ML20214E727

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Forwards Summary of 860128-30 Site Visit & Audit Drawing Review to Assure That Installation of safety-related Electrical Sys & Equipment Implemented in Accordance W/ Design Described & Criteria Specified in FSAR
ML20214E727
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1986
From: Chopra O
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Rosa F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20214D170 List:
References
FOIA-86-760 NUDOCS 8605020406
Download: ML20214E727 (29)


Text

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APR 2 8 198.6 o

MEMORANDUM FOR: Faust Rosa, Chief Electrical, Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch Division of PWR Licensing-A THRU: Seymour H. Weiss, Section leader Electrical, Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch Division of PWR Licensing-A FROM: 0. P. Chopra Electrical, Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch Division of PWR Licensing-A

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF SITE VISIT HELD ON JAN. 28-30, 1986 AT SHEARON HARRIS PLANT On January 28-30, 1986, a site visit and an audit drawing review were conducted at the Shearon Harris Station to assure that the installation of safety related electrical systems and equipment were implemented in accordance with the design described and the criteria specified in the FSAR.

Enclosure I sumarizes the systems observed and identifies areas of concern and our position on these issues. Enclosure 2 is a list of attendees.

/s/

Om P. Chopra Electrical, Instrumentation &

Control Systems Branch Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosures:

Distribution:

As stated Central File EICSB Rdg.

cc: C. E. Rossi 0. Chopra (PF)(2)

L. Rubenstein S. Weiss B. Buckley Shearon Harris S/F J. Mauck EICSB/DPA SL/EICSB/DPA OChopra SHWeiss 4/18/86 4/L1 /86 .

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY y.O -

gbofoY 6/2.

D ENCLOSURE 1 SHEARON HARRI5 SITE TRIP A site trip and an audit drawino review was conducted by Sy Weiss and Om Chopra of EICSB, Division of PWR-A, at the Shearon Harris plant on January 28-30, 1986 to assure that the installation of safety-related electrical equipment was im-plemented in accordance with the design described and ti.e criteria specified in the FSAR.

A. Plant Walk Through The following areas were observed:

1. Control. Room -
2. Cable Runs and Cable Spreading Area
3. Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Supply Installation
4. ESF Systems and Pump Rooms
5. Electrical Penetration areas
6. Battery and Battery Charger rooms
7. Switchgear rooms
8. Diesel Generator rooms
9. Turbine Building
10. Reactor Building

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11. Auxiliary Shutdown panel
12. Switchyard B. Comments
1. In general, we verified that separation between the redundant divisions or between the Class IE and non-class 1E circuits of the same division is maintained and barriers are provided where separation is marginal.
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2 Where the above could not be accomplished, the applicant insti-tuted a test program conducted by Wyle Laboratories, to provide justification for lesser separation distances. The test program methodology and the test results have been reviewed and accepted by the staff.

2. As part of the in-plant observation, we traced control and power cable routes for two redundant Residual Heat Removal pumps from

_ switchgear to the pump installations and control room. It was demonstrated that the minimum separation requirements had been met for the two RHR pumps.

3. The implementation of identification and color coding schemes for safety-related circuits and equipment was observed. We found that one of the RHR pumps (for the selected systems observed) was not identified. The applicant has consnitted to properly identify the

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above RHR pump and we find this to be acceptable. However, we re-quire the applicant to check other e'quipment to assure this condi-tion does not exist elsewhere in the plant.

4. During our audit of the battery rooms, we found that the showers in the battery rooms are not enclosed and are very close to the batteries, thereby creating the potential of shower spill causing S

damage to the batteries. We require the applicant to either enclose the showers in battery rooms or provide justification for the existing design.

5. During our audit of the control room alarms provided for de power systems, we found there was only one battery trouble alarm provided for both redundant trains (125V DC Emer. Bus A/B Trouble). We re-q'uire that a separate de bus trouble alarm for each train be provided to facilitate quick trouble diagnosis of de power systems.

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ENCLOSURE 2 LIST OF ATTENDEFS NRC CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO.

Seymour Weiss John Euds 4

Om Chopra David McCarthy George Maxwell Dean Tibbitts Steve Burris EBASCO Paul Gattney George Attarjan -

S. Parikh B. Pehush M

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Q ReferMe 3 l COL-8787 l

Wes1inghouse Water Rextor l

De:tric Corporation Divisions gm May 13,1985 '

Mr. L.1. Loflin, Manager Ref: Telecon Harris Project Engineering Carolina Power & Light Company P.O. Box 101 New Hill, NC 27562 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLAhT MCB - CONDUIT AIR GAP ANALYSIS

Dear Mr. Loflin:

Attached please find the requested analysis / backup infonnation to support the Westinghouse position that a one inch air gap is not necessary ': prevent heat propagation to wires which may be in contact with the flexible conduit wall -

for the Main Control Board.

The analysis provides backup information as requested by CP8L per a recent 4 telecon. If any additional information is required, please give us a call.

Very truly yours.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION Q Y.

A. T. Parker, Manager }

yarolina Power & Light Project ARB/bdm/494Sd:1 Attachment i

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CQL-8787 ,

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$ k cc: M. F. Thompson, CPAL Site 2L, 2A L. I. Loflin, CPAL Site 2L 2A R. A. Watson, CPAL Site IL,1 A J. R. Santosuosso, Ebasco 3L, 3A W. C. Arent, Ebasco 1L i

J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, CPAL Site IL,1 A N. J. Chiangi, CP&L Site IL,1 A G. S. Cashell, CPAL ll,1 A R. E. Lumsden, CPAL IL,1 A L. H. Martin, CPAL IL,1 A R. M. Parsons, CPAL Site IL, lA G. L. Forehand, CPAL Site IL,1 A R. S. Pollock, W Raletg5 1L B. J. Mandag11o! W Sales (Hillside) IL e

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2 SHEARON. HARRIS MAIN CONTROL SOARD

_ CONDUIT AIR CAP ANALYSIS I

Written: [

RM KrayneE, PI&CS A( Y/d[F Approved: . 3B Reid.flanager PI&CS Reviewed:

L. Gingerich, uality Assurance

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Date: May 10, 1985 M9

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s SHEAR 0H EALk15 MAIN CONTROL BOARD CONDUIT AIR CAP ANALYSIS .

PURPOSE The purpose of this analysis is to show that a one-inch air gap is not necessary to prevent heat propagation to wires which may be in contact with the flexible conduit wall.

BACKCROUND When current flows through a conductor, heat is generated in that conductor due to inherent resistance. 51 ace the bgat generated is dependent upon the amount of current flowing (1 1 losses), the larger the current flow, the more heat is generated. Thus the tesperature rating of the insulation and 1 the site of the conductor dictate the maximum current that a ,

conductor can handle safely. I

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ASSUMPTIONS For clarification, the following assumptions are stated here:  ;

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o All wiring to be considered as 1/c, (16 AVO

[ teflon _ type TFE, 600V. (Ref 1) o The maximun teperature of TFE is 250C--for conservatise 200C will be used. (Ref 2) o The control board ambient temperature range is 40-120F. Verse case will be assumed--120F (50C). (Ref 1) o All voltages to be 120 VAC or,125 VDC.

, o All conduit to be 1/2" flexible me tallic conduit.

o All conduit is to be considere'd grounded to the control board.

I o The average CD of the cable is considered to be .083" or .0054 sq in, giving a maxieum number of 22 conductors per conduit.

e The cross-sectional area for # 16 AVC wire is 2580 cir mils. (Ref 3) o Power supplies are to be considered unlimited.

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MOR.*tAL CIRCUlf CUkRENT

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The maximum current of a i 16 AVG conductor with 200C insulation rating in free 30C ambient air is 32 seps. ,

correcting this current for 30C, a . bundling factor for 22 conductorsand a conduit factor, the maximus current is given by:

32 Amps x .95 (50C Amb Temp) x .7 (Bund. Fact) x .73 (Cond, factor)= 15.5 Amps (Ref 4)

To determine the maxieue fuse size to be used with this size conductor, a factor of 1.25 is applied to 15 seps to give a fuse aise of 11 Amps. A review of the control circuit fusing by Ebasco shows the maximum fusing for 'the different contrcl circuits given belows o 220 Solenoid Circuits 6 Amps o Main Termination Cab. 3 Amps o 480V MCC 10 Amps

, o Reactor Trip Switchgear 10 Asps ____

o 6.9 Kv Sutchgr. Closing Ckt 3.2 Amps o 6.9 Ky Swtchgr-Trip Ckt 35 Amps

-- o 480V Loadcenter-Closing 30 Amps o 4807 Loadcenter-Trip Ckt 35 Amps Although the switchgear and loadcenter fuses are gutte a bit .

larger than the rating of the wire, a review of the circuit and I' switchgear specifications shows that the circuits involved intermittently operate only the close and trip coils. The total current for these itees, again according to Ebasco,is 9.6 amps maximus. This is within the calculated range of the wire.

SHORT CIRCUlf CURRENT The maximum shore circuit current that this wire will be required to carry will be supplied by the 35 asp fuse in the switchgear tripping circuits.. These fuses are Could-Shaeut one-Time, fuses 2507 Cat. # 0T35. According to the manufacturer's characteristic curves, the OT35 will melt and open the circuit af ter allowing a current of 750 Amps for . 01 sec. -

The equation that relates current and time to temperature is given as:

2 (Ref 5) )[ t = .0297 log 'T2 +23i

,A, ,71 +234 Where: I = Short Circuit Current A = Cross-sectional area in Mils t = Time in seconds T2= Maximus insulation temperature T1= Ambient temperature' 0

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Solving for I, the maximum short circuit current that this cable can handle for .01 seconds ist 2

I=(2580) 0297 log ((434)/(284))

.01 or I = 1908 Aaps This is considerably more than the maxieue forced short circuit current.

HICH CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS While the normal and short circuit currents are within the range of the i 16 wire, high impedance shorts must now be reviewed. Due to the characteristics of the 30 and 35 sep fuses protecting the contro_1 circuits in the switchgest, a current can flow that would not be ecssidered a short circuit for the fuses, but could cer tainly cause strain on the

-- conductor insulation. Interpolating the fuse characteristic l curves, the currents given below will pass through the fuse for t' time shown, af ter which the fuse will melt.

/ 373 Asps G .1 seconds

( 210 Asps 0 1.0 second 110 Asps 0 10 seconds 64 Aeps 0 100 seconds i 52 Asps 01000 seconds l 1

Using the short circuit equation f rom the last section, the saxieus current the cable can carry for the asse time periods is given as:

603 Asps 0 0.1 see 191 Asps 0 1.0 sec 60 Asps 9 10 see 19 Asps e 100 sec 6 Amps 9 1000 see Casparing the two sets of data revents a probles in the high impedance short circuit current for "long" time periods.

However, in analyzing the Ebasco Control Viring Diagrass for the switchgear involved, it would be neces sa ry for the high tapedance short to occur in the close or the trip coils, switch or lockout relay contacts, light bulbs or the corresponding resistors.

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e Analysis of the closing coil circuit shows that the high ..

impedacce short would have to occur af ter the control board switches, since any shorts prior to the wire entering the control board would be an instantaneous short. If the probles ~

occurred in the closing circuit (closing cell windings shorting), not only would the closing cell not close the breeler (indicating trouble), bute the anti-pumping circuit would,ren'ove the closing coil from the circuit, even if the auto circuits were made up. The higher resis tance anti-pumping teley coil would then limit the current in the control ,

circuitry. j If the probles occurred in the trip circuit, it sust occur is three elements--the trip coil and the indicatteg If ght. bulb and j indicating Ifght resistors. Because of the trip strcuit 1 4

design, three sets of indicating lights and resistors are in l series with the trip cott. If one of the lasps or the resisters were to short, the load would be goversed by the trip coil, Ifetting current to 3 seps. If the trip coil windings were to short, the indicating lasps would them be the sein load

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for the circuit, limiting the current, la general, to 50 mA.

Nowever, if the trip coil windings were to short, the higher current caused by this ahorting would be present when the control board switch was activated to trip the breaker. This ,

current would be !! sited to the trip operating time of the breaker, however, if the m4gnetic strength of the coil was weshened such that the breaker did not trip, the length of time the current flowed would be determined by the amount of time

, the operator held the control board switch in the trip position.

j It can be seen from the above analyste, that, is g en e ral, the high (spedance short should not be considered a problem in the switchgear control circuits. However, la a certain situation, a high impedance short could esuse overheating of the control wiring in the control board conduits. The extent of this

, overt eating would be determined bys 1. the asovat of safety sargin built into the tecperature rating of the wire insulation and, 2. how long the operator held thy switch is the trip position.

_Cp_NC}U510N Due to the above analysis, in general, the requirement for the sne inch air gap between conduits, to prevent heat propagation to wires which may be in con ta c t with the flexible conduit well, is not necessary. Hewever, a potential probles exists in the control circuitry of the 6.9 kV switchgest and the 440 Y loadeenter trip circuits protected by the 35 arp fuses. Ibasco would be prudent to sr.alyse these control circuite to determine the probability of occuraece of a high fepedance abort in the trip cirevit and take effective action.

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RET ER ENCES 1 Westinghouse E-spec 2 NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE 1981, Table 310-13.

  • 3 NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE 1981. Chapter 9, table 8. .

4 AIEE-IPCEA POWER CABLE AMPACITIES COPPER CONDUCTORS, Publication no. P-46-426 Aug.1962.

5 ENGINEERING DATA POR COPPER AND ALUMINUM CONDUCTOR ELECTRICAL CABLES, The Okonite Co., Bulletin EMB-74, Table 4-1, 1978.

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  • rad" Electric Corporation Divisions , => m em:vpPe:Vef n w W 30 March 13, 1985 S.O. No: 395 CBD(83)-291 Mr. L. I. Loflin, Manager Harris Project Engineering Ref COL-6900 Carolina Power & Light Cornpany P.O.-Box 101 New Hill, NC 27562 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COW ANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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ONE INCH SEPARATION OF FLEXIBLE METALLIC CONDt!IT (IN COL BOARDSJ_

PER IEEE-3BA.1974

Dear Mr. Lof11n:

The l separation of flexible metallic conduit in the COL boards is deemed unnecessary due to the following arguments:

1. The wire size was determined for the particular load per the National Electric Code.
2. All control circuits are fused effectively limiting the amount of o'ercurrent that the circuit would be forced to carry.
3. Separation by voltage level limits possible fault voltage to 140VDC or 118VAC. .

4 The control wiring utilizes teflon insulation rated at 600Y and 200C.

The combination of the wire sizing, fuse protection and insulation type precludes any possibility of a fire being generated or propagated between trains or betwwn train and non-train conduits.

Due to th'e substantial conservatism in the above listed design criteria, further analysis and or testing was not deemed necessar

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. L. I. Loflin COL-8664 Page 2 of 2 C8D(85)-291 If you have any further coerents or questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Very truly yours.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION k

jgQ,T. Parker, Manager arolina Power & Light Project

_ M. N. Kraynek/sjp Mttshaent ces 4. } , Loflin, CP&L Site, 2L I d

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R. A. Watson, CP&L Site, IL J. R. Santosuosso, Ebasco, IL W. C. Arent, Ebasco, IL J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, CP&L Site, IL N. J. Chiangt, CP&L Site, IL G. S. Cashell, CP&L, IL R. E. Lumsden, CP&L, IL L. H. Martin, CP&L, IL R. M. Parsons, CP&L Site, Il G. L. Forehand, CP&L Site, IL R. S. Po11uck, y Raleigh, IL

. B. J. Man'daglio,1 Sales (Hillside), IL l

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NRtftftmu. F r- a ES ASCO SERVICES INCORPOR ATED (gGw w w r::..:.ceme,ne. ,o.* Nvicce

.MAY 31 WD EB-C-18950 File: L-1/2-L-1 RFT's affected: 16010.001 16011.002, 16020.001 Mr L 1 Loflin, Manager Engineering - Harris Plant Carolina Power & Light Company P O Box 101 New Hill, North Carolina 27562

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Dear Mr Loflin:

Subject:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INTEGRATED DESIGfi INSPECTION (IDI)

MCB, AEP-1 & ACP - CONDUIT AIR GAP ANALYSIS g'

Reference:

1. COL-8787 dated May 13, 1985 Ebasco has reviewed the Westinghouse MCB conduit air gap analysis attached to the referenced letter which was prepared in response to IDI Item 6.3-2.

Ebasco's position is that a one inch air gap is not necessary to prevent heat-propagation to wires which may be in contact with the flexible conduit wall for the Main Control Board, Auxiliary Control Panel or the Auxiliary Electrical Panel.

In accordance with the suggestion contained in the Westinghouse conclusion, an investigation was conducted in those circuits where the possibility of a high impedance short circuit exists, Ebasco concludes that due to the control . i circuit configuration, and the fact that the 12SVDC supply is not grounded. l there is no possibility for overheating for single failure occurrences (only one pole grounded).

Closing / tripping of 480 volt power center breakers and tripping of the 6.9Kv switchgear breakers is performed by control switches or auxiliary device contacts which will be closed only momentarily. The assumed excessive current would be removed within the allowed cable time-current capability.

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e Mr L 1 Loflin EB-C-We feel that the result of our investigation resolves the concern regarding the possible overheating of any conductor inside of a flexible conduit used in any of the subject control panels.

A copy of the referenced Westinghouse letter has been attached for your convenience. Please advise if you have any questions.

Very trul yours, gh 1 A C A derson

- Project Manager SS/rtg -

Attachment

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D McCarthy L H Martin -

J L Willis g

C C Wagoner Sheldon D Smith G L Forehand N J Chiangi R E Lumsden I

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FOnes M. stels CAROLINA POWEQ O LIGHT COMPANY T .-

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR power PLANT Exhibit I m oot t k FIELD CHANGE REQUEST /PERMAPCNTWAIVER g

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As wested By: %149 VEGMOWQ $ 210 (/" Site A Pprovol:

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I Atheriretion to Proceed: O

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DESIGN ORGANIZ T10N APPROVAL ,

O APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED PED ONL'Y A/E ONSSS OOTHER O CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OYES do TELEPHONE RESOLUTION O REJECTED CYES NO DESIGN ORGANIZATION ATTACHMENT l

COMMENTS:

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1 Signcture Title Date Signature Title Date l

CPSL Horris Plant Engineering Approval jOpproved as Recommended HPES Attochments O Yes 0 Conditiono! Appr_ovo! . ALARA Applicable O Yes No l O Rejected I

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This change requires the following Document (s) to be revised:

Drawings, Specs., Instr. lso's, Procedures, Etc.- /844 **/78 Ms Do2 l

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MINOR CHANGE DESIGN VERIFICATION l NOT REQUIREDggyi l

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Implementation Completed As Approved O Y O "*

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- TEST REPORT ON ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VEPJFICA170N TESTING FOR THE CAROUNA POWER AND UGHT COMPANY FOR USEIN THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Por Camlina Power and Ligtit Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant New HIII, North Carolina 27582 S

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I Page No. I-7 Test Report No. 47879-02 3.0 S RESULTS Q h

The five Control Cable Screening Tests were conducted per Paragraph 2 0 and <

successfully met the Acceptance Criteria of Paragraph 1.0.

the Twisted Pair 16 AWG target cable inside the 1-inch rigid steel conduit m There was no visual evidenc ounted 1 inch electrical degradation as evidenced by the results4 o Potential the five Controltest Cableresults.

ScreeningThere Tests. were no ignitions of the fault cable, , uring in the test are The results of the five individual tests are summarized in the following tables .

E Test TABLE L CURREN'IS APPLIED AND TIME TO OPEN CIECU1T NEC Current at i

5 Fault Cable Rated 90 No. Size C +5 Conductor Current TeTnperature Tect 'llme to

_ Current Open Circuit

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i 2/C 16 AWG 18A 2 25A 1 2/C 12 AWG '30A 139A (1) 55.12 see 3 41A 180A 2/C 10 AWG 40A 118.12 sec 4

50A 180A 3-1/C 10 AWG 40A (2)

SOA m 5 180A 324.4 see 3-1/C 6 AWG 75A h 75A 180A After application of test current.

(3)

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ictes: (1) cable due to tne high impedance of the cable whi conductors were brought to 900C. The machine was capable of delive current on a cable to be representive atplant of actual ambient temperature. However, this condition is judg conditions. -

i (2)

The fault cable did not open-circuit during this test.

358 seconds, at 180 amperes, the fault cable conductors er shorted jtoge which decreased additional heat sink. the effective length of the cable as well as added a an maximum of 14640 F toConsequently, 375 conductor temperature dropped from a I F over a period of approximately 6 minutes. At this point, the test was terminated. Based on the results of the previous t which did open-circuit, the conductor temperatures_ ests the fault cable was on the verge of open-circuiting.

recorded indicated (3)

The fault cable did not open-circuit during this test. This test was term after 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> when the heat-up rate had decreased to approximately minute that (from steady-state a maximum conditions rate of had been reached. approximately 180F per minute)

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WYLE LABORATORIES Hutttende Facehty

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1 over-conservative cross-referencing. The team agreed with this EBASCO connent, particularly since system level considerations need not be imposed on some vendors. EBASCO subsequently revised procedure E-35 to reflect those codes, i standards, and NRC Regulatory Guides listed as requirements in the instrumentation specifications. The team reviewed the changes made in this revised procedure and considered them acceptable.

4 (Closed) Deficiency 06.1-10, Incomplete and Unissued Drafting Manual At the Shearon Harris site, the team noted that issued instrumentation and control drawings were being modified without a drafting manual for the instrumentation and control discipline. The team reviewed the Carolina Power j

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and Light electrical and instrumentation and control drafting manual issued as )

revision 1 on July 3,1985, and determined that it provided appropriate drawing format and content guidance. The team also reviewed a recently prepared Carolina Power and Light instrumentation and control design guide that provides detailed instructions on a number of instrumentation and control topics for use by both engineering and drafting personnel. The team anticipates that this design guide l -

will expand over time as additional instructions are prepared. In addition, the team reviewed a quality assurance audit report of the Harris plant engineering j section dated May 13, 1985. Revision of the drafting manual and development of the design guide for the instrumentation and control discipline resolved the

, team's concerns in this area.

(Closed) Deficiency D6.3-2, Conduit Separation ,

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( During the inspection of main control room panels at the plant, the team noted numerous instances of redundant flexible conduits that were in direct contact with one another, and expressed a concern about conformance with electrical separation criteria provided in IEEE Std. 384-1974 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75. Separation distances less than those prescribed in these documents may be justified by an analysis of the particular installation. The team reviewed 4

a Westinghouse analysis of their panels dated May 10, 1985, and a ,

corresponding EBASCO analysis of their panels dated May 20, 1985. Each of these analyses used a technical basis of wire size, control circuit fusing, voltage level separation, and control wiring insulation characteristics. These

! actions satisfactorily resolve the team's concern. ,

1 (Closed) Unresolved Item U6.3-3, instrument Impulse Line Separation Distance The team detemined that a Carolina Power and Light field change request had been issued and subsequently revised to pemit reduced separation distances between redundant safety-related instrument impulse lines as well as between i safety and non-safety-related instrument impulse lines. This-field change request had been designated as a minor change not subject to design  !

verification. An extensive discussion of the separation distance requirements l in EEASCO's design criteria and other minimum values used to accept the

{ instrument tubing installation was conducted with Carolina Power and Light and

! E8ASCO personnel during the reinspection. The team reviewed seismic walkdown ~

procedures and the corresponding EBASCO acceptance criteria for the walkdown.
Telephone discussions were held with E8ASCO plant site personnel regarding the

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