ML20214G393

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Forwards Electrical,Instrumentation & Control Sys Branch Site Rept on 860128-30 Audit.Cable Separation Concerns Resolved.List of Attendees Encl
ML20214G393
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/1986
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Buckley B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20214D170 List:
References
FOIA-86-760 NUDOCS 8605150396
Download: ML20214G393 (31)
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          • April 10,1986 MEMORANDUM f0R: Bart Buckley, Project Manager Project Directorate 62 Division of PWR Licensing-A FROM: C. E. Rossi, Assistant Director for Technical Support Division'of PWR Licensing-A

SUBJECT:

EICSB SITE AUDIT REPORT ON SHEARON HARRIS A site audit was perfonned by the staff from the Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch on January 28-30, 1986 at Shearon Harris Nuclear Station. The purpose of the site audit was to supplement the staff's prior

__ review of instrumentation and control systems based on electrical schematic /

elementary diagrams by evaluating the actual implementation of the design at the site. Enclosure 1 summarizes the major areas and systems observed, and identifies our concerns. Two concerns were not resolved during the exit meeting.

(1) Cable separation concern inside the main control consoles and remote shutdown panel.

(2) Cable separation concern inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets with respect to WCAP-8892A generic design.

The followup evaluation and conclusion as stated in Section E of Enclosure I has closed out these two issues. There is no open issue as a result of this site audit. Enclosure 2 is a list of attendees. Enclosure 3 are the reference documents provided by the applicant. Please forward a copy of this report to

, the applicant.

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. Rossf, Assistant Director for Technical Support Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosures:

As stated ,

Contact:

H. Li (EICSB/ DBL)

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Enclosures:

W. Houston G. Lainas L. Rubenstein M. Srinivasan F. Rosa S. Weiss J. Joyce J. Mauck O. Chopra G. Maxwell (Resident Inspector)

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! ENCLOSURE 1 SHEARON HARRIS SITE AUDIT

SUMMARY

Staff from the Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (EICSB) conducted a site audit at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Station on January 28 through 30, 1986 to assure that safety related instrumentation and control >

systems were implemented in accordance with the design criteria specified in

the FSAR.

A. Plant Walk Through The following areas were audited:

1. Control room main control board instrumentation.
2. Reactor protection system and engineered safety feature 1

actuation system cabinets and their provision fcr testing.

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3. Console and panel cable routing and separation.

4 Cable spreading area and isolation cabinets.

5. Instrumentation and control systems vital power supply installation.
6. Auxiliary shutdown panel and transfer panels.

Electrical penetration area.

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8. Switchgear rooms and safety related motor control centers.

f 9. Engineered safety feature equipment and pump rooms.

10. Instrument sensors and transmitters inside containment.

B. Circuit Traces From Sensors to Protection Cabinets

1. The staff traced signal paths from redundant channels of the steam generator narrow range level inputs to the protection system. The tracing started from the steam ge,nerator _ level measurement instrument taps to the sensing lines to the transmitters, the cable from the transmitter to the cable conduits, the cable trays, the electrical penetrations, the cable spreading room area, and entry into the protection cabinets in the instrument room. The staff verified that

> channel separation and channel identification are properiy main-  !

tained. The staff also audited the provisions for testing and did a walkthrough of a typical test procedure for solid state protection system testing.

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2. The staff traced signal paths for four radundant channels of the ,

turbine stop valve inputs to the protection system starting at the turbine building. Each channel has a dedicated conduit from sensor to the protection cabinet. The conduit and its supports are designed to safety system requirements. The staff verified that channel separation and channel identification are properly maintained.

C. Specific Items Discussed Durino the Audit

1. Cable separation inside the main control board console and the remote shutdown panel.

Duriog the audit of main control room control board consoles, the staff found numerous instances where redundant safety train's flexible conduits were in direct contact with opposite train's cable or in direct contact with non-safety related cable. The flexible conduits were also in direct contact with Belden Braid (armored cable for non-safety related signals). A similar situation was found during

- the audit of the remote shutdown panel.

The staff expressed the concern that main control boards contain redundant circuits which are required to be physically separated from each other. Based on IEEE Standard 384-1974, the minimum distance between these redundant circuits shall be one inch i# a barrier was installed; the minimum separation distance shall be six inches air space if no barrier was provided. The applicant stated that this concern was also raised by the integrated design inspection (IDI) team from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. A copy of IDI team's supplement report (References 1 and 2) and the applicant's justification documents (References 3, 4 and 5) were provided to the staff.

2. Cable separation in solid state protection system input cabinet.

- During the audit of the solid state protection system (SSPS) input cabinets, the staff fourd different color coded cable in two input cabinets. The different color cables represent signals from two independent channels. In accordance with separation criteria, these cables should be separated by a barrier. The applicant stated that corrective action has been initiated and a barrier will be installed inside the SSPS cabinets. A copy of the field change request (Reference 6) was provided to the staff.

3. Cable separation inside process control system cabinets.

During the audit of the NSSS 7300 process . control systeIn cabinets,

, the staff found some yellow color coded cables in the green color coded cabinets and some blue color coded cables in the orange color coded cabinets. These different color coded cables did not have any

3 separation barrier. There were also some black cables in the cabinet without proper color coding identification. The staff expressed the concern that the charnel separation criteria may be violated in these cabinets.

The applicant showed his design basis by a color coded sketch and stated that green and yellow cables are for train B signals and orange and blue cables are for train A signals. The NSSS vendor (Westinghouse) has performed a test to demonstrate that electrical faults, including application of maximum credible ac or de poten-tials, or interference, on cables connected to the protection racks do not prevent the protee' ion system for meeting performance require-ments. The NRC rias approved this design under a topical report review cf WCAP-8892-A, " Westinghouse 7300 Series Process Control System Noise Tests." The black cables were only temporary cables which are used during hot. functional test. These temporary cables will be removed after the test is completed.

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4 Cclor coded nameplate on RVLIS instrument rack.

The staff observed that two instrument racks for the reactor vessel level instrumentation system (RVLIS) do not have a proper color coded nameplate on the rack for identification as a safety related instru-ment rack. The applicant st:ted that a corrective action has been initiated. A copy of the field change request (Reference 7) was provided to the staff.

5. Shunt trip modification.

The staff has reviewed the drawings and verified that reactor protec-tion system shunt trip modification has been installed in accordance .

with Generic Letter 83-28 requirements.

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6. P-4 interlock test provision The staff has reviewed the drawings and verified that a permanent voltmeter and a selection switch per.each train was installed on reactor trip switchgear. This satisfies the P-4 interlock test provision as stated in the safety evaluation report.
7. Remote shutdown operation The staff inspected the remote shutdown panel, transfer panels, auxiliary transfer panels, and the instrumentation on the remote shutdown panel. A copy of the remote shutdown panel layout was provided to the staff. Six instruments were added since the last FSAR Amendmsnt was submitted to NRC. The staff will verify the changes when the next FSAR Amendment updates this information.

The applicant will perform a remote shutdown operation test in

4 accordance with R.G.1.68.2 during his startup test program, and will report to the NRC on successfully completing the test. The resident inspector will witness the test and will include the results in his monthly inspection report. The staff will address this confirmatory item in a supplement to the SER after receiving the applicant's confinnation that this test has been successfully completed.

8. Isolation device for SPDS.

The staff discussed the concerns on isolation devices used for SPDS.

The applicant provided clarification of his design. The SPDS isola-tion is an open item. The staff will address this item in a supple-ment to the SER.

D. Exit Meeting Summary -

~ During the exit meeting on January 30, 1986, the staff expressed the following concerns:

1. The staff observed the cable separation problem inside the main control board consoles and the remote shutdown panel. The staff will look into the IDI report and consult with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement review team so that a conclusion could be drawn in the audit report.
2. f The staff observed the cable separation problem inside the solid state protection system input cabinets. The staff re ognized that a

! corrective action has been initiated to install a barrier in these

'.two cabinets. The applicant should inform the resident inspector for nspection after the modification is completed.

3. The staff observed temporary black cables inside Westinghouse 7300
  • process cabinets. The applicant should inform the resident inspector for reinspection after those temporary cables are removed.  !
4. The staff observed some different coTor coded cables inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets. The staff will verify that the Shearon Harris design follows the WCAP-8892A generic design and a l conclusion will be drawn in the audit report. '
5. The remote shutdown operation test is a confirmatory item in the SER.

The resolution of this item will be addressed in a supplement to the SER.

6. The SPDS isolation is an open item. The staff will address this item )

in a supplement to the SER.

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5 E. Follow-up Evaluation and Conclusion Two concerns need follow-up action after the site audit.

(1) Cable separation inside the main control consoles and remote shutdown panel.

(2) Cable separation.inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets with respect to WCAP-8892-A generic design.

With respect to first concern, a meeting was held on February 11, 1986 between the NRA staff (S. Weiss, J. Mauck, H. Li) and 18E's IDI team member (L. Stanley) to discuss the justification provided by Westinghouse (Reference 3). The NRR staff agrees that Westinghouse has provided a 4

reasonable approach to analyze the staff concerns. However, this analysis should be based on tests performed to determine the flame retardant charac-teristics of the wiring and wiring materials internal to the control switch-board. The NRR staff required additional information on tests performed by the applicant. In a subsequent telephone conference, the applicant referred to a Wyle Laboratories test report no. 47879-02, " Test Report on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant." That report was submitted on November 21, 1985 to support Shearon Harris plant compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. The report

' stated that there were no ignitions of the fault cable, in the test area, during the fire control cable screening tests (page I-7 Section 3.0).

j Based on the analysis performed by Westinghouse (Reference 3) and the i

independent test performed by Wyle Laboratories (Reference 8), the <

staff concludes that the applicant's justification is acceptable.

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With respect to the second concern, the staff has reviewed the recommendad design basis of electrical circuit physical separation criteria as stated in the Westinghouse report WCAP-8892-A, " Westinghouse 7300 Series Process Control System Noise Tests," and the applicant's commitment to comply with Westinghouse criteria as stated in the FSAR. The staff concludes that Shearon Harris design satisfies the requirements specified in the Westinghouse test report, and is acceptable.

ENCLOSURE 2 NRC - INSfRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS SITE AUDIT AT SHEARON HARRIS STATION JANUARY 28 THROUGH 30, 1986 LIST OF ATTENDEES h;RC ,

Carolina Power and-light Company Seymour Weiss John Eads

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Joe Joyce David McCarthy Om Chopra E. M. Harris Jerry Mauck Barry M. Hynos Hulbert Li Steven McCoy George Maxwell (SRO) Vickie H. Coble Steve Burris (PC) Dan Hardesty L. I. Loflin E. J. Wagner A. J. Howe EBASCO Kent Russell I

C. L. McKenzie Bill Pehush Mike Jackson Dean Shah N. J. Chiangi S. Parikh G. L. Forhand Paul Gaffney W. I. Edwards ,

R. W. Prunty  :

, Max F. Thompson, Jr. l l

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O ENCLOSURE 3 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED 8Y THE APPLICANT

1. Letter from I&E tof CP&L dated December 27, 1985 on " Integrated Design Inspection 50-400/84-48"
2. Letter fr-om I&E to CP&L dated October 1, 1985 on " Integrated Design Inspection 50-400/84-48 Supplement 1"
3. Letter from Westinghouse to CP&L dated May 13, 1985 on " Main Control Board Conduit Air Gap Analysis"

-- 4. Letter from Westinghouse to CP&L dated March 13, 1985 on "One Inch Separation of Flexible Metallic Conduit in Control Board"

5. Letter from Ebasco to CP&L dated May 31, 1985 on "MCB AEP-1 and ACP Conduit Air Gap Analysis"
6. CP&L Field Change Request No. AF-10306 dated December 13, 1985
7. CP&L field Change Request No. 1-3033 dated January 29, 1986
8. CP&L submittal dated November 21, 1985, a Wyle Laboratories test report No. 47879-02 " Test Report on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Carolina Power and Light Company for Use in the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant" e

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..... Rtfereec.e f DEC t7 25 I Docket No. 50-400 f/)CLofuRE 3 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

INTEGRATED DESIGN INSPECTION 50-400/84-48 This letter documents the results of the public meeting held at our office on October 16, 1985 and NRC review of your letters forwarding the Containment Recirculation Sump Evaluation Report (NLS-85-384, dated October 25, 1985) and providing additional information addressing Integrated Design Inspection (IDI) items, which remained open. (H0-853332(e) dated October 25,1985). As dis-

_ cussed.in Enclosure 1, and considering our previous reviews of your responses and corrective actions documented in our letter to you dated July 12, 1985, and the IDI Report Supplement 1, dated October 1,1985; all IDI findings are now considered closed with the exception of the containment recirculation sump design (Deficiency 02.3-1). The visual aids which forred the background for your presentation during the meeting are enclosed.

As noted in Supplement I to the IDI report, further inspection of your corrective actions may be conducted during routine inspections of your licensed activities.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincer ,

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ian K. Grimes, Direc or Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosures:

1. Evaluation of Open IDI Items
2. Meeting Attendance
3. Meeting Visual Aids .

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.[ j W ASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 s . ,.... p OCT 011985 Docket No. 50-400 y Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

INTEGRATED DESIGN INSPECTION 50-400/84-48, Supplement I

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The Office of Inspection and Enforcement conducted a follow-up reinspection to the Integrated Design Inspection at EBASCO offices from July 22-24, 1985.

The reinspection team was composed of personnel from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and consultants.

( The purpose of the reinspection was to assess the adequacy and status of your actions in response to the Integrated Design Inspection report dated April 15, 1985.

Our letter to you dated July 12, 1985, identified items to be addressed in the reinspection. These items were based on the IDI team's need for more information relative to your response to the IDI report dated June 13, 1985. During the reinspection, you agreed to take additional corrective actions; these actions and some clarifications and proposed FSAR revisions are documented in your letter l dated August 6, 1985.  !

The enclosed report indicates IDI items which remain open. In addition, the  :

  • Office of Inspection and Enforcement has identified potential enforcement findings '

which may result in enforcement action. These are listed in an attachment to the enclosed report. Resolution of these potential enfercement items will be handled by the Region II office. All other IDI items sere closed out based on either the reinspection or the team's review of your June 13, 1985 letter. The report indi-cates that a significant percentage of the IDI items were resolved.by the team's review of your June 13, 1985 letter and the reinspection. The NRC Region II Office and Yendor Program Branch may perform confimatory inspections of certain items noted in the enclosed report..

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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

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~- c , A Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-400/84-48, Supplement 1 -

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