|
---|
Category:Memoranda
MONTHYEARML23044A3662023-02-15015 February 2023 Calendar Year 2022 Reactor Oversight Process Baseline Inspection Program Completion - Region III ML22300A0842022-11-10010 November 2022 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (Ptlr), Revision 8 ML21349A1062021-12-15015 December 2021 Justification for the Deviation from MRP 2019-008, Technical Evaluation 635273 ML21277A2472021-11-0505 November 2021 Notification of Significant Licensing Action - Proposed Issuance of Order Approving the Transfer of Licenses for Which a Hearing Has Been Requested - Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Et. Al ML20155K6862020-11-23023 November 2020 Memo to File: Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact and NRC Financial Analysis for Exelon Corporation LLC Decommissioning Funding Plan Submitted in Accordance with 10 CFR 72.30(b) and (C) for Braidwood ISFSI ML17335A0442017-12-0404 December 2017 Tvel Lead Test Assembly 3rd Closed Meeting ML17142A2382017-05-25025 May 2017 OEDO-17-00280 - Briefing Package for Drop-In Visit on June 9, 2017, by Senior Management of Exelon Generation Company, LLC with Chairman Svinicki, Commissioner Baran, and Commissioner Burns ML16236A2022016-08-24024 August 2016 Backfit Appeal Review Panel Findings Associated with Byron and Braidwood Compliance ML16088A2042016-03-28028 March 2016 Memo T Bowers from s Ruffin, Technical Assistance Requests - Review 2015 Tri-Annual Decommissioning Funding Plans for Multiple Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations W/ Encl 2 (Template) ML16088A2052016-03-28028 March 2016 Enclosure 1 - (72.30 DFP Reviews to Be Completed 2015) - Memo T Bowers from s Ruffin, Technial Assistance Requests - Review 2015 Tri-Annual Decommissioning Funding Plans for Multiple Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML16082A5422016-03-25025 March 2016 Backfit Review Panel Recommendation Regarding Exelon Appeal of Backfit Affecting Braidwood and Byron Stations Regarding Compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(b), GDC 15, GDC 21, GDC 29, and the Licensing Basis ML16074A3232016-03-21021 March 2016 Forthcoming Meeting with Exelon Nuclear ML16075A3292016-03-16016 March 2016 OEDO-16-00165 - Briefing Package for Drop-In Visit on March 23, 2016, by Senior Management of Exelon Generation Company, LLC with the NRC Executive Director for Operations ML16070A3622016-03-15015 March 2016 03/07/2016 Summary of Public Meeting Between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff and Exelon Generation Company, LLC to Discuss an Appeal of a Compliance Backfit ML15336A0172016-01-20020 January 2016 Renewal of Full-Power Operating License for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 ML15355A0812016-01-12012 January 2016 Backfit Review Panel Charter Regarding December 8, 2015, Exelon Appeal of Imposed Backfit Affecting Braidwood and Byron Stations ML15253A9132015-09-11011 September 2015 ACRS Full Committee - Corrections to the Aging Management Programs Table ML15187A3272015-07-13013 July 2015 Request for ACRS Review of Byron Braidwood SER ML15051A3612015-03-0303 March 2015 02/05/2015 Summary of Telephone Conference Call No 2 Held Between the NRC and Exelon Generation Co., LLC Concerning Request for Additional Information, Set 45, Pertaining to the Byron, and Braidwood, License Renewal Application ML14317A5432014-11-17017 November 2014 Federal Register Notice Regarding the ACRS Plant License Renewal Subcommittee Meeting (Braidwood/Byron), December 3, 2014 ML14205A5752014-08-11011 August 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on June 10, 2014, Between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Fire Water System Request for Additional Information Responses Pertaining to Byron Station. ML14227A1092014-07-0909 July 2014 Bryron, Units 1 & 2 - Imposition of Facility-Specific Baskfit Compliance with Licensing Basis Plant Design Requirements ML14177A4302014-07-0202 July 2014 06/23/2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Between NRC and Exelon Generation Co., LLC, Concerning the Byron and Braidwood, License Renewal Application (TAC Nos. MF1879, MF1880, MF1881 and MF1882) ML14148A3882014-06-0505 June 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on May 19, 2014, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Draft Request for Additional Information, Set 28, Pertaining to the Byron Station and Br ML14126A5432014-05-19019 May 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on April 22, 2014, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Draft Request for Additional Information, Set 24, Pertaining to the Byron Station and ML14092A4402014-05-14014 May 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on March 19, 2014, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Draft Request for Additional Information, Set 18, Pertaining to the Byron Station and ML14107A2262014-05-14014 May 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on March 26, 2014, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Draft Request for Additional Information, Set 21, Pertaining to the Byron Station and ML14085A1102014-04-30030 April 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on March 24, 2014 Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Braidwood Station, License Renew ML14092A3562014-04-15015 April 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on March 31, 2014 Between the U.S. NRC and Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Braidwood Station, License Renewal Application ML14069A3372014-04-0202 April 2014 Final Response to Task Interface Agreement 2012-13, Braidwood Station Technical Specification 3.6.3 Compliance with One or More Main Steam Isolation Valves Inoperable ML12194A5002014-03-31031 March 2014 Final TIA Response Byron Braidwood Single Spurious Assumption ML14064A4032014-03-11011 March 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call on February 27, 2014, Between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission & Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Draft Request for Additional Information Re Byron Station & Braidwood Station License Renewal ML14058B1802014-03-11011 March 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call on February 18, 2014, Between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission & Exelon Generation Company, LLC Concerning Draft Request for Additional Information Regarding Byron & Braidwood Stations, License Renewal ML14036A3102014-03-0404 March 2014 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on January 28, 2014, Between NRC and Exelon, Concerning RAI Set 10, for the Byron and Braidwood Station, LRA ML14063A1742014-01-28028 January 2014 Making Non-Concurrence NCP-2013-014 Public Available ML13267A0802013-12-0909 December 2013 Reactor Systems Branch Safety Evaluation Input to Byron Station Units 1 and 2 and Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Update ML13303B4632013-11-25025 November 2013 Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on October 22, 2013, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Concerning RAI Set 3 for the Byron-Braidwood LRA ML13246A4342013-09-27027 September 2013 09/28/2013 Meeting Summary of Public Scoping Meetings Conducted Related to the Review of the Braidwood Station, Unit 1 and 2, License Renewal Application ML13246A0162013-09-0404 September 2013 Notice of Forthcoming Teleconference Meeting with Exelon Generation Company, LLC to Discuss Future Submittal of License Amendment Request to Clarify Braidwood Nuclear Station Technical Specification 5.5.16 ML13193A3612013-08-0505 August 2013 08/21/2013 Forthcoming Meeting to Discuss the License Renewal Process and Environmental Scoping for Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Braidwood Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 ML13190A3522013-07-10010 July 2013 Notice of Forthcoming Teleconference with Exelon Generation Company, LLC ML13094A0922013-04-0404 April 2013 Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Exelon Generation Company, LLC to Discuss Future Submittal of a License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specifications for the Main Steam Isolation Valves & Their Actuators ML13014A7652013-02-0404 February 2013 03/20/2013 Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Exelon Corporation Regarding License Renewal Application for the Byron and Braidwood Nuclear Power Stations ML12348A6962012-12-17017 December 2012 1/3/2013 - Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Exelon Generation Company, LLC, to Discuss Requests for Additional Information Regarding Exelon Physical Security Plans ML1208602902012-03-26026 March 2012 Notice of Forthcoming Public Meeting with Exelon Generation to Discuss Future Fleet Submittal Regarding Licensed Operator Eligibility Requirements ML1120104142011-07-21021 July 2011 Staff Review of Braidwood Nuclear Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Physical Security Plan and Verification of ASM Incorporation ML1110906502011-05-0505 May 2011 Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Exelon Generation Company, LLC Pre-Application Meeting to Discuss Proposed Amendment Uncertainty Recapture (Mur) Power Uprate License Amendment Request for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2 and Byron, Units 1 ML11132A1292011-03-17017 March 2011 Transmittal of Ihpb Safety Evaluation, Byron, Units 1 and 2, Braidwood, Units 1 and 2, License Amendment Request Regarding Low Temperature Overpressure Protection and Loss of Decay Heat Removal ML1100502522011-02-0909 February 2011 Memo to Chairman Jaczko Fm R. W. Borchardt, EDO Initiatives for Improved Communication of Groundwater Incidents ML1030702392010-11-0303 November 2010 Notice of Category 3 Public Meeting NRC Roundtable Discussion with NRC Commissioner William Magwood, IV 2023-02-15
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARBW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form ML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood RS-23-056, Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 102023-04-20020 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 BW220062, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (Ptlr), Revision 92022-10-20020 October 2022 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (Ptlr), Revision 9 NMP1L3469, Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits2022-06-30030 June 2022 Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML21349A1062021-12-15015 December 2021 Justification for the Deviation from MRP 2019-008, Technical Evaluation 635273 BW210065, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 82021-10-27027 October 2021 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 8 RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-093, R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2021-09-0101 September 2021 R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections BW210047, ER-BR-330-1008, Revision 0, Snubber Program Plan for the Fourth 10-Year Interval2021-06-30030 June 2021 ER-BR-330-1008, Revision 0, Snubber Program Plan for the Fourth 10-Year Interval RS-21-056, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld2021-05-12012 May 2021 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld RS-21-001, Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping2021-01-0404 January 2021 Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping RS-20-154, Application for Revision to TS 5.5.9, Steam Generator (SG) Program for a One-Time Deferral of Steam Generator Tube Inspections2020-12-16016 December 2020 Application for Revision to TS 5.5.9, Steam Generator (SG) Program for a One-Time Deferral of Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML20195B1622020-06-30030 June 2020 Attachment 11 - SG-SGMP-17-25-NP, Revision 1, Foreign Object Limits Analysis for the Byron and Braidwood Unit 2 Steam Generators June 2020 ML19228A0232019-08-15015 August 2019 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-879 ML18348A9792018-12-14014 December 2018 Transmittal of 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report ML18348A9722018-12-12012 December 2018 Submittal of Analytical Evaluation in Accordance with ASME Code Section XI RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 RS-16-223, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-12-0707 December 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-16-174, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...2016-11-0303 November 2016 High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review... ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML16356A0202016-10-0707 October 2016 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17360A1742016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6: Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations (Non-Proprietary) RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-099, Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal2016-06-30030 June 2016 Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal ML16250A5182016-04-30030 April 2016 Technical Evaluation Report Related to the Exelon Generation Company, LLC, License Amendment Request to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink. Docket Nos. Stn 50-456 & 457 RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-16-057, Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds2016-03-15015 March 2016 Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds ML16014A1882016-01-22022 January 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights ML15344A1592015-12-10010 December 2015 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 8 and Braidwood, Unit 2 - Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 7 ML15322A3172015-11-18018 November 2015 Record of Decision ML15237A3822015-10-15015 October 2015 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate RS-15-259, Final Report: Five Year Post-Construction Monitoring of the Unionid Community Near the Braidwood Station Kankakee River Discharge.2015-09-30030 September 2015 Final Report: Five Year Post-Construction Monitoring of the Unionid Community Near the Braidwood Station Kankakee River Discharge. RS-15-129, Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 20152015-04-30030 April 2015 Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 2015 ML14349A6572014-12-15015 December 2014 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Paragraph (d)(2), Summary Report RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application RS-14-277, Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 12014-09-24024 September 2014 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1 ML14141A1332014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14178B2222014-06-24024 June 2014 Technical Review of TIA 2013-02, Single Spurious Assumptions for Braidwood and Byron Stations Safe-Shutdown Methodology ML14101A4452014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (Tac No. MF0095) ML14101A3522014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14127A1742014-05-0707 May 2014 Startup Report for the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses 2023-04-20
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARBW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form ML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML21349A1062021-12-15015 December 2021 Justification for the Deviation from MRP 2019-008, Technical Evaluation 635273 RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 RS-16-174, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...2016-11-0303 November 2016 High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review... RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-099, Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal2016-06-30030 June 2016 Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML16014A1882016-01-22022 January 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights ML15344A1592015-12-10010 December 2015 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 8 and Braidwood, Unit 2 - Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 7 ML15322A3172015-11-18018 November 2015 Record of Decision ML15237A3822015-10-15015 October 2015 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate RS-15-129, Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 20152015-04-30030 April 2015 Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 2015 ML14349A6572014-12-15015 December 2014 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Paragraph (d)(2), Summary Report RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application ML14141A1332014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14101A4452014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (Tac No. MF0095) ML14101A3522014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14127A1742014-05-0707 May 2014 Startup Report for the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses ML14066A4792014-03-0404 March 2014 Clarification of Licensing Basis Assumptions for a Natural Circulation Cooldown Event ML14059A1242014-02-28028 February 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs) IR 05000272/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000456/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML13008A2192013-01-31031 January 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000454/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000461/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000237/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000373/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000289/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000254/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000277/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000219/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000352/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML12349A3632012-12-14014 December 2012 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report for June 19, 2010 Through June 18, 2012 ML12339A2172012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 1 of 5 ML12339A2182012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-002, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 2. Part 5 of 5 ML12339A2192012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 2 of 5 ML12339A2202012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 3 of 5 ML12339A2212012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 4 of 5 ML12339A2222012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 5 of 5 2023-11-17
[Table view] |
Text
ATTACHMENT Braidwood Unit 1 Justification for the Deviation from MRP 2019-008, Technical Evaluation 635273
EC 635273 Page 1 of 4 Reason for Evaluation/Scope:
This evaluation supports a deviation from the "needed" Interim Guidance in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP) 2019-008 document. This evaluation is prepared in accordance with ER-AA-4003.
The evaluation applies to the IA Residual Heat Removal Suction line (1RC04AA) from the Reactor Coolant System Hot leg. The evaluation documents the acceptability of extending the inspection for the IA RH suction line welds/pipe/elbow from the Spring of 2021 (Al R22) to the Fall of 2022 (A 1R23) .
Background:
Materials Reliability Program (MRP) 2019-008, "Interim Guidance for NEI 03-08 Needed Requirements for US PWR Plants for Management of Thermal Fatigue in Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines", was issued April 1, 2019 (Reference 1). The requirements ofMRP 2019-008 shall be implemented within two refueling outages after August 1, 2019.
The Braidwood review of MRP 2019-008 and required actions are documented in Action Tracking Assignment 4236453-03 (Reference 4). Based on the results of this review, required Non-Destructive Examinations were scheduled for A 1R22 in the Spring of 2021 for Braidwood Unit 1. This schedule meets the MRP 2019-008 implementation requirement of"within two refueling outages after August l, 2019". Interim Qui dance 2 (102) from MRP 2019-008 applies to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps' suction lines from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot legs.
While reviewing the inspection reports in support of a Byron request and in preparation of sending the documentation to EPRI, it has been determined that the UT inspection for the 1A RH Suction line (1RC04AA) covered the 45-degree elbow and welds upstream of the branch line vertical drop from the A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot leg (welds lSI-02-47 and ISI-02-48) and not the 90~degree elbow and welds upstream ofthe first horizontal piping run (welds lSI-02-45 and lSI-02-46). IR4450126 has *
- been initiated to documents this issue.
IR 4450129 has been written to add the MRP 2019-008 inspection for the 1A RH Suction line from the A RCS Hot Leg to A1R23.
This discrepancy is considered a "deviation" from the MRP 2019-008 "Needed" requirements.
The complete list of components that have been inspected in response to MRP 2019-008 in A 1R22 (including the IA RH train) is below:
- High Head Safety Injection Lines 1RC30AA, AB, AC and AD - Weld to the RCS nozzle and piping base metal downstream of the SI8900A-D check valves.
- RHR Suction Lines l RC04AA - Piping Base metal and welds connected to the 45° elbow upstream of the first horizontal piping run from the RCS. This inspection does not meet the MRP 2019-008 requirements.
- RHR Suction Lines 1RC04AB - Piping Base metal and welds (Welds lRC-11-3 and lRC-11-4) co_nnected to the 90 6 elbow upstream of the first horizontal piping run from the RCS.
- Note-The branch lines have an RC Equipment Part Number for the first section of the line off the RCS pipe.
The results of the inspections do not show any evidence of thermal fatigue (Reference 9).
For Braidwood Unit 2 the inspections are scheduled for A2R22, October 2021. This schedule meets the MRP 2019-008 implementation requirement of within two refueling outages after August 1, 2019.
EC 635273 Page2 of4 Detailed Evaluation:
The operating experience (OE) from the MRP 2019-008 (Reference 1) is based on Westinghouse designed plants. Operating Experience reports document rejectable indications at the upstream elbow weld at the first elbow off the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction line. Subsequent thermocouple measurements indicated thermal cycling in the horizontal piping downstream of the elbow. This line had screened out ofMRP-146 (Reference 2) because the MRP-170 (Reference 3) analytical software .
predicted the horizontal portion of the piping stays hot (no stratification/destratification cycling expected).
Exelon will implement the MRP 2019-008 "Needed" action to inspect the lA RH Suction line for Braidwood Unit 1 in the Fall of 2022.
This extension does not result in negative consequences because:
- 1) Braidwood Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 3.4.13.1 requires that the RCS operational leakage be within limits by performance of RCS water inventory balance. In accordance with the Braidwood Surveillance Frequency Control Program, Surveillance Requirement 3.4.13.1 is required to be performed every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The Braidwood U-1 RCS leakage rate surveillance (Reference 5) is conservatively performed on a daily basis (Reference 6).
Although the Technical Specification limit for unidentified leak rate (ULR) is 1 gpm (Technical Specifications.3.4.13), the leak rate surveillance (Reference 5) includes action levels if the leak rate increases above baseline by a set factor. The current (As of 10/8/2021) baseline value for the Braidwood U-1 _ULR is 0.021 gpm. This value is significantly lower than the 1 gpm limit.
The Reference 5 leak rate procedure directs actions to identify the source ofleakage .. The capability to detect small RCS leakage allows taking actions before the potential degradation progresses to the point of challenging the structural integrity of the affected piping. This capability reduces the overall risk to the plant. .
- 2) The welds connected to the 90-degree elbow on the lA RHR suction line, lSI-02-45 and lSI 46, are within the scope of the Braidwood In-Service Inspection (ISI) Program. Weld lSI-02-45 has been inspected in A1R22 (Spring 2021) and weld lSI-02-46 has been inspected in AlR17 (Fall 2013). Neither exams documented any recordable indication (Reference 8A and 88).
These examinations could not be credited for MRP 2019-008 IG 2 requirements because they did not include the elbow base metal as shown in Figure 18 ofMRP 2019-008. Since the OE that was part ofMRP 2019-008 Interim Guidance 2 identified flaws in the welds only (Reference 9),
the ISI exams results provide confidence that Braidwood Unit 1 is not incurring similar degradation. *
- 3) The need for the MRP 2019-008 exams has been identified to determine if thermal fatigue indications are present in the stagnant piping due to the thermal cycling resulting from the proximity to the RCS Hot leg. The physical configuration between the 1,A and 1B RH suction piping from the RCS are very similar (Reference 11 and 12). The factthat the MRP 2019-008 exam was not done on the IA RH train welds does not raise concerns about thermal fatigue because the corresponding welds on the 18 RH train were inspected with no issues identified.
EC 635273 Page 3 of 4
==
Conclusion:==
The objective of the MRP 2019-008 interim guidance is to minimize the probability of thermal fatigue cracks that exceed allowable flaw dimensions in stagnant lines that are connected to the RCS. As discussed above, deferring the examination of the 1A RH Suction line from the 1A RCS Hot Leg by one cycle to AlR23 is not expected to pose significant risk to the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System for Braidwood Unit 1. MRP EPRI Programs owners have indicated that no flaws have been reported by nuclear plants in the United States that have performed these inspections and reported them, as required by MRP 2019-008 (Reference 13 ). Therefore, the deferral is acceptable.
EC 635273 Page 4 of 4
References:
- 1. MRP 2019-008 "Interim Guidance for NEI 03-08 Needed Requirements for US PWR Plants for Management of Thermal Fatigue in Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines",
Electric Power Research Institute, April 2019 (attached below)
- 2. MRP-146, "Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines", Revision 2, Electric Power Research Institute, September 2016
- 3. MRP-170 "Thermal Fatigue Evaluation per MRP-146, Version 1.0, "Electric Power Research Institute," April 2006
- 4. Exelon CAP Action Tracking Item 04236453-03
- 5. Braidwood Surveillance procedure IBwOSR 3.4. 13.1, "Unit One Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance Surveillance, Revision 40 *
- 6. Braidwood Surveillance Procedure 1BwOSR 0.1-1,2,3, "Unit One Modes 1,2 and 3 Shiftly and Daily Operating Surveillance", Revision 98
- 7. ~raidwood Surveillance Frequency Control Program Revision 30 8-. Sraidwood Station AlR22 ISi Non-Destructive Examination Reports for IA RH Suction Line:
a) AlR22-UT-014 (1RC04AA-12, Weld lSI-02-45) b) A1Rl7-UT-023 (1RC04AA-12, Weld lSI-02-46)
- 9. Braidwood Station Al R22 MRP 2019-008 Non-Destructive Examinations Reports:
(Pdffiles of these reports are embedded in the EC Scope section of EC 635273) _
a) 2021-UT-032 (1 RC30AA- l .5) .
b) 2021-VT-004 (1RC30AA-l.5) c) 2021-UT-033 (1RC30AB-l.5) *
- -e, d) 2021-VT-005 (1 RC30AB- 1.5) 202f-u-r~o34 c1ilC30Ac-1.sJ
- f) 2021-VT-006 (1 RC30AC-l .5) g) 2021-UT-035 (1RC30AD-l:5) h) 2021-VT-007 (1RC30AO-l.5) i) 2021-VT-008 (1RC04AA-12) j) 2021-VT~0l l (1RC04AA-12) k) 2021-VT~009 (IRC04AB-12) l) 2021-VT-010 (1RC04AB-12) m)
- AlR22-UT-032 (1RC04AB-12) n) A1R22-UT-033 (IRC04AB-12) o) AlR22-UT-025 (IRC04AA-12) p) AlR22-UT-031 (1RC04AA-12)
- 10. ML17338Al31, "Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units land 2-ReliefRequest REP-RHR~SWOL, Request for Approval of Alternate for Application for Full Structural Weld Overlay"
- 11. Isometric Drawing lSI-02, Revision F
- 12.
- Isometric Drawing l RC-11, Revision E
- 13. E-Mail with Exelon MRP Owner, October 6, 2021 m
ry!RP Owner Contact.pdf Embedded
Attachment:
MRP 2019-008:
MRP 2019-008.pdf
Attachment 13 - E-Mail with Exelon MRP Owner, October 6, 2021 RE: MRP 2019-008 Deviation EC - Braidwood U-1 A Tamburro, Peter.(Exelon Nuclear)
- To
- Pani,ci, Giovanni:(Exdon Nuclear}
(D You reptied to this messag,e on .10/6/2021 2:24 PM, Hey John This statement is based on telephone conversations I had with the MRP-146 EPRI program owners Bob McGill and Chris Wax.
They basically said that no utility has reported issues for MR:P 2019-008 inspection of there RHR elbows.
Embedded Attachment MRP 2019-008
~r.:::1r.=11
.,;;;;;;;;;.1-,~
IELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE MRP Materials Reliability Program_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MRP 2019-008 DATE: April 1, 2019 TO: PMMP Members
- MRP Research Integration Committee (RIC) Members MRP Pressure Boundary and Fatigue TAC Members FROM: David Czufin, TVA, PMMP EC Chair Brian Burgos, EPRI, MRP Program Manager .
SUBJECT:
Interim Guidance for NEI 03-08 Needed Requirements for US PWR Plants for Management of Thermal Fatigu~ in Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines ENCLOSURE:
- 1. Notification of Recent Thermal Fatigue OE Regarding Cross-Flow In-Leakage, December 15, 2017 (M~ 2017-026). . .
The purpose of this letter is to transmh NEI03-08 "Needed" Interim guidance regarding thermal fatigue cracking.
NEI 03-08 Needed Interim Guidance for Management of Thermal Fatigue Note: The requirements of this guidance shall be implemented within two refueling outages after August 1, 2019.". Results of the exams shall be reported to the EPRI MRP within six months after completion.
- IG# Interim Guidance Basis for Interim. Guidance 1 . DH lines previously exempted by the Generic The MRP 2015-019 (and subsequently, MRP-146 Rev. 2 Analysis option (i.e. R-Strat) described in Section 2.1.5.4) requires that sites.with DH lines evaluated MRP-.146, paragraph 2.1.5 .4 shall be using the MRP-146, Appendix A generic evaluation complete inspected every other RFO if all the following a one-time examination and report the results to MRP. If*
conditions are true: cracking is then identified on these lines and the cause evaluation is unable to identify and mitigate the cause, then it a) cracking has been identified should be conservatively assumed that a degradation mechanism is present. Therefore, a routine exam is justified b) the cause of the cracking could not be consistent with other MRP-146 screened-in DH lines.
identified and mitigated / eliminated.
2 For those large bore(> 4") DH lines that During a 2016 risk-informed in-service inspection of a 14" previously screened-out as "HOT" (p~r MRP- RHR Suction line (Class 1 piping), a weld flaw extending 146) a one-time examination of the piping at 24% of through-wall was identified by ultrasonic testing. This the first 45-degree (or 90-degree) elbow is flaw was located in the Heat Affected Zone of the pipe to 45-Together ... Shaping the Future of Electricity PALO ALTO OFFICE 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304* 1338 USA
- Customer Service 800.313.3774
MRP 2019-008 Pg. 2 of 6 IG# Interim Guidance Basis for Interim Guidance required (as represented on Figure IA). As a degree elbow weld on the upstream end of the elbow. This minimum, the inspection volume shall include pipe line previously was exempt from examination since it the base metal and welds represented in was screened out as "HOT" per MRP-146 guidelines and Figure 18. .MRP-170 software. Using an array of thermocouples at the flaw location and at additional downstream locations, high-Note: credit may be taken for previous exam frequency temperature oscillations were recorded at 100%
if: power operations. An extent-of-condition examination on the
- Previous exam volume requirements sister unit in Spring 2017 revealed a similar (though less bound those of this IG extensive) crack depth in a similar location.
Sample RH.R Hot Leg Suction Line - See Figure 1 3 Sites shall review MRP-146 "screened" out From MRP-146 Rev. 2, Section 2.1.1, it is possible that a UH/H lines to determine susceptibility to in- UH/H branch line previously screened out of MRP-146 leakage from cross-flow. To perform this because no high pressure source(> RCS pressure) is present; determination, interconnected lines, or lines however, such lines could still be susceptible to in-leakage sharing a common header, with only check- from cross-flow iftne following two conditions exist:
v.alve isolation between RCS loops, shall be a) The Loop branch lines are interconnected via "screened-in" as potentially susceptible to in-*
a common header, AND leakage/ cross-flow. For those new b) A differential pressure exists between the "screened-in" lines a one-time inspection interconnected RCS loops.
shall be performed using the volumetric requirements ofMRP-146 Rev. 2 (Figure 2.-
Reference Enclosure 1- MRP letter 2017-026 for more 11 through Figure 2-14, as applicable) and as background.
amended by 1G #4 below.
Note: credit may be taken for previous exam if:
- Previous exam volume requirements bound those of this 1G 4- Future fatigue examinations of the bottom For the Boron Injection leakage event at a 4-loop inner third thickness of base metal as Westinghouse-designed plant in 2017, the Metallurgical indicated in Figure 2-20 of MRP-146, Rev. 2 Examination showed cracking extending beyond the 1/2" shall be l" wide. width bottom dead center, as indicated in Figure 2 below.
Therefore, TFFG recommends an increase to l" width.
See Figure 2 below.
MRP 2019-008 Pg. 3 of6 Figure 1B: I.G. #2 Sample Hot Leg RHR Suction Line uction sssteel ro HHH :~ucl:ion IG #2: Includes this upstream weld; UT the adjacent base -
metal per Figure 2*18 ed of MRP-146 Rev. 2.
1G #2: Also includes the existing MRP-146 elbow volume and downstream weld per Figure 2-15 of MRP-146 Rev. 2; UT the adjacent Figure lA: I.G. #2 Sample Hot Leg RHR Suction Line base metal pe( Figure 2-18 of MRP-146 Rev. 2.
1/2to1" SecUonA~A Figure 2: lG #4 Examination Volume Width Increase to 1 loch
Background
Management of fatigue resulting from the interaction of thermally stratified fluids in reactor coolant system piping was first recognized in operating experience during the 1980s. Industry response to management of this fatigue mechanism was based on a combination of testing, analysis and operating experience (OE) assessments. This work resulted in development of thermal fatigue management guidelines including [2] & [3].
In* response to numerous OE during the period 2013-2015, the MRP established a Thermal Fatigue Focus Group (TFFG) in 2015 to evaluate OE and determine if interim guidance was needed. MRP subsequently issued interim guidance via [4] and the portions of that guidance applicable to MRP-146 have since been incorporated into MRP-146 [2] in 2016.
In 2017 MRP 1ssued letter MRP 2017-26 [ 1], included as Enclosure 1, which informed PMMP and MRP RIC members of Recent Thermal fatigue OE Regarding Cross-Flow In-Leakage.
Whereas, cross-flow in-leakage is not new, being described in Section 1.0 of[5], Section 2.1.5 of [8], and Section 3.4.2 [l O], it was thought to only be limited to periods of heat up/cooldowns when less than full number of reactor coolant pumps was running; thus, cross-flow in-leakage was not expected during normal operation. The MRP letter also indicated the TFFG was evaluating additional OE (2016-2017) to determine if interim guidance was warranted.
MRP 2019-008 Pg. 4 of6 Consequently, this Interim Guidance letter communicates those findings. This added guidance is designed to minimize the probability of thermal fatigue cracks that exceed allowable flaw dimensions or result in forced or extended outages.
In parallel with this guidance, MRP Research Focus Area RF A 5.1 is seeking to improve MRP guidance using analytical CFO and Heat transfer analysis models validated against recent laboratory testing. Therefore, the TFFG is also tasked with identifying the research necessary to understand and effectively mitigate or manage the factors underlying the recent events. The recommended research is prioritized and managed by the appropriate Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and Integration Committee.
Operating Experience Evaluation Of the OE events summarized below, the TFFG has determined that four of these (highlighted) warranted additional interim guidance.
NEI 03-08 Needed IG Interim Guidance OE %T Inspection Req'd Reference and
- NSSS System location w Basis Config ? Bases (Enclosure 1)
Weld D/S YES RCS EOCfrom 1 W3 (Elbowto 58 DH Drain Ul (2014)
Pipe) IG#l N/A Met Lab results 3" Pipe to limited, but 2 W4 Charging 44 MRP-146 UH Nozzle inconclusive w.r.t.
NO Thermal Fatigue as cause.
RHR HL 14" Pipe to 3 W4 34 Sec XI DH YES Suction Elbow IG#2 Boron injection line 4 W4 SI leak N/A H SD bend YES IG #3 and 4 near RCS RHR HL 14" Pipe to EOCfrom 5 W4 14 DH YES IG#2 Suction Elbow DC2 Other Observations for Consideration As described above, each of the recent OE events was analyzed by the Thermal Fatigue Focus Group (TFFG) to identify actions to prevent thermal fatigue cracking from exceeding allowable limits or resulting in forced or extended outages. In addition to the IO, the following observations are provided for consideration by engineers responsible for management of thermal fatigue:
MRP 2019-008 Pg. 5 of6 A. Technical guidance and recommendations for proper and cost-effective maintenance of check valves is provided in NMAC Application Guide for Check Valves, NP-5479
[6] and EPRI Check Valve Maintenance Guide (Revision to TR-100857) [7].
- In one of the OE events back-leakage through check valves combined with loop differential pressure during normal operations caused cross-flow in-leakage as described in Reference [ 1].
- In another event, the apparent cause evaluation indicated a lift check valve (charging bypass line around isolation valve) was susceptible to leak by.
Either of these leakage scenarios prese!]._ts the potential for thermal fatigue cracking in the branch piping connecting to the RCS, Program owners are encouraged to take advantage of these resources.
B. Both units of another plant experienced rejectable weld indications at the upstream elbow weld at the first elbow off the RHR Suction Line. Subsequent thermocouple measurements have indicated thermal cycling in the horizontal piping downstream of the elbow. However, this line had screened out of MRP-: 146 because the MRP-170 analytical software predicted the horizontal portion of the piping stays hot (no stratification/destratification cycling expected). MRP Research Focus Area 5.1 .6 is performing additional research to establish improved guidance on RCS stagnant branch lines addressing this particular RHR suction line configuration, C. Use of Integrated Fatigue Management guidance as identified in MRP-148 [9] and the Fatigue Management Handbook, MRP-235 [10] are valuable tools to help manage fatigue degradation at operating units. In addition, Fatigue Management Handbook training materials are accessible to EPRI members via the training section of the EPRI MRP Cockpit. Program owners are encouraged to take advantage of these resources.
This information will be included in a future revision of MRP-146. If there are questions, please contact Paul Crooker, (650-855-2028, pcrooker@epri.com), or the undersigned.
David Czufin, TVA Brian Burgos, EPRI PMMP EC Chair MRP Program Manager
MRP 2019-008 Pg. 6 of6 REFERENCES
- 1. MRP Letter, MRP 2017-026, "Notification of Recent Thermal Fatigue OE Regarding Cross-Flow In-Leakage", December 15, 2017.
- 2. Materials Reliability Program: Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines (MRP-146, Revision 2, 3002007853), Final Report, September 2016
- 3. Materials Reliability Program: Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines - Supplemental Guidance (MRP-l46S, 1OJ 8330, January 2009
- 4. MRP Letter, MRP 2015-019, "Implementation ofNEI 03-08 Needed and Good Practice Interim Guidance Requirements for Management of Thermal Fatigue", May 28, 2015.
- 5. EPRI Report TR-103581, "Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping", March 1994.
- 6. NMAC Application Guide for Check Valves in Nuclear Power Plants, EPRI NP-54 79s, Rev. 1
- 7. EPRI Check Valve Maintenance Guide (Revision to TR-I 00857), October 2015
- 8. Operating Experience Regarding Thermal Fatigue of Piping Connected to PWR Reactor Coolant Systems, EPRI MRP-85, Rev. 1, October 2014.
- 9. Materials Reliability Program: Integrated Fatigue Management Guideline (MRP-148, Revision 1, 1025159, November 2012).
- 10. Materials Reliability Program: Fatigue Management Handbook (MRP-235, Revision 2, 3002005510, December 2015).
Enclosure to MRP 2019-008 Pg. 1 of 5
~~~, 1 ELECTRIC POWER a=1-1c;;;;;, RESEARCH !NST!TUTE MRP Materials Reliability Program _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MRP 2017-026 DATE: December 15, 2017 TO: PMMP Members MRP IC Members FROM: Terry Childress, Duke Energy Corporation, TS TAC Chair ElliotJ. Long, EPRI, Materials Reliability Program
SUBJECT:
Notification of Recent Thermal Fatigue OE Regarding Cross-Flow In-Leakage
REFERENCES:
- 1. Materials Reliability Program: Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-lsolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines (MRP-146, Revision 2). EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2016. 3002007853.
- 2. NEI 03-08, Rev. 3, Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues, Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC: February 2017.
- 3. Materials Reliability Program: Operating Experience Regarding Thermal Fatigue of Piping Connected to PWR Reactor Coolant Systems {MRP-85, Revision 1). EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2014. 3002003080.
- 4. Materials Reliability Program: Fatigue Management Handbook (MRP-235, Revision 2).
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2015. 3002005510.
The MRP Technical Support Advisory Committee is issuing this notification of recent operating experience (OE) in piping and components potentially exposed to thermal fatigue. This experience has revealed a source of in-leakage from cross-flow that has resulted in through-wall thermal fatigue cracking and a forced plant outage. This cross-flow in-leakage is mentioned, but not specifically addressed, in current EPRI Materials Reliability Program (MRP) guidance. Therefore, this OE is being provided to you for your awareness and consideration at your sites. Please ensure the appropriate site management at your plants are made aware of this OE.
Together ... Shaping the Future of Electricity PALO ALTO OFFICE 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304*1338 USA* 650.855.2000
- Customer Service 800.313.3774
Enclosure to MRP 2019-008 Pg. 2 of 5 There are no new Materials Initiative (NEI 03-08) requirements associated with this communication; such requirements may be issued later after relevant OE is collected and investigated and the MRP Thermal Fatigue Focus Group (TFFG) has further dialogue on the matter.
BACKGROUND MRP-146 [1] provides guidance and identifies "Needed" NEI 03-08 [2] requirements for the management of thermal fatigue in stagnant, non-isolable reactor coolant system (RCS) branch line~. For branch lines attached to the tops or sides of RCS piping, in-leakage (unintended fluid movement toward the RCS main loop) may interact with hot swirl penetration (generated from the RCS high speed flow) and result in thermal fatigue cycling. Typically, this in-leakage results from a leaking isolation valve that allows fluid from the charging system (high pressure source) to enter the stagnant safety injection system during normal operation (see Figure 1).
To eves CL1 CL2 CL3 (lso Valve)
CL4 CHARGING PUMPS Note: Some piping configurations only have single check valve isolation from the RCS.
Figure 1: Schematic of a PWR 4-Loop Safety Injection System with Leaking Isolation Valve Thermal cycling due to in-leakage can result in rapid thermal fatigue damage that can lead to crc;icking. Dampierre-1 (a F.rench PWR) experienced a through-wall leak in non-isolable safety injection piping attributed to swirl penetration and in-leakage in December 1996. After replacement in-kind of the affected piping, a follow-up examination in October 1997 revealed new thermal fatigue cracking of as much as 33% through-wall depth due to continued in-leakage. Refer to MRP-85 [3] on thermal fatigue OE in RCS piping for additional details.
Enclosure to MRP 2019-008 Pg. 3 ofS CROSS-FLOW IN-LEAKAGE CONDITION In February 2017, leakage was detected in the safety injection piping at McGuire Unit 2, which caused a forced plant shutdown. The cracking occurred in the non-isolable portion of the Loop 4 branch line near the intrados of a SD bend elbow. The affected line was managed under the plant's MRP-146 program, as it was susceptible to in-leakage. In fact, the line was previously replaced in Spring 2014 due to thermal fatigue cracking at the nozzle weld downstream of the elbow. No indications were found during a follow-on inspection during the Fall 2015 outage.
Subsequent investigation into the cause of the February 2017 through-wall cracking revealed another in-leakage source - cross-flow of reactor coolant into the affected Loop 4 safety injection branch line from one of the adjacent safety injection branch line (Loops 1, 2 or 3),
Cross-flow (or cross-leakage) can occur when there is a common header serving multiple trains of a system. If a slightly higher-pressure exists in the RCS loop, and any of the check valve(s) in adjacent loops of the connected piping are leaking, in-leakage may occur into one or more of the other RCS loops (see Figure 2).
If the CL 1 check valves allow leakage, and the pressure in CL 1 is greater than CL4, then in-leakage !nto CL4 may occur, as shown. TOCVCS CL1 lso Valve CL2 CL3 CL4 CHARGING PUMPS Note: Some piping configurations only have single check valve isolation from the RCS.
Figure 2: Schematic of Cross-Flow In-Leakage The cross-flow phenomenon is not new to the industry, but it has been observed under different circumstances. MRP-85 [3] and the EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook (MRP-235)
[4] both discuss cro~s-flow; however, it has typically only been seen during plant startup or cooldown when less than the full number of reactor coolant pumps are operating. The accompanying rise in static pressure in conjunction with a leaking check va_lve allows reactor coolant to flow from the loop with the idle RCP, through the check valve, and back toward the
Enclosure to MRP 2019-008 Pg. 4 of 5 other loops, resulting in potential thermal cycling in both the forward and reverse flow lines (see Figure 3). However, the number of cycles from this scenario is limited since this generally occurs only temporarily during startup or shutdown conditions when a RCP is idle and the available temperature difference is low.
Section 1.2 of MRP-146 [1] describes the same cross~flow condition that was seen at McGuire Unit 2 based on OE from D.C. Cook Unit 1 in 2015 where elevated temperatures were measured in their safety injection header1
- However, the MRP-146 screening criteria do not address the potential for cross-flow in-leakage and guidance is not provided on how to manage this specific thermal fatigue mechanism.
RCS COLD LEGS P1
-INLEAK P2 INLEAK P3 l
INLEAK P4>~
P4
---+
OUTLEAK Figure 3: Schematic of Cross-Flow Potential During Startup or Shutdown with Loop 4 RCP Idle 1 Note that, during their Fall 2017 refueling outage, D.C. Cook completed their MRP-146 examinations in the affected piping with no findings.
Enclosure to MRP 2019-008 Pg.SofS
SUMMARY
The purpose of this letter is to inform you of this specific OE that resulted in a forced plant shutdown earlier this year. The MRP TFFG is continuing deliberations on whether any interim guidance is necessary. Based on current industry knowledge, it is likelythat the TTFG will provide recommendations for stations to review their safety injection systems for the potential of cross-flow in-leakage and seek opportunities to mitigate risk at their facilities. Plant-specific investigations or augmented examinations may also be recommended.
If you or your team have any follow-up questions, or have any related plant-specific OE to share, please contact Paul Crooker, EPRI TFFG Lead (pcrooker@epri.com; 650-391-7057), Terry Childress, Chairman of the MRP Technical Support Advisory Committee (terry.childress@duke-energy.com, 704-382-5715) or Elliot J. Long, EPRI MRP Technical Support Advisory Committee Lead (elong@epri.com; 412-495-6659).
Sincerely, Terry Childress Elliot J. Long Chair, Technical Support TAC MRP Technical Support TAC Lead Duke Energy Corporation EPRI cc: MRP TAC Members