ML20212P900
| ML20212P900 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1986 |
| From: | LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212P890 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8609030330 | |
| Download: ML20212P900 (41) | |
Text
__ . - - . . . . . _ . _ ,_ -. .- -- _. .
POTENTIAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATICS CHANGES Rrvisien 3, 8/29/86 (7) GROl'P E ~ (7) GROUP F f 3fj /8 jg (1) GROUP G (8)
TECH SPEC NATURE OF fI 8 CROUP H TECH SPEC NATURE OF TECH SPEC NATURE OF TECH SPEC NATURE OF SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANCE 3.1.1.3 ffTC will become more 3.1.3.1 CEA Misalignment 2.2.2 Removal, requested. 3.3.1/3.3.2 RPS/ESFAS Surveillance i negative at EOC and ACTION statement 51FR 10465, 3/26/86 Interval (dependent.
more positive at BOC (01/01/87) need to be modified CPC Addressable on NRC review of (Submitted to NRC on (Submitted to NRC constant Topical Report) 7/15/86) 8/29/86) (Tech Spec change
, received) 3.1.3.7 Add curve and change 3.3.3.8 Change Table 3.3.3.8 6.2.2 Staffing short-term and tran- to list smoke detector (Submitted to NRC on sient insertion limits in Control Room 6/24/86)
(Submitted to NRC on (Submitted to NRC 7/15/86) 8/29/86) 3.2.7 ASI ranges will 3.3.1 RPS, Allow Bypass change SG Level High Trip (Submitted to NRC on (Submitted to NRC on 7/15/86) 6/24/86) l 3.3.3.6 Add RVLMS per License 5.3.1 Correct mistake re-Conditions and CEOG characterizing 1807 gr (Submitted to hRC on uranium as maximum fuel 7/15/86) rod loading (Submitted to NRC on 6/24/86) i 3.10.2 Add 3.1.3.7 for 6.2.2.d Clarify SRO Staffing part-length CEAs (09/12/86) requirements during (Submitted to NRC on refueling operations 7/15/86) 3.6.1.2 Add spare penetration
}
to leak rate testing a
list i
(Submitted to NRC on 1
i 8/29/86) 3.3.3.3 Change location of seismic monitors (Submitted to NRC on i
8/29/86) g.
l 8609030330 860829 V PDR ADOCu 05000382 P PDR
. . . . - - ~ . . - . -- .. . - - - - - - . . . - . . - . . - . - - - .
POTENTIAL TECHNICA1. SPECIFICATIC"3 CHANGES Revision 3, 8/29/86 i
TECH SPEC (7) ~ GROUP E If6 NATURE OF TECH SPEC (7) GROUP F f3f5ff NATURF. OF I
(1) GROUP G fI 6 2 86 (8) GROUP H TECH SPEC MATURE OF TECH SPEC !!ATURE OF SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE 3.1.1.3 NTC will become more 3.1.3.1 CEA Misalignment 2.2.2 Removal, requested, 3.3.1/3.3I2 RPS/F.SFAS Surveillance negative at EOC and ACTION statement SIFR 10465, 3/26/86 Interval (dependent (01/01/87) l' more positive at BOC need to be modified CPC Addressable on NRC review of (Submitted to NRC on (Submitted to NRC constant Topical Report) 7/15/86) 8/29/86) (Tech Spec change j received) 3.1.3.7 Add curve and change 3.3.3.8 Change Table 3.3.3.8 6.2.2 Staffing
, short-term and tran- to list smoke detector (Submitted
- a NRC on
! sient insertion limits .in Control Room 6/24/86)
(Submitted to NRC on (Submitted o NRC 7/15/S6) 8/29/86) 3.2.7 ASI ranges will 3.3.1 RPS, Allow Bypass l change SG Level High Trip (Submitted to NRC on (Submitted to NRC on 4
7/15/86) 6/24/86) 9 3.3.3.6 Add RVLMS per License 5.3.1 Correct mistake re-
, Conditions and CEOG characterizing 1807 gr (Submitted to NRC on uranium as maximum fuel 7/15/86) . rod loading ;
(Submitted to NRC on 6/24/86)
, 3.10.2 Add 3.1.3.' for 6.2.2.d Clarify SRO Staffing part-length CEAs l (09/12/86) requirements during 4
(Submitted to NRC on refueling operations-7/15/86) 3.6.1.2 ' Add spare penetration to leak rate testing list (Submitted to NRC on i 8/29/86) t 3.3.3.3 Changt location of i
1 seismic monitors (Submitted to NRC on 8/29/86).
i
?
i A
l i :
t-i 1
4 ,
4 e
e
'S S
NPF-38-34 f
- - r v- ,---,--n-- , - , - ... .- . - -,._ _,. _ __ ,,, , , _ .,
DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-34 This is a request to revise ACTION statements "c" and "d" of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, " Movable Control Assemblies, CEA Position".
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description The proposed change would revise ACTION statements "c" and "d" to Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, " Movable Control Assemblies, CEA Position". The reason for this change is to impose new requirements on power reduction during the period from 15 minute.s to one hour following a full length or part length CEA misalignment. This enange is a necessary consequence to other changes associated with the CPC Improvement Program which would reduce the inward (i.e., inserted farther into the core) CEA deviation penalty factors currently provided by the CEA Calculators (CEACs) to the CPCs to a value of 1.0. The reduction of these penalty factors will reduce the sensitivity of the CPCs to CEA drops and to electronic noise which can be interpreted in the logic as a major CEA deviation and will therefore eliminate some unnecessary reactor trips. This change has been previously approved for other CE plants which utilize the CPC digital protection system.
The margins on DNBR and Linear Heat Rate (LHR) which now exist will be maintained after the reduction in the penalty factors. Currently, if an inward CEA deviation event occurs, the CPC algorithm applies two penalty factors to the ONBR and LHR calculations. The first, a static penalty factor is applied upon detection of the CEA deviation event. The second, a '
xenon redistribution penalty, is applied linearly as a function of time over a one hour period following the detection of the deviation.
In the proposed change, the margin reserved by the DNBR Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is based on the maximum inward CEA deviation (i.e. , the CEA Drop) and therefore accommodates changes in the static power distribu-tion. This margin also accommodates the first 15 minutes of xenon redistri-bution effects for the limiting CEA drop. Thereafter, fer up to one hour after the deviation event, the proposed change to this specification imposes a core power reduction in accordance with the proposed Figu.e 3.1-1A in order to accommodate xenon redistribution effects occurring beyond the first 15 minutes. Therefore, the combination of the margin reserved by the DNBR LCO (based on the limiting CEA Drop) and the power reduction based on Figure 3.1-1A maintains the required margins to DNB and LHR for the first hour after a deviation event. Thereafter the current action statements in the Technical Specification apply.
NS41144
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
- 1. Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Reducing the static penalty factor generated by the CEACs to a value of 1.0 is accounted for by setting aside margin in the ONBR LCO.
This ensures that the Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits (SAFDLs) on both DNBR and LHR can be maintained for up to 15 minutes following the limiting CEA Drop event without any reduction in core power.
Similarly, reducing the xenon redistribution penalty factor to a value of 1.0 is accounted for by imposing new requirements for core power reduction (Figure 3.1-1A) starting 15 minutes after the postu-lated CEA drop and continuing for an additional 45 minutes. There-after, all other ACTION str.tements in the Technical Specifications are applicable. Adhering,to the proposed power reduction require-ments ensures that the power peaking resulting from xenon redistribu-tion will not result in a violation of the SAFDLs. Therefore, since the consequences of the limiting CEA drop event are still acceptable, the proposed change will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not affect the logic used by the CPCs to mitigate the consequences of any Anticipated Operational Occurrence (A00). Since the proposed change will not affect the ability of the CPCs to perform their design function af protecting the core against a violation of the SAFDLs (during an A00), it will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. W'll operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed ,
change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response: No.
i l
l l
l j
l
In the proposed change, credit is taken for margin in the DNBR LCO.
By staying within this LCO there is always enough margin to accommo-date the first 15 minutes of the most limiting CEA drop. Thereafter the proposed change requires a core power reduction in accordance with Figure 3.1-1A to accommodate the increased power peaking associ-ated with xenon redistribution in the core. Therefore, the combina-tien of additional margin reserved in the DNBR LCO and the power reduction imposed by Figure 3.1-1A ensures that the proposed change will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based upon the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFR50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
O
- , -, - - - . . . - - , . - - - , + - - - - - - - - . . - - . - - - . - , , , - - - , - - . - - - . - - , - - - , , _ . - . , - . - . - . . , , - . - . - - - . , . . , -
v _- m 9
4 NPF-38-34 ATTACHMENT A t
i.
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MOVA8LE CONTROL ASSEM8 LIES i CEA POSITION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 All full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs, and all part-length l l
CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERA 8LE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.
APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.
I ACTION:
a.
1 With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable
- as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUT 00WN MARGIN require-i ment of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in ~
at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- b. With more than one full-length or part-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 19 inches (indicated position), be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- c. With one full-length or part-length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 19 inches, operation in MODES 1 ar.d 2 may continue, provided that within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the misaligned CEA is either:
- 1. Restored to OPERA 8LE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or
- 2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA inoperable, operation in MODES I and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 prcvided:
a) Within I hour the remainder of the CEAs in the group
- with the ir. operable CEA shall be aligned to within 7 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to
- l. Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1
- is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
! Otherwise, be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
I
- See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.
4 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-18
. _ , - , . . . , _ _ . , _ . _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . _ , , . . . _ . . . . , . . _ . - , . _ _ . _ . - _ - _-._..,__.____.__.__,.____._._r.,, _ _ _ _ . . . , . . _ _ _ _ _ . , , _ , , , - . . . _ .
i .,
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)
) ACTION: (Continued) l
- d. With one or more full-length or part-length CEAs misaligned from any l other CEAs in its group by more than 7 inches but less than or equal j to 19 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that l within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the misaligned CEA(s) is either:
- 1. Restored to OPERA 8LE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or
- 2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to t'he requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 provided:
a) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the remainder of the CEAs in the group with
! the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7 inches of '
} the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2; the
! THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,
- e. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, and inserted beyond the Long Tern Steady State Insertion Limits but within its above specified alignment requirements, operation in M00ES 1 end 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6.
4
! f. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed
! by ACTION a., above, but within its above specified alignment require-1 ments and either greater than or equal to 145 inches withdrawn or
] within the Long Tern Steady State Insertion Limits if in full-length i
CEA group 6, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue.
, g. With one part-length CEA inoperable and inserted in the core, -
- operation may continue provided the alignment of the inoperable part-length CEA is maintained within 7 inches (indicated position).of all other part-length CEAs in its group and the CEA is maintained pursuant to the taquirements of Specification 3.1.3.7.
i l
l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-19
. i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA shall be determined to be within 7 inches (indicated position) of.all other CEAs in its group at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when one CEAC is inoperable or when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length CEA not fully inserted and each part-length CEA which is inserted in the core below 145 inches shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 5 inches in any one direction at least once per 31 days.
l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-20
INDEX LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 3.1-1 MINIMUM BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK VOLUME AND TEMPERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF STORED BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION................................. 3/4 1-13 3.1-2 CEA INSERTION LIMITS VS THERMAL P0WER.............. 3/4 1-27 3.2-1 ALLOWA8LE PEAK LINEAR HEAT RATE VS BURNUP.......... 3/4 2-2 3.2-2 DN8R MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON COLSS......... 3/4 2-8 3.2-3 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS (COLSS OUT OF SERVICE)...... 3/4 2-9 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1.0 pCi/ GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131....... 3/4 4-27 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (HEATUP)........................................... 3/4 4-30 3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (C00LDOWN)......................................... 3/4 4-11 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE ............... 3/4 6-12 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUB 8ER FUNCTIONAL TEST. . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-26 5.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA..................................... 5-2 5.1-2 LOW PO PU LAT ION Z0N E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 5.1-3 SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADI0 ACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS................................... 5-4 6.2-1 0FFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPP0RT................................. 6-3 6.2-2 PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION...................... 6-4 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 XIX
a -,ma e
e NPF-38-35 ATTACHMENT B I
,, , , - - - - , ,, , --- ,---- _ . - -- -- - -_ - .-,, - , - - _ - , , ,__, ,_ ,em.- --. --,,-
- REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MOVA8LE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES CEA POSITION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3.1. 3.1 All full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs, and all part-length i
' CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERA 8LE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group, i
! APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1* and 2*. cete power is reduced in occorchnee uiM F; pre 3.1 1A i ACTION: and +A4f -
- a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN require-
- ment of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within I hour and be in at least NOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
'b. With more than one full-length or part-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 19 inches (indicated position), be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,
- c. With one full-length or part-length CEA misaligned from any other i
CEA in its group by more than 19 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 l may continue, provided that within I hour the misaligned CEA is
- either
- 1. Restored to OPERA 8LE status within its above specified alignment i requirements, or i 2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied.
After declaring the CEA l inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to j the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 provided:
a) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to -
Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. {
! Othemise, be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
l l *See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.
i l i
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1 18
t
! ( core pwer is nduced in REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS accordance wie Qua 1.t-IA and ht LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) l l
ACTION: (Continued) ,
- d. With one or more full-length or part-length CEAs misaligned from any i
' other CEAs in its group by more than 7 inches but less than or equal '
to 19 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that j' i
- within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the misaligned CEA(s) is either
- 1. Restored to OPERA 8LE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or i
- 2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA f inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to l the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 provided:
1 a) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the remainder of the CEAs in the group with
- the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA 1 sequence and insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2; the i
, THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to j Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
b) The SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Othenvise, be in at least H0T STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
I
- e. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed i by ACTION a., above, and inserted beyond the Long Ters Steady State l Insertion Limits but within its above specified alignment requirements, i
operation in M00ES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to tiie requirements j of Specification 3.1.3.6.
l f. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed i by ACTION a., above, but within its above specified alignment require-i ments and either greater than or equal to 145 inches withdrawn or within the Long Tern Steady State Insertion Limits if in full-length
! CEA group 6, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue.
- g. With one part-length CEA inoperable es? inserted in the core, .
operation may continue provided the alignment of the inoperable part-
! length CEA is maintained within 7 inches (indicated position)_of all
! other part-length CEAs in its group and the CEA is maintained pursuant j to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.7.
I WATERFORO - UNIT 3 3/4 1-19
4
- . l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA shall be determined to be within 7 inches (indicated position) of all othe" CEAs in its group at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when one CEAC is inoperable or when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length CEA not fully inserted and each part-length CEA which is inserted in the core below 145 inches shall be determined to be OPERA 8LE by movement of at least 5 inches in any one direction at least once per 31 days.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-20
i Figure 3.1 - 1A n- J.
Required Power Reduction after Single CEA Deviation
- 5 -
~
o ww 2
E "5 30 -
- (60 MIN, 30%)
kgq ES sh I"g5m 20 -
~
Egf g 10 -
0 1 I i 0 15 30 45 60 TIMEAFTERCEADEVIATION(MINUTES)
- When core power is reduced to 60% of rated power per this limit curve, further reduction is not required by this specification.
WATERFORD-UNIT 3 3/4 1-20a l
L 31-1A REQulfED PMJ99 REbucTION AFTER Sp)&LC CSA )CVI A TION
/ INDEX LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 3.1-1 MINIMUM 80RIC ACIO STORAGE TANK VOLUME ANO TEMPERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF STORED 80RIC ACIO CONCENTRATION......... ....................... 3/4 1-13 3.1-2 CEA INSERTION LIMITS VS THERMAL P0WER.............. 3/4 1-27 3.2-1 ALLOWA8LE PEAK LINEAR HEAT RATE VS BURNUP.......... 3/4 2-2 3.2-2 DN8R MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT 8ASED ON COLSS......... 3/4 2-8 i
i
! 3.2-3 DN8R MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE l PROTECTION CALCULATORS (COLSS OUT OF SERVICE)...... 3/4 2-9 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1.0 pCi/ GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131....... 3/4 4-27 i . 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE j LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (HEATUP)........................................... 3/4 4-30 l
3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (C00LOOWN)......................................... 3/4 4-31 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE ............... 3/4 6-12 4
4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNU88ER FUNCTIONAL TEST.......... 3/4 7-26 l
5.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA..................................... 5-2 5.1-2 LOW POPULATION 20NE................................ 5-3 5.1-3 SITE 800NOARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASE0US ANO LIQUID EFFLUENTS................................... 5-4 6.2-1 0FFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT ANO .
TECHNICAL SUPP0RT................................. 6-3 6.2-2 PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION...................... 6-4 WATERFORO - UNIT 3 XIX
0)
O t
NPF-38-35 b
e.
DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-35 This is a reouest to revise Table 3.6-1 of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2, Containment Leakage, to include two additional containment penetrations.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description Table 3.6-1 of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 lists those containment penetra-tions considered to be potential containment leakage paths, and identifies the type of leakage test to be performed on each listed penetration in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The proposed change would add two containment pene-trations to Table 3.5-1. These. penetrations are presently designated as spares (i.e., they are welded shut), but are to be modified for use during refueling outages in order to provide temporary auxiliary air, water and electrical services inside containment.
Following their modification and following their later use during refueling out-ages, each affected penetration will be sealed using blind flanges to maintain containment integrity during power operation. These penetrations, however, are presently excluded from the Waterford 3 Appendix J test program and Table 3.6-1 because they are welded shut.
Upon modification, these penetrations will be given a Type "B" leak rate test to establish the integrity of the blind flange seals. They will also be added to the Waterford 3 local leak rate test program to ensure continued periodic moni-toring in the future. This proposed Technical Specification change is submitted to maintain consistency between the Technical Specifications and the pending revision to the local , leak rate test program.
Precedent for the proposed change exists. NRC approval was granted,to a similar CE plant for the concept of a temporary services penetration for construction /
outage use.
In summary, the proposed change simply represents the addition of two containment penetrations to the existing leak test program. The change involves no excep-tions or deviations from the existing level of compliance of Waterford 3 to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J or plant Technical Specifications. The changes are needed to allow conversion of spare penetrations to active use in providing temporary auxiliary services inside containment during refueling outages. ,
NS41154
~
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
- 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Conversion of two spare penetrations to active use would add two new points of potential leakage from containnent during an accident. However, the Waterford 3 local leak rate test program has been established to ensure that all active penetrations are periodically tested at accident pressure for leakage in accordance with plant Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The allowable leakage rates set forth are based on accident conditions and account for the combined leakage through all con-tainment penetrations. Thus, inclusion of the converted penetrations in the Waterford 3 local leak rate test program will ensure that any leakage through these penetrations is accounted for in calculations used to demonstrate that overall containment integrity will be maintained within acceptable leakage limits under accident conditions.
The affected penetrations were originally designated to maintain contain-ment integrity under accident conditions. Their modification to accept blind flange seals when not in service will not result in any degradation of the penetration structural adequacy or sealing ability. A type "B" '
i leakage test at accident pressure will be ;erformed upon installation of the blind flanges to ensure initial seal ir.tegrity prior to power ascension.
Based on the above, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequenct;s of any accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change introduces no new systems, modes of operation, failure modes or other plant perturbations. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frou any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
l .
As noted above, margin of safety with respect to allowable leakage from containment during an accident is established in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J and plant Technical Specification limits. Although the subject penetrations constitute two more points of potential leakage, their inclu-sion in the Waterford 3 leak rate test program will ensure that the over-all margin of safety is not reduced below the established acceptable limits.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the above safety analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.91; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
O b
'S
/
, NPF-38-35 ATTACHMENT A b
~ .g TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
I p{ CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE PATHS 4
jg PENETRATION NO. SYSTEM NAME VALVE TAG NO. TEST TYPE 48 CARS Exhaust from 2HV-8190A (CAR 202A) Bypass / Type C E Containment 2HV-F253A (CAR 201A)
Z u, 49 Containment Atmosphere 2CA-E605A (ARM 110) Type C Monitoring Inlet and 2CA-E6048 (ARM 109)
Outlet 2CA-V607 (ARM 104) 2CA-E606A (ARM 103) 51 Refueling Cavity 2FS-V14SA/8 (FS 405) Bypass / Type C Purification Inlet 2FS-V144A/8, (FS 406) l 59 Safety Injection System 2SI-V1570 (SI 344) Bypass / Type C u, from SI Tank to Refueling 2SI-V1561A/8 (SI 343) l 3: Water Storage Pool -
)$ 60 Fire Protection System 2FP-F127 (FP 601A) Bypass / Type C to Reactor Building 2FP-V128 (FP 602A) i 61 Fire Protection System 2FP-F129 (FP 6018) Bypass / Type C l to Reactor Building 2FP-V130 (FP 6028) 1 62 Water from Refueling 2FS-V165A/8 (FS 416) Bypass / Type C l Cavity to RWSP . 2FS-V164A/8 (FS 415) 1 63 Containment Leakage Rate 25A-V114 (LRT 109) Type C Test Connection Blind Flange NA 65 Containment Leakage Rate 25A-V609 (LRT 202) Type C Test Connection and 2SA-V611 (LRT 204)
Instrument H&V r
66 Hydrogen Analyzer Supply 2HA-E609A (HRA 110A) Type C and Return 2HA-E608A (HRA 109A) 2HA-E610A (HRA 126A) i 2HA-E637A (HRA 128A)
e O
. NPF-38-35 ATTACHMENT B t
~ :
TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
I M CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE PATHS t
g PENETRATION NO. SYSTEM NAME VALVE TAG NO. TEST TYPE 48 CARS Exhaust from 2HV-8190A (CAR 202A) Bypass / Type C E Containment 2HV-F253A (CAR 201A)
Z w 49 Containment Atmosphere 2CA-E605A (ARM 110) Type C
, Monitoring Inlet and 2CA-E6048 (ARM 109)
2CA-E606A (ARM 103) 51 Refueling Cavity 2FS-V145A/8 (FS 405) Bypass / Type C Purification Inlet 2FS-V144A/8 (FS 406) l
- 59 Safety Injection System 2SI-V1570 (SI 344) Bypass / Type C m from SI Tank to Refueling 2SI-V1561A/8 (SI 343)
) Water Storage Pool 60 Fire Protection System 2FP-F127 (FP 601A) Bypass / Type C to Reactor Building 2FP-V128 (FP 602A) 61 Fire Protection System 2FP-F129 (FP 6018) Bypass / Type C to Reactor Building 2FP-V130 (FP 6028) j 62 Water from Refueling 2FS-V165A/B (FS 416) Bypass / Type C Cavity to RWSP 2FS-V164A/8 (FS 415) 63 Containment Leakage Rate 2SA-V114 (LRT 109) Type C
. Test Connection Blind Flange NA 65 Containment Leakage Rate 25A-V609 (LRT 202) Type C Test Connection and 2SA-V611 (LRT 204)
Instrument H&V
) 66 Hydrogen Analyzer Supply 2HA-E609A (HRA 110A) Type C
! and Return 2HA-E608A (HRA 109A) 2HA-E610A (HRA 126A) 2HA-E637A (HRA 128A)
^
64 Temporary Services $N hate NA TYP* 0 50 Temporary SernceS $ndFleM N TYP* 8
6 3
NPF-38-36 b
DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-36 This is a request to revise Table 3.3-11 of the Waterford 3 Technical Specifica-tions to indicate the addition of battery powered smoke detectors to the control room panels.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 addresses fire protection instrumentation. In Table 3.3-11, a summary of the fire detection instruments is given. The change of this table reflects the installation of these battery powered smoke detectors in control room panels CP-1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 18, 35 and 36. The installation of these smoke detectors is made as an enhancement to satisfy License Condition 2.c.9.d.
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant haz-ards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
- 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change indicates the installation of these battery powered smoke detectors ~to control room panels. This is an enhancement and as such, will not increase the probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
- 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The installation of the battery powered smoke detectors is performed in response to License Condition 2.c.9.d. By providing extra smoke detection ability in the control room, this enhancement will not create the possibil-ity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
NS41153
s
~
- 3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The detectors are powered from a IE power supply. These detectors provide for increased safety against control room fires. Therefore, the operation of the facility with these detectors will not involve a signifi-cant reduction in a margin of safety.
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 CFR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. Example (2) relates to a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications, (i.e., a more stringent surveillance requirement).
In this case, the proposed change is similar to Example (2) in that the addi-tional smoke detectors constitute additional restrictions. -
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the above safety analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.91; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
NS41153
4 e
NPF-38-36 ATTACHMENT A NS41153
e f*i..!.?
a .. s TA8LE 3.3-L1
%%* FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS TOTAL NUMEER CF iNSTRCPU TV SLE'/ATION HEAT F_L AME SMOXI ONE 2CCM 9AME.'utMBER /'t} ' 'c / v ' '</v) ' ' i
- 1. REACTOR AUXILIARY 90!L0!NG
-RA8 1A Control Room Proper /304 +46 20/0 RA8 18 Emergency Equip. H&V Room /314 +46 0/12 RA8 10 Comouter Room (above raised floor)/306 +46 5/0 Comouter Room (below mised 'loor;/306 +46 0/7 RA8 2 Ventilation Ecuio. tocm/2?9 -a6 -;/ 25
?A8 I 1A8 ! r-i':or .: teiay tocm/051 -15 7/1(2) 1/0 1A8 f/AC Iwi t:ngear Equie. .tocm/ 322 -4'i Je '.0 4A8A 1A8 3attary I,cnaus: sn Roemia06
~
-59 0/2 RA8 4 Caole Vault /260 +35 0/27 RA8 5 Electrical Penetration Area "A"/053 +35 0/13
?A8 i ?!actrical 2enetration area T*,'052A -15 1/ 14 1A8
- taiay iccm/052 -!5 I ', *. C.' O
- .soiation Janeis ' 3 : m::ar.ments -15 2,'O 2 :er ::mo. .
RA8 8A High Voltage Switchgear.Roce "A"/212A +21 0/1(1) 18/0 RA8 88 Electrical Equio. Room /2258 and High +21 0/1(2) 23/0
'loltage 3 wit:ngear acem '3" <212
- 80V iwite..gaar
- A;2 tcom -21 (0) 2.'O (AB 3C rfign loitage swit:ngear icem -21 .,;
3/0 "A-B"/2123 4AB .1E '*2A */G set teem / 16 -21 2.'O IA8 ! lemota ihuta:wn 22nei :com/217 -!! .. ]
MB " 2attary icem "1"'012 -Il ;/0 1A8 10 3 attar / tcom *t3"/012A -21 :/0 3A8 *.2 3attarj team Ma* 1; -21 2/0
? A8 '.5 imer;er.cy P esai :en. "1" 2com/22 !; 0/1 RA8 15A Emergency Giesei Gen. "B" Feed TX +46 Oil Room /328A RA8 16 Emergency Diesel Gen. "A" Room /221 +21 0/1 .
'1A8 16A Emergency Olesel Gen. "A" Feed ik. +46 0/1 Rcom 128A
.tA8 17 JCW riest Exenanger '8"/236 +21 0/4
- 7A8 18 CCW Heat Exenanger "A"/020 -21 0/4 9AB 19 COW Pumo "A"/235 +21 2.'0 TAB 20 ; .4 Nmo '.s8".'2:a -il J/ 2 RA8 21 CCW Pump "B"/233 +21 1/0 RA8 23 Corridor to CCW Pumos/218 Corridor +21 0/39
- :~.i inat I::cnancere/010 ina
- rricor .s imer;ency :lesef Jen.,:05A (1) Common Resistor Wire
.- '2'C:mmon tesistor dire s2;Cammon ,teststor , eire WATERFORO - UNIT 3 3/4 3-51
~~ " ~
s' o'
NPF-38-36 ATTACHMENT B NS41153
d*
t 03LE 3.2-i*.
FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS TOTAL .NUMBES OF (NS MLP N '
SLEVATICN HEAT : LAME MOXI 20*E ?CCM AME/4t,MSEi Aoo - /ft! 0"y- '"vi
- 1. Qf ACTOR 4t'Yil *aRY !UtL0 inn _ _
CRAs IA M w cournet mm.s i,2,3 AG,74,Is,35,3G +# */O~
RA8 1A Control Room P-oper/304 +46 20/0 RA8 18 Emergancy E;uip. P.1V Room /314 +46 0/12 RA3 ID Comcutar Room (above raised floor)/306 +46 5/0 Comouter Recm (below . aised floor;/306 +46 C/7 RA8 2 Ventilation Ecuio. toom/299 -46 0/*E 1A8 3 IA8 .:r-i':or :s telay loom /051 -!5 2/ ~.( 2 ) -/0 4A8 MVAC iwi::ngear Icu:::. .iccm/ 222 -46 0/ .0 4A8 2A 1A8 3attary Ixnaust ~1n Rocs /406 -49 0/2 RA8 4 Caole Vault /260 +35 0/27 RA8 5 Electrical Penetration Area "A"/053 +35 0/13 1A8 i Ilectrical 2enetration Area "3"/052A -!S }/14 1A8 ' telay Accm/062
-15 3) *. 2.'1 soistion 21nels ? ? :.:moarments -i5 lio
- 2 :er ::mo.;
RA8 8A High Voltage Switchgear. Room "A"/212A +21 0/1(1) 18/0 RAB 88 Electrical Equio. Room /2258 and High +21 0/1(2) 29/0 Voltage swit:ngear Rocs 3"/212
-80V Iwic:ngest A;2 team -21 (2) 2.' ')
(AB !C dign voitage swit:ngear iccm -21 '1; 3/G "A-9"/2123 2A8 4E '*2A 9/G Set icom/015 21 2.'O TA8 2 temota ihut::wn J nei i 8ecm/2*.7 -?! 1.
?AB " 2at ary icem "1" ' 12 -Il .1 1A8 .0 1stt.ir/ tcom "ta"/014A -!! 2/ ')
3AB *.2 !attary icom 't" '011 -21 ,
U0
- AB '.3 imer;ency Jf esei 2en. '9" 2cem/222 -il 1/1 RA8 15A Emergency Olesei Gen. "B" Feed TX +46 0/1 Room /328A RA8 16 Emergency Diesel Gen. "A" Room /221 +21 0/1
'tA8 16A Emergency Olesel Gen. "A" Feed ik. *46 0/1 9com 128A
.tA8 17 CCW deat Exenanger '8"/235 +21 0/4 RAB 13 CCW Heat Exchanger "A"/020 -21 0/ 4 9AB *.9 CWouac "A*/235 +:1 lJ4 1A3 20 :-'t Nro 128" *221 -Il 2,'
RAB 21 CCW Fumo "3"/233 +21 1/0 RA8 23 Corricor to CCW Pumos/218, Corridor +21 0/39
- :~.; sat casneer <010 inc
- .:r-+ :or :: Ie.er;sney : N s e s'
.4n. 2:5A (1) Common Resistor Wire
' :C:mmon tesfstar '4I s
. oJ.:x.cn Aesuccr 41: e WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-51 N
I.
NPF-38-37
l DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS ,
OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-37 This is a request to revise Tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4 to reflect the relocation of ,
a seismic monitor and correct the location of another.
Existina Specification-See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment 8.
Description During the first qycle of Waterford 3, a seismic monitor suffered heat damage effects incurred at its present location. This was reported in Special Report SR-85-0001-00 pursuant to Technical Specification action statement 3.3.3.3.a. ,
The seismic monitor is a passive device which serves no safety related function.
It allows evaluation of RCS movement following a seismic event. During the first i refueling cutage, a proposed relocation of this seismic monitor is planned, removing it from the heat source at its present locatign on the Pressurizer to Safety Injection Tank 18. The planned relocation will employ a mount virtually identical to the original mount and thereby will perform the identical function.
Tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4 identify Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.and Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, respectively. Changes are made to indicate the new location of YR-SM 6020. In reviewing the Technical Specifications to identify the pages affected by this change, the location for i monitor YR-SM 6021 was identified as incorrect. The correction of this elevation involves the same tables as the above change for YR-SM 6020. Therefore, both changes are included in this request.'
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
- 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change '
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The seismic monitors are not credited for any safety related function in any of the accidents previously evaluated. Therefore, these changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. !
t NS41155 i
- 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
These monitors provide no safety function. Therefore, the relocation for one and the correction of the location for the other in the Technical Specifications will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
As stated, the monitor only provides evaluation of RCS movement following a seismic event. The relocation does not affect any accident analysis and as such, will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing cer-tain examples (48 CFR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to in-volve significant hazards considerations. Example (1) relates to a purely admin-istrative change to technical specifications; i.e., a change to achieve consis-tency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.
For the change involving monitor YR-SM 6021, the proposed change fits this example since it is merely a correction of an error.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the above safety analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the pubilc will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environrent as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
u
O b
NPF-38-37 ATTACHMENT A
~
TABLE 3.3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
, HINIMUM MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS RANGE OPERABLE 1
, 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerograph System
0.02-1.0 g i
- c. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6002) Free Field Yard Area 0.02-1.0 g 1
- d. Starter Unit (YS-SM 6000) Adjacent to RB
-35 ft MSL 0.01-0.02 g 1
- 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs
- 3. Triaxial Seismic Switches
- 4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders
- a. YR-SM 6040 R8 +10 ft MSL 1-32 Hz, 0-2 g 1 .
- d. Peak Shock Annunciator (YR-SM 6045)
RB -35 ft MSL 1-32 Hz, 0-2 g i
- e. Peak Shock Annunciator Control Unit (YZ-SM 6045) Control Room RAB +46 ft MSL 1-32 Hz, 0-2 g 1 "With reactor control room annunciation.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-36
. _ . _ _ _ , _ - _.._ _._ , . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . . , , ._ _.,,,..m..__ _ , .. _-
r TABLE 4.3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS CHECK CALIBRATION TEST
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerograph System
- b. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6001) R8
- c. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6002) Free Field Yard Area N.A. R SA
- e. Starter Unit (YS-SM 6001) RB
- 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs
- b. YR-SM 6021 R8 -4 ft MSL N.A. R N.A.
- c. YR-SM 6022 R4B +21 ft MSL N.A. R N. A.
- 3. Triaxial Seismic Switches
- 4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders
- b. YR-SM 6041 RA8 -35 ft MSL N.A. R N.A.
- c. YR-SM 6042 RA8 +21 ft MSL N.A. R N.A.
- d. Peak Shock Annunciator YR-SM 6045 RB -35 ft MSL N.A. R N.A.
- e. Peak Shock Annunciator Control Unit YZ-SM 6045 Control Room RAB
- With reactor control room annunciation.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-37
i
'e G
NPF-38-37 ATTACHMENT B b
TABLE 3.3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION i MINIMUM MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTS AND SEN5OR LOCATIONS RANGE OPERABLE
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerograph System
- b. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6001) R8 +46 ft MSL 0.02-1.0 g 1
- c. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6002) Free Field Yard Arec 0.02-1.0 g i
- d. Starter Unit (YS-SM 6000) Adjacent to R8
-35 ft MSL 0.01-0.02 g i
Triaxial Peak Accelerogra)m to 4-56
- a. YR-SM 6020 R8 t MSL g to + 8'2,, 0-2 g 1
- 3. Triaxial Seismic Switches
- b. Control Unit (YZ-SM 6060) Control Room RAB +46 ft MSL 0.1-0.25 g la 4 Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders
- b. YR-SM 6041 RA8 -35 ft MSL 1-32 Hz, 0-2 g 1
- d. Peak Shock Annunciator (YR-SM 6045)
R8 -35 ft MSL 1-32 Hz, 0-2 g i
- e. Peak Shock Annunciator Control Unit (YZ-SM 6045) Control Room RAB +46 ft MSL 1-32 Hz, 0-2 g 1
- With reactor control room annunciation.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-36
r 9
TABLE 4.3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS CHECK CALIBRATION TEST
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerograph System
- b. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6001) RB
- c. Accelerometer (YT-SM 6002) Free Field Yard Area N.A. R SA
- e. Starter Unit (YS-SM 6001) RB
- 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs g
- a. N.A.
YR-SM6020RBd3)'ftMSL RevasETO +8,2y N. A. R
- b. YR-SM 6021 RB f 4 f t\MSL N.A. R N.A.
- 3. Triaxial Seismic Switches
- 4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders
- d. Peak Shock Annunciator YR-SM 6045 RB -35 ft MSL N.A. R N.A.
- e. Peak Shock Annunciator Control Unit YZ-SM 6045 Control Room RAB '
+46 ft MSL N.A. R SA "With reactor control room annunciation.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-37
.