ML20236D225
| ML20236D225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1989 |
| From: | Bloch P, Harbour J, Luebke E Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| References | |
| CON-#189-8281 88-858-01-OL, 88-858-1-OL, LBP-89-09, LBP-89-9, OL-1, NUDOCS 8903230009 | |
| Download: ML20236D225 (43) | |
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! LBP-89-09 March 3,1989 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Uhr NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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Before Admistrative Judges:
.- Peter B. Bloch, Chair ^e Emmeth A. Luebk Dr. Jerry Harbour SERVED MAR -61989 In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 50-444-OL-1 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY CF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET_AL. (On-Site Emergency Planning and Safety Issues)
(seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
ASLBP No. 88-058-01-oL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Summary Disposition)
We shall. grant in part Applicants" Motion for summary disposition of all i
emergency planning contentions
- related to notification and warning of people within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.'
'Public Service Company of New Hampshire, eLal, which has filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on Amended Contention on Notification System of Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, September 14,1988 (Motion).
' Admitted by this Board's Memerandum and Order (Ruling on Admissibility of Mass.
Amended Contention and Bases), June 2,1988 (unpublished). In this opinion we shall refer to the Massachusetts Attorney General as Intervenor.
'In response, the other parties filed the Answer of Massachusetts Attorney General in Opposition to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Amended Contention on Notification System, October 11,1988 (AG Response), and NRC Staff Response to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of the Massachusetts Attorney General's Amended Contention on Notification Systems, October 12,1988 (Staff Response).
' 8903230009 890303i PDR ADOCK 0500o443 o PDRV, 5d7
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in this opinion, we will discuss separately each of the bases for the admitted-contention and state the extent to which summary disposition shall be granted. We shall then also review each material issue of fact that Applicants allege not to be in dispute and shall determine which of those facts are not in dispute. .
- l. Legal Standard A. Procedural Standard Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 9 2.749 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, a party may move for summary disposition of all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding. Paragraph (d) of 9 2.749 provides:
The presiding officer shall render the decision sought if the filings in the proceeding, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that 4 there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.
The proponent of the mo. ion for summary disposition must meet this burden even if the party opposing the motion fails to present evidentiary material to the contrary.
Cleveland Electric illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-443,6 NRC 741,753-54 (1977). To meet this burden, the movant must eliminate any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Louisiana Power and Llaht Comoany (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3) LBP-81-48,14 l NRC 877, 883 (1981); Cleveland Electric liluminatina Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, l
3 Units 1 and 2). ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753 (1977).* Moreover, the record is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion. Dairvland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58,16 NRC 512,519 (1982).
Judging against these standards, some of the Applicants' motion must be denied.
B. Substantive Law The relevant part of the Commission's emergency planning regulation requires that means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.
10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(5); see also 9 50.34(b)(6)(v) (requiring that an applicant demonstrate in its FSAR that it complies with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning).
Appendix E to Part 50, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities" also was published for notice and comment and adopted by i
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- A licensing board has said that summary disposition is only authorized "where it is quite clear what the facts are" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 10 C.F.R. 9 2.749(d); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-77-45, 6 NRC 159,163 (1977). Another board said that "[l]n order to grant a motion for summary disposition, the record before [the Licensing Board] must demonstrate clearly that there is no possibility that there exists a litigable issue of fact." Washinoton Public Power Sucolv System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No.
2), LBP-79-9, 9 NRC 330, 340 (1979).
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4 the Commission. Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 99 552, 553, 44 Fed. Reg.
75,167, 75,171 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402, 55,408. Appendix E provides that The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the j capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes.
,. Ida at 3-3. Appendix E then states the requirements for the content of emergency plans i that must be met by an applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power plant.
In addition to these regulations, which have the force of law, this proceeding is
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affected by a " guidance" document, NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (1980), which provides further explanation of the planning criteria set forth in 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(1) through (16). This NUREG was subject to public comment (44 Fed. Reg. 9768, February 13, 1980) but has a non-binding or suggestive effect.' Relevant parts of NUREG-0654 state:
Plannino Standard
. . . [M]eans to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.
NUREG-0654 at 43; see also 9 50.47(b)(5).
Evaluation Criteria
'See Carolina Power & Llaht Co.. et al. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP- l 06-11,23 NRC 294 (1986) at 364-369 (NUREG-0654 requirement of alerting through 60 '
decibel sirens not adequate to alert " essentially 100 percent" of residents at 2 a.m.).
l In this case, we considered making nighttime alerting a sua sponte issue, pursuant to l 10 C.F.R. 9 2.760a but in our discretion we have the view that the policy guidance of NUREG-0654 is adequate and that a serious safety issue does not exist.
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l Each organization shall establish administrative and physical means, and the time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. (See Appendix !
3.) It shall be the licensee's responsibility to demonstrate that such means exist, regardless of who implements this requirement. . . .
E at 45.
.. APPENDIX 3 MEANS FOR PROVIDING PROMPT ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION OF
. . . THE POPULATION Commercial broadcast messages are the primary means for advising the general public of the conditions of any nuclear accident. The primary means for alerting the public to an impending notification by public authorities may be any combination of fixed, mobile or electronic tone generators which will convey the alerting signal with sufficient timing and intensity to permit completion of notification by broadcast media in a timely manner. . . .
I E at 3-2. '
. . . Within the plume exposure EPZ the system shall provide an alerting signal and notification by commercial broadcast (e.g., EBS) plus special systems such as NOAA radio. . . .
... The minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by the system are:
a) Capability for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 15 minutes.
b) The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 5 miles of the site.
c) Special arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage withi'1 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ. . . .
Id a at 3-3.
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e Wherever proposed as part of a -system, subject to later testing.by statistical sampling, the design concept and expected performance must be documented as part of plans submitted by licensees . . . . The designs of such systems must take into account the demography and topography of the areas being considered.
E at 3-7 to 3-8.
, The basic criterion needed for the oesign of a siren system is the acceptable dissonant sound level as described in " Outdoor Warning Systems Guide," Report No. 4100, by Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., June 1979 (FEMA publication number. CPG-1-17).
As an acceptable criterion at most locations 10db above average daytime ambient background should be a target level for the design of an adequate siren i system. . . .
E at 3-8; see Jonas Affidavit, Exibit C, for FEMA CPG-1-17..
Siren systems should be designed considering the demography and topography of an area, and taking into account other alert or notification systems in place or planned. The maximum sound levels received by any member of the public should be lower than 123db, the level which may cause discomfort to individuals. . . .
E at 3-8.
. . . The 10db differential above daytime ambient is meant to provide a distinguishable signal insids of average residential construction under average conditions. Where specie individual cases require a higher alerting signal, it should be provided by other means than a generally distributed acoustic signal.
E at 3-9.
The siren signal shall be a 3 to 5 minute steady signal as described in Paragraph IV E of CPG-1-17 and capable of repetition.
E at 3-12.
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- 11. Discussion of Basis A.1 Basis A.1 is:
The VANS and the New Hampshire fixed sirens because of their locations, height, acoustic range and number, do not provide tone or message coverage for essentially 100 percent of the population in the Massachusetts plume .
exposure pathway EPZ at the sound pressure levels required in NUREG-0654 !
and FEMA-REP-10.
A. Applicants' Position The Applicants claim that Basis A.1 is "put to rest" because their VANS system does not and ne.ed not provide informational and instructional messages and because Wyle Laboratories has determined that essentially 100 percent of the population in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ will be covered by the tone alert mode of the sirons, i Applicants Brief at 3 5. They also submit an affidavit of David M. Keast, who states he was author of CPG 1-17, which was the source of the regulatory language limiting sound to no more than "123 dB, the level which may cause discomfort to individuals."
Keast Affidavit at 2. He claims that the 123 dB level used in this language was selected to avoid hearing damage to individuals and that no damage would be caused by a 134 dB rotating siren at 25 feet sounded for 3 minutes at 550 Hz. Id. at 4; see Kreiter Affidavit at 4.
8 B. Intervenor's Position With respect to the message mode of the siren (also called "public address mode"), the Intervenor filed a Motion to Amend Bases on September 8,1988 which addresses the Applicants' claim that the VANS system need not provide instructional messages for the beach population. However, the motion was denied, Memorandum and Order (Granting Mass. Request to File a Reply; Denying Mass. Motion to Amend),
October 12,1988 (unpublished) and is not an issue in this case.
With respect to tone alert coverage, the Intervenor states that the Applicants' experts proceed from a faulty, crucial assump+ ion. They assume that it is acceptable for each VANS siren to put out 134 dBC of sound output. Applicants' calculations are based on that output. Stusnick Affidavit,18; Attachment E,6 and 7 of 10. They also acknowledge, based on their own calculations, that the maximum sound level received by members of the public will be 131 dBC. Motion at 4 n.3; Sutherland Affidavit,15.
Intervenor also argues that NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 states that "[t]he maximum sound levels received by any member of the public should be lower than 123db, the level which may cause discomfort to individuals." NUREG-0654, Appendix 3 at 3-8. They state that Applicants' affidavits concerning lack of hearing loss at 131 dBC are irrelevant, as the clear wording of the regulations is addressed to discomfort.
They stato Applicants have far exceeded the allowable 123 dBC level in order to squeeze additional coverage from their limited number of sirens. If the sound level is limited to the acceptable 123 dBC level, coverage falls off sharply and leaves a
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9 substantial portion of the Massachusetts EPZ unprotected by an alert and notification l system. Bouilane Affidavit,131, Appendices 9 and 10.
Intervenor states that there also are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether this calculation underestimates the sound level received by members of the
, public by not including sound reflection from buildings. See Affidavit of Thomas Bouliane, 11 25-30.
C. Staff's Position The Staff supports the motion of Applicants. However, Staff's agreement with Applicants does not result in a change in any of our conclusions concerning the existence of a material issue of fact. What Staff's position can do is add to the weight of evidence, but it would not negate a genuine issue arising out of an affidavit submitted by Intervenor. See above, pp. 2-3. Consequently, we shall not separately review Staff's position, but we will remain aware of it in case it ought to have some effect on our determination.
D. Findings The follow!ng genuine issues of fact exist and shall be heard:
A.1-1. Whether sound levels in excess of 123 dBC cause enough dis-comfort so that the Board should not approve the use of sirens at a higher level of sound. We note that this issue of fact also involves a legal question: What standard
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should we apply to determine the possible relevance of discomfort? On this question, we invite simultaneous. briefs from Intervenor and. Applicants five days prior to.the deadline for the prefiling of testimony; and we-invite a legal filing 'from the, Staff simultaneously with the prefiling of testimony.
. A.1-2. If there is some level higher than 123 dBC that the Board should allow, what is that level?
A.1-3. Whether Applicants' sirens can provide adequate coverage if used at sound levels that are not unduly uncomfortable.
A.1-4. Whether Applicants' position on the sound level resulting from their sirens is an underestimate because of sound reflection from buildings.
The following are material facts that we find are not in dispute:
1 A.1-a. The alert function is performed by using the tone mode of the siren.
A.1-b. The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) radio broadcasts are relied upon to provide the notification function (i.e., providing information and instructions) to the public.
A.1-c. The siren message mode is not used for alert or notification.
A.1-d. There is no dispute relevant to this case concerning siren message mode substantive requirements.
A.1-e. The population density distribution for the geographical area within the Massachusetts plume exposure EPZ has been determined.
11 A.1-f. Those areas where the population density exceeds 2,000 persons per square mile have been identified and are depicted on Figure 2-2 of the Seabrook Station Public Alert and Notification System FEMA REP-10 Design Report.
A.1-g. All other areas have a population density less than 2,000 persons per square mile.
A.1-h. The siren sound coverage for each VANS siren was determined by means of a computer modei developed by Wyle Laboratories.
A.1-l. Figure 2-2 of the FEMA-REP-10 Design Report depicts 60 and 70 dBC sound level contours calculated by the model and then graphically combined into the envelopes depicting the total system coverage.
A.1-J. Ambient sound surveys were conducted in all four areas that Applicants have admitted, based on siren sound levels in excess of 123 dBC, would not be covered by a sound level of at least 60 dBC.
A.1-k. Applicants do not rely upon New Hampshire fixed siren coverage for any of the portion of the coverage for Massachusetts.
Ill. Basis A.2 Intervenor withdrew Basis A.2 based on arguments made by the Applicants.
The following material facts are not in dispute:
A.2 a. The VANS sirens do not operate continuously.
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12 A.2-b. The VANS sirens are not permanent, stationary facilities.
Rather they are mobile' equipment, moved from place to place by truck, located at different sites (even in different states) at different times.
A.2-c. The Governor of Massachusetts and the town officials of
. Amesbury will obey 'the statutes of the Commonwealth .of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States.
A.2-d. 'The Governor of Massachusetts and the town officials of Amesbury will use their best efforts to protect the populace in response to a
- radiological emergency at Seabrook station.
IV. Basis A.3 Basis A.3 is:
The fourteen VANS locations' are physically inaccessible to the VANS equipment.
A. Comparison of Parties' Positions The Applicants ask for summary disposition on Basis A.3 based on the personal observations of a Seabrook employee, Joseph Story 11. We agree with Intervenor that those observations are sufficient to allow summary disposition with respect to acoustic
'There are 16 VANS locations and six staging areas, from which the VANS are deployed. Two of the staging areas also serve as a VANS location. See New Hampshire Yankee, Seabrook Station Public Alert and Notification System: FEMA REP-10 Design Report, April 30,1988 at 2-33 to 2-34 (Tables 2-1 and 2-2).
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13 locations VL-02 and VL-13, but they do not dispose of factual issues remaining for VL-03, VL-06, VL-07 and VL-12. l On October 3,1988, Nancy Mason, an investigator for Intervenor revisited VL-03, VL-06, and VL-12 and made measurements of those areas to determine their
,'"- ' accessibility to VANS equipment. The Ford Series F-800 truck is 95 inches wide, and the outriggers extend approximately 5 feet from the truck on each side. Mason Affidavit 13; Bouliane Affidavit 132, Appendices 11 and 12. With outriggers extended, a VANS truck parked at the side of the road at VL-12 will extend at least 6 feet into the road.
See Mason Affidavit,16. The Board is not sure whether this conclusion is correct or, in fact, whether that is a permissible location for the truck.
Moreover, the Applicants acknowledge that VL-06 and VL-07 are inclined where the trucks would set up. Story Affidavit 1111 and 12. While Applicants characterize those inclines as slight or negligible, interveners claim that their photographs indicate otherwise. See Mason Affidavit, Exhibits C through H. In any event, the crane manufacturer's instructions state, "do not use this equipment except on solid, level surface", and that the " crane must be level for operation." Bouliane Affidavit 132, Appendix 13; see Johnson Affidavit, Attachment C,2 of 2. The record does not contain information on the crane's tolerance for being on a slight incline.
Another factual issue is raised by Intervenor's observation that the grass and dirt surface of VL-12 is uneven, again suggesting operation inconsistent with the manufacturer's specifications. Mason Affidavit 16.
i 14 Finally, there was an issue concerning whether the Applicants had made appropriate provision for acoustic location accessibility during the winter. Locations l VL-06, VL-07 and VL-12 are simply unpaved roadsides. Those locations might have l b been blocked by snow piles in the winter, making access difficult. However, this argument has been' disposed of by Joint stipulation,' based on Applicants contract with a firm to remove snow from each acoustical location; and the Board accepts this i stipulation.
B. Board's Findings The following are genuine issues of material fact:
A.3-1. Whether the appointed destination locations, including VL-06, VL-07, and VL-12, are sufficiently level for the safe deployment of the VANS vehicles.
A.3-2. Whether or not VANS vehicles may gain physical access to VL-03, VL-06, VL-07 and VL-12.
C. Requirement for Negotiation and Accurate Measurement The physical characteristics of the VANS destination sites are definitely knowable.
Consequently, we expect the parties to engage in good-faith efforts so that Applicants can drive vehicles into the sites with Intervenor' consultant as an eyewitness. An agreed method also should be arrived at for accurately measuring the degree of inclination at the site so that the Board will not need to litigate a fact which any person
15 could obtain merely by visiting the site. Appropriate protective order agreements should be entered into so that information about the sites will not become public, if the parties are unable to reach an agreement on a site visitation procedure they may ask the Board for informal assistance in reaching agreement. .
The following facts are not in dispute:
A.3-a. Of the 16 preselected VANS acoustic locations, two are located at the staging area where the VANS vehicle is parked.
A.3-b. At acoustic location VL-02, Applicants have observed the parking lot numerous times in the spring and summer, and it has ne'ver been close to being full. In addition, part of the lot is not used for parking, and this part is large enough to accommodate the VANS vehicle.
A.3-c. All VANS drivers will be trained to locate VL-03 (and all other acoustic locations). When Applicants set the VANS prototype up at VL-03, fully extending the boom, there were no observed stability problems.
A.3-d. Applicants are able to, and intend to, set up on the dirt rather than on the paved pad at VL-13. Applicants have set up the VANS prototype here, fully extending the boom, with no problems.
A.3-e. A review was conducted at each of the selected acoustic i
locations, which entailed actually driving a Ford Series F-800 truck with a truck-mounted 1
telescoping crane to each acoustic location.
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extending the boom, with no interference by the trees and without obstructing the l access road.
V. Basis A.4 Basis A.4 is:
The VANS vehicles are inadequate for their intended use. The vehicles cannot withstand and will_ not operate properly with the weights, amount and nature of equipment intended to be carried by the vehicles. The weight distribution with the siren fully extended will cause the equipment to fall and/or the lifting mechanism to bend or break under- heavy wind or precipitation conditions.
Moreover, the telescopic crane will not reliably lift the siren to its fully extended position because of the weight of the siren and the capacity of the crane.
The Intervenor does not dispute the affidavits presented on Basis A.4, hence there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to this basis.
All of the following facts are not contested:
A.4-a. The crane manufacturer has informed intervenor that high winds will not impair the operation of the VANS crane assembly.
A.4-b. The deflection observed during Applicants' pull test is a normal structural phenomenon and did not indicate any failure of the VANS crane.
A.4-c. The wind tunnel test cited by intervenor is seven years old and was performed on a drive mechanism less than one-fifth as strong as that used by Applicants. !
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17 A.4-d. The weight of a fully loaded VANS vehicle is far below the gross vehicle weight rating for the model of truck to be used.
The VANS equipment is securely attached to.the VANS A.4-e.
i truck.
A.4-f. The only. relevant concerns regarding the adequacy of a vehicle carrying or transporting equipment / material are the weight of the equipment / material and~the method used, if any, to secure it to the vehicle during transit.
A.4-g. The rated lifting capacity of the crane in any position far exceeds the hypothetical load.
A.4-h. A pull test that was performed on a National Crane Series 4 hydraulic crane showed no structural or stability deficiencies.
A.4-1. Based on analysis and testing, the VANS lifting mechanism will support the siren package under the various design environmental loading conditions, and there is no danger of the equipment failing or the mechanism breaking.
i VI. Basis A.5 Basis A.5 is:
The time needed for driver alert, dispatch, route transit, setup and activation '
in accordance with NRC regulations will exceed 15 minutes for many of the VANS vehicles in optimum weather conditions. The reasons for this include the time required to get vehicles on the road (which itself includes the time required to notify the driver, have the driver proceed to the vehicle, check out the vehicle and equipment, start the vehicle and leave the staging area, along with other vehicles at the staging area), the distance to be traveled, the traffic that will be
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18 encountered, the setup time and the need for both alert signal and message capability within the 15 minute period. In poor weather, heavy traffic, and nighttime conditions the times needed to accomplish these tasks will increase.
' A. Summary of Positions The Applicants motion with ' respect to Basis A.5 is supported by six affidavits.
These affidavits address each of the phases of deploying the VANS vehicles and they conclude that the total time elapsed will be under 15 minutes. Intervenor, on the other hand, questions whether these time estimates are conservative and they also question
- whether Applicants have improperly failed to address "the reality that at any particular time drivers will be in different states of readiness for an alert signal." AG Response at 12, footnote 7.
We shall address each of the factual assertions separately in this portion of our opinion.
B. The Legal Setting The 15 minute time requirement appears at 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E IV.D(3):
The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentiaj!y complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure Pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. [ Emphasis added.] The use of this ' notification capability will range from immediate notification cf the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system. NUREG-0654 sets forth what it. describes as the " minimum acceptable design objectives" for the system:
19 a) Capability for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an area-wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 15 minutes, b) The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 5' miles of the site.
c) Special arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 45
<'o- minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ.
E App. 3 at 3 3.
The Commission has concluded that the 15 minute time limit is a " general objective" and that planners have timing flexibility in designing a system to notify the population located between five and 10 miles from the plant. Final Rule on Emeroency Plannina.
CLl-80-40,12 NRC 636,638 (1980).
C. Alert Applicants argue' that the initial notification call from the Seabrook Control Room Communicator is received by the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Emergency Operations Contact (Contact Person). Catapano Affidavit at 15. This contact person mobilizes the VANS by entering a simple code into a touch pad sitting on his desk where he receives the notification call. E at 117-12. The notification is completed and verified electronically within 10 seconds. E at 112.
Intervenor argues that the 10 second time period is pure speculation. They 1 argue that the system has not been constructed nor tested. Desmarais Deposition at
' Motion at 20.
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20 85 86, Exhibit A to Jonas Affidavit. However, it is not necessary that a system be i constructed. The system to be used is described in the Catapano Affidavit at 117-
- 12. It includes automatic simultaneous dialing of all staging areas, with automatic verification of receipt and decoding of the message. Provision is made.for following-
, up on any location that does not verify receipt. All this can be done within 10 seconds, 1
according to the affidavit. And there is no contrary proof to raise a genuine issue of fact. The Intervenor relies on its own speculation, unsupported by any affidavit. So we find that there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the 10 sectend alert period.
D. Dispatch We agree with intervenor that Applicants have misinterpreted the requirement for coriservative calculations with respect to dispatch time. Dispatch time tests included a maximum of 53.35 seconds. Beard Affidavit, Attachment B,1 of 4. There were 17 runs with a dispatch time of ever 40 seconds. Ich We notice that aH of the runs of over 40 seconds occurred in the first 27 of the 50 runs, indicating a possible bias due to a practice effect. Hence, we conclude that these trials are consistent with a dispatch time of as great as 53 seconds. Furthermore, it is not clear whether these tests, where the operators were aware that they would be repeatedly called, are a fair prediction of what would actually happen in an event with no forewarning.
Over years of plant operation, how likely is it that each of the VANS operators will be actually available and alert (e.g., not in the rest room, not away from post on
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21 break, not believing that the situation is a false alarm) at the time an aled message is received? How long will it take if electronic activation fails and radio or telephone voice
. contact becomes necessary?< See AG Response at 11-12: footnote. .We note that the I 1
actual personnel procedures to be used have not.been made available.to us... it is {
,. possible that those procedures would provide such measures as advanced aleding of personnel as would assure us that our concerns about driver readiness are not realistic.
E. Route Transit Applicants state that route transit time may be estimated at 10 minutes; they rely on 1397 test runs done in the spring and summer of 1988 and tabulated on Summary Tables 1 and 2 in the Desmarais Affidavit.118. As we review those tables, which are not contradicted by Iritervenor, they do show that it is conservative to assume spring and summer route transit times of under 10 minutes for acoustic locations 1-15 and 15 l minutes for acoustic location 16 (a sparsely populated area between 10 and 11 miles from Seabrook; Desmarais Affidavit at 122).
Hence, the only issue left here is whether, in the event of snow, the average transit times will exceed 10 minutes and how frequently such a condition might be I expected to occur. We note that Applicants concede tnat travel times might be as great as 11.5 minutes at one acoustic location and 10.45 minutes at another in the l event of snow or icy road conditions'. Ueberman Affidavit at 6. However, Applicants have demonstrated that:
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22 it is very unusual for roads to be' impassable for a significant amount of time. During the preparation of the Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study .
. . the Police Chiefs of all Massachusetts towns in the 10-mile EPZ except Amesbury . . . Indicated that snow plowing equipment is mobilized and deployed during the snowfall after<an appropriate amount.of. snow has, accumulated,ain order to maintain passable roads. The general consensus was that snow l
plowing efforts are generally successful in maintaining roadway passage for/all I
but the most extreme blizzards and icing conditions.
Ueberman Affidavit,18. Intervenor does not contradict this evidence by citing the Johnson Affidavit, Att. B,11 of 12, for the proposition that continuous snow coverage of at least one inch lasts 30 to 45 days. The testimony is that the snow does not last that long on the roads. and the Johnson Affidavit does not even address that proposition.
F. Setup of Sirens f
The Applicants have introduced uncontradicted evidence that the setup of sirens 1 can be accomplished within one minute. We note that, to do that, it might happen that sirens would be activated while the sirens were still being raised from 25 feet to 45 feet above ground level. See Sutherland Affidavit at 115-6. However, we note that the activation of sirens in the 25 foot position would last less than one minute until a 45 foot l l
elevation would be reached. Sutherland Affidavit at 3.
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G. Siren Sounding There is no conflict concerning Applicants' assertion that sirens will be sounded for a duration of three minutes.
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23 H. Message Capability .
The'intervenor. argues that the Applicants ignore completely the regulatory requirement of "[c]apability for.providing both an alert signal and an. informational.or.
. instructional message" within 15 minutes. NUREG 0654, Appendix 3 at 3-3 (emphasis added). 'Within the plume exposure EPZ the system shall provide an alerting signal and notification by commercial broadcast (e.g., EBS). . . ." Id i Applicants conclusion that they can complete initial notification in the non-winter months in 14 minutes and 50 seconds does not permit any accommodation for EBS l
or other instructional messages. See Applicants Brief at 27. (The Applicants rely on the EBS radio network for providing information and instructional messages. Desmarais !
Affidavit, Att. D,3 of 23.) The EBS messages drafted by the Applicants in the SPMC would require a considerable amount of time to read. The initial EBS message used in the June 28-29,1988 exercise took slightly over two minutes to read. Jonas Affidavit, Exhibit B. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of fact concerning how much time should I
be added for this notification function. We note that this question is apparently not simple since it appears to us that a person must first hear a siren before tuning in for notification. Not all people will hear the siren at the same time. Not all will tune in their radio immediately. Not all will tune in at the beginning of a broadcast of the rressage.
24
- 1. Overall Time -
There are enough questions concerning individual components of time for the.
<lntervenor to have raised a genuine issue of fact concerning the adequacy of the. time for both alerting the public and transmitting informational messages to it. . a J. Genuine issues of Fact For reasons already stated, the following are genuine issues of fact:
A.5-1. What is an ap'propriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take for drivers to take the necessary actions before their vehicles leave their stations during conditions likely to prevail at the time of need?
A.5-2. Given that there is cnowfall of 0.5 inches or more during 5.5% of the days of the year, would a conservative estimate of travel times to VANS acoustic locations include the somewhat prolonged travel times anticipated during snow conditions? If so, what time estimates should be included?
A.5-3 What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take for people within five miles of Seabrook to receive the informational message to be broadcast over the EBS?
A.5-4. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the total length of l time for alerting and inforrning people within five miles of Seabrook? Is that estimate within acceptable guidelines? (If it is longer than 15 minutes, what are the factors we are to consider in deciding whether the time period is adequate?)
{
i
_____n-- ... _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - -
25 K. Issues of Fact that are not in Dispute The following are not genuine issues of fact: -t A.5-a. Notification of the VANS is completed within 10 seconds.
A.5-b. Applicants have established procedures by which the VANS
,. drivers are responsible for ensuring that the vehicles are ready at all times for immediate dispatch, and no additional check is required upon notification.
A.5-c. At the time of notification, procedures require the driver to walk to the vehicle, disconnect the external power cord to the battery charger, and drive away. Fifty tests of this process (which included having the drivers walk 100 feet to the vehicle) used an average time for this phase of less than 40 seconds. -
A.5-d. Since there are at most three VANS tliat would leave any staging area, they will not delay one another appreciably while leaving.
A.5-e. The VANS transit studies, involving 1397 test runs, provide authoritative transit time data under a variety of road conditions, including clear road, heavy summer weekend traffic, rain, and darkness.
A.5-f. The results of the VANS transit study show that for acoustic locations VL-02 through VL-15, under test conditions, the transit times are below ten minutes.'
' 'In our judgment, it is not necessary to use the extreme values-in a sample of this size. We also would not use the mean. However, using a legal standard of reasonableness, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of fact about this statement.
y i l 26 1
A.5-g. Applicants have arranged for a satellite staging area within ;
l a 0.6 mile travel distance of VL-01, to be staffed during summer. weekends and )
holidays. The short distance from the satellite staging area to VL-01 will ensure that the transit time can be accomplished in less than ten minutes. ;,.
. A.5-h. The geographical area covered uniquely by the siren at VL-16 is between 10 and 11 miles from Seabrook Station and has a maximum population, l over three square miles, of 401 people, or less than 0.2 percent of the EPZ population.
A.5-i. The transit time to VL-16 is less than 15 minutes.
ll A.5-J. The VANS trucks are equipped with dual mud and snow tires on the rear axle, which with the weight of the vehicle will provide sufficient traction to propel the vehicle over a snow or ice-covered roadway.
A.5-k. Winter adverse weather conditions occur on affected roads about 5% of the time in the EPZ.
A.5-l. Estimated adverse winter transit times can be determined, using conservative assumptions, by multiplying spring average transit times by 1.33.
A.5-m. Winter adverse weather conditions could delay a few VANS by 1.5 minutes or less. I A.5-n. The estimated adverse winter troasit time 'o VL-16 is less than 20 minutes.' i
'Since Intervenor did not move for sammary disposition, Applicants were not required to respond to their suggestions of undiscuted facts and we do not consider ourselves authorized to adopt their suggestions. I
27 A.5-o. Applicants' VANS system is part of a utility emergency plan designed to replace a fixed pole siren system for which Applicants were unable to obtain proper authorizations from responsible governments. - ..
- A.5-p. The setup time of the siren consists of the time required for 1
the VANS operator to proceed from the vehicle cab, remove the boom strap, lower the stabilizing outriggers, and raise the siren boom to the operable position. This process was tested 50 times and found to take less than one minute.
A.5-q. The tarpaulin covering the boom and siren will be designed automatically to uncover when the siren is raised and does not need to be manually-removed by the operator.
A.5-r. After remote activation, the sirens will sound for a period of three minutes.
A.5-s. If the activation signal is transmitted prior to the siren being set up, the signal will be stored and the siren will automatically begin to sound once it is set up.
Vll. Basis A.6 Basis A.6 is:
Snow, icy and extreme cold weather conditions will impade extension of the sirens to their operational position, rotation and oscillation of the sirens during the tone and message modes and operation of the sirens themselves.
28 -
Intervenor abandons this basis. The following are not disputed issues of fact:
I A.6-a. The VANS crane will extend and raise the siren to.its.
operational position in snowy, icy, and extreme cold conditions because the crane 1 boorr crane control, and siren system. components are keptcunder a tarpaulin-type
, cover which will prevent puddles and deflect precipitation to the ground. -
A.6-b. The VANS operators will perform the maintenance required to keep the VANS vehicles in a state of readiness for deployment, including removing
~
^ ' snow and ice, as. outlined in the SPMC procedures.
A.6-c. Snow and ice would not hinder crane or outrigger operation, because the VANS hydraulic system generates enough excess power to overcome any resistance due to ice and/or snow.
A.6-d. The hydraulic control valves are covered and the hydraulic fluid has a rated operating range down to at least -22 F.
A.6-e. The mechanism that oscillates the siren (rotates it through 360* and reverses) is designed so that weather conditions do not impede operation.
A.6-f. The rotation mechanism is in a weatherproof housing and is effective in keeping out rain and snow regardless of operating position.
A.6-g. The rotation mechanism will be covered by a tarpaulin while parked at the staging area.
A.6-h. Extensive experience with the rotation mechanism has !
identified no fal: ores of the weather tightness design.
29
' A.6-1. The siren manufacturer has informed Intervenor that weather conditions will not impair. operation of the system, and that the system is.used all over the world including Alaska.
Vill. Basis A.7 Basis A.7 is:
At a sound level of 134 dBC anyone within 100 feet of the siren during its operation will suffer severe hearing damage.
As the Applicants recognize, see Applicants Brief at 29-30, Basis A.7 derives from the instruction in NUREG-0654 that, "[t]he maximum sound levels received by any member of the public should. be lower than 123 db, the level which.may cause discomfort to individuals. J4 Appendix 3 at 3-8. This basis is discussed, above,-in our discussion of Basis A.1.
The following are not material issues of fact that are in dispute: -
A.7-a. There are no permanent structures (except for two of the i
staging areas themselves) at er within 100 feet of the preselected siren locations. 1 1
A.7-b. With the siren operating at 25 feet, the maximum sound level j at ear level (5 feet) is no more than 133 dBC.
1 A.7-c. Expcsura to the sound level produced by the VANS system will not cause permanent hearing damage nor result in temporary hearing loss.
l A.7-d. The VANS sirens comply with the safety criteria intended by NUREG-0654. (But there is still a dispute about whether they comply with the
-- -- __ __ w
- m . , ,4 -
R 30 discomfort criteria also intended by NUREG-0654. .See Genuine issue of Fact 11.1,
, above.)
IX. Basis A.8
.. Basis A.8 is:
Because of the large size of the intended dispersion angle (60 degrees), sound irregularities will occur within the coverage angles including gaps in sound coverage for certain areas. Moreover, the oscillation of the speaker assembly will cause gaps in coverage when the siren is used in its tone alert mode.
What intervenor has done in their discussion of this contention is to raise an i issue more properly belonging under Basis A.1. They are no longer alleging any " gaps"'
I or even " irregularities."- Instead, they are alleging that the sweep of the. rotating sirens-will result in peak sound along the axis of the siren and that as it rotates away from a listener the sound intensity will diminish. Thus, although the sirens will sound continuously, the listener will not receive a steady tone as suggested by NUnEG-0654,4 Appendix 3 at 3-12: "The siren signal shall be a 3 to 5 minute steady signal as described in Paragraph IV E of CPG-1-17 and capable of repetition."
However, when we reviewed Paragraph IV E of CPG-1-17 (Jonas Affidavit, Exhibit B), we found the following language, which is a gyggggtign with which compliance is optional and which is apparently nQ.t an audib!!ity requirement:
Different cri!es and towns use their outdoor warning systems in different ways.
Most local governments, however, follow the Federal Emergency Management
. m
.a Agency (FEMA) puidance and use a certain signal to warn people of an enemy
31 attack, and 'a different signal to notify them of a peacetime ' disaster. These.
warning signals are:
Aggntion or Alert Warnina - This is a 3- to 5-minute steady signal from m .w %. sirensrhornsl or'other devices.-This signal may be . used as authorized by local government officials to alert the public in peacetime emergencies.
. . . . [T]he action or alert signal shall mean to all persons in the United States, " Turn on radio or W. Usten for essential emergency information?
We also note that rotating sirens are expressly authorized in IV A.,id:
. . . The most powerful sirens . . . use a horn that radiates a beam of sound in
. a single direction., The horn is then rotated several times a minute, so that the-beam sweeps through the entire area around the siren. For a. stationary listener, the sound from such a siren goes up and down in loudness as the horn sweeps around.
Our investigation of the legal materials cited by the Intervenor persuades us that i
there is no genuine issue of material fact related to the changing levels of perceived {
sound from the rotation of a siren in the method that is planned. What will actually l I
happen at Seabrook is described in New Hampshire Yankee, Seabrook Station Public i Alert and Notification System (FEMA-REP-10 Design Report), (" Design Report"), April 30, q 1988 at 2-14:
To ensure full 360* coverage by the siren, the speaker assembly is oscillated back and forth through an angle of about 360". The horn rotates 360* in one direction, stops, rotates back to the same position, stops, and then rotates in the !
other direction. The cycle is repeated 2-4 times por rninute.
We have no affidavit that suggests that this procedure is not adequate to alert people, as intended.
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J
32 Hence, the following statements of fact are not in dispute:
A.8-a. The rotation of a siren in the tone alert mode to assure 360*
l.
j coverage is an acceptable procedure and changes in perceived volume to a stationary
>- - lister do not prevent the siren from producing an acceptable " steady" signal of 60 dBC
,. In areas with population of 2,000 people or less per square mile and of 70 dBC in more l populous areas.
A.8-b. A!though the oscillation of the speaker assembly may cause s;--
changes in the perceived sound level to a listener due to the directionality of the signal,
~
this oscillation will not cause gaps in coverage when the siren is used in the tone alert mode.
A.8-c. Sound irregularities due to sound cancellation are not at all likely to occur except for stationary, pure tone, point sources in a laboratory environment.
X. Basis A.9 Basis A.9 is:
Listeners in areas where thers Is an overlap in sound coverage from 2 or more sirens, whether both sirens are in Massachusetts or one is in Massachusetts and one is in New Hampshire, will experience severe echo conditions, rendedng any voice message unintelligible.
Since the Board hat denied intervenor'.s Motion To Amend Bases of September o~~"- >8,' Basis A.9 is irrelevant. Memorandum and Order (Granting Mass. Request te Rio A Reply; Denying Mass. Motion to Amend), October 12,1988 at 9, til 2-3.
.a a 1 B
(
33 The following is not a genuine issue of fact:
A.9-a. Applicants do not use the VANS sirens for voice messages.
-XI. Basis A.10 i.
.,. Basis A.10 is:
The Appilcants have not indicated when and under what circumstances the tone l alert mode or the message mode will be used.
As Applicants and Intervenor agree, Basis A.10 no longer applies.
Xil. Basis A.11 Basis A.11 is:
Sufficient drivers and backup drivers will not be stationed at the six staging areas to ensure 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> availability of the system. Moreover, the system will work reliably, if at all, only when each vehicle is manned by at least two people.
The principal arguments underlying this basis may be litigated with respect to Basis A.5, as we have ruled above. The burden of proof will be on Applicants to demonstrate that a person will be on duty and alert at all times at each station so that a 10 second alert time, or some greater period of time, is realistic.
The following are not genuine issues of fact:
i A.11-a. New Hampshire Yankee has a personnel plan that is ;
designed to insure continuous 24-hour per day coverage seven days per week and that i > r-~provides-for-supplemental drivers as well as backup VANS and drivers. (The likelihood
i
, - ., ., i 34 that this plan may result in unpiannsd for gaps in actual coverage is in dispute under genuine issues of fact VI.1 and 2.)
A.11-b, The prototype VANS vehicle works reliably with one operator, as demonstrated during training,' by numerous. tests, by inspection by NRC Region 1 inspectors, and by demonstration to Intervenor during discovery.
A.11-c. The prototype VANS vehicle is comparabie in all relevant aspects to the VANS vehicles to be used.
A.11-d. The ability of the VANS vehicles to work reliably with one operator was also demonstrated 50 times during recent dispatch and setup timing tests. i Xill. Basis A.14 Basic A.14 is:
~
The Applicants have not identified the equipment to be used for remote activation of the VANS sirens and, therefore, no conclusion can be reached concerning the reliability of the equipment. Moreover, the Applicants have not indicated whether the siren signals will be pre-recorded or broadcast to the remote locations and l have not provided sufficient information to conclude that in either event the equipment has adequate fidelity to ensure intelligibility.
Because this contention also addresses Applicants' use of the cirens in message mode, it has become irrelevant. Memorandum and Order (Granting Mass. Request to File A Reply; Denying Mass. Motion to Amend), October 12,1988 at 9,112-3.
l l
L_____________.___._______.______.________- _ . _ - - _ .-
35 XIV. Basis B Basis B is:
The Applicants have not identified the circumstances under which the backup airborne alerting system would be called into operation, the flight path it would
-take, whether tone or message mode-would be used..the time necessary to complete a single operational run, or the areas the helicopter is intended to cover. This lack of information prevents this Board from making a finding that the airborne system meets NRC regulations and standards.
- 1. One of the circumstances which might give rise to the need for a backup system, poor weather (and in particular high wind, heavy rain, snow, icy or extreme cold conditions), is equally or more debilitating for the use of a helicopter.
- l
- 3. A steady 3 to 5 minute tone alert capable of repetition cannot be accomplished with the airborne system for significant numbers of people even within the covered area because the speed necessary to provide that duration of a tone is too slow for extended operation of the aircraft.
l l
4 l
l
36 I l
L Since Applicants do not rely on the airborne backup system to meet regulatory requirements, Intervenor has stated that it will not introduce evidence concerning this basis. The following issue of material fact is not in dispute:
l l
B a. . Applicants' helicopter system is a backup system and, as such, is not relied upon by Applicants in any way to meet NRC alerting and notification regulations and standards.
XV. Basis B.4 Since Basis B.4 also deals with the airborne backup system, it is disposed of in our discussion of Basis B.3.
XVI. ORDER For all the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is, this 3rd day of March 1989, ORDERED, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 9 2.749:
1 A. Genuine issues of Fact The following genuine issues of fact exist and shall be heard unless resolved through negotiation and agreement:
37 A.1-1. Whether sound levels in excess of 123 dBC cause enough dis-comfort so that the Board should not approve the use of sirens at a higher level of sound. We note that this issue of fact also involves a legal question: What standard should we apply to determine the possible relevance of discomfort? On this question, we invite simultaneous briefs from Intervenor and Applicants five days prior to the deadline that shall be set for the prefiling of testimony; and we invite a legal filing from the Staff simultaneously with the prefiling of testimony.
A.1-2. .lf.there is some level higher than 123 dBC that the Board should allow, what is that level?
A.1-3. Whether Applicants' sirens can provide adequate coverage if used at sound levels that are not unduly uncomfortable.
A.1-4. Whether Applicants' position on the sound level resulting from their sirens is an underestimate because of sound reflection from buildings.
A.3-1. Whether the appointed destination locations including VL-06, VL-07, and VL-12, are sufficiently level for the safe deployment of the VANS vehicles.
A.3-2. Whether or not VANS vehicles may gain physical access to VL-03, VL-06, VL-07 and VL-12.
A.5-1. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take for drivers to take the necessary actions before their vehicles leave their stations during conditions likely to prevail at the time of need?
I ....
38 l A.5-2. Given that there is snowfall of 0.5 inches or more during 5.5% of the days of the year, would a conservative estimate of travel times to VANS acoustic l I locations include the comewhat prolonged travel times. anticipated during snow l conditions? If so, what time estimates should be included? o A.5-3. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take for people within five miles of Seabrook to receive the informational message to be broadcast over the EBS?
. A.5-4. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the totallength of time for alerting and informing people within five miles of Seabrook? Is that estimate within acceptable guidelines? (if it is longer than 15 minutes, what are the factors we are to consider in deciding whether the time period is adequate?)
B. Facts Not in Dispute All issues described in the opinion as not being genuine issues of fact or not being in dispute shall be considered resolved. The lettered paragraphs setting forth such issues may be cited as findings should they in some way appear to be relevant after hearing.
C. Site Visits and Further Definition of Issues The physical characteristics of the VANS destination sites are definitely knowable.
Consequently, we expect the parties to engage in good-faith efforts so that Applicants
1
...i l l
39 l l
can drive vehicles into the sites with Intervenor' consultant as an eyewitness. An !
agreed method also should be arrived at for accurately measuring the degree of inclination at the site so that the Board will not need to litigate a fact which any person could- obtain merely by' visiting the site. Appropriate protective order. agreements should be entered into so that Information about the sites will not become public.
There are other issues that may be able to be narrowed and focused through negotiation. We expect the parties to conduct such negotiations in good faith.
-if the parties are unable to reach agreements on site visitation and measurement procedures or on issue focusing, they may ask the Board for informal assistance in reaching agreement.
We have allowed two weeks for good faith negotiation.
1 D. Scheduling Conference There shall be an on-the-record telephone conference at 9 am on March 20 for the purpose of resolving procedural issues, scheduling the prefiling of testimony, and scheduling a hearing. The parties shall confirm their participation prior to March 13 by
40 telephoning Ms. Joyce McDow at 301-492-7479 and providing the names of planned participants and the appropriate telephone number to call on the day of the conference.
THE. ATOMIC SAFETY, AND LICENSING. BOARD
< i
~
Peter BIBloch, Chair Administrative Judge Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge i D(Jerry Harbour Administrative Judge Bethesda, Maryland l
1 L
P V 4
. . . s t
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of I l
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW l Docket No.(s) 50-443/444-OL-1 HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. 1 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) i 1
l l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
! hereby certify that copies of the foregoing LB M&O (
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION) '
have been served upon the f ollowing persons by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712.
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Thomas S. Moore Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board U.S. Nuclear Requistory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Howard A. Wilber Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Peter B. Bloch, Chairman .
Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Law Judge Jerry Harbour Ivan W. Smith Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 ,
Administrative Judge Edwin J. Reis. Esc.
Emmeth A. Luebke Office of the General Counsel 5500 Friendship Boulevard, Apt. 1923N U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chevy Chase, MD 20815 Washington, DC 20555 Diano Curran, Esa. Thomas S. Dignan, Jr., Esc.
Harmon, Curran & Tousley Repos k Gray o 2001 S Street, N.W., Suite 430 One International Place l
Washington, DC 20009 Boston, MA 02110 e
.h..
Docket No.(s)90-443/444-OL-1 LB M&O (
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION)
Robert A. Backus, Esq. Paul McEachern Esq.
Backus, Meyer & PJ1omon Shaines k McEachern 116 Lowell Street 25 Maplewood Avenue. P.O. Box 360 Manchester, NH 03106 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Gary W. Holmes, Esq. Charles P. Graham, Esq.
Holmes & Ells McKay, Murphy and Graham 47 Winnacunnet Road 100 Main Street Hampton, NH 03842 Amesbury, MA 01913 Barton 2. CoNan, Esg. Jane Doughty Eckert, Seamans, Charin k Mellott Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 600 Brant Street, 42 Floor 5 Market Street
- Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Portsmouth, NH 03801 ,
George W. Watson, Esq. Edward A. Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W. 442 J.W. McCormack (PDCH)
Washington, DC 20472 Boston, MA 02109 George D. Bisbee, Esq. Suzanne Breiseth Assistant Attorney General Board of Selectmen Office of the Attorney General Town of Hampton Falls 25 Capitol Street Drinkwater Road Concord, NH 03301 Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Carol S. Sneider, Esq. Matthew T. Brock, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Office of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02100 Boston, MA 02108 The Honorable Philip Ahrens, Esq. Edward J. Markey, Chairman Assistant Attorney General ATTN Linda Correia Office of the Attorney General Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and State House Station, #6 Power Augusta, ME 04333 House Committee on Energy and Commerce Washington, DC 20515
t I
'oA .*
Docket No.(s)S0-443/444-OL-1 LB M&O (
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION)
Richard A. Hampe. Esq. J. P. Nadeau Hampe & McNicholas Board of Selectmen 35 Pleasant Street 10 Central Street Concord, NH 03301 Rye, NH 03870 Allen Lampert William Armstrong Civil Defense Director Civil Defense Director Town of Brentwood Town of Exeter 20 Franklin Street 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833 Exeter, NH 03833 Sandra Gavutis, Chairman Calvin A. Canney Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD #1 Box 1154 City Hall Kensington, NH 03827 126 Daniel Street Portsmouth, NH 03801 Anne Goodman, Chairman Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen 13-15 Newmarket Road Town Hall - Friend Street Durham, NH 03024 Amesbury, MA 01913 Peter J. Matthews Mayor of Newburyport Michael Santosuosso, Chairman City Hall Board of Selectmen Newburyport, MA 01950 South Hampton, NH 03827 I
R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire Stanley W. Knowles, Chairman !
Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton & McGuire Board of Selectmen !
79 State Street P.O. Box 710 Newburyport,, MF 01950 North Hampton, NH 03862 The Honorable ;
Bordon J. Humphrey '
ATTN Janet Colt f United States Senate l Washington, DC 20510 Dated at Rockville, Md. this
- h. .............
Office of the Secretary of the Commission 1
1
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