Text

Forwards W Responses to FSER Open Items Re AP600.NRC Should Review Encl Table & Inform W of Status to Be Designated in NRC Status Column of Oits
	ML20198J526
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	12/29/1997
From:	Mcintyre B; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Quay T; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	NSD-NRC-97-5505, NUDOCS 9801140150
	Download: ML20198J526 (43)
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3-i Westinghouse Energy Systems Q3g, p,,n,g,,,,a mac 03*is

! Electric Corporation l DCP/NRCl200 NSD NRC 97 550$

Docket No.: 52 003 December 29,1997 -

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 205$5 NITl!NTION: T. R. QUAY SullJliCT: AP600 Rl!SPUNSE TO l'SER OPliN ITEMS

Dear Mr. Quay:

linclosed with this letter are the Westinghouse responses to l'SER open items on the AP600. A summary of the enclosed responses is provided in Table 1. Included in the table is the 1 SER open item number, the associated OITS number, and the status to be designated in the Westinghouse status column of OITS.

The NRC should review the enclosure and inform Westinghouse of the status to be designated in the "NRC Status" column of OITS.

Please contact i on (412) 374 4334 if you have any questions concerning this transmittal, lirian A. McIn re, Mar Advanced Pl it Safety and 1.kensing jml linclosure

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cc: W. C. IlulTman, NRC (linclosure) ., ~ C T. J. Kenyon, NRC (Enclosure) g '

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J. M. Schrosky, NRC (Enclosure)

D. C. Scaletti NRC (Enclosure)

N. J.1.iparulo, Westinghouse (w/o Enclosure) 1140150 971 P ADOCK 0 3 90R zu J

DCP/NRCl200 NSD NRC 97 5505 2- December 29,1997 Table !

List of FSER Open items included in letter DCP/NRCl200 FSER Open item OITS Number Westinghouse status in OITS 4103711' 6289 Confirm W 4103721' 6290 Confirm W 410.37517 6293 Confirm W 4103761 6294 Action N 4103781' 6296 Confirm W )

410.37917 6297 Actlon N 410380F 6298 Action N 99t A u rt

4 I:nclosure to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRCl200 December 29,1997

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e NRC FSER OPEN ITEM Question: 410.371 F (OITS #6289)

Westinghouse need. to provide the following to clarify the VES flow design, temperature, and relative humidity critena:

(a) Revise SSAR Section 6 4 3.2 to provide specific minimum and maximum temperatures with the corresponding relative humidities for the MCRE during the 72 hout period following the onset of a postulated design basis acci<ient. Also, provide (for NRC staff review) the results of the evaluation performed (based on Gothic methodology or similar methodologies employed) and associated assumptions made to arrive at these temper atures and humidities.

(b) State in the text of the SSAR that the VES How capacity conforms to: (1) the MCRE now design " Table 1, and Appendia C Table C 1," of ASilRAE Standard 621989 " Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality,* and (2) 1993 ASilRAE llandbook, " Fundamentals 51 Edition." Chapter 23.2, Ventilation and Indoor Air Quahty" since these references provide the appropriate guidelines for maintaining the carbon dioxide concentration limits below one half percent by volume for a maximum occupancy of eleven persons inside the MCRE.

(c) Justify why the above now capacity is adequats enough to meet the presenbed limits of the contaminants described in Table 1, and Appendia C Table C 1, of ASHRAE Standcrd 621989 " Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quahty."

(di Provide a revision oesignation letter to MIL HDDK 759,31 July 1995," Human Enginect ing Guidelines,"

which is listed as a reference in SSAR Section 6.4.8.

Response

a) SSAR subsection 6.4.3.2 has been amended to include specific values of temperature / humidity at key intervals in the room heatup calculation. See SSAR markup attached to this open item response.

A discussion of the MCR thermal analysis performed with the Gothic code has been previously supplied to the NRC in letter number DCP/NRC1071 dated October 10,1997, on page 12 of attachment 1.

The relative humidity calculation is not performed with the Gothic code. Rather,it utilizes a calculation which tracks the amount of water vapor within the MCR pressure boundary by tabulating the moisture bair :e in the room as a function of time. 'Ite calculation takes into account a fixed control room volume, a maximum of 11 occupants, each having a respiration rate of 32 ft%r, a minimum air addition rate of 60 scfm with a dewpoint of 78'F, an initial room relative humidity of 60%, and an initial room temperature of 75'F.

The tesults of this calculation, in combination with I'.e MCR roam heatup computation, demonstrates that the MCR environment remains within the limits for reliable human performance as specified in MIL HDBK 759C and Mil STD 1472E during VES operation, b) completed, see SSAR markup.

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c) The VES air addition flowrate of 65 : $ 6cfm is sufficient to meet the prescribed limits of the contaminants in the MCR pressure boundary to that desenbed in Table I and Appendin C Table C.I of ASHRAE Standard 62 1989.

t d) The SSAR has been amended to designate revision C of the MIL handbook.

l SSAR Rdvisions: See attached markups.

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6.4.2.2 General Descripdos M

I The main sontrol room emergency habitability system air storsge pewff2; ; mibed-1 "-H- ;:.;; c' lMS =W ':: ;;.d are sized to deliver the required air flow to the main control room to meet the venulation and pressurizauon requirements for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months bas:d on the performance requirements of subsection 6.4.1.1. Normal system makeup is provided by a connecuon to the breathable quality air compressor in the compressed and instrument air system (CAS). See subsection 9.3.1 for a desenpuon of the CAS. A connection for retilling operation is provided m the CAS.

De funcuon of providing passive heat sinks for the main control room. Instnamentation and control rooms, and de equipment rooms is part of the main control room emergency

. habitability system. De heat sinks for each rcom are designed to limit the temperature nse inside each room during the 72. hour penod following a loss of nuclear island nonradioactive venclation system operation. The heat sinks consist primanly of the thermal mass of the concrete that makes up the ceilings and walls of these rooms.

To enhance the heat. absorbing capability of the ceilings, a metal form is attached to the intenor surface of the concrete at selected locations. Metallic plates are attached perpendicular to the form. These plates extend into the room and act as thermal fins to enhance the heat transfer from the room air to the concrete. De specifics of the fin construction for the main control room and IAC room ceilings are d3senbed in subsecuon 3.8.4.1.2.

i De normal opersong temperatures in the main control room, instrumentation and control l rooms, de equipment rooms, and adjacent rooms are kept within a specified range by the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilanon system in order to maintain a design basis truual heat sink capacity of each room. See subsection 9.4.1 for a desenpoon of the nuclear island nonradioactive venclacon system.

i In the unlikely event that power to the nuclear island non.adioactive ventilation system is unavailable for more than 72 houn, MCR habitability is maintained by operating one of the two MCR ancillary fans to supply outside air to the MCR. See subtection 9.4.1 for a desenption of this cooling mode of operation. Doon and ducts may be opened to provide a l supply pathway and an exhaust pathway. Likewise, outside air is supplied to division B and C instrumentation and control rooms in order to maintain the ambient temperature V)w the qualification temperature of the equipment. -

1 De main control room emergency habitability system piping and instrumentation diagram is shown in Figurs 6.4 2.

6.4.2.3 Component Descripdom I ne main control room emergency habitability system compressed air supply contains a set I of storage tanks connected to a main and an attemate air delivery line. Components common I

to both lines include a manual isolacon valve, a pressure regulaung valve, and a flow I metenns onfice. Single active failure protection is provided by the use of r*,dundant, u

Revistoat 17 6.4 3 October 31.1997 3 Westif4houS4 i

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6. Engineered Safety Futurm I remotely operated isolanon valves, which are located within the MCR pressure boundary. In I the event of insufficient or execisive flow in the man delivery line, the main delivery line i is isolated and the alternate delivery line is manually actuated. ne attemate delisery line I contains the same components as the main delivery line with the exception of the remotely I operated isolation valves, and thus is capable of sup;,1 yin compressed air to the MCR I pressure boundary at the required air flowrate. Tnycf M

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Emergency Air Storage Tanks

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i Bert are a total of 32 air storage tanks. De air storage tanks are constructed of forged, seamless pipe, with no welds, and confortn to Secuon VW and Appendix 22 of the

! AShE Code. De design pressure of the air storage tanks is 4000 psi The storage I tanks collectively contain a minimum storage capacity of 314,132 scif 404 4 dst rniderm l4%U't N .%YpQr

Pressure Regulating Valve Each compressed air supply line contains a pressure regulaung valve located downstream of the common header, ne pressure at the outlet of the valve is controlled via a self contained pressure control operator. 'The downstream pressure is sety that the flow rate can be controlled by an orifice downstream of the valve. 9 g

Flow Metenng Onfice ne flow rate of air delivered to the main control room pressure boundary is linuted by an orifice located downstream of the pressure regulating valve. De onfice is sized to provide the required air flowrate to the man control room pressure boundary; M//t det /p f4 %st& st t1(fRexlo Q pc p y, t

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?-T+%p._d M Pd At Isolation ht Valve I De pressure boundary of the compressed air storage tanks is maintained by normally I closed remotely operated isolauon valves in the main supply line. Rese vahes are I located within MCR presture boundary downstream of the pressure regulaung vahe and

! automancally ininate air flow upon receipt of a signal to open !see subsecuon 6.4.3.2).

Pressure Relief Isouon Valve To limit the pressure increase within the mam control room, isolanon valves are provided, one in each of redundant flowpaths, which open on a time delay after receipt of an emergency habitability system actuanon signal. De valves provide a leak oght seal to protect the integnty of the main control room pressure boundary dunng normal f operanon, and are normally closed to present interference with the operanon of the nonradioactive venulanon system.

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Revision: 17 Westinghouse October 31,1997 6.4 4 lllo, 3 71 f ~ 't'

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I Insert'AA for section 6.4.3.2 The initial values.of temperature / relative humidity in the MCR !

are 75 'F/60%. At 31 hours3.587963e-4 days 0.00861 hours 5.125661e-5 weeks 1.17955e-5 months , when the non-1E battery heat loads ,

are exhausted, the conditions are 87.20F/41%. At 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , when -

i the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months battery heat loads are terminated, the conditions are 84.4 0F/45%. At 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the conditions are 85.8 0F/39%. l L

Insert BB for~section 6.4.2.3

. -Main Air Flowpath Isolation-Valve .

The main air flowpath contains a normally open, manually. t operated valve located within the MCR pressure boundary, upstream of the remotely-operated air' delivery main '

isoletion. valves. -The valveLis provided as a means of isolating and preserving the air storage tanks contents in-the event of a pressure regulating valve malfunction, i

-4 Air: Delivery Alternate Isolation Valve

.The alternate air delivery flowpath contains a normally closed, manually operated valve, located within the MCR pressure boundary. The valve is provided as a means of manually activating the alternate air delivery flowpath in the event-the main air delivery flowpath is inoperable. l Insert ~CC-for section 6.4.2.3 The VES piping and penetrations for the MCR envelope are designated as safety class C. Additional details on Safety Class C designation are provided in section 3.2.2.5.

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6. Ensiewred Safety Featurm p n h y l'hiN & M k

Pressure Relief Damper JM.

Pressure relief dampers are located downstream of the butter 0y isolan n valves, and are i set to open on a differennal pressure of at least 1/8 inch water gaug ne differential pressure between the control room and the relief damper exhaust locanon is monitored to ensure that a posinve pressure is maintuned in the control room with respec', to its surroundings.

Control Room Access Doors Two sets of doors, with a vestibule between that acts as an urlock, are provided at the access to the mon control room.

Breathing Apparatus Self-contained portable breathing equipment with air bottles is stored inside t' . .nain control room pressure boundary. The amount of stored ur is sufficient to provide a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months supply of breathable air for up to 11 n sin control room occupants. This is backup protecuon to the permanently installed habitability systems.

6.4.2.4 Leaktightness .

8 De main control room pressure boundary is designed for low leakage. It consists of cast in place reinforced concrete walls and slabs, and is constructed to nurumize leakage through consuuction joints and penetrations. The following features are applied as needed in order to cchieve this objecove:

The outside surface of penetrations sleeves in contact with concrete are scaled with I epoxy crack sealer. De piping and electrical cable penetranons are scaled with quali6ed pressure resistant material companble with penetracon materiais and/or cable jackenng.

ne intetior or exterior surfaces of the main control room envelope (walls Door, and ceiling) are coated with low permeability punt / epoxy sealant.

I e Inside surfaces of penetrations and sleeves in contact with commodices (i.e., pipes and I conduits, etc.) are sealed. Main control room pressure boundary HVAC isolation valves i are quali6ed to shut tight against control room pressure.

Penetration sealing materials are designed to withstand at least 1,4 inch water gauge l pressure differencal in an air pressure bamer. Penetracon sealing matenal is gypsum I cement or equivalent.

I ne piping, conduits, and electncal cable trays penetrating through any combination of men I control room pressure boundkry are scaled with seal assembly companble with the matenals of penetration commodities. Penetration sealing matenals are selected to meet bamer design Redsfon: 17 3 W95tiligh0084 October 31,1997 6.4 3 yt O. 31If

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jl* De main control room pressure boundary main entrance is designed with an airlock type I sjl double door vesubule. De emergency eut door (suurs to elevauon 100')is normajly closed, 30 g*%; and remains closed under design basis source term coaditions. ;*;

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I j j I- When the main control room pressure boundary is isolated in an accident situadon, there is' 44 9rfl no direct communication with the outside atmosphere, nor is there commurucanon with the P -

~2 %d gf(p normal sentilacon system. Leakage from the main control room pressure boundary is the result of an inumal pressure of at least 1/8 inch water gauge provided by emergency i* D df 1*,5g *v

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habitabihty system operation.

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$j ]' ne exfiltracon and infiltracon analysis for nuclear istrd nonradioactive venulauon system I4

u. p 'i operauon is, discussed in subseccon 9;4.1. lg!

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ko 6.4.2J Interaction with Other Zono and Pressurized Equipment De main control room emergency habitability system is a self contained system. De 2 no interaccon between other zones and pressurized equipment. , e 3, a

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[ j 'i. t For a discussion of the nuclear island nonradioacuve venulation system, refer to) i # a subsecuon 9.4.1. g$ $-

6,.4.2,6 Shielding Design ne design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) dictates the shielding requirements for the main control room. Main control room shielding design bases are discussed in Secuon 12.3.

('f Desenptions of the design basis LOCA source terms, main control room shielding parameters,

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5 and evaluauon of doses to main control room personnel are presented in Secuen 15.6.

ne main control room and its locanon in the plant are shown in Figure 12.31.

6.4.3 System Operation his subseccon discusses the operation of the main control room emergency habitabibty system.

6,4.3.1 Normal Mode ne main control room emergency habitability system is not required to operste dunns normal condicons. The nuclear island nonradioacuve venulanon system maintains the air temperature of a number of rooms within a predetermined temperature range. The rooms with this requirement include the rooms with a main control room emergency habitabihty system passive heat sink design and their adjacent rooms.

i Revision: 17 '

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6. Engineered Safety Features 6.4.3.2 Emergency Mode ,

l Opersoon of the main control room emergency habitability system is automaucally initiated by the following safety related signals: ,

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High high paruculate or iodine ratioactmty in the mon control room supply air duct

Loss of ac power Operauon can also be initiated by manual a tuativi.

If radiauon levels in the. main control room sul.py air duct exceed the "high high" setpoint, the nuclear island nonradioacuve ventilation system is isolated from the mam control room pressure boundary by automane closure of the isoltuon devices located in the nuclear island nonradioactive venuiston system ductwork. At the same ume, the main control room emergency habitability system begins to deliver or from the emergency or storage M T A' I the men control room by automatically opening the isolation valves located in the supply line.

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[$0.377Fpicr.Onr.of ,pe,isolauon valvessopen/ allowing the pressure relief dampers to func' ion.

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After the main control room emergency hab'. ability system isolation valves are oper.ed, the or supply pressure is regulated by,a self contaned regulating valve. This valve maintains a s

constant downstream pressure regardless of the upstream pressure. A constant air now ate is maintained by the now metering orifice downstream of the pressure regulaung valve. His

> l flow rate is sufficient to mamtain the men control room pressure boundary at least 1/8. inch water gauge positive differtntial pressure with respect to the surroundings. De main control room emergency habitability system air now rate is also sufficient to maintain the carbon I dioxide levels below 0.5 percent concentration for 11 occupants and to mamton air quality I within the guidelines of Tablep2'of Referenceg 1 I A1 M d p h C*TheC-I ne emergency air storage tanks are sized to provide the required or now to the main control I room pressure boundary for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . After 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the main control room is cooled by drawmg in outside air and circulating it through the room, as discussed in subsecuon 6.4.2.2.

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I The temperature and humidity in the main control oom rescure boundary following a loss 1 of the nuclear island nonradioactive senulation system ter un within limits for reliable human i performance (References 2 and 3) over a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months penod.P uf6cient thermal mass is erovided_

in the walls and ceiling of the main control room to a so the heat generated by the \

equipment, lights, and occupants, ne temperaturt in the instrumentauon and control rooms and de equipment rooms following a loss of the nuclear island nonradioacuve ventilation system remains below 120'F over a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months penod. As m the main control room, sufficient thermal mass is provided surrounding these rooms to absorb the heat generkted by the equipment. After 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the instrumentacon and control rooms will be cooled by drawing in outside air and circulaung it through the room, as discussed in subsecuon 6.4.2.2.

In the event of a loss of ac power, the nuclear island nonradioacuve venulacon system I isolauon valves automancally close and the men control room emergency habitability system Revision: 17 T Westingh0054 October 31, 1997 6.4 7 ll10.311f*0

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6. Engumred Safety Featuru

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isolation valves automaucally open, These accons protect the main control room occupants from a potenual radiacon release. In insunces in which there is no radiological source term present, the compressed air storage tanks an refilled via a connection to the breathable quahty

! ur corapressor in the compressed and instrument air system (CAS) The compresseJ air ,

I storage tany:an also be refilled from poruble Lpplies by an installed connection m the CAS.

6.4.4 System Safety Evaluation Dosts to main control room personnel resulung from a postulated 1.OCA ve presented in subsecuon 15.6.5.3. De doses associated with the LOCA are bounding for all other design basis accidents. No radioactive matenals are stored or transported near the main control room pressure boundary.

As discussed and evaluated in subsection 9.5.1, the use of noncombusuble construcuon and heat and flame resistant matenals throughout the plant reduces the likelihood of fire and i consequencal impact on the main control room atmosphere. Operanon of the nuclear island nonradioacuve ventilanon system in the event of a fire is discussed in subsection 9.4.1. ,

i The exhaust stacks of the onsite standby power diesel generators are located in excess of .

I 150 feet away from the fresh air intakes of the main control room. De onsite standby power system fuel oil storage tanks are located in excess of 300 feet from the main control room fresh air intakes. Rese separanon distances reduce the possibility that combusuon fumes or smoke from an oil fire would be drawn into the main control room.

The protection of the operators in the main control room from offsite toxic gas releases is discussed in Section 2.2. The sources of onsite chemicals are desenbed in Table 6.41 and their locanons are shown on Figure 1.2 2. Analysis of these sources are in accordance widi

!- Regulatory Guide 1.78 and shows that these sources do not represent a toxic hazard to control I roona personnel.

A supply of protecove clothitig, respirators, and self contained breathing apparatus adequate for 11 persons is stored within the main control room pressure boundary.

The main control room emergency habitability system components discussed in I subsecuon 6.4.2.3 art arrangtd as shown in Figure 6.4 2. The locanon of components and piping within the main control room pressure boundary provides the required supply of compressed air to the main control room pressure boundary, as shown in Figure 6 41.

During emergency operu;on, the main control room emergency habitability system passive

! heat sinks are designed to limit the temperature inside the main control room to remain within I limits for rehable human perfo mance (References 2 and 3) over 72 hoers, and to limit the air temperature inside the instrumentation and control rooms and de equipment rooms to 120*F The walls and ceilings that act as the passive heat sinks contain sufficient thermal mass to accommodate the heat sources from equipment, personnel, and lighting for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Revision: 17 Westinghouse October 31,1997 6.4 8 L//0, 3 7/F - 9

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6. Engineered Safety I'estures 4p @

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The main controll room emergency habitability system nommally pr vides 65 scfm of

[tWht 1 Nenulanon air to thI mam control room from the compressed air stora e tanks. Sixty scfm I of senulacon flow i' sufficient to pressurize the control room to at leas 1/8 mch water gauge

. differential pressurePn addition to limiting the carbon dioxide concentranon below one half i percent by volume for a maximum occupancy of 11 persons and maintaining air quality within I the guidelines of ', ele 15f.of Reference,4 f.

^ t p / Ay p u k C 'fi kt H Automanc transfer of habitability system functions from the nuclear island nonradioactive venulation system to the main control room emwrgency habitability system is accomplished by the receipt of one of two signals:

. "Hirh high" paruculate or iodine radioactivity in MCR air supply

. Loss of ac power sources The airbome fission product source term in the reactor containment following the postulated I LOCA is assumed to leak from the containment and airbome fission producu are assumed to I result from spent fuel pool steaming. The concentration of radioacuvity, which is assumed to surround the main control room, after the postulated accident, is evaluated as a funcuon of the fission product decay constants, the containritent leak rate, and the meteorological conditions assumed. The assessment of the amount of radioactivity within the main control room takes into consideranon .the radiological decay of fission products and the '

infiltranon/exfiltration rates to and from the main control room pressure boundary.

A single active failure of a component of the main control room emergency habitability system or nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system does not impair the capability of I the systems to accomplish their intended functions. The Class IE components of the mairt

! control room emergency habitability system are connected te independent Class IE power I supplies. Both the main control room emergency habitability system and the pomons of the nuclear istrnd nonradioacuve vencilation system whici, isolates the mam control room are designed to remain funcoonal during an SSE or design basis tornado.

6.4.5 Inservice Inspection / Inservice Testing A program of preoperauoral and postoperational tesung requirements is implemented to confirm initial and continued system capability. The VES system is tested and inspected at appropriate intervals, as defined by the technical specificanons. Emphasis is placed on tests and inspections of the safety reltt-d portions of the habitability systems.

6.45.1 Preoperadonal Inspection and Testing Preoperaconal testing of the main control room emergency habitability system is performed i to senfy that the air flow rate of 65 r.5 scfm is sufficient to mamtain pressunzanon of the i main control room envelope of at least 1/8-inch water gauge with respect to the adjacent areas. The positive pressure within the main control room is confirmed via the differential pressure transmitters within the control room. The installed flow meters are unlized to venfy the system flow rates. The pressunzation of the control room limits the mgress of Revision: 17 October 31,1997 NSII@0034 6.4 9 t//0, 3 7 /F * /O

6. Engineered Safety Features I radioactivity to mamtain operater dose limits below regula ory limits. Air quality within the 4 1 MCR environment is confirmed to be within the guidelines of Table #4.of Reference I by I analyzing air tarnples taker dunng the pressunzauon test. 1, gpdig d b/t d-/

I The storage capacity of the compressed sir storage tanks is venfied to be in excess of i 314.132 scf This amount of compressed air will assure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of air supply to the ma n uSgl4 da en%m fw%aM A 3'Nt'pf An inspection will venfy that the heat loads within the rooms idendfied in Table 6.4 3 are less g than the specified values.

1 Preoperanonal tesung of the main control room isolation valves in the nuclear island I nonradioactive venulanor, system is performed to senfy 'Jie leakughtness of the valves.

Tesung and inspection of the radiation moniters is discussed in Section 11.5. The other tests noted above are discussed in Chapter 14.

6.4.5.2 In.serHce Testing in.senice tesung of the main control room emergency habitability system and nuclear island nonradioacuve venclation system is conducted in accordance with the surveillance requirements specified in the technical specificanons in Chapter 16.

Leakughtness tesung of the main co .wl room pressure boundary is conducted in accordance a with the frequency specified in the & hnical sp9eificanons.

6.4.5.3 Air Quality Testing Connections are provided for sampling the air supplied from the compressed and instrument I air system and for penodic sampling of the air stored in the storage tanks. Air samples of 'he

! compressed air storage tanks are taken quarterly and analyzed for acceptable air quality within I the guidelines of TableK / Reference 1.

1 sd Appdet 6 Tid 4 e-l 6.4.6 Instrumentation Requirements The indications in the main control room used to monitor the main control room emergvacy habitability system and nuclear island nonradioactive ventilauon system are listed m Table 6.4-2.

Instrumentation required for actuation of the main control room emergency habitability system and nuclear island nonradioacave venulation system are discussed in subsection 7.3.1.

Details of the radianon monitors used to provide the main control room indication of actuauon of the nucles island nonradioactive ventilation system supplemental filtration mode of operation and actuanon of main control room emergency habitability system operanon are given in Secuon 11.5, Revision: 17 October 31,1991 6 4-10 M@0m yto. 3 71 F -II

6. Engineered Safety Featres f 1

A descripuon of initiating circuits, logic, periodic testing requirements, and redundancy of instrumentauon relating to the habitability systems is provided in Section 7.3. pq

l 6.4,7 Combined License Information 4.e #.: m c C6t g ary I 458 II Combined License applicants referencing the AP600 cerufied design are responsible for te I amount and locauon of possible sources of toxic chemicals in or near the plant andEotic gu i monitonng, as required. Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95 address control room protecuen , l W**< A 9 sia tusic consa ses Gownwaa3- $

potwid !

I for toxic chemicals,

5. ... t u r e.t sse.J*olonting ge fo u T L h ovrs h * *.~ 4 hm .*w*. the 1 A te ,Lat.,y bra s.s i,7 7 s)e t,tf a erw 4, m a.* n e.

3.r4. st s ~

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. it"-^ L - .... ;p,:; _ .; r* r* r :::: ;= y,..... p m m ..,, ;.- -J .; . . - ' % v' f 8 "'

pG z: ;;. .. ,.n woG'. ; b ,

t'tM W*

d, 8 #'4g) 0 tan N 2,b.lM .4 6.4.8 References k DC 19.

I 1. "Venulation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality," ASHRAE Standard 62 1989, i ig-m < n C

I 2. "P.uman Engineering Design G'iidelines," MIL.HDBK 759t 31 July 1995, I 3. " Hum:.n Engineenng," MIL STD 1472E, 31 October 1996.

i 6 Ph o o c.e.< Gre.k k Com o d L.; en s e. spp\:c u ts r e.Fe.c e.n e.in3 +% a.

e <e.y o n 5! bi e fo < vs.<if g +%t p <o c.e4 e e.a a.na c.ond51e.q.t 3 4+<a;ny enip ><for c.e nt or l re> o m h A ;tabilit 3 'acc.S 3 ( 38c 5

t-l10

~C 55 0 e-J th +h e. h+844 ok l* e4 eA c.-

Revision: 17 3 W85tingh0USS October 31,1997 6.4-11 y10.131F -t2

t 6. Engineered Safety Featura Table 6.4-1 ONSTTE CHEMICALS Material State tecation i Hydrogen Gas Gas storage Nitrogen Liqmd Turbine bldg.

CO, Liqmd Turbine bldg.

Oxygen Scavenger Liqmd Turbine bldg.

pH Addioen Uqmd Turbine bids.

Uqmd Turbine bldg.

Sulfuric Acid Sodium Hydrotide Liquid Turbine bldg.

Dispenant Liqu d Turbine bldg.

Liqmd DG fuel oil storage tanivDG bldg / Turbine Fuel Oil

' bids / Annex bldg.

Liqmd Turbine b3dg.

Cortosion Inhibitor Scale tahibitor Liqmd Turbine bids.

BiocidJDisinfectant Liqmd Turbine bldg.

Algicide Liqmd Turbine bldg.

M2fAi (a) Site specific, by Combined License applicant Revidon: 14 g ,

June 27,1997 6.4-12 = l y/0. 3 7/ F - / 3

(

6. Eachneered Satory Features 1

Table 6.4 2 MAIN CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY INDICATIONS AND A1. ARMS VES emergency ur storage tank pressure (indicanon and low and low low alarms)

VES MCR pressure boundary differennal pressure (indicauon and high and low alarms) 9 VES air delivery line flowrate (indicacon and high and low alarms)

VBS maan control room supply aar radiacon level (high high alarmsk VBS outside air intake smoke level (high alarm) l VBS isolanon valve poainon i VBS MCR pressure boundary differential pressure h

KEY: VES = Main control room emer$ency habitability system VBS = Nuclear island nonradioacuve vencianon system MCR = Mun control room l

l l

l t

Revision: 17 October 31,1997 MM 6.4 13 V/0. 3 7 / F - /Y

=. . . .-

6. Empmeered Safety Feature l

Table 6.4-3 1 .

I LOSS OF AC P0%IR REAT LOAD LBUTS I

Rooes Neanbers Heat Lead Heat Load I Room Nome 0 to 24 beers 24 to 72 Hoors 1

(Btu /sec) (Ben /sec)

I 12401 12.823 3.92 l MCR Envelope 1

(Hour 0 through 3) l 5.133 I

(Hour 4 through 24) 12301.12305 8.854 0 I 1&C Rooms 12302,12304 13.07 4.22 l !&C Rooms 3.792 0 i de Equipment Rooms 12201.12205 (Hour 0 through 1)

I 2.465 I

(Hour 2 through 24) 1220.'. 12207 3.84 2.05 I de Equipment Rooms l (Hour 0 throesh 1)

4.51 l

(Hour 2 through 24) j l

l l

l l l

Revision: 13 May 30,1997 6.4-14 MON l

I L//0,3 7 / F -/f

M ew sa.n r -

=

/ ...................

' TOILET l CICHEN ,

s Y t :

U J SHI Ma*EA.'*" l l

,, , e 'T .

35NE CLERK '

400M O!v!SION A i

l I esame ammamed j{

Ns i d AiCOLN T Eej M AIN T ACCING , CONTROL AREA,- . I 900M I

e a)- , .

u= l

- - - /

Q. \ / -

ELEv i / N : s

' " s 1 3...J Figwe 6 41 Mais Control Room Envebpe RetMoa: 17 October 31,1997 MM 6.4 14 A tho. 37 F-Its

p. Auxiliary Systems 9.4.1.2.1 General Descripdon T

9.4.1.2.1.1 Main Control Room /rechnical Support Center HVAC Subsystem W

j De main control room / technical support center HVAC subsystem serves the main control room and technical suppon center areas with two 100 percent capacity supply air handling j( units, retum/ exhaust air fans, supplemental air filtranon umts, associated dampers.

instrumentanon and controls, and common ductwork. De supply ur handling units and I

E return / exhaust air fans are connected to common ductwork which distnbutes air to the main

_q

.N control room and technical support center areas, he main control room envelope consists of the main control room, shift supervisor office, tagging roors, toilet, clerk room, and 4 kitchen /operuor area. De technical support center areas consist of the main technical support 2y center operations area, conference rooms, NRC room, computer rooms, shift tumover room, g kitchen / rest area, and restrooms. The main control room and technical support center toilets have separue exhaust fans.

4 x Outside supply air is provided to the plant areas served by the main control room /te:hnical

-% support center HVAC subsystem through an outside air intake duct that is protected by an intake enclosure located on the roof of the auxiliar/ building u elevanon 153' 0*. De supply, retum, and toilet exhaust art the only HVAC penetranons in the main control room envelope and include redundans safety related seismic Category I isolanon valves that art x physically locued within the main control room envelope. Redundant safety.related radiation

, f monitors are located inside the main control room upstream of the supply air isolanon vahes.

GhY Rese momtors imnate operation of the nonsafety related supplemental air filtration units on high gaseous radioacuvity concentranons and isolate the main control room from the nuclear 4 d ,q island nonradioacuve ventilation system on high peticulate or iodine radioacuvity concentrations. See Section 11.5 for a description of the main control room supply air

.dh -4 4 radianon momtors.

g h Both redundant trains of supplemental ur filtranon units and one trun of the supply air handling unit are locued in the. main control room mechanical equipment room at elevanon 135'.3* in the auxiliary building.JDe other supply air handling unit subsystem is locued

(~ _.

in the main control room mechanical equipment room u elevanon 135'.3* in the annex building. De main control room toilet exhaust fan is located u elevanon 135'.3* in the auxiliary building. A humidifier is provided for each supply air handling unit. De supply air hmadhng unit cooling coils are provided with chilled wuer from air-cooled chillers in the central chilled water system. See subseccon 9.2.7 for the challed water system desenpuon.

The main control room / technical support center HVAC subsystem is designed so that smoke, hot gases, and fire suppressant will not migrate from one fire area to another to the extent thu they could adversely affect safe shutdown capabilities, including operator actions. Fire or combinanon fire and smoke dampen are provided to isolate each fire area from adjacent fire areas dunns and following a fire in accordance with NFPA 90A (Reference 27) requirements.

Rese combinanon smoke / fire dampen close in response to smoke detector signals or in response to the heat from a fire. See Aopendix 9A for idenuficanon of fut areas.

h !

st o Q w2M m & A WQF 94 mg Revision: 17 Ocsober 31,1997 W~

Westiftghouse.+yym7u.A. Nv'A d. ,&5 ,W, 4 xA_W, gis w a. 4 dy,yvF

i

\

s 14. Initial Test Prograan i

l l Table 14.3 7 (Sheet 1 of 4) l l RADIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS l SSAR Reference Design Feature Value i Table 21 Plant elevation for maximum flood level (ft) s100 I

l Section 2.3.4 Atmospheric dispersion factors - X/Q (sec/m')

1 Site Boundary X/Q l 0 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months time interval 51.0 x 10 8 1 Low Population Zone Boundary X/Q l 0- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 51.35 x 10d I 8- 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 51.0 x 10d i 24 - % hours 5 5.4 x 10~5 l % - 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months 5 2.2 x 10-s l Table 6.2.31 Containment penetration isolation features are configured I as in Table 6.2.3-1 1 Table 6.2.31 Maximum closure time for remotely operated containment s5 I purge valves (seconds) i Table 6.2.31 Maximum closure time for e.ll other remotely operated s 60 l containment isolation valves (seconds) l Section 6.4. 2.3 The minimum storage capacity of each set of storage s l tanks in the VES (sef) /fj32 i Section 6.4.3.2 ~Ihe maximum temperature rise in the main control room 5 15 i pressure boundary following a loss on the nuclear island I nonradioactive ventilation system over a 72-hour period I (*F) l Section 6.4.3.2 'Ihe maximum temperature in the instrumentation and s125 I control rooms and de equipment rooms following a loss I of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system I remains over a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months period (*F).

f 65 l Section 6.4.4 The main control'emer abitability system 25 I nominally provide. . scfm of ventilation air to the main I control room from e compressed air storage tanksgif wc @, p h, I >d . .. &bmius, a M ::fr !' b^6 dr = dcM.ms 1 -(wim).-

Revision: 14 MM 14.3-57 June 27,1997 Ll10,311f*IB

o ='

l ,

l

14. Imidal Test Pregri.se Table 14.3 7 (Sheet 2 of 4)

RADIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS SSAR Reference Design Feature Value l Section 6.4.4 2 five scfm of ventilation flow is sufficient to 1/8*

pressurize the control room to 1/8* inch water gauge differential pressure (WIC).

Figure 6.42 De main control room emergency habitability system l consists of a set of emergency air storage tanks and an air delivery system to the main control room.

Section 6.5.3 he passive heat removal process and the limited leakage from the containment result in offsite doses less than the regulatory guideline limits.

Section 8. 3.1.1. 6 Electrical penetrations through the containment can withstand the maximum short-circuit currents available either continuously without exceeding their tnermal limit, or at least longer than the field cables of the circuits so that the fault or overload currents are interrupted by the protective devices prior to a potential failure of a penetration.

I Section 9. 4.1.1.1 The VBS isolates the HVAC piping that penetrates the main control room boundary on high particulate or iodine concentrations in the main control room supply air or on extended lou of ac power to support operation of the main control room emergency habitability system.

I nevision: 17 October 31,1997 14.3 58 MIN

%o .17/ F - / 9

s NRC FSER OPEN ITEM au; anu Question: 410.372F (OITS #6290)

Westinghouse needs to pa , ie following:

1. Provide data in SSAK Section 6.4.2.3 for the VES pressure regulating valves, flow metering orifices, remotely operated isolation valves, manual isolation valves, pressure relief isolation valves, pressure relief dampers, and breathing apparatus. The data should include the specific ASME code class, AP600 classification and seismic cate. gory, in addition provide a functional description of the manual isolation valves and list these as references in SSAR Section 6.4.8.

2. Provide a description and data in SSAR Section 6.4.2.3 for the VES piping and penetrations such as specific ASME code class AP600 classification and susmic category and list these references iri SSAR Section 6.4.8.

Additionally, provide consistency in the text of the SSAR for the use of terminology such as " air Enttles" and

" air storage tanks," i.e., are they air bottles or are they air storage tank 7

3. Provide an evaluation of the air piping material that is alloy steel except piping from tanks to sub-headers is stainless steel, as shown in Figure 6.4 2, as to its suitabihty without any degradation such as corrosion or any other degradation which may degrade the quality of breathing air during the life of the plant and revise the text of the SSAR according'y, Also, provide clarification concerning the " loop" shown at the discharge side of each emergency air storage tank and revise SSAR Figure 6.4 2 accordingly.

4. Verify that the above components are meluded in Table 3.2 3 of the SSAR with the proper code classification data.

5. SSAR Section 6.4.2.2 state that the VES air storage vessels have a combned minimum volume of 41.77 m%ec (1475 cubic feet) while it is stated in SS AR Section 6.4.2.3 that the storag ":nks collec*.svely contain a minimum storage capacity of 8895.3 m%ec (314,132 standard cubic feet). Clariif t..b uorage capacity data with the appropriate pressure values and revise the text of the SSAR Sections accordingly. Also, provide a breakdown of air Cow and corresponding design and operating pressures at various points of the VES including the outlet of the air storage tanks, outlet of pressure regulating valves, inlet to Dow metering orifice in each train, and outlet to air flow metering orifice in each train,in order to show that the system can provide a total of 0.0306 m%ec (65 scfm) of airnow, at a given time during accident conditions, as stated in SSAR Section 6.4.4. Revise the test of the SSAR and Figure 6.4-1 to include this information.

6. SS AR Section 6.4.4 states that 60 scfm of ventilation now is sufficient to pressurize the control room to at least 1/8 in water gauge differential pressure. 'Ihis statement should be revised to state that 60 scfm of ventilation How is sufficient to pressurize the control room to at least positive 1/8 in water gauge differential pressure with respect to the surroundings spaces.

410.372F-1

t NHC FSER OPEN ITEM 3 "E 1 , e e.

1

Response

1. SSAR subsection 6.4.2.3 has been amended to include a clarifying statement that the classification of VES components inay be found in Table 3.2-3 as appropriate.

2, SSAR subsection 6.4.2.3 has been amended to include a clarifying statement that the VES piping and penetreions are designated AP600 Safety Class C, and that details on Safety Class C designation is provided in section 3.2.2.5.

3. The " loop'shown on the discharge side of each emergency air storage tank in SSAR Figure 6.4-2 is called a

" pigtail" by the vende; -d is standard in the construction and arrangement of the assembly, it is designed to allow more flexibility in the connection to account for expansion and contraction in the piping.

The alloy steel chosen for use in the VES piping is material SA335 Pil, from ASME B&PV code section Ill, class 3, quality group C, and is corrosion resistant. Air quality testing is performed on a quarterly basis, as to its acceptability for breathing purposes.

4. Table 3.2 3 of the SSAR includes the VES components.

5. SSAR subsection 6.4.2.3 has been amended to add ct:rifying statements regarding the physical volume of the tanks, the compressed air capacity of the tanks, and operating pressure in the lines feeding the MCR.

6. SSAR subsection 6.4.4 has been amended to include the clarifying statement that the sixty scftr. of ventilation flow is sufficient to pressurize the MCR to at least positive 1/8 in water gauge differential pressure with respect to the surrounding areas.

SSAR Revisions: See the SSAR markup provided with the response to open item 410.371F.

m 72s2 W westinghouse L

4 NRC FSER OPEN ITEM i[

9 11 Question: 410.375F (OITS #6293)

Westinghouse should revise the SSAR to include the following:

(a) Revise SSAR Section 9.4.1 (VBS) to state the VES carbon dioxide concentration limit and air flow criteria for normal and maximum occupancy of the areas served by VBS.

(b) Reuse SSAR Table 14.3 7 (Sheet i of 4)," Radiological Analysis", to reflect the VES flow rate 65 scfm +/-

5 sefm.

Response

a) SSAR subsection 9.4.1 has been amended to state that operation of the VBS precludes the CO2 concentration from exceeding the 0.5% limit.

b) See amended Table 14.3 7 for the revised values.

SSAR Revisions: See the SSAR markup provided with the response to open item 410.371F.

410.375F-1 gg t

& _ _ 3

1

'(.

NRC FSER OPEN nEM -

gamm ~

'H=-

Question: 410.376F - (OITS #6294) -

In response to RAI Question 450.10.g. Westingt.ouse states that AP600 does not have an onsite chlorine or other toxic chemicals storage facility, and offsite chlorine or toxic release is site specific.' However, SSAR Table 6.4-1,.

"Onsite Chemicals," shows various chemicals. Additionally,in a letter dated October 10,1997, Westinghouse states, in response to a staff's concern for om ite chemicals, that chemicals listed in SSAR Table 6.4 1 were evaluated using the methodology in NUREG-0570,' " Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Following A Postulated Accidental Release." and concluded that these chemicals do not represent a toxic hazard to control room operators.

'Also, SSAR Section 6.4.4 states that analysis of onsitt chemicals as described in SSAR Table 6.41 and their locations as shown in SSAR Figure 1.2 2 are in accordance with RG 1.78 and shows that these sources do not represent a toxic hazard to MCRE personnel. Therefore, Westinghouse needs to update the response to RAI Question 450.10.g and provide the results of these evaluations (conformance with NUREG-0570 and RG 1.78) and associat'ed

assumptions to meet the requirements of GDC_19 with the following details:

1. Amount and name of chemicals stored in individual storage cylinders and number of cylinders

2. Overall dimensions and locations of cylinders .

3. , Pressure of each cylinder Response: -

An evaluation cf the onsite chemicals shown in Table 6.4-1 has been performed, with the result that they do not present a hazard to control room personnel. A summary of the material, state, quantity, location, and distance to air intake is presented as follows.

Material Slait Qgatt!!!y Location Distance to Air Intake Hydrogen Liquid / 2000 gal / - Gas storage 375 ft Gas 500 ft' Nitrogen Liquid 1000 gal Turbine bldg. 328 ft CO, Liquid 275 gal Tut, s bldg. 328 ft

-Oxygen Liquid 1600 gal Turbine b!dg. 245 ft Scavenger (Hydrazine) pH Liquid 1600 gal Turbine bldg. 245 ft addition (morpholine)

Selfur'c Liquid ' 20000 gal Turbine bldg. 328 ft Acid -

~ Sodium Liquid 20000 gal Turbine bldg. 328 ft

- Hydroxide -

410.376F-1

. ~ , ._. . _ . . - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . . . . . . . . __ . _ . . . _

'.g 4-s-

' NRC PSER OPEN ITEM II -

Fuel Oil Liquid - 200000 gal - DO fuel oil - 328 ft storage tar.k/DO bldgfrurbine bldg / Annex bldg

-e Corrosion - Liquid - $000 gal . Turbine blog. 328 ft

- Inhibitor .

' Scale Liquid 5000 gal Turbine bldg. 328 ft inhibitor Biocide / Liquid 10000 gal Tuibine bldg. 328 ft

. Disinfectant

Algaecide - Liquid . 240 gal ' Turbine bldg. 328 ft SSAR Revisions: None. .

1 410.376F-2

4 a

4 NRC FSER OPEN ITEM

?

I Ouestion: 410.378F (OITS #6296)

Air samples from the emergency air storage tanks are taken quarterly and analyzed to conform with the guidelines of Table C 2 of ASHRAE Standard 62. The staff has determined that reference to C 2 is not acceptable. However, confonnance with both, Appendix C, Table C 1 and Table 1 of ASHRAE Standard 62,is acceptable. Additionally, Westinghouse must include the above criteria as part of de Surveillance Requirements of Chapter 16 Technical Specifica.tions to validate the VES air quality of the er > tency air storage tanks and air quality of the air supplied from the compressed and instrument air system (CAS) and revise SSAR Sections 6.4.5.1,6.4.5.3 and 9.4.1, and the VES Surveillance Requirements of Chapter 16 Technical Specifications.

Response

See Tech Specs section 3.7.6 markup for the VES. This section is a markup of the markup provided in correspondence DCP/NRC1071, dated October 10,1997.

SSAR Revisions: See attached markup of Tech Spec 3.7.6.

410.378F-1

(pk % Ts o mkap hfmiddla 129 <se ,(o L.s.

'0

$p,37% F an) Vlo,YtYF) 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Main Control Room Habitability System (VES) 714-

.Two Hain Control Room (MCR) Habitability System inbhall LCO 3.7.6 be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1. 2.-3. and 4.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Ag 4p~ &&p A. One VES 6eefe-- A.1 Restore VES tee 4e to 7 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.

B. MCR air temperature 8.1 Restore HCR air 24 hnurs not within limit, temperature to within

+

, limit.

C. Loss of integrity of C.1 Restore HCR pressure 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months HCR pressure boundary to OPERABLE boundary, status 1

D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Conditions A. AND B, or C not met in H00E 1. 2, 3, or 4. D2 Se in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E. Required Action and E.1 Suspend CORE Imediately associated Completion ALTERATIONS.

Time of Conditions A.

B. or C not met AND

~

during movement of irradiated fuel. E.2 Suspend movement of Innediately i

irradiated fuel assentlies.

(continued) l AP600 3.7 12 08/97 Amendnent 0 l

~2-W o. 3 7F F

,,' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .,..... ..... J l

l 3.7.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. #wtr VES' tessus- F.1 Be in RODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months inoperable in M0(E 1, 2, 3. or 4. AND F.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND b

F.3 Restore eseVES W 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months OPERABLE status.

G. .Tse VES teesse- G.1 Suspend CORE Inmediately inoperable during ALTERATIONS.

movement of irradiated fuel. AND G.2 Suspend movement of Inmediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

@ AP600 3.7 13 08/97 Amendment 0

4,, , , n ,. 2

~

3.7.6 1

. I l

SURVEILLMCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLMCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify Main Control Room air temperature 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is 5 N'F.

77 SR 3.7.6.2 Verify that the compressed air storage 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months tanks are pressurized to Q 3400 psig].

SR 3.7.6.3 Verify that each VES air delivery In accordance isolation valve is OPERABLE. with the Inservice Testing Program Verify that sich VES air header manual '31 days SR 3.7.6.4 isolation valve is in an open position.

M 24 months SR 3.7.6.5 all VBS Main Control Room Verify isolationtha[4 ampere are OPERA 8LE and will close upon receipt of an octual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.6.6 Verify that each VES pressure relief In accordance isolation valve within the MCA pressure with the boundary is OPERABLE. Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.6.7 Verify that each VES pressure relief 24 months damper is OPERA 8LE.

(continued)

AP600 3.7 14 08/97 Amendnent 0

+ 0. 3 ? d ' 'l

E o

3.7.6 SURVEILLATE REQUIREENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.8 Verify that the self contained pressure In accordance regulating valve in each VES, tee 4w is with the OPERA 8LE. p Inservice

. Ag' g' f Testing Prograta p . -r -

SR 3.7.6.9 Verify that ene VES air delivery ' h ' 24 months maintains a positive pressure in the MCR, relative to the adjacent areas.

-th: re;JirM eir :Mitie ; ihr:te.

la ana&ma eJith ik Spk lad OpiutWhh 7?ch O'0% int T Sp.3.7.0.l0 hAify Thdtk ain gadh of /k l?aukaty emny.ayin dv.ay -lno#s nuts ik- 9piumb d TNble( ms Ay&x C Time d-l of AsHAAE %Jax.d W- I'rt1.

L

~

3.7 15 08/97 Amendment 0 h ,_,AP600.. '

gjo. 3 MF -l

. m ., ..... . . - w 1" '

,e si neoisevni6y ayu um ,

, 8 3.7.6 l

. 1 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.6 - Main Control Roca Emergency Habitability System BASES

BACKGROUND The Main Control Room Habitability System (VES) provides a t

protectsd environment from which operators can control the plant following an uncontrolled release of raibactivity.

The system is designed to operate following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) which requires protection from the release of i

radioactivity. In these events, the Nuclear Island

, Non Radioactive Ventilation System (VBS) would continue to 4

function if AC power is available. If AC power is lost or a High 2 main control room (MCR) radiation simal is received, the VES is actuated. The major functions o" the VES are:

1) to provide forced ventilation to deliver an adequate supply of breathable air for the MCR occupants: 2) to

. provide forced ventilation to maintain the MCR at a 1/8 inch

! water gauge positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas: and 3) to limit the temperature increase of the MCA equipment and facilities that must remain

. functional during an accident, via the heat absorption of :

passive heat' sinks. p '

i The YES EeelbeeW consists compressed air storage tanks and sociated valves, pi)ing, and instrtmentation. of M tanks contain# --int ^[t) enougi breathable air to supply the required air flow to the NCR for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The VES system is designed to maintain CO, concentration less t_han 0.52 for up to 11 MCR lt Do tral o itn one tr in

, ai CO,perating.

"-- itr ion less t n 0.5%

o5 r, and P [ntY n C0 concen ation 1 s 1.0! for to ',1 MCR kmnts. 1 Sufficient thennel mass exists in the surrounding concrete l structure (including walls, ceilin t the heat generated nside the MCA.g andisfloors) which toat initially absorb or belent X'F. Heat sources inside the MCR include operator

,- ~ orkstations, w emergency 11ghting and occu> ants. Sufficient l 73 insulatica is provided surroundias the Mct pressure boundary -

to preserve the minima required therenal capacity of_ the i heat sink. The insulation also limits the wat gain fros l the adjoining areas following the loss of VBS cooling.

i (continued) l AF600 8 3.7 26 08/97 Amendment 0

(

Lp0, 3 Nf " b

. 1

- ..,............_-,,..n.....,,,,,,a

B 3.7.6 s ' '~f ~ r " .-l k L ,-^ 2 ."

":! C ]~

8ASES el&& 7lR W + :_ : = t 4 41:". .

BACKGROUW -!f the = r-95 uneveil:M;-fell 2 6g the-7E-Wr Wetoc (contin y--

_ .gK-, ef tM "2 2 i: uMe.g n:rt: tie cir :::M s; Mgp The compressed air storage tanks are initially pressurized

< @NM to 3400 psig. During peration of the VES. a self contained w /r /Ja t$5 is autta,Alh )ressure regulating va ve maintains a constant downstream

>ressure regardless of the upstrean pressure. An orifice M /** #W 7Alnw3 M, j

lownstream of the regulating valve is used to control the khi/ahi/,/ is sNiet/ng Inch tir flow rate into the ER. The ER is maintained at a 1/8 Ag/Y water ga positive pressure to minioize the e m. 0 /u /r!M' infiltration o airborne contaminants from the surrounding p s Ila m) f M lv ,sq p & O h c

MNN APPLICABLE M r:idnt r com>ressed air storage tanks are sized SAFETY ANALYSES such tha 4eeWset of tants has a combined capacity that

(//fM trw provide t least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of VES operation. <

I Oper tion of the VES is automatically initiated by either of ;

two safety related signals: 1) undervoltage to Class 1E l battery charger, or 2) high 2 particulate or iodine !

, radioactivity. -

l In the event of a loss of all AC power, the VES functions to j provide ventilation, pressurization. and cooling of the ER pressure boundary.

In the event of a high level of gaseous radioactivity outside of the ER, the VBS continues to operate to provide pressurization and filtration functions. The HCR air supply downstream of the filtration units is monitored by a safety '"C

+

related radiation detector. Upont: -

jM gf s u-tr=lt:;- te Clas: 1E Mtteay cwW::*~' :high 2 particulate or iodine radioactivity setpoint. a safety related signal is generated to isolate the ER from the VBS I

and to initiate air flow free tne VES sto e tanks.

Isolation of the VB5 consists of Pety related fM .4ampose in the supply and exhaust hat penetrate the MCR pressure boundar . VES air initiated by a safety related signa which opens the isolation valves in the VES supply lines.

The VES functions to sitigate a DBA or transient that either asstmes the failure of or challenges the integrity of the fission product barrier.

(continued) i l

b AP600 8 3.7 27 08/97 Amendnent 0 410 . 3 MF- l

~

. . . . w. ... . .- -. p ~, . . u s eu i i i s y a y u B 3.7.6 BASES APPLICABLE The VES satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the NRC

SAFETY ANALYSES Policy Statement.

(continued)

LCO The VES limits the MCR temperature rise and maintains the MCR at a positive pressure relative to tha surrounding environment, b o.

T= i nds.4...; .c. ::f_ d::: VES 6eesse 4as. required to be OPERABLE *e :::r: ths. ;.: h;:' := h :nt' ebh. :::rin;

;in;'jU;ihr; di;Ok; the ethz +-9.-

CThe VES is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to deliver a supply of breathable air to the MCR are OPERABLE,fn4stemepWns. This includes components listed in SR 3.7.6.2 through 3.7.6.8. In addition, the MCR pressure boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, h

-e electrical and mechanical penetrations, and access doors.

APPLICABILITY The VES is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and during movement of irradiated fuel because of the potential for a fission product release following a 08A.

The VES is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 when irradiated fuel is not being moved because accidents resulting in fission product release are not postulated.

ACTIONS A.1 gg yg

,When one VES 4pe6* is inowrable action is required to (r restore tha.systerto OPELABLE tatus. A Com>letion Time of G days is pensitted to restore ths4sain to OUA8LE status before action sust be taken to reduce power. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on engineering judgment, considering the low probability of an accident that would result in a significant radiation release from the fuel, the low probability of not containing the radiation, and that the remaining tee 4a can provide the required capability.

Tw. VES AM L W:if PA-

$ fla. W (continued) 8 3.7 28 08/97 Amendment 0

@ AP60 __0 41o.318F-8

. na n svi... w . ~vi u i v. .w nevi wu i s i 6f synes B 3,7.6

, BASES ACTIONS 8.1

~

(continued)

When the main control room air temperature is outside the acceptable range during VBS operation, action is required to restore it to an acceptable range. A C letion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is permitted based upon the avai ability of ,

temperature indication in the MCR. It is judged to be a sufficient amount of time allotted to correct the deficiency in the nonsafety ventilation system before shutting down.

9.e !

If the MCR pressure boundary is damaged or otherwise degraded. action is required to restore the integrity of the pressure boundary and restore it to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . A Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is permitted based upon operating expeience. It is judged to be a* sufficient amount of time allotted to correct the deficicxy in the pressure boundary.

0.1 and 0.2 In MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 if Conditions A, B, oi C cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. This is done by entering MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

E.1 and E.2 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the 6-:;:::L % , 6. _ ::x;t k cxt;.;d iw ^^:"Ja; star- -

Required Actions A.1, B.1, or C.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the movement of fuel and core alterations must be sus . Performance of Required Action E.1 and E.2 shal not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe condition.

%MMkdM N F.1 tM-F.2, and F.3

.r.a.

If be e VES += W = inoperabl i MODES 1, 2, 3. or 4,

W the VES may not be capable of performing the intended function, and must be brought to MODE 4, where the probability consequences of an event are minimized, and M ene VES must be restored to OPERA 8LE status within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months , is is done by entering MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i and MODE 4 within Xhours.

I %. l (continued)

[4 L -

h -AP600 B 3.7 29 08/91 Amendnent 0 i m => = ,. , = = ,

~ . ,

I 8 3.7.6 BASES ,

ACTIONS G.1 and G.2 (continued) ;go During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies with awe VES taa4as inoperable, the Required Action is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might enter the MCR. This places the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 ejg REQUIREMENTS The MCR air temperature is checked at a frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to verify that the VBS is per orming as required to main +ain the initial condition temper ture assumed in the safet> analysis, and to ensure that MCR temperature will t exceed the required conditions er loss of VBS

..- coo .

N n sve111ance limit af M'EW *" --'- '

tp:;-. .. ; ;C :" ^^"I '...;'..! . &

M. fd4 .L 2* x "2

.t :r:::

.;rt:r.;;;The T.y. 24 hour Frequency is Q/F acceptable based on the availability of temperature indication in the MCR.

,,,M SR 3. 7. 6. 2' Verification every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months that ssed air storage is sufficient to gg6 LP' tanks are pressurized to (> 3400 ensure that there will be an adequate supply of breathable 7Q air to maintain MCR habitability for a wriod of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is based on tw availability of pressure indication in the MCR.

SR 3.7.6.3 VES air delivery isolation valves are required to be verified as OPERABLE. The Frequency required is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.7.6.4 VES air header isolation valves are recuired to be verified open at 31 day intervals. This SR is <esigned to ensure that the pathways for supplying breathable air to the MCR are available should loss of VBS occur. These valves shocid be closed only during required testing or maintenance of downstrees components, or to preclude complete depressurization of the systen should the VES isolation valves in the air delivery line open inadvertently or begin l to leak. (continued) ;

M AP600 B 3.7 30 08/97 Amendment 0 ll10.3 ??? f- !D

t

noin venu ve mua user viency nevuevo n,y aynes e.- .

B 3.7.6-BASES-SURVEILLAKE SR' 3.7.6.5 REQUIREMENTS ardve4-(continued) Verification that all VBS isolation dow4ees are operable and will actuate upon demand is required every 24 months to ensure that the ER can be isolated upon loss of VBS operation.

SR 3.7.6.6 Verification that each VES pressure relief isolation valve within the ER pressure boundary is OPERABLE is required in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The SR is used in combination with SR 3.7.6.7 to ensure that adequate vent area is available to mitigate ER overpressurization.

SR 3.7.6.7 Verification that the VES pressure relief damper is OPERABLE is required at 24 month intervals. The SR is used in

+

combination with SR 3.7.6.6 to ensure that adequate vent area is available to sitigate ER overpressurization.

SR 3.7.6.8 j b Verification of the operability of t if. contained pressure regulating valve in each VES is required in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This is done to ensure that a sufficient supply of air is provided as required.-and that uncontrolled air flow into the ER will not occur.

SR 3.7.6.9 This SR requires the performance of a systes perforance test of the VES to verify MCR pressurization can.bilities.

The systes performance test demonstrates that tw ER pressurization assumed in dose analysis is maintained.

Although the likelihood that system performance would degryg.when time is low, it is considered prudent to perlocically verify systen performance. The Systee Level Operability Testing Progras provides specific test requirements and acceptance criteria.

SK S. 7. 4,10

<& 5+

b >

(continued) 4to . 3 ?p f-H h AP600 8 3.7 31 08/97 Amendnent 0

i .;- 4

_ :;)

48%

-; # 4

.y , i

' Insert DO:for-SR'3.7.6.9-(bases)

~

~ ? Verification that:the: emergency air storage' tanks;contains:

' breathable :; quality air - is ; required -- on : a - quarterly-- basis . __ ThislSR=

-ensures that-the: air is.-suitable'for breathing purposes ~and that--

,-no degradation ofq-. air in the emergency; air: storage. tanks has occurred, q

L i

I u

310. 3 ?bFr/ 3

rum wm vi avum cmrwncy neottant itty system

. . B 3.7.6 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. AP600 SSAR. Section 6.4. ' Main Control Roon Habitability Systems.*

2. AP600 SSAR. Section 9.4.1. ' Nuclear Island Non. Radioactive Ventilation Systes.'

3. SECY 95132. ' Policy and Technical Issues Associated With The Regulatory Treatment of Non Safety Systems (RTHSS) In Passive Plant Designs (SECY.94 086).' Hay 22.

1995.

Y ASHME SindaAd 62-HF), "\ftdLhe,, gg heaplable Tdut AM qwtf@, "

i .

I e

h ,_AP60,.0... ,

83.732 08/97 Amendient 0 4/o. 5 76f ' 3

3

, o o

e

'e NRC PSER OPEN ITEM f""""

Question: 1410.379F (OITS #6297)

SSAR Table 15.6.5 2 Provides the MCRE volume and matimum urifiltered air in leakage (infiltration) rates as follows De main control room envelope (MCRi!) volume is 1010 91 m8 (35,700 ft'). ne maximum unfiltered air in. leakage (infiltration)into the MCRE under accident conditions is 0.00117 0.00233 m'/sec (2.5 5.0 cfm) when the VES is operating. De maximum unfiltered air in leakage (infiltration)into the MCRE during a "high" gaseous radioactivity signal while the VBS 16 operating is 0.066 m%c (140 cfm). The AP600 design features such as a vestibule style entrance preventing contamir.ated air from entering the MCR envelope as a result ot' egress and ingress, and maintaining the MCRE at positive pressure, with respect to surrounding areas, are not uncommon. His design is quite prevalent at operating reactors and those reactors show comparatively much larger amounts (i.e.,

hundreds of cfm) of unfiltered in leakages as has been detertr.ined by a tracer gas testing method. Non safety-related ductwork and as6ociated equipment routed through the MCRE, such as the AP600 VBS design, :an provide pathways for unfiltered in. leakage of contaminated alt from outside the MCR envelope, and can also helps to provide a false indication of pressuriration of the MCRE. Pressuritation testing measurements do not asst e that the MCRE is at a uniform positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas because pockets it, the MCRE m sy be at a negative or lower positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas and thus provide pathways for relatively larger amounts of sdditional unfi!!ered in leakage than assumed in dose calculations for postulated design basis accident conditions.

Derefore Westinghouse should validate the VES design. One of the acceptable methods of validation is testing in accordance with ASTM E741, " Standard Test Method for Determining Air Leakage Rate by Trace: Dilution."

- Westinghouse needs to validate the VES design for the MCRE by tracer testing or its eqo. valent and revise SSAR Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1, and the VES Surveillance Requirements of Chapter 16 Technical Specifications.

Response

Westinghouse does not believe that tracer gas testing is needed or required for the AP600 plant to validate the VES design. The statement made in the Open item 410.379f that "Non safety related ductwork and associated equipment routed through the_MCRE, such as the AP600 VilS design, can provide pathways for unlittered inleakage of contaminated air from outside the MCR envelope, and can also helps to provide a false indication of pressurization of the MCRE" is incorrect.

As stated in SSAR subsection 9.4.1.2.1.1,"De supply, return, and toilet enhaust are the only HVAC penetrations in the main control room envelope and include redundant safety related seismic Category I isolation valves that are physically located within the main control room envelope" specifically shows this statement to be incorrect.

Validation of the VES design is accomplished via the MCR pressuriration testing, To accomplish this testing, differential pressure monitors are provided in both the VBS and VES desi ns, and are used to confirm that a 1/8 in

- water gauge diffenential exists between the MCRE and adjacent areas, including the outside environment. A systematic evaluation of MCR pressurization was previously provided to the NRC in Attachment I of DCP/NRC1071 on October to,1997. Please refer to this evaluation for ccafirmation as to how there would be o lower pressure pockets with respect to adjacent areas and for the specifics on monitoring the differential pressure in adjacent areas.

410.379F 1 g

1

l

q. e: .f l'

).. ,

i e NRC FSER OPEN ITEM t F-I L

Regarding instrumentation available to assure adquate monitoring, there are five instruments in the VBS system l which provide differential pressure information between the MCR and the areas outside the MCR. and there are two j instruments in the VES system, which also provide differential pressure information between the MCR and areas i outside the MCR.

SSAR' Revisions: None, 1 l

-t t

a r

t i

i 410.379F 2 gg

7 a Q l,

NRC FSER OPEN ITEM l

Question: 410.380F (OlTS #6298)

Pre operational testing is discussed in Chapter 14 of this report. The staff has determined that the air quality reference to Appendix C. Table C 2 of ASilRAE Standard 62,is not acceptable. Ilowever, conformance with both, Appendix C, Table C l and Table I of ASilRAE Standard 62, is acceptable, nerefore, Westinghouse needs to revise pre operational inspection and testing requirernents of Chapter 14 for the VES and VBS to include the alove.

criteria to validate the VES air quality of the ernergency air storage tanks and air quality of the air supplied from the CAS.

Response

Revision 17 of SSAR subsection 14.2.9.1.6 includes references regarding test prerequisites for air quality in the emergency air storage tanks by stating "De mea control room air supply tanks are Alled with air acceptable for breathing" in addition to item e) of the General Test Acceptance Criteria and Methods by specifying that " periodic gras samples will be taken of the control room air environment for a sufficient time to confirm that specified limits would not he exceeded for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ". Consistent with other chapter *

secti>ns, specific acceptance criteria is not supplied. Ilowever. Section 6.4 provides the specific criteria used provided in the various open item responses.

Therefore, no markups of subsection 14.2.9 l.6 are provided.

SSAR Revisions: None, ea- 410.380F 1 W-

NSD-NRC-97-5505, Forwards W Responses to FSER Open Items Re AP600.NRC Should Review Encl Table & Inform W of Status to Be Designated in NRC Status Column of Oits

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NSD-NRC-97-5505, Forwards W Responses to FSER Open Items Re AP600.NRC Should Review Encl Table & Inform W of Status to Be Designated in NRC Status Column of Oits

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