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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000456/20230042024-02-0202 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000456/2023004 and 05000457/2023004 ML24025C7242024-01-29029 January 2024 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000456/2024002; 05000457/2024002 IR 05000457/20230112024-01-25025 January 2024 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Diesel Fuel Oil Dilution Report 05000457/2023011 and Preliminary Greater than Green Finding and Apparent Violation ML24018A0362024-01-17017 January 2024 Paragon Energy Solutions, Defect with Detroit Diesel/Mtu Fuel Injectors P/N R5229660 Cat Id 0001390618 RS-24-004, Proposed Alternative to the Distribution Requirements of ASME Code Table IWC-2411-1 for the Steam Generators2024-01-11011 January 2024 Proposed Alternative to the Distribution Requirements of ASME Code Table IWC-2411-1 for the Steam Generators ML23348A2162023-12-15015 December 2023 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0030 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) IR 05000456/20200232023-12-15015 December 2023 Baseline Security Inspection Document; 05000456/2023/402; 05000457/2023/402 ML23277A0032023-12-11011 December 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Adoption of TSTF-370 ML23339A0452023-12-0505 December 2023 Request for Information for an NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal Inspection Report 05000546/2024010 ML23313A1552023-12-0101 December 2023 Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23331A8922023-11-22022 November 2023 Supplement - Braidwood Security Rule Exemption Request ISFSI Docket No. Reference 05000457/LER-2023-001, Submittal of LER 2023-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Inoperable Due to Degraded Oil in the Crank Case2023-11-17017 November 2023 Submittal of LER 2023-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Inoperable Due to Degraded Oil in the Crank Case ML23321A0442023-11-17017 November 2023 Notification of Deviation from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Topical Report MRP-227, Revision 1-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guideline RS-23-118, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023 Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums RS-23-114, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds2023-11-0101 November 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds IR 05000456/20234012023-10-18018 October 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000456/2023401 and 05000457/2023401 IR 05000456/20230102023-10-18018 October 2023 Functional Engineering Inspection Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000456/2023010 and 05000457/2023010 RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans RS-23-108, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles2023-10-11011 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles RS-23-105, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2023-10-10010 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections RS-23-093, License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel.2023-09-29029 September 2023 License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel. ML23226A0062023-09-19019 September 2023 Review of License Renewal Commitment Number 10 Submittal ML23180A1692023-09-11011 September 2023 Calvert Cliff Units 1 & 2, and R.E. Ginna Plant - Withdrawal of Proposed Alternatives to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Requirements (Epids L-2022-LRR-0074, 0076, 0079, 0091, 0092, 0093 and 0094) IR 05000456/20230052023-08-30030 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Braidwood Station Report 05000456/2023005 and 05000457/2023005 ML23234A2462023-08-25025 August 2023 Confirmation of Initial License Examination IR 05000456/20230022023-08-0303 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000456/2023002 and 05000457/2023002 ML23188A1292023-07-26026 July 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 233 and 233 Adoption of TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections, Revision 1 ML23087A0762023-07-13013 July 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 232 and 232 Revision of Technical Specifications for the Ultimate Heat Sink ML23191A8442023-07-10010 July 2023 05000456; 05000457 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and Request for Information ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III RS-23-083, Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators2023-06-27027 June 2023 Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23110A1152023-06-12012 June 2023 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related to a Requested Increase in Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature (EPID L-2023-LLA-0042) (Letter) RS-23-074, Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink2023-06-0909 June 2023 Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink RS-23-075, Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2023-06-0707 June 2023 Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process RS-23-050, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube.2023-05-22022 May 2023 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube. ML23138A1342023-05-18018 May 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Braidwood Station and Byron Station ML23132A0472023-05-12012 May 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report ML23130A0072023-05-10010 May 2023 Submittal of Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 24, Rev. 16 IR 05000456/20230012023-05-0808 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000456/2023001 and 05000457/2023001 ML23114A2522023-04-28028 April 2023 Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI ML23118A0202023-04-28028 April 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report ML23110A3202023-04-21021 April 2023 Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection RS-23-056, Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 102023-04-20020 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 RS-23-055, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2023-04-10010 April 2023 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML23095A1292023-04-0505 April 2023 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for Refueling Outage 23 ML23094A1352023-04-0404 April 2023 Request for Information for Nrc Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Inspection Report 05000456/2023010 05000457/2023010 RS-23-052, License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink2023-03-24024 March 2023 License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink RS-23-049, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-23023 March 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARBW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form ML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood RS-23-056, Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 102023-04-20020 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 BW220062, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (Ptlr), Revision 92022-10-20020 October 2022 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (Ptlr), Revision 9 NMP1L3469, Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits2022-06-30030 June 2022 Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML21349A1062021-12-15015 December 2021 Justification for the Deviation from MRP 2019-008, Technical Evaluation 635273 BW210065, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 82021-10-27027 October 2021 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 8 RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-093, R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2021-09-0101 September 2021 R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections BW210047, ER-BR-330-1008, Revision 0, Snubber Program Plan for the Fourth 10-Year Interval2021-06-30030 June 2021 ER-BR-330-1008, Revision 0, Snubber Program Plan for the Fourth 10-Year Interval RS-21-056, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld2021-05-12012 May 2021 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld RS-21-001, Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping2021-01-0404 January 2021 Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping RS-20-154, Application for Revision to TS 5.5.9, Steam Generator (SG) Program for a One-Time Deferral of Steam Generator Tube Inspections2020-12-16016 December 2020 Application for Revision to TS 5.5.9, Steam Generator (SG) Program for a One-Time Deferral of Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML20195B1622020-06-30030 June 2020 Attachment 11 - SG-SGMP-17-25-NP, Revision 1, Foreign Object Limits Analysis for the Byron and Braidwood Unit 2 Steam Generators June 2020 ML19228A0232019-08-15015 August 2019 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-879 ML18348A9792018-12-14014 December 2018 Transmittal of 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report ML18348A9722018-12-12012 December 2018 Submittal of Analytical Evaluation in Accordance with ASME Code Section XI RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 RS-16-223, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-12-0707 December 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-16-174, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...2016-11-0303 November 2016 High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review... ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML16356A0202016-10-0707 October 2016 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17360A1742016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6: Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations (Non-Proprietary) RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-099, Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal2016-06-30030 June 2016 Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal ML16250A5182016-04-30030 April 2016 Technical Evaluation Report Related to the Exelon Generation Company, LLC, License Amendment Request to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink. Docket Nos. Stn 50-456 & 457 RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-16-057, Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds2016-03-15015 March 2016 Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds ML16014A1882016-01-22022 January 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights ML15344A1592015-12-10010 December 2015 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 8 and Braidwood, Unit 2 - Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 7 ML15322A3172015-11-18018 November 2015 Record of Decision ML15237A3822015-10-15015 October 2015 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate RS-15-259, Final Report: Five Year Post-Construction Monitoring of the Unionid Community Near the Braidwood Station Kankakee River Discharge.2015-09-30030 September 2015 Final Report: Five Year Post-Construction Monitoring of the Unionid Community Near the Braidwood Station Kankakee River Discharge. RS-15-129, Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 20152015-04-30030 April 2015 Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 2015 ML14349A6572014-12-15015 December 2014 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Paragraph (d)(2), Summary Report RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application RS-14-277, Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 12014-09-24024 September 2014 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1 ML14141A1332014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14178B2222014-06-24024 June 2014 Technical Review of TIA 2013-02, Single Spurious Assumptions for Braidwood and Byron Stations Safe-Shutdown Methodology ML14101A4452014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (Tac No. MF0095) ML14101A3522014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14127A1742014-05-0707 May 2014 Startup Report for the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses 2023-04-20
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARBW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form ML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML21349A1062021-12-15015 December 2021 Justification for the Deviation from MRP 2019-008, Technical Evaluation 635273 RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 RS-16-174, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...2016-11-0303 November 2016 High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review... RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-099, Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal2016-06-30030 June 2016 Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment (Msfha) Submittal RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML16014A1882016-01-22022 January 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights ML15344A1592015-12-10010 December 2015 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 8 and Braidwood, Unit 2 - Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs), Revision 7 ML15322A3172015-11-18018 November 2015 Record of Decision ML15237A3822015-10-15015 October 2015 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate RS-15-129, Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 20152015-04-30030 April 2015 Westinghouse Report CCE-15-27, Revision 1, Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (Rai)Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase License Amendment Request, April 2015 ML14349A6572014-12-15015 December 2014 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Paragraph (d)(2), Summary Report RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application ML14141A1332014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14101A4452014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (Tac No. MF0095) ML14101A3522014-06-0404 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14127A1742014-05-0707 May 2014 Startup Report for the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses ML14066A4792014-03-0404 March 2014 Clarification of Licensing Basis Assumptions for a Natural Circulation Cooldown Event ML14059A1242014-02-28028 February 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Reports (Ptlrs) IR 05000272/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000456/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML13008A2192013-01-31031 January 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000454/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000461/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000237/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000373/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000289/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000254/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000277/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000219/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000352/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML12349A3632012-12-14014 December 2012 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report for June 19, 2010 Through June 18, 2012 ML12339A2172012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 1 of 5 ML12339A2182012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-002, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 2. Part 5 of 5 ML12339A2192012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 2 of 5 ML12339A2202012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 3 of 5 ML12339A2212012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 4 of 5 ML12339A2222012-11-16016 November 2012 12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 5 of 5 2023-11-17
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 4 , 2014 Mr. Michael J. Pacilio Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO)
Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville , IL 60555
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION , UNIT 2 - STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0095)
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Paragraph 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) . The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011 , Great T6hoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded , nonconforming , or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program , and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.
By letter dated November 27, 2012, as supplemented by letters dated January 6, 2014, and March 31 , 2014, Exelon Generation Company (Exelon) submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the Braidwood Station, Unit 2. By letter dated November 27, 2013, Exelon provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the staff to complete its assessments.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
M. Pacilio If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-6606 or by e-mail at Joei .Wiebe@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, oel S. Wiebe, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing 111-2 and Planning and Analysis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-456
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl : Distribution via Listserv
STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 050-457
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 2012,1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) , Paragraph 50.54(f)
(50.54(f) letter) , to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3:
Seismic," 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded , nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP) , verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC.
The 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following :
- a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation .
- b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process.
- c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them .
- d. Results of the walkdown including key find ings and identified degraded ,
nonconforming , or unanalyzed conditions.
- e. Any planned or newly installed protectiQn and mitigation features .
- f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.
In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic 1
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340 2
ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A049 Enclosure
walkdown process. By letter dated May 29, 2012, 3 the Nuclear Energy Institute submitted Electric Power Research Institute document 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, " (walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31 , 2012 ,4 the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance.
By letter dated November 27, 2012, 5 Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee) provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for Braidwood Station (Braidwood) , Unit 2. In addition to the aforementioned letter, the licensee by letter dated January 6, 20146 , provided an update to the initial seismic walkdown report. The purpose of the latter submittal was to update and provide information on inaccessible components and supplemtal cabinet inspections not completed in the first submittal. The licensee, by letter dated March 31 , 20147 , updated the seismic walkdown report to include several walkdown results not provided as part of the January 6, 2014 update.
The NRC staff reviewed the walkdown report and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the staff in completing its review. In a letter dated November 1, 20138 ,
the NRC staff requested additional information to gain a better understanding of the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys . The licensee responded to the NRC staff request by letter dated November 27, 2013.9 The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance, and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with , or meet the intent of, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2: "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena; " and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria. " GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami , and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions .
For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an SSC of a facility must perform, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design .
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The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.
The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with , and operation within ,
applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Information The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for Braidwood , Unit 2, in Section 2 of the walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance, the NRC staff noted that the report includes a summary of the safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) and a description of the codes , standards, and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements. The staff reviewed Section 2 of the walkdown report, focusing on the summary of the SSE and the design codes used in the design.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Section 8, Submittal Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.2 Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys ; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic walkdown methodology. By letter dated July 10, 2012, 10 the licensee confirmed that it would use the walkdown guidance in the performance of the seismic walkdowns at Braidwood, Unit 2.
The walkdown report dated November 27, 2012, and updated on January 6, 2014, and March 31, 2014, did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance.
The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report:
- Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs)
- Implementation of the Walkdown Process
3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 3 and Appendix A of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications.
Specifically, the staff reviewed the summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the following personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities: equipment selection personnel, seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers, IPEEE reviewers, peer review team , and operations staff.
Based on the review of the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate seismic background, knowledge and experience, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.2 Development of the SWELs Section 3, Selection of SSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel.
The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the Braidwood, Unit 2, base list, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool (SFP)-related equipment). The licensee stated that the process for selecting a sample of SSCs for safe shutting down the reactor and maintaining containment integrity began with IPEEE Success Path Equipment List (SPEL) . The IPEEE SPEL was then subjected to the screening process provided by the walkdown guidance to identify items to be included in SWEL 1.
The licensee provided the SWEL 1 for Braidwood, Unit 2, in Appendix B, Table B-3, of the walkdown report and discussed this list in Section 4.2 of the walkdown report. The SWEL 2 items are listed in Table B-4.
The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance as discussed above. Based on Appendix B of the walkdown report, Braidwood, Unit 2, SWELs 1 and 2, meets the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance. Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection:
- A variety of systems, equipment and environments,
- Major new or replacement equipment, and
It is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL due to individual plant configurations , and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not
being present in the plant (e.g ., some plants generate direct current power using inverters and, therefore , do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance).
Based on the information provided , the NRC staff noted that a detailed explanation was provided justifying cases where specific classes of equipment were not included as part of the SWEL and concludes that these exclusions are acceptable.
The NRC staff noted that a rapid drain-down list was not included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the guidance. In Section 4.2.2.4 of the walkdown report, the licensee stated there are no components that could, upon failure , result in rapid drain-down of the SFP water level to below 3 meters (1 0 feet) above the top of the fuel. After reviewing the information provided in this section, the staff concludes that the licensee provided adequate justification for not including rapid drain-down items as part of the SWEL 2.
After reviewing the SWEL, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby, meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance. In addition, the NRC staff notes that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as described in the walkdown guidance.
3.2.3 Implementation of the Walkdown Process Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site.
The NRC staff reviewed Section 5 of the walkdown report, which summarizes the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. The walkdown report states that teams, which consisted of two trained SWEs, conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. According to the signed seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walk-by checklists (AWCs), these activities were conducted during the week of July 30, 2012. In addition , a subsequent set of walkdowns were performed by the end of 2012, and throughout 2013, as referred to in the January 6, 2014, letter, from the licensee. The purpose of the last activity was to complete a number of items that were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns and to complete internal inspections on electrical cabinets. Several of the walkdown results were provided as part of this update. The complete set of walkdown results were provided as part of the second update submitted to the NRC on March 31 , 2014.
The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations and judgments with each other during the walkdowns . Additionally, the SWEs agreed on the results of their seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys before reporting the results of their review. Appendices C and 0 of the initial walkdown report, Appendices AC and AD of Annex A, and Appendices BC and BD of Annex B of the updated report, provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, documenting the results for each item of equipment on the SWELs and each area containing SWEL equipment. The licensee used the checklists provided in Appendix C of the walkdown guidance report without modification.
The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation . The licensee stated that none of the issues identified during the walkdowns were ultimately judged to be PASCs. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the walkdown report list the conditions identified during the initial seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys. Tables A5-2 , A5-3 , B5-2 and B5-3 of the updated report list the PASCs identified during the subsequent walkdowns . The tables describe how each condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP) , its resolution and current status.
Based on the initial review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in this table. By letter dated November 1, 2013, the staff issued two questions in a request for additional information (RAI) in order to obtain additional clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys. Specifically, in RAI 1, the staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation was determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In response to RAI 1, the licensee confirmed that all conditions identified during the walkdowns and walk-bys were documented as issue reports (IRs) in the Braidwood, Unit 2, CAP. The licensee referred to Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the initial walkdown report and Tables A5-2, A5-3, B5-2 and B5-3 of the updated walkdown reports , which include the IRs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys for Braidwood , Unit 2. In addition, the licensee stated that all identified nonseismic potentially adverse conditions , such as housekeeping and material conditions items, were identified by SWEs and addressed through the CAP. Furthermore, the licensee confirmed that, based on its review of Braidwood, Unit 2, walkdown process and the information submitted in the walkdown report, that no new conditions were identified that would require an additional supplement or additional CAP entries.
After evaluating the licensee's response and reviewing summary Tables 5-2, 5-3, A5-2 , A5-3, B5-2 and B5-3 of the walkdown reports, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1. In addition, the staff concludes that conditions, including any PASCs, were properly identified and documented, and the summary tables provided are considered complete.
In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50 percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance.
Tables E-1 and E-2 of the initial walkdown report, list equipment and areas that were inaccessible during the 180-day period. Table E-1 lists 18 SWEL components that were inaccessible at the time of the walkdowns due to a required outage, its respective completion date, and status.
Table E-2 lists those cabinets that were not internally inspected during the initial walkdowns.
Items identified in Tables E-1 and E-2 were walked down by the end of 2012, and during 2013, before the Spring 2014, comm itment. As confirmed by the January 6, 2014, letter, from the licensee, walkdown results were provided for most of these items. The walkdown results for several internal cabinet inspections were submitted to the NRC. As part of the March 31 , 2014, submittal.
Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded , nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance.
The NRC staff reviewed Section 6 of the Braidwood , Unit 2, walkdown report which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. The licensee stated that it performed licensing basis evaluations and resolved PASCs using the plant's CAP. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the intial walkdown report, and Tables A5-2, A5-3, B5-2 and B5-3 of the updated walkdown report, list the key licensee findings, and provide a complete list of the potentially degraded , nonconforming , or unanalyzed conditions . These tables also describe the actions taken or planned to address these conditions, including the current status of each of the items the licensee entered into the CAP.
The NRC staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken or planned to address potential deficiencies. The staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified degraded , nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations.
3.3 Peer Review Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns . Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process:
- Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs.
- Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.
- Review the licensing basis evaluations.
- Review the decisions fo r entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP.
- Review the walkdown report.
- Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 8 of the Braidwood , Unit 2, walkdown report which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. Specifically, the staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity. In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer-review process, and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 8, and the full-peer review report in Appendix F of the walkdown report. In addition, the licensee stated that there were no cases where any peer reviewer reviewed their own work.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of these activities, which included a discussion of the peer review team members' qualifications and level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review comments. After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report.
Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance.
3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities , of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program . Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ," licensees previously had performed a systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents.
The licensee provided background information regarding their IPEEE program and referenced several submittals to the NRC . The licensee stated that no vulnerabilities were reported in the previous IPEEE reports. However, a few plant improvements were identified in Appendix G.
Table G-1 lists the improvements, the IPEEE-proposed resolution, the actual resolution and the resolution date. All IPEEE plant improvements and associated actions are complete.
Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 7 of the walkdown report, the staff concludes that the licensee's summary of the IPEEE is consistent with and meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance.
3.5 Planned Upgrades The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report.
3.6 NRC Oversight 3.6.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors On July 6, 2012,10 the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188 "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns. " In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that Braidwood, Unit 2, licensee implemented the seism ic walkdowns in accordance with the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. The inspection report dated February 7, 2013,11 documents the results of this inspection and stated that no findings were identified.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The staff concludes that the licensee, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities, and in accordance with plant processes and procedures, verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded , nonconforming , or unanalyzed seism ic conditions ; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features . Furthermore, the staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
10 ADAMS Accession No. ML 121.56A052 11 ADAMS Accession No. ML13038A635
If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-6606 or by e-mail at Joei .Wiebe@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, IRA!
Joel S. Wiebe, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing 111-2 and Planning and Analysis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-457
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl : Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION :
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