Text

Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages
	ML20323A254
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	11/18/2020
From:	; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20324A090	List: ML20323A254; RS-20-115, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements;
References
	RS-20-115, TSTF-582
	Download: ML20323A254 (80)
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ATTACHMENT 3 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages (Information Only) 3.2 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES B 3.3.5.2-1 B 3.3.5.2-2 B 3.3.5.2-3 B 3.3.5.2-4 B 3.3.5.2-5 B 3.3.5.2-6 B 3.3.5.2-7 B 3.3.5.2-8 B 3.3.5.2-9 B 3.3.8.1-4 B 3.3.8.1-5 B 3.3.8.1-6 B 3.3.8.1-8 B 3.5.2-1 B 3.5.2-2 B 3.5.2-3 B 3.5.2-5 B 3.5.2-6 B 3.5.2-7 B 3.5.2-8 B 3.6.1.3-9 B 3.8.2-3 B 3.8.2-6 B 3.8.2-7

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded."

The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LCO 2 . 2 . 9 . 1 , "Erner§enc y Core Coolin§

'.;ystern (ECG'.;) Instrblrnentation ," or LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation."

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will (continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-1 Revision-----7-B-

RPV Water In ventory Control In strumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water le vel isolation instrumentation.

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Contro l Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, "Rea ctor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Contro l," and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that ~

re~~ire8 fgr man~a l sperat i sn sf the ECG~ injectisn / spray s~bsystem re~~ired ts be OPERAgL E by LCO J . §. 2 and sther f~nctisns that support automatic i so lation of Shutdown Cooling (SOC) and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWC U) system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water le ve l.

The RPV Water Inventsry Csntrsl Instr~mentatisn s~ppGrts s peratisn sf csre spray (C~) and 1 011 pressb1re css l ant injectisn ( LPC I ) . The e~~ipment inv0 l ved i1iH1 each sf H1ese 1

systems i s described in the gases fgr LCO J . § . 2.

APP LICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory contro l is SAFETY ANA LY SES, not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated LCO, and in the safety analyses. RPV water in ventory control is AP PLICABILITY required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material shou ld a draining event occur.

considered>----------~ considered A double-ended guill tine break of the Reactor Coolant ~I System (RCS) is not psst~ l ate8 in MODES 4 and due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is psst~ l ated in which tt s i n§ l e speratsr errsr sr initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a sing le penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e . § ., seismic event , l sss sf nsrmal pG1ier , sin§ l e h~man errsr) . It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one l ow pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually operated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water le ve l.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3 . 3.5.2-2 Revision B-

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating SAFETY ANALYSES, experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant LCO, and to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory APPLICABILITY Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii ).

(continued)

Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Core £era " anci Lo11 Pressblre Coolant Injection £"stems

l. a 2. a. Reactor £team Qome Pressblre LO '..' (Permissive)

Lo11 reactor steam ciome pressblre signals are blseci as permissives for the 101/ pressb1re ECG£ Sb18systems . +-A-i--&

ensblres that , prior to opening the injection valves of the 101/ pressb1re ECG£ Sb18systems , the reactor pressb1re has fallen to a valble 8elo11 these Sb18systems maximblm ciesign pressblre . While it is assblreci ciblring MQQE£ 4 anci § that the reactor steam c:Jome pressblre ', Jill be belo '..' the ECG£ maximblm Elesign pressblre , the Reactor £team Qome Pressblre Loi,1 signals are assblmeci to be QPERAgLE anci capable of permitting initiation of the ECG£ .

The Reactor £team Qome Pressblre Lo1i' (Permissive) signals are initiated from t 'n'O pressblre Sllitches that sense the reactor steam ciome pressblre .

The All o*. iabl e Val ble is l O'..' enoblgh to prevent overpressblri zing the eEjbli pment in the l O'd pressblre ECG£ .

T .10 channels of Reactor £team Qome Pressblre LO 'd f"blnction 1

are only reE]blireci to be QPrnAgLE in MQQE£ 4 anci § '..'hen ECG£ is reE]blireci to be QPERAgLE by LCQ J . § . 2 .

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-3 Revision B-

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE 1.8 2 . 8 . Core £Bra \/ anci Lo*.1 Pressblre Coo l ant I n j ect i on SAFETY ANALYSES, Pbim f? Qischarge fl o*.: Lo11 rn v12ass)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY The minim61m f l o11 i nstrblments are f)rov i cieci to f)rotect t he (continued) associ ateci l 011 pressblre ECG£ pbimp fr om overheati n§l *i1hen the f)blmf) is Of)eratin§ anci t he assoc i ateci injection va l ve i s not Sbl ff iciently open . The minimblm f l o11 line va l ve is openeci

i1hen l oi,,i floi,,i is senseci , anci t he valve i s abltomatical l y closeci i,,ihen the fl oi,1 r ate is acieqblate to p r otect the pbimp .

One floi,,i t r ansmi tt er per C£ pbimp anci one fl o11 transmitter f)er LPC I l oof) are useci to cietect the associateci S618systems '

fl oi,1 rates . The l O§i c is arran§eci S61ch that each transm i tter Cablses its assoc i ateci mi ni mblm flo *i1 va l ve to open

i1hen fl oi,1 is l 011 *,1i th t he pbimp rblnn i n§l . The l O§i c *i1i 11 close the minimblm flo *i1 va l ve once the closblre setpoint is exceecieci . The Pbimp Qischar§le f l o11 Lo *i1 (Elypass) " l l o*..*a8 l e Va l bles are hi §h enobl§h to ens61re that the pbimp fl o*.1 rate is Sblff i cient to protect the pbimp . The Core £pray Qischar§le f lo*i1 Lo *i1 (Elypass) Al l o11a8 l e Val61e is al so 1011 eno61§lh to ensblre t hat t he c l os61re of t he mi ni mblm flo *,,i va l ve is init i ateci to allo11 f61l l flo *i1 into the core . f or LPC I , the c l osblre of t he mi nim61m f l o11 valves i s not creciiteci .

Eac h c han nel of Pbi mp Qi sc har§le f l mi Lo*.1 (Elyf)ass) f blnct i on i s on l y reqbl i reci to ee OPER/\ ElLE in MOQE £ 4 anci § *i1 hen t he assoc i ateci ECG£ sblbsystem i s reqblireci to be OPERAElL E 8y LCO ~ . § . 2 to ensblre the f)bl mf)s are Caf)a9le of i nject i n§l into t he RPV i,1 hen manbla l l y operateci .

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-4 Revision B-

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Shutdown Cooling CSDC) System Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and J....e. - Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low APPLICABILITY (continued) The definition of Drain Time allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Function associated with SOC System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the SOC System.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. Each channel inputs into one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the SOC suction isolation valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation. Therefore, one trip string in each trip system is required to provide for automatic SOC system isolation.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Functions isolate some Group 3 valves (SOC isolation valves).

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-5 Revision B-

RPV Water In ventory Control In strumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Reactor Water Cleanuo CRWCUl System Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and 4-.-e- - Reactor Vessel Water level - Low APPLICABILITY (continued) The definition of Drain Time allows crediting the cl osing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by va l ves that will clo se automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water le vel isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System .

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Isolation Function receives input from four reactor vesse l water le vel channels. Each channel inputs into one of four trip strings . Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the RWCU va l ves . Any channel will trip the associated trip string.

Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system . The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation. Therefore, one trip str ing in each trip system is required to provide for automatic RWCU system isolation.

The Reactor Vessel Water Le ve l-Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Le ve l-Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the ca pa bi l i ty to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Le ve l-Low Fun ct ion is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic i so lation of the associated penetration flow path i s credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

RWCU Fun ct ions i so late some Group 3 valves (RWCU isolation va l ves).

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3 . 3.5.2-6 Revision-----7-B-

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

Re~Yire8 Actien A. l 8irects entry inte the apprepriate Cen8itien reference8 in Ta8le ~ . ~ . 9 . 2 1. The applica8le Cen8itien reference8 in the ta8le is rYnctien 8epen8ent .

Each time a channel is 8iscevere8 inepera9le , Cen8itien A is entere8 fer that channel an8 previ8es fer transfer te the apprepriate sY8se~Yent Cen8itien .

IA.1. A.2.1. and A.2.2

'V B. l. B. 2. 1. an8 B. 2 . 2 Shutdown cooling (SOC) system Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, and Reactor Water Cleanup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration fl ~ th is credited in calculating Drain Time. If the ~

instrumentation is inoperable, Required Action .g,..+ directs immediate action to place the channel in trip. With the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, the remaining A.2.1 channel will isolate the penetration flow path on low water le If both channels are inoperable and placed in trip, the pene ion flow path will be isolated. Alternatively, Required Actio .g....,....z.., requires the associated penetratio~n~~

flow path(s) to be immediately declared inC 9J? able o f IA.2.2 I automatic isolation. Required Action -B-.--2--.--2-~ irects initiating action to calculate DRAIN TIME. The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow path(s).

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-7 Revision ~

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

Lo11 reactor steam dome presswre signa l s are wsed as permissives for the 101/ press61re ECG£ injection/spray swbsystem manwal injection fwnctions . If a reqwired channe l of the permissive is inoperab l e , manua l operation of ECG£ may be prohibited . Therefore , the affected channel (s) mw s t be pl aced in the trip condition ', 1ithi n 1 howr . \*Jith the affected channel(s ) in the trip condition , manwal operation may be performed .

The Completion Time of 1 ho61r is intended to al l o the 1 operator time to eva l wate any discovered inoperabilities and to pl ace the channel in the trip condition .

If a C£ or LPC I Pwmp IJischarge F" lo',1 Lo11 bypass function is inoperable , there is a risk that the associated l oi1 pressb1re1 ECG£ pwmp cow l d overheat 11hen the pwmp i s operat i ng and the associated injection valve is not fwl l y open . I n this condit i on , t he operator can take manwa l contro l of the system to enswre the pwmp does not over heat .

The 2~ howr Comp l et i on Ti me 'das chosen to al l O'il t i me for the operator to evalwate and repair any discovered inoperab ili ties . The Completion Time i s appropr i ate given the ab ili ty to manwa l ly start t he ECG£ pwmps and open the mi nimwm f l o11 valves and to manwa l ly enswre t he pwmp does not over heat .

Wi th the Reqwired Act i on and associated Comp l etion Ti me of Cond i t i on C or Q not met , t he assoc i ated 101/ presswre ECG£ inject i on / spray s wbsystem may be incapab l e of performing the intended fwnction , and mwst be declared inoperable i mmediate l y .

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-8 Revision B-

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 The following SRs apply to BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE 6 £ nete8 in tRe 9eginning ef tRe ~R£ , tRe ~R£ fer each RPV REQUIREMENTS Water Inventory Control instrumentation Function are fe~n8 in tRe ~R£ cel~mn ef Table 3.3.5.2-1.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thu s, it is key to verifying the in strumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel wi 11 perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all (continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.5.2-9 Revision-----7-B-

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)

SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY minimum Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Value but after the voltage drops below the maximum Loss of Vo l tage Function Allowable Value. This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.

Two channels of 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the bus undervoltage function. Refer to LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," aAEl 3. 8 . 2 , "AC SeuFces Sl9l:1tElo*1JA ,"

for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

2. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltaqe (Degraded Voltage)

A reduced voltage condition on a 4160 V ESS bus indicates that, while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS function.

Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Value, however the transfer does not occur until after the inherent and No LOCA time delays have elapsed, as applicable. If a LOCA condition exists coincident with a loss of power to the bus, the Time Delay (No LOCA) Function is bypassed. This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supply to recover or (continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.8.1-4 Revision B

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)

SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY allow restoration to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment.

Two channels of 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay (Degraded Voltage) Function and one channel of Degraded Voltage-Time Delay Function per associated bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no s ingle in strument failure can preclude the degraded vo ltage and time delay function.

Refer to LCO 3.8 .1 aAe LCO 3 . 8 . 2 for App licability Bases for the DGs.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels . Section 1.3, Completion Times, spec ifie s that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variab le s expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limit s, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry int o the Condition. Howe ver, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation channel.

With one or more channels of a Fun ct i on inoperable, the Function is not capable of performing the intended function.

Therefore, only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is allowed to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status . If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate (continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.8.1-5 Revision .g.

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure (within the LOP instrumentation), and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the channel in trip would result in a DG initiation), Condition B must be entered and its Required Action taken.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 aA~ LCO 3 . 8 . 2 , which ~ Fev i~ e appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s). ~

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided the associated Function maintains LOP initiation capability. LOP initiation capability is maintained provided the bus load shedding scheme and the associated DG can be initiated by the Loss of Voltage or Degraded Voltage Functions for one of the two 4160 V ESS buses. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.8.1-6 Revision B

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 . 3.8.1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3 . 8 .1 aAe LCO 3 . 8 . 2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions.

The Surveillance Frequency is control led under the Survei 11 a nee Frequency Contro l Program. ~

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.7 .

2. UFSAR, Section 5. 2.

3. UFSAR, Section 6. 3.

4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.8.1-8 Revision 5-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV)

WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND ISOLATION CONDENSER (IC) SYSTEM t B 3.5.2 RPV Water Inventory Control +

BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is SAFETY ANALYSES not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of 7

radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur .

lc-o-ns-i-de_r_e_d____,I A doub1 e -ei'tEJ gd qu1 l lot1ne break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is no f'° post~ l ate8 in MODES 4 and 5 due to the an reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile an event that creates a drain piping systems. Instead, an event is considered in which ~

path through multiple vessel initiating event allows draining of penetrations located below RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow top of active fuel, such as path with the highest f ow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple enetration flow paths susceptible to Iorasmge1----p I a comfDo n mode failure ( , loss of normal 1

- o_w

_e_r...,,.! single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually operated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii ).

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-1 Revision----7--B-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 BASES (continued)

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur, the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does OPERABILITY of the not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit ECCS injection/spray 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant subsystem includes any opera ti on* aligned and started from the control room necessary valves, One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsyst mis required instrumentation, or to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually eperateci to controls needed to provide ~ efense-in-depth should an unexpected draining event manually align and start occur. ~ A low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem the subsystem from the consists of either one Core Spray (CS) subsystem or one Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem. A CS subsystem control room.

consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or contaminated

--+-

t condensate storage tanks (CCSTs) to the RPV. A LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or the CCSTs to the RPV. In MODES 4 and 5, OPERABLE CCSTs can be credited to support the OPERABILITY of the required ECCS subsystem. A single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of the similar injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In addition, in MODES 4 and 5, the LPCI System cross-tie valves are not required to be open.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

A required ECCS subsystem may be aligned with the pump control switch in pull -to-lock and associated ECCS subsystem injection valves may be configured to allow throttling to control RPV makeup flow rates. Operators must be able to take manual action from the control room to provide makeup to the RPV as-necessary with the pump and associated injection valve in this alignment without delay.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-2 Revision B-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 "Instrumentation,"

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY RPV water inventory control is r quired in MODES 4 and 5.

Requirements on water inventory ntrol in other MODES are "ECCS, RPV Water contained in LCOs i D Section 3.3, Instr8mentatien , and other LCOs in Section 3.5,YECC£ , RPV \*later Inventery Centrel , and Inventory Control, IC £ystem . RPV water inventory control is required to and IC System." protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 If the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this Condition, the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem, however the defense-in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considers the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probability of an unexpected draining event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory.

If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be initiated immediately to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually operated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems, and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-3 Revision-----7-B-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS C.l. C.2. and C.3 (continued) penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filtering gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place one SGT Required Actions C.1 , C.2, subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The and C.3 are considered to required verification confirms actions to place a SGT be met when secondary subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary containment, secondary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem containment penetrations, can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The required verification is an administrative activity and and the Standby Gas does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

Treatment System are OPERABLE in accordance ~

with LC 0 3. 6 .4. 1 , LCO D'-'".-=l. . . . ._,D"""""'.'""""2. . . .--=-D_,__,3"""""'

. .'---=a-'-'-n=-d_,D"""""'.'-'-4 3.6.4.2, and LCO 3.6.4.3.

With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.l is also applicable.

Required Action D.l requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.l states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually operated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected (continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-5 Revision B-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS D.l. D.2. D.3. and D.4 (continued) water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material.

Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the secondary containment boundary established, one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify ~~~~~~~

that each secondary containment pen automaticallyor isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room. Examples of manual isolation from the control room could include the use of manual isolation pushbuttons, control switches, or placing a sufficient number of radiation monitor channels in trip from either unit. A secondary containment penetration flow path can be considered isolated when one barrier in the flow path is in place. Examples of suitable barriers include, but are not limited to, a closed secondary containment isolation valve (SCIV), a closed manual valve, a blind flange, or another sealing device that sufficiently seals the penetration flow Required Actions D.2, D.3, path.

and D.4 are considered to be met when secondary One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment, secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the containment penetrations, environment and filtering gaseous releases. Required Action D.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify and the Standby Gas that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed Treatment System are in operation. The required verification is an OPERABLE in accordance dministrative activity and does not require manipulation or with LCO 3.6.4.1, LCO esting of equipment.

3.6.4.2, and LCO 3.6.4.3.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-6 Revision +-B-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or Dare not met, or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition, there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation.

A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange, the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used.

closed and The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation administratively those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed controlled system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked , sealed , or othernise seCblred in the closed position ,

blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor (continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-7 Revision-----7-B-

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 BASES or multiple penetration flow paths SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 (continued) susceptible to a common mode failure, REQUIREMENTS (continued) coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected w'th a number of bolts to prevent draining +H-b-!*~~1+t--1::H'-El-*

0 Operat i ng ga s i s E arth~wake . Normal or ex leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices s permitted.

Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines and ong oing plant mai ntenance and test i ng act i vit i es .

la single I :1, should The exclusion of'i'p enetra w path ~ from the temporary alterations in determination of DRAIN TIME consider the potential effects of Va single operator error or initiating event on support of maintenance items supporting maintenan ce and testing (rigging, If reasonable controls are scaffolding, temporary shielding, piping plugs, snwbber implemented to prevent remo val , freeze seals, etc.) ...+.. If failure of such -i-tem-&

~ "'cowl d res b1l t and 11ow l d cab1se a draining event from a closed temporary alterations from system or between the RPV and the isolation device, ~

penetration f l 011 path ma y not be excl wded from t he QR/\ ! M causing TI ME ca l culat i on .

Survei 11 ance Requi requires SRs to be met between performance . Therefore, any changes in plant conditions that wou d change the DRAIN TIME requires that a new DRAIN TIME be de ermined.

The Surveillance Freq ency is controlled under the Survei 11 ance Frequenc Control Program.

(continued) the effect of the temporary alterations on DRAIN TIME need not to be considered. Reasonable controls include, but are not limited to controls consistent with the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 4, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," or commitments to NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.5.2-8 Revision B-

PC I Vs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

With the MSIV leakage rate (SR 3.6.1.3.10) not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.

Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices.

The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months allows a period of time to restore MSIV leakage rate to within limit given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MOO E 1 , 2 , Gr 2 , the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.6.1.3-9 Revision B-

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES the ability to manually start a LCO Systems-Shutdown," ensures that all required l (continued) powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE DG, a sociated with a Distribution System Essential Service System (ESS) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3 . 8 .8, ensures that a iverse power source is available for providing electrical po er support assuming a lo ss of the offsite circuit . Toget r, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availab ility of suffic ient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e .g., fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel).

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capab le of maintaining rated frequency and voltage wh ile connected to their respective ESS bus(es), and of accepting required lo ads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licen s ing basis for the unit. The offsite cir cuit from the 138 kV or 345 kV switchyard consists of the incoming breakers and disconnects to the 22 or 32 reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) (or 21 or 31 unit auxiliary transformer (UA T) on backfeed), associated 22 or 32 RAT (or 21 or 31 UAT on backfeed), and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4160 V ESS buses required by LCO 3 .8.8.

Another qualified circuit i s provided by the bus tie between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units.

!being manually started!

The required DG must be capable of\lrstarting , accelerating to rated speed and vo ltage, connecting to it s respective 4160 V ESS bus on detection of bbls blndervoltage , and accepting required load s. This seEjblence FRblst be accoFRpl i shed ',1i thin 12 seconds . Each QG FRblst also be capable of accepting reEjblired loads 11ithin the assb1FRed loading seEjblence intervals , and FRblst continble to operate blntil offsite po11er can be restored to the 4190 V E~~ bblses . These capabilities are reE]blired to be FRet froFR a variety of initial conditions sblch as !JG in stanElby Iii th engine hot anEl !JG in stanElby 'iii th engine at aFRbient conditions . Additional QG capabilities FRblst be deFRonstrated to FReet reE]blired ~blrveillances . Proper seEjblencing of loads , inclblding tripping of nonessential loads , is a reEjblired fblnction for QG OPERABILITY . The necessary portions of the DG Cooling Water and Ultimate Heat Sink System capable of providing cooling to the required DG i s also required.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.8 .2- 3 Revision B-

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. B.l. B.2. and B.3 (continued)

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESS bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized division.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8 .1.12, o er an , an 3 to be applicable. SR 3.8.1.9 SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8 .1.14, is not required to be me since only one offsite circuit is SR 3.8.1.16, SR 3.8 .1.18, required to be OPERABLE. In MODES 4 and 5 ECCS and SR 3.8.1 .19 are not injection/spray subsystems are manually controlled in required to be met accordance with LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) because DG start and load Water inventory Control." No ECCS initiation signals are within a specified time and credited for initiation of these subsystems. Adequate time response on an offsite is available to manually start and load EDGs from the Main power or ECCS initiation Control Room in support of RPV inventory control, if signal is not required. required. Therefore , £R 2 . i:l . 1. B anEl £R 2 . i:l . 1. 19 , ',;hich ve r ify th e EQG ' s c a~abilit y t o st ar t a~t o rnati c all y on a c t~al or sirn~ l ateEl ECG£ initiation si§nals , are not re~~ireEl to be met in MOQ E£ 4 anEl 5. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.21 is not required to be met because the opposite unit's DG is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

(continued)

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.8.2-6 Revision .g_i

AC Sources-Shutdown which precludes B 3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note ~ The reasen fer the Nete is te ~recl~9e requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESS bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE.

REFERENCES None.

Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.8.2-7 Revision .g_i

ATTACHMENT 3 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages (Information Only) 3.3 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES B 3.3.5.2-1 B 3.3.5.2-2 B 3.3.5.2-3 B 3.3.5.2-4 B 3.3.5.2-5 B 3.3.5.2-6 B 3.3.5.2-7 B 3.3.5.2-8 B 3.3.5.2-9 B 3.3.6.1-35 B 3.3.8.1-4 B 3.3.8.1-7 B 3.3.8.1-9 B 3.5.2-1 B 3.5.2-2 B 3.5.2-3 B 3.5.2-6 B 3.5.2-7 B 3.5.2-8 B 3.5.2-9 B 3.5.2-10 B 3.5.2-11 B 3.5.2-12 B 3.8.2-3 B 3.8.2-4 B 3.8.2-7 B 3.8.2-8

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentati on - r B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions wi l l correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded."

The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LG O 3. 3. 5. 1 , "E!flel"§eAey Gel"e Gee l iA§ Syste!fl ( EGGS) l AStl"tl!fleAtat i eA ," SF LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation."

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-1 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation ~

B 3.3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND be isolated by valves that will close automatically without (continued) offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control , " and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that are requiree for maAual or:ieratioA of tAe EGGS iAjeetioA / sr:iray subsystem requiree to be OPERABLE by LCO 3. 5. 2 aA8 otAer fuAetiOAS tAat support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level.

TAe RPV ', Jater lA 'o'eAtory GoAtrol IAstrumeAtati OA sur:ir:iorts or:ieratioA of 10'11 r:iressure eore sr:iray (LPCS) , lo '..' r:iressure eoolaAt iAjeetioA (LPCI) , aA8 Ai§A r:iressure eore sr:iray ( ll PGS) . TAe equi r:imeAt i A'o'Ol vee '11itA eaeFi of tAese systems is eescribee iA tFie Bases for LGO 3. 5. 2.

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is SAFETY not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated ANALYSES, LCO, in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is and APPLICABILITY required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining .d d cons1 ere

!considered I A double-ended guillotine break of th Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is n ~ r:iostulates in MOD S 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping tresses, and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is r:iostulates in which siA§le or:ierator error or initiating event allows draining the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e . §., seismic eveAt , loss of Aormal f30 'oJer , siA§le FiumaA error) . It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually operated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-2 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation -{'

B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating SAFETY experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant ANALYSES, LCO, to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory and APPLICABILITY Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii ).

(continued)

Permissive and interlock setpoints are general l y considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Low Pressure CoolaAt IAiectioA Systems aAd Low Pressure Core

~

l . a . l . d. 2. a . 2. c . Reactor Steam Dome Pl"essure Lo *;1 (IAiectioA Permissive) aAd LPCI aAd LPCS IAiectioA LiAe Pl"essure Low CIAiectioA Permissive)

Lo *,; reactol" steaFR EloFRe J3ressul"e a Ad LPCI a Ad LPCS i Ajecti GA liAe [3ressure si§Aals are used as [3ermissives for Hie 10*.1 J31"essure EGGS subsysteFRs . TAis eAsures tAat , J3rior to 013eAiA§ Hie iAjectioA valves of Hie lo*..* J31"essure EGGS subsystems , tAe reactor J3ressul"e Aas falleA to a value below Hlese subsystems ' maid mum desi §A J3ressul"e .

Tl9e Reactol" Steam Dome Pressul"e Low (IAjectioA Permissive)

Si§Aals are iAitiated fl"OfR foul" J3l"CSSure switCACS tl9at SCASC tl9e reactol" doFRe J3l"CSSure . TAC LPCI aAd LPCS IAjectioA LiAe Pl"essure Lo*;1 CIAjectioA Permissive) si§Aals are iAitiated fl"OFR foul" 13ressure s*;1itcAes tAat srnse tAe 13ressul"e iA tAe iAjectioA liAe (oAe S\l'itcl9 fol" eacl9 lo'.,* J31"essure EGGS iAjectioA liAe) .

T19 e Pt l l e"a bl e Va l ues a re l e\J e Ae u§19 t e 13 rev e At everJ3ressul"iziA§ tl9e C(CjUiJ3meAt iA tl9e lo\*' 13ressure EGGS .

0Ae cl9aAAel of Reactol" SteaFR Dome Pl"essure Lew (IAjectioA PerFRissive) FuActioA 13er associated DivisioA al9d oAe cl9aA19el of LPCI aAd LPCS IAjectioA LiAe Pressure Lew (IAjectioA PerFRissive) 13er associated iAjectioA liAe are OAly l"C(Cjuired to be OPERABLE iA MODES ~ al9d 5 WACA tAe associated subsystem is re(CjUil"ed to be OPERABLE by LCO 3 . 5. 2, SiACC tl9ese cAaAAels SUJ3J30rt tl9e FRaAual 013eratioA of tAese systeFRs .

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-3 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation ~

B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE l.a . 1.El . 2 . a . 2 . e . Reaetel" Steam Deme PFesst:Jl"e Le *;1 SAFETY (IAieetieA Pel"missive) aAEl LPCI aAEl LPCS IAieetieA LiAe ANALYSES, LCO, PFesst:Jl"e Le *;1 CIAjeetieA Pel"missive) (eeAtiAt:JeEl) and APPLICABILITY IA aElElitieA , SAe eRaAAel ef LPGS IAjeetieA LiAe Pl"eSSl:.11"e Lew (IAjeetieA Pel"missive) is l"eqt:Jil"eEl te se OJ3el"a8le feF a l"eqt:Jil"eEl LPCS system , aAEl OAe eRaAAel ef LPGI IAjeetieA LiAe PFeSSl:.11"e LOI.' (IAjeetieA Pel"missive) is Feqt:Jil"eEl te se OPERABLE fel" a l"eqt:Jil"eEl LPCI Sl:.18system .

1.8 . l.e . 2 . 8 . LPGS aAEl LPGI Pt:Jm(,? DiseRal"ee Fle 1..* LS ';J EBnass>

The miAimt:Jm fle11 iAstFt:JmeAts aFe J3l"OviEleEl te pFoteet tRe asseei ateEl l e*.1 pl"esst:JFe EGGS pl:.1mp fFem eveFReati A§ \i'ReA tRe pl:.1mJ3 is epeFatiA§ aAEl the asseeiateEl iAjeetieA valve is Ast st:JffieieAtly epeA . TFle miAimt:Jm fle *11 liAe *1 alve is epeAeEl

1 Ae A l e\J fl e\i' i s s e As e El , a AEl tFl e v a l v e i s a l

.1 t em at i ea l l y elescEl WRCA tRc flew rate is aElcqt:Jatc te pretcet tRc pl:.1mp .

0Ac flew switeR per EGGS pl:.1mp is t:JscEl te dctcet tRc asseeiatcEl Sl:.18systcm fle *.1 Fate . TFlc le§ie is aFraA§CEl st:JeR that caeh switeR eat:Jscs its asseeiatcEl miAimt:Jm flew valve te ep e A wAc A fl e*,1 i s l e.,, *;1 i t A tFl e p l:.1 mp I" l:.1 AAi A§ . TR c l e § i e *,1 i l l elesc tRc miAiffil:.1ffi flew valve eAec tRc elest:Jrc sctpeiAt is CJteceEleEl . TFle LPGI miAimt:Jm fle *,, va l ves arc time ElclaycEl st:JeR tFlat tFlc val vcs \i'i 11 Ast epcA fel" appreJtimatcly 8 sceeAEls after tFlc s\i*itehcs Elctcet le1;;* fle *,; . TFlc time Elclay is previEleEl te limit Fcaetel" vessel iAveAtery less Elt:Jri A§ tFlc startt:Jp ef tFlc Rll R SRt:JtElo *.rn cool i A§ moElc .

TFle Pl:.1ffip DiSCRar§C FlO ';J LO ';/ (Bypass) P1llo\1a8le Valt:Jes are Ai §Fl CA8l:.1§Fl te eASl:.1rC tFlat tFlc pl:.1mJ3 fl 8';;' Fate is Sl:.1ffi ei eAt to pl"etcet the pl:.1ffiJ3 , yet lew eASl:.1§R te eASl:.11"C that tRc elest:Jl"e ef tFle miAimt:Jm fle *.1 *1al~* e is iAitiatcEl teal le *,; ft:Jll flew iAtO tRe RPV .

0Ae ehaAAel ef Pl:.1ffiJ3 DiseRal"§C Fle *,; Le *.1 (Bypass) Fl:.1AetieA is l"Cqt:Ji FeEl te se OPERABLE *,;heA tFlc asseei atcEl LPGS er LPGI pl:.1ffip is reqt:JircEl te BC OPERABLE By LGO 3 . 5 . 2 te CASl:.1re that the pl:.1mp is eapasle ef iAjcetiA§ iAte the Rcaetor Presst:Jl"C Vessel whcA maAt:Jally epcFatcEl .

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-4 Revision ffi

RPV Water In ventory Control In strumentation -}--"

B 3.3 .5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Ii i EJA PPeSSl::1Pe Cs Pe Sr;i Pay SvsteFA SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and 3 . a 3 . 13 . ll PCS Pl::1FA [2 BiseAaPEJe PPeSSl::1Pe ll iEJA ( Byr;iass) aAEl APPLICABILITY ll PCS SysteFA Fl s*.1 Rate Ls *.1 ( Byr;i ass)

(continued)

Hie FAiAiFA l: 1 FA fl s*.1 iA st P1:1 FA eAts aPe 13 Pov iEl eEl ts 13 Ps t eet tAe l lPCS 131:1FA13 fPOFA oveP Fie at i Ag wFie A tFie 13 1:1FA13 i s 013ePati Ag aAEl tFi e assoe i at eEl i Aj ee ti s A va l ve i s Aot s1:1 f f i eieAt l y 013 eA.

T Fi e FA i Ai FA 1:1 FA fl o*,1 l i Ae v a l v e i s o 13 eA e El *,1 Fi eA l o*,1 fl o.,, a AEl Fi i g Fi 131:1FA13 El i seFiaPge 13 Pess1:1Pe aPe seAseEl , aAEl tFie va l ve is a1:1 toFA at i ea ll y elo se El wFi eA t Fi e flo w Pate i s a El e ~ 1:1a t e t s 13Fsteet tFie 13 1:1FA13 SF t Fi e El ise Fi aFge 13Fess1:1Fe i s l sw (i AEl i eat i Ag tAe ll PCS 13 1:1FA 13 i s AOt s13 ePati Ag ) .

0Ae flo *,, s*, Jite Fi is 1:1 se El to El eteet tAe l lPCS Syste FA ' s fls\;

ra+e-:- TA e l o g i e i s a Fl" a Ag e El s 1:1 e Fi t Fi at t Fi e s\ J i t e Fi e a l: 1 s e s t Fi e FAiA i FA l: 1 FA fl o*;1 va l ve ts s13 eA , 13 Fov iEl eEl t Fi e l lPCS 13 1:1FA 13 Eli se F! aP ge 13 Fess1:1Pe , seAse El 8y aAs tFi eP s*iJ i t eFi , i s Fii gFi eAOl::1§A H AEli eat iAg t Fi e 13 1:1FA13 i s s13 ePa tiAg ) . TA e l ogie *.,*ill el sse tl9 e ffi i Ai ffi 1:1 ffi fl o*,1 *val ~* e o Ae e tA e el o s l: 1 Pe set 13 o i At i s eJt e e e El e El . ( TA e va l v e *;1 i l l al so el s s e 1:113 o A 11 PCS 131:1FA13 Eli s d 1a I" g e 13 1" es s l: 1 I" e El eel" ea s i Ag 13 el o*,1 tA e set 13 o i At . )

Hie ll PCS System Flo'ii' Rate LO'ii' ( By13ass) Ptlls\1*a8 l e Va l l::1es ape AigA eAOl::1§A ts eASl::1Fe tFiat 131:1FA13 flS\J Pate is Sl::1 f f i eieAt to 13Fsteet tFie 13l::1ffil3 , yet l ow eAOl::1§A ts eASl::1Fe tFiat tFie elssl::11"e sf tA e FA i Ai FA 1:1 FA fl s \J v a l ve i s i Ai t i at e El ts a l l o*,1 f 1:1 l l fl o\J i At e tA e RP V.

TAe llP CS Pt1FA13 Bi se AaP ge PPeSSl::1Fe lligA ( By 13 ass) Allo *;1a 8l e Va l 1:1e i s se t Fi i gFi eA0 1:1gFi t o eASl::11"e tA at tAe *,*al ve *;1 i 11 Ao t 8e 013eA *.,*AeA tAe 13l::1FA13 i S ASt 013ePat i A§ .

0Ae eAaAAel of eaeA Ft1AetisA is Pe~l::1 i PeEl to 8e OPERA BLE WAeA tl9e ll PCS is Fe~l::1iFeEl ts 8e O P ER,~ B L E 8y LCO 3 . 5 . 2 iA MOBE S ~ aAEl 5 .

~RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation 4-:-a-:- Reactor Vessel Water Level -Lo w. Level 3 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows cred iting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water l evel isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water le ve l being equal to (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-5 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentati on -r B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low. Level 3 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and the TAF. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 APPLICABILITY Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated RHR penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (i.e., two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value CLCO 3.3.1.1) since the ca pa bi l i ty to cool the fuel may be threatened.

This Function isolates the Group 6 valves.

~ ~tor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation L Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Low. Level 2 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Whi l e four channels (two per tip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-6 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation }-"

B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE :--a-:- Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low. Low. Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1),

since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low, Level 2 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

This Function isolates the Group 5 valves.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

R e ~Hi Fe 8 Ac ti eA A. l Si Pee t s eAtFy i Ate tA e a ~~ FB ~ F i a t e Ce Aeiti eA Fe f eFeAce e iA Tasl e 3 . 3 . S. 2 1. TAe a ~~li c asl e CeAeiti eA Fe f eFe Ace e iA tA e Tasl e i s FHA cti eA 8 e ~ e A8 eA t .

Ea cA tiffi C a CABAA Cl i s ei sceveFC S iAB~ CF asl e , CeASiti eA A i s eA t eFe S fep t Aat CAB AAe l aAS ~FBoi e es fep tF aA sfeF ts tA C a ~ ~ FB ~ F iat e s Hs se ~H e At Cs Aeiti s A.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-7 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation +

B 3.3.5.2 IA.1 . A.2.1. and A.2.2 I J,

BASES ACTIONS B. l aAd B. 2 (continued)

RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water immediate action to place the Level-Low, Leve l 3, and Reactor Water Cleanup System, channel in trip. With the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Functions are inoperable channel in the applicable when automatic isolation of the associated tripped condition, the remaining penetration flow path is credited in calculating Drain Time.

channel will isolate the If the instrumentation is inoperable, Required Action : directs~ aA immed i ate dcc l arat i oA that the associated penetration flow path on low penetra t ion flow path(s) -a-re incapable of automatic initiating action water level. If both channels are i sol at i on . Req ui red Ac

on :8-;-2--d i re ct s +"'C-r+a+lHCu+lr-ra+-+t,-+i-;.;of+!A-++o'ff'- +-1to calculate inoperable and placed in trip, DRAIN TIME. The calcula io cannot credit automatic the penetration flow path will be isolation of the affecte p flow paths.

isolated. Alternatively, Required Action A.2.1 requires Ito be immediately

c. 1 declared A.2.2 Lo *;1 r eacto r s team dome a Ad LPG I a Ad LPGS i Ajccti GA l i Ae pre s sure s i §Aa l s are used as permis s i ves for the maAua l opc r atioA of tA e 10*.1 pr es s ure EGGS i Aj ectioA /s pr a)'

subsystems . If t Aesc perm i ss i vcs are i Aopcrable , maAua l opcrat i oA of t he affected subs)'stcm i s pro hi bi ted .

TAcre f ore , t Ac affected perm i ss i ve must be pl aced i A tAe t r i p c0 Ad i t i 0 A '*Ii tA i A 1 h0u r . II i tA a pe r mi s s i ve i A t he t r i p coAdit i oA , maAua l opcratioA ma y be performed .

TAC CompletioA Ti me of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months i s iAteAded to al l ow tAc ope r ator t i me to evaluate aA )' discovered iAopcrabi li tics aAd to pl ace tAc affe cted cAaAAel i A t r i p prior to de clariA§ the aff ected subs ystem i Aop e rab l e .

If a LPGI or LPGS Dischar§ c Fl o*;1 Lo *.1 b)'pass fuActieA or ll PGS S)'st em Dischar§e Pr essure ll i§h or Fl o*.1 Rate Lo *.1 b)' pass fuActioA i s iAoperab l e , tAer e i s a r isk that tAc associated EGGS pump cou l d overheat wh eA t he pump i s opcr atiA§ aAd th e assoc i at ed i Aj cc ti oA va l ve i s Aot fu ll )'

-e-p-ett-:- I A t hi s co Ad it i GA, th e opera t or ca A t ake maAu a l ce Atrol of th e pump aAd th e i Aj ect i oA val ve to eAsure t he pump do es Aot over heat .

TAc 2 ~ ho ur Gom pl e t i oA Ti me *.,*a s c hos e A t o a 11 ovd t i me f o r tA e opera t or to evaluate aAd repair BA) discovere d (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-8 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation --V B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS D. l (eeAtiAuee) iAepeFabi l ities pFieF te eeelaFiA§ tAe affeetee subsystem iAepeFable . TAe GempletieA Time i s appFepF i ate §iveA tAe abi l i t y te maA ual ly st aFt t Ae EG GS pumps aA e epeA t Ae i Aj ee ti eA valves as AeeessaFy te eAsuFe t~ e af fee t ee pump s ees Aet eveFAea t .

lli t A t Ae R e ~u iFe e Ae ti eA aA e asseeiate e Gomp l et i eA Time ef GoAeiti eAs G eF D Aet me t , tA e assec i at ee EGG S iAjee t ieA/s pFay s ub system may be iAca pabl e ef peFfeFFfliA § t Ae i At eAe ee f uAe ti eA, aAe mu st be eee l aFe e iAe peFa bl e imm eei at el y .

- - - - - - -'l/-.--1IThe following SRs apply to 11---------------

SURVEILLANCE As Aetee at tAe be §iAA i A§ ef tAe SRs , t Ae SRs feF each RPV REQUIREMENTS Water Inventory Control instrumentation Function aFe fe uAe in t Ae SRs ce l umA ef Table 3.3.5.2-1.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channe l s monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-9 Revision ffi

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS J.1 aAS J . 2 (continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration f l ow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status OF to isolate tAe Rll R SAutsO\i'A Goel iA§ System (i . e ., pFo *,*ise alteFAate secay Aeat Femoval capabilities so tAe peAetFatioA f l ow patA caA be isolates) . ACTIONS must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status OF tAe Rll R SAutso*.m Cool iA§ System is isolates .

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each REQUIREMENTS Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analyses (Refs. 9 and 10) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross y(--

failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channe l s monitoring the same parameter should read (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-35 Revision---5+

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and l.a. 1.b. 2.a. 2.b. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage APPLICABILITY (Loss of Voltage) (continued) the power supply to the bus is transferred from the offsite power supply to DG power. Thi s transfer is initiated when the voltage on the bus drops below the relay settings with a short time delay. The transfer occurs prior to the bus voltage dropping below the minimum Loss of Voltage Function Al l owab le Value but after the vo lt age drops be l ow the maximum Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Value ( lo ss of vo ltage with a short time delay). The short time delay prevents inadvertent relay actuations due to momentary vo ltage dips. For Divisions 1 and 2, the time delay varies inversely with decreasing voltage. For Division 3, the time delay is a fixed value. The time delay values are bounded by the upper and lower Allo wable Values, as applicable.

This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are low enough to prevent inad vertent power supply transfer since they are below the minimum expected vo ltage during normal and emergency operation, but high enough to ensure power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Al lowable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supp l y to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.

Two channels of each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the DG function. For the Division 1 and 2 4.16 kV emergency buses, the Loss of Voltage Functions are 1 ) 4.16 kV Basis and 2) Tim e Delay. For the Division 3 4.16 kV emergency bus, the Loss of Voltage Functions are: 1) 4.16 kV Basis and 2) Time Delay. Refer to LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," aAE1 LCO 3. 8 . 2 , "AC Se1:n*ces Sl9cttE1e*.:19 ,"

for App licability Bases for the DGs.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.8.1-4 Revision .g.

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

With one or more channels of a Function inoperable, the Function may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is allowed to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where pla cing the channel in trip would result in a DG initiation), Condition B must be entered and its Required Action taken.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the associated Function may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) are declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 aA8 LCO 3 . 8 . 2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s).

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS Instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.8.1-7 Revision .g.

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1.2 and SR 3.3.8.1.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.8.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.8.1 aAe LCO 3 . 8 . 2 overlaps this Surveillance to

+

provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 8.2.3.3.

2. UFSAR, Section 5.2.

3. UFSAR, Section 6.3.

4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.8.1-9 Revision +

RPV Water Inventory Control -r-B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV)

WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM B 3.5.2 RPV Water Inventory Control BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is SAFETY ANALYSES not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur.

!considered A double-ended guil ~ tine break of the Reactor Coolant 1 - I- - - - - - - - - - .

System (RCS) is not pest~ l ates in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile

~ , piping systems. Instead, an event is considered in which

~ s iA g l e operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-1 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control ;f' B 3.5.2 an event that creates a drain path through multiple vessel penetrations BASES located below top of active fuel, such as APPLICABLE path with the highest f ow rate, or the sum of the drain SAFETY ANALYSES rates through multiple \ }enetration flow paths susceptible to (continued) a common mode failure (e . §., se i smi c eve At , loss of normal

~ power, Asingle human error). It is assumed, based on

~r ing judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii ).

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur, the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant ....--~~~~~~~~~

OPERABILITY of the operation. aligned and from the control room ECCS injection/spray One ECCS injection/spray subsystem is equire subsystem includes any OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide necessary valves, defense-in-depth should an unexpected draining event occur.

instrumentation, or ~ An ECCS injection/spray subsystem is defined as either one controls needed to of the three Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) manually align and start subsystems, the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, or the subsystem from the the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System. The LPCI control room. subsystem and the LPCS System consist of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. The HPCS System consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. The necessary portions of the Diesel Generator Cooling Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each ~

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-2 Revision ffi

RPV Water In ventory Control -i--

B 3 .5. 2 BASES LCO required ECCS injection/spray subsystem. Management of gas I ~

(continued) voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem ~

OPERABILITY.

A required ECCS subsystem may be aligned with the pump control switch in pull -to-lock and associated ECCS subsystem injection valves may be configured to allow throttling to control RPV makeup flow rates. Operators must be able to take manual action from the contro l room to provide makeup to the RPV as-necessary with the pump and associated injection valve in this alignment without delay.

The LCO is modified by a Note which allows a required LPCI J.-

subsystem (A or B) to be considered OPERABLE during ~I alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capab le of being manually realigned (Fe ffi ete eF l eca l ) to the LPCI mode and is not otherw i se inoper ab le. Al ignment and operation for decay heat removal includes: a) when the system is realigned to or from the RHR shutdown cooling mode and; b) when the system i s in the RHR shutdown coo ling mode, whether or not the RHR pump is operating. This allowance is necessary since the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown coo ling mode to remove decay heat and sens ible heat from the reactor. Because of the restrictions on DRAIN +

TIME, su ffi cient time wi ll be available to manually align and operate the required LPCI subsystem to maintain RPV in ventory prior to RPV water le ve l reaching the TAF.

APP LIC AB ILITY RPV water inventory contr l is requi ed in MODES 4 Requirements on water in v ntory contr l during other are contained in LCO s in S ction 3.3, In strumentat i on, and other LCO s in Section 3.5, ECCS, RPV Water Inventory Control , and RC I C-:- RP V Water I nvent or y Control i s re qui red to protect Safety imit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vesse l.

(continued)

System."

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-3 Revision ffi

RPV Water In ventory Control r-Y""

B 3 .5. 2 BASES ACTIONS C.l. C.2. and C.3 (continued)

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verificat i on of the capability to place one SGT Required Actions C.1, C.2, subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The and C.3 are considered to required verification confirms actions to place a SGT be met when secondary subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary containment, secondary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem containment penetrations, can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

and the Standby Gas The required verificat i on i s an adm ini strat i ve activ it y and Treatment System are does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

OPERABLE in accordance ~

with LCO 3.6.4.1, LCO 3.6.4.2, and LCO 3.6.4.3.

D.l. D.2. D.3. and D.4 With the DRAIN TIME les s than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event shou ld occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME i s les s than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.l i s also app licable.

Required Action D.l requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS inje ct i on/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary in strumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and va l ves needed to add water to the RPV or refue l ing cav ity shou ld an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.l states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water inj ect i on must be capable of operat ing without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiat ed and may consist of one or more system or subsystems. The additional method of water inj ect i on must be able to access water in ventory capable of being inje cted to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources . If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume .

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-6 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control -+--

B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS 0.1. 0.2. 0.3. and 0.4 (continued)

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material.

Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action 0.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the secondary containment boundary established, one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room. Examples of manual isolation from the control room could include the use of manual isolation pushbuttons, control switches, or placing a sufficient number of radiation monitor channels in trip from either unit. A secondary containment penetration flow path can be considered isolated when one barrier in the flow path is in place. Examples of suitable barriers include, but are not limited to, a closed secondary containment iso l ation valve (SCIV), a closed manual valve, a blind flange, or another sealing device that sufficiently seals the penetration flow path. The actions are not required to restore secondary containment to an OPERABLE status, only sufficiently sealed Required Actions 0.2, 0.3, to allow one division of SGT to maintain a negative pressure and 0.4 are considered to with respect to the environment.

be met when secondary containment, secondary One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment penetrations, containment at a negative pressure with respect to the and the Standby Gas environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Treatment System are Action 0.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being OPERABLE in accordance placed in operation. The required verification is an with LCO 3.6.4.1, LCO administrative activity and does not require manipulation or 3.6.4.2, and LCO 3.6.4.3. esting of equipment.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-7 Revision ffi

RPV Water Inventory Control --j---'

B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Conditions C or Dare not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition, there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation.

A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange, the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used.

closed and administratively The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation controlled those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are l 8e lzeEl , sea l eEl , 81" 8Hler *.Ji se seettreEl i 19 Hie el 8seEl J38Si t i 819 ,

blank flanges, or other devices that prevent f l ow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-8 Revision ffi

RPV Water In ventory Control ,f B 3 .5. 2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5. 2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining iA tAe eveAt ef aA 013eratiA§ Basis EartAql:lake . Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted.

Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines aA8 BA§BiA§ 13laAt ffiaiAteAaAce aA8 testiA§ activities .

The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System i s only considered an intact clo sed system when misalignment issues (Reference 6) have been precluded by functional va l ve interlocks or by i so lation devices, such that redirection of RPV water out of an RHR subsystem is precluded. Further, RHR Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system if it s controls have not been transferred to Remote Shutdown, which disables the interlock s and isolation signa l s. lasiflel lshouldl

, or multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common The exclusion of penetratio flow path ~.f rom the determination of DRAIN TIME ffitt5-t. consider the 13eteAtial mode failure, effects of a siA§le e13erater errer er iAitiatiA§ eveAt eA temporary alterations iteffiS Sl:lJ3J38FtiA§ ffiaiAteAaAce BAS testiA§ (rigging, in support of maintenance scaffold ing, temporary shie lding, piping plugs, SAl:l88er reffieval , freeze seals, etc.). If faill:lre ef Sl:lCA iteffis If reasonable controls are cel:ll8 eccl:lr aA8 wel:ll8 cal:lse a draining event from a c lo sed implemented to prevent system or between the RPV and the i so l ation device, tft.e such temporary alterations 13eAetrati BA fl e*,; 13atA ffiB)' Aet se e)(Cl l:l8e8 freffi tAe BRArn

/ T T~ - 1--'-"-*-

from causing ..1. I- ~ ~ ........ I.A \.A \J \J the effect of the temporary Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requires SRs to be met alterations on DRAIN TIME between performances. Therefore, any changes in plant need not be considered. conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME requires that a Reasonable controls include, new DRAIN TIME be determined.

but are not limited to, controls consistent with the guidance in The Surveillance Frequency is control led under the NUMARC 93-01 , "Industry Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance (continued) at Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 4, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," or commitments to NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-9 Revision ffi

RPV Water In ventory Control ~

B 3 .5. 2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5. 2.2 and SR 3.5.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The m1n1mum water le ve l of -12 ft 7 in (referenced to a plant elevation of 699 ft 11 in) required for the suppression pool, equivalent to a contained water vo lume of 70,000 ft 3 , is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool wil l provide adequate net positive suct i on head (NPS H) for the ECCS pumps, recirculation vo lume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water le vel le ss than the required limit, all ECCS injection/spray subsystems are in operable.

The Surveillance Frequencies are controlled under the Surveil l ance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.4 The Bases provided for SR 3 .5.1.1 are applicable to SR 3 .5.2.4.

The Surveillance Frequency is control led under the Surveillance Frequen cy Control Program.

-&R 3 . 5 . 2. 5 +-

VePifyiA§ tAe coPPect ali§AffieAt fop ffiaA~al , ~oweP o~ePates ,

a AS a~toffiati c val \fCS i A Hie PCCj~i PCS EGGS S~Bsysteffi fl o*.1

~atA ~po *wi ses ass~PaAce tAat Hie ~Po~eP fl 0 *;1 ~at As \i'i 11 Be availaBle fep EGGS e~ePatieA . TAis SR sees Ast a~~ly te val ve s tAat ap e le c ll es , s cal es , BP etA CP \,*is e s ec ~ Pe s iA

~es i ti e A s i Ace t Aes e val *o *es *,; e Pe ver i f i es t e Be i A t Ae ce nect ~esi ti BA ~ P i er t e l ec l(i A§ , s eal i A§ , e r sec ~Pi A§ . A val ve tAat Pece i ve s aA iAitiatieA si§Aal is al l ewes te Be iA a ASA a cc is eAt ~e s itioA ~ rev is e s Hi e *wal ve *,;il l a~teffiati c a lly re ~esitieA iA Hie ~PBl=Jer streke tiffie . TAis SR sees Ast PCC]~i r e aA y testiA§ or valve ffiaAi~~latioA , ratAeP ,

it iAvelves verificatieA tAat tAese valves ca~aBle of

~eteAtiall y BeiA§ ffiis~esitioAes are iA tAe coprect ~ositioA .

TAis SR sees Aot a~~ly te valves tAat caAAot Be i AaS 'o'CP t e Atl y ffii s ali§ AC S , S ~ C A as CRCC ll val ves . fft.e S~ Pve illaA ce Fre ci~ eAcy i s coAt re ll es ~ A s er tA e S~ Pve illaA ce Freci~eAcy GeAtre l Pre§Paffi .

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2- 10 Revision----7 RPV Water In ventory Control ~

B 3 .5. 2 BASES SURVEILLANCE -&-R 3 . 5. 2. 5 (CSAtiA~e s )

REQUIREMENTS TAe S~Fveil l aAce i s ffie 8i fi e8 by a Nete wAi cA eice ffip ts systeffi ve At fl e*..* pat As epeAe 8 ~ A8 eF asffii Ai stFat i ve ceAtFe l . -Tfte aSffii Ai StFati ve CSAt Fe l S AS~lS be pF OCe S~ Fa liz e 8 aAS iA C l~s e st atieAiA§ a 8e8i cat e8 iA8i v i8~al at tA e sys t effi ve At fle *.1 patA WAS is iA C SAtiA~S~S C Sffiffi~Aic a tieA witA tAe epeFateF S i A tAe CS AtFel F8 8ffi . TAi S iA8i v i8~al ';;'ill Aa 'o'e a ffi etA SS t e Fapisl y clese tAe systeffi veAt fle w patA if 8iFecte8 .

aligned , and the pump

~ -&-R 3 . 5 . 2. 6 return operated Verifying that e required CCS injecti n/spray subsystem This SR is modified can be manually started and epe Fate for t lea st 10 minutes by two Notes. Note 1 demonstrates th the subsystem is avail ble to mitigate a states that testing draining event. Tes tiA§ the ECCS injection/spray subsystem

~ through the f~l l fl S'*d test Fec i F c~l ati eA i ne i s as e q~at e t e

. .. . coAfi Fffi tA e epeF atieAal Fe asiA ess ef tA e Fe q~i Fe 8 EGGS toavo1doverf1ll1ngtherefuellng The minimum operating time of cavity.Note2statesthatcredit 10 minutes was based on engineering judgement.

for meeting the SR may be taken for normal system The Surveil lance Frequency is contro ll ed under the operation that satisfies the SR, Surveil lan ce Frequency Control Program.

such as using the RHR mode of LPCI for~ 10 minutes.

3.5.2.7 ~

Verifying that each va l ve credited for automatically i solating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simu lated RPV water level isolation signa l is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF should an unexpected draining event occur .

The Surveillance Frequency is control led under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2- 11 Revision ffi

RPV Water In ventory Control +

B 3 .5. 2 BASES SURVEILLANCE 3.5.2.8 ~

REQUIREMENTS (continued) T~e Fe~~iFe~ EGGS s~~system s~a ll ~e ca~a~le ef ~eiA§ ffiaA~ally e~eFate~ fFSffi t~e maiA CSAtFel FOOffi . This can be manually aligned Surveil l ance verifies that the required LCPI subsystem, LPC S and started from the control System, or HPCS System :++tte+i:rEH1A-e--ttt-e---a-5r-5-tl~-ttte&--&1i:tfltl'1---Tttttt room, including any necessary valve alignment, instrumentation, or controls, to transfer water from the suppression pool or CST to The Surveillance Frequency is control led under the the RPV. Surveil l ance Frequency Control Program.

This SR i s modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveil lance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the full flow test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Survei 11 ance.

REFERENCES 1. Information Notice 84-81, "Inad vertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86-74, "Redu ction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 92-04, "Resolution of the I ssues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Le ve l In strumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)," August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93-03, "Resolution of I ssues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Le vel Instrumentation in BWRs,"

May 1993.

5. Information Notice 94-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Drai ndown at Mi 11 stone 1,"

July 1994.

6. General Ele ctric Service Information Lett er No. 388, "RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6," February 1983.

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.5.2- 12 Revision ffi

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES LCO powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE unit DG, associated (continued) with a Division 1 or Division 2 Distribution System emergency bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, ensures a diverse power source is available to provide el ectrical power support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit.

Similarly, when the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is required to be OPERABLE, an OPERABLE Division 3 DG ensures a diverse source of power for the HPCS System is available to provide electrical power support, assuming a loss of the offsite power circuit. Additional l y, when the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, Control Room Area Filtration (CRAF) System, or Control Room Area Ventilation Air Conditioning System is required to be OPERABLE, one qualified offsite circuit (normal or alternate) between the offsite transmission network and the opposite unit Division 2 onsite Class lE AC electrical power distribution subsystem or an opposite unit DG capable of supporting the the ability to opposite unit Division 2 onsite Class lE AC electrical power manually start a distribution subsystem is required to be OPERABLE.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit(s) and DG(s) ensure the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). ,-f" The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capab l e of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective emergency bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant. An OPERABLE qualified normal offsite circuit consists of the required incoming breaker(s) and disconnects from the 345 kV switchyard to and including the SAT or UAT (backfeed mode),

the respective circuit path to and including the feeder breakers to the required Division 1, 2, and 3 emergency buses.

An OPERABLE qualified alternate offsite circuit consists of the required incoming breaker(s) and disconnects from the 345 kV switchyard to and including the SAT or UAT (backfeed mode), to and including the opposite unit 4.16 kV emergency bus, the opposite unit circuit path to and inc l uding the unit tie breakers (breakers 1414, 1424, 2414, and 2424), and the respective circuit path to the required Division 1 and 2 emergency buses.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-3 Revision----7 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES being manually started LCO The required DG must be capable of , accelerating to (continued) rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective emergency bus eA detectieA ef Bus uAdeFvelta§e , and accepting required loads. TAis sequeAce ffiust Be acceffiplis Aed witAiA 13 seceAds . EacA DC ffiust al se BC capaB l e ef acceptiA§ FequiFed leads 11itAiA tAe assuffied l eadiA§ sequeAce iAteFva l s , aAd ffiust ceAtiAue te epeFate uAti l effsite peweF caA Be FesteFed te tAe effieF§eAcy Buses .

TAese capaBilities aFe FequiFed te Be ffiet fFeffi a vaFiety ef iAitial ceAditieAs sucA as . DC iA staAdBy *o1 it A tAe eA§iAe Aet aAd DC iA staAdBy witA t Ae eA§iAe at affiBieAt ceAditieAs .

AdditieAa l DC capaBi l ities ffiust Be deffieAstFated te ffieet FequiFed SuFveil l aAces , e . §., capaBility ef tAe DivisieA 1 aAd 2 DCs te FeveFt te staAdBy status eA aA EGGS si§Aal

v1Ai le epeFati A§ i A paFal l el test ffiede .

PFepeF sequeAciA§ ef leads , iAc l udiA§ tFippiA§ ef AeAesseAtia l leads , is a FequiFed fuActieA feF DC OPERABILITY . The necessary portions of the DG Cooling Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink capable of providing cooling to the required DG(s) are also required.

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core cooling are available;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

(continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-4 Revision ffi

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

When the HPCS System is required to be OPERABLE, and the Division 3 DG is inoperable, the required diversity of AC power sources to the HPCS System is not available. Since these sources only affect the HPCS System, the HPCS System is declared inoperable and the Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control," entered. -r In the event all sources of power to Division 3 are lost, Condition A will also be entered and direct that the ACTIONS of LCO 3.8.8 be taken. If only the Division 3 DG is inoperable, and power is still supplied to HPCS System, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed to restore the DG to OPERABLE. This is reasonable considering the HPCS System will still perform its function, absent a loss of offsite power.

When the SGT System, CRAF System, or Control Room Area Ventilation Air Conditioning System is required to be OPERABLE, and the required opposite unit Division 2 AC source is inoperable, the associated SGT subsystem, CRAF subsystem, and control room ventilation area air conditioning subsystem are declared inoperable and the Required Actions of the affected LCOs are entered.

The immediate Completion Time is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required opposite unit Division 2 AC electrical power source should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the aforementioned safety systems are without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in SR3.8 .1.7, SR3.8.1.11, SR other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 to be applicable. SR 3.8.1.8 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1 .13, SR is not required to be met since only one offsite circuit is 3.8.1.15, SR 3.8.1 .18, and required to be OPERABLE. ~ SR 3.8.1.17 is not required to be SR 3.8.1.19 are not required to be met because DG start (continued) and load within a specified time and response on an offsite power or ECCS initiation signal is not required. B 3.8.2-7 Revision ffi

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3 .8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8 .1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for ; discussion of e~whichprecludesf This SR i s modi fi ~ Note-s-:- ~l'I fel" Nete 1 i ~

to ~l"ecl~ee requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4.16 kV emergency bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs . With limited AC sources available, a sing le event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must st ill be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE.

Note 2 states t~at SRs 3 . 8 . 1. 12 aAe 3 . 8 . 1 . 19 al"e Aot l"e ~~i l"c e to ec ffi ct . ~

REFERENCES None.

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-8 Revision ffi

ATTACHMENT 3 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages (Information Only) 3.4 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES B 3.3.5.2-1 B 3.3.5.2-2 B 3.3.5.2-3 B 3.3.5.2-4 B 3.3.5.2-5 B 3.3.5.2-6 B 3.3.5.2-7 B 3.3.5.2-8 B 3.3.5.2-9 B 3.3.8.1-4 B 3.3.8.1-5 B 3.3.8.1-6 B 3.3.8.1-8 B 3.5.2-1 B 3.5.2-2 B 3.5.2-3 B 3.5.2-5 B 3.5.2-6 B 3.5.2-7 B 3.5.2-8 B 3.5.2-11 B 3.5.2-12 B 3.6.1.3-4 B 3.6.1.3-9 B 3.8.2-3 B 3.8.2-6

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions wi l l correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded."

The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LGO 3. 3. 5. 1 , "E1t1e1"§eAC)' Gere GeeliA§ Syste1t1 ( EGGS ) lAStl"tlrtleAtatieA ," 81" LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation".

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-1 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control," and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that -a-re FequiFee feF maAua l epeFatieA ef tAe EGGS iAjectieA / spFay subsystem FequiFee te be OPERABLE by LCO 3 . 5 . 2 aAe etAeF fuActieAs tAat support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SOC) and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level.

Hie RPV ',JateF l A'o'eAteFy CeAtFel I AstFumeAtat i eA suppeFts epCFat i eA ef ceFe spFay (CS) aAe le'1i pfessufe ceelaAt iAjectieA (LPCI) . Hie equipmeAt iA 'o'elvee *o1itA eacA ef tAese systems is eescfibee iA tAe Bases fef LCO 3 . 5. 2.

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is SAFETY ANALYSES, not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated LCO, and in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is APPLICABILITY required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. considered considered A double-ended guil tine break of th Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping tresses, and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is pestulatee in which tt siA§ l e epeFateF eFFBF eF initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e . §., seismic eveAt , less ef AeFma l pe *o1ef , siA§ l e AumaA enef) . It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually operated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-2 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating SAFETY ANALYSES, experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant LCO, and to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory APPLICABILITY Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii ).

(continued)

Permissive and interlock setpoints are general l y considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Cel"e St:il"ay a19EJ Le ...* Pl"esst1l"e Ceela19t I19jectiel9 Systems l .a 2. a. Reactel" Steam Deme Pl"esst11"e Le *..* (Pel"missivel Le *.: l"eactel" steam El eme 13Fesst1l"e si §19al s al"e t1seEl as 13el"mi ssi *t es fel" Hie l e*rr 13Fesst11"e EGGS st16sy*stems . f+:l+ el9st1Fes tl9at , f31"iel" te e13el9il9§ tl9e il9jectiel9 valves ef tl9e le *.: 13Fesst11"e EGGS st16systems ', Hie reacter 13resst1re 19 as fall e19 te a val t1e eel e*;1 tl9ese st16systems maitimt1m Elesi §19 13resst1re . 1119ile it is asst1reEl Elt1l"il9§ MODES q a19El 5 tl9at tl9e l"eactel" steam Eleme f31"eSStll"e *..*i 11 ee eel ev1' tl9e EGGS maitimt1m Elesi§l9 13resst1re , tl9e Reacter Steam Deme Presst1re Lew si§19als aFe asst1meEl te ee OPERABLE a19EJ ca13aele ef 13el"mittil9§ mal9t1al e13 eratie19 ef tl9e l"e~t1ireEl EGGS st16system frem tl9e Cel9trel

~

Tl9 e Reacter Steam Deme Presst1re Lew (Permissive) si§19als aFe il9itiateEl frem t *;1e 13resst1l"e s*. :itcl9es tl9at se19se tl9e react8r steam El8me 13resst1re .

T 19 e Al l 8*,.*a 6 l e Va l t1 e i s l 8vd e198t1§19 t 8 13 I" eve 19 t 8Vel"f3l"esst1l"izil9§ tl9e e~t1i13me19t il9 tl9e 18v1' 13resst1l"e EGGS .

Tv1'8 cl9a1919els 8f React81" Steam D8me Presst1l"e L9 *,1 Ft119cti819 ape 8191)' re~t1i res t8 BC OPERABLE i 19 MODES q a19El 5 ';;'Ael9 tl9e aSS8CiateEl EGGS StlBSystem is l"C~tlil"CS t8 ee OPERABLE B)'

LCD 3 . 5 . 2 .

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-3 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE l . B 2. B. CePe S[°llav a19El Le *..* PPess1:JPe Ceela19t I19jectiel9 SAFETY ANALYSES, P1:Jmp DischaPge Flew Lew (Bypass)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Hie mi19im1:Jm fle *,1 il9stP1:Jme19ts aPe pPeviEleEl te pPetect tAe (continued) asseciateEl lew pPess1:JPe EGGS p1:Jmp fpem evePheatil9§ whe19 the p1:Jmp is epePatil9§ a19El the asseciateEl il9jectiel9 valve is 19et s1:JfficieAtly epe19 . TAe mi19im1:Jm fle *11 li19e valve is epe19eEl

'"A e 19 l e\J fl e\i' i s s e 19 s e El , a 19 El tA e va l v e i s a 1:J t em at i ca l l y cleseEl whe19 the flew Pate is aEleq1:Jate te pPetect the p1:Jmp .

019e flew tPal9smitteP peP CS p1:Jmp a19El e19e flew tPal9smitteP peP LPCI leep aPe 1:JseEl te Eletect the asseciateEl Sl:JBsystems '

flew Pates . The le§ic is aPPal9§eEl s1:Jch that each tl"al9smittel" ca1:Jses its asseciateEl mi19im1:Jm fle*,; valve te epe19

'iJAel9 fl e*,; is le" 11i tA tAe p1:Jmp Pl:Jl919i 19§ . Hie l e§i c *;Ji 11 1

clese tAe mil9iffil:Jffi fl eh' valve e19ce tAe cles1:JPe setpeil9t is eJtceeEleEl . The P1:Jmp DischaP§e Fleh' Le*.1 (Bypass) Alle\1 aBle 1 Val1:Jes al"e hi§h el9e1:J§h te el9S1:Jl"e that the p1:Jmp flew !"ate is s1:Jfficie19t te pPetect the p1:Jmp . The CePe SpPay DischaP§e Flew Lew (Bypass) AllewaBlc Val1:Jc is alse lew cAei:J§h te el9Sl:JPC that the cles1:Jl"e ef the mi19im1:Jm flew val ve is iAitiatcEl te a11e ... fl:Jll fle Yi iAte Hie Cel"C . FeP LPCI , the 1 1 cles1:JPe ef tAe mi19im1:Jm fle*.1 *1al ves is 19et cPcElitcEl .

Each cha1919Cl ef P1:Jmp DischaP§e Flew Lew (Bypass) F1:Jl9Ctie19 is eAly PCql:Jil"CG te BC OPERABLE iA MODES ~ aAEl 5 whcA the asseciatcEl EGGS Si:JBSystcm is l"Cql:JiPcEl te BC OPERABLE By LCO 3 . 5 . 2 te CASl:Jl"C the p1:Jmps ape capaBlc ef iAjcctiA§ iAte Hie RPV *,.*hc19 maA1:Jal ly epcPatcEl fl"em the Col9tPel Reem .

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-4 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Residual Heat Removal RHR Shutdown Coolin SOC S stem SAFETY ANALYSES, Isolation LCO, and APPLICABILITY :-a- - Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (continued)

The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Function associated with RHR SOC System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RHR SOC System.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. Each channel inputs into one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the RHR SOC suction isolation valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation. Therefore, one trip string in each trip system is required to provide for automatic RHR SOC system isolation.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Functions isolate some Group 2 valves (RHR SOC isolation valves).

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-5 Revision -&-+/--

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Reactor Water Cleanup CRWCUl System Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and 4-:-a- - Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low APPLICABILITY (continued) The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Isolation Function receives input from four reactor vessel water l evel channels. Each channel inputs into one of four trip stings.

Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the RWCU va l ves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation. Therefore, one trip string in each trip system is required to provide for automatic RWCU system isolation.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

RWCU Functions isolate some Group 3 valves (RWCU isolation valves).

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-6 Revision -&-+/--

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

R e ~ H i Fed ActieA A. l di Peets eAtFy iAte tAe appFepFiate CeAditieA FefeFeAced iA Tas l e 3 . 3 . 5 . 2 1 . TAe app l icasle Ce Adi t i eA FCfCFCACCd iA t AC tas l e i s FHACtieA depeAdCAt .

EacA time a cAaAAe l is disceveFcd iAepcFas l c , CeAditieA A is CAtCFCd fep tAat CAaAACl aAd pFevides fep tFaAsfcp te tAC appFepFiatc SHBSC~HeAt CeAditieA .

B . 1 a Ad B. 2 ~(:--[IQA:::!.1:::.QA~.2~.1!=*::§a!!:!ngd.:f.A~.2§:*§.2_J Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SOC) System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, and Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating N TIME. If the instrumentation is inoperable, Required

. : the -to_b_e_i_m_m......_e_d-ia_t_e_ly~

associated penetr ion flow path(s) -a-re incapable of initiating action to automatic isolati n. Required Action ~ directs ~d_e_c_la_r_e_d...----~

calculate ca l cH l atieA ef DAIN TIME. The calculati cannot credit automatic isola ion of the affected penetra flow paths.

immediate action to place the channel in trip. With the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, the remaining channel will isolate A.2.2 the penetration flow path on low water level. If both channels are inoperable and placed in trip, the penetration flow path will be isolated. Alternatively, Required Action A.2.1 requires Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-7 Revision-+

RPV Water In ventory Control In strumentation B 3.3 .5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

Le *.: PeacteP steaFR EleFRe flPess1:1ioe si §lAal s aioe 1:1seEl as flePFRissives feio Hie le *;1 flFess1:1ioe EGGS iAjectieA / SflFay Sl:lbsysteFR FRaA1:1al iAjectieA fl:lACtieAS . If a Fe~l:liFeEl CAaAAel ef tAe fleFFRissive is iAeflePable , FRaA1:1al GflePatieA ef EGGS FRay be flFSAibiteEl . TAeioefeioe , tAe affecteEl cAaAAel (s) FR1:1st be fl l a c e El i A t Ae t Fi fl c e AEl i t i e A ';Ji t Ai A 1 Ae l:l F. II i t A t Ae affecteEl CAaAAel ( s) i A Hie tioi fl CSAEliti SA ' FRaA1:1al SfleFati SA FRay be flCFfSFFReEl .

TAe CeFRflletieA TiFRe sf 1 ASl:lF is iAteAEleEl ts allew tAe SflCFateio tiFRe ts eval1:1ate aAy ElisceveioeEl iASfleFabilities aAEl te fllace tAe CAaAAel iA tAe tFifl CSAElitieA .

If a cs SF LPCI Pl:lFFlfl Di SCAaF§le Fl e*.1 LeVJ byflaSS fl:lACti SA is iASflCFable , HleFe is a iois l( tAat Hie asseciateEl le *11 flFess1:1Fe EGGS fll:lFRfl ce1:1lEl eveioAeat VJACA tAe fll:lFRfl is SflCFatiA§l aAEl tAe asseciateEl iAjectieA valve is Ast f1:1lly SflCA . IA tAis ceAEli ti eA , Hie SflCFateP ca A take FRaA1:1al ceAtioel sf Hie systeFR ts eAs1:1Fe tAe fll:lFRfl Elees Ast eveFAeat .

TAe zq ASl:ll" CSFFlflletieA Tiffie was cAeseA ts allew tiFFle feF tAe SflCFateio ts eval1:1ate aAEl FCflaiio aAy EliscevePeEl iASflCFabilities . TAe CSFFlflletieA TiFRe is aflfll"Sfll"iate §liveA tAe ability ts FF1aA1:1ally stal"t tAe EGGS fll:lFFlflS aAEl SflCA tAe FRiAiFRl:lFR fle *;1 valves aAEl ts FRaA1:1ally eAs1:1ioe Hie fll:lFRfl sees Ast SVCl"Aeat .

llitA tAe Re~1:1iioeEl ActieA aAEl asseciateEl CeFRflletieA TiFRe sf CeAEliti eA G SF D Aet FF1et , Hie asseei ateEl le *" fJFess1:1Fe EGGS iAjeetieA/SfJFay Sl:lbsysteFR FFIJ)' be iACaf)able sf fJeFfeFFRiA§l tAe iAteAEleEl fl:lACtieA , aAEl FFll:lSt be EleelaFeEl iAefJeFable iFRFReEli ately .

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-8 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ccontinued p The following SRs apply to SURVEILLANCE As Aetee iA tAe ~e§iAAiA§ ef tAe SRs , tAe SRs feF each RPV REQUIREMENTS Water Inventory Control instrumentation Function aFe feuAe in tAe SRs celumA ef Table 3.3.5.2-1.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channe l s monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel wi 11 perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptab l e CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.5.2-9 Revision -6+

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltaqe (Loss of Voltage)

SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY minimum Loss of Voltage Function Allowab le Value but after the voltage drops below the maximum Loss of Voltage Function Allowab le Value (loss of voltage). This ensures that adequate power wil l be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are l ow enough to prevent inad vertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that power is availab le to the required equipment.

Two channels of 4160 V ES S Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no sing le instrument failure can preclude the bus undervoltage function. Refer to LCO 3.8 .1, "AC Sources-Operating," anci 2 . @. 2, "/\C ?i0b1rces ?ihblt80 .m ,"

1 for App licability Bases for the DGs.

2. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltaqe (Degraded Voltage)

A reduced voltage condition on a 4160 V ESS bus indicates that, while offs it e power may not be complete l y lost to the respective emergency bus, availab le power may be in suff i ci ent for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that cou ld disable the ECCS function.

Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the vo ltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Vo ltage Function Allowable Value, however the transfer does not occur until after the inherent and No LOCA time delays have elapsed, as applicable. If a LOC A condition exists coincident with a l oss of power to the bus, the Time Delay (No LOCA ) Function is bypassed. This ensures that adequate power wil l be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Undervoltage Allowable Values are lo w enough to prevent inad vertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment. The Time Delay Al lo wable Values are long enough to provide time for the offsite power supp l y to recover or (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3 . 3 . 8 .1-4 Revision -G-

LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2. 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)

SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY allow restoration to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment.

Two channels of 4160 V ESS Bus Undervoltage/Time Delay (Degraded Voltage) Function and one channel of Degraded Voltage-Time Delay Function per associated bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the degraded voltage and time delay function.

Refer to LCO 3.8.1 eR8 LCO d . ~ . 2 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation channel.

With one or more channels of a Function inoperable, the Function is not capable of performing the intended function.

Therefore, only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is allowed to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.8.1-5 Revision LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure (within the LOP instrumentation), and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the channel in trip would result in a DG initiation), Condition B must be entered and its Required Action taken.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated OG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 eA8 LCO 2 . @. 2, which appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s). provides SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided the associated Function maintains LOP initiation capability. LOP initiation capability is maintained provided the bus load shedding scheme and the associated DG can be initiated by the Loss of Voltage or Degraded Voltage Functions for one of the two 4160 V ESS buses. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.8.1-6 Revision LOP In strumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 . 3.8 .1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The LOGIC SYST EM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specif ic channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3 . 8 .1 eR8 LCO 2 . @. 2 overlaps this Survei ll ance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety functions.

The Surveillance Frequency is contro lled under the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.8.

2. UFSAR, Section 5. 2.

3. UFSAR, Section 6. 3.

4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3 . 3 . 8 .1- 8 Revision----4J.

RPV Water Inventory Control i-B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CECCS), REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CRPV)

WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING CRCIC)

SYSTEM B 3.5.2 RPV Water Inventory Control BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel CTAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is SAFETY ANALYSES not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur.

!considered A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant

System (RCS) is not \Vp ost~ l ates in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile f8i11---: piping systems. Instead, an event is considered in which

~ siA§ l e o~eFatoF eFFOF OF initiating event allows draining of aneventthatcreatesa the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow

. path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain drai~ path through rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to mult1plevessel a common mode failure C . . , , loss of normal penetrations located power, single human er o ). It is assumed, based on belowtopofactivefuel engine ring judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low such as pressu e ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually {

operat d from the control room to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii ).

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-1 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control ~

B 3.5.2 aligned and started BASES (continued)

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 a d 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should ccur, the reactor coolant water level remains above the t p of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit .1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitiga e unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event th t could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the PV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hour4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limi OPERABILITY of the 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal pl ant ECCS injection/spray operation.

subsystem includes any One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem~ is quired necessary valves, to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually -e-e-e-ra-i-<e-e-* from instrumentation, or e con ro room o prov1 e e en e-in-depth should an controls needed to unexpected draining event occur. A low pressure ECCS manually al ign and start injection/spray subsystem consists of either one Core Spray the subsystem from the (CS) subsystem, or one Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) control room. subsystem. A CS subsystem consists of one motor driven r

pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or contaminated condensate storage tank(s)

(CCST) to the RPV. A LPCI subsystem consists of one motor r-t-driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or the CCST(s) to the RPV. In MODES 4 and 5, OPERABLE CCSTs can be credited to support the OPERABILITY of the required ECCS subsystem. In addition, in MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System cross-tie valves are not required to be open. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILI TY.

A LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capab l e of being t

manually realigned (Felf!ete eF leeal) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes: a) when the system is being realigned to or from the RHR shutdown cooling mode and; b) when the system is in the RHR shutdown cooling mode, whether or not the RHR pump is operating. Because of the restrictions on DRAIN TIME, sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and operate a LPCI subsystem from the control room to maintain RPV water inventory prior to the RPV water level reaching the TAF.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-2 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 rr BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY control is r quired in MODES 4 and 5.

r inventory ontrol in other ODES are contained i Section 3.3, Instrumentation, and other LCOs in Sec ion 3.5, ECCS, RPV Water Inventory Control, and RCIC System. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicab l e whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

ACTIONS A.l and B.l If the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this Condition, the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray t

subsystem, however the defense-in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considers the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probability of an unexpected draining event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory.

If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be initiated immediately to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually operated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems, and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-3 Revision -6+

RPV Water In ventory Control -}--

B 3 .5. 2 BASES ACTIONS C.l. C.2. and C.3 (continued) penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required ver ifi cation i s an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Act ion C.3 requires verification of the capability to place one SGT subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to place a SGT Required Actions C.1, C.2, subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem and C.3 are considered to can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

be met when secondary The required verificat i on is an administrative activity and containment, secondary does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

containment penetrations, and the Standby Gas -7 Treatment System are D.l. D.2. D.3. and D.4 OPERABLE in accordance with LCO 3.6.4.1, LCO With the DRAIN TIME le ss than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions 3.6.4 .2, and LCO 3.6.4.3. are implemented in case an unexpected draining event shou ld occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME i s le ss than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.l is also applicable.

Required Action D.l requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS inj ection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. Th e additional method of water injection includes the necessary in strumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and va l ves needed to add water to the RPV or refue l ing cavity shou ld an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.l states that either the ECCS inj ect i on/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operat ing without offsite electrica l power. The additional method of water injection may be manually operated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems . The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being inj ected to maintain the RPV water l eve l above the TAF for~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-5 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control .f-B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS 0.1. 0.2. 0.3. and 0.4 (continued) water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material.

Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume into -:J which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action 0.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the secondary containment boundary established, one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action 0.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room. A secondary containment penetration flow path can be considered isolated when one barrier in the flow path is in place. Examples of suitable barriers include, but are not limited to, a closed secondary containment isolation valve (SCIV), a closed manual valve, a blind flange, or another sealing device that sufficiently seals the penetration flow path.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action 0.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify Required Actions 0.2, 0.3, that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed and 0.4 are considered to be in operation. The required verification is an met when secondary administrative activity and does not require manipulation or containment, secondary testing of equipment.

containment penetrations, and the Standby Gas (continued)

Treatment System are OPERABLE in accordance with LCO 3.6.4.1, LCO 3.6.4.2, and LCO 3.6.4.3.

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-6 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control --t" B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Conditions C or Dare not met, or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition, there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation.

A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange, the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used.

The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed closed and system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are administratively l ee lzeEl , seal eEl , er eHler *.Ji se seeelreEl i A Hie el eseEl fJGSi ti eA ,

controlled blank flanges, or other devices that prevent f l ow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-7 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS number of bolts to prevent draining iA tAe eveAt ef aA 013erati A§ Basis EartAeiuake . Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted.

Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines aAs eA§eiA§ 13 l aAt maiAteAaAee aAs testiA§ aetivities .

The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SOC)

System is only considered an intact system when misalignment issues (Reference 6) have been precluded by functional valve temporary interlocks or by isolation devices, such that redirection of alterations in support RPV water out of an RHR SOC subsystem is precluded.

of maintenance FurtAer , Hie Rll R SBC is eAl:Y eeAsiseres iAtaet

, or multiple penetration flow The path ~ from the paths susceptible to a common ion of consider the 13eteAtial mode failure, a siA§le eperater errer er iAitiatiA§ eveAt eA items su13pertiA§ maiAteAaAee aAs testiA§ (rigging, lfreasonablecontrolsare scaffoldin tern orar shielding, piping plugs, sAubber implemented to prevent remeval , freeze seals, etc.). If failure ef such 4-t-efl:t.s.

temporaryalterations L--~ eeuls result aAs ..,*euls eause a draining event from a closed from causing system or between the RPV and the isolation device, tfte.

__,,,;;;.._=====~---;;? peAetrati eA f l e*.1 pa Hi may Aet be eJte l uses frem Hie BRArn TIME ea l eulatieA .

the effect of the temporary alterations on DRAIN TIME Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requires SRs to be met need not be considered. between performances. Therefore, any changes in plant Reasonable controls include, conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME require ~ that a new DRAIN TIME be determined.

but are not limited to , controls consistent with the guidance in The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," SR 3.5.2.2 Revision 4, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions The minimum water level of 8.5 feet above the bottom of the to Assess Shutdown suppression chamber required for the suppression pool is Management," or commitments periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool to NUREG-0612, "Control of will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for a ~

Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

(continued)l Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-8 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control --t--

B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE -&-R 3 . 5. 2. 4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) VeFifyiA§ tAe ceFFect ali§AmeAt feF maAual , peweF epeFateEl ,

aAEl autemati c val *1es i A tAe Feeiui FeEl EGGS suBsystem fl e*11 patA pFeviEles assuFaAce tAat tAe pFopeF flew patA will Be availaBle feF EGGS epeFatieA . TAis SR Elees Ast apply te va l ve s tA a t a Fe l e c ke El , s e a l e El , e F otA e n1 i s e s e c uFe El i A positieA , siAce tAese valves weFe veFifieEl te Be iA tAe coFFect pesitieA pFieF te leckiA§ , sealiA§ , SF secuFiA§ . A valve tAat Feeeives aA iAitiatieA si§Aal is al l e11eEl te Be iA a AeAacciEleAt positieA pFeviEleEl tAe valve will autematically FepesitieA iA tAe pFepeF stFeke time . TAis SR Elees Ast FeEjuiFe aAy testiA§ SF valve maAipulatieA , FatAeF , it iAvelves veFificatieA tAat tAose valves capaBle ef poteAtially BeiA§ mispesitieAeEl aFe iA tAe CSFFeCt positiSA .

TAis SR Elees Ast apply te valves tAat caAAet Be iAaElveFteAtly misali§AeEl , sucA as cAeck valves .

TAC SuFveillaAce FFeEjUCACy is CSAtFolleEl UAEleF tAe SuFvcillaAcc FFCEjUCAcy GoAtFel PFe§ram .

IA MODES 4 a AEl 5 , tAc Rll R Systclfl !flay BC rceiui FCEl te operate i A tAe sAutEle *11A ceol i A§ meEle te Femove Elecay Aeat a AEl seAsiBle Aeat fFelfl tAe reacter . TAeFefere , tAis SR is moEli fi eEl By Netc 1 tAat all e*..*s eAe LPGI suBsystem te BC coAsiElcFcEl OPERABLE EluFiA§ ali§AlflCAt aAEl opcratieA for Elccay Aeat remeval , if capaBle ef BeiA§ maAually Fea l i§AeEl (Femete er local) te tAc LPG! lfleEle aAEl Ast otAeFwisc iAopeFaBlc .

Ali§AlfleAt aAEl eperatieA feF Elccay Acat rclfleval iAcluElcs .

a ) \;' Ac A t Ac s y s t cm i s Bc i A§ r c a l i §Ac El t e 0 r f Fem t Ac R R 11 SAutEle*11A ceeliA§ lflOElc aAEl , B) 11ACA tAe systelfl is iA tAe Rll R SAUtEle*..*A ceeliA§ moEle , \;'ACtAer SF AOt tAe Rl lR pump is e per at i A§ . Because ef t Ae l e'vJ pFess ure a AEl l e*11 t e lfl pe Fat uFe c 0 AEli ti e As i A M0 DE s 4 a AEl 5 ' s uff i c i e At ti me '11 i l l Be availaBle te lflaAually ali§A aAEl iAitiate LPG! suBsystelfl eperatieA te previEle care ceeliA§ prier to pestulateEl fuel UAC8YCFy . TAiS will CASure aEleEjuate C8FC ceeliA§ if aA iAaElveFteAt RPV ElFaiAElewA sAeulEl eccuF . ~iete 2 CJlempts systelfl veAt fl e*11 pat As epeAeEl uAEleF aEllfli Ai strati ve coAtrel .

TAC aElmiAistrative ceAtrel sAoulEl BC preceElura l izeEl aAEl iAcluEle statieAiA§ a EleElicateEl iAEliviElual at tAe systelfl veAt fle1,* patA v.*Ae is iA ceAtiAueus celfllflUAicatieA 11itA tAe e pe r a t e Fs i A tA e c oAt r e l r e em . TA i s i AEl i v i El ua l 11 i l l Aav e a lfletAeEl te rapiElly clese tAe systelfl *,*eAt fle *,; patA if Eli FCCteEJ .

(continued)~

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2-11 Revision -6+

RPV Water Inventory Control 'i-B 3.5.2 SR 3.5.2.4 Note 2 states that credit for meeting the SR may be taken BASES aligned, and the pump return for normal system operation that

- - - - - - - ---+- - - - - - -r--- - - - - - - ---+- -----1 satisfies the SR, such as using the RHR mode of LPCI for~ 10 SURVEILLANCE -&-R 3 . 5 . 2 . 5 minutes.

REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that he required ction/spray subsys em can be manually started and for at least 10 mi utes This SR is modified demonstrates that the subs erationally ready to by two Notes. Note 1 mitigate a draining event. Test i R§ e ECCS injection Vspray states that testing s ubsystem t hr o ug h the f 1:.1 l l fl o'*i test I" e c i r c 1:.1 l a ti oR l , e ..:i lmay be done I Recess a P)"f't o avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes is based on engineering judgement.

The Surveil lance Frequency is control led under the Surveil lan ce Frequency Control Program.

~

~ 3 -. 5 . 2 . 6 Verifying that each va l ve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or s imulated RPV water level isolation signa l is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF shou ld an unexpected draining event occur. TAe FPe~1:.1eRc y i s ~a s es OR tA e Rees to pePfo rlfl tAi s S1:.1P veillaR ce 1:.1R8er tAe coRsitioRs tAat apply 81:.1PiR§ a plaRt 01:.1ta§e aR8 tA e poteRtial fol" aR 1:.1RplaRR e8 tPaR s i eRt if tA e S1:.11" 'o'ei 11 a Ree '11el"e pepforlfle8 'ii'i tA tAe Peactol" at po ,o1eio .

OpePat i R§ eJ(pePieRce Aas SAO'ii'R tAese colflpoReRts 1:.1s1:.1a l ly pass tAe S1:.1Pveil l aRce wAeR pePfOPlfles at tAe se l ectes Fioe~1:.1eRcy .

TAeioefoioe , tAe Fioe~1:.1eRcy was c0Rcl1:.18e8 to ~e accepta~le f ioolfl a Pe l ia~i li ty staRspo i Rt .

The Surveillance Frequency is control led under the Surveil lance Frequency Control Program.

can be manually aligned and started from the

~. S . 2 . 7 ~

control room, including TAe Pe~1:.1iPe8 EGGS s1:.1~systelfl sAa ll ~e capa~le of ~eiR§ ~

lflaR1:.1ally opeioates . This Surveil lance verifies that t+t-e any necessary valve required CS or LPCI subsystem ~HTE:+bt-e-t-A-e----Tfte---El-'.~*"'1r-a-:i=:-e-e1--BttFR~

alignment, aR8 valve(s)) is capa~ l e of ~ e1R§ lflaR1:.1al l y opePates fl"Olfl instrumentation, or CORtl"Ol fOOlfl , aRS witAOl:.1t s ela y , to pl"o vise a88itioRa l RPV controls, to transfer water l.'at e l" I R'weA t oPy , if Ree ses .

from the suppression pool or CCST to the RPV The Surveil lance Frequency is control led under the Surveil lance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.5.2- 12 Revision -6+

PC I Vs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements) to be de-activated and (continued) closed, are considered OPERABLE when the valves are closed and de-activated. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Reference 1.

MSIVs must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5. CertaiA valves , hm1ever , are req~irec:i to be OPERAgLE 11heA the associated iAstr~rnentation is req~irec:i to be Qprn cdnE per LCO 2 . 2 . 9. 2 , "Reactor Press~re Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instr~rnentation ." (This c:ioes not incl~c:ie the valves that isolate the associatec:i instr~rnentation . )

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.6.1.3-4 Revision

PC I Vs B 3.6. 1.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

With the MSIV leakage rate (SR 3.6.1 . 3.10) not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.

Theref ore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic va l ve, closed manual valve, or bl ind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leak age rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices.

The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months allows a period of time to restore MSIV le akage rate to wit hin limit given the fact that MSIV clo sure will result in i so l ation of the main steam line( s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Comp letion Time cannot be met in MQQE 1 , 2 , Gr 2 , the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at lea st MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power cond ition s in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(cont inued )

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3 .6.1. 3-9 Revision--4-l-

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES (continued)

LCO One offsite circuit supplying the onsite Class lE power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown," ensures that all required loads are powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE DG, associated with a Distribution System Essential Service System (ESS) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, ensures that a diverse power the ability to source is available for providing electrical power support manually start a assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Toget ~ r, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel). --+-----

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capab l e of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESS bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. The offsite circuit from the 345 kV switchyard consists of the incoming breakers and disconnects to the 12 or 22 reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT), associated 12 or 22 RAT, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4160 kV ESS buses required by LCO 3.8.8. Another qualified circuit is provided by the bus tie between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units.

being manually 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , ,

started The required DG must be capable of startiA§ , accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecting to its respective 4160 V ESS bus BA eeteetieA ef BHS HA8erve l ta§e , and accepting required loads. TAi s seEJHeAee ffiHSt se aeeeffi13l i sl9e8 *,1i Hli A 13 seeeAes . Eael9 DC ffiHSt alse se ea~asle ef aeee~tiA§ reEJHiree leaes *,1iti9iA Hie assHA'lee leaeiA§ seEJHeAee i Ater va l s , a A8 ffi Hst ee At i AH e t e e ~er ate HA ti l e ff s i t e ~ e*,1 er eaA se resteree te tl9e 4160 V ESS 8Hses . T19ese ear:iasilities are reEJHiree te se met freffi a variety ef iAitial eeAeitieAs SHEA as DC i A staA88y *;1i tl9 eA§i Ae 19et aAe DC i A staA88y *,1i tl9 eA§iAe at affisieAt eeAeitieAs . AeeitieAal DC ea~asilities ffiHSt se eeffiBAStratee te ffieet reEJHiree SHrveillaAees . Pr8[3er seEJHeAeiA§ ef leaes , iAelHeiA§ tri~~iA§ ef AeAesseAtial leaes , is a reEJHiree fHAEtieA fer DC OPERABILI TY. The necessary portions of the DG Cooling Water System capable of providing cooling to the required DG is also required.

(continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-3 Revision--&+/--

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. B.l. B.2. and B.3 (continued)

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1 .12, SR not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1 .14, SR resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required 3.8.1.16, SR 3.8.1.18, and Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to SR 3.8.1.19 are not required indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to be met because DG start to any required ESS bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be

.... ~-*u~~,J .... """ ~-* ~ *s Note allows Condition A to and load within a specified provide requirements for ~ he loss of the offsite circuit time and response on an whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.8 offsite power or ECCS provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation initiation signal is not involving a de-energized division.

required.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the ~Rs from LCO 3.8.1 that are t

necessary for ensuring tre OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, ard 3 to be applicable. SR 3.8.1.9 is not required to be me1 since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE. 'll sR 3 . 8 . 1.13 aAEl SR 3 . 8 . 1. 19 al"e Aet l"e~~ i l"ee te ~e ffiet s i Aee EGGS s~~systeffis wil l ~e ffiaA~a ll y stal"te e i A M eses 4 aAEl 5. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.21 is not required to be met because the opposite unit's DG is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.l for a discussion of each SR.

!which precludes Thi s SR i s mo d i f i e d by a Not e-:- \JI Hl e I" e a s e A f e I" Hi e Ne t e i s t e ~ l"ee l~e e requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESS bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-6 Revision -6+

ML20323A254

Text

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