ML20215H062
| ML20215H062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1986 |
| From: | Verrelli D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Woody C FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8610210403 | |
| Download: ML20215H062 (2) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, - - onylnal OCT 141986 Floridp Power and Light Company ATTN: Hir. C. O. Woody Group Vice President ' Nuclear Energy Department P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT - ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF APRIL 24, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Final Report for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Exercise of April 24, 1986. As described in the enclosure, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies; however, one area was recognized that requires corrective action. Specifically, the item noted was the lack of adequete space in the St. Lucie County E0C to support the emergency response organization. FEMA also identified 22 areas recommended for improvement. These items are discussed in detail in Section IV of the Enclosure. We encourage you to assist the_ appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise. We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. Sin,cerely, David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
FEMA Final Report cc w/ encl: K. N. Harris, Vice President , St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (D.A.. B. Sager,PlantManager Harper, Site QA Superintendent bec w/ encl: (See page 2) l l l 1 8610210403 861014 S DR ADOCK 0500 I l}l
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* + Washington, D.C. 20472 SEP 4 1986 MFMORAfR13M FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.,,Nuplear Peg atory Conmission M/j ff FPOM:
f.'iRI'chIrd 'W.~Associate Assistant KNnm Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Progrants SUBJFXT: Exercise Report for the April 24, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Prepare 3 ness (REP) Plans for the St. Weie Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the Exercise Reprt for the April 24, 1986, partial participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. St. Wcie and Martin Counties,
. both located in the 10-inile plume emergency pl ann i ng zone, fully participated in the exercise.
The exercise report, dated July 28, 1986, was prepared by Reaion IV of the Federal Ehergency Management Agency (FEMA). There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. There was, however, one area requiring corrective action and several areas reconnended for inprovement. Based on the results of this exercise, the State of Florida and St. W cie and. Martin Counties demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 15, 1984, will remain in effect. FEMA Region IV staff has furnished a copy of this exercise report to the State of Florida and will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860. Attachment h 9-[ [
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,j D.2, Federal Emergency Management Agency 2 Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE' Atlanta, Georgia 30309 (2
ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I EXERCISE i Conducted on April 24, 1986 Exercise Report July 28, 1986 I c .g Utility: Florida Power and Light Company Plant Location: Hutchinson Island, St. Lucie County, Florida Participating State and Local Governments I i State of Florida St. Lucie County
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f 1 i 4 s t TABLE OF CONTENTS j Page 1 I. Exercise Summary 5 III. Detailed Discussion 5 Introduction i 6 State of Florida
} 6 i Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 8 Emergency News Center (ENC)
Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) 8 _ Radiological Monitoring 9 l 13 4 Rick Counties St. Lucie~ County 13 Martin County 15 Host County 18-Indian River County 18 21
; 1 III. Summary Listing of Inadequacies IV. Summary Listing of Areas Recommended for 22 Improvement I 25 V. Appendices
- A. Evaluator's List and Assignments B. Exercise Objective C. Exercise Scenario I -
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- 1. EXERCISE
SUMMARY
10n April 24, 1986, the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant conducted a radiological emergency response exercise. The State of Florida j participation included staffing the Emergency Operations Facility l (EOF), the Emergency News Center (ENC), the Mobile' Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL), and deploying three field monitoring teams. St Lucie, Martin and Indian River Counties participated and fully activated their emergency response plans. The St. Lucie Partial Participation Exercise was observed by fourteen l Federal Evaluators represent'ing three Federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, and DOT). This was the fourth exercise.for State and local governments to demonstrate the Florida Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants. The following is a brief summary of the exercise ~ activities. ( 9 Florida Emergency Operations Facility'(EOF) Communications and coordination between the Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were excellent. Similarly, the overall interaction among the representatives of the State and Florida Power and Light Company was also exceptional. Although this was a partial participation exercise on the part of the State, the dose assessment activities and field team activities were fully demonstrated. Dose assessment wasThe excellent. The facilities were spacious and properly equipped.
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staff was very well trained and knowledgeable their and carriedcooperation out tasks promptly and appropriately. There was excellent and coordination among the staff and between the staff and the licensee. The State assessments agreed with licensee assessments of the exercise scenario. Field team direction and control was generally adequate although there. was some slight confusion over exact deployment assignments. j Strategies for deploying teams were well considered. Team briefings and exposure control were excellent. i i
i Emergency News Center (ENC) There were no serious problems observed in the Emergency News Center (ENC). Both St. Lucie and Martin County generated EBS messages were which, although coordinated between each EOC before broadcast, different. A single message, designed to serve all EPZ residents, would have less potential for confusing an anxious public. Public informationNeither staffs were adequately tested by scenario play not phone in the exercise. incoming queries by media nor queries during news briefings were anywhere near the amount which would have been expected in such an accident. i Mobi'le Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL)
! Environmental sample analysis equipment aboard the MERL is of research grade and represents current " state-of-the-art" methodology in
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radioisotope analysis for a complex library of fission radionuclides. Personnel are well trained and sample analysis techniques were demonstrated adequately. A large number of recovery /re-entry samples i i were not collected for the exercise si ce this activity was not i considered to be an' objective for this exercise. 6 Radiological Monitoring Field Team 62 - The team was prepositioned and activation was not tested. The team was not familiar with the area or monitoring locations. The team had the proper equipment for plume tracking and air sampling and knew the procedures for its use. However, they were not aware that it might be necessary to move to measure the air sample cartridges in an area of background radiation. Communication and I radio protocol were acceptable. However, it was occasionally difficult to get air space to talk to the dispatcher. Field Team 63 - The field team had sufficient equipment to perform monitoring tasks. Prior to deployment, equipment checklists were used to ensure that all the necessary equipment was in the field kits and The team appeared that the equipment was in good operating condition. to be adequately trained and used SOP's; however, some operational problems were noted. Probes were not protected from contamination nor Also, sampling locations were open/ closed window measurements made. were difficult to locate due to lack of land marks near the sampling There also appeared to be some problems with direction and point. control of the field team. Several times Charlie Control thought Team 63 was in a different location than where they were. The problem seemed to. exist at Charlie Control. -The collection of soil, water, and vegetation samples was not observed nor was it v
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- e ordered. Collection of an air sample was adequately demonstrated.
The addition of the external electrical clips for the air pump is a Many " dead spots" were Communications were poor.
. great innovation.
observed and created problems throughout the exercise. Team members had 0-200 mR and 0-5 R direct reading dosimeters and permanent record dosi~ meters. They were not aware of PAG's for field teams, that is, what dose rate or accumulated dose was in excess and would require leaving the area or contacting Charlie Control. Field Team C The team was pre-staged at the Florida Power and Light substation. The team was equipped with appropriate instrumentation. However, some areas for improvement areWorker-exposure recommended i in techniques and procedures for taking measurements. control was demonstrated by the use of dosimetry. Communications posed several problems during the exercise. The use of other field teams to relay information was not always effective at all times and created confusion. Risk Counties
! St. Lucie County M
The St. Lucie County EOC staff was well trained and had an outstanding director and operations officer (county engineer). The coordination between State personnel at the EOF and St. Lucie County was excellent as was the coordination and cooperation between St. Lucie, Martin, and Indian River Counties. The communication capability in St. Lucie The Radio Emergency County is complete and operated effectively. Fifty-four radio operators
' Services personnel did an outstanding job. The present EOC is too
- checked into the net during the exercise.
i small, however, a new EOC will be occupied within the next 2-3 months. The St. Lucie County-Fort Pierce Fire District personnel appear to be well trained and well equipped to fulfill their decontamination responsibilities. Martin County All exercise objectives were fully demonstrated at the Martin County EOC. In addition, the deficiency noted in the last exercise was corrected. One area for improvement was suggested In regarding more general, the Martin effective use of the status board and maps. County EOC operated effectively to insure the public safety and welfare due to excellent training and.a high level of participation by l knowledgeable perso'nnel. A decontamination /washdown station for emergency workers in Martin Island Fire Department. County was demonstrated by the Hutchinson This was an excellent demonstration by the fire fighters which~ l
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included the use of an innovative washdown system. Also, a drill was observed which included a response demonstration ~by the Tropical Farms Fire Department, the Martin County Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and j i the Martin County Hazardous Materials Response Team. Although this i response was not part of the exercise evaluation, the performance of I the fire fighters and EMS was commendable. Host County Indian River County The emergency response demonstrated by Indian River County.was excellent. All exercise objectives were satisfied and shortcomings identified in earlier exercises were corrected. The County EOC was completely staffed according to planned procedures and elected officials. played an integral role in the exercise play. Primarily staffed by trained volunteers, each response group was double-or triple-staffed. Particularly outstanding was the assistance the State liaison. officer provided the County in formulating appropriate 3 emergency actions. 4 The County Emergency Director and his operations managers did an ( outstanding job in coordinating and implementing the emergency response. Overall, the physical facilities at the EOC were very good. Communications capabilities were excellent and no failures of Appropriate actions were primary or secondary systems were observed. implemented to coordinate the activation of the decontamination station, the reception / congregate care center, and the hospital drill. Overall, the demonstration of the host county response was excellent, well-integrated, and performed in a dedicated and I enthusiastic manner. Activities outside the Indian River County EOC included demonstrations of a unique vehicle washdown station, a monitoring station, a reception center where monitoring and decontamination were accomplished,-and the activation of a shelter. Participation by volunteers was excellent. Areas for improvement.were The demonstration was good and identifiedthat reflects andIndian will be addressed. River County has the capability and resources to protect the population. t
a a i II. DETAILED DISCUSSION Introduction The St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant is owned and operated by Florida Power and Light Company. It is located on Hutchinson Island of the City of. Fort Pierce in St. approximately 12 miles southeastLucie Lucie County. . Parts of St. and Martin Counties lie within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) and are risk counties. evacuees -Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach Counties have agreed to host
.i from the 10-mile EPZ should evacuation be necessary. All or parts of Brevard, Osceola, St. Lucie, Okeechobee, Martin, Highlands, Glades, Hendry, Indian River and Palm Beach Counties lie within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.
During this exercise, the Counties of St. Lucie, Martin and Indian The River participated and fully activated emergency response plans. State of Florida participated by staffing the Emergency Operations facility (EOF), the Emergency-News Center (ENC), the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) and deploying three field monitoring " teams. No ingestion pathway activities were conducted during this exercise. The St. Lucie partial participation exercise was conducted on April 24, 1986 and observed by fourteen evaluators representing three federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, and DOT). (See Appendix A for Federal Evaluator Assignments). This was the fourth exercise conducted at the St. Lecie Nuclear Power Plant based on the NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1-Rev. 1 guidance critt ria. Criteria used to evaluate the exercise are contained in the "1.adular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and-Evaluations" issued by FEMA on August 5, 1983. The exercise objectives establish a full-system test forAll the off site response plan. (See Appendix B - Exercise Objectives). objectives were incorporated in the exercise scenario. (Refer to Appendix C for a detailed time line of the scenario). The last exercise conducted in March 1984 was a full participation exercise. Those areas which were identified as problems in the 1984 exercise were incorporated The into this exercise to show that' corrective only recurring deficiency involves the actions have been made. inadequacy of St. Lucie County EOC (H.3.). This problem has been resolved with the construction of the new EOC for St. Lucie County which is projected for completion in June 1986.
I The St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Exercise included the following participants: Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie~ Nuclear Power Plant Florida Division of Emergency Management Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services St. Lucie County Emergency Management Agency Martin County Emergency Management Agency Indian River County Emergency Management Agency identified along I 'During this exercise fourteen superior items were and one (1)' area I with twenty-two. areas recommended for improvement requiring corrective action. The following detailed discussion highlights the specific activities demonstrated during the exercise. Activities are discussed by the location of the demonstration in the following order: the State of Florida, the risk counties, and the host county. State of Florida b' Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Communications and coordination between the Florida Division of Emergency Manag'ement and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were excellent. Similarly, the overall interaction among the representatives of the State and Florida Power and Light Company was also exceptional. Representatives of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services performed a rapid and independent assessment of the accident in a professional manner, and immediately coordinated the results of these assessments with the Governor's Authorized Representative. The results of the State-performed accident assessments were in accord with the results of the assessments performed by the utility since operator. This greatly f acilitated overall emergency management the need to reconcile major differences was eliminated. During the simulated emergency, the State and utility representatives jointly developed appropriate protective action recommendations to protect public health and safety, and implemented these recommendations in a timely fashion. The EOF carried out its responsibilities according to existing plan and fulfil-led the exercise scenario objectives in a professional and well-organized manner. f The EOF was well equipped with dose assessment computers,
' communication equipment, maps, charts, status boards, reproduction capability, etc. All equipment functioned well with a minimum of mechanical problems.
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. 7-The State DHRS dose assessment staff arrived at 2033 during the ALERT stage. Full mobilization was not demonstrated nor was it an objective of this exercise. They were given a complete briefing at 2051 by the licensee and were functional following the br.iefing.
Staffing levels for dose assessments consisted of team communicator, team coordinator, and clerk in charge of exposure logging. The staff was well trained and knowledgeable. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was not demonstrated for this exercise. The facilities were adequate.for the dose assessment function. They were spacious and well equipped with an IBM PC computer and a back-up l' T1-50 calculator for dose assessment, a TRS-80 computer to log team exposure and radio communication to the teams. The dose Maps assessment of the area models are the same as those used by the licensee.
' were available and used effectively for noting team locations.
The dose assessments were very well performed throughout the exercise. There was excellent cooperation and coordination between The first the State DHRS dose assessment team and the licensee staff. assessment was promptly made once conditions warranted and was completed at 2220 during the GENERAL EMERGENCY. It was based on known Subsequent A plant conditions and agreed with the licensee assessment. assessments were promptly made as new information was acquired; they also agreed with licensee results. Approximately six assessments were made during the exercise. The direction and control of the field teams was generally adequate. There was seme confusion over. the deployment of the teams as to their exact assignments; it was unclear what was the source of this confusion. Deployment strategies f or the teams were well considered ;
' they took into account the availability of licensee teams, terrain, potential weather conditions, and the need to define the margins of the plume. In general, the plume was adequately tracked.
The teams were given excellent briefings throughout the exercise and kept up-to-date on changing conditions. The MERL was briefed at 2057 and the field teams were first briefed at 2139. Teams reported their Exposure locations,control was very well demonstrated.and exposure rates and doses were small computer system. This is a commendable system. Superi'or Items
- 1. Tne DHRS dose assessment staff was well trained, knowledgeable and worked well among themselves and with the licensee staff.
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- 2. The field team deployment strategies were very well considered.
3.- The use of the.small' computer system to log and report field team exposures is an excellent system. Defi'ciencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1. The source of the confusion involving the field team
' deployment assignments needs to be identified and resolved. f Emergency News Center (ENC) Tnere were no serious problems observed in the Emergency News Center (ESC). Both St. Lucie and Martin Counties generated EBS messages which,- although coordinated between each EOC before broadcast, were
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different. A single message, designed to serve all EPZ residents, y would have less potential for confusing an anxious public. Public information staffs were not adequately tested by scenario play in the exercise. .Neither incoming phone queries by media nor queries 1 during news briefings were anywhere near the amount which would have been expected in such an accident. Deficiencies: None. 1 Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. 4 Areas Recommended for Improvement: None. l Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) Laboratory equipment aboard MERL is of research grade and represents current methods for radioisotope identification and analysis. l Procedures for sample analysis were adequately demonstrated, however, ' environment'al sampling for recovery / reentry was not considered to be an objective for the exercise. Thus, actual sample analysis was limited for the exercise.
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9 .l, Deficiencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. Areas Recommended for Improvement: None. Radiologica1' Monitoring Field Team 62 - Teams were prepositioned and activation was not tested. Team 62 had low- and high-range gamma instruments, a NaI detector and a 2-channel analyzer for measuring iodine . Ingestion pathway equipment was not demonstrated. Team 62 practiced good { radiological procedures; however, they were not aware that air sample cartridges might have to be measured at a new location with only background radiation. Team 62 did not know the area or the location of the monitoring points. Samples were not transported to the mobile lab during.the exercise. It was occasionally difficult to get air space for communication because of the use of teams to " repeat" messages of teams temporarily out of range of the dispatcher. Superior Items k 1. The vehicles had a battery connection for the air sampler This allowed the air sampler on the front of-the vehicle. to be connected without opening the hood. Deficiencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1. The team was not aware that in very high plume radiation fields, it might be necessary to go to an area of background radiation to make cartridge measurements for iodine l concentrations.
- 2. It was occasionally difficult to get through on the radio because of heavy traffic. The traffic was due to the use of teams as a repeater for teams temporarily 'out of range of the dispatcher.
! 3. The team was not familiar with the location.of monitoring points. It is recommended that the team learn the major roads in the vicinity of the monitoring points.
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10 Field Team 63 - Although activation of field monitoring teams was not observed, they can be activated at any time via telephone or radio Pierce. pagers. The team was dispatched from the MERL located in Ft. Before deployment, the team went through their equipment checklist to ensure all appropriate equipment was available and in good operating condition. Equipment checklists were reviewed by the team leader. Teams were briefed on plant conditions, meteorological conditions, and other pertinent information. Dosimeters were~ issued and the team was dispatched to However, the first monitoring upon arrivalpoint (J7) they at 9:15 were p.m. notified ~and that theyarrived at 9:35 p.m. should have gone to location J5. There appeared to be some confusion as to what team assignments were made from Charlie Control. The. field team was provided with all equipment necesssry to conduct i field monitoring duties and all instruments were within calibration One excellent innovation was the installation of an external electrical hookup on the vehicle for the air sampling pump. This dates. allowed for very easy operation of the equipment. Team 63 was knowledgeable in the proper operation of their instruments. Procedures for collection of background and air samples were demonstrated. Air samples wereAir collected, labeled with g samples were analyzed in the appropriate information and bagged. Collection of soil, vegetation, and field using the Ludlum 2200-01. Some operational problems were water samples was not demonstrated. noted during the exercise. Probes were not protected from Although contamination nor were open/ closed window measurements made. the maps were very detailed, they were so large that using them was Also, sampling locations were difficult to locate because of the lack of land marks. The field team was under utili:ed, much of
. difficult.
the time was spent parked waiting for further instructions. Although field team communications were maintained through the exercise, they were not without problems. Many " dead spots" Many were messages observed. This created problems throughout the night. This process hindered had to be relayed through other field teams. It also the ability of the teams to perform their field activities. Proper radio caused confusion telephonetic at Charlie Control andwas alphabet) in thenot field. used. This could protocol (use of identification of various sectors (E,C,D which cause confusion in theThe team was periodically briefed on meteorological all sound alike). conditions, plant status, and projected doses. The field teamPotassium was equipped with anti-contamination. suits and iodide was provided and the team advised to respirators. take it. However, the decision to actually take KI is left to the individual. Team members had 0-200 mR and 0-5 R direct reading Periodically the dosimeters as well as permanent record dosimeters. The team was not aware of any dosimeters were read and data recorded. policy regarding what the maximum dose or dose rate would be without authorization. The teams expect to remain in the field until called back by Charlie Control.
I a l 11 Superior Items
- 1. The exterior electrical connections on the vehicles for air sampling pump is an idea which makes operation of the equipment very easy.
- 2. Velcro strips to hold filter samples onto the probe is'an excellent innovation.
Deficiencies: None.
! Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.
Areas Recommended for Improvement: 1
- 1. Field teams did not protect their probes from potential contamination. Plastic bags should be placed over probes to protect them from possible contamination.
- 2. Sampling locations were difficult to find. This is the r e s ul.t of the field teams being unfamiliar with the region and no landmarks being given in the area of the sampling _
g point. Field teams failed to make open/ closed window readings. To 3. help define plume open/ closed window readings should be taken.
- 4. Teams were not fully utilized. Teams can better define the extent of the plume if they are not used as fixed monitors.
They should be allowed to move around to locate the plume. Field Monitorin; Team C The field monitoring teamsPrior were to pre-staged at t1e FPL substation on Weatherbec Road. departure to the field, the teams were briefed on meteorological conditions and plant conditions. The field teams were kept well conhtions, and PARS informed of any changes in meteorology, plant throughout the course of the exercise. The field monitoring teams were equipped with the appropriate high-and other and low-range survey instruments, air sampling equipment, All of the supplies necessary to monitor the plume pathway EPZ. radiation monitoring instruments and the air sampling equipment had been recently calibrated. 'There appeared to be some additional back-up equipment available at the MERL-in the event of an equipment failure in the field. Each The field team equipment was arranged in kits for easy deployment. equipment kit had a checklist of contents.
o The kit contents were checked against the list prior to deployment to the field. Field Team C-98 conducted source checks and. operability tests on all instruments and equipment, except the air sampling pump, prior to departure to the field. This field monitoring team generally gave a good demonstration of A their knowledge of technical procedures and equipment onerations. notebook containing operating procedures was available and was referred to, as needed, during the exercise. The team members demonstrated the appropriate use of high- and low-range radiation survey instruments. Most survey measurements were made with the
, Consequently, no attempt was made to j instruments inside the instruments vehicle.
from being contaminated,Also, i.e., the detectors were keep the since most-not covered with a protective plastic bag. measurements _were made inside the vehicle, no open window survey measurements were made. Both open and closed window surveys should be made when there isThese an indication of an increase measurements in the are important to radiation determinelevel if above background. the measurement is actually being made within the plume, or along side These measurements are necessary to or underneath the plume. g determine the validity of the air samples which are collected for N radiciodine measurements. The field team had the appropriate instrumentation and equipment to determine the concentration of radioiodine in the presence of noble gases. However, the C-98 field team counted each air sample at the location where the sample was collected. It was recommended to the which the samples team that they should taken establish a radiation-level at to a low or normal background area for would have to be counting. Ideally, all air samples should be counted in a low background area. Also, the accuracy of is the sample count can be purged with " clean" air prior improved if the air sample cartridge to counting. This procedure removes entrained noble gases from the sample cartridge. The C-98 field team detected and corrected which acauses potential problem with radio frequency (RF) interference spurious counts on the Ludlum 2200 analy er. The car door or seat belt bu::er generates an RF signal which is counted by the instrument. Therefore, it is important to keep the car door closed while counting the air sample cartridges. The field monitoring tesms had appropriate high- and low-range record direct device. The reading dosimeters and a TLD badge for a permanentsupply before going into team members were each issued a simulated KI
-the field, and the team members wereThe advised in the field as to when C-98 team members were very they should consider taking the KI.
conscientious about reading their direct reading dosimeters. The field kits contained the appropriate supplies of protective clothing and respirators. It is recommended that, for nighttime field
e
- _13 i
i monitoring, each field team member should wear reflecting material to i nake them more visible to traffic while they are conducting monitoring operations along roadways. i Field team radio communications were adequate, but some messages had to be relayed between field teams to the EOF. This appeared to create some confusion in the field team control from the EOF. Superior items
- 1. The field team detected and corrected a technical problem involving radio frequency interference with the Ludlum 2200 single-channel analyzer.
Deficiencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. Areas Recommended for Improvement: as well
- 1. Conduct operability tests on air sampling equipment M
as survey instruments prior to deploying to the field. C
- 2. The survey instrument detectors should be covered with plastic bags or baggies to prevent contamination of 'the detectors.
to
- 3. Both open and closed window measurements should be made determine if the measurement is actually in the plume and not just measuring " shine" outside of the plume. This is important for identifying where air samples should be collected.
- 4. Air sample cartridges should be taken to a low background area for counting--also, the cartridges should be purged with " clean" air prior to counting.
- 5. For nighttime operations, the team members should consider wearing some. type of reflecting material to make them more visible.
Risk Counties St. Lucie County Activation and staffing were performed in a timely manner. Emergency operations management was effect;vely carried out under the leadership
e.
- _14 i
J of the County Director, Operations Officer (County Engineer) and l permanent staff. The EOC is to small (H.3.) but a new EOC has been constructed and will be occupied within the nextThe 2-3radio months. emergency Communications-capabilities are outstanding. services (HAM) operators were very effective in transmitting messages. Fifty-four operators checked into theThe radio net during the public alerting, exercise. Many, of course, were'not utilized. j notification and instructions were carried out very efficiently and t effectively. The 15-minute requirement was met in all instances. Superior Items:
- 1. The Emergency Operations management, under the leadership of the County Director and Operations Officer.
l
' 2. The coordination of emergency information activities with-the State, Martin County and Indian River County.
l
- 3. The communication capability with the County, particularly the volunteer personnel from the Radio Emergency Services.
i g Deficiencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
- 1. H.3. The limited space in the EOC is not adequate to support the response organizations. It should be noted-that a new St. Lucie County EOC is under construction and-projected for completion in June 1986. The new EOC will (Recurring resolve this area requiring corrective action.
Deficiency). l l Areas Recommended for Improvement: None. t St. Lucie County Outside Activities the l Signs containing EBS information have been erected throughout ! 10-mile EP2. Basically, the signs advise readers to tune in certain l-radio and television stations if they hear a siren. Many of these signs are adjacent to roadways and are difficult to read from a moving vehicle. The County Director in St. Lucie County is j l. aware of this problem and plans are underway to replace present signs l l with signs that are easier to read. The decontamination station was established at the St. Lucie fair-ground. Personnel from the St. Lucie-Ft. Pierce Fire District were The procedures for determining assigned to this station. contamination were thoroughly demonstrated. Decontamination procedures were discussed in detail and it is evident that decontamination duties can be carried out in a satisfactory manner. t
o
. ~ ; Deficiencies: None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.
' Areas Recommended for Improvement: None.
f Martin County Activation and staffing were demonstrated in an efficient manner. The notification of alert status was received'via the2015. ring-down Staff wasat 1931, and the EOC was fully staffed and activated at Twenty-four hour staffing was notified using a writtenand callsometimes list. triple, agency representation. demonstated by double, All participants were knowledgeable'of procedures and displayed a high degree of professionalism. EOC operations were conducted effectively by the Emergency Management Director. He displayed good leadership and decision making, Excellent training particularly pertaining to interjected messages. the exercise. by the Director of Public informative Safety was and evident throughout included the polling of each Periodic briefings were There N agency. Written procedures were used and message logs kept. was good coordination between all agencies. Facilities at Martin County EOC are excellent. The communications room, which is staffed around the clock, is separate from the operations room. When the EOC was activated,
~
A new the ring-down line was message control system attached to a speaker phone in the EOC. utilizing runners to distribute messages worked effectively. The status a All displays and maps were in place and clearly visible. Suggested 4
' board was kept up-to-date at each classification level.
areas for improvement were to include PAR's on the status board and to use colored markers or overlays to plot the plume. Primary communications with the utility,. EOF, and EOC's were through the ring-down system. Landline phones were available to communicate with other agencies. Back-up systems include NAWAS and the Intercounty Command Net. HAM operators formed a network for contact with host counties. For this exercise, 31 private citizens participated in the link. Public alerting and instruction was coordinated with St. Lucie County EOC immediately upon receiving both the Site Area and General Emergency notifications. Martin and St. Lucie counties can sound the During the discussion sirens with St.inLucie either theirit own EOC, was or both counties. decided that St. Lucie would sound the As sirens in both counties. An electronic board monitors each siren. soon as the sirens had been sounded, radio and All television messages stations were were notified to broadcast the EBS message. coordinated between Martin and St. Lucie counties before release and included geographic descriptions and public instructions.
~
Protective action recommendations were implemented promptly and efficiently. Traffic control points and volumes of traffic were discussed among appropriate agencies. Provisions were made to care A computerized for mobility-impaired individuals within the county. list is maintained with each person's special needs. The Mobile Control Unit, equipped with dosimeters and KI for emergency workers, was-dispatched . The unit was staffed by personnel trained in the use of the equipment and administration of Kl. Radio contact was maintained with the EOC at all times. A PIO was sent to the Media Center and communicated with the local PIO via landline telephone. Messages were coordinated between the County and the Media Center, effectively controlling rumors. The scenario was adequate for the exercise, but the use of local controllers, supplementing state controllers, resulted in more realistic situations. All participants felt this was advantageous to the demonstration. Superior Items
- 1. Knowledge of procedures by all participants reflects a high degree of training and dedication.
I Deficiencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. Areas Recommended For Improvement:
- 1. Include PAR's on status board and use colored markers or overlays to plot the plume on the EPZ map.
Martin County Outside Activities A decontamination /washdown station for eu rgency workers in Martin County was demonstrated by the Hutchinson Island Fire Department. A six-man team conducted the demonstration which included the monitoring and washing of five vehicles (car, bronco, van, EMS vehicle and Sheriff's car). Procedures were carefully followed and all monitoring washdown activities were handled uniformly. The station set-up was well organized and included necessary control lines to prevent the possibility of unnecessary spread of contamination. A record keeping station was established which issued all personnel dosimetry and logged periodic readings. Radio communications were used to advise workers when a dose reading was needed and workers would then relay the reading back. This was an effective way to maintain frequent dose checks and not disrupt the operations.
l' The design and construction of the washdown equipment used during the l exercise was very innovative and economical. . The fire fighters at this department designed a washdown unit which is made out of PVC piping shaped in a square. The vehicle is drivenThis through the square washes both the
! which has water spraying out on all four sides.
top and bottom of the vehicle. Scrub brushes and spray hoses were also available. A windsock was set up and a shield was used to contain the water spray. All-water run-off was directed to a sloping i grassy area. This area was roped off and secured. If necessary this area could be dug out and hauled of f for permanent disposal. All other contaminated waste (i.e., rubber gloves, exposed clothing, etc.) would be collected in garbage bags and held for pick-up. Monitoring techniques were correctly demonstrated. However, it is recommended that the monitoring probe be covered with a plastic baggie or disposable glove to protect the probe from contamination. Fire fighters were dressed in turnout gear which is very heavy and hot. Given the operations at this decontamination station, a lighter weight clothing could be used. The activities demonstrated were excellent and indicated that thorough training had been provided-to the fire fighters. All personnel were professional in carrying out response operations. The innovative a washdown equipment is outstanding and the personnel are to be commended for their enthusiasm. Superior Items
- 1. The design and' construction of an innovative decontamination /washdown station. Not only is the equipment designed to be portable and easily assembled but it is also inexpensive to construct.
l Deficiences: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1. To improve equipment protection against contamination, it is recommended that the monitoring probe be covered with a plastic baggie or disposable plastic glove.
I
- 2. During the exercise, fire fighters were dressed in turnout
~
gear and they became very hot. It is recommended that lighter weight clothing be used especially given the warm temperatures in Florida. This would allow workers to 1 continue operations longer before being relieved to cool i off.
s. Host County Indian River County
.The Indian River EOC was completely staffed according to planned procedures. All agencies were represented by one or more county employees or volunteers. Elected. officials All were present and representatives were well participated fully in the exercise.
trained, knowledgeable of their responsibilities, and performed their duties in a competent manner. Overall, the demonstration of the host county response was excellent and well integrated. The county should be commended for the dedicated, enthusiastic, and serious response it provided to the radiological emergency scenarioParticularly as well as the numerous free-play situations and activities. I outstanding was the support the State Liaison.0fficer provided the i county in formulating appropriate emergency actions. The County Director and his operations managers did an outstanding job in coordinating and implementing the emergency response. Appropriate staff were involved in decision-making activities. Access to the EOC was strictly controlled through registration and badging. A copy of Written N the plan and a revised edition were available for reference. The status procedures and message forms were used by each agency. board has been revised and enlarged to depict emergency situations and the respective actions taken in response to the emergency. These
' improvements represent positive actions to correct shortcomings identified in earlier exercises. Although some briefings were provided, a more effective procedure involving participation of the operations staff in a structured format should be implemented. }
Overall, the physical facilities of the EOC were very good. The All operations room was adequate to support the emergency response. appropriate status boards, charts, and maps were posted and used. In general, the EOC was somewhat overcrowded as a result of the strong,
~
multiple-shift staffing response. Communications capabilities were excellent and no failures were observed in any of the. primary or back-up systems. A separate radio communications room was well-equipped and noise was effectively controlled. Each system was demonstrated to be operational through various response activities to free-play situations. Indian River County also demonstrated a wide variety of outside activities coordinated through the EOC. Appropriate actions were implemented to activate a decontamination station, a hospi tal drill, and a reception / congregate care center. In each case, procedures were correctly followed according to the plan, and the coordination was conducted efficiently and promptly. Deficiences: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.
1 Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1. Periodic briefings were weak and unscheduled. A more effective procedure would involve the operations staff in a scheduled, structured format.
Indian River Outside Activities Activities outside the Indian River EOC included demonstrations of a very unique vehicle washdown station, a monitoring station, a
! reception center where monitoring and decontamination were i accomplished, and the activation of a shelter.
Participation at all points was excellent, and included personnel (mostly volunteers) from Indian River County Emergency Management Agency, South County Fire District, Indian River Memorial Hospital, County Sheriff's Department, Indian River Volunteer Rescue Squad, American Red Cross, and HAM Radio Operators' Club. Two carloads of evacuees were followed through the entire process from evacuation, vehicle washdown, personnel monitoring, decontamination, and ,,[ assignment into a shelter. The washdown system is innovative and Y "one-of-a-kind." All players interviewed, particularly the monitors and medical personnel, appeared to have a' good grasp of their own responsibilities as well as the overall process of protecting the population; however, the' manager at the Red Cross Shelter indicated he had not had shelter management training. Proper equipment was on hand at every location, i.e., emergency vehicles, monitoring instruments, plastic bags, decontamination cleanser, brushes, sponges, first aid supplies, and shelter nursing i kits. Signs were posted identifying points along the way. Standard forms should be developed for recording individual dose readings and for registering evacuees at Reception Center. It would be helpful t.o provide those evacuees beingIn directed addition, a to shelters method should with be strip maps showing shelter locations. devised to identify (~for shelter registrars).those evacuees who have been through the monitoring process. This would preclude evacuees who have not been monitored from being admitted to shelters. Confusion exists as to who (agency / organization) has primary The current county plan is responsibility for reception and shelter. This needs to be clarified and all parties made aware. not specific. Overall, the demonstration indicated that Indian River County has the capability and resources to protect the population.
i Superior Items
- 1. Excellent participation of volunteers.
- 2. Unique vehicle washdown station.
Deficiencies: None. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. . . i Areas Recommended for Improvement: i
- 1. Standard form for individual dose recordings.
I
- 2. Standard form'for registering evacuees at reception center.
- 3. Strip maps directing evacuees to shelters, l 4. Means of identifying evacuees who'have been through -
monitoring process (handstamps, stickers, badges, referral forms, etc.). ,
- 5. Clarification of primary responsibility for reception centers and shelters.
i i I
i Ill.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled Date Action of Completion Activity Item
.. t Deficiencies None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions H.3. The limited space in July 31, 1986 St. Lucie i County EOC the EOC is not ade-El quate to support the response organiza-tions. It should be noted that a new St.
Lucie County EOC is under construction and projected for comple-tion in June 1986. The , new EOC will resolve this area requiring l~ corrective action. l l I
- f. .
2 IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended For Improvement EOF 1. The source of the confusion involving the field team deployment assignments needs to be identified and eliminated. I Field 1. The team was not aware that in very high Monitoring plume radiation fields,.it might be necessary to Team-62 go to an area of background _ radiation to make cartridge measurements for indine ;oncentrations.
- 2. It was occasionally difficult to get through on I the radio because of heavy traffic. The traffic C3 was due to the use of teams as a repeater for teams temporarily out of range of the-dispatcher.
- 3. The team was not familiar with the location of monitoring points. It_is recommended that the team learn the major roads in the vicinity of the monitoring points.
Field 1. Field teams did not protect their probes from Monitoring potential contamination. Plastic bags should be Team-63 placed over probes-to protect them from possible contamination.
- 2. Sampling locations were difficult to find. This is the result of the field teams being unfamiliar with the region and no landmarks being given in the area of the sampling-point.
- 3. Field teams failed to make open/ closed window readings. To help define plume, open/ closed window readings should be taken.
- 4. Teams were not fully utili ed. Teams can better define the extent of the plume if they are not used as fixed monitors. They should be allowed to_ move around to locate the plume.
l
I i Facility or-Activity Areas Recommended For Improvement Field 1. Conduct ~ operability tests on air sampling Monitoring equipment as well as survey instruments prior to Team-C-98 s deploying to the field.
- 2. The survey instrument detectors should be covered with plastic bags or baggies to prevent contamination of the detectors.
- 3. Both open and closed window measurements should be made to determine if the measurement is actually-in the plume and not just measuring i " shine" outside of the plume. This is important for identifying where air samples should be collected.
- 4. Air sample cartridges should be taken to a low background area for counting--also, the cartridges should be purged with " clean" air
, prior to counting.
- 5. For nighttime operations, the team members should t
consider wearing some type of reflecting material to make them more visible. Martin 1. Include PAR's on status board and use colored County EOC markers or overlays to plot the plume on the EP2
' map.
Martin County 1. To improve equipment protection against i Decontamina- contamination, it is recommended that the tion / Wash- monitoring probe be covered with a plastic baggie down Station or disposable plastic glove.
- 2. During the exercise, fire fighters were dressed in turnout gear and they became very hot. It is recommended that lighter weight clothing be used, I
especially given the warm temperatures in-Florida. This would allow workers to continue operations longer before being relieved to cool off. y e
i ( Facility or Activity Areas Recommended For Improvement Indian River 1. Periodic briefings were weak and unscheduled. A County EOC more effective procedbre would involve the operations staff in a scheduled, structured format. Indian River 1. Standard form for individual dose recordings. County Out- ~
- 2. Standard form for registering evacuees at l.sideActivi-ties reception center.
l
- 3. Strip maps directing evacuees to shelters.
- 4. Means of identifying evacuees who have been through monitoring process (handstamps, stickers, badges, referral forms, etc.).
- 5. Clarification of primary responsibility for reception centers and shelters.
gg i B i i 4 e
- _ ---n ------- e ,y , - ,
w - -
e e e V. APPENDICES A. Evaluators List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario i I t l l rs 9 FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIG1BiENTS St. Lucie Exercise April 24, 1986 Chief of Evaluators and RAC Chairman Glenn Woodard (FEMA) Emergency Operations Facility (Ft. Pierce) Bob Trojanowski (NRC) Tony Foltman (FEMA) Emergency News (Media) Center (Ft. Pierce) Jack Glover (FEMA) Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MEP1) Ray Boyett (FEMA)
; Radiological Field Monitoring Teams N Bill Gasper (FEMA)
Don Fingleton, (FEMA)
; Jim Opelka (FEMA) l St. Lucie County (Ft. Pierce)
John Heard (FEMA) Al Hall (DOT)
! !!artin County (Stuart)
Dee Demmitt (FE!1A) Indian River County (Vero Beach) Jim Levenson (FEMA) Virginia Baker (FFliA) Mobile Evaluator Cheryl Stovall (FEMA) Observor Phil May (FEMA - Regional Director)
I i j '. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ST. LUCIE EXERCISE PARTI AL PARTICIPATION STATE / LOCAL EXERCISE APRIL 24, 1986 The following goals and objectives reflect minimal staffing by the State of Florida in the State Emergency Operations Center. This center will be staffed by Division of. Emergency Management personnel only. The licensee's Emergency Operations Facility will.be staffed by the Governor's Authorized Representative, the I 1 Public Information Officer located at the Emergency News Center, i and liaison personnel assigned to local government emergency 1 operations centers. The exercise will evaluate emergency response and communications capabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee. wq ( Goals I. To evaluate portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants and confirm its adequacy for response to an emergency situation at the St. Lucie nuclear power plant. Specific portions of the plan to be addressed are: A. Annex R - St. Lucie Site Plan B. Annex B --Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities r C. Annex F - Emergency Communications D. Annex G - Public Information E. Annex H - Emergency Facilities F. Annex I - Accident Assessment G. Annex J - Radiological Exposure Control
I-
- j/ .
H. Annex K - Protective Response I. Annex L - Medical and Public Health Support II. To evaluate the radiological emergency preparedness capa-bilities of those counties within the plume exposure path-way EPZ. III. To provide an opportunity for state agency personnel to be cross-trained in dif f erent aspects of radiological
' emergency operations.
Objectives - Plume Exposure Pathway I .- Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources A. To, demonstrate point-to-point communication between t state and local emergency response organizations and 33 Florida Power and Light (FP&L) emergency personnel at the St. Lucie nuclear power plant. B. To determine the adequacy of the-St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River ;&; Palm Beach counties' EOCs to support i emergency operations. II. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff A. To demonstrate the procedures.for the alert and noti-fication of key emergency response personnel. All state, Indian River County and Palm Beach County staff will be prepositioned for the purpose of alert and notification. St. Lucie County and Martin County will demonstrate alert and notification of personnel using actual time. l l
i
,III, Emergency Operations Management ,t .
To demonstrate the ability of key individuals within l/ A. principal emergency response organizations to coor-dinate and direct the response operations and activi-ties of their respective organizations. IV. . Public Alerting and Notification A. To demonstrate the systems and procedures for notifi-cation of the public that a radiological emergency
! condition exists. The means of notification to be demonstrated will be the capability to activate the siren. systems. Messages will be developed, but not transmitted to. broadcast systems. Siren system acti-vation will be simulated as necessary during the N emergency.
, V. Public and Media Relations A. To demonstrate the organization and procedures for the coordinated and timely dissemination of information to the public'and media. This will include coordination of news releases among FP&L, state and county public ,
information officials. The Emergency News Center will be fully staffed and operational. B. To demonstrate rumor control capabilities in Martin and St. Lucie counties. VI. Accident Assessment A. To demonstrate the procedures for determining the radiological consequences of the emergency. This will include deployment of the MERL and field teams under the coordination, direction and control of the State.
/
/
" VII.
Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures j , A. To demonstrate the ability of St. Lucie County to pro-
~
vide adequate health and medical services to con-taminated individuals. Martin County will conduct a medical drill for training purposes only. VIII. Actions to Protect the Public A. To demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process with regard to determining the appropriate protective actions to protect the public. B. To demonstrate the ability of St. Lucie and Martin counties to implement recommended protective actions. This will include a demonstration of the decon-tamination of vehicles in Martin and Indian River counties and sheltering of evacuees in Indian River and Palm Beach counties. IX. Recovery and Reentry
! A. To test the joint recovery and reentry plans and pro-cedures made by the state and counties to relax pro-tective antions. This is a training activity and not for the purpose of demonstration and evaluation. A recovery and reentry plan will not be developed.
l 1 3
m ll , ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PARTIAL PARTICIPATION STATE / LOCAL EXERCISE APRIL 24, 1986 Time 6:00-pm Exercise commences, initial conditions are established. Unit 1 is at 100% power, approximately three fourths through its fuel cycle The with 85 daysfeedwrter 1C Auxiliary continuous pumpfullis 12 power operation.into a 72 hour action statement for maintenance hours A Unit 1 RPS logic on the governor control system. Unit I containment gaseous matrix test is in progress. l activity is slightly rising. ~ Unit 2 is in mode 6. The 2A diesel generator is out of Midway. service for a major overhaul / inspection.
' Service Center has Midway #1 Circuit out for maintenance.
6:05 pm St. Lucie 911 reports an aircraf t crash - St. Lucie Airport, twin. engine - 5 injured persons, and aircraft on fire.
> 6:16 pm A mismatch between charging and letdown is evident, containment pressure and sump increase slowly.
6:30 pm While filling Unit l's Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank, the tanker hose ruptures and is ignited. 6:35 pm Based on the inventory balance leak rate. result of 1.3 G PM , the Emergency Coordinator requests a Containment entry to determine the source of the leak. A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared based on a RCS water inventory balance greater than_1 GPM unidentified leakage. 6:40 pm State Warning Point receives Notification of Unusual Event. 6:55 pm A containment entry is underway to determine the source of the leak. 7:15 pm While filling Unit l's Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank , the tanker hose ruptures and is ignited. . 6
i 7:20 pm The' Fire Team Leader reports the fire is beyond the He requests capability of the fireCo. team Fire to control. assistance be off-site (St. Lucie Department) the The Fire Team Leader is concerned about firen ef f ect on the. saf ety related equipment (Diesel called. Storage Tank and Refueling Water Tank). An ALERT should be declared based on a fire potentially a f fecting a saf ety system requiring of f site assistance. 7:30 pm Upon investigation, steam appears to be coming out the Dose rates prohibit the team from pressurizer housing. The entry team inspecting areas within the bio-shield. j exits the Containment. i 7:35 pm State Warning Point receives Notification ofIndian Alert. The state agencies are placed on stand-by. l River, St. Lucie and Martin counties activate their EOC's and notify personnel to report to the DOC imme-diately. 7:45 pm A charging / letdown mismatch increases to 11 GPM.
' Operators commenc an orderly shutdown at 1 % per 7:50 pm M minute due to the rcd leak rate.. Due thetoTSC degrading requestsRCSthat leak rate and off hours response, the EOF be activated.
Lucie, and Martin counties 8:00 pm SEOC, Indian' River, St. State personnel activated at EOF. EOC's are activated. St. Lucie County and Martin CountySiren activate siren activation systems to notify public. (NOTE: but not-procedure will be demonstrated up the to, sirens.) including, the actual sounding of 8:20 pm The fire is brought under control. 8:45 pm EOF becomes operational. 8:45 pm Florida Highway Patrol Reports: 119 - Motor Vehicle Accident on Turnpike mile post North bound lane - two semis - 6 cars
' Several injuries - car fire 8:45 pm Subject on a 54 ft. boat has calling the Coast run aground Guard Jensen betweeen via f radio advising his boat Beach and the Stuart Causeway in the Indian River, he is requesting assistance.
Major traf fic jam between 8:50 pm St. Lucie S.O. Unit Reports: 1-95 and Turnpike. m
i / . Lucie Fire Dept. leaves 9:00 pm The fire is out and the St. the site. Traffic jam Port St. 9:10 pm St. Lucie County S.O. Reports: Lucie Blvd. and U.S. $11 9:28 pm A loss of offsite power occurrs due to an airplane crash west of the plant taking down the two remaining Lucie Plant. Midway transmission circuits to the St.The 1A Emergency The IB output breaker fails to close automatically. fails to come up to speed. diesel generator starts but Immediate operator actions 'to close the 1 A Emergency Diesel generator breaker and load the 1B Emergency Diesel generator are ineffective. i Due I 9:32 pm A small break LOCA takes place inside containment. < to loss of make up capability (LOCA greater than 132 is decreasing GPM) to the RCS. RCS pressure uncontrollably. A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared based on any one of the following:
- 1) LOCA with' a f ailure of the ECCS
- 2) Loss of off-site power with a loss of the secondary I
N heat sink 9:32 pm State Warning Point Receives Notification of GENERAL _ EMERG ENCY . FP&L Protective Action Recommendations are: 0-2 mile evacuate complete radius 2-5 mile evacuate downwind sectors HJK 2-5 mile shelter remaining sectors 5-10 mile shelter complete radius Lucie County and Martin County order recommended 9:35 St. PAR's. 9:35 pm Electrical Maintenance personnel dispatched if possible from the the emergency OSC to report on and resolve power situation. 9:45 pm The steam generator inventory is boiling of f due to the loss of electrical feedwaterThepumpsRCS and an out of ser-inve.ntory conti vice steam driven pump. Building. ' Containment l escape to the Containmentincreasing rapidily due to the loss of con-pressure is ~ tainment coolers and the absence of electrical power [' for the containment spray pumps. fire at entrance to City Marina - reported by House boat Marina employee to Ft. Pierce Fire Department. 9:50 pm 9:55 pm A CB operator reports an overturned Injuriestanker truck are on the Roosevelt Bridge. in Martin County. is blocked. reported as well as the southbound lane
/ Lucie and Martin counties request Executive Order. 9:55 pm St. Major traffic jams Port St. Lucie Blvd. and Turnpike 9:55 pm and Okeechobee Road and Turnpike reported to St. Lucie County S.O. 10:00 pm Core exit thermocouples indicate the fuel in the reac-Containment tor core is uncovered and begins to fail. High Range Radiation Monitor and core exit ther-mocouples are steadily trending upward. The electrical maintenance team dispatched to assess the diesel generator problems reports a severe mechani-cal problem with the lA Diesel causing the failure of the breaker to close and repeated attempts to start the l 1B diesel fail. F&L protective action recommendations are: 0-2 mile evacuate complete radius
' 2-5 mile evacuate complete radius l 5-10 mile evacuate-downwind sectors HJK 5-10. mile shelter remaining sectors 10:05 pm St. Lucie County and Martin County orders recommended PAR's.
10:10 pm Motor vehicle accident - car vs power pole - pole live All traf-wires across Midway Road and Jorgensen Road. fic stopped both directions. Reported by Ft. Pierce Police Department. 10:10 pm Chlorine leak at the Vero Beach Water Treatment plant.
' Unknown amount of leakage.
10:15 pm An anonymous phone call to 911 from the Standard Oil Station at Skyline Drive and Ccmmercial Street. Looters are reported at the Publix Shopping Center on Commercial Street. 10:15 pm A severe leak develops from the hydrogen purge return line in the annulus of the containment shield building. to the Therefore a leakage path f rom the containment plant vent exists. Lucie and Martin 10:25 pm Executive Order released f or St. counties. 10:30 pm Large gra ss f ire , Lakewood is Park , Eme5 son Avenue and causing traffic problems. Indrio Road. Smoke
10:35 pm The IB Diesel generator is successfully loaded after 1B success-
! cleaning a clogged fuel line and filters. Water is supplied to the fully picks up safety loads. With the core and further fuel damage is terminated.
return of EDG power and the start of the Shield Building . Exhaust Fans, a release f rom the plant site takes place. . A minor accident blocking 1 lane southbound is reported 10:40 pm 1 and Commercial Street. to Theroad blockof location units at U.S.the accident is one mile' south of Commercial Street on U.S. 1. 10:40 pm 5,000 gallons of Diesel Fuel spilled out of fill tank Day's Inn on Route 60. Primary con-during loading at cern is the environmental factor and fire. 10:40 pm A dose.of greater than 1R/hr thyroid is measured at l
' the site boundary (1 mile).
Reported gun fire - Second 10:40 pm Break in at Sun Bank. Street. 10:50 pm Containment spray and coolers are started to decrease the Containment pressure. Riot at City Jail, North 7th Street. Officer down - N" ' 10:55 pm needs help. 11:00 pm A train consisting of 43 cars derails in downtown VeroT Beach. contents as compressed gas (propane and anhydrousThe ammonia). No ruptures occur during the in the' City proper.some of the tanks are scored, gouged, derailment but and some dents are observed in the tanks. 11:10 pm The Stuart Turnpike toll booth reports a traffic jam. People exiting are refusing to pay tolls. Port St. Lucie Hospital Admin. wants to evacuate ll:15.pm hospital. in a south-11:30 pm A wind shift occurs causing the wind to move westerly direction (25 degrees). FP&L protective action recommendations are: 0-2 mile evacuate complete radius 2-5 mile evacuate complete radius 5-10 mile evacuate downwind sectors HJKL f' 5-10 mile shelter all remaining sectors 11:35 pm St. Lucie County and Martin County order evacuation and shelter for sector L.
1 /
- 11:35 pm Report from Port St. Lucie Turnpike Toll Booth'.
Traffic Jam. Tra f fic on turnpike south bound at _ a standstill. l'l:50 pm Heart attack at Fort Pierce-Turnpike Booth. Full arrest - no life signs.
~12:00 am With the use of containment spray and the containment coolers, the containment pressure continues to decrease. , 12:05 am Evacuee in shelter becomes very ill after taking a Tylenol capsule.
12:15 am Evacuees are wanting to leave the shelter and return home without official clearance. is terminated by
! 12:30 am The leakage path from containment lowering the containment pressure and mechanically iso-lating the source of the release.
1:00 am The plant is stabilized with no chance of restarting the. release. Recovery and reentry discussions begin. The exercise terminated on-site. 2:00 am Exercise activity is terminated of f-site. I
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