ML12339A217

12Q0108.10-R-001, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1. Part 1 of 5

ML12339A217
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/16/2012
From:	Delaney M Exelon Generation Co, Stevenson & Associates
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-12-159 12Q0108.10-R-001, Rev 0
Download: ML12339A217 (157)

Text

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 180-Day Response to 50.54(f) Letter NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic November 27, 2012 Page 4 Seismic Walkdown Report In Response To The 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 1, Report Number: 1200108.10-R-001, Revision 0 (610 pages)

SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC for the BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT I 35100 South Route 53, Braceville, Illinois, 60407 Facility Operating License No. NPF-72 NRC Docket No. STN 50.456 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Exeton fxeon Gwera Compmy, LLC Mxe)

P0 Box a0638 Chicao, IL 680.36 Preped by.

Stevenson & Asoclutas 1661 Fedel l D6^. Suite 150 Mount Proepec L 600 Rme t Nufme. 1200108.10.R.001, Rev. 0 PeW RView Tee LeaW RwponWe Branch Senio Deelp E Reviower.

Tony Pefz Apoe:

Tony/Peez m Lder.

Buce L"

&En*nmr. Thme Bortoin Man Rty Sad*

Ma nagMr I Row etmne-Jeofrey S Cmi

£*$~

1 1/13/2012 11113/2012 11113/2012 1111302012 ti /11411Z.

Document

Title:

SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC for the BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1 Document Type: Report Report Number: 12Q0108.10-R-001 Project Name:

NTTF R2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for Exelon - Braidwood Job No.: 12Q0108.10 Client:

E e This document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 17 and project requirements:

Initial Issue: Revision 0 Prepared by: Marlene Delaney Date: 11/13/2012 Reviewed by: Tony Perez Date: 11/13/2012 Approved by: Tony Perez Date: 11/13/2012

12Qo108.1-R-ROO1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Contents List of Tables...................................................

i Executive Summary...............................................................

iv 1

Introduction.................

1.

1.1 P u rp o s e...................................................................................................................

1 -1

1.2 Background

1-1 1.3 Plant Overview.

1-1 1.4 A pproach..........................................................

.......... 1-2 1.5 C o nc lu sio n..............................................................................................................

1-2 2

Seism ic Licensing Basis...................................................

2-1 2.1 O v e rv ie w.....................................................

2 -1 2.2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)............ I

.2-1 2.3 Design of Seism ic Category I SSCs........................................................................ 2-1 3

Personnel Qualifications........................................................................................

3-1 3.1 O v e rv ie w..................................

................................................... 3 -1 3.2 Walkdown Personnel

...... 3-1 3.2.1 Stevenson & Associates Personnel......

...................... 3-2 3.3 A dditional P ersonnel.............................................................................................

3-3 4

Selection of SSCs.........................................................

4-1 4.1 Overview............

I 4-1 4.2 SWEL Development

...... 4-1 4.2.1 SWEL I - Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions............. 4-1 4.2.2 SW EL 2 - Spent Fuel Pool Related Items.....................................................

4-3 5

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.................................................................

5-1 5.1 Overview...........................................................................

5-1 5.2 S e ism ic W a lkdow ns................................................................................................

5-1 5.2.1 Adverse Anchorage Conditions.....................................................................

5-2 5.2.2 V isua l Inspectio ns..........................................................................................

5-2 5.2.3 Configuration Verification

.... 5-2 5.2.4 Adverse Seism ic Spatial Interactions............................................................

5-3

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 5.2.5 Other Adverse Seism ic Conditions................................................................

5-4 5.2.6 Conditions Identified during Seism ic W alkdowns..........................................

5-4 5.3 Area W alk-Bys.......................................................................................................

5-4 5.3.1 Seism ically-Induced Flooding/Spray Interactions..........................................

5-5 5.3.2 Seismically-Induced Fire Interactions............................................................

5-6 5.3.3 Conditions Identified during Area W alk-bys...................................................

5-6 5.4 Supplemental Information on electrical cabinet internal inspections....................... 5-6 6

Licensing Basis Evaluations.....................................................................................

6-1 7

IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report................................................................

7-1 8

Peer Review...........................................................................................................

8-1 9

References......................................................................................................................

9-1 Appendices A

Project Personnel Resumes and SWE Certificates...............................................

A-1 B

Equipm ent Lists.............................................................................................................

B-1 C

Seism ic W alkdown Checklists (SW Cs)..................................................................

C-1 D

Area W alk-By Checklists (A W Cs)...........................................................................

D-1 E

Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment...........................

E-1 F

Peer Review Report...................................................................................................

F-1 G

IPEEE Vulnerabilities................................................................................................

G-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 List of Tables Table 2-1. List of Codes, Standards, and Specifications..............................................

2-3 T able 3-1. P erso nnel R oles...................................................................................

3-1 Table 5-1. Anchorage Configuration Confirmation................................

5-3 Table 5-2. Conditions Identified during Seismic Walkdowns.........................................

5-8 Table 5-3. Conditions Identified during Area Walk-Bys.......................................

5-9 Table B-I. Base List 1..................................................

B-3 Table B -2. B ase List 2........................................................................................

B -22 T a ble B -3. S W E L 1............................................................................................

B -24 T a ble B -4. S W E L 2............................................................................................

B -3 1 Table C-1. Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists...............................................

C-2 Table D-1. Summary of Area Walk-By Checklists.......................................................

D-2 Table E-1. Inaccessible and Deferred Equipment List.................................................

E-2 Table E-2. Supplemental Cabinet Internal Inspection List............................................

E-4 Table G-I. IPEEE Improvements Status.................................................................

G-2 iii

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. (Ref. 6) In particular, this report provides information requested to address Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter. (Ref. 6)

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction. The NTTF issued a report - Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21't Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident - that made a series of recommendations, some of which were to be acted upon "without unnecessary delay." (Ref. 11) On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter to all power reactor licensees in accordance with 1 0CFR50.54(f). The 50.54(f) letter requests information to assure that certain NTTF recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. (Ref. 6) The 50.54(f) letter requires, in part, all U.S.

nuclear power plants to perform seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration is within the current seismic licensing basis. This report documents the seismic walkdowns performed at Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 in response, in part, to the 50.54(f) letter issued by the NRC.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), supported by industry personnel, cooperated with the NRC to prepare guidance for conducting seismic walkdowns as required in the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. (Ref. 6) The guidelines and procedures prepared by NEI and endorsed by the NRC were published through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: S6ismic, dated June 2012; henceforth, referred to as the "EPRI guidance document." (Ref. 1.) Exelon/Braidwood has utilized this NRC endorsed guidance as the basis for the seismic walkdowns and this report. (Ref. 1)

The EPRI guidance document was used to perform the engineering walkdowns and evaluations described in this report. In accordance with the EPRI guidance document, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report.

Seismic Licensing Basis Personnel Qualifications Selection of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC)

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report Peer Review iv

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159.

Seismic Licensing Basis The Seismic Licensing Basis is briefly described in Section 2 of this report. The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations at the foundation level are 20% of gravity for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). (Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1)

Personnel Qualifications Personnel qualifications are discussed in Section 3 of this report. The personnel who performed the key activities required to fulfill the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are qualified and trained as required in the EPRI guidance document.

(Ref. 1) These personnel are responsible for:

Selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL),

Performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, Performing the seismic licensing basis evaluations, as applicable, Identifying the list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program and describing the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, Performing the peer reviews Selection of SSCs Selection of SSCs is discussed in Section 4 of this report. The process used to select the items that were included in the overall Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) is described in detail in the EPRI guidance document, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. (Ref.

1) The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items, which are described at a high level in the following subsections.

Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions - SWEL 1 Screen #1 narrowed the scope of SSCs in the plant to those that are designed to Seismic Category I requirements because they have a seismic licensing basis.

Screen #2 narrowed the scope of SSCs by selecting only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the plant licensing basis.

Screen #3 narrowed the scope of SSCs included on SWEL 1 as only those associated with maintaining the five safety functions. These five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity control, reactor coolant pressure control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal, which includes the Ultimate Heat Sink), plus the containment functions.

Screen #4 was a process intended to result in a SWEL 1 that sufficiently represented the broader population of plant equipment and systems needed to meet the objectives of the 50.54(f) letter. The following five sample attributes were used:

" A variety of types of systems Major new or replacement equipment A variety of types of equipment A variety of environments v

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - SWEL 2 Screen #1 and Screen #2 were used to narrow the scope of spent fuel pool related SSCs to those that have a seismic licensing basis and those that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process. Screen #3 was a process intended to result in SWEL 2 that sufficiently represents the broader population of spent fuel pool Seismic Category I equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the 50.54(f) letter, and included the following sample selection attributes:

" A variety of types of systems Major new or replacement equipment A variety of types of equipment A variety of environments Screen #4 identified items of the spent fuel pool that could potentially cause a rapid drain-down of the pool, even if such items are not Seismic Category I. Rapid drain-down is defined as lowering of the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the earthquake. Any items identified as having the potential for rapidly draining the spent fuel pool were to be added to SWEL 2.

For Braidwood Unit 1, the SWEL is comprised of:

SWEL 1 resulted with 100 items for walkdown.

SWEL 2 resulted with 21 items for walkdown.

No items associated with spent fuel pool rapid drain-down are included on SWEL 2.

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Section 5, Appendix C, and Appendix D of this report documents the equipment Seismic Walkdowns and the Area Walk-Bys. The online seismic walkdowns for Braidwood Unit 1 were performed during the week of July 16, 2012. During the walkdown activities, the walkdown team consisted of two (2) Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs), a station Equipment Operator, and various station personnel.

The seismic walkdowns focused on the seismic adequacy of the items on the SWEL.

The walkdowns focused on the following:

Adverse anchorage conditions Adverse seismic spatial interactions Other adverse seismic conditions (e.g., degradation, configuration, etc.,)

Area Walk-Bys were conducted in each area of the plant that contained an item on the SWEL (generally within 35 feet of the SWEL component). The Area Walk-By was performed to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item. The key examination factors that were considered in the Area Walk-Bys included the following:

Anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment) vi

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Significantly degraded equipment in the area Potential seismic interaction A visual assessment (from the floor) of cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting (e.g., condition of supports or fill conditions of cable trays)

Potential adverse interactions that could cause flooding/spray and fire in the area Other housekeeping items, including temporary installations The seismic walkdown team inspected 105 of the 121 components on the SWEL (comprised of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2). Walkdowns for 16 components were deferred due to accessibility issues such as being located in containment or energized equipment.

The 16 remaining items will be inspected during a unit outage or another time when the equipment is accessible, as required. Anchorage verification was required for a minimum of 31 components. (Ref. 1) A total of 42 anchorage configurations were confirmed to be installed in accordance with the station documentation and an additional 6 anchor configurations will be confirmed as the 16 deferred items are inspected.

Following the completion of the online seismic walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions. Supplemental inspections of 28 electrical cabinets are planned and will be completed, as required, during a unit outage or another time when the equipment becomes accessible. The list of electrical cabinets along with the milestone completion schedule is provided in Table E-2.

During the seismic walkdowns at the Braidwood Unit 1 twenty-one (21) Issue Reports (IRs) were issued. After evaluation through the CAP, it was determined that none of the issues identified in the IRs were adverse seismic conditions.

Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations The EPRI guidance document, Section 5: Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluation provides a detailed process to perform and document seismic licensing basis evaluations of SSCs identified when potentially adverse seismic conditions are identified. The process provides a means to identify, evaluate and document how the identified potentially adverse seismic condition meets a station's seismic licensing basis without entering the condition into a station's Corrective Action Program (CAP). In lieu of this process, Exelon/Braidwood utilized the existing processes and procedures (Site CAP Expectations) to identify, evaluate and document conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

In accordance with Exelon/Braidwood processes and procedures, all questionable conditions identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns were entered into the station CAP to be further evaluated and addressed as required. The SWEs provided input to support the identification and evaluation (including seismic licensing basis evaluations, as required) of the potentially adverse seismic conditions entered into the CAP. The station corrective action program is a more robust process than that provided in the EPRI guidance document; in part, ensuring each condition is properly evaluated for conformance with design and licensing bases and corrected as required.

Conditions identified during the walkdowns were documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs), Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs), and entered into the CAP. For those conditions that required, seismic licensing basis evaluations were completed and vii

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 documented within the IR. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 in the report provide the IR, a summary of the condition, and the action completion status.

IPEEE Vulnerabilities IPEEE vulnerabilities are addressed in Section 7 and Appendix G of this report. No vulnerabilities were identified as a result of the effort that addressed the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). (Ref. 3 and 5) However, plant improvements were identified in section 7 of Reference 3. Table G-1 provides the list of plant improvements, the IPEEE proposed resolution, the actual resolution and resolution date.

Peer Reviews A peer review team consisting of at least two individuals was assembled and peer reviews were performed in accordance with Section 6: Peer Reviews of the EPRI guidance document. The Peer Review process included the following activities:

Review of the selection of SSCs included on the SWEL Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Review of licensing basis evaluations, as applicable Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP process Review of the submittal report Provided a summary report of the peer review process in the submittal report Section 8 of this report contains a summary of the Peer Review. The Peer Review determined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are met. Further, it was concluded by the peer reviews that the efforts completed and documented within this report are in accordance with the EPRI guidance document.

Summary In summary, seismic walkdowns have been performed at the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 in accordance with the NRC endorsed walkdown methodology. All potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns have been entered into the corrective action program.

Evaluations of the identified conditions are complete and documented within the CAP.

These evaluations determined the Seismic Walkdowns resulted with no adverse anchorage conditions, no adverse seismic spatial interactions, and no other adverse seismic conditions associated with the items on the SWEL. Similarly, the Area Walk-Bys resulted with no adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item(s).

The Seismic Walkdowns identified 21 minor conditions. Other than these minor conditions, the Seismic Walkdowns identified no degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions that required either immediate or follow-on action. No planned or newly identified protection or mitigation features have resulted from the efforts to address the 50.54(f) letter.

Follow-on activities required to complete the efforts to address Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter include inspection of 16 items deferred due to inaccessibility along with viii

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 supplemental inspections of 28 electrical cabinets. Area Walk-Bys will be complete, as required, during these follow-on activities.

,All IPEEE plant improvements and associated actions are complete.

ix

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 I

Introduction 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. (Ref. 6) In particular, this report provides information requested to address Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter. (Ref. 6)

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction. The NTTF issued a report - Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident - that made a series of recommendations, some of which were to be acted upon "without unnecessary delay." (Ref. 11) On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter to all power reactor licensees in accordance with 1 0CFR50.54(f). The 50.54(f) letter requests information to assure that certain NTTF recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. (Ref. 6) The 50.54(f) letter requires, in part, all U.S.

nuclear power plants to perform seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration is within the current seismic licensing basis. This report documents the seismic walkdowns performed at Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 in response, in part, to the 50.54(f) letter issued by the NRC.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), supported by industry personnel, cooperated with the NRC to prepare guidance for conducting seismic walkdowns as required in the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. (Ref. 6) The guidelines and procedures prepared by NEI and endorsed by the NRC were published through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012; henceforth, referred to as the "EPRI guidance document." (Ref. 1) Exelon/Braidwood has utilized this NRC endorsed guidance as the basis for the seismic walkdowns and this report. (Ref. 1) 1.3 PLANT OVERVIEW The Braidwood nuclear power plant consists of two nearly identical generating units, and two pressurized water reactors (PWR) (NSSS) and turbine-generators furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse). The reactor containments are of post-tensioned concrete construction with a carbon steel liner. Sufficient free volume is provided to contain the energy released in a major accident without need for "pressure 1-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 suppression" devices. Sargent & Lundy was responsible for containment design. (Ref. 2 section 1.1)

The Braidwood Station is located in northeastern Illinois, near the town of Braidwood and near the Kankakee River. Cooling for the plant is provided by a large man-made cooling pond of approximately 2500 acres constructed over a previously strip-mined area. Essential service cooling is provided by a 99-acre auxiliary cooling pond which is integral with the main pond. The fuel loading dates for the two units were October 1986 and December 1987 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The corresponding dates for commercial operation were July 1988 and October 1988. (Ref. 2 section 1.1) 1.4 APPROACH The EPRI guidance document is used for the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 engineering walkdowns and evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference 1, the following topics areaddressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

Seismic Licensing Basis Personnel Qualifications Selection of SSCs Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Licensing Basis Evaluations IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report Peer Review

1.5 CONCLUSION

Seismic walkdowns have been performed at the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 in accordance with the NRC endorsed walkdown methodology. All potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns have been entered into the corrective action program.

Evaluations of the identified conditions are complete and documented within the CAP.

These evaluations determined the Seismic Walkdowns resulted with no adverse anchorage conditions, no adverse seismic spatial interactions,.and no other adverse seismic conditions associated with the items on the SWEL. Similarly, the Area Walk-Bys resulted with no adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item(s).

The Seismic Walkdowns identified 21 minor conditions. Other than these minor conditions, the Seismic Walkdowns identified no degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions that required either immediate or follow-on action. No planned or newly identified protection or mitigation features have resulted from the efforts to

-address the 50.54(f) letter.

Follow-on activities required to complete the efforts to address Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter include inspection of 16 items deferred due to inaccessibility along with supplemental inspections of 28 electrical cabinets. Area Walk-Bys will be complete, as required, during these follow-on activities.

1-2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 2

Seismic Licensing Basis 2.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report summarizes the seismic licensing basis for the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 and Unit 2. The safe shutdown earthquake and a summary of the codes, standards, and methods used in the design of Seismic Category I SSCs are presented. This section does not establish or change the seismic licensing basis of the facility and is intended to provide a fundamental understanding of the seismic licensing basis of the facility.

2.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE)

The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations at the foundation level are 20% of gravity for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). (Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1) 2.3 DESIGN OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I SSCs A full description of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake along with the codes, standards, and methods used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the seismic licensing basis requirements is provided in the following Braidwood Station UFSAR sections:

3.2 Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems 3.7 Seismic Design 0 Attachment 3.7A - Reevaluation and Validation of the Byron/Braidwood Seismic Design Basis 0

3.8 Design of Category I Structures 0

3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components 3.10 Seismic Qualification of Seismic Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment 3.2 Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems These UFSAR sections should be referred to for a detailed understanding of the seismic licensing basis.

Summary of Seismic Design The site response spectra, which are defined at the ground surface, are given in section 2.5.2 of Reference 2 and are shown in UFSAR Figures 2.5-47 and 2.5-48 for the Braidwood site. Foundation level response spectra and time histories were generated by a deconvolution procedure described in section 3.7.1.2 of Reference 2. The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations at the foundation level are 20% of gravity for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and 9% of gravity for operating basis 2-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 earthquake (OBE). The comparisons between the free field seismic design motion applied at the surface and the corresponding foundation (rock) spectra for 2%, 3%, 4%,

5%, and 7% damping ratios are shown in UFSAR Figures 3.7-21 through 3.7-40 for the Braidwood site. (Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1)

During the review of the FSAR for an Operating License, the Byron/Braidwood seismic design was reevaluated using the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectra without the application of a deconvolution analysis. UFSAR Attachment 3.7A contains the specific NRC questions/responses on seismic design. These questions and responses document the historical evolution of certain aspects of the Byron/Braidwood seismic design. UFSAR.7A also provides the details and results of this reevaluation. It is concluded that the present seismic design of Byron/Braidwood is conservative. Based on the reevaluation described in UFSAR Attachment 3.7A, the Byron/Braidwood seismic design basis is acceptable and will therefore be used for all future seismic evaluations.

(Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1)

Seismic Class I structures are designed for seismic forces calculated from the aforementioned spectra using a response spectrum method of analysis. The directional combination rule uses three components of earthquake motions (two horizontal directions with vertical direction) combined by the square-root-sum-of-the-squares (SRSS) method. For evaluation of Seismic Class I components, In Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) are used. For horizontal directions, ISRS are generated using an input acceleration time history at the base (foundation) of mathematical models that represent the plant structures. (Ref. 3)

To determine the foundation (rock) level motion, the soil rock profile above the foundation was modeled as a one-dimensional continuous shear layer system. The ground surface spectra consistent time histories were applied at the ground surface and the foundation level motion was obtained using the SHAKE program. For all of the structures founded on rock, the foundation level motion was used directly to excite the fixed base model. (Ref. 3)

Summary of Codes and Standards The information presented below has been extracted from the section 3.8 of Reference

2. This section summarizes the codes, specifications, standards of practice, and other accepted industry guidelines which are adopted to the extent applicable, in the design and construction of the following:

Containment - the applicable codes, standards, and specifications for the containment are 1 through 23 in Table 2-1 below.

Containment Internal Structures - all of the items listed in Table 2-1 below are applicable for the containment internal structures.

Safety-Related Structures Outside of Containment - all of the items listed in Table 2-1 below are applicable, with the exception of Items 17 and 18.

Foundations for Seismic Category I Structures - the applicable codes, standards, and specifications are I through 14 and 19 through 23 in Table 2-1 below.

2-2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table 2-1. List of Standards, Codes, and Specifications UFSAR Table 3.8 List of Specifications, Codes, and Standards Specification Specification or Reference Standard Title Number Designation 1

ACI 318-71, 77, 83 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete 2

ACI 301 Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings 3

ACI 347 Recommended Practice for Concrete Formwork ANSI A145.1 4

ACI 305 Recommended Practice for Hot Weather Concreting ANSI A170.1 5

ACI 211.1 Recommended Practice for Selecting Proportions for Normal Weight Concrete 6

ACI 304 Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing, Transporting, and placing concrete 7

ACI 315 Manual of Standard Practice for Detailing Reinforced Concrete Structures 8

ACI 306 Recommended Practice for Cold Weather Concreting 9

ACI 309 Recommended Practice for Consolidation of Concrete 10 ACI 308 Recommended Practice for Curing Concrete 11 ACI 214 Recommended Practice for Evaluation of ANSI A146.1 Compression Test Results of Field 12 ACI 311 Recommended Practice for Concrete Inspection 13 ACI 304 Preplaced Aggregate Concrete for Structural and Mass Concrete 14 Report by ACI Placing Concrete by Pumping Method Committee 304 15 AISC-69,78 Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Building 16 AWS D1.1 Structural Welding Code 17 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III ASME-1971, S73 Division 1, Subsection NE ASME-1974, S75 Division 1, Subsection NF ASME-1973 Division 2, Proposed Standard Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments Issued for Trial Use and Comments ASME-1980 Division 2, CC 6000 ASME-1992 1992 Addenda, Division 1,Section XI, Subsection IWL, IWE 18 American Public Test Methods Sulphides in Water, Standard Methods Health Assoc.

for the Examination of Water and Waste Water (APHA) 19 ASTM Annual Books of ASTM Standards 20 CRSI Manual of Standard Practice MSP-1 2-3

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 UFSAR Table 3.8 List of Specifications, Codes, and Standards Specification Specification or Reference Standard Title Number Designation 21 ANSI N45.2.5 Proposed Supplementary Q.A. Requirements for Installation, Inspection and Testing of Structural Concrete and Structural Steel During Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants 22 CRD Chief of Research and Development Standards, Department of the Army, Handbook for Concrete and Cement Volume I and II, Corps of Engineers U.S.

Army 23 ACI-349-76, 85 Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures 24 AISI Specification for design of cold-formed steel structural members Seismic qualification of Seismic Category I instrumentation and electrical equipment is in accordance with IEEE 344-1971 or IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practices of Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

(Ref. 2 section 3.10) 2-4

12Q0108.10-R-0O1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 3

Personnel Qualifications 3.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report identifies the personnel that participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown efforts. A description of the responsibilities of each Seismic Walkdown participant's role(s) is provided in Section 2 of the EPRI guidance document.

(Ref. 1) Resumes included in Appendix A provide detail on each person's qualifications for his or her role.

3.2 WALKDOWN PERSONNEL Table 3-1 below summarizes the names and corresponding roles of personnel who participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort.

Table 3-1. Personnel Roles Equipment Seismic L

NSeint Plant Walkdown icensing IPEEE Peer Name Selection Basis Reiwr evwr Engineer Operations Engineer Review Reviewer Reviewer (SWE)

Reviewer A. Perez X

K. Hull X

T.K. Ram X)

M. Delaney X

X P. Gazda X

X B. Lory X(2)

W. Djordjevic X

R. Richard (Exelon)

X D. Shaw (Exelon X

Contractor)

T. Bortolini (Exelon)

X X

Notes:

1. Peer Review Team member for SWEL review only.

2. Peer Review Team Leader.

3-1

12Q0.108.1 O-R-o 1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 3.2.1 Stevenson & Associates Personnel The following provides a synopsis of each individual's background and experiences.

Antonio Perez, P.E.: Mr. Perez is a Senior EngineerrIll and serves as the General Manager of the S&A Hudson, WI office. He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering at Michigan Technological University and is a licensed Professional Engineer in the states of Wisconsin and Minnesota. Mr. Perez has over 15 years of experience in project management, project engineering, equipment design, and mechanical systems design and has served in the nuclear power industry for over 11 years. He has extensive experience in Program and Design Engineering and has held positions such as MOV Engineer, Responsible Design Engineer, Design Engineering Supervisor and STA Trainee in the nuclear power industry. Mr. Perez has'successfully completed the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns Training Course.

Kim Hull: Mr. Hull is a Senior Engineer III in the S&A Hudson, WI office. He earned his Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering at Michigan State University. Mr.

Hull has over 30 years of experience in the nuclear power industry and has held positions such as Shift Technical Advisor, Principal Engineer, Senior Instructor, and Mechanical Design Supervisor. He has an extensive background in all aspects of nuclear power plant modifications with a thorough understanding of configuration control/management along with design and licensing basis of nuclear power plants. Mr.

Hull has successfully completed the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -

Plant Seismic Walkdowns Training Course.

Tribhawan K. Ram, P.E.: Mr. Ram is a Senior Engineer Ill in the S&A Phoenix, AZ Office. He has over 28 year experience in the nuclear power industry with expertise in plant systems and design engineering. Currently, Mr. Ram is leading the electrical engineering effort in support of Post-Fukushima Seismic Margin Analysis (SMA) for two Taiwan nuclear stations (PWR and BWR). This effort, in support of the plant Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), consists of relay list development, relay screening (using GERS, SQURTS or other available testing data), and relay chatter analysis. Mr.

Ram was involved in resolving USI A-46 relay outliers for several plants (Dresden, Quad Cities, Millstone, Palisades, and Pilgrim). He evaluated dozens of control circuits for relay chattering issues. To replace outliers, Mr. Ram developed and/or supervised the development of modification packages including: replacement relay selection; relay testing specification preparation; and seismic testing facility visits for relay qualification.

As a systems manager, Mr. Ram conducted periodic system walkdowns to discover and then pursue resolutions for any design, maintenance or operational issues with equipment. He has developed test plans for circuit breaker and other electrical equipment replacement, including involvement in test plan execution during refueling outages. Mr. Ram has interfaced, with NRC in their biennial Component Design Basis Inspections (CDBI), and with INPO in their biennial evaluations. Mr. Ram has MS degrees in Nuclear and Electrical Engineering from the University of Cincinnati, and an MBA from Bowling Green State University. He is a licensed Professional Engineer (electrical) in Ohio. Mr. Ram has completed a six month training course in BWR systems.

Marlene Delaney, P.E., S.E.: Ms. Delaney is a Senior Engineer'lll in the S&A Chicago, IL Office. She has a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering and has more than 30 years of experience in the nuclear power plant industry. She is a licensed Structural 3-2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Engineer in the State of Illinois and has a licensed Professional Engineer in several states. She is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and has completed the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Training Course (SWE). In addition to her involvement in design and analysis of structures, systems, and components at nuclear power plants, she has performed SQUG walkdowns at various nuclear power plants.

Phil Gazda, P.E., S.E.: Mr. Gazda is a Senior Consultant and serves as the Vice President of S&A as well as the Office Manager of the S&A Chicago, IL Office. He is an advanced degree structural engineering graduate and has more than 35 years of experience in the nuclear power plant industry. He is a licensed Structural Engineer in the State of Illinois and has a licensed Professional Engineer in several states. He is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and has completed the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Training Course (SWE). In addition to his involvement in design and analysis of structures, systems, and components at nuclear power plants, he has been involved in SQUG and IPEEE walkdowns and assessments at ten nuclear plants and led the ComEd team performing the SQUG program at Zion Station. Mr. Gazda has also been the moderator for three SQUG qualification training classes provided for utility engineers. In addition, Mr. Gazda was the Project Manager for the seismic assessment of HVAC ducts at another utility based on EPRI document Seismic Evaluation Guidelines for HVAC Duct and Damper Systems Revision to 1007896.

Bruce Lory Mr. Lory is a Senior Engineer III in the S&A Chicago, IL Office. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering and has more than 30 years of experience in the nuclear power plant industry. He is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and is the instructor of the Fundamentals of Equipment Seismic Qualification training course for EPRI, and is the co-instructor of the Fukushima Seismic Walkdown training course in response to NTTF 2.3. In addition, he has been involved with equipment modifications for Extended Power Uprates (EPU), as well as Seismic Qualification (SQ) and Environmental Qualification (EQ) of equipment/components at numerous nuclear power plants.

Walter Diordievic, P.E. Mr. Djordjevic is a Senior Consultant and serves as President of S&A with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He has managed and led seismic walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. Mr. Djordjevic has 37 years of seismic experience serving the nuclear industry. Mr. Djordjevic performed and managed more than 20 USI A-46 and IPEEE projects in response to the requirements of Generic Letters 87-02 and 88-20. Mr.

Djordjevic has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has received industry training as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE).

3.3 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL Exelon plant Operations staff members Messrs. R. Richard and D. Shaw reviewed the SWEL. Mr. Richard is a previously licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at Braidwood Station with numerous years of experience in various aspects of plant operations. Mr. Shaw is a previously licensed SRO at Byron Station with numerous years of experience in various aspects of plant operations.

Various additional station personnel also provided support to the SWEL preparer to help identify major equipment or system modifications, equipment and systems located in 3-3

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 different environments, and equipment and systems that would be accessible for inspection during the plant walkdowns, in accordance with Reference 1.

Exelon Engineering staff member Mr. T. Bortolini performed the IPEEE Vulnerabilities Review based, in part, on the BraidwoodlPEEE submittal along with subsequent correspondence and station records. (Ref. 3) Mr. Bortolini is a Structural Engineer in the Exelon Engineering Department. He has over 38 years of engineering experience and has worked at Braidwood since 1998. Mr. Bortolini has completed the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Training Course (SWE).

3-4

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 4

Selection of SSCs 4.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report describes the process used to select structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that were included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The actual equipment lists that were developed in this process are found in Appendix B and are as follows:

Table B-i, Base List 1 Table B-2, Base List 2 Table B-3, SWEL 1 Table B-4, SWEL 2 4.2 SWEL DEVELOPMENT The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012, was utilized to develop the SWEL for Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1. (Ref. 1)

The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items:

SWEL 1 is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity SWEL 2 is a list of spent fuel pool related items 4.2.1 SWEL 1 - Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions The process for selecting a sample of SSCs for shutting down the reactor and maintaining containment integrity began with the composite Seismic Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) Success Path Equipment List (SPEL). (Ref. 3)

The IPEEE SPEL was then subjected to the following four screens to identify the items to be included on the first Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL 1):

1.

Screen #1 - Seismic Category I As described in Reference 1, only items that have a defined seismic licensing basis are to be included in SWEL 1. Each item on the IPEEE SPEL was reviewed to determine if it had a defined seismic licensing basis. All items identified as Safety Category I, as defined in the Byron/Braidwood UFSAR Chapter 3, were identified as having a defined seismic licensing basis. (Ref. 2) Electrical enclosures containing Class 1E devices were identified as Safety Category I. Safety Category I and Class 1 E determination was made through a review of current design and licensing basis documentation.

4-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159

2.

Screen #2-Equipment or Systems This screen narrowed the scope of items to include only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration is consistent with the plant licensing basis. This screen further reduced the IPEEE SPEL of any Safety Category I Structures, Containment Penetrations, Safety Category I Piping Systems, cable/conduit raceways. and HVAC ductwork.

3.

Screen #3 -. Support for the Five Safety Functions This screen narrowed the scope of items included on the SWEL 1 to only those associated with maintaining the following five safety functions:

A.

Reactor Reactivity Control (RRC)

B.

Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (RCPC)

C.

Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (RCIC)

D.

Decay Heat Removal (DHR)

E.

Containment Function (CF)

The first four functions are associated with bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown condition. The fifth function is associated with maintaining containment integrity.

As described in Appendix E of Reference 1, the safety function for each item on the IPEEE SPEL was identified. It is noted that items on SWEL 1 with a specific safety function(s) are considered frontline systems. Items with a safety-function designation of 'Support System HVAC', 'Support System AC Power', 'Support System DC Power', 'Engineered Safety Features Actuation System' (ESFAS) or

'Cooling Water' may be a frontline or support system. Items.with a safety function designation of 'Support System HVAC', 'Support System AC Power', 'Support System DC Power', 'Engineered Safety Features Actuation System' (ESFAS) or

'Cooling Water' support at least one of the five safety functions however, the specific safety function(s) is not indicated as identification of the specific safety function(s) is not required by Reference 1.

The resultant equipment list after Screen #3 is defined in the EPRI guidance document as Base List 1 and is included in Appendix B. (Ref. 1)

4.

Screen #4-Sample Considerations This screen is intended to result in a SWEL 1 that sufficiently represents a broad population of plant Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter. The following attributes were considered in the selection process for items included on SWEL 1:

A.

A variety of types of systems.

The system is identified for each item on SWEL 1. The equipment included on SWEL 1 is a representative sample of several systems that perform one or multiple safety functions. Further, the systems represented include both frontline and support systems as listed in Reference 1 Appendix E: Systems to Support Safety Function(s).

B.

Major new and replacement equipment 4-2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 The equipment included on SWEL 1 includes several items that have been modified or replaced over the past several years. Each item on SWEL 1 that is new or replaced is identified.

C.

A variety of types of equipment The equipment class is identified for each item on SWEL 1. The equipment included on SWEL 1 is a representative sample from each of the classes of equipment listed in Reference 1 Appendix B: Classes of Equipment. Where appropriate, at least one piece of equipment from each class is included on SWEL 1.

Screening #1, #2, and #3 resulted in no equipment in the following classes:

(12) Air Compressors (13) Motor Generators.

D.

A variety of environments The location for each item is identified on SWEL 1. The equipment included on SWEL 1 is a representative sample from a variety of environments (locations) in the station.

E.

Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program The equipment included on SWEL 1 includes several items that were enhanced as a result of the IPEEE program. Each item on SWEL 1 that was enhanced as a result of the IPEEE program is identified.

F.

Contribution to risk In selecting items for SWEL 1 that met the attributes above, some items with similar attributes were selected based on their higher risk significance. To determine the relative risk significance, the Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely importance for a Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) scenario from the internal plant PRA were used. Additionally, the list of risk-significant components for the LOOP PRA were compared with the draft SWEL 1 to confirm that a reasonable sample of risk-significant components (relevant for a seismic event) were included on SWEL 1. (Ref. 7) 4.2.2 SWEL 2 - Spent Fuel Pool Related Items The process for selecting a sample of SSCs associated with the spent fuel pool (SFP) began with a review of the station design and licensing basis documentation for the SFP and the interconnecting SFP cooling system. The following four screens narrowed the scope of SSCs to be included on the second Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL 2):

1.

Screen #1 - Seismic Category I Only those items identified as Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) are to be included on SWEL 2 with exception to the SFP structure. As described in Reference 1, the adequacy of the SFP structure is assessed by analysis as a Seismic Category 1 structure. Therefore, the SFP structure is assumed to be seismically adequate for the purposes of this program and is not included in the scope of items included on SWEL 2.

4-3

12Qo108.1o-R-oo1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Per the Braidwood UFSAR Chapters 3 and 9, portions of the SFP SSCs are classified as Safety Category I and are screened into the SWEL 2 list. These Safety Category I SSCs include; the Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger, Spent Fuel Pit Pump, Refueling Water Purification Pump OA, associated instrumentation, piping and manual/check valves. Development of the Braidwood Unit 1 SWEL 2 list includes components associated with the common (Unit 0) Refueling Water Purification Pump GA. Note, these pump's motors are Safety Category II, even though the Refueling Water Purification Pump GA has an ESF power source. There are no Motor, Air or Fluid operated valves in the Safety Category I SSC flow paths.

2.

Screen #2-Equipment or Systems This screen considers only those items associated with the SFP that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process.

3.

Screen #3-Sample Considerations This screen represents a process that is intended to result in a SWEL 2 that sufficiently represents a broad population of SFP Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter. The following attributes were considered in the development of SWEL 2:

A.

A variety of types of systems The system is identified for each item on SWEL 2. The equipment included on SWEL 2 is a representative sample of the systems associated with the SFP and its cooling system.

The SFP pump, Refueling Water Purification Pump GA, and SFP heat exchanger are included on the SWEL 2 list. A representative sample of instrumentation, manual valves, and check valves are also included.

B.

Major new and replacement equipment The equipment included on SWEL 2 should include items that have been modified or replaced over the past several years. However, a review was performed that found none of the proposed equipment on SWEL 2 has been modified or replaced.

C.

A variety of types of equipment The equipment class is identified for each item on SWEL 2. The equipment included on SWEL 2 is a representative sample from each of the classes of equipment listed in Reference 1 Appendix B: Classes of Equipment. Where appropriate, at least one piece of equipment from each class is included on SWEL 2.

The classes/types of equipment include; (5) Horizontal Pumps, (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers, (18) Instrument Racks, (19) Temperature Sensors, and (0)

Other. The manual and check valves are included in the "(0) Other" class.

D.

A variety of environments

.The location for each item is identified on SWEL 2. The equipment included on SWEL 2 is a representative sample from a variety of environments (locations) for equipment associated with the SFP and its cooling system. All items are in the Auxiliary Building or Fuel Handling Building.

4-4

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159

4.

Screen #4-Rapid Drain-Down This screen identifies items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain rapidly.

Consistent with Reference 1, the scope of items included in this screen is limited to the hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to those lines. For the purposes of this program it is assumed the SFP gates are installed and the SFP cooling system is in its normal alignment for power operations. The SFP gates are passive devices that are integral to the SFP. As such, they are considered capable of withstanding a design basis earthquake without failure and do not allow for a rapid drain-down of the SFP.

The SSCs identified in this screen are not limited to Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) items, but is limited to those items that could allow rapid drain-down of the SFP. Rapid drain-down is defined as lowering of the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the earthquake.

Excerpts from the Braidwood UFSAR 9.1.3.2 System Description document the design features which preclude rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pit.

The Safety Category I spent fuel pool cooling system shown in Drawing M-63 consists of two complete cooling trains. The spent fuel pool cooling system (piping, pumps, valves, and heat exchangers) is Safety Category I, Quality Group C. The 3-inch piping from the refueling water storage tanks to the refueling water purification pump, the pump, and its associated piping and valves are Safety Category I, Quality Group C. A 2-inch Safety Category I, Quality Group C line from the discharge of the refueling water purification pump to the spent fuel pool is permanently installed. This is the Category I water makeup circuit. The backup Safety Category I makeup system consists of piping and hoses from the Safety Category I fire protection system. The primary water makeup system non-Category I takes water from both primary water storage tanks and routes the water through the spent fuel pool water filter and then to the return header as indicated in Drawing M-63. In addition, primary water may be added to the spent fuel pool via a fire hose connection in the fuel handling building. In summary, there are three sources of makeup water available, a primary unborated non-Category I source, a borated Safety Category I source, and an unborated fire protection Safety Category I water system. (Ref. 2, 8, 9, & 10)

The spent fuel pool system piping arrangement precludes siphoning after any failure by containing a 1/2-inch diameter hole four inches below the water level. Ten feet above the active fuel corresponds to an elevation of 410'-0". Both the cooling and skimmer systems meet this requirement. No piping in the pool extends below the 410'-0" elevation except the spent fuel pool cooling system discharge pipe. This pipe contains an anti-siphon hole near the surface of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, piping connections to the SPF explicitly contain anti-siphon features which preclude a rapid drain down of the SFP.

Excerpts from the Braidwood UFSAR Section 9.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation discuss SFP Dewatering incidents. Incident C discussed is a sluice/transfer gate failure with the transfer canal empty, an open/empty transfer tube and an empty refueling cavity. In this incident, the spent fuel pool water level would be lowered approximately 22 feet 10 inches to the bottom sill of the sluice/transfer gate. This leaves at least 2 feet 6 inches of water as shielding over the active portion of the spent fuel in storage.

4-5

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 This incident is not considered a rapid drain down transient. The gate is a structural element, seismically designed as part of the SFP structural analysis, and is a passive barrier with no active components.

There are no rapid drain-down considerations included in the Braidwood Unit 1 SWEL 2 list.

4-6

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 5

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys 5.1 OVERVIEW Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were conducted by two (2) person teams of trained Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs), in accordance with the EPRI guidance document during the week of July 16, 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.

Consistent with the EPRI guidance document, Section 4: Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, the SWEs used their engineering judgment, based on their experience and training, to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions. Where needed, the engineers were provided the latitude to rely upon new or existing analyses to inform their judgment.

The SWEs conducted the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys together as a team.

During the evaluations, the SWEs actively discussed their observations and judgments with each other. The results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys reported herein are based on the comprehensive agreement of the SWEs.

5.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS The Seismic Walkdowns focused on the seismic adequacy of the items on the SWEL as provided in Appendix B of this report. The Seismic Walkdowns also evaluated the potential for nearby SSCs to cause adverse seismic interactions with the SWEL items.

The Seismic Walkdowns focused on the following adverse seismic conditions associated with the subject item of equipment:

Adverse anchorage conditions Adverse seismic spatial interactions Other adverse seismic conditions The results of the Seismic Walkdowns have been documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) provided in the EPRI guidance document, Appendix C.

Seismic Walkdowns were performed and a SWC completed for 105 of the 121 items identified on the Braidwood Unit 1 SWEL. The completed SWCs are provided in Appendix C of this report. Additionally, photos have been included with most SWCs to provide a visual record of the item along with any comments noted on the SWC.

Drawings and other plant records are cited in some of the SWCs, but are not included with the SWCs because they are readily retrievable documents through the station's document management system.

Seismic Walkdowns are deferred for the remaining 16 items to a unit outage or appropriate time when the equipment is accessible. These items could not be walked 5-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 down during the 180-day period following the issuance of the 10CFR50.54(f) letter due to their being inaccessible. Inaccessibility of this equipment was either based on the location of the equipment (environment that posed personnel safety concerns while the unit is operating) or due to the electrical safety hazards posed while the equipment is operating. Appendix E of this report identifies the inaccessible equipment along with the plan for future Seismic Walkdowns.

The following subsections describe the approach followed by the SWEs to identify potentially adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic interactions, and other adverse seismic conditions during the Seismic Walkdowns.

5.2.1 Adverse Anchorage Conditions Guidance for identifying anchorage that could be degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed relied on visual inspections of the anchorage and verification of anchorage configuration. Details for these two types of evaluations are provided in the following two subsections.

The evaluation of potentially adverse anchorage conditions described in this subsection applies to the anchorage connections that attach the identified item of equipment to the civil structure on which it is mounted. For example, the welded connections that secure the base of a Motor Control Center (MCC) to the steel embedment in the concrete floor would be evaluated in this subsection. Evaluation of the connections that secure components within the MCC is covered later in the subsection "Other Adverse Seismic Conditions."

5.2.2 Visual Inspections The purpose of the visual inspections was to identify whether any of the following potentially adverse anchorage conditions were present:

Bent, broken, missing, or loose hardware Corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation 0

Visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors Other potentially adverse seismic conditions Based on the results of the visual inspection, the SWEs judged whether the anchorage was potentially degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed. The results of the visual inspection were documented on the SWC, as appropriate. If there was clearly no evidence of degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions, then it was indicated on the checklist and a licensing basis evaluation was not necessary. However, if it was not possible to judge whether the anchorage is degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed, then the condition was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a potentially adverse seismic condition.

5.2.3 Configuration Verification In addition to the visual inspections of the anchorage as described above, the Configuration of the installed anchorage was verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50% of the items on the SWEL.

5-2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Line-mounted equipment (e.g., valves mounted on pipelines without separate anchorage) was not evaluated for anchorage adequacy and was not counted in establishing the 50% sample size.

Examples of documentation that was considered to verify that the anchorage installation configurations are consistent with the plant documentation include the following:

Design drawings Seismic qualification reports of analyses or shake table tests IPEEE or USI A-46 program documentation, as applicable The Table C-1 of AppendixC indicates the anchorage verification status for components as follows:

N/A: components that are line-mounted and/or are not directly anchored (with separate anchorage) to the civil structure and therefore do not count in the anchorage confirmation total Y: components that are anchored to the civil structure which were confirmed to be consistent with design drawings and/or other plant documentation N: components that are anchored to the civil structure for which anchorage drawings were not identified and/or retrieved See Table 5-1 below for the accounting of the 50% anchorage configuration confirmations, and the individual SWC forms in Appendix C for the specific drawings used for each anchorage verification confirmation.

Table 5-1. Anchorage Configuration Confirmation No. of SWEL NIA Items Required to WEL Items Confirm?

Items Confirmed (A)

(B)

(A-B)12 Total 121 59 31 481 3ix (6) anchorage verifications have been deferred and will be completed as outlined in Appendix E Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions An adverse seismic spatial interaction is the physical interaction between the SWEL item and a nearby SSC caused by relative motion between the two during an earthquake. An inspection was performed in the area adjacent to and surrounding the SWEL item to identify any seismic interaction conditions that could adversely affect the capability of that SWEL item to perform its intended safety-related functions.

The three types of seismic spatial interaction effects that were considered are as follows:

Proximity Failure and falling of SSCs (Seismic II over I)

Flexibility of attached lines and cables 5.2.4 5-3

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Detailed guidance for evaluating each of these types of seismic spatial interactions is described in EPRI guidance document, Appendix D: Seismic Spatial Interaction.

The Seismic Walkdown Engineers exercised their judgment to identify seismic interaction hazards. Section 5.2.6 provides a summary of issues identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

5.2.5 Other Adverse Seismic Conditions In addition to adverse anchorage conditions and adverse seismic interactions, described above, other potentially adverse seismic conditions that could challenge the seismic adequacy of a SWEL item could have been present. Examples of the types of conditions that could pose potentially adverse seismic conditions include the following:

Degraded conditions Loose or missing fasteners that secure internal or external components to equipment Large, heavy components mounted on a cabinet that are not typically included by the original equipment manufacturer Cabinet doors or panels that are not latched or fastened Other adverse conditions Any identified other adverse seismic conditions are documented on the items' SWC, as applicable.

5.2.6 Conditions Identified during Seismic Walkdowns Table 5-2 provides a summary of the conditions identified during the equipment Seismic Walkdowns. The equipment Seismic Walkdowns resulted in a total of four (4) conditions identified which were entered into the station's CAP. The conditions were assessed and it was concluded that the conditions would not prevent the associated equipment from performing its safety-related function(s). The conditions identified by the SWEs during the equipment Seismic Walkdowns were concluded to not be adverse seismic conditions.

5.3 AREA WALK-BYS The purpose of the Area Walk-Bys is to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL items. Vicinity is generally defined as the room containing the SWEL item. If the room is very large (e.g.,

Turbine Hall), then the vicinity is identified based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item. This vicinity is described on the Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC), shown in Appendix D of this report. A total of 45 Area Walk-bys were performed for Braidwood Unit 1. It is noted that additional area walk-bys will be completed, as required, as deferred and supplemental inspections are completed.

The key examination factors that were considered during Area Walk-Bys include the following:

Anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment)

Significantly degraded equipment in the area 5-4

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A visual assessment (from the floor) of cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting (e.g., condition of supports or fill conditions of cable trays)

Potentially adverse seismic interactions including those that could cause flooding, spray, and fires in the area Other housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interaction (including temporary installations and equipment storage)

Scaffold clearances and tie offs were reviewed to meet Exelon Standard NES-MS-04.1, Rev..6 Seismic Prequalified Scaffolds Seismic housekeeping was examined to meet station procedure BwAP 1100-23, Seismic Housekeepi:ng Requirements for the Temporary Storage of Materials in Category I Area.

The Area Walk-Bys are intended to identify adverse seismic conditions that are readily identified by visual inspection, without necessarily stopping to open cabinets or taking an extended look. Therefore, the Area Walk-By took significantly less time than it took to conduct the Seismic Walkdowns described above for a SWEL item. If a potentially adverse seismic condition was identified during the Area Walk-By, then additional time was taken, as necessary, to evaluate adequately whether there was an adverse condition and to document any findings.

The results of the Area Walk-Bys are documented on the AWCs included in Appendix D of this report. A separate AWC was filled out for each area inspected. A single AWC was completed for areas where more than one SWEL item was located.

Additional details for evaluating the potential for adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding, spray, or fire in the area are provided in the following two subsections.

5.3.1 Seismically-Induced Flooding/Spray Interactions Seismically-induced flooding/spray interactions are the effect of possible ruptures of vessels or piping systems that could spray, flood or cascade water into the area where SWEL items are located. This type of seismic interaction was considered during the IPEEE program. Those prior evaluations were considered, as applicable, as information for the Area Walk-Bys.

One area of particular concern to the industry is threaded fire protection piping with long unsupported spans. If adequate seismic supports are present or there are isolation valves near the tanks or charging sources, flooding may not be a concern. Numerous failures have been observed in past earthquakes resulting from sprinkler head impact.

Less frequent but commonly observed failures have occurred due to flexible headers and stiff branch pipes, non-ductile mechanical couplings, seismic anchor motion and failed supports.

Examples where seismically-induced flooding/spray interactions could occur include the fol.lowing:

Fire protection piping with inadequate clearance around fusible-link sprinkler heads Non-ductile mechanical and threaded piping couplings can fail and lead to flooding or spray of equipment Long, unsupported spans of threaded fire protection piping 5-5

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Flexible headers with stiffly supported branch lines Non-Seismic Category I tanks The SWEs exercised their judgment to identify only those seismically-induced interactions that could lead to flooding or spray.

5.3.2 Seismically-Induced Fire Interactions Seismically-induced fire interactions can occur when equipment or systems containing hazardous/flammable material fail or rupture. This type of seismic interaction was considered during the IPEEE program. Those prior evaluations were considered, as applicable, as information for the Area Walk-Bys.

Examples where seismically-induced fire interactions could occur include the following:

Hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored shelves, or unlocked cabinets Natural gas lines and their attachment to equipment or buildings Bottles containing acetylene or similar flammable chemicals Hydrogen lines and bottles Another example where seismically-induced fire interaction could occur is when there is relative motion between a high voltage item of equipment (e.g., 4160 volt transformer) and an adjacent support structure when they have different foundations. This relative motion can cause high voltage busbars, which pass between the two, to short out against the grounded bus duct surrounding the busbars and cause a fire.

The Seismic Walkdown Engineers exercised their judgment to identify only those seismically-induced interactions that could lead to fires.

5.3.3 Conditions Identified during Area Walk-bys Table 5-3 at the end of this section provides a summary of the conditions identified during the Area Walk-Bys. Seventeen (17) conditions were identified during the Area Walk-Bys and entered into the station CAP. No potentially adverse seismic conditions were identified that resulted in a seismic licensing basis evaluation. No seismically-induced flooding or spray interactions were identified during the Area Walk-Bys. No seismically-induced fire interactions were identified during the Area Walk-Bys.

5.4 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON ELECTRICAL CABINET INTERNAL INSPECTIONS Following the completion of the online seismic walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions. The purpose for opening these cabinets is to inspect for evidence of:

internal components not being adequately secured, whether fasteners securing adjacent cabinets together are in place, and other adverse seismic conditions.

5-6

1200108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Appendix E of this report includes Table E-2 which identifies components in the specified equipment classes that would be considered as electrical cabinets:

1.

Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors

2.

Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels

3.

Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear

4.

Transformers

14. Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches

16. Battery Chargers and Inverters

20. Instrumentation and Control Panels Components that are identified on Table E-1 (inaccessible and deferred components) are not listed on Table E-2 to avoid redundancy. Table E-2 indicates internal accessibility of each cabinet. Cabinets that have been identified as requiring these supplemental internal inspections are those with doors or panels with latches or thumbscrews and can be readily opened during normal maintenance activities. Also provided for each cabinet is a proposed milestone schedule for performing these internal inspections and the associated station tracking number (IR number).

The Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWC) for the components identified in Table E-2 that can be opened for internal inspections will be revised at the time of the supplemental walkdown to indicate the results of these internal inspections.

5-7

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table 5-2. Conditions Identified during Seismic Walkdowns Actions Action Complete Item ID Description of Issue Request ID Yes/No (See (IR)

Notes 1 & 2) 1VX07J Junction box 1VX07J was not mounted per the 1389727 design drawing (Item on SWEL)

(WO No 1560290) 1DO01TB Tank 1DO01TB (Diesel Oil Storage Tank) has hairline cracks at 2 of the 12 anchor bolts (Found 1389743 No in area walk-by of Tank 1DO01TD)

I DC01 E Open S-hook on one chain at one light in room 1395981 Yes 1 DC02E Open S-hook on one chain at one light in room 1395992 Yes Notes:

1) "Yes" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are complete

2) "No" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are NOT complete. Actions are tracked by the IR number in the station Corrective Action Program.

5-8

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table 5-3. Conditions Identified during Area Walk-Bys Actions Action Complete Item ID/Area Description of Issue Request Yes/No (See ID (IR)

Notes 1 & 2)

Unit 1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank 1DO01TD (Diesel Oil Storage Tank Room (Area Walk-Tank) has hairline cracks at 2 of the 12 1389755 No by 12) anchor bolts (Item on SWEL)

During the area walk-by in the Unit 1 Aux Electric Equipment Room, a Unit 1 Auxiliary Electric temporary MESAC was not properly Equipment Room (Area shimmed at the base. The shims were 1389428 Yes Walk-by 3) intended to fit tight but were loose. The unit was anchored at the top with ropes to avoid tipping.

Unit 1 Fuel Handling During the area walk-by in the Fuel Building adjacent to Handling Building at El. 401'-0", adjacent truck bay (Area Walk-by to the truck bay, 4 tool cabinets

30) appeared to be in violation of BwAP 1390326 Yes 1100-23 Seismic Housekeeping Requirements for the Temporary Storage of Materials in Category 1 Areas.

Unit 1 MEER Room During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns a (Area Walk-by 5) vertical scaffold pole was found approximately 1" from fire damper 1397564 Yes 1VE21Y in the Unit 1 MEER at El 451 of the Aux Building Unit 1 RWST Tunnel It was noted that there was a small (Area Walk-by 39) amount of water on the floor directly below the RWST hatch - likely from 1390831 Yes previous day's rain. There was no water on the components in the tunnel.

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns, HOUSEKEEPING AUX a laundry container for slings and a BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg configuration control cabinet were found El 401 near Column S-less than 2" away from safety related 15 Blockwall 5A-141 which does not meet 1397682 Yes the 12" minimum requirement of BwAP 1100-23. These items are located near Column S-15 at El. 401 in the Aux Building.

5-9

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Actions Action Complete Item ID/Area Description of Issue Request Yes/No (See ID (IR)

Notes 1 & 2)

During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns a Shaw Knack tool storage box was found SEISMIC approximately 3" away from safety HOUSEKEEPING AUX related Blockwall 5A-140 which does not 1397680 Yes BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg meet the 12" minimum requirements of El 401 Column U-1 7 BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Houskeeping).

This box is located near Column U-17 at Elevation 401' in Aux Building.

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX an OP's corrosive storage cabinet BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg approximately 5' high was found less El 346' 15' south of than 12" or height plus 12" from a safety 1397642 Yes S-18 related block wall per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (seismic housekeeping) 15' south of Column S-18 at El 346' in Aux Building.

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX an RP storage cabinet approximately 6' BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg high was found less than 12" or height El 346' 15' south of plus 12" from safety related Blockwall 1397636 Yes S-18 2A-48 per BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) 15' south of Column S-18 at El. 346" in Aux Building SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX an RP storage cabinet approximately 6'

.BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg high was found less than 12" or height El 346' 10' south of plus 12" from safety related Blockwall 1397627 Yes Column Q-1 5 2A-45 per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) 10' south of Column Q-15 at El 346' in Aux Building SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX two RP storage cabinets approximately BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg 6' high were found less than 12" or El 346 Column S-17 height plus 12" from safety related 1397619 Yes Blockwall 2A-48 per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) near Column S-17 at El 346' in Aux Building.

5-10

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Actions Action Complete Item ID/Area Description of Issue Request Yes/No (See ID (IR)

Notes 1 & 2)

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns a HOUSEKEEPING AUX Shaw Knaack tool storage box was BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg found less than 1" away from safety El 364 at Column P-21 related Block wall which does not meet the 12" minimum requirements of BwAP 1397654 Yes 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping). This box is located near Column L-15 at Elevation 346' in Aux Building.

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX two MMD stoarage cabinets (caustic or BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg acid) approximately 5'-6" high were El 401 at elevator found less than 12" or height plus 12" 1397941 Yes from safety related Blockwall 5A-59 per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) east of the elevator door at El 401' in Aux Building SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX an RP storage cabinet approximately 6' BLDG: Unit 1 Aux Bldg high was found less than 12" or height El 426 Column U-18 plus 12" from safety related Blockwall 1397957 Yes 6A-74 per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) near Column U-18 at El 426' in Aux Bldg SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX an MMD gray storage cabinet labeled BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg "Outage Tools" approximately 5' high El 426 Column U-18 was found less than 12" or height plus 1397980 Yes 12" from safety related Blockwall 6A-74 per requiements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) near Column U-18 in Aux Building 5-11

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Actions Action Complete Item ID/Area Description of Issue Request Yes/No (See ID (IR)

Notes 1 & 2)

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns a HOUSEKEEPING AUX MMD valve team storage cabinet BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg approximately 5'-6" high was found less El 364 at Column P-21 than 12" or height plus 12" from safety related Blockwall 3A-61 per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic 1398023 Yes Housekeeping) near Column Q-17 at El 364' in Aux Building. Another MMD configuration control cabinet was less than 1" from Blockwall 3A-27A south of Column P-21 at El 364' in Aux Building.

SEISMIC During Fukushima Seismic Walkdowns HOUSEKEEPING AUX an RP storage cabinet approximately 6' BLDG:Unit 1 Aux Bldg high was found less than 12" or height El 383 at Column S-17 plus 12" from a safety related blockwall 1397949 Yes per requirements of BwAP 1100-23 (Seismic Housekeeping) near Column S-17 at El 383' in Aux Building Notes:

1) "Yes" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are complete

2) "No" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are NOT complete. Actions are tracked by the IR number in the station Corrective Action Program.

5-12

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 6

Licensing Basis Evaluations The EPRI guidance document, Section 5: Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluation provides a detailed process to perform and document seismic licensing basis evaluations of SSCs identified when potentially adverse seismic conditions are identified. The process provides a means to identify, evaluate and document how the identified potentially adverse seismic condition meets a station's seismic licensing basis without entering the condition into a station's Corrective Action Program (CAP). In lieu of this process, Exelon/Braidwood utilized the existing processes and procedures (Site CAP Expectations) to identify, evaluate and document conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

In accordance with Exelon/Braidwood processes and procedures, all questionable conditions identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns were entered into the station CAP to be further evaluated and addressed as required. The SWEs provided input to support the identification and evaluation (including seismic licensing basis evaluations, as required) of the potentially adverse seismic conditions entered into the CAP. The station corrective action program is a more robust process than that provided in the EPRI guidance document; in part, ensuring each condition is properly evaluated for conformance with design and licensing bases and corrected as required.

Conditions identified during the walkdowns were documented on the SWCs, AWCs, and entered into the CAP. For those conditions that required, seismic licensing basis evaluations were completed and documented within the IR. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 in the report provide the IR, a summary of the condition, and the action completion status.

6-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 7

IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report Per the CornED Transmittal of Braidwood Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report, dated June 27, 1997 and the Staff Evaluation Report of Braidwood IPEEE dated May 30, 2001, an explicit definition of vulnerability was not provided and no vulnerabilities with respect to potential severe accidents related to external events were identified in the IPEEE submittal. (Ref. 3 and 6) However, plant improvements were identified in Sections 3 and 7 of Reference 3. Table G-1 in Appendix G lists the plant improvements, the IPEEE proposed resolution, the actual resolution and resolution date. No open items exist as a result of the seismic portion of the IPEEE program.

7-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 8

Peer Review A peer review team consisting of at least two individuals was assembled and peer reviews were performed in accordance with Section 6: Peer Reviews of the EPRI guidance document. The Peer Review process included the following activities:

• Review of the selection of SSCs included on the SWEL

• Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

• Review of Licensing basis evaluations, as applicable

• Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP process

• Review of the submittal report

• Provide a summary report of the peer review process in the submittal report The peer reviews were performed independently from this report and the summary Peer Review Report is provided in Appendix F of this report.

8-1

12Q0108.10-R-OO1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 9

References Reference drawings related to SWEL items are provided in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists and if applicable, in the Area-Walkdown Checklists.

1.

EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.

2.

Byron/Braidwood Nuclear Stations Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),

Revision 13.

3.

ComEd letter from H. Gene Stanley to Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated June 27, 1997,

Subject:

Transmittal of Braidwood Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal Report

4.

Not Used

5.

Staff Evaluation Report of Braidwood Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) dated May 30, 2001

6.

NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," dated March 12, 2012

7.

BW-MISC-018 Rev. 0, "Braidwood Risk Importance to Support Development of Seismic Walkdown Equipment List".

8.

Drawing M-63 Sheet 1A rev. AZ, "Diagram of Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up Units 1 &2"

9.

Drawing M-63 Sheet 1B rev. BE, "Diagram of Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up Units 1 &2"

10. Drawing M-63 Sheet 1 C rev. BB, "Diagram of Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up Units 1 &2"

11. "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 2 1st Century: The Near-term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807, July 12, 2011 9-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A

Project Personnel Resumes and SWE Certificates Resumes and certificates (where applicable) for the following people are found in Appendix A:

A. Perez, Equipment Selection Engineer A-2 K. Hull, Equipment Selection Engineer A-6 M. Delaney, SWE, Licensing Basis Reviewer A-9 P. Gazda, SW E, Licensing Basis Reviewer....................................................... A-13 T. Ram, SW EL Peer Reviewer..................................................................... A-18 B. Lory, Peer Review Team Leader.........................

.................................. A-20 W. Djordjevic, Peer Reviewer A-24 T. Bortolini (Exelon), Licensing Basis Reviewer, IPEEE Reviewer.................

A-28 A-1

Stev 12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159

'enson & Associates Antonio J. Perez, P.E.

SUMMARY

Mr. Perez has over 15 years of experience in project management, project engineering, equipment design, and mechanical systems layout for nuclear and industrial facilities.

EDUCATION B.S. - Mechanical Engineering Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI Magna cum Laude LICENSES Professional Engineer, Wisconsin: September 2002 Minnesota: December 2010 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Stevenson & Associates, Green Bay, WI General Manager October 2010 - Present

" Responsible for interfacing with clients with a focus on continuously improving relationships.

Responsible for managing staff resources to meet or exceed clients' needs.

" Responsible for recruiting and hiring staff necessary to meet resource requirements while effectively increasing capacity.

" Responsible for providing Engineering Consultation services to clients.

Project Manager March 2007 - October 2010

" Performing Project Management tasks including development of project plans, identification of resource needs, estimating task durations, developing project schedules, and monitoring budgets.

" Lead design team efforts at the Kewaunee Power Station on multiple projects that include two separate Auxiliary Feedwater flow control modifications, Auxiliary Feedwater flow monitoring instrumentation modifications, and Auxiliary Building roof modifications.

" Supported the Calculation Reconstitution and Improvement Project at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant by mapping calculations associated with the RHR system.

Dominion Energy Kewaunee (formerly Nuclear Management Company 2001 - 2005)

Kewaunee Power Station, Kewaunee, WI Shift Technical Advisor (trainee)

January 2006 - March 2007 Trainee in a Senior Reactor Operator Certificate training program.

Page 1 of 3 A-2

Stev 12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159

'enson & Associates Antonio J. Perez, P.E.

Engineering Supervisor - M1E/CE/SE Design May 2004 - January 2006

• Supervised a staff of 12 to 15 engineers (mechanical, civil, and structural design) who were charged with developing design changes, maintaining design and licensing basis documentation and supporting maintenance.

" Integrated the civil/structural engineering group and the mechanical engineering group into a cohesive unit that resulted in gained efficiency and a net reduction of one full time equivalent engineer.

• Substantially increased the quality of engineering products developed and published by the ME/CE/SE Design Engineering group through coaching and feedback as a result of increased supervisory oversight of engineering products.

" Developed a work management system for the group that provided a means for prioritizing activities, estimating the level of effort, and scheduling of activities. This system allowed for an increased understanding of workload and became an invaluable tool for prioritizing work and managing resources.

" Increased communications within the group by holding daily 15 minute meetings where station messages were delivered and where the group's resources were assessed and redirected as necessary to meet commitments. This resulted in an increase in morale and an increase in commitments met.

• Increased communications with other departments by establishing a central point of contact for the group and by assuring that the ME/CE/SE Design Engineering group was represented at Planning and Scheduling meetings.

Motor Operated Valve Engineer June 2001 - May 2004

" Established a project plan and led the implementation effort that re-organized the Motor-Operated Valve Program at KPS. This effort consisted of developing a Program Manual, developing controlled calculations, performing Design Basis Reviews, and compiling and/or establishing plant positions on known industry issues.

The result of this effort was a reduction of full time equivalent engineers, from 3 to 1, required to maintain the Program.

" Performed and reviewed MOV safety related calculations including Minimum Required Stem Thrust, Weak Link Analysis, and Available Margin.

" Assisted in MOV testing by providing engineering support to maintenance personnel.

DISTRIBUTION PLANNING, INC., Grandville, MI Systems Mechanical Engineer 2000 - 2001

• Integrated mechanical systems and designed equipment for material handling systems.

• Procured equipment and coordinated delivery schedules with vendors.

Page 2 of 3 A-3

Stev 12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 renson & Associates Antonio J. Perez, P.E.

SMS SANDMOLD SYSTEMS, INC., Newaygo, MI Project Engineer /Manager 1998 -2000

" Led multi-discipline project design teams for several projects that ranged in size from a few thousand dollars up to $2.2 million.

" Coordinated efforts with engineering, manufacturing, and installation groups to establish and maintain project schedules that met or exceeded the client's expectations.

• Procured equipment and coordinated delivery schedules with vendors.

Acted as the company's liaison with clients to work through issues that arose during projects. Provided project status updates to clients and management.

• Designed equipment such as sand storage bins - up to 540-ton live load capacity, bucket elevators, belt conveyors, screw conveyors, and mixers. Most of this equipment was for handling of bulk solids (foundry sand).

" Analyzed and designed structural support members for various types of equipment such as vibratory conveyors, mixers, and conveyors. Designed access structures such as stair towers, service platforms and catwalks.

Calculated foundation loads and point loads of equipment support points.

LIFT-TECH INTERNATIONAL, Muskegon, MI Project Engineer 1997-1998

• Performed engineering analyses, wrote critiques, and recommended design modifications of structural members for the purpose of upgrading bridge cranes and hoists.

Implemented engineering design changes to enhance product development.

Page 3 of 3 A-4

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-5

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 KIM L. HULL BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

Accomplished Lead Engineer/ Project Manager with significant experience in commercial nuclear power industry.

Demonstrated ability to lead and contribute on cross-functional project teams.

Possess strong analytical, problem resolution, collaboration, and communication skills when interacting with diverse audiences including regulatory inspectors, internal inspectors, management, and employees. Respected trainer with ability to develop and present information and measure effectiveness through evaluation techniques. Strengths include:

Project Management Design Modifications Plant Operational Support Procurement Management/Leadership Regulatory Compliance Training/Coaching Auditing Inspections KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS Served as KNPP Lead Engineer/ Project Supervisor for approximately 125 plant design changes.

• Experienced in all aspects of nuclear power plant modification packages including development of calculations, design, engineering, and procurement specifications.

" Thorough understanding of configuration control, management, and preparation of 10CFR50.59 analyses.

• Participated in several regulatory and industry audits, including CDBI and INPO assessments.

• Experienced as a Technical Specialist performing NUPIC Audits.

• Well-developed communication skills for preparing technical presentations including lesson plans, project reports, and meetings in support of regulatory activities and inspections.

" Qualified Shift Technical Advisor for KNPP Operations Group (1980s).

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES - Project Manager 2010 - Current National consulting engineering firm specializing in civil, structural and mechanical engineering for power, industrial and advanced technology facilities.

Project Manager

" Development of plant specific Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists for multiple Units in response to NRC 50.54(f) requirements regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Enclosure 2.3, "Recommendation 2.3:

Seismic."

• Onsite at Kewaunee Power Station Consultant support to resolve Q-list Open Items

• On-site at Kewaunee Power Station Consultant support for Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Modification including preparation and review of design documentation.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE RESOURCES / Nuclear Management Company DOMINION ENERGY - Kewaunee, WI 1982 to 2010 Senior Instructor (Maintenance) (2009 - 2010)

Developed lesson plans and taught Basic Systems and Continuing Training Topics for Engineering and Technical Support training program.

Engineer III/Principal Engineer (2004 - 2009)

" Responsible for modifications and emergent issues including Steam Exclusion Boundaries, Fuel Transfer Carriage, Frazil Ice development on the KPS Circulating Water Intake, and NRC 96-06 Two Phase flow.

Member of Dominion Fleet Calculation Quality Review Team and Mentor for Calculation training.

Outage nightshift Lead Mechanical Design Engineer/Back-up Supervisor.

KPS Engineering representative on the Independent Review Team developed to address CDBI A-6

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence-No_:-RS-12:159 inspection findings. Assigned to review all calculations, modification packages, IOCFR 50.59 screenings, evaluations, and procurement packages.

Technical Instructor for Administrative Process training for new engineers.

Mechanical Design Supervisor (2002 - 2004)

Supervised nine engineers, analysts, and technicians assigned to the KNPP Mechanical Design Group.

Provided Mechanical Design Oversight for all vendor activities impacting KNPP Mechanical Design Bases.

Provided support for emergent plant issues, NRC Inspections, and Physical Change Packages.

Subject Matter Expert Instructor for 10CFR 50.59 process training for new engineers.

Principal Engineer (Analytical Group SGR Project) (1998 - 2002)

Contract Manager for Steam Generator Replacement (SGR).

Responsible for coordination of SGE design, fabrication and installation contracts.

Provided outage schedule development, coordination, and work process integration between Bechtel and KNPP.

Coordinated contractor mobilization, badging, and plant specific training.

Technical Specialist for Quality Assurance audits of vendors.

SGR Shift Manager for night shift Responsible Engineer for SGR related Physical Change Packages.

Responsible for SGR budget development up to 1998.

Prepared, reviewed, and awarded Bechtel Installation contract.

Participated in review and award of Ansaldo Fabrication contract.

Served on team to review and award Westinghouse Design contract.

Selected to work at Arkansas Nuclear One for their steam generator installation.

Senior Engineer (Analytical Group) (1994-1998)

Responsible Engineer for Physical Change Packages.

Member KNPP Engineering Reorganization Team.

Recognized Technical Expert for KNPP systems.

Senior Project Supervisor (1992-1994)

Provided project management and engineering services for KNPP DCR packages.

Supervisor of KNPP NPM Project Attendants responsible for modification package organization and close out.

Nuclear Services Supervisor (1991-1992)

Supervised initial Steam Generator replacement project effort.

Provided specification development for services and major plant components.

Prior to 1992 - Held engineering positions from Associate Engineer to Nuclear Design Engineering Supervisor.

EDUCATION Masters Program Coursework - Mechanical Engineering; Michigan State University - E. Lansing, MI B.S. - Mechanical Engineering - Michigan State University - E. Lansing, MI B.A. - Biology - Albion College - Albion, MI A-7

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-8

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence-No.:-RS=12159-Stevenson & Associates MARLENE M. DELANEY PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE March 1998 - Present Stevenson & Associates Project Engineer Stevenson & Associates is a structural/mechanical engineering firm.

Job tasks as a Project Engineer include performing engineering and project engineering activities on a broad scope of projects. Typical engineering activities include:

Seismic equipment qualification and anchorage design.

Component and support evaluations including modifications and new designs.

Analysis and modification design for cable tray systems.

SQUG/IPEEE evaluations and walkdowns.

Reinforced concrete analysis.

Structural steel framing assessments.

Detail fabrication drawings for steel modifications.

Interface with clients on all aspects of projects.

January 1981 - February 1998 Sargent & Lundy Engineers Senior Engineer, Engineer Sargent & Lundy is an engineering firm that consults primarily to the power industry.

Job tasks as a Senior Engineer included:

Performing project engineering and project management duties for numerous plant modification projects. Responsibilities included overall project scheduling, technical supervision, and budget control.

Interfaced with clients, contractors on various projects.

Prepared conceptual design report and cost estimates for rehabilitation of hazardous waste handling facility and canal water treatment facility owned by Argonne National Laboratories.

Field engineer at LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Enrico Fermi Atomic Power plant and Zion Nuclear Station.

Supervised and coordinated analysis of structural framing and designed modifications to such structures.

Evaluated and designed modifications for railroad bridges.

Detailed fabrication drawings.

Page 1 of 2 A-9

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 EDUCATION University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering, Graduated with Honors.

PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATIONS Licensed Professional Engineer in the State of Wisconsin Licensed Structural Engineer in the State of Illinois Licensed Professional Engineer in the State of Illinois Page 2 of 2 A-10

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-11

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-12

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence-No.:-RS-12-159 STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES PHILIP A. GAZDA PROFICIENCIES 0

Civil engineering Structural analysis and design Structural dynamics Plant betterment Specifications Project management Excellent communication, presentation and organizational skills Proven ability to function as part of a team SQUG and IPEEE assessments Strong commitment to customer service and long term relationships EXPERIENCE 1997 - Present General Manager, Stevenson & Associates - Chicago Stevenson & Associates Responsible for the day to day operation of the S&A Chicago office.

Manages the engineering efforts of the Chicago office and coordinates the efforts with other S&A offices.

He is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer. He been involved in SQUG and IPEEE walkdowns and assessments at ten nuclear plants and led the ComEd team performing the SQUG program at Zion Station. Mr. Gazda has also been the moderator for three SQUG qualification training classes provided for utility engineers. In addition, Mr. Gazda was the Project Manager for the seismic assessment of HVAC ducts at another utility based on EPRI document Seismic Evaluation Guidelines for HVAC Duct and Damper Systems Revision to 1007896.

1995 - 1997 Head - Maintenance Engineering Department, Zion Nuclear Power ComEd Station Managed and coordinated the activities of thirty-five Mechanical, Electrical, Structural and Program Engineers who supported the operation and maintenance of the Zion Nuclear Power Station.

Support activities included engineering trouble shooting and evaluations to repair degraded electrical, mechanical and structural components/systems. Oversaw engineering programs such as In Service Inspection, Vibration Testing, Thermographic Investigations and the Evaluation and repair of piping systems for the effects of Flow Accelerated Corrosion. Performed administrative duties related to the management of the Maintenance Engineering Department.

Conducted and managed the Zion SQUG and IPEEE programs.

1973 - 1995 1986 - 1995, Associate and Senior Project Engineer Sargent & Lundy Managed, coordinated and was responsible for the activities of the structural team engaged in the analysis and design of the structural A-13

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 and civil portions of power plants and other miscellaneous structures.

Had ultimate responsibility and ownership for the quality of the structural team and the product produced by the team. The team included hydrologists, geologists, soils engineers, architects, designers and structural engineers depending on the expertise required for each project. Responsible for coordinating the structural work with that of the Mechanical and Electrical disciplines on the project team. Established the technical approach and design criteria for the work, set schedules, and authorized drawings for construction.

1983 - 1986, Project Engineer The responsibilities are essentially the same as those described for the Senior Project Engineer (see above). Reported to the Senior Project Engineer.

1979 - 1983, Supervising Design Engineer Supervised the team generating engineering analyses, calculations, sketches, designs and drawings for steel and concrete structures, foundations, and electrical and mechanical component supports.

Reported to Project Engineer.

1978 - 1979, Supervising Structural Engineering Specialist Supervised the team that performed the structural analysis and design of specialized power plant structures such as containments, fuel pools, base mats, and drywells. Reported to Project Engineer.

1973 - 1978, Senior Structural Engineering Specialist (1976 - 1978)

Structural Engineering Specialist (1973 -1976)

Performed the analysis and design of power plant structures. This work included dynamic analysis for seismic and hydrodynamic loads, finite element analysis, and reinforced concrete and steel design for structures and foundations. Extensively involved in the analysis, design and construction of the heavy reinforced concrete structures for Illinois Powers Clinton Station. Reported to Project Engineer.

1972 - 1973 Research Assistant University of Illinois Performed research at the University of Illinois for the U.S.

Department of Transportation tunnel liner support system project.

A-14

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 EDUCATION University of Illinois at Urbana, IL.

M.S. Civil Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana, IL.

B.S. Civil Engineering REGISTRATIONS 0

0 0

0 0

Licensed Structural Engineer - Illinois Licensed Professional Engineer - Wisconsin Licensed Professional Engineer - Texas Licensed Professional Engineer - Nebraska Licensed Professional Engineer - Minnesota MEMBERSHIPS &

AFFILIATIONS PUBLICATIONS American Concrete Institute American Society of Civil Engineers Structural Engineers Association of Illinois University of Illinois Civil Engineering Alumni Association Board of Directors, 1992 - 2000 University of Illinois Civil Engineering Student Mentor Program, 1993 - present "Using Advanced Computer Technology to Consolidate Project Information" (co-author), American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April, 1993 "Structural Considerations in Steam Generator Replacement" (co-author), American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 1991 "Nuclear Plant License Renewal - Structural Issues" (co-author),

American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 1991 "Modifications at Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (co-author),

American Society of Civil Engineers Convention, Denver, Colorado, April 1985 "Engineering of Structural Modifications for Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (co-author), Seventh International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, Chicago, Illinois, August 1983 A-15

12QO108.1o-R-o"- Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 "A-16

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-17

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Tribhawan Ram EDUCATION:

B.S. - Electrical Engineering, Punjab University, India, 1972 M.S. - Electrical Engineering, University of Cincinnati, 1977 M.S. - Nuclear Engineering, University of Cincinnati, 1982 M.B.A. - Bowling Green State University, 1996 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION:

State of Ohio PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

Stevenson & Associates, Inc., Senior Engineer, 2011 - present Public Service Electric & Gas Co., Senior Plant Systems Engineer, Hancock Bridge, NJ, 2007 - 2011 Entergy Corporation, Plymouth,. Massachusetts, Senior Design Engineer, 2002-2007 Various Companies, Contract Consulting Project Engineer, 1996 - 2002 Public Service Electric & Gas Co., Senior' Staff Engineer, Hancock Bridge, NJ, 1983-1990 Toledo Edison Co., Toledo, Ohio, Senior Assistant Engineer, Associate Engineer, 1978-1983 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Electrical and Controls Design Engineering

• Plant Systems Engineering Transformer and Relay(s) Spec Developer Plant Modification Engineering 0 Systems and Component Test Engineering Factory Testing Witness 6 Month BWR Systems Engineering Training 0 ETAP Trained Arc Flash IEEE 1584 Trained Mr. Ram has over 28 years of electrical project, design and systems engineering experience in US nuclear plants. As part of the Seismic Margin Analysis (SMA) team, in 2012, Mr. Ram is leading the electrical engineering EPRI methodology effort to perform Post-Fukushima relay list development and evaluation to support Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), including relay functional screening and chatter analysis, for Taiwan nuclear plants (both PWR and BWR). In this effort, he is preparing the final reports including recommendations to replace any bad actor relays. Mr. Ram is preparing proposals to replace these bad actors including modification package development for field replacement of these relays. He has prepared proposals to lead similar forthcoming relay evaluation efforts for several Westinghouse plants in the USA. Mr. Ram has either prepared or peer reviewed the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWEL 1 & 2) for several Exelon Plants.

A-18

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 As a senior plant systems engineer, Mr. Ram has: 1. Developed several test plans for modification packages for the replacement of low and medium voltage circuit breakers (ABB K-Line to Square D Masterpact; GE Magneblast to Wyle Siemens) and for the replacement of the entire Pressurizer Heater Bus switchgear; 2. Personally been involved in execution of these test plans during refueling outages;

3. Witnessed factory testing of Pressurizer Heater Bus Switchgear; 4. Interfaced with NRC in their biennial Component Design Basis Inspections (CDBI); Interfaced with INPO in their biennial evaluations; 5. Developed and executed Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) strategies for Motor Control Centers (MCCs) and low and medium voltage circuit breakers and switchgear; 6.

Developed and executed margin improvement strategies for pressurizer heater busses, for twin units, through obtaining funds and then equipment replacement; 7. Developed refueling outage scoping for low and medium voltage circuit breakers and MCCs through working with outage group, maintenance, operations, and work MGMT; 8. Resolved breaker grease hardening issue for ABB K-Line breakers, over a two year period, through working with maintenance and work MGMT in implementing accelerated overhauls with better grease; 9. Trained operations and engineering personnel in the Engaging People and Behavior Change process, as part of a case study team and; 10.

Resolved day to day operations and maintenance issues with systems of responsibility (low and medium voltage systems)

Mr. Ram has regularly participated in the EPRI annual circuit breaker user group conferences; at the 2011 meeting, he made a presentation on circuit breaker as found testing vis-A-vis protection of equipment, cables, and containment penetrations, and selective coordination preservation.

As a Senior Design Engineer, Mr. Ram has: 1. Developed specifications and procured 345/4.16/4.16 kV and 23/4.16/4.16 kV transformers (ranging up to $1.25 million); 2. Prepared a modification package to install the 23 kV/4.16 kV/4.16 kV transformer, including leading the project team to get this transformer successfully installed, tested, and placed in service; 3. Developed ETAP scenarios and performed load flow studies to successfully support the 2006 INPO evaluation; 4. Performed arc flash calculations per IEEE 1584 methodology for 4 kV, 480V Load Centers, and MCCs, enabling a justification of reduced arc flash rated clothing, thereby allowing conversion of OUTAGE PMs into ONLINE PMs and; 5. Performed single point system vulnerability analysis.

As a Consulting Lead Project Engineer, Mr. Ram was heavily involved in resolution of the USI A-46 for several plants. He performed an extensive review of dozens of control circuits for relay chattering issues. To replace bad relay actors, Mr. Ram developed and/or supervised the development of many modification packages including: selection of replacement relays (both protective and auxiliary);

preparation of relay testing specification with civil engineering input; working with and visiting seismic testing facilities forfrelay qualification and; developing pre and post installation instructions including test procedures. He worked closely with teams consisting of maintenance, operations, and work MGMT during the development and implementation of these projects. Besides the A-46 issue, Mr. Ram first developed and then was personally involved in the implementation of modification packages consisting of Cable, Conduit, Circuit Breaker and motor starter (contactor) replacements.

The following provides a list of USI A-46 resolution projects:

Northeast Utilities - Millstone Station Consumers Power Co. - Palisades Nuclear Station Boston Edison Co. - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Commonwealth Edison Company-Dresden Station, Quad Cities Station Tribhawan Ram Page 2 A-19

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES 4350 DiPaolo Center, Suite H, Glenview, IL 60025 Tel: 847.795.0500 Fax: 847.795.0501 Bruce M. Lory blory@vecsa.com EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS B.S., Mechanical Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY - 1982 Exelon-certified instructor - 1992 ASME Training certification - "Design and Repair of ASME Section I, IV, and VIII, Division 1 Pressure Vessels" - 2000 Instructor of EPRI "Fundamentals of Equipment Seismic Qualification" course Member of 2003-11 IEEE Subcommittee-2 on Equipment Qualification Member of 2003-11 IEEE 323 Working Group (Environmental Qualification)

Member of 2003-11 IEEE 344 Working Group (Seismic Qualification)

QUALIFICATIONS Degreed Mechanical Engineer with over 30 years experience in the nuclear industry, with specific technical expertise in the field of overseeing equipment modifications for Extended Power Uprates (EPU), as well as Seismic Qualification (SQ) and Envi ronmental Qualification (EQ) of equipment/components.

Also possesses technical proficiency in design verification and project management for installation of single failure-proof cranes.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - EPU PROJECTS Provided staff augmentation services as utility responsible engineer, overseeing engineering activities necessary for developing engineering modifications packages for various EP U projects, including:

Generator rewinds (LaSalle, Clinton, & Dresden), and a ssociated GE support system modifications (SLMS package, flux probe, generator temperature monitoring, rotor torsional vibration monitoring system)

HP Turbine replacement with new ADSP advanced GE turbine design RWCU pump replacements Reactor Feed Pump, Recirc Valve, and FW Reg. Valve replacements Stator Cooling system improvements (heat exchangers, filters, strainer)

Replacement of entire IA system with 3 independent system trains in new building.

Activities included interface with Project Manager, Field Engineer, Work Planning, Construction, and Work Week Manager, as modification packages were developed, followed by implementation.

Worked within INDUS PassPort program for populating ADL, AEL, loading engineering deliverables in PassPort, ECN processing.

Performed owner's review of design descriptions, calculations, construction drawings. etc. Reviewed FAT test plans, as well as witnessed FAT activities at OEM locations, assisted supply chain oversight of OEM milestones and auditing OEM facilities and generating nonconformances. Provided technical interface with OEM as designs developed from mechanical & structural engineering perspectives. Reviewed resulting work order tasks in PassPort to get WO tasks to approved status. Produced CCNs in accordance with station procedures during installation phase to develop quick solution to engineering issues.

A-20

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Bruce M. Lory PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - SEISMIC QUALIFICATION Over 18 yea rs of exp erience in Sei smic Qualification of equip ment and components, including seismic stress analyses, equipment foundation load analyses, equipment nozzle secondary stress analyses, and selection of vendors for replacement of seismically qualified Class 1 E components.

Well versed in requirements of IEEE 344-1975 for seismic qualification of Class 1 E components, and use of SQUG m ethodology for demonstrating seismic adequacy of equipment. Excellent verbal/writing skills in field of SQ and EQ testin g/analyses; responds well to organi zational challenges, and relationship building.

Member/ Chairperson of numerous EPRI EQ and SQ technical committees (see below). Proficient in PC software applications: Microsoft Word, Excel, MS Projects and PowerPoint as well as INDUS PassPort database.

Special expertise in preparation of SQ test plans, and witnessing of SQ tests; having witnessed over 100 seismic tests for numerous utilities. Excellent knowledge of seismic and environmental testing facilities, including Wyle (Norco and Huntsville),

NLI, Southern Testing Services, Nutherm, NT S Acton, EGS, and Qualtech.

Served as CoinEd (now Exelon) corporate subject matter expert in SQ, providing SQ guidance and policy for all five ComEd generating stations, including on-site SQ engi neers.

Developed and implemented ComEd ownership of SQ prog ram by authoring corporate procedure and SQ review checklists in 1993. Also created existing ComEd SQ standards used at all sites.

Also served as subject matter expert for ComE d Corporate Engineering, providing technical guidance to Dresden, Quad Cities, and Zion sites required to complete the SQUG project. EPRI SQUG-certified Seismic Capability Engineer, and participated in all SQUG walkdowns at the three ComEd SQUG sites. Served on EPRI G-STERI, and SQURTS committees, as ComEd employee.

Specific SQ experience and special SQ projects includes:

Designed temporary fix to broken auxiliary switch mounting on Merlin Gerin 4KV circuit breakers in support of resta rting Dresden 2 & 3 and Q uad Cities 1 & 2 after extend ed shutdown to investigate issue. Coordinated and witnessed expedited seismic testing of temporary design fix that resulted in NRC app roval to restart affected units. Re ceived "Engaging in Excellence" award from ComEd for solving problem (1997).

Member of EPRI SQUG mock-NRC audit team which pe rformed 1 week inspection of TMI SQUG program at TMI in preparation for formal NRC SQUG inspection (1998).

Expedited SQ test procedure preparation and witnessed SQ testing and HELB (EQ) testing of Magnetrol level switch needed to re place Dresden HPCI Glo-SLO obsolete level swi tch, allowing Dresden to exit 14 day LCO (1999).

Coordinated response to NRC resident inspector inquiry at Byro n regarding SQ status of a racked out Westinghouse 4KV ci rcuit breaker, reviewed third party calculation justifying the configuration as seismically qua lified, interfaced with Resident Inspector at Byron, and consulted industry on the issue (2000).

Chairman of 1 day EPRI technical workshop on issue of "racked out" circuit breakers, attended by over 30 utilities and contractors, EPRI NDE Center-Charlotte, NC (1997)

Coordinated with Quad Cities SQ engineer the response to NRC con cern regarding potential contact of 125VDC batteries against hard spot on ass ociated battery racks under seismic loading. Solution involved SQ testing of non-conforming condition, SQ test procedure reviewed and SQ test witnessed as well (1998).

Member of the special root cause investigative team formed in response to NRC audit concern on seismic qualification status of commercial grade-dedicated protective relays on Quad Cities EDGs (1999).

Page 2 of 4 A-21

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Bruce M. Lory PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION Possess over 15 years of EQ experience, in consulting services and in utility positions. Prepared and reviewed over 1 00 EQ Binders to meet re quirements station-specific EQ licen sing basis requirement.). Knowledgeable in EQ requirements for satisfying the different levels of EQ licensing basis, (10CFR50.49, NUREG 0588 - Category I and II, or DOR Guideline).

Prepared, reviewed over 20 EQ test pro cedures, and witne ssed numerous EQ tests as part of licensee's initial EQ program origination or EQ component replacement objectives. Well versed in EQ requirements contained in IEEE Standards 323, 382, 282, 317, and 649. Understand s

differentiation between Arrhenius and Regression Line analysis methodologies for calculating thermal qualified life.

Have performed many F MEAs (Failure Mode Effects Analysis) on EQ com ponents down to part level to d etermine applicable failure mode and appropriate corresponding activation energy/regression line slope and intercept for calculating thermal qualified life of a given material.

Have used Digital Engineering and Wyle Materials databases to assist FMEAs in selection of most applicable Arrhenius material properties for failure mode/part use.

Member of Corporate EQ group at Commonwealth Edison (CoinEd) Downers Grove, IL overseeing EQ program compliance of all 6 nuclear stations (1991-1995). Served as backup EQ Engineer for ComEd Corporate Engineering office (1998-2000). Specific EQ experience and special EQ projects includes:

Prepared or reviewed over 100 EQ binders over entire six site CornEd EQ program (1983-1993)

Project Engineer overseeing staff of 5 EQ engineers prepare 88 EQ binders for Fort St. Vrain EQ program creation from scratch. Nu merous technical challenges due to high temperature MSLB profile, necessitating thermal lag anal yses and design of the rmal protection modifications. Included lead role of defending EQ program in mock-NRC audit followed by successful NRC audit.

Assisted in EQ impact evaluation for high drywell temperature excursion that o ccurred at CoinEd Dresden Nuclear Station, assessing EQ life consequences on Class 1E components (1988).

" Assisted in preparation of EQ test pro cedure and witnessed EQ HELB testing of non-conforming Raychem NMCK and WCSF-N electrical splices for ComEd LaSalle County Nuclear Station in support of JCO (1986)

Member of EQ inspection team performing mock-NRC audit of Q uad Cities EQ program with respect to compliance to R.G. 1.97, in cluding EQ walkdown discovery of Class 1 E terminal blocks epoxy glued to junction boxes involving R.G. 1.97 instrumentation circuitry (1991).

Member of EQ assessment team performing technical review of Consumers Energy - Palisades EQ program for compliance to DOR Guidelines and R.G. 1.97 (1990).

Performed special EQ impact assessment of potentially non-EQ components installed in Class 1 E 480VAC MCCs at ComEd Braidwood Nuclear Station, reviewed over 1 50 NWRs for Stores Item # used for installation.

Lead 5 EQ engineers on independent EQ asse ssment of Co mEd LaSalle County Nuclea r Station EQ program re-baseline initiative to determin e remaining weaknesses in EQ prog ram and identify corrective actions needed in EQ analyses and component replacements (1997)

Page 3 of 4 A-22

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Bruce M. Lory PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE DESIGN VERIFICATION Performed utility owner's (CMS Energy - Big Rock Restoration Project) design review of all crane manufacturer's design stress analyses for use of single failure-proof Containment Building Crane for dry cask activities. Activities in cluded assisting project manager in resolving d esign issues which arose during seismic qualification analyses by crane vendor, resolving crane manufacturer (Ederer)

NCRs, and establishing protocol for identification of critical cha racteristics for commercial grade dedication of crane for safety rela ted use.

Crane expertise includes owner's review of manufacturer's design stress calculations for all operating load conditions per CMAA Spec. #70, and compliance with NUREG 0554.

Project highlights included:

Visited crane manufacturer facility (Ederer) and vendor facility (Bigee) numerous times to resolve owner review comments on design stress calculations, attend project status meetings, and work with crane/vendor engineering staff towards final design resolutions.

Reviewed over 30 design stress calculations for Ederer "X-SAM" single failure-proof crane trolley and hoist, including vendor bridge, column, and end truck design. Review resulted in three design changes to crane in order to comply with CMAA Spec. #70 and NUREG 0554 design margin requirements.

Attended NRC meeting at NRR headquarters (Washington D.C.) with client to answer NRC and independent review team technical review questions on crane design and Ederer topical report.

Assisted utility project manager in related engineering activities of commercial grade dedication, QA program establishment, and seismic qualification interface with Bigee Rigging.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Stevenson & Associates - 2008 to present EMS Inc. - 2000 - 2007 Commonwealth Edison, 1991-2000 ABB Impell, 1989 - 1991 Sargent & Lundy Engineers, 1979-1989 SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS & AFFILIATIONS Presented ComEd C-Team facility design for LOCA test chamber system to NUGEQ - 1991 Inaugural Technical Program Chairman of EPRI - SQURTS program, 1993-95 Member of EPRI - G-STERI program, 1995-98 "Engaging in Excellence" award from ComEd for designing and seismically qualifying emergency fix to broken auxiliary switch mounting on Merlin-Gerin 4KV circuit breakers - 1997 "Certificate of Appreciation", ASME PVP Division for being Technical Program Representative of the OAC Committee for the 2000 ASME PVP Division International Conference - 2000 Instructor of EPRI "Fundamentals of Equipment Seismic Qualification" training course - 2011 Page 4 of 4 A-23

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Walter Djordjevic EDUCATION:

B.S. - Civil Engineering, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974 M.S. - Structural Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION:

State of California, State of Wisconsin, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of Michigan, State of Arizona, State of Missouri PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

Stevenson & Associates, Inc., President 1996 - present; Vice President and General Manager of the Boston area office, 1983 - 1995 URS/John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, Boston, Massachusetts, General Manager, 1980 - 1983; San Francisco, California, Supervisory Engineer; 1979 - 1980 Impell Corporation, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer, 1976 - 1979 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, Engineer, 1974 - 1976 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Structural Engineering Structural Dynamics

" Seismic Engineering Construction

" Vibration Engineering

" Expert Witness

" Committee Chairman Mr. Djordjevic founded the Stevenson & Associates Boston area office in 1983 and serves as President and General Manager. Mr. Djordjevic is expert in the field of structural engineering - more specifically, in the areas of structural vulnerabilities to the effects of seismic and other extreme loading phenomena.

As a structural dynamicist, Mr. Djordjevic also heads the Vibration Engineering Consultants corporate subsidiary of Stevenson & Associates for which he has overseen numerous designs of vibration sensitive microelectronics facilities for such clients as IBM, Intel, Motorola and Toshiba. He has personally been involved in such projects as resolvi ng vibration problems due to construction activities for the Central Artery Project (Big Dig) in Boston for which he was retained by Massport.

Finally, Mr.

Djordjevic has been personally retained as an Expert Witness a number of times relating to cases involving construction, structural and mechanical issues.

He has performed over a thousand hours of onsite seismic and other natural phenomena (including tornados, hurricanes, fire, and flooding) inspection walkdowns to assess structural soundness and vulnerabilities. He has inspected microelectronics fabrication facilities, power facilities, and hazardous material government and military reservations. He is one of the most experienced seismic walkdown A-24

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 inspection screening and verification engineers having personally participated in seismic walkdowns at over 50 U.S. nuclear units.

In recent years, he has concentrated on screening inspection walkdowns and assessments for resolution of the USI A-46 and seismic IPEEE issues, on numerous facilities. The following provides a partial list of recent projects:

American Electric Power - D.C. Cook Station Boston Edison Co. - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (SPRA)

Commonwealth Edison Company-Braidwood Station PM, Byron StationpM, Dresden StationpM, Quad Cities StationPM Consumers Power Co. - Palisades Nuclear StationPM Entergy - Arkansas Nuclear One Florida Power & Light - Turkey Point Station New York Power Authority - James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation - Nine Mile Point Station PM Northern States Power Co. - Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Co. - Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Omaha Public Power District - Fort Calhoun Station (SPRA)

Public Service Electric & Gas - Salem Nuclear Station Rochester Gas & Electric - R.E. Ginna Station Wisconsin Electric - Point Beach Nuclear StationPM (SPRA)

Wisconsin Public Service - Kewaunee Nuclear Power PlantPM (SPRA)

PM Indicates projects where Mr. Djordjevic served as Project Manager Hanford Reservation Savannah River Plant Reservation Rocky Flats Reservation Tooele US Army Depot Anniston US Army Reservation Umatilla US Army Reservation Newport US Army Reservation Aberdeen US Army Reservation He is a member of the IEEE 344 Standards Committee, Chairman of the ASCE Working Group for Seismic Evaluation of Electrical Raceways, and Chairman of the IES Committee for Microelectronics Cleanroom Vibrations Representative projects include overseeing the SEP shake-table testing of electrical raceways, in-situ testing of control panels and instrumentation racks at various nuclear facilities, equipment anchorage walkdowns and evaluations at various nuclear facilities. He is the principal author of the CERTIVALVE software package to evaluate nuclear service valves, and contributing author in the development of the ANCHOR and EDASP software packages commercially distributed by S&A.

Mr. Djordjevic is expert in the area of seismic fr agility analysis and dynamic qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment. He has participated in and managed over twenty major projects involving the evaluation and qualification of vibration sensitive equipment and seismic hardening of equipment.

As demonstrated by his committee work and publications, Mr. Djordjevic has participated in and contributed steadily to the development of equipment qualification and vibration hardening methodology.

Walter Djordjevic Page 2 A-25

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 PROFESSIONAL GROUPS Member, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Nuclear Power Engineering Committee-Working Group SC 2.5 (IEEE-344)

Chairman, American Society of Civil Engineers Nuclear Structures and Materials Committee, Working Group for the Analysis and Design of Electrical Cable Support Systems Member, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation, Application, and Components Committee on Valves, Working Group SC-5 Chairman. Institute of Environmental Sciences, Working Group foe Standardization of Reporting and Measuring Cleanroom Vibrations PARTIAL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 1979 ASME PVP Conference, San Francisco, California, "Multi-Degree-of-Freedom Analysis of Power Actuated Valves", Paper No. 79-PVP-1 06.

1983 ASME PVP Conference, Portland, Oregon, "A Computer Code for Seismic Qualification of Nuclear Service Valves", Paper No. 83-PVP-81.

1983 ASME PVP Conference, Portland, Oregon, "Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment at Rocky Flats Reservation Using Prototype Analysis".

1984 ANS Conference, "Qualification of Class 1E Devices Using In-Situ Testing and Analysis."

1986 Testing of Lithography Components for Vibration Sensitivity, Microelectronics, Cahners Publishing 1990 Nuclear Power Plant Piping and Equipment Confer ence, "Development of Generic Amplification Factors for Benchboard and Relay Cabinet Assemblies", Paper No. 106, Structures and Components Symposium, held by North Carolina State University 1991 Electric Power Research Institute, "Development of In-Cabinet Response Spectra for Benchboards and Vertical Panels," EPRI Report NP-7146 Walter Djordjevic Page 3 A-26

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Z~

fL4~ '~.N

-146 MIT M

4 Certificate of Completion Walter Djordjevic Successfullij Completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns A.'_

z A /0, %, ((1nop/0 Date: 06/26/12 Bruce M. Lorf-Instructor NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Course A

A I

A A

A A

A 0

MU91MM919 IV9 A-27

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 THOMAS J. BORTOLINI, S.E., P.E.

QUALIFICATIONS Proven civil engineer with extensive and diverse responsibilities in project management and structural engineering.

Major strengths in design, organization, team building, and budget cost control. Well organized, adaptable to change, and demonstrated communication and leadership skills.

EXPERIENCE EXELON CORPORATION, Braidwood, Illinois 1998 to Present Structural Design Engineer Responsible for engineering of structural modifications and technical interfaces with architect/engineers:

Responsible for Security modifications ISFSI modifications New plant buildings Tank foundation modifications Single failure-proof crane modifications ISI examinations Responsible Engineer for concrete containment and containment metal liner COMMONWEALTH EDISON, Zion, Illinois 1995 to 1998 Project Team Leader, Staff Engineer (1995 to 1996 and 1997 to Present)

Responsible for project management and engineering of structural modifications and technical interfaces with architect/engineers:

Implemented department goal of using in-house engineering, relying less on A/Es as lead structural engineer for design of $1.5 million instrument air project.

Tailored vehicle barrier system at $300,000 under projected costs.

Designed spare main transformer foundation so that it could be moved on or off a rail car expeditiously, reducing downtime by over 50%.

Developed new piping configuration and oversaw A/E piping analysis for overpressure protection of various piping systems.

Assistant Outage Director of Engineerin2 (1996 to 1997)

Responsible for resolution of emergent engineering issues that affect outage critical path (special 8-month assignment).

Identified, prioritized, disseminated, and followed through on all emergent engineering issues for over 120 engineers averting significant time delays and costs.

Interacted with other Assistant Outage Directors to obtain support required by engineering groups.

Performed peer reviews of station tests and procedures leading to successful test completions.

A-28

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 THOMAS J. BORTOLINI, Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)

VECTRA TECHNOLOGIES INC., Lincolnshire, Illinois 1987 to 1995 (Formerly IMPELL Corporation)

Supervising Engineer (1991 to 1995)

Responsible for project management and engineering of multiple structural modifications.

Managed numerous concurrent on-site engineering modifications at Commonwealth Edison's Zion Station in support of department profit and sales goals.

Site structural lead for $5 million emergency diesel generator controls modification.

Played key roll as site support engineer for $10 million service water modification.

Supported installation of the $5 million boric acid modification by resolving field installation problems with no schedule impact.

Engineering Site Coordinator (1989 to 1991)

Responsible for acquiring engineering projects by demonstrating ability to resolve complex technical issues while fostering client teamwork. Knowledgeable of all on-site activities and key interface with engineering groups and station manager.

Responsible for starting field engineering office and generating $1.0 million in additional engineering services.

Supervised six engineers and met quality, budgets, and schedules.

Supported office projects with field support resulting in reducing costs due to minimal redesigns.

Project Engineer (1987 to 1989)

Responsible for issuing engineering modifications and resolving field interferences.

Oversaw the design of control room ductwork, conduit supports, and suspended ceiling grid within schedule and budget.

Coordinated and facilitated on site construction of control room ductwork and ceiling grid meeting client's expectation.

SARGENT AND LUNDY ENGINEERS, Chicago, Illinois 1974 to 1987 Senior Structural Engineer (1981 to 1987)

Managed the design of structural steel framing.

Supervised work of 20 structural engineers performing gallery steel framing final load check.

Resolved field interferences with the installation and reinforcement of structural members while assigned to Cincinnati Gas and Electric's Zimmer Station, resulting in minimal craft downtime.

Structural Engineer (1974 to 1981)

Analyzed and designed concrete and steel structural members.

A-29

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 THOMAS J. BORTOLINI, Page 3 EDUCATION Graduate course work completed towards a Masters in Design and Construction Engineering University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio Bachelor of Science, Civil Engineering, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Registered Structural Engineer, State of Illinois Registered Professional Engineer, State of Illinois A-30

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159

,~i LECTRICPOE REEARC IIINTIUTE Certificate of Completion Thomas Bortolini Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3

- Plant Seismic Walkdowns June 27, 2012 Date Robert K. Kassawara EPRI Manager, Structural Reliability & Integrity A-31

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 B

Equipment Lists Appendix B contains the equipment lists that were developed during SWEL development. Note that because no Rapid Drain-Down items existed for Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1, there is no Rapid Drain-Down Equipment List.

The following contents are found in Appendix B:

SWEL Approval Signature Page...................................................................... B-2 T a ble B-1, B ase List 1.....................................

........................................ B -3 T a ble B-2, B ase List 2................................................................................. B -22 T a ble B-3, S W E L 1..................................................................................... B -24 T a ble B -4, S W E L 2..................................................................................... B -31 B-1

12QO108.10-R-O01 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Stevenson & Associates Seismic Walkdown Interim Report, Revision 0 In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 07/13/2012 Kim L. Hull Equipment Selection Preparer date Tony Perez/*

07/13/2012

.6ns Staff Member late Refer to Atta~hment 3 for synopsis of Station Operations role and responsibility.

B-2

12Qo108.1O-R-OO1 Re.v. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table B-1. Base List 1 (Including Equipment Common with Unit 2)

ID Description System Building Elevation Location OCC01A COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER CC Aux 364 ns OCC01P COMPONENT COOLING PUMP ASMBLY CC Aux 364 364-L-1 7 OPM01J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Main Control Room Main Control OPM02J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Room Room 0SX007 0 CC HX OUTLT VLV ASMBLY SX ns 346 12' LOCATED SW OF M-1 6 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST CHLD WTR COOLING COIL&

0VC01AA VC Aux 451 ns CABINET OVC01AB CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTCHLD WTR COOLING COIL&

VC Aux 451 ns CABINET OVC01CA MCR SUPPLY FAN OA ASMBLY VC Aux 451 ns OVC01CB CONTROL ROOM HVAC SUPPLY FAN VC Aux 451 ns OVC01 FA GA MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS VC Aux 451 ns OVC01 FB GB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS VC Aux 451 ns OVC01JA CONT RM HVAC LOCAL CONT PAN ASMBLY VC Aux 451 451-L-10 GVC01JB CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST LOCAL CONT PANEL ASMBLY VC Aux 451 451-L-26 GVC01SA CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTMAKE UP AIR FILTER UNIT VC Aux 463 ns GVC01SB GB VC MAKE-UP FILTER UNIT VC Aux 463 463-L-24 GVC01YA TRAIN B RTRN FAN GB INLT DAMPER VC Aux 0

ns GVC01YB TRAIN B RTRN FAN GB INLT DAMPER VC Aux 0

ns OVC02CA CONTROL ROOM HVAC RETURN FAN ASMBLY VC Aux 451 ns GVC02CB CONTROL ROOM HVAC RETURN FAN ASMBLY VC Aux 426 ns GVC02FA CONTROL RM REC CHARCOAL FILTER A TRAIN ASMBLY VC Aux 0

ns GVC02FB CONTROL RM RE CHARCOAL FILTER B TRAIN ASMBLY VC Aux 0

ns GVC03CA MAKE-UP FILTER FAN ASMBLY VC Aux 426 ns OVC03CB MAKE-UP FAN OVC03CB HOUSING FILTER ASMBLY VC Aux 463 463 OVC05YA ISOLATION DAMPER BUTTERFLY VC Aux ns ns GVC05YB TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER GB INLT DAMPER VC Aux ns ns Table B-1 Page 1 of 19 B-3

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location OVC05YC TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER GB INLT DAMPER VC Aux ns ns OVC05YD TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER GB INLT DAMPER VC Aux ns ns OVC06YA GB VC ABSORBER OUTLET DAMPER A ISOL DAMPER VC Aux ns*

ns OVC06YB TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER GB DISCH DAMPER VC Aux ns ns OVC06YC TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER GB DISCH DAMPER VC Aux ns ns OVC06YD TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER GB DISCH DAMPER VC Aux ns ns TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN GB DISCH FLOW OVC08Y CNRLVC Aux ns ns CONTROL OVC09Y TRAIN B EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM TURB BLDG VC Aux ns ns OVC15J MCR U-1 HVAC START PNL VC Aux 451 ns GVC16J MCR U-2 HVAC START PNL VC Aux 463 ns 0VC17YA ISOLATION DAMPER OPPOSED BLADE VC Aux ns ns OVC17YB TRAIN A RTRN FAN GA INLT DAMPER VC Aux ns ns OVC24Y TRAIN A MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN GA DISCH FLOW VC Aux ns ns CONTROL TRAIN A EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM THE TURB GVC25Y BLGVC Aux ns ns BLDG OW00GICA CHILLED WATER SYS CONTROL ROOM REFRIGERATION WO Aux 383 ns UNIT GA GW001CB CHILLED WATER SYS CONTROL ROOM REFRIGERATION WO Aux 383 ns UNIT GB GWO01 PA GA CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER PUMP ASMBLY WO Aux 383 383-N-8 GWO01 PB GB CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER PUMP ASMBLY WO Aux 383 383-N-9 GWO14MA SEPARATOR AIR M-118 WO Aux 383

+04 GWO14MB SEPARATOR AIR M-118 WO Aux 383

+04 1AF006A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 1A SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY; 6" AF Aux 383 ns 1AF006B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 1 B SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY; 6" AF Aux 383 IN PP RM 1AF017A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 1A SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY; 6" AF Aux 383 ns 1AF017B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 1B SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY; 6" AF Aux 383 IN PP RM 1AF01AA MOTOR DRIVEN AF OIL COOLER AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01AB DIESEL AF PUMP OIL COOLER AF Aux 383 Aux FW Pump Diesel Rm 1AFG1EA-1 AFW BATTERY CHARGER AF Aux ns ns 1AF01 EA-A AF PUMP 1 B BATTERY CHARGER AF Aux 383 ns Table B-1 Page 2 of 19 B-4

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1AF01EA-B AF PUMP 1B BATTERY CHARGER AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01EB-1 AFW PUMP 1B DIESEL ENGINE BATTERY CHARGER AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01EB-A AF BATTERY 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1B AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01EB-B AF BATTERY 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1 B AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01J AF LOCAL CONT PANEL 1B ASMBLY AF Aux 383 383-M-15 1AF01PA PUMP AUX FEEDWATER, MOTOR DRIVEN ASMBLY AF Aux 392 393-N-17 1AF01PA-A 1A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP AUX LUBE OIL PUMP AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01PA-L AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1A MAIN LUBE OIL PUMP AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01PA-M 1A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP MOTOR AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01PB DIESEL DRIVEN AUX FEED PUMP 1B ASMBLY AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01PB-A 1B AUX FEEDWATER PUMP AUX LUBE OIL PUMP AF Aux 383 ns 1AF01PB-B AUX FW PUMP 1B ENG AUX START RLY BATT 1 AF Aux ns ns 1AF01PB-B AUX FW PUMP IB ENG AUX START RLY BATT 2 AF Aux ns ns 1AF01PB-K 1B DIESEL DRIVEN AUX FEED PUMP ENGINE AF Aux 383 383-M-17 1AF01PB-L AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1B MAIN LUBE OIL PUMP AF Aux 383 ns 1AF02A AFW PUMP 1 B GEAR OIL COOLER AF Aux 383 Aux FW Pump

_________Diesel Rm 1AP01E UNIT AUX. POWER TRANSFORMER 141-1 AP Out-side 401 ns 1AP03E UAT 141-2 AP ns ns TRANS YRD 1AP05E EQ 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH GEAR 141 1AP075 ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-M-8 1AP06E 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH BUS 142 AP Aux 426 426 1AP10E EQ 480V ESF SUBSTATION BUS 131X ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-P-10 1AP11E EQ 480V ESF UNIT SUB 131X TRANSFORMER 1AP086 AP Aux 426 426-P-8 IAP12E EQ SWGR 132X 480 VOLT ESF 1VA025 ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-P-7 1AP13E EQ UNIT SUBSTATION 132X TRAN 480V ESF 1AP420 AP Aux 426 426-M-8 1AP21E 480VAUX BLDG ESF MCC 131X1 XFORMER AP Aux 364 ns 1AP22E 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 131X3 ASMBLY AP Aux 383 383-N-15 1AP23E 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 132X1 ASMBLY AP Aux 364 364-P-18 1AP24E EQ 480 V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 132X3 ASMBLY AP Aux 383 383-P-17 1AP25E 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 131X2 ASMBLY AP Aux 414 414-S-11 1AP26E 480V. AUX BLDG ESF MCC 131X4 ASMBLY AP Aux 414 ns 1AP27E EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 132X2 ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-S-12 1AP28E MCC 132X4 ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-S-12 1AP30E EQ 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 131X5 ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-Q-16 Table B-1 Page 3 of 19 B-5

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1AP32E EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 132X5 ASMBLY AP Aux 426 426-P-17 1AP38E ASSY - 480V AUX BLDG MCC 133X1 A AP Aux 346 ns 1AP39E ASS - 480V AUX BLDG MCC 134V1 AP Aux 346 ns 1CC01A COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER CC Aux 364 ns 1CC01PA 1A PUMP, COMPONENT COOLING 12X14-18 M66-3 ASMBLY CC Aux 364 364-M-17 1CC01PB 1B PUMP, COMPONENT COOLING 12X14-18 M66-3 ASMBLY CC Aux 364 364-M-17 1CC01T COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK CC Aux 426 426-P-11 1CC053 INSIDE CNMT PEN CLG SUPPLY ASMBLY; 3" CC Cont 401 OMB -5' 1CC9412A CC TO RH HX 1A ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" CC Aux 364

+11' 1CC9412B CC TO RH HX 1B ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" CC Aux 364

+11' 1CC9422A RHR RLF VLV; 2"- 1" CC Aux 364 IN RHR RM 1CC9422B RHR HX RLF VLV; 2" - 1" CC Aux 364 0

PEN 22 CURVE 1CC9437B CC FROM EXCESS LETDOWN HX ISOL VLVASMBLY; 3" CC Aux 401 WALL WALL 1 PM06J 1CO01J DG 1A RM FP CTRL PANEL CO Aux 401 ns 1CO02J DG 1A DAY TANK ROOM FP CONTROL PANEL CO Aux 401 ns lCO03J DG 1 B ROOM FP CONTROL PANEL CO Aux 401 ns 1CO04J DG 1 B DAY TANK ROOM FP CONTROL PANEL CO Aux 401 ns 1CO17JA DG 1A & DAY TANK FIRE DAMPER PANEL CO Aux 401 ns 1CO17JB DG 1B & DAY TANK FIRE DAMPER PANEL CO Aux 401 ns 1CO19JA LSCR & CAB TUN FIRE DAMPER PANEL CO Aux 401 ns 1CO19JB LSCR FIRE DAMPER CONTROL PANEL CO Aux 439 ns 1CO20J UCSR FIRE DAMPER CONTROL PANEL CO Aux 426 ns 1 CV01FA 1A CV SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER CV Aux 401 ns 1CV01FB 1B CV SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER CV Aux 401 ns 1 CV01 PA PUMP,1A CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING ASMBLY CV Aux 364 364-V-1 7 1CV01PA-A PUMP, 1A CV PP AUX LUBE OIL PP CV Aux 364 364-F-17; (V -

17??)

1CV01PB PUMP,1B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING ASMBLY CV Aux 364 364-ZX-14 1CV01PB-A 1B CNTRFGL CHG PP AUX OIL PP CV Aux 364 ns 1CV02A SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER CV Aux 426 ns 1CV02F SEAL WATER RETURN FILTER CV Aux 401 ns Table B-1 Page 4 of 19 B-6

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1CV02P-C PD CHARGING PUMP FLUID DRIVE OIL COOLER CV Aux 364 ns 1CV02SA 1A CV PUMP GEAR COOLER CV Aux ns ns 1CV02SB 1B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP GEAR COOLER CV Aux ns ns 1CV03SA 1A CV PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER CV Aux ns ns 1CV03SB 1B CV PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER CV Aux ns ns 1CV04AA 1A LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER CV Aux 383 ns 1CV04AB 1B LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER CV Aux 383 ns VCT VLV 1CV1 12B VCT OUTLT ISOL VLV (C/S AT IPM05J) ASMBLY; 4" CV Aux 426 AISLE VCT VLV 1CV112C VCT OUTLT ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J) ASMBLY; 4" CV Aux 426 ALE AISLE 1CV112D RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY; CV Aux 364 CURVE 8"

WALL +12' 1CV112E RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY; CV Aux 364 CURVE 8"

CV Aux WALL +10' 1CV8100 SEAL WTR RTRN CNMT ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY; CV Aux 364 PEN-28 1V8002" Aux 364 1 PM05J 1CV8105 CHG LINE CNMT ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1 PMO5J) ASMBLY; 3" CV Aux 364 PEN-71 1CV8106 CHG LINE CNMT ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY; 3" CV Aux 364 PEN-71 CURVE 1CV8110 CV PMP MINIFLOW ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J) ASMBLY/2" CV Aux 364 WALL 1 PM05J CURVE 1CV8111 CV PMP MINIFLOW ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J) ASMBLY; 2" CV Aux 364 WALL 1PM05J 1CV8112 SEAL WTR RTRN CNMT ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J) ASMBLY; CV Cont 377 OMB PEN-28 2"v 1CV8114 CHARGING PMP MINIFLOW ISOL VLV COBALT-2Y; 2" CV Aux ns ns 1CV8116 1B CV PUMP MINFLOW VLV; 2" CV Aux 364 CWA HX VLV 1CV8123 SEAL WTR HX INLT RLF VLV; 2" - 3" CV Aux 383 ALE AISLE CURVE 1CV8124 VCT SUP HDR RLF VLV; 3/4" - 1" CV Aux 364 WALVE WALL +7' I1CV8145 PZR AUXILIARY SPRAY VLV (C/S AT I1PM05J); 2" "CV Cont 412 OMB Table B-1 Page 5 of 19 B-7

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1CV8152 LETDOWN LINE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VLV CV ns ns ns 1CV8355A RCP 1A SEAL INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J)

CV Aux 401 PEN 33 ASMBLY; 2" 1CV8355B RCP 1B SEAL INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J)

CV Aux 364 PEN 53 ASMBLY; 2" 1CV8355C RCP 1C SEAL INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J)

CV Aux 364 PEN 53 ASMBLY; 2" 1CV8355D RCP 1 D SEAL INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J)

CV Aux 401 PEN 33 ASMBLY; 2" 1CV8804A RH HX 1A TO CV PMPS SUCT ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J)

CV Aux 364 CURVE ASMBLY; 8" WALL WALL 1DC01E 125V BATTERY 111 DIV. 11 DC Aux 451 ns 1DC02E 125V BATTERY 112 DIV. 12 DC Aux 451 ns 1DC03E BATTERY CHARGER 111 DIV.11 DC Aux 451 ns 1DC04E BATTERY CHARGER 112 DIV. 12 DC Aux 451 ns 1 DC05E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER 111 DC Aux 451 ns 1DC05EA 125V DC ESF DIST. PNL. 111 DC Aux 451 ns 1 DC06E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER 112 DC Aux 451 ns lDC06EA 125V DC ESF DIST PNL 112 DC Aux 451 ns lDC10J 125V DC FUSE PANEL - DIV. 11 DC Aux 451 ns 1DC11J 125V DC FUSE PANEL-DIV. 12 DC Aux 451 ns 1DG01KA 1A DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE DG Aux 401 ns 1DG01KB 1B DIESEL GENERATOR DG Aux 401 401-L-6 lDG01SA AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE 1A DG Aux 401 ns 1DG01SB AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE 1B DG Aux 401 ns 1DG04EA DIESEL GENERATOR 1A SYNCHRO-CHECK RELAY BOX DG ns ns ns 1DG04EB DIESEL GENERATOR 1B SYNCHRO-CHECK RELAY BOX DG ns ns ns Diesel Oil 1 DO01PA 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 1A DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm-1A Diesel Oil 1 DO01PB 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 1B DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm - 1B Table B-1 Page 6 of 19 B-8

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location Diesel Oil 1DO01PC 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 1C DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm-1A Diesel Oil 1DO01PD 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 1D DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm - 1B Diesel Oil 1DO01TA DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK 1A DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm-1A Diesel Oil 1DO01TB DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK 1B DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm - 1B Diesel Oil 1DO01TC DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK 1C DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm-1A Diesel Oil 1DO01TD DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK 1D DO Aux 373 Storage Tank Rm - 1B 10D02TA 500 GAL DAY TANK 1A DO Aux 401 Diesel Oil Day Tank Rm #2 1 DO02TB 500 GALLON DAY TANK 1 B DO Aux 401 Diesel Oil Day Tank Rm #1 1DO1OT 500 GAL DIESEL OIL DAY TANK DO Aux 383 Oil Day Tank Room #1 1 FC009 ISOLATION VALVE FC Con 377

+10 1FC012 ISOLATION VALVE FC Con 377

+14 1FT-0121 CHARGING LINE D/P CELL FLOW XMITTR ns ns ns ns LOCAL 1 FT-0132 LETDOWN FLOW DIP CELL ns ns ns MOUNT LOCAL 1 FT-0139 LOOP FILL HEADER FLOW XMITTR ns ns ns MOUNT 1 FT-0688 RESID HT EXCH 1B CCW OUT DP FLOW XMITTR CC ns ns ns 1 FT-0689 RESID HX 1A CCW OUT DP FLOW XMITTR CC ns ns ns 1FT-AF011 SG 1A AUX FEED PUMP 1A FLOW XMTTR AF Aux 364 ns 1FT-AF012 AF TO SG 1A FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux 364 ns Table B-1 Page 7 of 19 B-9

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1 FT-AF01 3 AF TO SB 1 B FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux 364 ns 1FT-AF014 AF TO SG 1B FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux ns ns 1FT-AF015 AF TO SG 1C FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux ns ns 1FT-AF016 AF TO SG 1C FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux ns ns 1FT-AF017 AF TO SG 1D FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux 364 ns 1FT-AF018 AF TO SG 1D FLOW TRANSMITTER AF Aux 364 ns 11POlE INSTRUMENT BUS 111 TRANSFORMER - DIV. 11 IP ns ns ns 1IPO1J 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 111 - DIV.

IP Aux 451 ns 11 IlP02E INSTRUMENT BUS 112 TRANSFORMER - DIV. 12 IP ns ns ns 11IP02J 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 112 - DIV.

IP Aux 451 ns 12 lIP03E INSTRUMENT BUS 113 TRANSFORMER - DIV. 11 IP ns ns ns 11IP03J 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 113-IP Aux 451 ns DIV. 11 IlP04E INSTRUMENT BUS 114 TRANSFORMER - DIV. 12 IP ns ns ns 11IP04J 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 114 -DIV IP Aux 451 ns 12 lIP05E INSTRUMENT BUS 111 INVERTER - DIV. 11 IP Aux 451 ns lIP06E INSTRUMENT BUS 112 INVERTER - DIV. 12 IP Aux 451 ns lIP07E INSTRUMENT BUS 113 INVERTER - DIV. 11 IP Aux 451 ns IlP08E INSTRUMENT BUS 114 INVERTER - DIV. 12 IP Aux 451 ns 1 IY-0606 RH HX 1A OUT I/P TRANSDUCER RH Aux 364 ns 1 IY-0607 RH HX #1 B OUT I/P TRANSDUCER RH Aux 364 ns 1 LS-0940A CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL SWITCH SI Cont 377 ns 1 LS-0941A CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL SWITCH SI Cont 377 ns 1LT-0459 EQ PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER RY Cont 377 377-R-12; 1 PL50J 1LT-0460 EQ PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER RY Cont 377 377-R-16 1 LT-0461 PZR LVL TRANSMITTER RY Cont 377 377-R-7 1 LT-0501 SG LOOP 1A W-RNG LEVEL D/P XMTTR FW Con 377 1 PL50J 1 LT-0502 SG LOOP 1 B W-RNG LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER FW Con 377 1 PL67J 1 LT-0503 SG LOOP 1C W-RNG LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER FW Con 377 1 PL75J 1 LT-0504 SG LOOP 1 D W-RNG LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER FW Con 377 1 PL52J Table B-1 Page 8 of 19 B-10

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1LT-0517 S/G LOOP 1A LEVEL DIP XMTTR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 401 ns 1LT-0518 S/G 1A LEVEL LOOP DIP XMTTR 2/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0519 S/G LOOP LA LEVEL DIP XMTTR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0527 S/G LOOP 1 B LEVEL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 377 ns 1 LT-0528 S/G 1B LEVEL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0529 S/G LOOP 1 B LEVEL DIP XMTTR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0537 S/G LP 1C LVL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 377 ns 1LT-0538 S/G 1C LEVEL LOOP D/P XMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0539 S/G LP 1C LVL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0547 S/G LP 1 D LVL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 401 ns 1 LT-0548 S/G 1D LEVEL LOOP DIP XMTTR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0549 S/G 1D LVL LOOP DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0556 S/G LOOP 1A LEVEL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG' FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0557 S/G 1B LEVEL LP DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1LT-0558 S/G LOOP IC LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1 LT-0559 S/G LOOP 1D LEVEL DIP TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 ns 1LT-0930 REF WTR STG TK LEVEL DIP XMTTR S

RWST 379

+05 Tunnel 1 LT-0931 REF WTR STG TK LVL DIP XMTTR SI 379

+06 Tunnel 1 LT-0932 REF WTR STG TK LVL DIP XMTTR SI RWST 379 ns Tunnel 1 LT-0933 REF WTR STG TK LVL DIP XMTTR SRWST 379 ns Tunnel 1MS001A MS ISOL VLV LOOP 1A ASMBLY; 30-1/4" MS Aux 377 1PM06J 1 MS001B MS ISOL VLV LOOP 1 B ASMBLY; 32-3/4" MS Aux 377 1 PM06J 1MS001C MS ISOL VLV LOOP 1C ASMBLY; 32-3/4" MS Aux 377 1PM06J 1MS001D MS ISOL VLV LOOP 1DASMBLY; 30-1/4" MS Aux 377 1 PM06J 1MSO13A S/G IA 1235 PSIG RELIEF; 6" MS Ax401 A SAFETY VLV RM B SAFETY 1MSO13B S/G lB 1235 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLR C SAFETY 1MS013C SG1C 1235 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLVRM I

I VLV RM Table B-1 Page 9 of 19 B-11

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1MS013D S/G 1D 1235 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 DSAFETY VLV RM B SAFETY 1MS014A S/G 1A 1220 PSlG RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLVRM VLV RM C SAFETY 1MS014B S/G 1B 1220 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLVRM VLV RM A SAFETY lMS014C S/G 1C 1220 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLVRM VLV RM 1MS014D S/G 1D 1220 PSIG D RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 D SAFETY VLV RM 1MS015A S/G 1A 1205 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 D SAFETY VLV RM A SAFETY 1MS015B S/G 1B 1205 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 BSAFETY VLV RM C SAFETY lMS015C S/G 1C 1205 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 V

RM VLV RM lMS015D S/G 1D 1205 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 D SAFETY VLV RM lMS016A S/G 1A 1190 PSIG RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 A SAFETY VLV RM C SAFETY 1MS016B S/G 1B 1190 PSIG RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLVRM VLV RM D SAFETY 1MS016C S/G 1C 1190 PSIG RELIEF; 6" MS Aux 401 VLVRM VLV RM lMS016D S/G 1D 1190 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MVS Aux 401 DSFT VLV RM 1 MS01 7A S/G 1A 1175 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MVS Aux 401 ASFT VLV RM lMS017B S/G 1B 1175 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MVS Aux 401 BSFT VLV RM lMS017C S/G 1C 1175 PSIG RELIEF; 6" MVS Aux 401 CSFT VLV RM lMS017D S/G 1D 1175 PS1G RELIEF; 6" MVS Aux 401 DSFT VLV RM lMS018A S/G 1A PORV ASMVBLY; 8" MS Aux 401 ns Table B-1 Page 10 of 19 B-1 2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1 MS018B S/G 1B PORV ASMBLY; 8" MS Aux 401 1PM03J 1MS018C S/G 1C PORV ASMBLY; 8" MS Aux 401 1PM03J 1MS018D S/G 1D PORV ASMBLY; 8" MS Aux 401 1PM03J 1NI-31B SOURCE RANGE ns ns ns 1 PM07J 1NI-32B SOURCE RANGE ns ns ns 1PM07J 1NR11E POSTACCIDENT NEUTRON DETECTOR NR Cont ns ns 1NR13E POSTACCIDENT NEUTRON DETECTOR NR Cont ns ns Aux. Elect.

1PA01J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 1)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA02J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 2)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA03J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 3)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA04J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 4)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1 PA06J CONTROL SYSTEM CABINET (I&C Rack Ctrl. Cab. Grp. 2)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER) 1 PA07J PROC I&C RACK CONT GRP 3 CAB 7 PA Aux 451 0

Aux. Elect.

1 PA08J CONTROL SYSTEM CABINET (I&C Rack CtrI. Cab. Grp. 4)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1 PA09J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (SSPS Cab. Train A)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA1OJ PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET(SSPS Cab. Train B)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA11J SAFEGUARDS TEST CABINET TRAIN A PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Table B-1 Page 11 of 19 B-1 3

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location Aux. Elect.

1PA12J SAFEGUARDS TEST CABINET TRAIN B PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA13J ESF SEQUENCING & ACTUATION CABINET TRAIN A PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA14J ESF SEQUENCING & ACTUATION CABINET TRAIN B PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA27J AUX SAFEGUARD RELAY CABINET (A)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA28J AUX SAFEGUARD RELAY CABINET (B)

PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1 PA33J CONTROL SYSTEM CABINET ESF DIV. 11 PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1PA34J CONTROL SYSTEM CABINET ESF DIV. 12 PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1 PA51J RX VESSEL LEVEL CHANNEL A HJTC CABINET PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER)

Aux. Elect.

1 PA52J RX VESSEL LEVEL CHANNEL B HJTC CABINET PA Aux 451 Equip. Rm (AEER) 1PL04J REMOTE CONTROL PANEL (Remote Shutdown Panel) ns Aux 383 ns 1PL05J REMOTE CONTROL PANEL (Remote Shutdown Panel) ns Aux 383 ns 1PL06J REMOTE CONTROL PANEL (Remote Shutdown Panel) ns Aux 383 ns 1PL07J 1A DG CONTROL PANEL DG Aux 401 ns 1PL08J 1B DG CONTROL PANEL DG Aux 401 ns 1PL1OJ FIRE HAZARDS PANEL ns Aux 426 ns 1PL50J LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL ns Cont 377 377-R-12 1PL52J LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL ns Cont 377 ns Table B-1 Page 12 of 19 B-14

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1PL66J LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL ns Cont 377 377-R-1 1PL67J LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL ns Cont 377 377-R-21 1PL75J LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL ns Cont 412 412-R-6 1PL77JC LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 377 1B MSIV Rm 1PL79JB LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 377 1A MSIV Rm 1PL84JA LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 383 ns 1 PL84JB LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 383 ns 1 PL85JB LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 383 ns 1PL86J LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 364 ns 1PL97J LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ns Aux 364 ns Main Control 1PM04J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Room Room Main Control 1PM04J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Room Room Main Control 1 PM06J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Room Room 1PM07J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451Control Room 1PM11J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Main Control Room Main Control IPM12J MAIN CONTROL BOARD ns Aux 451 Room Room 1PT-0455 EQ PZR PRESSURE CHANNEL 1 RY Cont 377 377-R-12; 1 PL50J 1PT-0456 EQ PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CHANNEL 2 RY Cont 377 377-R-16 1PT-0457 PRZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER RY Cont 377 377-R-7; 1 PL52J 1 PT-0458 PRZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER RY Cont 0

1 PL75J 1PT-0514 S/G LOOP 1A STM PRESS TRANSMITTER FW MSIV 377 ns 1PT-0515 S/G LOOP 1A STM PRESS PRESS XMTTR FW MSIV 377 ns 1PT-0516 S/G LOOP 1A STM PRESS XMTTR FW MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0524 S/G LOOP 1 B STM PRESS XMTTR FW MSIV 377 ns Table B-1 Page 13 of 19 B-1 5

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1 PT-0525 S/G LOOP 1 B STM PRESS PRESS XMTTR FW MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0526 S/G LOOP 1 B STM PRESS XMTTR FWV MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0534 S/G LP 1 C STM PRESS XMTTR FW MSIV 377 ns 1PT-0535 S/G LP IC STM PRESS PRESSURE XMTTR FWV MSIV 377 ns 1PT-0536 S/G LO 1C PRES PRESS TRANSMITTER FWV MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0544 S/G LP 1 D STM PRESS PRESSURE XMTTR FWV MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0545 S/G LOOP 1 D STM PRESS XMTTR FWV MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0546 S/G LP 1 D STM PRESS XMTTR FWV MSIV 377 ns 1 PT-0935 CNMT PRESS XMTTR SI Con 451

+04 1 PT-0936 CONT PRESS XMTTR SI Con 451

+04 1IPT-403 LOOP A RC HOT LET WIDE RANGE PRESSURE RC Cont 0

1 PL75J TRANSMITTER 1 PT-405 LOOP C RC HOT LET WIDE RANGE PRESSURE RC Cont 0

1 PL66J TRANSMITTER 1PT-406 LOOP A RC HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESS TRANSMITTER RC Cont 0

1 PL75J 1PT-407 LOOP C RC HOT LET WIDE RANGE PRESS TRANSMITTER RC Cont 0

1 PL66J 1RC01BA STEAM GENERATOR 1A RC Cont ns ns 1RC01BB STEAM GENERATOR 1B RC Cont ns ns 1RC01BC STEAM GENERATOR 1C RC Cont ns ns 1RC01BD STEAM GENERATOR 1D RC Cont ns ns 1RC01PA REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1A RC Con 390 ns 1RC01PB REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1B RC Con 390 ns 1RC01 PC REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1C RC Con 390 ns 1RC01PD REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1D RC Con 390 ns 1RC01R REACTOR VESSEL (INTERNALS)

RC Cont ns ns 1RD01E 1A MG SET RD Aux 451 Misc. Elect.

Equip. Rm Misc. Elect.

1RD02E 1B MG SET RD Aux 451 Equip. Rm 1 RD05E RX TRIP BREAKERS RD ns ns ns 1RHI01PA PUMP, 1A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL ASMBLY RH Aux 364 364-U-13 1RHI01PA-A RH PUMP 1A SEAL COOLER RH Aux 346 ns 1RH01PB PUMP,1B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL ASMBLY RH Aux 364 364-Y-13 1 RH01 PB-A RH PUMP 1 B SEAL COOLER RH Aux 346 ns Table B-1 Page 14 of 19 B-16

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1RH02AA RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A RH Aux 364 ns 1RH02AB RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B RH Aux 364 ns RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HX 1A FLOW CONT VLV A3+10 1A RH ASMBLY; 8" HX RM N.E.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HX 1 B FLOW CONT VLV

+1 'u 3B RH 1 RH607 ASBY "RH Aux 357 HX RM N. OF ASMBLY; 8" H

HX

@FLOOR IA 1RH610 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PMP 1A MINIFLOW VLV ASMBLY; RH Aux 357 RH HX RM 3"

N.E. OF HX RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PMP 1B MINIFLOWVLVASMBLY;

@FLOOR B B

1 RH611 31RH Aux 357 RH HX RM 3"

N.W. OF HX 1 RH8701A RC LOOP 1A TO RH PMP 1A SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" RH Cont 377 OMB PEN 68

+10' IMB NEAR RX 1 RH8701B RC LOOP 1A TO RH PMP 1A SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" RH Cont 377 FNDATI FOUNDATIO N

1 RH8702A RC LOOP 1C TO RH PMP 1 B SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" RH Cont 377 OMB PEN 75

+10' IMB NEAR RX 1RH8702B RC LOOP 1C TO RH PMP 1B SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" RH Cont 377 FNDATI FOUNDATIO N

+11 NEAR S.

1 RH8716A HX 1A DISCH CROSSTIE VLV ASMBLY; 8" RH Aux 364 WALL WALL CWA +11' 1RH8716B 1B RH HX DISCHARGE XTIE VLV ASMBLY; 8" RH Aux 364 NEAR S.

WALL 1RY01S PRESSURIZER (SPIN RCP.CPR) ASMBLY RY Cont 426 ns 1RY01T PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK RY Cont 383 ns 1RY32MA PORV ACCUMULATOR 1A RY Cont 426 ns 1RY32MB PORV ACCUMULATOR 1B RY Cont 426 ns S1RY455A PZR PORV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY RY Cont 451 ABOVE PZR IMB NEAR ID 1RY455B PZR SPRAY VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY RY Cont 390 RCP RCP Table B-1 Page 15 of 19 B-1 7

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1 RY455C PZR SPRAY VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY RY Cont 390 1MB NEAR ID RCP 1 RY456 PZR PORV (C/S AT 1PM05J) ASMBLY RY Cont 451 TOP OF PZR 1 RY8028 PW TO PRT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VLV RY Cont 387 ns 1RY8046 U-I PRT 1RY01T PWSUP CHK VLV RY Cont ns ns 1SI01T REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK SI FH 401 ns 1SI05TA CNMT RECIRC SUMP SI Cont 377 IMB 1SI05TB CNMT RECIRC SUMP SI Cont 377 IMB 1S18801A CHG PMP TO COLD LEGS INJECTION ISOL (C/S AT 1PM05J)

SI Aux 375 PEN 26 CWA ASMBLY; 4" 1S18801B CHG PMP TO COLD LEGS INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S AT SI Aux 375 PEN-26 CWA 1PM05J) ASMBLY; 4" PEN AREA 1S18811A CNMT SUMP 1A ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 24" SI Aux 364 PMNAE (1 PM0SJ) 1S18811B EQ CNMT SUMP 1B ISOL VLV; 24" SI Aux 364 364-Y-13 1A CS PP RM 1S18812A PMP 1A SUCT FROM RWST ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" SI Aux 343 1PP 1(1 PMOSJ) 1B RH PP RM 1S18812B ASSY - PMP 1B SUCT FROM RWST ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 12" SI Aux 343 1PP (1 PM06J) 1S18840 MOV U-1 RH HXS TO 1A/1C LOOP HL ISOL VLV SI Aux 374

+05 (EOP VLV) 4' DOWN N 1SX001A ESSENTIAL SERVICE WTR PMP 1A SUCT VLV ASMBLY/ 36" SX Aux 346 VLV P VLV PIT 4' DOWN N 1 SX001 B ESSENTIAL SERVICE WTR PMP 1 B SUCT VLV ASMBLY; 36" SX Aux 346 VL PIT VLV PIT 1SX01AA 1A SX PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER SX Aux ns ns 1SX01AB 1 B SX PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER SX Aux ns ns 1SX01FA 1A SX PP DSCH STRN SX Aux 330

+03 1SX01FB 1B SX PP DSCH STRN SX Aux 330

+03 1SX01K DIESEL DRIVEN AF PUMP CLOSED CYCLE HX SX Aux ns ns 1SX01PA PUMP, 1A ESSENTIAL SER WTR ASMBLY SX Aux 330 330-M-13 1SXO1PA-C 1A SX PP AUX LUBE OIL PUMP SX Aux 330 330 1SX01PB PUMP,1B ESSENTIAL SER WTR ASMBLY SX Aux 330 330-P-18 1SX01PB-C SX PUMP 1B AUX LUBE OIL PP SX Aux 330 ns Table B-1 Page 16 of 19 B-1 8

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1SX02K DIESEL DRIVEN AF PUMP RT ANG GEAR SX Aux ns ns 1SX101A MOTOR DRIVEN AF PMP 1A OIL CLR SX OUTLT VLV SX Aux 383

+11 ASMBLY; 1-1/2" 1SX1 12A CNMT CHILLER 1A INLT ISOL VLV ASMBLY; 10" SX Aux 401

+8'(0MP02J) 1SX112B CNMT CHILLER 1B INLT ISOLVLVASMBLY; 10" SX Aux 401

+9' (OPM02J) 1SX114A ASSY -AOV 1A CNMT CHLR 1WO01CA SX RTRN VLV SX Aux 401

+7 1SX114B ASSY - AOV 1 B CNMT CHLR 1WO01CB SX RTRN VLV SX Aux 401

+7 1SX147A RCFC CHILLER CNDSR 1A BYPASS VLV ASMBLY; 16" SX Aux 401

+8' (0PM02J) 1SX147B RCFC CHILLER CNDSR 1B BYPASS VLV ASMBLY; 16" SX Aux 401

+9' (OPM02J)

NE CORNER 1SX169A DG 1A SX VLV ASMBLY; 10" SX Aux 401 DG RM 1A

+13'

+13' lB D/G 1SX169B DG 1B SX VLVASMBLY; 10" SX Aux 401 RM NE CORNER SX SUP VLV TO ENG Driven CLG WTR PP FOR Diesel Driven

+10' AF PMP 1SX173 AFPSY "Aux 383 R

AF PP ASSY; 6" RM SX Au 383

+7' AF PMP 1SX178 SX RETURN FROM 1B AUX FEED PMP HX ASMBLY; 6" SX Aux 383 RM 1TE-0463 PZR RELIEF DISCH RTD RY Cont 439 447-R-7 1TE-0464 PZR SAFE DISCH RTD RY Cont 435 435-R-7 1TE-0465 PRZR SAFE DISCH RTD RY Cont 435 438-R-7 1TE-0466 PZR SAFE DISCH RTD RY Cont 439 442-R-7 1TE-0604 RHR LP 1A RETURN TEMPERATURE RTD RH Aux 375 375-S-13 1 TE-0605 RHR LP 1 B RETURN TEMPERATURE RTD RH Aux 375 375 1TE-0674 CC HX DISCH RTD 100 OHMS PLATINUM TEMP ELEM CC ns ns ns 1 TE-RCO22A RC WIDE RANGE LP 1A TEMP RC Con 390

+03 RC022A 1 TE-RCO23A RC WIDE RANGE LP 1A TEMP RC Con 390

+03 RC022B I1TE-RCO23B RC WIDE RANGE LP 1B TEMP RC Con 390

+03 RC023AI 1REýC WIDE RANGE LP 1 B TEMP RC Con 390

+3 RC023BII

+

Table B-1 Page 17 of 19 B-19

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1 TE-1CO24A RC WIDE RANGE LP 1C TEMP RC Con 390

+03 RC024A I1TE-RCO24B RC WIDE RANGE LP 1C TEMP RC Con 390

+05 RC024B 1 TE-RCO25A RC WIDE RANGE LP 1 D TEMP RC Con 390

+03 RC025A 1 TE-RCO25B RC WIDE RANGE LP 1 D TEMP RC Con 390

+03 RC025B 1VA01J EXX SERV WATER PMP 1A CUB COOLER LOCAL PNL VA Aux 330 ns 1VA01SA COOLER ESSENTIAL SERV WATER PUMP 95-10 VA Aux 330 330-P-15 1VA01SB COOLER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP 95-10 VA Aux 330 330-M-19 1VA02J ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATE1B CUBICLE COOLER LOCA VA Aux 330 ns 1VA02SA 1A RHR PUMP ROOM CUB CLR ASMBLY VA Aux 346 346-13-U 1VA02SB 1B RHR PUMP ROOM CUB CLR ASMBLY VA Aux 346 346-X-13 1VA03J RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CUBICLE COOLER LOCAL P VA Aux ns ns 1VA04J RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CUBICLE COOLER LOCAL P VA Aux 346 ns 1VA04SA 1A SI PP CUB CLR VA Aux 364 ns 1VA04SB 1B SI PP CUB CLR VA Aux 364 ns 1VA06SA COOLERCENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1A VA Aux 364 364-U-17 1VA06SB CCOLER AUX BLDG HVAC SYS CEN CHG PP 1B 95-7 VA Aux 364 364-U-17 1VA08S AUX BLDG HVAC SYSTEM D-D AF PUMP-1 B CUBICLE VA Aux 383 ns 1VA1OJ CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PCUBICLE COOLER LOCAL P VA Aux 364 ns 1VA11J CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PCUBICLE COOLER LOCAL P VA Aux 364 ns 1VD01CA DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM VENT FAN ASMBLY VD Aux 401 401-Q-8 1VD01CB 1B DG ROOM HVAC FAN ASMBLY VD Aux 401 ns 1VD01JA DIESEL GEN ROOM HVAC SYSTEM ANN PANEL 1A VD Aux 401 401-P-8 1VD01JB DIESEL GEN ROOM HVAC SYSTEM ANN PANEL VD Aux ns ns 1VD04J 1A DG RM HVAC DMPR START PNL VD Aux 401 ns 1VD05J 1B DG RM HVAC DMPR START PNL VD Aux 401 ns 1VE01C MISC ELECT EQUIP ROOM VENT FAN ASMBLY VE Aux 426 ns 1VE01J MEER VENTILATION SYSTEM ANN. PANEL ASMBLY VE Aux 451 451-Q-8 1VE02C BATTERY RM 112 EXHAUST FAN VE Aux ns ns 1VE03C BATTERY RM 111 EXHAUST FAN VE Aux 451 ns 1VE04C ASSY - U-1 MISC ELEC EQUIP RM DIV 11 EXH FAN VE Aux 463

+22 Table B-1 Page 18 of 19 B-20

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 1VE04J MISC ELEC EQUIP RM DAMPER STARTER PANEL VE Aux 451 ns 1VE05C ASSY - U-1 MISC ELEC EQUIP RM DIV 12 EXH FAN VE Aux 463

+13 1VP01AA CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 1A (RCFC)

VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01AB CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 1 B (RCFC)

VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01AC CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 1C (RCFC)

VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01AD CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 1D (RCFC)

VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01CA PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01CB PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01CC PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 1VP01CD PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 1VX01C DIV 12 ESF SWGR ROOM FAN ASMBLY VX aux 364 ns 1VX01J ESF/BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION SYS ANN PANEL VX Aux 426 426-Q-10 1VX02J MISC VENTILATION SYSTEM ANN PANEL VX Aux 426 426-P-6 1VX04C ESF SWGR ROOM DIV 11 VENT FAN CABLE 1VX001 ASMBLY VX Aux 439 443-Q-7 1VX07J ESF SWGR RM DIV 12 HVAC DMPR START PNL VX Aux 426 ns 1VX08J ESF SWGR RM DIV 11 HVAC DMPR START PNL VX Aux 426.

ns Reactor CNMT Fan CLG 1A/1C Chiller WTR INLT CNMT ISOL ORC PEN 6 1WO006A WO Aux 401

+61 VLV ASBLY; 10"

+6'___

1W0006B Reactor CNMT Fan CLRS 1B/1D CHLR WTR INLT CNMT ISOL WO Aux 375 ORC PEN 10 VLV ASBLY; 10" 1WO020A REACTOR CNMT FAN CLRS 1A/1C CHLR WTR OUTLT CNMT WO Aux 401 ORC PEN 5 ISOL VLV ASSY; 10"

+61 1WO020B CNMT FAN COOLERS 1B/1D CHL WTR OUTLET CNMT ISOL WO Aux 375 CWA PEN 8 ASMBLY; 10" 1 W0056A Reactor CNMT Fan CLRS 1A/1C Chiller WTR Outlet CNMT ISOL WO Cant 401 PEN 5+6' VLV ASSY; 10" 1W0056B Reactor CNMT Fan CLS 1 B/1D Chiller WTR OUTLT CNMT ISOL WO Cant 401 PEN 8 VLV ASSY; 10" 1

Table B-1 Page 19 of 19 B-21

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table B-2. Base List 2 (Including Equipment Common with Unit 2)

ID Description Building Elevation Column OFC001 REFUEL WTR PURIF PMPS DISCH TO FUEL CASK FILL AUX 401 15 Y OFC002A REFUEL WTR PURIF PMPS DISCH TO SPENT FUEL PIT AUX 385 15 X 0FC003 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP GB SUCTION ISO VLV 364 12 S OFC004 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP GB DISCH CHECK AUX 364'+8' 12 S 0FC006A REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO OPI-FC003 364 12 S OFC007A REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP GA DISCH INST ROOT TO OPI-FC005 AUX 364 12 S OFC011 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP GA CASING DRN 364 12 S OFC012 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO OPI-FC003 AUX 364 17 Q 0FC013 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP GA DISCH INST ISOL TO OPI-FC005 AUX 364 17 Q OFC03PA PUMP REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION OA ASMBLY AUX 364 12 S OFC8754 SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL FH 401 18 Y OFC8763 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP GA DISCH CHECK AUX 364+18' 12 S OFC8790 SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL FH 401 18 Y OHS-FC002 REFUELING WATER PURIF PUMP OA AUX 364 12 S OLS-FC010 SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL SWITCH 418 20 X OPI-FC003 REFUELING VVTR PURIFICATION PUMP GA SUCT PRESS OPI-FC005 RFLG VVTR PURIF PUMP GA DISCHARGE GAUGE AUX 364 17 S OTEW-RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP GA DISCH FC007 OTI-FC007 REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP GA DISCH TEMP IND AUX 364 12 S OTIS-0626 SPENT FUEL POOL TEMP INDICATING SWITCH FH 426 20 X 1FC004A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE VENT FH 401 17 Z 1FC004B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE VENT FH 401 17 Y 1FC005 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING DRN FH 401 18 Y 1FC006 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING VENT FH 401 18 Y 1 FC007 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 REFU CAVITY DRN TEST AUX 364 12 U CONN 1FC008 SPENT FUEL PIT FLT DEMIN RTRN TO Ul REFUEL CAV DRN TEST CONN AUX 364 12 S 1FC009 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL CNMT 377 7 R 1FC010 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL AUX 364 12 U 1FC011 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-1 REFUEL CAV CNMT AUX 364 12 S Table B-2 Page 1 of 2 B-22

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description Building Elevation Column ISOL 1FC012 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-1 REFUEL CAV CNMT CNMT 377 8 R ISOL 1 FC01 3 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP DISCH TO SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN AUX 401 17 Q LOOP 1FC01A SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCHANGER FH 401 17 Z 1FC01P U-1 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP AUX 401 18 Y 1 FC021 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH I NST ISOL TO 1 PI-627 FH 401 17 AA 1 FC022 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST ISOL TO 1 PI-633 FH 401 19 AA 1FC02M SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP START UP STRAINER 1FC032 REFUEL WTR PURIF PUMP SUCT FROM U-1 REFUEL CAVITY DRN CONN 364 12 U 1FC03F SPENT FUEL PIT STRAINER 1FC03PA PUMP, OA REFUELING WATER PURIFICATION 1FC8756 Ul SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCTION ISOL FH 401 18 Y 1 FC8757 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST ROOT TO 1 PI-633 FH 401 18 Y 1FC8758 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 RWST AUX 364 13 V 1 FC8761 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH INST ROOT TO 1 PI-627 FH 401 17 Y 1FC8762A SPENT FUEL PIT HX INLET FH 401 17 Z 1FC8762B UI SPENT FUEL PIT HX OUTLET FH 401 17 Z 1FC8765 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO SPENT FUEL PIT AUX 401 15 X 1FC8766 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-1 RWST CHECK VLV 1FC8792A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE DRN FH 401 17 Z 1FC8792B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE DRN FH 401 17 Z 1FC8793 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH CHECK FH 401 17 Y 1FC8794 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP INLT ISOL FH 401 17 Y 1FI-0631 FC DEMIN FLOW INDICATOR AUX 390 12 N 1HS-FC001 SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP FH 401 1PI-0627 GAUGE; PRESSURE, U.S. GAUGE CO.,0-160 PSIG FH 401 17 AA 1PI-0630 SPENT FUEL POOL FILTER OUTLET PRESSURE INDICA 1PI-0633 SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATO FH 401 AA-19 1TI-0628 SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCH OUTLET TEMP INDICAT 1TW-0628 SFP HX OUTLET WELL AUX 364 14 V Table B-2 Page 2 of 2 B-23

DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING I ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Seismic Cat 1?

Safety Function(s)

New or Replace IPEEE Enhancemer KEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 463 463 HVAC G VC S Support

-OW CONTROL Axlay 43 6HVCCY System HVAC ERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 HV VC Y

Support

ý BLDG System HVAC Support

%C SUP FLTRS (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 HV VC Y

System HVACS ROL BOARD (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels Auxiliary 451 451 MAIN C PM Y

ESFAS and Cabinets

,N SYSTEM CABINET (I&E (20) Instrumentation Yes - Interactio

-I 1) and Control Panels concern. Adjac and Cabinets Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 AU PA ESFAS cabinets not bo together.

,N SYSTEM CABINET (I&E (20) Instrumentation Yes - Interactio

-I 3) and Control Panels concern. Adjac and Cabinets Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 AU PA Y

ESFAS cabinets not bo together.

ACK CONT GRP 3 CAB 7 (20) Instrumentation Yes - Interactio and Control Panels concern. Adjac and Cabinets Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 AU PA Y

ESFAS cabinets not bo together.

NCING & ACTUATION (20) Instrumentation Yes - Interactio

,AIN B and Control Panels concern. Adjac and Cabinets Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 AU PA Y

ESFAS cabinets not bo together.

UARD RELAY CABINET (B)

(20) Instrumentation Yes - Interactio and Control Panels concern. Adjac and Cabinets Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 AU PA Y

ESFAS cabinets not bo together.

YSTEM CABINET ESF DIV.

(20) Instrumentation Yes - Interactio and Control Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-i AU PA Y

ESFAS concern. Adjac and Cabinets cabinets not bo S_

I_

I_ _

I_

together.

JTRUMENT BUS

'*'Nk 1 M' A k I r-I1 441*1 r-%l 1% 14,"n (14) Distribution Panels Support A

A Il

'-'I

,OOM HVAC SYST CHLD (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 HV VC Y

Support NG COIL& CABINET System HVAC DAMPER BUTTERFLY (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 HV VC Y

Support

____System HVAC VAC LOCAL CONT PAN (20) Instrumentation Support and Control Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 HV WO Y

System HVAC and Cabinets SystemHVAC

'AC START PNL (20) Instrumentation Support and Control Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 HV VC Y

System HVAC and Cabinets SystemHVAC 1ISC ELEC EQUIP RM DIV (09) Fans Auxiliary 463 451 DIV 12 VE Y

Supp HVort

___System HVAC JT BUS 112 TRANSFORMER (04) Transformers Support Yes - Interactio Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 AP Y

System DC with adjacent M Power F DIST CENTER 112 (14) Distribution Panels Support Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 DC Y

System DC Power SE PANEL - DIV. 12 (14) Distribution Panels Support Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 DC Y

System DC Power SE PANEL - DIV. 11 (14) Distribution Panels Support Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 11 DC Y

System DC Power

RY 112 DIV. 12 (15) Batteries on Support Racks Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 DC Y

System DC Y

Power

.RY 111 DIV. 11 (15) Batteries on Support Racks Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 11 DC Y

System DC Y

Power HARGER 112 DIV. 12 (16) Battery Chargers Yes - Interactio and Inverters concern. Adjac cabinets not bo Support together.

Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 DC Y

System DC Calculated spe(

Power displacement exceeds availal clearance.

IT BUS 112 INVERTER - DIV. (16) Battery Chargers and Inverters Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 PO Y

Support System AC

'-I IT BUS 114 INVERTER - DIV. (16) Battery Chargers Support and Inverters Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 PO Y

System AC Power EAKERS (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels Auxiliary 451 451 DIV 12 RD Y

RRC and Cabinets F SUBSTATION BUS 131X (02) Low Voltage Support Yes - Interactio Switchgear Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y

System AC with adjacent MA Power LT ESF SWITCH GEAR 141 (03) Medium Voltage Support IBLY Switchgear Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y

System AC Power F UNIT SUB 131X (04) Transformers Support Yes - Interactio IER 1AP086 Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y

System AC with adjacent MA Power 32X 480 VOLT ESF (02) Low Voltage Support Yes - Interactio Switchgear Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y

System AC with adjacent IV Power

SF SWITCH BUS 142 (03) Medium Voltage Support Yes - Interactio Switchgear Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y

System AC with adjacent NA Power RM DIV 12 HVAC DMPR (20) Instrumentation Support and Control Panels Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW VX Y

System HVAC and Cabinets SystemHVAC LV ASMBLY; 10" (07) Pneumatic-Support Operated Valves Auxiliary 401 401 11B DG SX Y

System cooling water M HVAC FAN ASMBLY (09) Fans Auxiliary 401 401 1B DG VD Y

Support Auxiliary 401 01 lB DG VD Y

System -HVAC GENERATOR (17) Engine-Support Generators Auxiliary 401 401 1 B DG DG Y

System AC Power FROL PANEL (20) Instrumentation Support and Control Panels Auxiliary 401 401 1B DG PL Y

System AC and Cabinets Power IVAC DMPR START PNL (20) Instrumentation Support and Control Panels Auxiliary 401 401 1B DG VD Y

System HVAC and Cabinets SystemHVAC STORAGE TANK 1 B (21) Tanks and Heat Support Exchangers Auxiliary 373 383 U-1 DI DO Y

System AC Power

i *.4,1 i

i V ASMBLY; 8" (08) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 401 401 U-1 MS MS Y

DHR Y

Valves V ASMBLY; 8" (08) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 401 401 U-1 MS MS Y

DHR Valves WATER STORAGE TANK (21) Tanks and Heat FH Ou 401 401 FH OUT SI Y

ROIC Exchangers V LOOP 1A ASMBLY; 30-1/4" (07) Pneumatic-Operated Valves Auxiliary 377 377 U-1 MS MS Y

DHR A STM PRESS XMTTR (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 377 377 U-I MS PT Y

DHR Racks PTY DHR X BLDG MCC 132X2 (01) Motor Control Support Yes - Interactio Centers Auxiliary 426 426 AREA 5 AP Y

System AC with adjacent IV Power

SEL OIL DAY TANK (21) Tanks and Heat Auxiliary 383 All DO Y

DHR Exchangers Axlay 3AlDO YH VEN AUX FEED PUMP (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

DHR DWATER PUMP AUX LUBE (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

DHR

)RIVEN AUX FEED PUMP (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

DHR

-CIRC VLVASMBLY; 3" (07) Pneumatic-Operated Valves Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

DHR

'TO ENG Driven CLG WTR (08) Motor-Operated 3el Driven AF PPASSY; 6" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 383 All SX Y

DHR Valves

-EEDWATER PMP 1B SX (08) Motor-Operated

,SMBLY; 6" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

DHR Valves

-EEDWATER PMP 1B SX (08) Motor-Operated

,SMBLY; 6" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

DHR Valves

)RIVEN AF PUMP CUBICLE (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 383 All VA Y

Support S) 1B FAN System HVAC BATTERY CHARGER (15) Batteries on Support Racks Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

System DC I

I_

I_

I Power

{ 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (15) Batteries on Racks Support System DC Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

MP 1B ENG AUX START (15) Batteries on Support

& 2 Racks Auxiliary 383 All AF Y

System DC Power LDG ESF MCC 131X3 (01) Motor Control Support Centers Auxiliary 383 All AP Y

System AC Power JX BLDG ESF MCC 132X3 (01) Motor Control Support Yes - Interactio Centers Auxiliary 383 All AP Y

System AC with adjacent M Power

.LOW DIP CELL (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 383 All FT Y

ROIC Racks AllFT Y

RCIC

\\TER SYS CONTROL ROOM (11) Chillers Support

,TION UNIT OB Auxiliary 383 All VC Y

System HVAC N CONT VLV ASMBLY; 4" (07) Pneumatic-Auxiliary 364 36410-15/

AF Y

DHR Y

Y Operated Valves 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER (18) Instruments on Racks Auxiliary 364 364 10-15/

AF Y

DHR OMPONENT COOLING (05) Horizontal Pumps Support 36-3 ASMBLY Auxiliary 364 364 15-21/

CC Y

System cooling water LINE D/P CELL FLOW (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 364 36417-19/

FT Y

RCIC Racks 17-19/

FT Y

RCIC TLT VLV HEADER ASMBLY; (08) Motor-Operated Support and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 346 346 15-23/

SX Y

System Valves cooling water

'AUX BLDG MCC 133X1A (01) Motor Control Support Yes - Interactio Centers Auxiliary 346 346 10-18/

AP Y

System AC with adjacent M Power 3CH STRN (00) Other Support Auxiliary 330 330 18-23/

SX Y

System cooling water

'SENTIAL SER WTR (05) Horizontal Pumps Support Auxiliary 330 330 18-23/

SX Y

System cooling water 3 AUX LUBE OIL PP (05) Horizontal Pumps Support Auxiliary 330 330 18-23/

SX Y

System cooling water SENTIAL SERVICE WATER (05) Horizontal Pumps Support Auxiliary 330 330 18-23/

VA Y

System cooling water NLT VLV ASMBLY; 30" (08) Motor-Operated

- I I No

, *,,vl.,v,,\\*!

T VLV ASMBLY; 30" (08) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/

SX Y

DHR Valves rG TK LVL D/P XMTTR (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 379 379 U-I RW LT Y

ROIC Racks Auxiliary 379 379_U-1 RW

_LT YRCIC ENTRIFUGAL CHARGING (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 364 364 1B CV CV Y

RCIC

-.SIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (06) Vertical Pumps Auxiliary 364 346 1B RH RH Y

DHR 11B RH HX TO 1B SI PP (08) Motor-Operated SOL VLV and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 UNIT 1 SI Y

RCIC Valves

NTRIFUGAL CHARGING (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 364 364 1A CV Y

Support

___System HVAC AL CHARGING PCUBICLE (20) Instrumentation

'CAL P and Control Panels Auxiliary 364 364 1B CV VA Y

RCIC and Cabinets UGAL CHARGING PUMP (21) Tanks and Heat Support

_ER Exchangers Auxiliary 364 364 1B CV CV System HVAC iEAT REMOVAL HX 1B (07) Pneumatic-F VLV ASMBLY; 8" Operated Valves Auxiliary 357 364 1B RHR RH Y

DHR AIP ROOM CUB CLR ASMBLY (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 346 346 1B RH Y

Support System HVAC 3 SEAL COOLER (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers Auxiliary 346 346 lB RH RH Y

DHR C PMPS THERMAL (08) Motor-Operated OL VLV ASMBLY; 3" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 401 383 U-1 AR CC Y

CF Valves 1 INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S (08) Motor-Operated ASMBLY; 2" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 401 383 U-1 AR CV Y

CF Valves 3 COLD LEGS INJECTION (07) Pneumatic-

/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY; 4" Operated Valves Auxiliary 375 383 U-i AR SI Y

RCIC RETURN TEMPERATURE (19) Temperature Sensors Auxiliary 375 364 U-1 AR TE Y

DHR LDG ESF MCC 131X1 (01) Motor Control Support Centers Auxiliary 364 364 U-1 AR AP Y

System AC Power

) LEGS 1B/1C ISOL VLV (08) Motor-Operated

MBLY; 8" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 383 U-1 AR SI Y

RCIC Valves I

iv.,vm i\\v/

HG PMPS SUCT VLV (C/S (08) Motor-Operated Yes - Seismic ASMBLY; 8" and Solenoid-Operated impact of Oper, Valves Auxiliary 364 364 U-1 AR CV RCIC on adjacent platform steel grating HG PMPS SUCT VLV (C/S (08) Motor-Operated ASMBLY; 8" and Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 U-1 AR CV Y

RCIC Valves

-L LOOP DIP XMTTR (18) Instruments on Cont 412 (No Data)

LT Y

DHR G

Racks C PMPS ISOL VLV ASMBLY; (08) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Cont 401 OMB 1PM06J CC Y

CF Valves CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (08) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Cont 387 (No Data)

RY Y

CF Valves

'TO RH PMP 1 B SUCT ISOL (08) Motor-Operated Y; 12" and Solenoid-Operated Cont 377 OMB PEN 75 RH Y

CF Valves

'RIZER LEVEL (18) Instruments on Cont 377 377-R-12; LT Y

RCIC ER Racks

-SSURE CHANNEL 1 (18) Instruments on Cont 377 377-R-12; PT Y

RCPC Racks__

SERVICE WATER COIL 1A (10) Air Handlers Cont 377 377-R-16 VP Y

CF C/S AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY (07) Pneumatic-

____________Oeae avsCont 451 ABOVE PZR RCS Y

RCPC Operated Valves IMULATOR 1A (21) Tanks and Heat Cont 426 426-R-8 RY Y

RCPC Exchangers kNGE LP 1A TEMP (19) Temperature Cont 390 3

TE Y

DHR

,Sensors I

I I

I I

I II

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Class BUILDING ELEVATION I LOCATION Seismic Cat 1?

HX RTRN ISOL (0) Other FH 401 18 Y FC Y

PURIF PMP OA DISCH CHECK (0) Other AUX 364+18' 12 S FC Y

PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL (0) Other AUX 364 12 U FC Y

PIT PMP SUCTION ISOL (0) Other FH 401 18 Y FC Y

PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 RWST (0) Other AUX 364 13 V FC Y

HX INLET (0) Other FH 401 17 Z FC Y

PIT HX OUTLET (0) Other FH 401 17 Z FC Y

FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-1 RWST CHECK VLV (0) Other 364 14 V FC Y

PMP DISCH CHECK (0) Other FH 401 17 Y FC Y

FLTR DEMIN LOOP INLT ISOL (0) Other FH 401 17 Y FC Y

IRE, U.S. GAUGE CO.,0-160 PSIG (18) Instrument Racks FH 401 17 AA FC Y

IG WTR PURIFICATION OA ASMBLY (5) Horizontal Pumps AUX 364 12 S FC Y

) PURIFICATION PUMP OA SUCT PRESS (18) Instrument Racks AUX 365 13 S FC Y

F PUMP OA DISCHARGE GAUGE (18) Instrument Racks AUX 364 17 S FC Y

PURIFICATION PUMP OA DISCH TEMP IND (19) Temperature Sensors AUX 364 12 S FC Y

HEAT EXCHANGER (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers FH 401 17 Z FC Y

.OOLING PUMP (5) Horizontal Pumps AUX 401 18 Y FC Y

PUMP (18) Instrument Racks FH 401 17 Y FC Y

PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATO (18) Instrument Racks FH 401 AA-19 FC Y

DL HEAT EXCH OUTLET TEMP INDICAT (19) Temperature Sensors FH 426 20 X FC Y

)L TEMP INDICATING SWITCH (18) Instrument Racks FH 426 20 X FC Y

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 C

Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)

Table C-1 provides a description of each item, anchorage verification confirmation, a list of Area Walk-By Checklists associated with each item, comments, and page numbers of each Seismic Walkdown Checklist.

C-1

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table C-1. Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists COMPONENT Anchorage ID DESCRIPTION Configuration AWC COMMENTS PAGE ID__Confirmed?

PUMP REFUELING WTR Y

41 SWEL 2 C-9 0FCG3PA PURIFICATION GA ASMBLY SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN OFC8754 N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-12 ISOL OFC8763 REFUELINGWTRPURIF N/A 41 SWEL 2 C-15 PMP GA DISCH CHECK REFUELING WTR OPI-FC003 PURIFICATION PUMP GA N/A 31 SWEL 2 C-18 SUCT PRESS OPI-FC005 RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP OA N/A 31 SWEL 2 C-21 DISCHARGE GAUGE CC HX 0 OUTLT VLV HEADER ASMBLY; 30" REFUELING WTR OTI-FC007 PURIFICATION PUMP GA N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-27 DISCH TEMP IND GTIS-0626 SPENT FUEL POOL TEMP N/A 32 SWEL 2 C-31 INDICATING SWITCH CONTROL ROOM HVAC OVC01AA SYST CHLD WTR COOLING N

4 C-34 COIL& CABINET GVC01FB GB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS N

45 C-37.

OVC01IJA CONT RM HVAC LOCAL N

4 C-42 CONT PAN ASMBLY ISOLATION DAMPER LATER-BUTTERFLY OUTAGE TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR GVC08Y UNIT FAN GB DISCH FLOW N/A 1

C-45 CONTROL TRAIN B EMERGENCY OVC09Y MAKEUP INTAKE FROM N/A 45 C-49 TURB BLDG-GVC15J MCR U-1 HVAC START PNL N

4 C-52 CHILLED WATER SYS GWO01CB CONTROL ROOM N

22 C-56 REFRIGERATION UNIT GB 1AFG05E S/G 1A FLOW CONT VLV N/A 23 C-61 ASMBLY; 4" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 1AF006B PMP 1B SX SUCT VLV N/A 19 C-64

_ASMBLY; 6" 1

1 Table C-1 Page 1 of 7 C-2

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 COMPONENT Anchorage ID DESCRIPTION Configuration AWC COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 1AF017B PMP 1B SX SUCT VLV N/A 19 C-67 ASMBLY; 6" AF PUMP 16 BATTERY 1AF01EA-A AR Y

19 C-70 CHARGER 1AFOIEB-A AF BATTERY 2 AUXILIARY Y

19 C-73 FEEDWATER PUMP 1B AUX FWPUMP 1B ENG 1AF01EB-B AUX START RLY BATT 1 &

Y 19 C-76 2

DIESEL DRIVEN AUX FEED 1AF01PB PUP1 SBYY 19 C-80 PUMP 1 B ASMBLY 1AF01PB-A 1BAUXFEEDWATER PUMP N/A 19 C-83 AUX LUBE OIL PUMP 1AF01PB-K lB DIESEL DRIVEN AUX Y

19 C-86 FEED PUMP ENGINE 1AF024 AFPPSXRECIRC N/A 19 C-91 VLV ASMBLY; 3" 1AP05E EQ 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH LATER -

GEAR 141 1AP075 ASMBLY Y (LATER)

OUTAGE 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH LATER -

1AP06E BUS 142 Y (LATER)

OUTAGE EQ 480V ESF SUBSTATION OUTAGE FOR BUS 131X ASMBLY Y_(LATER)

ANCHORAGE EQ 480V ESF UNIT SUB 1AP11E 131X TRANSFORMER Y

9 C-94 1AP086 EQ SWGR 132X 480 VOLT OUTAGE FOR 1AP12E ESF Y (LATER) 10 ANCHORAGE 1AP21E 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC Y

41 C-97 131X1 XFORMER 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 1AP22E 31AMLYY 20 C-101 131X3 ASMBLY 1AP24E EQ 480 VAUX BLDG ESF Y

20 C-105 MCC 132X3 ASMBLY 1AP27E EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC Y

17 C-108 132X2 ASMBLY 1AP38E ASSY - 480V AUX BLDG Y

27 C-114 MCC 133X1A 1B PUMP, COMPONENT 1CC01PB COOLING 12X14-18 M66-3 Y

24 C-119

_ASMBLY Table C-1 Page 2 of 7 C-3

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 COMPONENT Anchorage ID DESCRIPTION Configuration AWC COMMENTS PAGE ID_

Confirmed?

CC FROM RC PMPS 1CC685 THERMAL BARRIER ISOL N/A 43 C-124 VLV ASMBLY; 3" CC FROM RC PMPS ISOL LATER -

1CC9416 N/A OTG 1_CC9416_VLV ASMBLY; 6" N/A OUTAGE S1CV01PB PUMP,1B CENTRIFUGAL Y

40 C-127 CHARGING ASMBLY 1B CENTRIFUGAL 1CV02SB CHARGING PUMP GEAR N/A 40 C-131 COOLER RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT 1CV112D VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J)

N/A 42 C-134 ASMBLY; 8" RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT 1 CV1I12E VLV (C/S AT 1 PM05J)

N/A 42 C-137 ASMBLY; 8" RCP 1A SEAL INJECTION 1CV8355A ISOL VLV (C/S AT 1PM05J)

N/A 43 C-140 ASMBLY; 2" 1DC01E 125V BATTERY I1I DIV. 11 Y

7 C-143 lDC02E 125V BATTERY 112 DIV. 12 Y

6 C-147 lDC04E BATTERY CHARGER 112 8

C-i15 DIV. 12 lDC06E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER Y

8 C-154 112 1DC1OJ 125V DC FUSE PANEL - DIV.

Y 5

C-158 11 1DC1IJ 125V DC FUSE PANEL - DIV.

Y 8

C-161 12 lDG01KB 1B DIESEL GENERATOR Y

11 C-165 IDOOITB DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK Y

12 C-171 1DO01T_ B Y_12_C-_17 1B 1DO10T 500 GAL DIESEL OIL DAY Y

18 C-179 TANK REFUELING WTR PURIF 1FC010 PMP SUCT FROM U-1 N/A 43 SWEL 2 C-184 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL 1FC01A SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT Y

33/34 SWEL 2 C-187 EXCHANGER I

U-1 FUEL POOL COOLING 1FC01P UUEP N

33/34 SWEL 2 C-191

__PUMP__

1 FC8756 UI SPENT FUEL PIT PMP N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-195 SUCTION ISOL Table C-1 Page 3 of 7 C-4

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 COMPONENT Anchorage ID DESCRIPTION Configuration AWC COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

1FC8758 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-1 RWST 1FC8762A SPENT FUEL PIT HX INLET N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-201 1FC8762B Ul SPENT FUEL PIT HX N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-204 OUTLET SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR 1 FC8766 DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-1 N/A 41 SWEL 2 C-207 RWST CHECK VLV 1FC8793 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-210 DISCH CHECK SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR 1FC8794 DEN LOPIT IL N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-214 DEMIN LOOP INLT ISOL IFT-01 21 CHARGING LINE DIP CELL N/A 25 C-217 FLOW XMITTR 1FT-0132 LETDOWN FLOW D/P CELL N/A 21 C-221 1FT-AF014 AF TO SG 1B FLOW N/A 23 C-224 TRANSMITTER 1 HS-FC001 SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP N

33/34 SWEL 2 C-226 INSTRUMENT BUS 112 TRANSFORMER - DIV. 12 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS lIP02J DISTRIBUTION PANEL 112 -

Y 3

C-232 DIV. 12 lIP06E INSTRUMENT BUS 112 Y

8 C-235 INVERTER - DIV. 12 INSTRUMENT BUS 114 INVERTER - DIV. 12 EQ PRESSURIZER LEVEL LATER -

1 LT-0459 N/A OTG TRANSMITTER OUTAGE S/G 1A LEVEL LOOP D/P LATER -

1 LT-0518 N/A OTG XMTTR 2/FILLED LEG OUTAGE REF WTR STG TK LVL DIP 1 LT-0932 XMTTR N/A 39 C-241 XMTTR 1MS001A MS ISOL VLV LOOP IA N/A 16 C-245 ASMBLY; 30-1/4" 1MS018A S/G 1A PORV ASMBLY; 8" N/A 13 C-248 1MS018B S/G 1B PORV ASMBLY; 8" N/A 14 C-252 PROTECTION SYSTEM 1PA01J CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH Y

3 C-256 1)

PROTECTION SYSTEM 1PA03J CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH Y

3 C-260 3)

Table C-1 Page 4 of 7 C-5

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 COMPONENT Anchorage ID DESCRIPTION Configuration AWC COMMENTS PAGE ID Confirmed?

1 PA07J PROC I&C RACK CONT GRP Y

3 C-264 3 CAB 7 ESF SEQUENCING &

1PA14J ACTUATION CABINET TRAIN Y

3 C-267 B

1IPA28J AUX SAFEGUARD RELAY Y

3 C-271 CABINET (B)

CONTROL SYSTEM CABINET ESF DIV. 12 1 PI-0627 GAUGE; PRESSURE, U.S.

N/A 33/34 SWEL 2 C-279 GAUGE CO.,0-160 PSIG SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP 1PI-0633 SUCTION PRESSURE N/A 30 SWEL 2 C-282 INDICATO 1PL08J 1B DG CONTROL PANEL N

11 C-285 1PM05J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Y

2 C-289 EQ PZR PRESSURE LATER-1 PT-0455 N/A OTG CHANNEL 1 OUTAGE 1 PT-0516 S/G LOOP 1A STM PRESS N/A 16 C-293 XMTTR LATER-1 RD05E RX TRIP BREAKERS Y (LATER)

OUTAGE 1 RH01 PB PUMP,1B RESIDUAL HEAT Y

35 C-296 REMOVAL ASMBLY 1RH01 PB-A RH PUMP 1B SEAL COOLER N/A 35 C-299 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 1 RH607 HX 1 B FLOW CONT VLV N/A 36 C-302 ASMBLY; 8" RC LOOP 1C TO RH PMP 1B LATER-1 RH8702A SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY; N/A OUTAGE 12" 1RY32MA PORV ACCUMULATOR 1A N

LATER-OUTAGE 1RY455A PZR PORV (C/S AT 1 PM05J)

N/A LATER-ASMBLY OUTAGE PW TO PRT CONTAINMENT LATER -

1 RY8028 N/A OTG ISOLATION VLV OUTAGE iSI0lT REFUELING WATER N

15 C-305 STORAGE TANK CHG PMP TO COLD LEGS 1 S18801 B INJECTION ISOL VLV (C/S N/A 44 C-309 AT 1 PM05J) ASMBLY; 4" Table C-1 Page 5 of 7 C-6

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 COMPONENT Anchorage ID DESCRIPTION Configuration AWC COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

ASSY - MOV 1 B RH HX TO 1S18804B 1B SI PP SUCT HDR ISOL N/A 38 C-312 VLV RH TO COLD LEGS 1B/1C 1S18809B ISOL VLV (1PM06J) ASMBLY; N/A 44 C-316 8"1 1 SX004 CC HX 1 INLT VLV ASMBLY; N/A 29 C-319 30"1 1 SX005 U-0 CC HX INLT VLV N/A 28 C-322 ASMBLY; 30" 1SX01FB 1B SX PP DSCH STRN Y

28 C-325 1SX01PB PUMP,1B ESSENTIAL SER Y

28 C-328 WTR ASMBLY 1 SX1 PB-C SX PUMP I B AUX LUBE OIL N/A 28 C-335 PP 1SX169B DG 1B SX VLV ASMBLY; 10" N/A 11 C-338 SX SUP VLV TO ENG Driven 1SX173 CLG WTR PP FOR Diesel N/A 19 C-341 Driven AF PP ASSY; 6" RHR LP 1A RETURN 1TE-0604 TEMPERATRETRT N/A 41 C-344 TEMPERATURE RTD RC WIDE RANGE LP 1A LATER-1TE-RC022A N/A OTG TEMP OUTAGE SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT 1TI-0628 EXCH OUTLET TEMP N/A 30 SWEL 2 C-347 INDICAT COOLER ESSENTIAL 1VA01SB SERVICE WATER PUMP.95-Y 28 C-350 10 1VA02SB 1B RHR PUMP ROOM CUB Y

35 C-354 CLR ASMBLY I

1VA06SA COOLER,CENTRIFUGAL Y

37 C-358 CHARGING PUMP 1A 1B DIESEL DRIVEN AF 1VA08CB PUMP CUBICLE CLR N/A 19 C-361 (1 VA08S) 1B FAN CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING 1VA11J PCUBICLE COOLER LOCAL N

40 C-365 P

1VD01CB 1B DG ROOM HVAC FAN Y

11 C-368 ASMBLY 1lB DG RM HVAC DMPR 1VD05J N

11 C-372 START PNL Table C-1 Page 6 of 7 C-7

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table C-1 Page 7 of 7 C-8

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

O OFC03PA Equipment Class:

(5) Horizontal Pumps Equipment

Description:

PUMP REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION 0A ASMBLY Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

Yes of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Yes

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Yes

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Yes

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

Yes This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Drawing M-1220 Sheet 5 Revision Y Detail 74 The pump was contaminated so bolt size was not measured. However, bolt size was determined to be accurate based on visual observation.

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Yes potentially adverse seismic conditions?

C-9

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OFC03PA Equipment Class:

(5) Horizontal Pumps Equipment

Description:

PUMP REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION OA ASMBLY Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-10

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OFC03PA Equipment Class:

(5) Horizontal Pumps Equipment

Description:

PUMP REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION OA ASMBLY Photos UI-LUUJI-A (-1hI-12 UZI UF CU3PA 7-19-12 U26 C-1l

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: F N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0FC8754 Equipment Class:

(0) Other Equipment

Description:

SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL VALVE Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

FH, 401.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage,

1.

Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-12

12Q0108.10-R-O01 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: FT] N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0FC8754 Equipment Class:

(0) Other Equipment

Description:

SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL VALVE Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7116112 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-13

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

Photos 0FC8754 (0) Other SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL VALVE 0FC8754 7-18-12 061 C-14

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status:

Y N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0FC8763 Equipment Class:

(0) Other Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA DISCH CHECK VALVE Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-15

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0FC8763 Equipment Class:

(0) Other Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA DISCH CHECK VALVE Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes Yes Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Valve is high overhead. Tag is not visible. Operations Equipment Operator identified valve.

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-16

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0FC8763 Equipment Class:

(0) Other Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA DISCH CHECK VALVE Photos 0FC8763 7-19-12 031 C-17

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OPI-FC003 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA SUCT PRESS Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-18

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status:

IN U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OPI-FC003 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA SUCT PRESS Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Piping above is well-supported.

Seismic block wall.

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-19

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

Photos None.

OPI-FC003 (18) Instruments on Racks REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA SUCT PRESS C-20

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OPI-FC005 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP CA DISCHARGE GAUGE Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

No of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Instrument is securely mounted to a rack that is well-supported.

Yes C-21

1200108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OPI-FC005 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP OA DISCHARGE GAUGE Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Seismic block wall.

Overhead components are well-supported.

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Date:

Photos C-22

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OPI-FC005 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP GA DISCHARGE GAUGE OPI-FC005 7-18-12 055 OPI-FC005 7-18-12 056 C-23

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0SX147 Equipment Class:

(8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

Description:

CC HX 0 OUTLT VLV HEADER ASMBLY; 30" Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 346.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the'results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-24

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: F N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0SX147 Equipment Class:

(8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

Description:

CC HX 0 OUTLT VLV HEADER ASMBLY; 30" Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Pipe is well-supported laterally in both directions Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-25

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: F N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

0SX147 (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves CC HX 0 OUTLT VLV HEADER ASMBLY; 30" Photos 0SX147 7-18-12 025 C-26

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0TI-FC007 Equipment Class:

(19) Temperature Sensors Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP 0A DISCH TEMP IND Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-27

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OTI-FC007 Equipment Class:

(19) Temperature Sensors Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA DISCH TEMP IND Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found. no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-28

12QO108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

OTI-FCO07 (19) Temperature Sensors REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA DISCH TEMP IND Photos OTI-FC007 (AWB - Water leakage) 7-19-12 033 OTI-FC007 7-19-12 029 C-29

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 4 of 4 Status:

N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OTI-FC007 Equipment Class:

(19) Temperature Sensors Equipment

Description:

REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA DISCH TEMP IND OTI-FC007 7-19-12 030 C-30

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OTIS-0626 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

SPENT FUEL POOL TEMP INDICATING SWITCH Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

FH, 426.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-31

12Q0108.10-R-O01 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OTIS-0626 Equipment Class:

(18) Instruments on Racks Equipment

Description:

SPENT FUEL POOL TEMP INDICATING SWITCH Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-32

12Q0108.1O-R-OO1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-1 2-1 59 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

OTIS-0626 (18) Instruments on Racks SPENT FUEL POOL TEMP INDICATING SWITCH Photos OTIS 0626 7-18-12 057 C-33

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status:

Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0VC01AA Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST CHLD WTR COOLING COIL& CABINET Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 451.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Coating prevents measurement of weld size and length

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No Yes Yes

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Yes

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Drawing M-1320 Sheet 7, Rev AD, provides installation detail however floor is coated so weld cannot be verified. Also equipment is adjacent to wall which prevents visual inspection of anchorage along wall. Based on anchorage in area, it is judged that the welded detail is acceptable (dry environment, non-vibrating equipment).

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Not Applicable Yes C-34

12Q0108.1O-R-O01 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC01AA Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST CHLD WTR COOLING COIL& CABINET Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1,/2012 Evaluated by:

Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-35

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

OVC01AA (10) Air Handlers CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST CHLD WTR COOLING COIL& CABINET Photos OV01AA 7-16-12 033 OV01AA 7-16-12 034 OV01AA 7-16-12 035 C-36

12Q0108.1O-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 5 Status: 7 N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0VC01FB Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

OB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 451.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No Yes Welded detail top and bottom of component - no issues

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Yes

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Yes

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-37

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 5 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

EquipmentID No.:

OVC01 FB Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

OB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Nearby ladder is restrained in 3 directions.

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-38

12Q0108.1O-R-O0i Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 5 Status: MI N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

OVC01 FB (10) Air Handlers OB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS Photos UVL;ul F b 1-1 t5-1 2 uzb UVL;U11-E I-1b-1z Uzi C-39

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 4 of 5 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC01FB Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Eauioment Descnotion:

OB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS OVC01FB 7-16-12 028 C-40

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 5 of 5 Status: F N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC01FB Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

OB MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS OVC01FB 7-16-12 030 C-41

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC01JA Equipment Class:

(20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Equipment

Description:

CONT RM HVAC LOCAL CONT PAN ASMBLY Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 451.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

No of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Yes

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Yes

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Yes

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-42

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: F N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC01JA Equipment Class:

(20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Equipment

Description:

CONT RM HVAC LOCAL CONT PAN ASMBLY Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-43

1200108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

Photos OVC01JA (20) Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets CONT RM HVAC LOCAL CONT PAN ASMBLY OVC01JA 7-16-12 036 C-44

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

0VC08Y Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN OB DISCH FLOW CONTROL Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 463.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

No anchorage detail required to be verified since air handler is an in-line component. Air handler shown on Pacific Air Products Drawing No. 5600-411 Yes C-45

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC08Y Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN OB DISCH FLOW CONTROL Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic.interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-46

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC08Y Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN OB DISCH FLOW CONTROL Photos 0

0VC08Y 7-16-12 002 C-47

12Q0108.1O-R-OO1 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-1 2-159 Sheet 4 of 4 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

Equipment Class:

EauiDment DescriDtion:

OVC08Y (10) Air Handlers TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN GB DISCH FLOW CONTROL OVC08Y 7-16-12 003 C-48

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC09Y Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

TRAIN B EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM TURB BLDG Project:

Braidwood 1 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 451.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%

No of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Not Applicable

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note:

This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Anchorage not required to be verified since it is an in-line component. Air handler shown on Pacific Air Products Drawing 5600-43 1.

Yes C-49

12QO108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: F N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC09Y Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

TRAIN B EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM TURB BLDG Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Yes

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Air handler covered in insulation but configuration matches drawing. Duct well supported.

Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown performed week of 7/16/12 by M. Delaney & P. Gazda Evaluated by:

Marlene Delaney Date:

10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-50

12Q0108.10-R-001 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M-I N

U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.:

OVC09Y Equipment Class:

(10) Air Handlers Equipment

Description:

TRAIN B EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM TURB BLDG Photos OVC09Y 7-16-12 031 OVC09Y 7-16-12 032 C-51