Safety Evaluation Re Containment Liner Leak Chase Channel Venting.Concurs W/Licensee That Plant Does Not Need to Vent Containment Liner Weld Leak Chase Channels During TestML20248A010 |
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Point Beach ![NextEra Energy icon.png](/w/images/9/9b/NextEra_Energy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
09/18/1989 |
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From: |
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML20247P648 |
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References |
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NUDOCS 8910020122 |
Download: ML20248A010 (6) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212D5961999-09-15015 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee IPEEE Process.Plant Has Met Intent of Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 ML20196J4251999-06-30030 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternatives Described in Relief Requests VRR-01,ROJ-16,PRR-01 & VRR-02 ML20207D6751999-02-22022 February 1999 Assessment of Design Info on Piping Restraints for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.Staff Concludes That Licensee Unable to Retrieve Original Analyses That May Have Been Performed to Justify Removal of Shim Collars ML20206R9001999-01-13013 January 1999 SER Accepting Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Changes for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198C7671998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME BPV Code,1986 Edition,Section XI Requirement IWA-2232, to Use Performance Demonstration Initiative Program During RPV Third 10-yr ISI for Plant,Unit 2 ML20236Q3161998-07-10010 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code Requirements PTP-3-01 & PTP-3-02 ML20236L6771998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Wepco Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Point Beach NPP Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3131998-04-17017 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Nonstructural Seal Welds,For Plant, Unit 1 ML20217A8501998-03-19019 March 1998 SER Accepting Proposed Changes Submitted on 980226 by Wiep to Pbnp Final SAR Section 1.8 Which Will Impact Commitments Made in Pbnp QA Program Description.Changes Concern Approval Authority for Procedures & Interviewing Authority ML20216J0101998-03-17017 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Third 10-yr Inservice Insp Interval Relief Request RR-1-18 for Plant ML20198L1151998-01-0808 January 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198L4671998-01-0202 January 1998 SER Approving Request for Relief VRR-4B to Inservice Testing Program Wisconsin Electric Power Co,Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20197J9341997-12-12012 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from Performing Inservice Volmetric Exam of Inaccessible Portions of RPV Lower Shell to Lower Head Ring Weld During 10-yr ISI Interval of Plant,Unit 2 ML20137U4991997-04-10010 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternatives Contained in Requests for Relief RR-1-17 & RR-2-21 ML20129G6901996-10-0303 October 1996 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code Class Three Piping at Plant ML20062J4991993-10-28028 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting IST Relief Requests Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) & 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(iv) ML20062F1361990-09-25025 September 1990 SE Accepting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review - Data & Info Capability ML20248A0101989-09-18018 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Containment Liner Leak Chase Channel Venting.Concurs W/Licensee That Plant Does Not Need to Vent Containment Liner Weld Leak Chase Channels During Test ML20246H0121989-07-0707 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 880325 & 1117 Responses to NRC Bulletin 88-002, Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes ML20245B0311989-06-14014 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3 Re on-line Functional Testing of Reactor Trip Sys.Existing Intervals for on-line Functional Testing Consistent W/High Reactor Trip Sys Availability ML20207E4191988-08-0404 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Compliance W/Atws Rule 10CFR50.62, Requirements for Reduction of Risk from ATWS Events for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants ML20151R6771988-08-0202 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Relief from ASME Code,Section XI Evaluation Requirements ML20151N2191988-07-27027 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Proposal Re Design of Switchgear Room,Per Sections Iii.G & Iii.L of App R to 10CFR50 ML20150C1311988-06-21021 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 2.1,confirming That Program Exists for Identifying, Classifying & Treating Components Required for Performance of Reactor Trip Function as safety-related ML20154H5791988-05-12012 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Conclusions That Rev 1 to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Uses Methods Consistent W/Staff Requirements,However Some Discrepancies Identified.Odcm & Environ Manual Should Be Revised ML20148H4551988-03-24024 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 840405 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1,(Part 2) Re Vendor Interface Programs & Reactor Trip Sys Components ML20235K9241987-07-0909 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Reactor Pressure Vessel Flaw.Flaw Conditionally Acceptable Per Subarticle IWB-3123 of Section XI of ASME Code & Therefore Requires Augmented Inservice Insps Based on 10CFR50.55(g)(4) ML20213G5801987-05-0707 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util 861027 Request for Relief from Exam Requirements of Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code for Shell & Nozzle Welds in Regenerative Hxs. Request Granted ML20206K6011987-04-10010 April 1987 SER Supporting Util 860513 Proposed Replacement of Hydraulic Snubbers W/Energy Absorbers on Main Steam Bypass Line ML20210P2781987-02-0505 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831107 & 860411 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys Reliability on-line Testing.Plant Designed to Permit on-line Functional Testing of Diverse Trip Features of Breakers ML20214U6081986-11-26026 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850516 Capsule T Summary Rept Re Use of Reactor Vessel Pressure Temp Limits Specified in Figures 15.3.1-1 & 15.3.1-2 of Tech Specs.Temp Limits Valid & May Continue to Be Used ML20206S7091986-09-16016 September 1986 Safety Evaluation on Util 850426 Response to Open Items Re Generic Ltr 81-14, Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys (Afws). Reasonable Assurance Exists That Afws Will Perform Required Safety Function Following SSE ML20214L9311986-09-0404 September 1986 Corrected Safety Evaluation Re Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.Licensee Projections Acceptable ML20207D6781986-07-11011 July 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 82-33 Re post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation Compliance W/Guidelines of Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 2,subj to Listed Condition.Portions of Rev 1 to EGG-EA-6771 Encl ML20138N7801985-10-31031 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 840706 Relief Requests for Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Interval.Review of Requests for Relief from ASME Code Section XI Requirements Summarized in Encl Tables ML20134A4821985-10-24024 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,4.1 & 4.5.1 Re post-maint Testing (Reactor Trip Sys Components) & Reactor Trip Sys Reliability.Programs Outlined in Acceptable ML20134A6051985-10-22022 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Re Util 831107 & 850910 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1, Post-Trip Review Program Description & Procedures. Program & Procedures Acceptable ML20138H1721985-10-18018 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831107 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3 Re post-maint Testing ML20133G4171985-07-29029 July 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831108 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review.Response to Listed Deficiencies,Including Development of Systematic Safety Assessment Program for Unscheduled Reactor Trips Required ML20129H7871985-05-16016 May 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys Reliability,Provided Corrective Action Taken If Higher than Normal Valves Observed in Trip Force & Response Time Values ML20205H2171984-09-10010 September 1984 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Re Util 820820 & 860113 Requests for Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements. Volumetric Exam Acceptable Method for Detecting O.D. Initiated Flaws.Relief from Surface Exams Should Be Granted ML20204F5381983-04-25025 April 1983 Safety Evaluation of Util Preferred Ac Power Sys Conformance GDC 17.Proximity of Low Voltage Transformers Does Not Fully Meet GDC 17 Requirements for Physical Separation,But Deluge Sprinkler Sys Adequate 1999-09-15
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARNPL-99-0569, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20212D5961999-09-15015 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee IPEEE Process.Plant Has Met Intent of Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 NPL-99-0051, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with NPL-99-0449, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20196J4251999-06-30030 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternatives Described in Relief Requests VRR-01,ROJ-16,PRR-01 & VRR-02 ML20209D2691999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2 ML20196F3341999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation for Implementation of 422V+ Fuel Assemblies at Pbnp Units 1 & 2 ML20195F9781999-06-10010 June 1999 Unit 2 Refueling 23 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Form NIS-1 ML20209D2751999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised MORs for May 1999 for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2 NPL-99-0328, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with NPL-99-0273, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196F3521999-04-30030 April 1999 Non-proprietary WCAP-14788, W Revised Thermal Design Procedure Instrument Uncertainty Methodology for Wepc Point Beach Units 1 & 2 (Fuel Upgrade & Uprate to 1656 Mwt - NSSS Power) NPL-99-0193, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with NPL-99-0134, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20207D6751999-02-22022 February 1999 Assessment of Design Info on Piping Restraints for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.Staff Concludes That Licensee Unable to Retrieve Original Analyses That May Have Been Performed to Justify Removal of Shim Collars ML20206R9001999-01-13013 January 1999 SER Accepting Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Changes for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 NPL-99-0008, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with NPL-99-0091, 1998 Annual Results & Data Rept for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Results & Data Rept for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20198C7671998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME BPV Code,1986 Edition,Section XI Requirement IWA-2232, to Use Performance Demonstration Initiative Program During RPV Third 10-yr ISI for Plant,Unit 2 NPL-98-1006, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195J5101998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Revs to Section 1.3 of FSAR for Pbnp QA Program ML20198J5941998-11-0303 November 1998 1998 Graded Exercise,Conducted on 981103 NPL-98-0948, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With NPL-98-0880, Special Rept:On 980913,fire Alarm Control Panels Inoperable for More That Fourteen Days.Troubleshooting of D-401 Panel Following Installation of Replacement Batteries Revealed No Apparent Cause for Spurious Alarms.Panel D-401 Restored1998-10-21021 October 1998 Special Rept:On 980913,fire Alarm Control Panels Inoperable for More That Fourteen Days.Troubleshooting of D-401 Panel Following Installation of Replacement Batteries Revealed No Apparent Cause for Spurious Alarms.Panel D-401 Restored ML20154M9121998-10-14014 October 1998 Unit 1 Refueling 24 Repair/Replacement Summary Rept for Form NIS-2 ML20154L6751998-10-14014 October 1998 Unit 1 Refueling 24 ISI Summary Rept for Form NIS-1 NPL-98-0826, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20151W3851998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Pbnp Units 1 & 2 NPL-98-0653, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W4471998-07-31031 July 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for July 1998 for Pbnp Unit 2 ML20151W4541998-07-31031 July 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for July 1998 for Pbnp Unit 1 ML20236Q3161998-07-10010 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code Requirements PTP-3-01 & PTP-3-02 ML20236L6771998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Wepco Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Point Beach NPP Units 1 & 2 NPL-98-0558, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W4261998-06-30030 June 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for June 1998 for Pbnp Unit 2 ML20151W4221998-05-31031 May 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for May 1998 for Pbnp Unit 2 NPL-98-0481, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W4011998-04-30030 April 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for April 1998 for Pbnp Unit 2 NPL-98-0356, Monthly Operating Repts for April 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3131998-04-17017 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Nonstructural Seal Welds,For Plant, Unit 1 ML20216D7071998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W3981998-03-31031 March 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for March for Pbnp Unit 2 NPL-98-0209, Special Rept Re Fire Barrier Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days.Compensatory Measures Implemented in Accordance W/Fire Protection Program Requirements During Time That Barriers Were Inoperable1998-03-30030 March 1998 Special Rept Re Fire Barrier Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days.Compensatory Measures Implemented in Accordance W/Fire Protection Program Requirements During Time That Barriers Were Inoperable ML20217A8501998-03-19019 March 1998 SER Accepting Proposed Changes Submitted on 980226 by Wiep to Pbnp Final SAR Section 1.8 Which Will Impact Commitments Made in Pbnp QA Program Description.Changes Concern Approval Authority for Procedures & Interviewing Authority ML20216J0101998-03-17017 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Third 10-yr Inservice Insp Interval Relief Request RR-1-18 for Plant NPL-98-0159, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W3891998-02-28028 February 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for Feb 1998 for Pbnp Unit 2 ML20216D7121998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised Corrected MOR for Feb 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Unit 2 NPL-98-0084, Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198L1151998-01-0808 January 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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UNITED STATES
' ,y$ p,( NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 x*****/rE. SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE'0F NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONTAINMENT LINER LEAK CHA5E CHANNEL VLNTING WI5 CON 5IN ELELIKIC POWER COMPANY.
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT N05. 1 AND 2 DOCKLI N05. 50-266 AND 50-3C1 1.; - Background The leak chase channels which cover the containment-liner welds are welded
- to the liner plate. These channels were not specifically addressed in the-original liner plate analysis, were not intended to be vented to the containment, and have not been vented during the' containment integrated leakage rate tests (CILRT) conducted at Point Beach. The NRC position (Reference 1) is that;the containment liner weld leak chase channels must be vented to the containment atmosphere during the Type A test or CILRT, unless the channels are designed and built to the same criteria as those used for the containment shell- .
In a~ 1etter dated February 12, 1986 (Reference 2), Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO),. the licensee for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, initiated a program-to perform appropriate design reviews.and tests to determine the.
' qualification of the leak chase channel system as an integral part of the
, containment liner plate. .By letter of July 24, 1986 (Reference 3), the
' licensee submitted a technical evaluation of containment liner plate leak chase channel system (Reference 4) and a test report on static load tests on liner plate leak chase channel assemblies (Reference 5). However, the staff believed that in order to redefine the pressure boundary of the containment, the licensee should compare the applicable portion of the ASME B&PV code,Section III, with what has been done in the program. .
Additional information was requested to demonstrate that the Point Beach
' leak chase channels and the associated welds meet-the design acceptance criteria.
On December 1, 1988, a meeting was held between the licensee's represen-tatives and the NRC staff to discuss the issue. (Reference 6) The licensee explained that since the Point Beach Plant was built before the ASME B&PV Code, Section III~, was implemented, the containment' liner plate leak chase channels cannot be compared with the code. Nevertheless, to qualify the leak chase channels as a structural unit, the staff requires that the leak chase channels, as built, meet the intent of the code. By letter of May 9,1989, the licensee transmitted a summary report, " Containment Liner Plate Leak Chase Channel Pressure Boundary at Point Beach, Units 1 and 2,"
for staff information and review. (Reference 7)
II. Discussion The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals (References 2 through 7) and the justification f or not venting the liner weld leak chase channels during a CILRT or Type A tests. It is the staff's position that the channels need not be vented if the licensee can demonstrate that:
8910020122 890918 PDR ADDCK 05000266 P PDR t
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(a) the channel welds are qualitatively equivalent to or better than those for the primary containment liner welds; (b) the channels would maintain their integrity when subjected to the l loading conditions of a postulated design basis accident as well I as during normal operation; and (c) the inspection and reporting of tests as required,in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J has been implemented.
III. Evaluation The containment structure is a right cylinder (105 ft. I.D.,110 ft. Ht.)
with a flat base slab and a shallow (approximately 40 ft.) dome roof. The 3 ft.-6 in.-thick concrete cylindrical wall and 3-ft.-thick dome are prestressed and post-tensicned. The 9-ft.-thick concrete base slab is reinforced with high strength reinforcing steel. The 1-in.-thick liner plate is attached to the concrete by means of an angle grid system stitch welded to the liner plate and embedded in the concrete. The liner plate is fabricated with a leak chase channel system which covers all welded seams in the liner plate.
The original purpcse of the leak chase channels was to have the ability to pressure-test the liner plate or penetration welds for leaks without pressurizing the full containment structure. Since these leak chase channels are not to be vented during subsequent Type A tests, they are considered as an integral part of the liner plate and therefore a part of the leak tight containment pressure boundary.
The licensee has conducted an investigation to assess the ability of the liner plate leak chase channel system to function as an integral part of the containment structure leaktight pressure boundary (References 3, 4 and 5). This investigation included the following:
- a. Performance History Forty-nine (49) plants in the United States with similar liner plate systems have been surveyed. No evidence of unacceptable leakage was found for leak chase channels or liner plate butt welds in these plants subsequent to the initial CILRT.
- b. Quality Verification of Construction Records Verification of existing construction records included reviewing documents !'
such as fabrication drawings, bills of materials, welder qualification records, weld test and inspection records, certified material test reports, etc. A review of construction records for the Point Beach plants indicates thht the liner plate system, including the leak chase channels, has been fabricated, constructed, and tested in accordance with specified requirements.
L_________-_-________-_-__________--- _ - _ - _ - _ .
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. c. Structural Analysis Structural analyses of typical containment liner plate sections were performed to evaluate the severity of loading on leak chase channels. These analyses included investigation of internal forces, stresses, strains and displacements of the leak chase channels in the liner plate system and the assessment of the effect of the presence of the leak chase channels on the structural behavior of the liner plate system. The results of these analyses indicate that some of the leak chase channel secticns in the cylinder portion of the containment could sustain minor inelastic deformations when subjected to maximum design load conditions. The dome area leak chase channels, which are embedded in concrete, would also sustain some nonlinear deformation with a high factor of safety.
For analytical purposes, each leak chase channel section may be put in one of two categories. In the first category, which is typical of the dome sections, the leak chase channel projects outward and interacts with the containment structure concrete when relative displacement occurs between the liner plate and the concrete. In the second category, all leak chase channel sections project inward and do not directly interact with the concrete.
The general approach for the first category, i.e., embedded channels, included definition of loads in terms of induced strains, load-deformation characteristics in both linear and nonlinear response ranges, development of a mathematical model and a parametric analysis of the system. Conventional structural analysis techniques are utilized with evaluations based on lower bound physical material properties. The loads utilized in this investigation were derived from those contained in the plant FSAR. Because the loads in the liner plate leak chase channel system are predominantly a direct function of the relative strain between the liner plate and the containment structure concrete, the loads from the FSAR were redefined in terms of relative strain. The load combination includes dead load, differential pressure, accident pressure, seismic prestress, shrinkage, creep, operating thermal, and accident thermal loads. .
Analytical results for embedded leak chase channels in concrete show that the lowest calculated safety factor of 11.3 is well above a lower bound acceptable value of 2. The presence of the leak chase channels increases safety margins for other critical elements of the liner plate system.
In the analyses of the second category, the interior leak chase channel sections receive direct containment internal pressure load in addition to forced displacements due to the strain in the structural elements to which the leak chase channel members are attached. The axial stresses and strains of the leak chase channels are comparable to those of the support element in the axial direction of the channels. The forced lateral displacements induce internal forces and moments into the leak chase channel member cross section which responds to these displacements and to direct pressure loading
l l
1 essentially as a rigid frame with flexural continuity at corners and support ;
points. Conventional structural analysis procedures were utilized in solving the frame models. Most leak chase channels were found to remain elastic. In cases where inelastic response was predicted, ductility ratios based on strain levels and plastic section strengths were calculated. The resulting maximum
)
ductility ratio was found to be 1.94 which is well within acceptable range,
- d. Test Program ;
i A test program was conducted to obtain the load-deformation characteristics of leak chase channels interacting with the liner plate and containment concrete and to verify the leak tight integrity of the leak chase channels under the severe load and deformation conditions imposed during testing.
It was required that the leak chase channels be soap bubble tested and pressure decay tested under a test pressure of 70 psig. Construction records showed that these requirements were met. The tests demonstrated that the leak chase channels and the 3/16-inch double pass fillet welds retained their leaktight integrity throughout the test loading which produced lateral deformations in the 2-inch channel sections in excess of 0.149 inch.
For the composite tests (channels embedded in concrete), the shear resis-tance capacity was controlled by compressive failure of the concrete engaged by the leak chase channels. For the liner plate leak chase channel (steel only) tests, the capacity was limited by the flexural resistance of the i-inch-thick liner plate. Although the sections sustained inelastic dis-placement in excess of 0.10 inch, no failures were observed in the channels or welds to the liner plate.
The licensee has concluded that, as a result of this investigation, the least factor of safety for the external leak chase channels (embedded in '
concrete) based on strain energy and test-defined capacities is greater than 11. The most severe conditions for the interior leak chase channels resulted in a ductility ratio of 1.94 and is comparable to a safety factor based on displacement of about 22. All tests, analyses, and quality control and historical records indicate that the liner plate leak cnase channel systems will retain their structural and leaktight integrity under the most severe postulated loading conditions.
After reviewing the licensee's investigation, the staff wanted further assurance of structural integrity and requested comparisons of design analyses and tests of the containment liner plate leak chase channel system with the design criteria and requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III. On December 1, 1988, a meeting was held between the licensee and the NRC staff to discuss the problem and the nature of the additional information required. The licensee has adequately explained that the containment liner plate leak chase channels cannot be compared with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Division 1 Subsection MC requirements as requested because the Point Beach plants were designed and built before the ASME Code was implemented. Nevertheless, the staff required that the leak chase channels, as built, meet the intent of the code (Reference 6).
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.- j I
l By letter of May 9,1989, the licensee transmitted a summary report entitled,
" Containment Liner Plate Leak Chase Channel Pressure Boundary at Point Beach, Units 1 and 2," which also addresses the staff's concern of meeting the intent of the ASME design code. Based on the review of this report and the additional information on comparison of design codes, the staff finds that: j (a) The channel welds are qualitatively equivalent to those for the primary containment liner welds as demonstrated by construction records, quality 3 control measures, leak tests and inspection reports.
(b) The analyses and tests demonstrate that the leak chase channels, external or internal, are rugged components and will function as integral parts of the liner plate system. Comparison of FSAR specifications versus the present ASME code further conf trms the strength of the leak chase channels.
IV. Conclusions On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff concludes that:
(a) the channel welds at the redefined pressure boundary are qualitatively equivalent to those for the primary containment liner welds and are acceptable; (b) the channels are capable to withstand the loading conditions of a postulated design basis accident as well as during normal operation and maintain their structural integrity at all times.
The staff therefore concurs with the licensee that it is not necessary for Point Beach plants to vent the containment liner weld leak chase channels during a CILRT, provided that the licensee commits to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, including a visual inspection of readily accessible areas prior to each subsequent Type A test.
References:
- 1. Memorandum for K. V. Seyfrit f rom G. C. Lainas and W. R. Butler, dated December 15, 1977, on venting of containment liner weld channels. j
- 2. Letter from C. W. Fay, WEPCO, to H. R., Denton, NRC, dated February 12, 1985.
- 3. Letter from C. W. Fay, WEPC0, to H. R. Denton, NRC, dated July 24, 1986, transmitting Bechtel's Evaluation Re Michigan's Test Report (Reference 5) port (Reference 4) and University of 4 " Evaluation of Containment Liner Plate Leak Chase System for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2," by Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation, June 1986.
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.5. ~ " Test Report on Static Load Tests on Liner Plate Lenk Chase Channel Assemblies," by University of. Michigan, Department of Civil Engineering, Deceraber = 1985.
F
! 6. ' Summary of December 1,1988 meeting, including slides presented by WEPC0 and Bechtel during the meeting..
- 7. Letter from C. W. Fay, WEPCO, to NRC, dated May 9,1989 transmitting the summary report, " Containment Liner Plate _ Leak Chase Channel Pressure Boundary.at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," April 1989.
Principle Contributor: S. Chan Dated:
_u_____________________ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _