ML20245H447
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| ML20245H447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1989 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J, Glasman M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245H435 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-89-14, 50-414-89-14, NUDOCS 8906290488 | |
| Download: ML20245H447 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1989014
Text
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6* RFo UNITED STATES
*
, ug}o NUCLEAR REGfjLATORY COMMISSION
[\I n REGION ll
* j 101 MAF.lETTA STRE ET, N.W.
*, ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
*
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Report Nos.: 50-413/89-14 and 50-414/89-14
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242 ]
1
50-413 and 50-414
^
Docket Nos.:
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 i
Inspection Conducted: April 24-28, 1989
Inspectors: n (_- 2 8Ci
Date Signed
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M. Glasman
J.
\.Y V
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A 5'oY$ 9
Dat Signed
Approved by: - . / 6 I
J. . B ak'e, Chief Date Signed
Ma eri is and Processes Section
E gir) ering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of inservice
inspection and included a review of the Automated Reactor Insnection System
(ARIS) data from the Unit 2 hot leg nozzle inner-radius areas in which
indications were found. In addition, the inspectors followed the replacement
of steam generator tube plugs identified as being susceptible to stress
corrosion cracking; witnessed search for and removal of a loose part in a
Unit 2 steam generator, and addressed previously opened NRC Unresolved and
Inspector Followup Items. Also included in this report is a review of the Unit
1 End of Cycle 3 Inservice Inspection Report.
Results
Within the areas inspected, a major weakness in the area of protection of
permanent plant equipment was identified, in that adequate procedural guidance
in this area does not exist. (paragraph 3.e.) NRC inspectors witnessed '
personnel climbing and walking on equipment important to safety in the lower
containment. In the area of inservice inspection, the licensee's progiam is
adequate in . that personnel were knowledgeable and well-q'. lified to perform
inspection their respective areas of certification, hot er, procedurt
qualification documentation of examinations not fully performed to Code
requirements was not available during the performance of the subject
examinations, or for NRC review. i
B906290480 890622
~
PDR ADOCK 05000413
G PNU
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Within the areas inspected, a violation was identified: " Inadequate Procedural
Guidance for Protection of Permanent Plant. Equipment" (paragraph 3.e.).
One inspector followup item was identified involving the ARIS inspection of the
reactor vessel het leg nozzles (paragraph 2.a.(2)).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1. Persons Contacted
L Licensee Employees
*J. Barbour, Quality Assurance Director Operations
R. Giles, Site Inservice Inspection Coordinator
*R. Glover, Technical Support / Operations
R. Kaye. Maintenance Engineer Service Specialist
*V. King, Technical Support / Compliance
*P. LeRoy, Duke Power Corporation Regulatory Compliance
*T. Owens, Catawba Station Manager
*G. Robinson, Quality Assurance, Catawba
Babcock & Wilcox Employees
G. Bryant, Eddy Current Task Leader
M. Hacker, Supervisor, Ultrasonic Technology
R. Patterson, Task Leader, Inservice Inspection
NRC Resident Inspectors
M. Lesser, Resident Inspector
*W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
* Attended Exit Interview
2. Inservice Inspection (ISI) Units 1 and 2
The inspectors reviewed documents and records, and observed activities as
indicated below to determine whether ISI was being conducted in accordance
with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee
commitments. The applicable code for ISI is the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code, ,
Section XI,1980 edition with addenda through Winter 1981 (80 W' 81).
Commercial operation commenced June 29, 1985, for Unit 1, and August 19,
1986, for Unit 2. Unit 1 has recently completed the third outage of the
first 40 month period of the first ten year interval. At the time of this
inspection, Unit 2 was in the second outage of the first 40 month period
of the first ten year interval.
Duke Power Company (DPC) nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel were
performing the liquid penetrant (PT), magnetic particle (MT), radiography
(RT), and visual examinations (VT) under the DPC Quality Assurance (QA)
program. Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) and DPC personnel were conducting j
ultrasonic (UT) examinations, under the B&W QA program. I
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a. Observation of ISI Work and Work Activities, Unit 2(73753)
The inspectors observed examination activities, and reviewed NDE
personnel qualification records for personnel that performed ISI
examinations this outage. The observations and reviews are listed
below.
(1) Radiographic Examination (RT)
The inspectors independently verified results of the RT
examit,ation:: performed in the Units 1 and 2 outages. The
inspectors also reviewed documentation associated with the
respective examinations listed below to assure that the i
examinations were consistent with Section XI. The inspectors !
reviewed the documentation and films to ensure that the
following was evident and/or recorded: type of material;
material and weld surface condition requirements; type of
radiation source and its intensity; effectue source-to-film
. distance; effective focal spot, or effective source size; film
brand and type; number of films in cassette; minimum
source-to-film distance; type and thickness of intensifying
screens and filters; quality of radiographs; film density and
contrast for single and composite viewing; use of densitometers
for assuring compliance with film density requirements; system
of radiograph identification; use of location markers; methods j
of reducing and testing for backscatter; selection of l
penetrameters, including penetrometer placement; number of
penetrameters; shims under penetrameters; quality of film and
its general condition; film storage adequate; proper evaluation
of indications; proper density of film, and proper film viewing
conditions.
Unit 1 Radiographs
Weld
Identification Diameter x Wall Thk. System
ISM 29-3 34" x 1.451" Main Steam
ISM 29-7 32" x 1.459" Main Steam
ISM 18-1 32" x 1.375" Main Steam
Unit 2 Radiographs
Weld
Identification Diameter x Wall Thk. System
2SM 11-2 34" x 1.375" Main Steam
2SM 1A-I 34" x 1.375" Main Steam
2SM 11-3 34" x 1.375" Main Steam
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Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not
identified.
(2) Evaluation of ARIS Data, Reactor Vessel Hot Leg Nozzle Inside .
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Radius
During the week of April 17-21, 1989, Region II was
notified that indications had been detected during the
ultrasonic examinations of the inside radius of reactor vessel
hot leg nozzles A, C, and D on Unit 2. On April 24, 1989, the '
inspectors arrived at the Catawba facility to review B&W's
evaluation of the reported evaluation of the reported
i ndi cations . Discussions with the Level III examiner revealed
that B&W's preliminary evaluation of the indications indicated ,
that the ultrasonic reflectors appeared to be located totally i
in the stainless steel clad. The Accusonex (B&W's i
Automated Ultrasonic / Computer System) data further revealed
that the indications were laying in a circumferential direction
around the nozzles, in the same plane as the clad
deposition, and spaced between each pass of the weld metal.
The indications had initially been detected with a 70 degree ;
refracted longitudinal (RL) wave transducer which examines the i
clad and base material for 1/2 inch below the clad.
This transducer is excellent for near-surface detection,
however, the long beam angle required for near-surface >
detection tends to over size indications considerably. To j
prevent distortion in indication size, B&W examined the J
indications with focused 5 Megahertz (mHz) straight-beam
transducer, and 40 and 60 degree angle beam RL
transducers. The result of this ultrasonic enhancement
revealed that the indications were not planar oriented like a )
crack, but had volume like an inclusion, and contained within i
the clad weld material. The focused SmHz readily displayed the
indications revealing width and no depth. The 40 degree and 60
degree RL transducers did not detect crack tips or facets to
the indications. A test block with apparent inclusions and
electro-discharge machined (EDM) notches in the clad and
examination area also revealed similar type ultrasonic
reflectors for visual / ultrasonic comparison. At the conclusion
of the inspection, B&W had not completed their evaluation,
since they intended to further enhance the focused 5 mHz data
to further pin-point the exact location in the clad
of the indications. However, the inspectors were confident
that the preliminary eval M tions were sound, based on the data I
reviewed, and the DPC rLrporate QA supervisor agreed to I
pursue the following three concerns raised by the inspectors as l
a result of their examination of the evaluation activities: l
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Clad welding fixture / process data should be determined by
contacting the fabricator prior to classification of the
indications as a particular type of welding abnormality,
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The test block used for comparison should be ,
polished, etched, and examined with magnification on a l
side edge to determine the type of inclusion in the test
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block and whether the inclusions have any cracks running
from them into the base material.
l Demonstrate the sizing capabilities of the ARIS system
(Accusonex) on real underclad cracks, using the same
type of angle beam transducers used to evaluate the Unit 2
nozzle inner radius indications. B&W intends to perform
this demonstration for the B&W owners group and Duke in
several months at the Electric Power Research Institute in
Charlotte, NC. The inspectors requested that the
licensee notify Region II, Materials and Processes
Section, when this demonstration is performed so that
Region II can observe the capabilities of this system.
The first two concerns will be addressed by the licensee prior
restart. The third concern addresses system capabilities and
limitations resulting from the inspectors' review of the
system's display of the trailing tip on the EDM notches, and
concerns that cracks would be even harder to detect. This item
was reported to the licensee as Inspector Followup Item (IFI)
50-414/89-14-01, " Evaluation of ARIS Data."
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were
identified.
(3) Visual Examination and Retrieval of Foreign Material in
Steam Generator A, Unit 2 .
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The inspectors observed B&W efforts to examine Steam Generator A
Unit 2 (S/G 2A) for apparent loose material which had
damaged three Alloy 600 tubes. This retrieval required the
Licensee to bore an additional hole in S/G 2A near the level
of the third support plate in order to expedite this retrieval
effort. Several days of visual examination were required, and
various fixtures for the remote video probe were tried before
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B&W located and retrieved the loose part. The inspectors
observed B&W's visual examination to determine the condition
of the Alloy 600 tubes in contact with the loose part. In
addition, the inspectors observed the examinations to determine
if upplicable drawings of the steam generator's internal
structure and tube alignments were available; whether required
tools and examination aids were available; if specific areas,
locations, and extent of examinations were clearly defined, and
if inspection results were recorded and reported in a
prescribed manner. The loose part was retrieved on April 25,
1989, and consisted of a 3" x 5/8" x 1/4" tube wedge that had
apparently been left in the steam generator since fabrication.
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Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not
identified.
(4) Observation of Steam Generator A Unit 2 Tube Plug Replacement
l and Plug Repair
In a B&W letter, from James H. Taylor of B&W Licensing Services
to Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director, NRR, dated September 6,
1988, B&W fridicated that certain steam generator (S/G) tube
plugs fabricated from Inocnel 600, heat W-592-1, possessed a
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microstructure that may be susceptible to stress corrosion
I cracking (SCC). This letter identified the plants which had
plugs installed that were manufactured from this heat of
material. Catawba Unit 2 was identified as having six
non-conforming plugs installed that were fabricated from Heat
W592-1. The inspectors observed B&W replace these six plugs in
S/G 2A with conforming material. In addition, three plugs were
installed because of tube degradation caused by loose parts in
S/G 2A as described above in paragraph 2.a.(3). The inspectors
observed the plugging of the following tubes:
Steam Generator A, Unit 2
Tube Number Location Replacement / Repair
49-54 Cold Leg W592-1 Replacement
49-39 Cold Leg W592-1 Replacement
24-67 Cold Leg * W592-1 Replacement / Repair
24-68 Cold Leg Repair
24-69 Cold Leg Repair
15-77 Cold Leg W592-1 Replacement
* Denotes tube with non-conforming plug installed, and
degradation caused by foreign object on steam generator.
The non-conforming W592-1 S/G tube plugs were only in S/G
2A, and have been in service since February 23, 1988, or the
duration of one fuel cycle. The locations the non-conforming
plugs occupied are shown in the table below:
Steam Generator 2A
Tube Number Location
15-77 Hot Leg
15-77 Cold Leg
24-67 Hot Leg
24-67 Cold Leg
49-39 Cold Leg
49-54 Cold Leg
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At the time of the inspection, the licensee and B&W did not
have any definite plans for laboratory evaluation or NDE to
determine if the W592-1 plugs which were removed suffered i
service induced degradation.
Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not-
identified.
b. Inservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation, Unit 2 (73755)
(1) Records of completed nuadestructive examinations were selected
and reviewed to ascertain whether: the methods, technique, and
extent of the examination complied with the ISI plan, and
applicable NDE procedures; findings were properly recorded and
evaluated by qualified personnel; programmatic deviations were
recorded as required; personnel, instruments, calibration
blocks, and NDE materials (penetrants, materials) were
designated. The records selected for this review are listed
below: j
Item Number Weld / Component Method
802.011.002 2PZR-W8E UT
Pressurizer
B02.012.002 2PZR-W9D UT
Pressurizer
B09.011.044 2NC25-05 UT
Reactor Coolant
B09.011.312 2N161-05 UT
Safety Injection
B09.011.021 2NC13-W2 UT
Reactor Coolant
B05.010.005B 2RPV202-121ASE PT
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Reactor Vessel
Hot Leg Safe End
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B05.040.002A 2PZR-W2SE PT
Pressurizer
Safe End
C05.011.181 2ND13-7 PT
Decay Heat
Removal
C05.011.300 2NI18-01 PT
Safety Injection
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B09.021.011 2NC44-23 PT
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Reactor Coolant
C05.011.322 2NIf0-06 PT
Sa' sty Injection
C05.011.400 2SM25-01 MT
Main Steam
C05.012.300 2SV-02L MT
Main Steam
C05.021.054A 2CF-27-C MT
Feedwater
,
B07.070.049 2NI-175 VT-1
Safety Injection
B07.070.023 2ND-36B VT-1
Decay Heat Pemoval
y
F1.03.959 2-R-TE-0021 VT-3
Feedwater Turbine
2-R-KC-0414 F1.03.269 VT-3
Component Cooling
Water
(2) Review of Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 3 Inservice Report
The Inspectors reviewed the DPC Inservice Summary Report for
Catawba Unit 1, cycle 3 refueling outage. This outage was
completed February 6,1989. The report was reviewed to
determine whether the inspections performed were consistent
with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code,
applicable addenda, and licensee commitments. Specific areas
o examined for compliance were: minimum examinations completed;
limitations recorded; examination methods recorded, and
indications were recorded, evaluated, and reported as required.
Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not
identified.
3.- Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a. (0 pen) URI 50-413,414/89-08-01, "MT Demonstration"
L In the performance of the MT examinations on reactor vessel studs
and nuts, the licensee used less amperage than Section XI requires.
The Code, however, allows this if it can be shown to the
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satisfaction of the Authorized Inservice Nuclear Inspector (ANII)
that the _ alternate method (s) are equivalent or superior to the
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Code-specified method. The inspectors found that a procedure
qualification document approved by the ANII was on file for the
alternative MT exam.for the nuts, however, the procedure ,
qualification documentation for the studs ras not prepared at the
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time of the inspection. The inspectors found, however, that the
ANII did, in fact, witness, and approve the alternate MT examination
for the studs. Pending NRC review of the DPC procedure
qualification documentation, this item will remalr. open.
b. -(0 pen) IFI _50-413,414/89-08-02, "ISI Baseline Inspection Method"
The Code requires that repair work be inspected using the same
method that was used to detect the defect prior to performance of
the required repair work. Two DPC NDE procedures (NDE 25, Revision 12,
and NDE 35, Revision 10) did not incorporate this requirement,
and at the time of the inspection, were being revised. Pending NRC
review of the revised NDE procedures, this item will remain open.
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c. (Close)IFI 50-413,414/89-08-03, " Unavailable ISI Recoros"
Spectrum analysis data for transducer numbers M18416, M18423, and
data indicating hot leg wide range temperature instrument A0668 was
in calibration were shown to the. inspectors. This item is closed,
d. (0 pen) IFI 50-413,414/89-08-04, " Valve Identification"
. A Valve tagged "27SV27A". was incorrectly identified as "2SV027" on a
DPC drawing used by inspectors as reference in performing ISI. The
subject valve is a S/G power operated relief block valve; the "A"
indicating either A or B train power for the valve. Further review
by the licensee indicated that additional drawings which included
this valve required correction, however, the inspector found that
the valve was correctly identified on the Unit 2 main control board.
The inspectors also checked nine other A and B train valves for
consistency between drawings (Flow Isometrics and Design Isometrics)
.
and tagging on the main control board and found no additional
inconsistencies. Pending NRC review of the revised DPC drawings,
this item will remain open.
e. (Close) URI 50-413,414/89-08-05, " Protection of Installed Plant
Equipment"
During a tour of the Unit 2 Containment lower level, the inspectors
confirmed that personnel were climbing and walking on safety-related
equipment, including cable trays, small-bore piping, and pipe
supports. At one point, the inspectors observed a number of
personnel climbing down a long, vertically -run cable tray, scaling
its rungs as if it were a ladder. The inspectors also found an
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example of a damaged line (WL400-12) during this tour at the 558'
270 degree location in the pipechase. The line, part of the liquid
waste system, carries radwaste and was obviously struck with a heavy
object, and badly dented at the point of impact. At the time of the
inspection, the inspectors found that the licensee's procedure, CNS
Station Directive 3.11.1, page 4, states, in part, that " Adequate
working space shall be provided where possible utilizing
a proper work stages and platforms having accessibility by stairs or
ladders." Discussions with the licensee indicated, however, that
this Station Directive was not intended to provide guidance to
personnel regording protection of installed plant equipment during
regular moveme nt through the containment. Based on these
observations, this unresolved item will be closed, and elevated to a
violation for eack of procedural coverage for protection of i
permanent plant equipment. This matter will be identified as
Violation 50-413,414/8914-02, " Inadequate Procedural Coverage for
Protection of Permanent Plant Equipment."
4. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 28, 1989, with
those persons indicated in pa;agraph 1. The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in Jerail the inspection results listed
below. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information
is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received
from the licensee.
Item Number Description and Reference
50-414/89-14-01 IFI, " Evaluation of ARIS Data", Paragraph 2.a.(2)
50-413, 414/89-14-02 Violation, " Inadequate Procedural Coverage for
Protection of Permanent Plant Equipment,"
Paragraph 3
Licensee management was informed that one IFI and one URI discussed in
paragraph 3 were closed.
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