actuation system and the transfer of power be-tween the offsite and the onsite power system is tested.

8.3.1.2.2 Compliance with RG 1.6: Section 8.3.1.1.4 describes the onsite standby power sources and explains the degree of separation and independence that exists between the three subsystems.

8.3-20 Amendment 52

- ATTACHMENT ST.HL.AE IS90 S FSa PAGE VoOF r L The three-train arrangement of power sources and load groups is designed to meet the single-failure criterion.

8.3.1.2.3 Compliance With RG 1.9: Each SBDG is rated on the basis of the sum of the nameplate ratings of the ESF loads it energizes during an accident.

During step loading of the SBDG, possible voltage dips and frequency devi- l36 ations due to the application of large motor loads may occur. These devi-ations do not exceed 20 percent of the nominal voltage and 5 percent of the '

nominal frequency. Recovery from such variations is within the RG 1.9 posi-tion (i.e., voltage restored to within 10 percent of nominal and frequency l36 within 2 percent of nominal within 60 percent of each load sequence time in-terval). The DC protective trips are tagged by the ERF computer with a time, but time resolution provided may not be sufficient to identify the first trip as depicted by Rev. 2 of RG 1.9. _

49 8.3.1.2.4 Compliance With IEEE 279-1971 and RG 1.32: Class 1E systems and equipment comply with the requirements of IEEE 279 1971 (as amended by RGs 1.47 and 1.62 and RG 1.32) by virtue of the separation, redundancy, and inde- 36 pendence provided in the various systems and the location of equipment in seismic Category I buildings and structures. Surveillance of Class 1E Systems will be described in the Technical Specifications. l 36 8.3.1.2.5 Failure Mode Analysis: Application of the single failure cri-terion to safety related systems is used to analyze failures of components and l 4 causes and effects of failures in systems. Tabulations of failure modes and effects are shown in Tables 8.3 9 and 8.3 13. g 8.3.1.2.6 Effects of Hostile Environments on Electrical Equipment: Class l 49 1E electrical equipeent is designed to withstand the effects of the environ- l 36 ment existing at the equipment locations. All equipment located inside the Containment and' required to operate during and after a design basis event is identified in Table 3.11 3. l 49 8.3.1.2.7 Coepliance with RG 1.75: The design and layout of the electric Esystem 3.1.h, is andin8.3.1.4.

accordance with " " -" " RG 1.75; fs noted in Sections 36

^E r l' S S S - - -- -- - n e . A 7;;iti:r ;. "C 1. D is eL "i H ib " "'" M .2.2 ~7.A.E.'FUO]

3 8.3.1.2.8 Compliance with RG 1.53: The design of the safety related electrical system is in accordance with the single failure criterion as dis-cussed in RG 1.53.

8.3.1.2.9 Conformance With Appropriate Quality Assurance Standards: Con-formance to RG 1.30 is as stated in Table 3.12-1 and Chapter 17. 36 8.3.1.2.10 Compliance With RG 1.108: ^The - - 1g*

dwe ments

= with th. intanemof RG 45 1.108 are met with the following interpretations and exceptions: ,

0.

1. Starting air system: System boundary starts at air receivers (isolation 36 valve downstream of the air dryer). Air compressors and dryers are not f450.

included percent since the engine can be started five times from air stored in 100l 49 le M redundant (2 full capacity) receivers for each engine.

l 36 8.3-21 Amendment 49

ATTACHME ST.HL AE. / 90 STP FSAR PAGE V/ OF 6 o

2. Fuel Oil System: Fuel oil system boundary starts from the diesel fuel oil tanks and this is not part of the DG system for test purposes.

3. Coolina Water System: The Essential Cooling Vater (ECV) System cools the engine jacket water, lube oil, turbocharger discharge and intake air, and governor oil cooler. The ECW system is not part of the diesel generator unit. 36

4. Position on Paranraoh C.2.e 7: Tests to verify correction will be con-ducted after the affected DG is declared " ready for service." The diesel and the associated systems may be operated as necessary to perform troubleshooting and verify correction of specific problems, prior to such declaration, without these operations counting as a test, for the purposes of complying with this Regulatory Guide.

5. Position on Paranraoh C.2.a.(3): STP takes a partial exception to the periodic operational load testing of the standby diesel generators. STP will not perform the two hour run at the two hour rating during normal plant operation, as specified in position C.2.a.3 of this Guide. Eheat test ::; i:;;;n; le wie.;d :: i;p;;in; __;.:;;;e..y .6 ..... ... ;h; 12: h in et

!- - t'- ::;ic : 1 :d r.3mised I.. ihe dest.; heele eccid;;; 1;; din;;

q

: n:: :p:::tien av.. uvi . ;;;d :h; ;;;;ag of ;he 41;;;1 ;;;;;;;;;;.

The type qualification test performed on an STT diesel generator proved that the STP diesel generator can operate for two hours at the two hour rating. . . . .

1---- --

r---r-------- -Psesse; ;; d;;;;it;d in 0.cile. 14.2.12.2 ("1) . l49g430,l T5: r-culte of thi: pr;;p;re;ien;l :;;; will :..iher 4.eenstre:e :h;; t':; 130N Ji---I : :::::: nd ite ::t:y;eem, vill rc: .;;;;d th:i: :::p:::ir; 4; c

@ m ing: under-simi4*c-eendire4enet.

.--e i ru e r- + 'A" 45 STP will run the diesel generator for 22 consecutive hours at the contin- g430, uous rating of the diesel generator. g43

6. Egiftion on Parerrsch C.2 d: In addition to the above stated exceptions, the increased frequency of diesel testing in section C.2.d is excessive and may cause premature engine degradation. It is STP's intent to base the increase in testing frequency on the last 20 valid tests instead of the last 100 valid tests. This will reduce the RG 1.108 established reli-ability goal of .99 by four percentage points to .95, and will signifi-cantly reduce the rate of engine wear. The reliability goal of .95 is consistent with Generic Letter 84-15.

The criterion of first out alarm for diesel generator protection is not in-piemented as it does not reduce the damage to the diesel generator or the down time of the diesel generator.

8.3.1.2.11 Compliance With RC 1.81: Safety-related electrical systems 36 are not shared between Units 1 and 2. Therefore, the design is in compliance with RG 1.81.

8.3.1.2.12 Compliance With RC 1.106: Thermal overload units on safety- 49 related motor operated valves are used to provide alarm only under all Q430.

130N 8.3-22 Amendment 52

, , , _ - , . _ _ _ -, . - - - - - - - - ~

ATTACHMENT ST HL AE /WO PAGE 42.0Fd, e Insert A:

STP will perform the two hour run at the 2000 hour0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months rating in accordance with the Technical Specifications. No transient condition or anticipated future load conditions will exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months rating of the DG.-

Ll/NRC/oo

ATTACHMENT

. . ST-HL.AE N @

PAGE SUB OF 6 o STP FSAR only conditions. Activation of these thermal overload units is alarmed in the 'q control room.

, , ar .

^::rl::d; .Lich e;; .i ..e4 fe; ;;;ppir. le s.e; ce....; ty 20".

8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment. Class 1E equipment is provided with nameplates having a colored background in accor-dance with the color designation indicated in Section 8.3.1.4, for easy iden-tification of separation groups.

Safety-related cables are identified by color designation indicated in Section 8.3.1.4. Color coding is provided by colored jackets during manufacturing or in the field by using colored markers of sufficient durabi glit prior to or during installation, at intervals not exceeding 5 feet infaccordance with RC 1.75. on stoc.x c Metes The safety-related tray and conduit system is identified by unique numbers and colors to designate trains, channels or separation groups. Trays and conduits 36 outside the Containment are identified with adhesive-back stickers havin colored background and the printed raceway number. Traysandconduits(hIfhe"**

Containment have the raceway number stenciled colored pigment of the train Of!"

or channel color. Color coding of the trays and conduits is done at encin-tervah not exceeding 15 feet, prior to installation of cables. Where caoles and conduits penetrate walls and floors, the color markings are applied on both sides of the wall or floor penetration,

usi,qg A description of the Class 1E control boards, panels, etc., furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation as part of the Nuclear Steam Supply System, including such items as the Solid-State Protection System, Process-In:t: t

nt: tier er.t Control System, and the reactor trip switchgear, is provided in Section 7.1.2.3. Other Class 1E equipment supplied by the owner conforms to IEEE Standard 420-1973 and RG 1.75.

Class 1E cables or wire bundles within control boards or relay racks are iden-tified by color codes and/or tags to distinguish between Class 1E redundant separation groups and between, Class 1E systems and non-Class 1E systems.

castes of 8.3.1.4 Separation of Redundant Systems. Separation is accomplished for redundant equipment and circuits by the following methods:

1. Physically Separate Areas 36 Q C-

2. Separation by Distance 19;

3. Separation by Barriers O'C 4

8.3.1.4.1 Separation Groups: Separation groups are identified as groups A, B, C, D R, S, N, or M defined as follows.

Separation Group A A Class 1E instrumentation control or power cable, raceway or equipment re-latedtoESFTrainA,p/SubsystemI,vitalfjTinstrumentationandcontrol channel I or 44444F Fest Acc.icsent MonitoAng (PAM) CHonnel 1.

8.3 23 Amendment $2

HL AE STP FSAR SO Separation Group B A Class lE instrumentation, control or power cable, raceway, or equipment re-lated to ESF Train B, // Subsystem III, or vital // instrumentation and con-trol channel Ill.

36 Separation Group C Q430.

393 A Class lE instrumentation, control or power cable, raceway, or equipment re. Q40.4 lated to ESF Train C, J$' Subsystem IV, vital /g instrumentation and control channel IV or PAM 2.

1 channel Separation Group D A Class lE instrumentation, control or power cable, raceway, or equipment re-lated to gf Subsystem II, or vital p' instrumentation and control channel II.

Separation Group R Reactor trip and ESF actuation train "R" as identified by Westinghouse.

All cables are equivalent to Separation Group A and can be installed A raceway systec: with the exception oiukhe interconnecting cables between in the Group logic cabinet R and the output actuation cabinets, " M iti:nellf the 48 V undervoltage trip signals i.e !d ein b ::und i .jnperei. -..d ic These are to be installed in dedicated steel conduits. Q (2) ho m ++e S $ PS Ao +He reoctor- 49 Separation Group S + rip swi+cngeor.

Reactor trip and ESF actuation train "S" as identified by Westinghouse.

All cables are equivalent to Separation Group B and can be installed in the Group B raceway system with the exception of6khe interconnecting cables between logic cabinet - ' ' -

S and thel output acutation cabinets 6t the 48 V undervoltage trip signa jsi' Ae 1d 1. 1,. . m ..

These are to be installed in[ dedicated steel conduits,. 1, . gg (2)

. . y.. . . . . ::r':!!:

Gem +He 35 95 e +ne reactoQig SeparationGroupN(DesignatedMforthereservoir$Ikeuppumpfacility)

All non Class lE cables, raceways and equipment.

8.3.1.4.2 Separation Color Codes and Measurements:

Separation groups A through D and R, S N and M shall be color coded as follows:

(Protection channels and DC subsystems of a separation group use same color)

Group A:

Red (red may be replaced by violet for cables and equipment tags)

Group B:

Blue (blue may be replaced by brown for cables and equipment tags)

Group C: Yellow tags)

(yellow may be replaced by gray for cables and equipment Group D: White 8.3 24 Amendment 49

- - ATTACHME ST HL AE. / 9 L' PAGE V50F e STP FSAR Group R: Orange Group S: Green Group N or M: Black (black may be replaced by black / white, black / blue, black / yellow, black / violet, black / brown, black / red, or black /

gray, for cables) a.

Horizontal separation is measured to the side rail of ther tray. - Vertical sep-aration is measured from the bottom of the upper tray to the top of the side rail of the lower tray.

36 Horizontal, vertical or diagonal separation for conduit is measured to the Q43C closest point on the conduit, fitting body or box. 19N Q40.

8.3.1.4.3 Equipeent separation: Equipment separation is described in Section 8.3.1.1.5.

8.3.1.4.4 Eac M 95 Raceway and Cable Separation: ?:il: t::y:'within a given train or a separation group are separated on the basis of function and voltage class. In general, separate raceways are provided for the following services in each separation group:

1. 13.6 k" +;+a,+e.c.kco;e

2. 4.16 kV e4 e. ciC tr.

3. 600 V power circuits 4 Control circuits

5. Instrumentation circuits Vertical tier.

tiers of cable trays carry the highest energy level cables in the top Other tiers carry lower energy level cables in decreasing order to the lowest energy level in the lowest tier. Instrumentation cabling occupies the lowest tier.

8.3 24a Amendment 49

ATTACHMENT

ST HL AE 4 9 C STP FSAR PAGE84 OF4 o Both ac and de circuits rated 600 V and below utilize 600 V class cables. The 600 V class ac and de power cables are routed in common cable trays. Control cables are routed in cable trays separate from power circuits as much as pos-sible but they may be combined in one tray due to physical restraints. In-strumentation cables and other low-level signal cablem are routed in separate raceways from power and control cables.

redoevia.,t

-Rwdendene Class IE circuits of4 separation groups are routed in separate pen-etrations, cable trays, conduits, and o assure complete separation.

Separation of raceway systems is as follows. omer 4etally emesed vocawogS 8.3.1.4.4.1 Cable Spreading Areas Tray Separation: Cable spreading areas consist of the control room, the relay room and the cable spreading rooms on Elevations 21'-0". 60'-0" and 74'-9".::::" ' : 9 c el: ^ rr %

The separation distance in these areas is based on open cable tray of either the ladder or solid bottom type. The minimum horizontal separation distance between different separation group trays is 1 ft. The minimum vertical sep-aration distance between different separation group trays is 3 ft.

8.3.1.4.4.2 General Plant Areas Tray Separation: The separation distance in general plant areas is based on open cable tray of either the ladder or solid bottom type. The minimum horizontal separation distance between sep-aration groupSere**cis 3 ft. The minimum vertical separation distance between 36 different separation group trays is 5 ft. +vaga el ei.#erent 9:3c 19 8.3.1.4.4.3 Conduit-to-Conduit separation - All Areas: The minimum horf-rental, vertical or diaSonal separation between conduits of different separa- f"'

tion groups is 1 in.

8.3.1.4.4.4 Class IE Conduit-to-Open Tray Separation:

8.3.1.4.4.4.1 Cable Spreading Areas - The minimum horizontal separation between conduit of any one Class 1E separation Froup and open cable trays of any other separation group is 1 ft. The minimum vertical separation between conduit of any one Class 1E separation group and open cable trays of any other separation group is 3 ft.

8.3.1.4.4.4.2 General Plant Areas - The minimum horizontal separation between conduit of any one Class 1E separation group and open cable trays of any other separation group is 3 ft. The minimum vertical separation betwe7n conduit of any one Class IE separation group and open cable trays of any other separation group is 5 ft.

Selld 8.3.1.4.4.4.3 Class 1E Conduit to Solid Bottom and/orITop Trav Separa-tion - The minimum separation distance between3 Class IE conduit and solid bottom and/orptop of a tray is 1 in, a-solid 8.3.1.4.4.4.4 Non-Class 1E Conduit to Open Tray Separation - All Areas -

The minimum horizontal or vertical separation between totally enclosed raceway (described.in Section 8. 3.1. 4. 4. 7) o gn-Class 1E separation GroupsN or M and open ventilated cable trays,of any .1E separation group is 1 in, or cables in free air 8.3-25 Amendment 36

/

ATTACHME

+ = ST.HL. E / 9p PAGE 70U., 0 STP FSAR 8 1.4 4 5 ,eEsceptions tp AreafSepernetop Requi1gements are e e ra esents hy pfant strangpeenes e u na ni e ni -

r tJen ipfarIce/ a rrier'iti p2 ace'd b tw n ra , rte ice ts a ~

s{y d.[ -

8.3.1.4.4.df., Separation Within Enclosures - 46e&dtcables/ x n.,n' ;_an en-Jn' closure maintain a 6-inch minimum separation between redundant safety-related group cables and between safety-related and nonsafety-related group cables.

Where a 6-inch physical separation cannot be maintained, one of the following alternatives is provided:

.i . Q,-

Jul.Each Class 1E separation group is installed in a totally enclosed metallic raceway. Minimum spacing between enclosed raceways is 1-inch or equiva-lent in thermal insulation material. The raceway is installed over the 36 entire length of the cables or cable conductors from/to the point where a 6-inch minimum separation distance can be established (e.g., from the Q430 point of entry into the cabinet to the point of termination of the cable 19N conductor). Q40.4 kb. A metal barrier is erected between the cabling, terminal blocks, or components of the redundant separation groups. A minimum separation of 1-inch or equivalent in thermal insulating material is maintained between the barrier and the cable, terminal blocks, or components. The barrier is extended a sufficient distance beyond the outer edge of the separation group cable or cable bundle such as to allow a minimum of 6 inches of air space between cables of redundant separation groups.

k.C.Incaseoflessthana6-inchseparationbetweennon-Class 1Ecablesand Class 1E cables, non-Class 1E cables are placed in totally enclosed metallic raceway and a minimum separation of 1 inch or equivalent in thermal insulating material is maintained between totally enclosed raceways and Class 1E cables,a'dr ** *" S i-mm. .,.r. ... m v v % .at- 1 *wo.

O8f30' mn..cm C6""*4 M P'e*

sep o<ov M n a* d cow'H'"

ee e-e~*." m' ^ "ed pj e

c. . w . : : < aumnte wi, TEEe se - H74. $2 8.3.1.4.4.7 Totally Enclosed Raceway - The ollowing raceways are considered totally enclosed raceways: Q430.

126N Rigid steel conduit Aluminum sheathed cable and copper sheathed cable 52 Flexible du upew m metale e m con.o.it:n b'::::leee4, Q430.

12 6.,.

me , e os,- ##e Ven,tlistedm,tdel.n .-w n.* in +eq rol te n re ur<a .

s es l. . . . ne trays vi solid steel covera installed at top and bottom of tray solid bottom tray with solid steel covers 8.3.1.4.4.8 Separation Criteria for Pipe Failure Hasard Areas - Separa-tion of conduit and cable trays from pipe failure hazards in all areas is accomplished by the use of barriers, restraints, separation distance, or the appropriate combination thereof. Where it is not possible to prevent damage 8.3 26 Amendment $2

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE ' M PAGEVPOFGo Insert "A"

2. Control and Instrumentation Cables.

a. Each Class lE separation group is installed in a totally enclosed metallic raceways. The raceway is installed over the entire length of the cables or cable conductors from/to the point where a 6-inch minimum separation distance can be established (e.g., from the point of entry into the cabinet to the point of termination of the cable conductor).

b. A metal barrier is erected between the cabling, terminal blocks, or components of the redundant separation groups. The barrier is extended a sufficient distance beyond the outer edge of the separation group cable or cable bundle such as to allow a minimum of 6 inches of air space between cables of redundant separation groups.

c. In case of less than a 6 inch separation between non-Class IE cables and Class lE cables, non-Class 1E cables are placed in totally enclosed metallic raceway. Minimum separation may also be established by analysis in accordance with IEEE M4-1974.

Ll/NRC/cs

ATTACHMENT ST.HL.AE. 19 9 0 STP FSAR PAGE 490F 4e to a Class 1E raceway in the event of a pipe failure, an analysis is performed to assure that safe shutdown capability is maintained. The protective mecha-nisms provided for pipe failure are further discussed in Sections 3.6.1.3.2 and 3.6.2.4.

potential 8.3.1.4.4.9 Separation hriteria for Missile Hasarddr,e,as: -.e4.g Separation of l49 conduit and cable trays fron4 missile hasardsgie eli ;;;;; 1. .cc yttstretk. ly430.

I 2::: 70:eit1; ty th: rr ef i.. 1.-e, . ;.1: teti , ::;:r:0i n di:::n n . --~1 12 P.

05: rr -r.i.s. 6v- i... i iv.. snersoi. -n.s. . Lie :g:nti- ir ret ;rr?ti if 36 th: ...ilua v. wuss lE ovoJois .od i..y; ;h. ;. L iim =s== 6 Jv. ; a :'- t @ 30.1 f.;i.. in . .v.. . ;-.;..; . 0 @0.4 r y. t)iej ajes pil u ce in lv d a ot as b1 t a pin a tv si .I l49 p 3,, ,

a 4 fa$hte e a g h mi i oe n qu e roy4c v c to ' I 12 Y.

s./1E p neu e nd t y to e t r sh h er a e in e4 to a n e- ,

j " ' l l ,i j' , ,

30.

12 P.

./Vher/ the fa'ilure 'of th4 mis e soVrce i 'o ed requir,as pro ec v j ectfon' Ala'ssi1F. cond9 1t p'nd rpys/ar 'n ut/d phro6gh/th ar,4a t

/ dot thote 4thl'chlaust terufina e fat We e o Idad( within t e ates, Ior flooaing is aceemplished where poss ble p 4He use of borre'ers,

, orientamen, separate. i,oistorte, o, me oppropiote combinaton mo/ .

1 ldhere it is ne+ possible 4e pmen+ oomage s3 o C4oss 1E roceway 7., the evene e8 a Mstite ho ta rd er flooding . an analgtis is perfo,.med to 'usure AMF saf e sherdown copo b'elig i=., Minta'ie .

\

8.3 27 Amendment 52 t

ATTACHMENT

ST HL AE. 6 90 STP FSAR PAGE 53 0F4 o

3. ?;.: th ::ft:3 r; k ;d a n;;h ::::;; i: :;;1;n;il: :: ; :ir;1: di;nd: :

M :hi; f:i hr; r%uiu. m W . ;;;; ::tir- '" - : " - doit -aA + 272

_;;d: ';;_;r ;h; en. u limi;.d ;; :h; :::: di fi-!- i mm i h e.

8.3.1.4.4.10 Underground Class IE Ductbanks - Where Class 1E cables must be installed between Seismic Category I structures and deceano physical con-nections exist for continuation of exposed trays or conduits, underground Class IE duct systems are provided.

Separate ducts are provided for each redundant Class 1E separation group; how-several ever, since the ducts are enclosed in reinforced concrete, the duct enclosure for4e44t. separation groups may be common. Instrumentation cable and cables of different voltage levels are routed within aanholes in a manner that maintains a separation commensurate with that outlined for general plant areas, anci tocmed at egegy;c 8.3.1.4.4.11[Electrice&.PenetrationArea-Containment [penetrationsare physically separatedh.m different f1:: relevations of the Containment wall.ende.

Ch;:-it-! " dli m Bu!Idin; The vertical and horizontal separation dis-tancer between redundant separation groups are not less than the minimum ac-certable separation distances of 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically for general plant areas.

Electrice4t penetrations and piping penetrations are located in dif f erent quad- 36 rants of the Containment circumference. There are no possible missile sources 0430.

inside or outside the Centaineent electrice4. penetration areas. In addition, g9g all nonconducting neneetallic materials are flame retardant.

040 04 Assigneent of penetrations is tabulated in Table 8.3-12 and, Figure 8.3-14 tocane.o et ecrtews are pewn en 6.3.1.4.4.12 Faceway Supports -sacewog M : _ m supportsy eenduit ;@Fr: crk po, : '! dz:M for Clas= IE circuits are designed to comply with Seismic Category

1 requirements.1 Carl :: gsupports f er non-Class 1E Mrede*cwhich are lo-cated ds i g ;ind areas w w.%which

. contain saf ety-related or Class 1E equipment q',"112

':S 0:1--!- Creeg;ry 1 y uiu,+nts, M ';,8,,

raceways 8.3.1.4.4.13 Cable Routing and Cable - Cables going to the control room sedebelonging to n(separation groupstl A and Df; ErdWB and Cf are generally routed through separate cable chases and cable spreading rooms within the Electrical Auxiliary Building. Separation group A and D cables enter the lower cable spreading room while separation groups B and C cables enter the upper cable spreading room.

Non-Class 1E cables are not routed through Class 1E raceways.

4 ,e rotecf Cable trays penetrating ': hrn::11- thruP walls or vertically through floors are provided with fire stops.

The fire barriers used to achieve required separation in lieu of spatial separation are rated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months unless g en?! m demonst, rated adequate.

a. Lettev rahng it Ampacity rating and group derating factors of cables are in accordance with ranufacturers' standarda which comply an a minimum, with ICEA P-46-426 for cables in conduit or ducts and with ICEA P-54-440 for cables in trays. Power e.3 28 Amendment 36

. ATTACHMEN pe ,

$$dM/oh4e F,%.Q. c.1!.0 703 ,

ik) SERT 3

.. . an_ euutyta. ,ra he t% w;ll not @l Ark 3 m. .ca(4.-Ikwtdown LAr%.p*ke. 6 Ek de.3rto t L t t. % w'dl etage4 44., ts, a.N a.suapaLk sensi, su Ut;43 oQ s Q sy relabed , stirWse. datgery I A m t w r e r , t y t h .r ad u pontest.r w p(, % Ektir et.gair(L fa.ht h ( % dion,. .

O 9 e

4 S

A

ATTACHMENT SIP FSAR ST HL PAGE 6Z AJ OF C.o/ '/ 90

. ,two@ 2kV cables rated at 5 kV and 15 kV are installed.with 1/ diameter maintained i spacing,i- ^: t r e:n For power conductors rated a 6M-48 and below, tray fill ;

is generally limited to 35 percent of the usable cross section of a 5-inch deep tray. In cases where this condition is exceeded, each individual case is b5 ) i reviewed for adequacy of the design. For trays containing only control or '

instrumentation cables, a 40 percent fill of a 5 inch deep tray limitation is p5 applied in general.

As a minimum, power cables are sized using 100 percent load factor and rated for 90*C conduc.or temperature. Correction factors for ambient temperature other than 40*C are incorporated in accordance with ICEA publication P-54-440.

As stated in Section 3.11. cables are qualified in accordance with RG 1.131.

Conduit fill is based on 53 percent fill for one conductor. 31 percent fill for two conductors and 40 percent fill for three conductors or more. -

Cwwi+s h eWCM'8I.

Ore 8.3.1.4.4.14 Associated Circuits and Isolation Devices E eM di m 4st.n t qualifiedasClass1Eanddoee.notperformasafetyfun/quipment ction but which are est connected to theT 1E system through isolation devicesP Th::: cirrrit: "i:M [3 ly " 1.9 d:ficiti: are classified as " associated"Aare identified as Class 1E from the Class lE source up to and including the isolation device. The circuit f rom the isolation device to the equipment in identified as non-Class y 1E.c.1::: 1: ;;h: M :: 5::::::-:::::irt d by ab=H a- :: = ;1.. e v. . _;;r;A G71th Class 1E ecutement or circuiG. 36 ircuits which share an enclosure or q raceway 4 subsequent to the isolation device but which are not connected to ,

Class IE circuits are identified as Class IE. Therefore, associated circuits 4195

30. L' are not identified as such but eithe as Class II or non-Class IE. o E

eguipment items don gicLS11' The followinglare :12 i'i & as isolation devices: 40.h 4 -

qua hhed

1. Class IE Isolation Transformers. f*

7

2. Class IE The .41 M..oeiR icij.e. Devices which are tripped on receipt of a SI signal. '

I

3. Class IE Digital Isolators (See Section 8.3.1.5.1).

[

4 Class IE Analog Isolators (See Section 8.3.1.5.2).

{

5. Class IE control switches with 6" separation or barriers between separation groups.

6. Control circuit fuses (Class IE) which isolate the non-Class lE circuit prior to the operation of the Class 1E circuit $ protective device.

7. Class lE relays with barriers.

8. Redundant Class lE thermal magnetic trip devices in series.

9. Class ir current transformers.

Devices which are located in the TCB (a non-seismically designed building) but which are connected in Class IE circuits are routed in dedicated non-Class it 43 rigid steel conduit in accordance with Section 8.3.1.4 h,

31 g,3 29 Amendment 45

ATTACHMEN

ST HL AE. ' N STP TSAR PAGE G OF $ o 8.3.1.4.4.15 Administrative Responsibilities and Controls for Assuring Separation Criteria - The cable and raceway channel identification described in Sections 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4.2 facilitates and ensures the maintenance of

h separation in the routing of cables and the connection of(control boards and 36 panels. At the time of the cable routing assignment during design, those re. Q430.

sponsible for cable and raceway scheduling check to ensure that the separation 19h group designation in the cable number is compatible with a single-line-diagram g40,4 load group designation. Extensive use of computer facilities assists in en-suring separation. Each cable and raceway is identified in the computer pro-gram, and the identification includes the applicable separation group designa-

. tion. Auxiliary programs are made available specifically to ensure that ca-bles of a particular separation group are routed through the appropriate race-ways. The routing is also confirmed by quality control personnel during in-stallation to be consistent with the design document. Color identification of ,

equipmentgand cabling assist field personnel in this effort, roteweg s ,

8.3.1.5 Engineered Safety Signal Isolation Systes. The Engineered Safety Signal Isolation System provides Class 1E to non-Class 1E and non-Class 1E to Class 1E digital and analog signal isolation while maintaining Class 1E integrity in accordance with RG 1.75. This system uses solid state componente 32 to the maximue extent practicable, consistent with interface and reliability requirements. Interchangeability is provided for all similar modules, com-ponents, or assemblies. Dissimilar modules, components, and assemblies do not permit interchangeability. To prevent incorrect insertion or interchange, cable connectors, if required, are keyed and identif14d. The isolation device terv.inal arrangement provides physical separatica in accordance with RG 1.75.

When isolation barriers are required, they are in accordance with RG 1.75. 36 To comply with RG 1.75. additional consideration is emphasized as follows:

e Mercury wetted relays are not used.

e Printed circuit board layout provides separate input and output patterns and corpenents, cahs ca duct' e Relay sockets ensure separation of relay W and n .. W.Sconnections. 36 8.3.1.5.1 Digital toelation: Digital 1selators are optical components.

Separation is maintained in the interrogation of Class 1E field contacts e.g.,

Class 1E train A designated field contacts are interrogated only by Class 1E train A power.

32 8.3.1.5.2 Analog Isolators: Analog isolators are betW. transformer-coupleh eadtoptically-coupled types whose functions and operation are neither disturbed by nor transmit electromagnetic or noise interference. Analog iso-1stor linearity and stability does not decrease significantly as a function of time and temperature. The isolators are accurate within 0.5 percent of the input span.

8.3.2 DC Power Systees 8.3.2.1 Description. Thef/PowerSystemsofUnits1and2consistof /each four Class 1E 125 yde battery systems and Balance-of-Plant (BOP) battery sys. l 36 tens err m :d d one 48 vde,* two 125 yde, and one 250 yde battery in each unit l43 mobo g 6.3-30 Amendment 43

ATTACHMENT ST.HL.AE. N 90 PAGESVOffe-STP TSAR as shown in Figure 8.3 3. There are separate batteries provided with the l

plant computer, and other data acquisition systems. These batteries do not i

interface with the rest of the plant jyf Power System.

6.3.2.1.1 class IE Batterv Systems: TheClass1E125ydeBatterySysten/'

of each unit consists of four independent, physically separated buses, each energized by two battery chargers and one battery. Voltage on any seperate 49 bus varies between 105- yde depending on the operating mode of battery Q430.

charging equipment and system loads. The batteries are sized in accordance 1075 with IEEE 485 1978. 335

. 29 Emergency power required for plant protection and control is supplied by the batteries without interruption when the power from ac sources is interrupted. !Q260.

035 Each battery system also supplies power to its associated inverter system, which converts the de power to ac power ** " r :. i^ .".; ;'.q1; ;h:: _

for the vital instrumentation and protection system, Th: :in rit:1 :: 5::: cu;;by 36

u ; a ...;;;r m;;;iem a. - 1: , i , i i , ; ; ; , ; . .J *.' S::: :: := : : 1 ;; -

H: -W '" 4_ m !: , ! ;M I '.' . : d =: ;; ::1 ;; L ; a d. f , J , . .. ,,1 ; ; ; .,

" " '- at, dis.c.us, sed M 5echen 8. 5. f . l .+. 6.

The ampere hour capacity of each battery is sufficient to provide, for a mini-num of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , the power required by emergency de controls and the vital ac l43 instrumentation and pro:ection system. Only small de loads and de controls are supplied fror the 125 yde batteries. l4925 Q*

i t o at .y F r _,e O' sa o is v th h ft . tyr >c ue ae _I n e p. u s ft de b' s '

. s t a o nisfi e e 1 l13

,, .n . ge a ,i d o n e', ,a r rs t .

I a d 11 n a h of et n el Iad '

r rq ed. J N The four 125 yde batteries are each located in separate rooms in a selsric Category tection against nissiles.

I building which inhibits the propagation of fire and provides pro.

Battery chargers and distribution panels associated with a given battery are located outside of the battery room. Each battery room is (Section System ventilated by the 9.4.1) Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) energized free the EST buses.

h f m m te ir 4: :nd M r: vjans which are M8% 49 The Class IE DC Power Systens are designed to withstand the effects of tor.

nadoes, fires, and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) without loss of func.

tion.

Flooding of the battery rooms is precluded by the elevation and loca.

tion (MEAB).

of the battery roons in the Mechanical. Electrical Auxiliaries Building The environmental and seismie qualification programs of the Class 1E battery system are discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11. The Class 1E Battery System 3

i menet.as designed to comply with the requirements of NRC RCs 1.6 and 1.32. l 39 Each $ System is provided with an annunciator window having inputs from each of the two chargers and the switchboard.

The computer may be used to identify 43 which of the three inputs is being alarmed. p9 30, Each battery charter is provided with the following alarm circuits which are connected in co v on to the control room annunciator / computer to indicate bat.

tery charter trouble: I 8 3 31 EU Amendment 49

r ATTACHMENT

. STP TSAR ST.HL AE. /V90 PAGE s4DF Ga

! I ;rt tr': relta; {c:)c g,[ Output under and overvoltage (de) 2.)' i: ;;a .i ' STtT

t. ^ : 7_ : L . .L . g . . u c r. ::1:-

_ a-- ::-M Each 125 yde switchboard has the following alarm circuits which are connected 43 incosunontothecontrolroomannunciator4 coni. uter:

OtF

1. Input breaker posititn from battery charger (alarm when open)

2. Input breaker position from battery (alarm when open)

3. D... __.t. D.Y._ N_ _ ? O'N,

?_ N _ saH, 9, toodS(alarm tahen open)

,_......7 l

st--- - S ;;; - :;rra.;/ew is s.;c.; :;_., ::: =1$

36 Q430.

4 Mt de bus ground and over/under voltage (combined) 35N

--$snSerl

i .

The following indicating instrumentation for each --' "-- '-is provided in the control room: de. g ate m

/ whchbeard S

1.+/usvoltage

2. Battery current

3. Battery charger current kom Coch Cha"98" Each battery in protected by an air circuit breaker with long-time and short-time protection.

36 Identification of Class 1E de systens and equipment is discussed in Section 8.3.1.3.

8.3.2.1.2 class 1E Batteries: Class IE 125 yde batteries are 59-cell l 36 lead-calcium type. agseebled in shock-absorbint clear plastic, sealed con- l2 tainers. Noncombustible spacers are provided between cells and en11 clamps to prevent shifting during seismic events. The battery cells are mounted on seismic Category I. corrosion resistant, steel racks.

The batteries are suitable for continuous float duty and are maintained in a nominally fully charged state by the battery chargers. The batteries are sized to carry their connected ESF loads for two hours without power flow from l36 the chargern in the event of loss of

utac power.

The FST loads energized from each de bus are shown in Table 8.3-6.

tlpen loss of power frem the g System to the battery chargers, the batteries automatically assume the load witheut switching, in the event that all off-site ac sources are lost. ac power to the battery chargers is supplied by the standby DGs. l36 8.3-32 Amendment 44

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE /Y9D PAGES6 OF 4 D Insert 1 In addition to these annunciator alarms, the ESF Status Monitoring System, described in Section 7.5.4, is used to indicate bypassed or inoperable status of the battery or battery chargers. Camponent-level windows provided for the de system indicate the following conditions:

1. Input undervoltage, charger output breaker open position or charger input to switchboard breaker open position for each battery charger. (ERF computer is used to indicate which condition caused the window to light.)

2. Battery output breaker open position.

As indicated in Section 7.5.4, actuation of any component-level window also actuates the system-level window for that system and affected systems.

Ll/NRO/oo

ATTACHMENT ST.HL AE IV9D 5TP FSAR PAGE.f'/OF C t' Each battery is sired to provide a minimum of 1.78 V/ cell at the discharge state after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . 49 8.3.2.1.3 Battery Chargers: Erd Cir:: 15 5 tt:ry Sy:t: rrnri-te rf - :i l2-5:t"; y abroar- --ee+4;ted . 4 . d. 125 en 5:t y0

--+ i nser F ".i l36

[])A r e s)z d or hre h ey h or o t $36 2!

4 e e .74 /e ) e ia d t 9 er n a/ ai zd e ri t e .

/ 1, v f, 49 )

2 cf rWi is se t a) 1 sp n si c MQ W i ab e 8.3- .

J 4M 30 The output voltage of each battery charger is adjustable to 10 1 percent of the g3h'9 value required for periodic equalizing charging of the battery (i.e., 1 10 373 percent of 141 vde).

l43 AC power to the Class 1E battery chargers associated with a given battery is supplied from independelt MCCs connected to double ended sections of switch-gear. The switchgear sections are energized from the ESF buses and supplied with power from the star dby DCs when offsite sources are unavailable.

achieved Independence of the four battery systems is weeusede.by separation of cables and equipment and by prohibiting cross ties between load groups in different trains. l36 Each battery charger is equipped with a de voltaeter and ammeter. Protection against power feedback froe. the battery to the charger and ac source, upon 43 loss of the ac source, is provided.

8.3.2.1.4 Testing- PeriodictestingofClass1EffPowerSystemequip-ment is performed in accordanc e with RG 1.32 to verify its ability to perform its safety function.

The batteries and chargers are inspected and tested in accordance with the l36 Technical Specifications.

Visual inspection, liquid level, specific gravity, and cell voltage and tem- l36 parature checks are performed routinely on the batteries.

Additional testing in accordance with RC 1.129 is performed. l36 8.3.2.1.5 Service Equipment: A&& gquipment of the Jy Power Systems is located in st. ventilated, controlled environmentsoutside of the Reactor Con- 2 tainment Building.

c.wt44+s Class 1E ff Power System -edle- er ru;;;:tir;; :tru:turr " penetrating into the RCB are designed to operate in the post accident environment for the period of time required t.o maintain the plant in a safe shutdown conditions following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), as discussed in Section 3.11, 8.3.2.1.6 Non Class IE Battery Systems: The non Class 1E Battery Systers in each unit consist of one 48 yde distribution panel bus, two 125 yde distri-button panel buses and one 2$0 yde distribution panel bus. These buses are '3 energized by two battery chargers and a battery.

8.3 33 Amendment 49 J

o ATTACHMENT ST HL AE if(,90 PAGESPOF o Insert 1 There are two battery chargers associated with each of the four 125Vdc buses.

These chargers are connected to their train related ac buses. One charger is required for each of Channels 11 and III. Two chargers are required for each of Channels I and IV.

The battery charger configurations, as stated above, are sized to restore the battery voltage within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after being discharged for the batteries' 2

~ hour duty cycle. The batteries are floated at 2.20V/ cell (130 Vde) and equalized at 2.27(+1%) V/ cell (135Vde).

L1/NC/co e M vt

. ATTACHMENT ST HL AE N90 STP FSAR PAGE 570F v o The plant computer " SP n and other data acquisition IMW)'ystems are sup- 43 plied with separate batteries. These battery systems do not interface with the other g Systems.

These non Class 1E battery systems are entirely independent of the Class 1E batteriesandtheClass1E//DistributionSystem. There are no interconnec-tions between the two classes of systems. The 250 yde system generally supplies the large balance of-plant loads, such as the turbine generator eser-gency lube oil pump and other similar loads. The 125 yde systems supply l 36 smaller balance of plant loads, such as switchgear control power. The 48 yde system is used exclusively for the plant annunciator and has no interface with theClass1E//PowerSystem.

Generally, characteristics and specifications of these batteries and battery chargers are similar to those of the Class 1E Battery Systems, but it is not intended that they necessarily meet Class 1E equipment requirements.

8.3.2.2 Analvsis. The following summary highlights the compliance of the designoftheClass1E//PowerSystemswiththeNRCCDC,andNRCRCs. l36 FailuremodesandeffectsanalysisfortheClass1EffSystemispresentedin' Table 8.3 8. 3 8.3.2.2.1 Compliance with CDC 17, 18 and 21: As described in Section 8.3.2.1, the class 1E y/ Power Systems are designed with sufficient flexi. l36 bility and redundancy to ensure the availability of power to the plant pro-04- tection -" ^^---^ systems under all postulated design basis events. In Me addition, when a114 ac sources are lost, the stored energy in the batteries is sufficient to supply the power needs of critical instrumentation and control systems for a duration sufficiently long tr. restore the ac power sources.

Therefore, the design is in compliance with CDC 17. I 36 Provision for periodic inservice testing of Class 1E /g Power System equipment is made in compliance with CDC 18 and 21. This testing verifies the availa- g bility and capability of equipment to perform its design functions.

8.3.2.2.2 Conpliance with RC 1.6: Figure 8.3 3 and Section 8.3.2.1 de-l 36 scribe the separation, redundancy, and independence which exists within the Class 1EjfPowerSystemtomeetthesinglegfailurecriterion. l 13 8.3.2.2.3 Compliance with RC 1.32: To comply with RC 1.32, a study of de loads under normal operating conditions and under accident conditions was made to determine the largest demand on each battery. Each battery was sized on 3 the basis of meeting de loads determined by the load study. Each battery charger is sized as discussed in Section 8.3.2.1.3. Battery performance and service test will be in compliance with RC 1.32. 36 8.3.2,2.4 Compliance with RC 1.75: The design and layout of the Elec- !3 trical Raceway System and circuits comply with the requirements of RC 1.75, as discussed in Section 8.3.1.4.1.

36 8.3.2.2,$

Coepliance with RCs 1.128 and 1.129: The Class 1E W System is Testing is described in compliance 8.3.2.1.4, with RG$ ' '" "^1.12%and w+4 RA f 128 wi+e *in Section e oncepsenof tecian 6.1. 2 ( 2.) ef 7 8f.E 484

1915 endorsed knj Rei 1. #26. The 'in+wcell connecean reshtence auscnone.e MWAmendment 49 Ull no+ toe g(rooter mon 15ba icdohm'g NUROG C4 62, Julg 2h 19 68 ) Sec.h on 4.B 2. l .

,3 34/n

r

" a ATTACHMENT ST HL AE /49 O STP FSAR PAGE 4o OF d e 8.3.2.2.6 Conformance with Appropriate Quality Assurance Standards:

Quality assurance, described in Chapter 17 applies to all equipment of the Class 1E gg Power System and its installation, in accordance with IEEE Stan-dard 336-1971 and NRC RG 1.30. Conformance with RG 1.30 is as stated in Chap-ter 17 and Table 3,4+!

3.12 - 1.

8.3.2.2.7 Compliance with RGs 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.81, 1.93 and 36 1.106: The Class IE 35 System is in compliance with RGs 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62,1.81,1.93, and 1.106 similar to Class 1E J$ Systems as stated in Section 8.3.1. ,

8.3.3 Fire Protection for Cable Systems The measures employed for prevention of and protection against fires in electrical cables are described in Section 9.5.1 and in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report.

36 9

8.3-35 Amendment 43

( >

ST-HL-AE-1490, Forwards Response to Draft Ser/Fsar Item D 8.3-6 Re Loads on Emergency buses.Marked-up FSAR Pages Will Be Included in Future FSAR Amend.Related Correspondence

Text

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Navigation menu

ST-HL-AE-1490, Forwards Response to Draft Ser/Fsar Item D 8.3-6 Re Loads on Emergency buses.Marked-up FSAR Pages Will Be Included in Future FSAR Amend.Related Correspondence

Text

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Navigation menu

Search