Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Shutdown Margin Whenever All Full Length Control Element Assemblies (CEA) Fully Inserted in Core & Special Test Exceptions on Shutdown Margin to Allow Credit for Previous Reactor Trip
	ML20215A709
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	09/25/1986
From:	; LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20215A695	List: ML20215A709; W3P86-3323, Application for Amend to License NPF-38,consisting of Tech Spec Change Requests NPF-38-40,NPF-38-41 & NPF-38-42, Revising Shutdown Margin Whenever All Full Length Control Element Assemblies Fully Inserted in Core.Fee Paid;
References
	NUDOCS 8610060198
	Download: ML20215A709 (36)
	v • d • e

. INDEX

_ LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIR SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICA8ILITY.............................................. 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 80 RATION CONTROL SHUTOOWN MARGIN - T,yg >200*F........................ 3/4 1-1 avg 200'F........................ 3/4 1-3 SHUT 00WN MARGIN - T <

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT.................... 3/4 1-4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY..................3/4 1-5 3/4.1.2 80 RATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS -

SHUTD0WN................................ 3/4 1-6 FLOW PATHS -

0PERATING............................... 3/4 1-7 CHARGING PUMPS -

SHUTD0WN............................ 3/4 1-8 CHARGING PUMPS -

0PERATING........................... 3/4 1-9 BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS - SHUTDOWN...................

3/4 1-10 80RIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS - OPERATING..................

3/4 1-11 80 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN.....................

3/4 1-12 80 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING....................

3/4 1-14 80RON 3/4.1.3 DILUTION....................................... 3/4 1-15 MOVA8LE CONTROL ASSEM8 LIES CEA P0SITION......................................... 3/4 1-18 POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - OPERATING.............. 3/4 1-21 POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - SHUTDOWN............... 3/4 1-22 CEA DROP TIME........................................ 3/4 1-23 SHUTDOWN CEA INSERTION LIMIT.........................

3/4 1-24 REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS......................

3/4 1-25 PART-LENGTH CEA INSERTION LIMITS.....................

. 3/4 1-28 P

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 IV

INDEX LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 3.1-1 MINIMUM BORIC ACIO STORAGE TANK VOLUME AND TEMPERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF STORED BORIC ACIO CONCENTRATION................................

3/4 1-13 3.1-2 CEA INSERTION LIMITS VS THERMAL POWER.............. 3/4 1-27 3.2-1 ALLOWABLE PEAK LINEAR HEAT RATE VS BURNUP.......... 3/4 2-2 3.2-2 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON COLSS......... 3/4 2-8 3.2-3 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS (COLSS OUT OF SERVICE)...... 3/4 2-9 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1.0 pCi/ GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131....... 3/4 4-27 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (HEATUP)........................................... 3/4 4-30 3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (C00LDOWN)......................................... 3/4 4-31 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE ............... 3/4 6-12 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUB 8ER FUNCTIONAL TEST.......... 3/4 7-26 5.1- 1 EXCLUSION AREA..................................... 5-2 5.1-2 LOW POPULATION Z0NE................................ 5-3 5.1-3 SITE BOUNGARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS................................... 5-4 6.2-1 0FFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT ANO TECHNICAL SUPP0RT................................. 6-3 6.2-2 PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION...................... 6-4 WATERFORO - UNIT 3 XIX

. 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 80 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T GREATER THAN 200*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 5.15%

delta k/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTOOWN MARGIN less than 5.15% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpa of a solution con-taining greater than or equal to 1720 ppe boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 5.15% delta k/k:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the- above required SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1.0, at !

leastonceper12hoursbyverityIngthatCEAgroupwithdrawalis within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

c. When in MODE 2 with K less than 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor criI.$$ality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6. *

, See Special Test Exception 3.10.1. !

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

e. When in MODE 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of at least the following factors:

1. Reactor Coolant System baron concentration,

2. CEA position,

3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5. Xenon concentration, and

6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.25 delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.le., above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFP0s after each fuel loading.

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e WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-2

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUT 00WN MARGIN - T,yLESS THAN'OR ECUAL TO 200 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

3.1.1.2 delta k/k.The . SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 2.0%

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5. -

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 2.G4 delta k/k, immediately. initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or' equal to 1720 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN *is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.1.1.2 to 2.0% delta The SHUTDOWN k/k: MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal a.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the above requirec SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

b.

At factors:least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following 1.

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2. CEA position, 3.

Reactor Coolant System average temperature, 4.

5. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, Xenon concentration,and

6. Samarium concentration.

l WATERFORO - UNIT 3 3/4 1-3 "

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two independent charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERA 8tE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2% delta k/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERA 8LE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 Each required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once every 18 months by verifying that each charging pump starts in response to an SIAS test signal.

I l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-9 l

l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

, BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid makeup pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a. shall be OPERABLE and caps 51e of being powered from an OPERA 8LE emergency bus if the flow path through the boric acid pump (s) in Specification 3.1.2.2a. is OPERA 8LE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid makeup pump required for the boron injection flow path (s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a. inoperable, restore the boric acid makeup pump to OPERA 8LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2%

delta k/k at 200*F; restore the above required boric acid makeup pump (s) to OPERA 8LE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 Each required boric acid makeup pump shall be demonstrated OPERA 9..

at least once every 18 months by verifying that each boric acid makeup pump starts in response to an SIAS test signal.

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WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-11

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth and SHUT 00WN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERA 8LE CEA(s).

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 2 AND 3*.

ACTION:

a. With any full-length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the I

above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immedi-ately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpa of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppe

baron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all full-length CEAs fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a i

solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppe baron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1

is restored.

! SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

1 4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within

, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of I Specification 3.1.1.1.

" Operation in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.

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WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 10-1

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES i

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in-the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T,yg. The most restrictive condition occurs at E0L, with T,yg at no load operating temperature, and is i associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncon-trolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 5.15% delta k/k is required to control the reactivity transient.

Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T,yg

less than or equal to 200*F, the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accident are minimal and a 2% delta k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate protection.

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT b

j The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analysis remain valid through each fuel cycle. The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC i value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction j in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that l

the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coef-ficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

o WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 1-1

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_INDEX LIMITING CON 0!TIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEIL SECTION .,.

?A!iE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY.................................. ............ 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 80 RATION CONTROL guy up uzrHDMUN

_C ~ SH UTOOWN MARGIN '

y ,, % SNuT00wN MARGIN My! r ="T...................... .

3/4 1-1 INSEMED r...................... 3/4 1-3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT.................. .. 3/4 1-4 3/4.1.2 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY.................

80 RATION SYSTEMS 3/4 1-5 FLOW PATHS - SHUT 00WN................................

FLOW PATHS - 3/4 1-6 0PERATING............................... 3/4 1-7 CHARGING PUMPS - SHUT 00WN............................

CHARGING PUMPS -

3/4 1-8 0PERATING........................... 3/4 1-9 BORIC ACIO MAKEUP PUMPS - SHUT 00WN................... 3/4 1-10 BORIC ACIO MAKEUP PUMPS - OPERATING.................. 3/4 1-11 80 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHUT 00WN..................... 3/4 1-12 80 RATED WATER SOURCES -

BORON OPERATING.................... 3/4 1-14 3/4.1.3 DILUTION....................................... 3/4 1-15 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES .

CEA P0SITION......................................... 3/4 1-18 POSITION IN01CATOR CHAMNELS - OPERATING.............. 3/4 1-21 POSITION IN0!CATOR CHANNELS - SHUT 00WN...............

CEA OROP 3/4 1-22 TIME........................................ 3/4 1-23 SHUT 00WN CEA INSERTION LIMIT......................... 3/4 1-24 REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS...................... 3/4 1-25 PART-LENGTH CEA INSERTION LIMITS..................... 3/4 1-28 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 IV

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3,1 0 5HurDoiJAt in*WGIN /!5 A fuNC TicN ,

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2/

i INDEX LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 3.1-1 MINIMUM 80RIC ACID STORAGE TANK VOLUME AND TEMPERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF STORED BORIC ACIO CONCENTRATION.................................

3/4 1-13 3.1-2 CEA INSERTION LIMITS VS THERMAL POWER.............. 3/4 1-27 3.2-1 ALLOWABLE PEAK LINEAR HEAT RATE VS BURNUP.......... 3/4 2-2 3.2-2 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON COLSS......... 3/4 2-8 3.2-3 DN8R MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS (COLSS OUT OF SERVICE)...... 3/4 2-9 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1.0 pCi/ GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131....... 3/4 4-27 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (HEATUP)........................................... 3/4 4-30 3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (C00LDOWN)......................................... 3/4 4-31 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT. PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE ............... 3/4 6-12 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNU88ER FUNCTIONAL TEST.......... 3/4 7-26 5.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA..................................... 5-2 5.1- 2 LOW PSPULATTfm_2nNE - ...... - .. ~.............. 5-3 5.1- 3 SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS................................... 5-4 6.2-1 0FFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPP0RT...............,................. 6-3 6.2-2 PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION...................... 6-4 l

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 XIX

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

/ {EA W /7Nh/MA/A/ )

SHUTOOWN MARGIN - T C'*J C '".'" 200 _

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUT 00WN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to S.15%

delta k/kf ahen h is qresfer un Joo f or 2.o 7 desh k/A when % f is less %n W eguel k Joo *f APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3,and 4/and 5 si/4 my /u// /<ng/4.cM fuely or parbelly adhdevan. _ __

ACTION: ,,Jed

,[

With the SHUTOOWN MARGIN less than 5.1"' J t: PJh, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpo of a solution con-taining greater than or equal to 1720 ppe boron or equivalent until the required SHUTOOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (tJi@any fuli knyh CEt9 (ully ot- forbelly upIh drewrt, 4.1.1.1.1 M e/fHUT00WN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 5.12", tit; hlh. +4) etyaired above :

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least l

once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1.0, at l 1eastonceper12hoursbyveriNfngthatCEAgroupwithdrawalis within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

c. When in MODE 2 with K less than 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor criff[ality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

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. See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

e i WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-1 i__ .._. _ _ _ . . _ _ __ _ _._. .__. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ ._. . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits'of Specification 3.1.3.6.

e. When in MODE 3,ee least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of at least the following factors:

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2. CEA position,

, 3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5. Xenon concentration, and

~

~6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.0% delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Pover Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.le., above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFP0s after each fuel loading.

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WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-2 l

l______ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

~

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ~ -

ALL CEAS FULLY INSERTED j SHUTD0WN MARGIN - T '555 "" 0 " 50"^ '.

O 20C'e i.IMITINGCON0!TIONFOROPERATION 3.1.1.2 2:?t: L'hltlef shown in R nee 3.1-0The SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be gr 3

APPLICA8ILITY:

MODE [1*", .5, 4 ,,is s aNA .# cas 4/4 /osed,a' ACTIGN: _e f

/Ao/ & n in R <<rw 3./ h-With the SHUTOOWN MARGIN less than 2.a*' _:!!: '/'-, immediately initiate and greater than or' equal to 1720 ppe boron or equivalen SHUTDOWN MARGIN *is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 64/A en $/ Inoyh t*Ms SrMy inseihr< &

4.1.1.2.f }.. SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determ to 2. "*' :;'t; %'h; && shown in Agure

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least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following 1.

2. Reactor Coolant System baron concentration, CEA position, 3.

4. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

5. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, Xenon concentration,and

6. Samarium concentration.

4. I. I. 2.1 INSSAT A

Win .k,y less h., f.0 See Special Test EncefHon 3.10 1 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-3 i

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INSERT #1

a. When in MODE 2 withe k gg less than 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

INSERT #2 4.1.1.2.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within ! 1.0% delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.2.1b, above.

The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

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0 100 200 300 400 500 600 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE ( F)

I FIG NE 3.I-0 1

l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1- 3a l

l i - _ _ , , _ _ _ . _ . _. - ,_ _ _ _- -

t HEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

3.1.2.4 At least two independent charging pumps shall be OPERA 8LE.

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERA SHUTDOWN 8LE status within equivalent MARGIN 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ort:be:t in lent at least

" "!t HOT t'i :t ?^^**STAN08Y and borated to a within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pump to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the xt 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

), jfl,eyyirsmen/s of ViS"O" l

g. i. i. , o, s.i.i.a, aicAe*< 's W$ -

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 Each required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once every 18 months by verifying that each charging pump starts in response to an SIAS test signal.

e WATERFORO - UNIT 3 3/4 1-9

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORIC ACIO MAKEUP PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid makeup pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required OPERA 8LE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a. shall be OPERA 8LE and capable of being powered from an OPERA 8LE emergency bus if the ficw path through the boric acid pump (s) in Specification 3.1.2.2a. is OPERA 8LE.

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid makeup pump required for the boron injection flow path (s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a. inoperable, restore the boric acid makeup pump to OPERA 8LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent t; c' h::;; 2" d !t: t/h :t 2^^**; restore the above required boric acid makeup unp(s) to OPERA 8LE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN thin the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 Each required boric acid makeup pump shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE at least once every 18 months by verifying that each boric acid makeup pump starts in response to an. SIAS test signal.

l 1

e 1

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-11

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.10.1 Q- I.1&

The SHUT 00WN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1/may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth and SHUT 00WN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERA 8LE CEA(s).

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 2 ANO 3*.

ACTION: '

a. With any full-length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immedi-ately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpa of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppa-boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all full-length CEAs fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate j

and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpa of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppe boron or its ;t equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.J is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

4.10.1.2 Each CEA"not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

i

, " Operation in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 10-1

I 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES l

l 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUT 00WN MARGIN !

A sufficient SHUT 00WN MARGIN ensures that (1) the reactor can be made sub ical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transient associa with postulated accident conditions are controllable wit acceptable ts, and (3) the reactor will be maintained suffi ' ntly subcritical to p ude inadvertent criticality in the shu n condition.

fjI SHUTDOWN MARGIN requ nts vary throughout e life as a function of y gsf fuel depletion, RCS boron conc ration, and The most restrictive T,yg.

condition occurs at EOL, with T,yg a oad operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated st ine bre ccident and resulting uncon-trolled RCS cooldown. In analysis of this dent, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 5.15% delta s required to control the activity transient.

Accordingly, the S MARGIN requirement is based up his limiting condition and consistent with FSAR safety analysis assump s. With T,yg less t or equal to 200*F, the reactivity transients resulting fr ny po ated accident are minimal and a 25 delta k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN prov dequate protection.

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analysis remain valid through each fuel cycle. The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS baron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coef-ficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

I

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 1-1

M55/5 ? 5 SHUTOOWN MARGIN is the amount by which the core is suberitical, or would be

, subtritical immediately following a reactor trip, considering a single

. malfunction resulting in the highest worth CEA failing to insert. ;

l The function of SHUT 00WN MARGIN is to ensure that the reactor remains j suberitical following a design basis accident or anticipated operational occurrence.

During operation in MODES 1 and 2, with k,ff greater than or equal to 1.0, the transient insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6 ensure that sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN is available.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout the core life as a function of fuel depletion and reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (Teold)*

The most restrictive condition occurs at E0L, with T cold at no-load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line breek accident and the resulting uncontrolled RCS cocidown. In the analysis of this accident, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to control the reactivity transient and ensure that the fuel performance and offsite dose criteria are satisfied.

As (initial) Tcold decreases, the potential RCS cocidown and the resulting reactivity transient are less severe and, therefore, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN also decreases. Below T cold of about 200*F, the inadvertent deboration event becomes limiting with respect to the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements.

Below 200'F, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that sufficient time for operator actions exists between the initial indication of the deboration and the total loss of'3Htff00WN MARGIN. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon these limiting conditions.

Additional events considered in establishing requirements on SHUTDOWN MARGIN

) are single CEA withdrawal and startup of an inactive reactor coolant pump.

Other technical specifications that reference the Specifications on SHUTDOWN MARGIN are: 3/4.1.2, BORATION SYSTEMS, 3/4.1.3, MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES, 3/4.9.1, REFUELING OPERATIONS - BORON CONCENTRATION, and 3/4.10.1, SHUTCOWN MARGIN.

J NPF-38-41

DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-41 This is a request to revise section 3/4.10.1, SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS, SHUTDOWN MARGIN of the Technical Specifications for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.

Existing Specification See Attachment A.

Proposed Specification See Attachment B.

Description The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification 3/4.10.1, SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS, SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

Technical Specification 3.10.1 presently allows shutdown margin to be reduced to less than the normal operating shutdown margin requirements during low power physics testing provided that certain conditions are satisfied. One of these conditions (Surveillance Requirement 4.10.1.2) stipulates that all CEAs not fully inserted in the core be shown to be capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to reducing the shutdown margin to less than normal operating requirements. The requested revision would allow this surveillance to be performed within 7 days of the

, shutdown margin reduction instead of within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months as presently required.

This modification is proposed to allow low power physics testing to be accom-plished without an additional reactor trip to verify CEA insertability. The startup test pro CEA drop timesreference (gram includes a CEA Technical trip test before Specification criticality 3.1.3.4). to measure Following these measurements, criticality is achieved and low power physics tests are performed, CEA integral reactivity worths are determined during this testing sequence and may require reduction of shutdown margin as permitted by Technical Specification 3.10.1. Since the worth measurements are typically performed several days after the CEA drop time measurements, the reactor must be tripped to verify CEA insert-ability and satisfy Surveillance Requirement 4.10.1.2. The requested revision would therefore eliminate the need for an additional reactor trip during low power physics testing by requiring verification of CEA insertability within 7 days of reducing the shutdown margin instead of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The primary consideration in extending the surveillance time period for verifying CEA insertability is whether there would be a significant increase in the prob-ability of a stuck CEA during the 7 day period of time as compared to the present 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months time period. Consideration of the configuration of the components that are used in CEA insertion indicate that there is nothing which could cause a significant increase in the probability of a CEA becoming stuck. This is due to the fixed geometry of these components over the 7 day period that could elapse I

NS41169

between rod drop time measurements and shutdown margin reduction. The components considered include the fuel assembly, the CEA, the CEA extension shaft, the control element drive mechanism and the upper guide structure. Also, since the CEAs will insert upon loss of power, the probability of a stuck CEA is not increased due to an electrical malfunction.

This change is similar to changes issued to other CE plants.

Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not remove the trip surveillance requirement.

It merely allows for a 7 day surveillance requirement rather than the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months surveillance requirement. During this interim, there would be no significant increase in the probability of a stuck CEA since there is nothing occurring during this period which would alter the fixed geometry of the components associated with the rod drop time measurements. There-fore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

This revision addresses a change in a surveillance requirement and as such, no new failure or accident path is created. Consequently, there will be no creation of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Will operation of this facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in margin of safety?

Response: No.

Although the trip surveillance requirement is relaxed from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to seven days, there is no significant increase in the probability of a stuck CEA with the new surveillance requirement. As such, this change will not include a significant reduction in margin of safety.

l

Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.

i I

e t

i i

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NPF-38-41 ATTACHMENT A

O

~

. - 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 2 AND 3*.

ACTION:

a. With any full-length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immedi-ately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored,

b. With all full-length CEAs fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by-Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

i

" Operation in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 10-1

v NPF-38-41 ATTACHMENT B t

1 i

l

. ,' 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 2 AND 3*.

ACTION:

a. With any full-length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immedi-ately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTOOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all full-length CEAs fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppm baron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 7 BAYS :" hx;; prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of l Specification 3.1.1.1.

l l

0peration in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 10-1 l_ _ _ _ __ ,. - - _ . . . .-_. - - -- --

NPF-38-42 DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-42 This is a request to revise section 3/4.10.3, SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS, REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS of the Technical Specifications for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.

Existing Specification See Attachment A.

Proposed Specification See Attachment B.

Description The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification 3/4.10.3, SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS, REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS.

In order to perform certain physics tests at low thermal power levels, it is necessary to bypass the core protecticn calculators. This is accomplished by manually bypassing the calcu}ators after increasing the CPC operating bypass permissive setpoint from 10 % power to a value that will allow physics testing to take place without incurring a DNBR - Low or LPD - High reactor trip. This adjustment is made to a bistable setpoint in the log power circuitry.

Concurrently, Technical Specification 3.10.3.b requires that the Linear Power Level - High trip setpoint be decreased to less than or equal to 20% RATED THERMAL POWER. This provides additional assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the event of an unplanned power excursion while the operating bypass permissive setpoint is set to a higher than normal value.

The addition of Technical Specification 3.10.3.c is being proposed to provide an alternate means of ensuring a reactor trip prior to exceeding the present limit for physics testing at low thermal power levels. The CPC operating bypass permissive bistable serves the dual function of permitting the Log Power Level -

High trip to be manually bypassed when the thermal power exceeds the operating bypass permissive setpoint. If the permissive setpoint is increased to a value greater than the Log Power Level - High trip setpoint specified in Table 2.2-1 of Technical Specification 2.2.1, then a Log Power Level - High reactor trip will occur if an unplanned power excursion takes place during physics testing.

Therefore, the Log Power Level trip function may be used in place of the Linear Power Level trip function to provide additional assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the event of an unplanned power excursion during physics testing.

Safety Analysis The proposed changes described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:

NS41168

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

This change increases the power level at which the CPC's enable the DNBR - Low and LPD - High reactor trips. Protection however is still provided through this increase by the Log Power Level - High reactor trip. Since ample protection is still supplied, there will not be any significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

Although this change alters the range of application for certain trips, proper core protection is still supplied. No other functional changes are made to these trips; consequently, this change can not create nor involve a new path which may lead to a new or different kind of accident.

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposal involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

As stated above, a change has been made altering the range of applica-tion for certain trip functions. Protection, however is still provided for over this increase. Since there will be no reduction in trip cover-age, this proposed change can not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the above Safety Analysis it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.

u - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

NPF-38-42 ATTACHMENT A 1

,e- , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . , , - - - - - - - - - - , . . - - -

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.3 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.3 The noted requirements of Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and PHYSICS TESTS, provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set at less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: During startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately trip the reactor.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j

4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 5%

of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during startup and PHYSICS TESTS. -

4.10.3.2 Each wide range logarithmic and power level neutron flux monitoring channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 10-3

NPF-38-42 ATTACHMENT B

j i

(. ~ '3;

>N SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.3 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.3 The noted requirements of Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and PHYSICS TESTS, provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set at less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

fAPPLICABILITY: During startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately trip the reactor.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 5%

of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during startup and PHYSICS

{ TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each wide range logarithmic and power level neutron flux monitoring channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

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