ML20216J205

Discusses 980106 & 0120 Ltrs Indicating That NRC Independent CA Verification Program Lacks Objective Criteria & Concerns That Process Being Used Will Provide Restart Recommendation Whenever Utilities Seeks It

ML20216J205
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/11/1998
From:	Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Lochbaum D UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Shared Package
ML20216J211	List: ML20216J205 ML20216J229 ML20216J255
References
NUDOCS 9803230380
Download: ML20216J205 (11)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-4001 R %,l

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March 11. 1998 l

Mr. David A. Lochbaum Nuclear Safety Eng:neer Union of Concemed Scientists 1626 P Street NW., Suite 310 Washington, DC 20036-1495

Dear Mr. Lochbaum:

in your letter dated Jcnuary 6,1998, you indicated that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) lacks objective criteria and, since a large number of issues are being identified by the contractor at Unit 3, the j NRC should either (1) require additional system assessments or (2) formally issue " objective - j standards" for assessing if additional reviews are necessary. In your followup letter dated January 20,1998, you expressed the concem "that the process being used by the NRC staff

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will provide a restart recommendation whenever Northeast Utilities (NU) seeks it, irregardless of the findings from the independent corrective action verification program (ICAVP) and NRC ]

inspections._

l As stated in the NRC Confirmatorf Order of August 14,1996, the purpose of the ICAVP is to confirm the effectiveness of the licensee's program in assuring that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design bases. Accordingly, '

the regulatory standard being used to evaluate this element of the licensee's performance and restart readiness is conformance with the plant's licensing and design bases. Consistent with the ICAVP purpose, the NRC staff established in SECY-97-003, " Millstone Restart Review Process," dated January 3,1997, the term " defect" to represent any condition identified during the ICAVP review that results in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases.

Nonconformances with the licensing and dasign bases are being assessed through the identification of any " defects" during the ICAVP reviews.

In addition to the identification of " defects," the ICAVP reviews include the identification and assessment of other errors that do not meet the definition of a " defect"(e.g., minor calculational errors). Although such findings do not involve nonconformance with the licensing and design bases, they are being reviewed to determine if any programmatic trereds raise a question about conformance with the plant's licensing and design bases.

l As a result of concems from members of the public, expressed in periodic briefings held by the NRC, the NRC staff developed four levels of significance which are being used to categorize findings from the ICAVP. Levels 1,2, and 3 contain findings which would indicate nonconformance with the licensing and design bases (i.e., defects) and Level 4 contains findings which would not question the licensing and design bases. These levels indicate the graded significance the staff would associate with such findings. Given the technical complexity of the ICAVP reviews, the significance of an identified " defect" could vary markedly, and the significance levels developed by the NRC staff are viewe'd as appropriate for establishing a I clear hieratchical grouping of the ICAVP findings.

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David A. Lochbaum in addition to the establishment of the graded significance levels, the NRO developed likely or potential NRC actions corresponding to each significance level. A listing of predetermined NRC actions resulting from ICAVP findings has been requested by some. However, the complexity inherent in detailed licensing and design reviews does not lend itself to the establishment of automatic thresholds to trigger an appropriate expansion of ICAVo scope. The NRC's existing process for performing these reviews, relying on established regulatory requirements ar,d risk insights, provides for a broad consideration of possible ICAVP findings and is consistent in its use of the licensing and design bases as the regulatory standard for measuring the licensee's performance. The NRC has recently provided additionalinformation on the NRC process in letters to the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council, NU, and the ICAVP contractors.

This additional information (see enclosure) was also discussed at a meeting with the public on Jsnuary 27,1998.

The ICAVP oversight plan, described in SECY-97-003 dated January 3,1997, allows the NRC staff to make informed judgments based not only on an assessment of the individual issues, but also on the licensee's corrective actions for that issue, including the identification of root cause(s) and causal factors associated with the issue, the proposed resolution to the issue, the applicability of the issue to other systems, and broader programmatic and operational implications. An important element in the ICAVP process is the NRC staffs or ICAVP contractor's independent verification of corrective actions being taken by the licensee in response to ICAVP findings. This independent verification of the adequacy of corrective actions results in additional ICAVP evaluations of the plant's conformance to its licensing and design bases.

In carrying out its evaluations of ICAVP findings and the licensee's corrective actions, the NRC staff is using, in past, the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, and the guidance contained in NRC Generic Letter No. 91-18 (GL-91-18) Revision 1, dated October 8, 1997. Both Appendix B and GL-91-18 address actions necessary for the resolution of degraded and nonconforming conditions. These actions include evaluation for both operability and reportability to NRC, and prompt disposition of the finding using an effective corrective action program. An important element of effective corrective action, in accordance with Appendix B, is to ensure that the root cause is identified and the issue is fully addressed in a l timely manner, j You have indicated a concem with the number of deficiency report (DRs) findings identified and how those numbers would extrapolate to the other safety systems. The third-party contractor I has reviewed 15 of the 88 risk-significant or safety-related systems, as categorized by the Maintenance Rule, in conducting its Tier 1 review at Unit 3. Additionally, portions of another 22 s systems were reviewed as part of the Tier 2 review.

The large number of DRs that you have referenced are preliminary in that they have not been reviewed by NU. NU may provide additional information to the contractor that may, subject to review and styreement by the ICAVP contractor, demonstrate that the discrepancy was: a)

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, Divid A. Lochbaum previously discovered during Configuration Management Plan; or b) that it is not an issue and the plant is in conformance with its licensing and design bases. In these two cases, the DRs are categorized respectively as "previously identified" and "nondiscrepant." NU may also agree with the contractor that the DR is a true nonconformance which was not previously identified.

These are called " confirmed" DRs and these are what are reported by the staff and trended.

The number of confirmed DRs, as of February 27,1998, is 184 for Unit 3. Of 937 DRs issued as preliminary, as of February 27,1998, caly 301 have been " closed." (" Closed DRs are those that are either " confirmed," "nondiscrepant," or "previously identified.") Thus far, the contractor review has confirmed six findings which involve a nonconformance with the licensing bases 1 (Level 3). With such a small percentage of DRs closed, it is premature to draw meaningful conclusions. However, as previously discussed, the NRC staff has developed a listing of likely i or potential NRC actions corresponding to each significance level.

The NRC's program is focused on assuring that each Millstone unit is in compliance with its licensing and design bases, including applicable NRC regulations. The NRC expects that the licensee will correct any safety-significant areas of noncompliance before restart. Corrective actions that the licensee is planning to defer until after restart are being reviewed by the NRC staff to ensure that the licensee's process for identifying deferable actions and for carrying out the corrective actions, inciuding the timing of these actions, is adequate and commensurate with the safety importance of the issue.

The NRC staff, consistent with the ICAVP Confirmatory Order dated August 14,1996, is d. wen not by schedule, but by the primary task of determining whether the Millstone licensee has effectively carried out a comprehensive, broad-scope program to identify and correct its weaknesses, in addition, the Commission has consistently indicated that their decisions on restart do not presuppose that any of the three plants will restart by any certain date, j Sincerely, Originalsignedby SamuelJ. Collins Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-423 3

Enclosure:

As stated I

cc: See next page i

Distribution: See next page DOCUMENT NAME: AdLOCHBAUM.LTR *See previous concurrence To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box "C" copy wfo attachtenci "E" copy wfattach/enci "N" OFFICE TA-SPO C D-SPO C D:NRR C EDO C OCM k NAME RPerchtsr* WTravers* SCollins* JCallan# ,

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DATE 2/5/98 2/5/98 2/11/98 L /l3/98 3 li193 D8 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Millstone Nuclear Powor Station Unit 3 cc:.

Lillian M. Cuoco, Esquire Mr. William D. Meinert Senior Nuclear Counsel Nuclear Engineer Northeast Utilities Service Company Massachusetts MunicipalWholesale P. O. Box 270 Electric Company Hartford, CT 06141-0270 P.O. Box 426 Ludlow, MA 01056

. Mr. Kevin T. A. McCarthy, Director -

Monitoring and Radiation Division Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Egan & Associates, P.C.

79 Elm Street 2300 N Street, NW )

Hartford, CT 06106-5127 Washington, DC 20037 Regional Administrator, Region i Mr. F. C. Rothen U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vice President-Work Services 475 Allendale Road Northeast Utilities Service Company King of Prussia, PA 19406 P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 First Selectmen Town cf Waterford Emest C. Hadley, Esquire Hall of Records 1040 B Main Street 200 Boston Post Road P.O. Box 54g Waterford, CT 06385 West Wareham, MA 02576 Mr. Wayne D. Lanning Mr. John Buckingham Deputy Director ofInspections Department of Public Utility Control Special Projects Office Electric Unit 475 Allendale Road 10 Liberty Square King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 New Britain, CT 06051 l Mr. M. H. Brothers Mr. James S. Robinson, Manager Vice President- Operations Nuclear investments and Administration Northeast Nuclear Energy Company New England Power Company P.O. Box 128 25 Research Drive Waterford, CT 06385 Westborough, MA 01582 Mr. M. R. Scully, Executive Director Mr. D. M. Goebel Connecticut Municipal Electric Vice President- Nuclear Oversight Energy Cooperative Northeast Utilities Service Company 30 Stott Avenue P. O. Box 128 Norwich, CT 06360 Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. David Amerine Vice President - Nuclear Engineering  ;

and Support Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 cc:

Deborah Katz, President Mr. B. D. Kenyon Citizens Awareness Network Chief Nuclear Of'icer- Millstone P.O. Box 83 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Shelburne Falls, MA 03170 P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Senior Resident inspector Millstone Nuclear Power Station Mr. Daniel L. Curry clo U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project Director P.O. Box 513 Parsons Power Group Inc. I Nientic, CT 06357 2675 Morgantown Road Reading, PA 19607 Mr. Allan Johanson, Assistant Director Office of Policy and Management Mr. Don Schopfer i Policy Development and Planning Verification Team Manager I Division Sargent & Lundy 450 Capitol Avenue - MS# 52ERN 55 E. Monroe Street P. O. Box 341441 Chicago,IL 60603 i Hartford, CT 06134-1441 Mr. J. A. Price Citizens Regulatory Commission Unit Director- Millstone Unit 2 ATTN: Ms. Susan Perry Luxton Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 180 Great Neck Road P.O. Box 128 l Waterford, CT 06385 Waterford, CT 06385 '

The Honorable Terry Concannon Mr. J. P. McE' wain Nuclear Energy Advisory Council Vice President (Acting) - Millstone 3 Room 4035 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Legislative Office Building P.O. Box 128 Capitol Avenue Waterforo, CT 06385 Hartford, CT 06106 Mr. G. D. Hicks Legislative Office Building Unit Director- Millstone Unit 3 Captio! Avenue Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Hartford, CT 06106 P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. Evan W. Woollacott Co-Chair Nuclear Energy Advisoy Council 128 Terry's Plain Road 4 Simsbury, CT 06070 Little Harbor Consultants, Inc.

Millstone -ITPOP Project Office P.O. Box 0630 Niantic, CT 06357-0630

DISCUSSION OF NRC ACTIONS RELATED TO ICAVP FINDINGS A further discussion of corresponding NRC actions related to the ICAVP findings, as follows, is -

intended to better explain and document the process being used by the NRC staff.

Level 1: System does not meet licensing and design bases and cannot perform its f intended function. J NRC Action: Would likely result in selection of additional system (s) for ICAVP review Additional Discussion:

If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 1 finding, the NRC staff anticipates that, as a minimum, an additional system or systems will be added to the current scope of the ICAVP review. Following confirmation of a Level 1 finding, the Special Proiects Office (SPO) staff will immediately present the finding and recommendations for ICAVP scope expansion to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). Expansion of ICAVP scope will involve an additional system or systems review by the ICAVP contractor, the NRC staff, or both. Absent a negative determination by the EDO, the SPO staff will require tin expansion of the ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determl nation and bases for requiring scope expans!on will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.

Level 2: Single train of redundant system does not meet licensing and design bases and cannot perform its intended function.

NRC Action: Would likely result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar nonconformance issues in other systems Additional Discussion:

If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 2 finding, the NRC staff anticipates that the scope of the ICAVP would be expanded to, as a minimum, require the evaluation of similar operational, procedural, or design attributes in other safety-related or risk-significant systems for potential nonconformances. Following confirmation of a Level 2 finding, the SPO staff will immediately present the finding and recommendations for ICAVP scope expansion to the Director, NRR. The extent of reviews required under any expansion of the ICAVP will be based on (1) an NRC staff assessment of the licensee's root cause of the Level 2 finding, and (2) an NRC staff assessment of the corrective actions taken by the licensee to address both the staff's specific finding and any broader programmatic implications. Absent a negative determination by the Director, NRR, the SPO staff will require the appropriate expansion of the ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.

Level 3 : System does not meet licensing and design bases but able to perform its intended function.

NRC Action: Could result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar nonconformance issues in other systems Enclosure

l Additional Discussion:  !

If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 3 finding, the NRC sta# will consider expanding the scope of the ICAVP to require the evaluation of similar operational, procedural, or design attributes in other safety-related or risk-significant systems for potential nonconformances. The SPO staff will present confirmed Level 3 findings and recommendations regarding ICAVP expansion to the Millstone Restart Assessment Panel (RAP). The staff recommendation on possible ICAVP expansion for individual findings will consider the specific finding, and the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions. The effectiveness of corrective actions will be independently verified by the NRC staff, or the ICAVP contractor, and will consider the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and the guidance of GL-gi-18. The staff expects that, for an individual Level 3 finding, effective licensee corrective action to address both the specific

• defect," as well as any broader implication for other systems, would lead to an NRC staff determination that the ICAVP need not be expanded.

Conversely, a negative determination on effective licensee corrective action would be expected to result in a decision to expand the ICAVP. The RAP decision on ICAVP expansion will be documented in the RAP meeting minutes, and the Director, NRR, will approve any expansion of ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be ,

communicated to the licensee by written correspondence, l in addition to evaluating individual Level 3 findings, the NRC staff (Chief, ICAVP Branch, SPO, NRR), will periodically, at least biweekly, consider the collective group of confirmed Level 3 findings identified during the conduct of the ICAVP reviews. Negative trends established by I these Level 3 findings, which raise a question about licensing and design bases conformance in other systems, would, in the absence of effective corrective actions by the licensee, be expected to result in expansion of the ICAVP to address possible similar nonconformances in other systems. In its evaluation of possible trends, the NRC staff will consider whether or not (1) the findings represent a large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g., program or procedural requirements were not properly performed; (3) the findings are concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, or structural); and (4) the findings are concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g.,

operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure). Any decision to expand the scope, based on negative trends associated with Level 3 findings, will be approved by the Director, NRR. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.

Level 4: System meets licensing and design bases but contains minor calculational errors or inconsistencies of an editorial nature.

NRC Action: Multiple examples could result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar errors / inconsistencies in other systems Additional Discussion

• Although they do not result in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases (i.e., the ICAVP regulatory standard / acceptance criteria), Level 4 findings will be assessed by the NRC staff. Level 4 findings will be assessed to determine whether trends exist which could raise a question regarding the plant's licensing and design bases. Confirmed Level 4 findings are l

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, , being assessed initially by the contractors to determine if licensee corrective actions are appropriate. The NRC staff, on an ongoing basis, is also reviewing these findings for identification of multiple examples of specific findings and corresponding trends. In its evaluation of possible trends, the NRC staff will consider whether or not (1) the findings represent a large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g.,

program or procedural requirements were property performed); (3) the findings are concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, or structural); and (4) the findings are concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g.,

operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure). The staff j anticipates that if licensee corrective actions are determined to be effective, and trends which '

raise questions about the licensing and design bases are not identified, the scope of the ICAVP would not be expanded The status of Level 4 findings are periedically presented to the RAP.

Any expansion of ICAVP scope resulting from Level 4 findings will be approved by the EDO.

The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.

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' Lett:r to D;vid A. Lochbaum ditedi l

Distribution:

Docket File (w/originalincoming) l PUBLIC

.EDO - 980012 & 980036 SPO R/F

1 NRR Mailroom (w/ incoming) j

. Elmbro JCallan  !

-PMcKee 'AThadani  !

SReynolds HThompson  !

PEselgroth PNorry -

Collins /Miraglia JBlaha l RZimmerman HMiller, RI  !

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i j EDO Principal Correspondence Control DUE: 02/05/98--

'~ EDO CONTROL: G980036 M A. Lochbaum DOC DT: 01/20/98 FINAL REPLY:

n of Concerned Scientists hommission SIGNATURE OF : **

• • PRI mint'~ CRC NO: 98-0059 OS-T ,6.32.2-w/ Oh c" * * ~~~

ROUTING:

hLSTONE UNIT 3 Callan Thadani Thompson Norry Blaha 01/26/98 Burns

%ED TO:

Lieberman, OE CONTACT: Miller, RI Cyr, OGC NRR ,

Collins kLINSTRUCTIONSORREMARKS:

., G980012.

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NRR ACTION: SPO: Travers ACTION NRR RECEIVED: January 27. l'8 i

n ,-e NRR WUTItG: Collins /,'iragl' a DUE TO NRR DIRECi0n.

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' OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER HUMBER: CRC-98-005? LOGGING DATE: Jan 23 98 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: DAVID LOCHBAUM AFFILIATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ADDRESSEE: CHRM. JACKSON /COMRS.

LETTER DATE: Jan 20 98 FILE CODE: ID&R 5 MILLSTONE

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE UNIT 3 ACTION: Signature of Chairman DISTRIBUTION: CHAIRMAN, COMRS, SECY, RF SPECIAL HANDLING: SECY TO ACK CONSTITUENT:

NOTES: g-  ;

DATE DUE: Feb j '98 SIGNATURE: . DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION  ;

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EDO -- G980036