ML20211Q020

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Production Changes,Tests & Experiments as Required by 10CFR50.59b, for 1986
ML20211Q020
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1986
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20211P982 List:
References
NUDOCS 8703020471
Download: ML20211Q020 (32)
v • d • e


Text

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 10CFR50.59 REPORT '

FOR TIME PERIOD JANUARY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1986 In the attached report, each number refers to the Safety Evaluation questions listed below:

1. Is the probability of occurrence or the consequences of i an accident or malfunction evaluated in the FSAR increased?

Because: YES , NO

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different_ type than any evaluated in the FSAR created?

Because: YES , N0

3. Is the margin of safety, as defined ih the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?

Because: YES , N0 i

30 C P e ,

0015JWT1/ND126-3

-e 7, ..

FACILITYMODIFICATIOj DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

-Remote Shutdown Facility (Room) Provide an Architectural. fire wall with Key-L(77-07-01-01) card admission to convert hoist: area into a separate room.. Add penetrations thru exist-

-ing structures to allow entry and exits of HVAC duct and electrical raceways. Provide an HVAC system, supports and electrical system to support the Remote Shutdown Panel Room.

1. No, this modification will not affect the function or operability of any plant equipment or system. Its function is to provide a room to house the Remote Shut-down Panels.
2. No, this modification will not affect any other equipment or structure.
3. No, the room and supports of this modi-fication are not addressed in any part of Technical Specification and will not affect any margin of Safety defined as the basis of any Technical Specification.

Remote Shutdown Electrical This modification will provide the equipment Termi nations and electrical termination additions and (77-07-01-04)' changes necessary' for the addition of the Remote Shutdown Systems.

1. No, this modification provides addition-al electrical and mechanical equipment which interfaces with existing plant equipment and systems. This equipment is IE qualified and the instruments and tubing are seismically supported and separated in accordance with the latest criteria. The basic systems and func-tions have not been altered; therefore, the probability of an accident or mal-function of equipment important to safe-ty is not increased.

2 No, this modification does not alter the fluid system designs as previously evaluated. This modification provides dedicated controls to safely shutdown 0015JWT1/ND126-3 c.

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(77-07-01-04) Continued the plant in the event of a control room fi re. NRC letter 3N-0183-05, dated January 6,1983, transmitted approval of the Remote Shutdown System design.

3. No, this modification will not degrade the performance of any engineered safety features as requi red by the technical specifications.

Remote Shutdown Reactor Building This modification will provide the outage Modi fication electrical raceway, cable termination, trans-(77-07-01-05) mitter installation and tubing additions and changes necessary for the addition of the remote shutdown modification inside contain-ment.

1. No, this modification provides addition-al electrical and mechanical equipment inside containment which interfaces with existing p1 ant . equipment and systems.

This equipment is IE qualified and is in accordance with the latest criteria.

The basic systems and functions have not been altered; therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equip-ment important to safety is not increased.

2 No, this modification does not alter any system designs as previously evaluated in the FSAR.

3. No, this modification will not degrade the performance of any engineered safety features as requi red by the technical specifications.

Remote Shutdown Final Terminations This Modification will provide the final Connections electrical terminations and mechanical con-(77-07-01-06) nections required for the addition of the Remote Shutdown System. This Modification integrates the Remote Shutdown equipment into existing plant systems.

0015JWT1/ND126-3 h

1 .. <

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(77-07-01-06) Continued 1. No, this Modification provides addition-al electrical and mechanical equi pment -

which interfaces with existing plant equipment and systems. This equipment is IE qualified and the instruments and tubing are seismically supported and separated in accordance with the latest criteria. The basic systems and func-tions have not been altered; therefore, .

the probability of an accident or mal-function of equipment important to safe-ty is not increased.

2. No, this Modification does not alter the fluid system designs as previously evaluated. This modification provides dedicated controls to safely shutdown the plant in the event of a control room fi re. NRC letter 3N-0183-05 dated Jan. 6,1983 transmitted approval of the Remote Shutdown System design.

3 No, this Modification will not degrade the performance of any engineered safety features as required by the technical specifications.

Remote Shutdown Panel and Cabinet Provide foundation pads to support and hold Foundation in place the following Control Cabinets for (77-07-01-07) the Remote Shutdown Facility:

a. Remote Shutdown Relay Racks "A",

"A-1", "B" and "B-1".

b. Remote Shutdown Aux. Equip. Cabinet "A" and "B".
c. Remote Shutdown Panel "A", "AB" and "B".
1. No, this modification will not affect the function or operability of any plant equipment or system. Its function is to provide support for the control cabinets in the Remote Shutdown Facility.
2. No, this modification will not affect any other equipment or structure.

0015JWT1/ND126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION- DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(77-07-01-07) Continued 3. No, the foundation pads of this modifi-cation are not addressed in any part of Technical Specification and will not affect any margin of safety defined as the basis of any Technical Specification.

Atmospheric Dump Valve Change control responsibility for Atmospheric Modifications Dump Valves MSV-25 and MSV-26 from ICS to (77-07-01-11) EFIC. Also, modify existing controls of turbine bypass valves MSV-9, MSV-10, MSV-11, and MSV-14, and convert existing cont rol signals from 110V to 4-20 ma.

1. No, the function of the atmospheric dump valves and turbine bypass valves remain unchanged. Thus, the safety evaluation of the consequences of the accident is unaffected.
2. No, the functional requirements of the atmospheric dump and turbine bypass valves are not being modified; thus, the possibility of a di f ferent type of accident is not applicable.
3. No, the proposed modifications do not affect any Technical Speci fication requi rements.

Remote Shutdown Neutron Flux Install remote shutdown-source range neutron Monitor flux monitor system to meet requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R.

(77-07-01-12)

1. No, the addition of the Remote Shutdown Source range Monitor is intended to pro-vide source range indication to assist in bringing the plant to cold shutdown following an event that require evacua-tion of the control room. The probabil-ity of an occurrence or consequences of an accident is not increased.
2. No, the Remote Shutdown Source Range Monitor does not interface with any plant systems and does not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunc-tion of a different type than analyzed in the FSAR.

0015JWT1/N0126-3 _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ _ _ - - _- _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

FACILITY liODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(77-07-01-12) (Continued- 3. No, the margin of safety is not reduced by addition of this system.

Installation of two post-accident Hydrogen

~

Post Accident Containment Hydrogen Monitoring analyzers, two auxiliary relay cabinets, two (79-11-70-00) L&N recorders, five high pressure gas cylin-ders, and the associated valves, tubing, conduit and cable.

1. No, this installation is required per Reg. Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 and is for Post-Accident Monitoring.

2 No, this equipment performs no control function. It is used for Post-Accident monitoring only.

3. No, this is a Post-Accident Monitoring System, normally not in use.

Generator Power System Stabilizer Install and place in service a Power System (80-10-07-02) Stabilizer (PSS). The PSS provides increased exciter regulator control system damping to prevent generator "overswings" due to trans-mission system disturbances.

1. No, the modification enhances the capa-bility of the Generator Excitation System to respond to Transmission System disturbances and, therefore, may reduce the number of unit trips. The addition of this modification does not diminish the functions of existing equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR. Therefore, the probability of an occurrence or the con-sequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR, is not increased.
2. No, this modification affects the Main Generator Exciter Regulator Control System, which is not important to safety. The Generator Power System Stabilizer is self-monitoring and its failure causes it to bypass itself, and the Control System is then the presently existing Control System.

001SJWT1/N0126-3 ,

1

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(80-10-07-02) Continued 3. No, the Power System Stabilizer (PSS) works in conjunction with the Main Generator Exciter Regulator Control System, which is not a Safety Related System. Upon f ailure of the PSS, it bypasses itself and the existing Control System regulates the Exciter.

Therefore, the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced.

Emergency Feedwater Piping Installation of Piping, Fittings, Valves, Modification and Flow Orifices in the existing Emergency (80-10-66-04) Feedwater System to assure reli ability and operability of the EFW System.

1. No, this system will be utilized in the event of an accident or malfunction of the Main Feedwater System. Emergency Feedwater System functionability is a vital concern aad therefore, per this modification, this system will be up-graded to provide greater reliability and operability.

2 No, four flow control valves have been added to the Emergency Feedwater System to properly maintain steam generator levels. If any of these control valves should f ail, they will f ail in the open position. Since the valve fails in the open position, this will create a greater flow rate to the steam genera-tor. Once the level in the steam gener-ator gets too high the line will be iso-lated and the steam generator level will be allowed to lower.

3 No, the modifications being made to this system offer greater diversity, redundancy, reliability, and operabili-ty than previously. Due to these modi-fications the margin for safety as defined in Technical Specification Appendix A Sections 3.7.1.2 8 4.7.1.2 is increased.

0015dWT1/N0126-3 -

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • Emergency Feedwater Initiation Installation of transmitters required with and Control (EFIC) System the EFIC System and the associated instrument (80-10-66-05) tubing needed for the process connection.

1 No,. the additional transmitters installed in this modification are required only by the EFIC system and do not impact on the safety of other systems.

2 No, this modification is .only an upgrade of the present Emergency Feedwater System, and does not introduce any addi-tional safety hazards.

3. No, this modification is an upgrade of the present Emergency Feedwater System.

ICS/NNI EFW Upgrade Modification Remove the emergency feedwater control func-(80-10-66-12) tion from the Integrated Control System (ICS)

1. No, deletes equipment that is a single action function from a non-safety cate-gory. The hardware associated with control of EFW has been removed from the ICS. Initiation and control of EFW will be performed by the new safety related EFIC System.

2 No, safety-related redundant equipment will be installed to perform the auxil-iary feedwater initiation and control function.

3. No, the auxiliary feedwater system initiation .and control is being upgraded from a non-safety system to a redundant safety grade system.

NI/RPS Signals to EFIC This change modifies each N!/ FPS subsystem by

, (80-1066-13) adding new equipment and wiring inside the subsystem cabinets to provide the following Class each RC 1EPump, output signals;

2) Flux >10%1)F.P.,

Trip) status 3 RPS of chan-nel (subsystem) bypass status and 4) Main Feedwater Pumps AaB tripped and Flux >20%F.P.

4 0015JWT1/N0126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(80-10-66-13) Continued 1. No, this modification is performed to support the requirements of the EFIC and does not affect or change the ability of the NI/ FPS to perform its protective functions. Therefore, the safety evalu-ation as given in the FSAR remains valid.

1 2. No, the equipment added by this modifi-cation is similar to that presently existing in the NI/RPS and is subject to the same type of potential failure modes and effects as demonstrated by the NI/RPS failure modes and effects analysis.

3 No, the equipment added to the NI/RPS by this modification doesn't affect those elements of the system which are con- ,

sidered in determining the margin of safety.

Condenser Hotwell Level Installation of two new level transmitters, (80-10-66-18) CD-100-LT and CD-101-LT, to provide Control Room indication of Condenser 3A and 3B Hot-well level.

1. No, this modification is non-safety related and does not impact any equip-ment in.portant to safety.

2 No, this modification provides indica-tion only. No safety system is impacted i 'by this change.

3 No, the transmitters do not provide a safety-related function.

0015JWT1/N0126-3 1

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • EFIC-Addition of Target Rock Installation of target rock solenoid operated Solenoid Valves valves CHV-90, CHV-97, CHV-101 and CHV-108.

(80-10-66-24) These valves are to act as isolation boundary valves for aligning EFIC air handling unit AHF-54B with the dedicated Appendix 'R' chilled water system.

(

1. No, the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or mal-function of equipment important to safe-ty has not been increased. The modi-fication deals in the addition of valves which are to act as isolation boundary valves between the Appendix "R" chilled water system and the main plant chilled ,

water system. Failure of these valves i will not result in the loss of normal  ;

plant chilled water into the Appendix '

"R" system.

2 No, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type has not been created by this change. The addi-tion of the isolation valves will permit

! the alignment of the EFIC AHU's in the i event of a plant fire which causes the norma.1 plant chilled water system to be inope rable.

3 No, the margin of safety has not been reduced by this modification. Redundant air units are available to ensure con-tinuous air conditioning to the EFIC rooms. The addition of the valves does not impact or change any technical specification limits and surveillance requicements.

Internal RPS Modification This modification changes the RPS RC loop for RC Flow Transmitter flow channels from a 0-10VDC t ransmitter Replacement input signal to a 4 to 20ma transmitter input (81-05-41-02) signal.

1. No, the protective function of the Reactor Pr otection System RC flow chan-nel remains unchanged. The new Square Root Extractor (4 to 20ma input) replaces the existir.g Square Root 0015dWT1/ND126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION
  • 81-05-41-02(Continued) Extractor (0 to 10VDC input) and is

. qualified for Reactor Protection System applications. Additional time delay to the power / delta flux / flow trip is added i by the new Square root Extractor.

2 No, the function of the RC flow channel remains the same. RPS flow channel equipment having a 0 to 10VDC input signal range is being replaced with equipment having a 4 to 20ma input signal range.

3. No, the minimum DNBR Safety Limit for evaluation of RC pump coastdown events does not change as a result of this MAR. The conservative margin from the safety limits any change due to the effects of additional time delay. The effects of the additional time delay added to the power / delta flux / flow trip will be considered in cycle VI reload report to maintain the same margin of safety. The following will be consider-ed. Increased reactor coolant flow, deletion of rod bow penalty and utiliza-tion of RPS string error calculations based on Square Root Sum of the Squares method rather than algebraic addition.

EFP Turbine Steam HELB Restraints The 6 inch Main Steam supply lines to the (81-10-19-01) turbine driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-2) will now have par 6 meters greater than 200*F and 275 psig and will be examined as high energy lines per FPC " Effects of High Energy Piping System Breaks Outside the Reac-tor Building." Therefore, break locations have been identified and pipe rest raints designed to protect vital equipment from pipe movement. Also, equipment will be relocated or a jet shield installed to protect equip-ment in the path of a jet.

1. No, the 6 inch main Steam lines to the Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-2) are being analyzed as high energy lines in order to eliminate condensation. During testing, the turbine driven EFWP was D015JWT1/N0126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(81-10-19-01). Continued tripping due to a large amount of con-densation existing in the lines when MSV-55 and MSV-56 were closed. By open-ing MSV-55 and MSV-56 and analyzing the

. Main Steam lines as high energy, the condensation in the lines will be elimi-i nated. Thus, the probability' of a mal-i function of the turbine driven EFWP will not be increased.

2 No, since the 6 inch main Steam lines to I the turbine driven EFWP are now high energy, break' locations have been postulated. The possibility of a break occurring on these lines and a jet striking equipment important to safety was not previously evaluated in the FSAR, however was reported in LER #81-068. This design package' provides reso . i lution to the LER and is consistent with previous Safety Analysis methodology.

3 No, the margin of safety is not reduced i by this modification since pipe re- L straints are being designed to restrain i pipe movement, and equipment that could  :

be hit by a jet.is being relocated.

! Hi-Range Gamma Detection Installation of redundant hi-range gamma ,

! (81-12 02-00) detection modules as required per Reg. Guide  ;

1.97 for post-accident detection of signifi-l cant releases, release assessment, long-tern surveillance, and emergency plan actuation.

i

1. No, this equipment is a monitoring system only. It does not impact any control system which affects a safe

! shutdown of the plant.

i 2. No, equipment supplies additional post-accident information only and in no way creates the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type.

3. No, this is a monitoring system only.

it does not impact any control or shut- .

j down system.

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1 i D015JWT1/ND126-3

, FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 79-01B Transmitter Replacement Replace 14 existing electric t ransmitters (82-05-24-04) with units qualified to NRC IE Bulletin 79-018 and perform circuit modifications to ensure compatible operation of the new trans-mitters with existing instrument circuits.
1. No, the modification includes trans-mitter replacements only, which upgrade these devices to qualified status.
2. No, the modi fication includes replace-ment only and does not add or subtract from existing device performance.
3. No, Technical Specifications are un-affected by this modification.

Appendix R - Cable Tray and Fire protection will be provided for elec-Conduit Protection trical raceways and the associated supports (82-10-19-04) by installing fire barrier material on specific cable trays, conduit, and/or sup-porting structural components.

1. No, the enclosing of electrical raceways does not impact the reliability of elec-trical cables. Ampacity derating has been evaluated for power cables to assure that design limitations are not exceeded, and raceway supports will be reviewed tn assure seismic integrity for additional weight loading. Supports will be modified if required.

2 No, only the fireproofing on electrical raceways and associated supports is being performed by this modification.

No new components that would alter existing system logic are being installed.

3. No, system function reliability is not changed by enclosing electrical raceways with fire rated material. The installa-tien of this material on electrical raceways actually enhances the reliabil-ity of the system to function as required by the Technical Specification.

D015JWT1/ND126-3 - __ ____ _ _ -____________________- - _______ - _ __ _ _ _ ____ - - _ _

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • Appendix R - Control Complex This modification adds a dedicated chilled-Dedicated Cooling System water cooling system and individual cooling (82-10-19-09) units to the control complex (CC) areas list-ed below:
a. New remote shutdown room (CC el 108 ft 0 in.)
b. Divisions A and B 4160-V switchgear rooms (CC el 108 ft 0 in.)
c. Divisions A and B inverter rooms (CC el 108 ft 0 in.)
d. Divisions A and B battery charger rooms (CC el 108 ft 0 in.)
e. Divisions A and B 480-V switchgear rooms (CC el 124 ft 0 in.)
f. EFIC rooms (CC el 124 ft 0 in.)

1 No, the modification adds a dedicated chilled water cooling system and sepa-rate cooling units to those control com-plex areas (listed above) which are required to ensure the safe shutdown capability of CR3 in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.

The installation of this modification will require revision to CR3 FSAR Sec-tion 9.7, Plant Ventilation Systems, to describe the additions installed by this modification. It is concluded that this nodification will not increase the prob-ability of an occurrence or the conse-quence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as evalu-ated previously in the FSAR.

2. No, the nodification provides a dedi-cated cooling system for the Control Complex to preserve the safe shutdown capability of the plant in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R. Therefore, it is concluded that the modification does not create the possibility or malfunc-tion of a different type than any previ-ously eyaluated in the FSAR.

D015JWT1/ND126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(82-10-19-09) Continued 3. No, the modification does not interface with the existing control . complex ventilation system and does not reduce the margin of safety in the control room emergency ventilation system as described in Section 3/4.7.7 of CR3's technical specification.

Appendix R - FS Sprinkler This modification installs new fire service -

System Installation sprinkler system additions at EL 124'-0" of (82-10-19-21) the control complex and EL 95'-0" and 119'-0" of the auxiliary and intermediate buildings.

1. No, the modification provides additional fi re protection / suppression capability to comply with the requirements of.

10CFR50, Appendix R. It has been designed to the requirements of CR3 FSAR Section 9.8.1.2. Installation of the modification will require revision to FSAR Section 9.8.1.2, paragraph e, to describe the additional areas being pro-vided with sprinkler protection.

2. No, the modification provides additional safe shutdown capability as required by 10CFR50, Appendix R. While the modifi-cation does not prevent a particular fire event, it will extinguish the fire so as to protect nearby safety-related equipment and preserve the safe shutdown capability of the plant.

3 No, the modification is an addition to the existing plant fi re protection system and is being installed to increase the safe shutdown capability of the plant. It will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases section 3/4.7.11 of the CR3 technical specification.

0015JWT1/N0126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

1. No, the utilization of the shunt trip function provides an additional safety grade trip actuation of each control rod drive trip breaker. The CRD Trip Breaker Shunt Trip actuation is a redundant backup to the CRD trip breaker undervoltage coil trip function.
2. The utilization of the shunt trip func-tion provides redundant safety grade trip actuation- of each CRD trip breaker. Safety grade environmental and seismically qualified components are used in the design. Separation and isolation between safety grade and non-safety grade channels is maintained in the design as outlined in IEEE 384-1974.
3. No, the shunt trip is a redundant backup to the CRD trip breaker undervoltage trip. The addition of the shunt trip function does not add additional time delay to that included in the safety analysis for the undervoltage trip. l Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the technical specification has not boon reduced.

Water Storage Tan < Instrumentation Pr niide permanent electrical heat tracing for Freeze Protection the sensing lines to fire service water (84-02-16-01) storage tank level indicators FS-1-LI and FS-2-LI and to the condensate storage tank level instrument impulse line from CDV-48 to the penetration of this line into the turbine bldg. Replace ambient thermostat FS-49-TS with a bulb / capillary thermostat where the bulb is remotely mounted to the 1/2" 0 l

sensing line for the fire service level l

indicators FS-1-L1 and FS-2-LI. New thermo-I stat to act as temp. switch which locally alarms at fire service panel upon heat trace 0015JWT1/ND126-3 L__________.__._

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(84-02-16-01) Continued f ailure (when sensing line temp. is at or below 32*F), setpoint for temp. switch is 34*F.

1. No, the function of FS-49-TS as it applies to FSAR Section 9.8.2.1.C enhances system response time by being remotely mounted directly to the level sensing lines of FST 3A and 3B providing fr r a greater margin of safety and reliability.

2 No, the possibility of FST water level instrument line freezing (FSAR Section 9.8.2.1.A) is eliminated by the perma-nent electrical heat tracing provided under this MAR.

3. No, the installation of (thermostatical-ly controlled) permanent heat tracing will now protect the level sensing lines from f reezing and prevent errant level indication for maintaining the min.

water volume per Tech. Spec. 3.7.11.1.B.

RCP Snubber Optimization Disable or remove the existing thirty-two (84-11-02-01) (32) large bore hydraulic RC pump snubbers.

A minimum of eight (8) existing snubbers will be removed and replaced with four (4) new smaller snubbers and four (4) rigid link-bars. The remaining twenty-four (24) snub-bers will be disabled or removed as the situ-ation dictates.

1. No, the requirement to provide protec-tion for pipe breaks in the RCS main loop primary piping will no longer be necessary due to NRC granting an exemp-tion from G00-4 for the main loop pip-ing. Thus, modifications specified in this MAR to RC pump supports will not affect the LCCA design bases since analysis of large breaks will no longer be required.
2. No, possibility is decreased due to overall reliability increase in primary piping and due to enhanced awareness of system monitoring equipment and l

0015JWT1/N0126-3 l

FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION *

(84-11-02-01) Continued standards. In addition, other accidents previously enveloped by main loop pipa breaks were reviewed and were found ".o not affect the Final Safety Analysis Report.

3. No, margins of safety are not reduced as large bore snubbers are removed since the overall reliability of the system is increased.

Makeup Tank Pressure Alarms This modification provides for lowering of (85-04-09-01) the high pressure alarm for MU tank from 40 PSIG to 15 PSIG. Also update the existing engineering documents to the data provided by this MAR.

1. No, this modification does not alter the functional performance of MU tank. By lowering tank high pressure alarm to 15 PSIG, unnecessary generati on of waste gas, which must be vented to atmosphere is avoided, thus preventing p rsonnel exposure to waste gas ( ALARA). There-fore the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in FSAR is not increased.
2. No, no control circuit design is modi-fied. Only the high pressure alarm setting is lowered. Therefore the probability of a different type of acci-dent than that previously evaluated in FSAR is not created.
3. No, alarm setting is within the safe operating limits. Technical specifica-tions are unchanged by this modi ficati on.

0015JWT1/ND126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • RCP-1C & 10 Shaft Replacements Remove and replace the RC pump shafts. Some

'(86-02-10-01) ' design changes have been made by_ Byron Jack-son Pump Division with respect- to shaft con-figuration, shaft material, journal attach-ment, and impeller configuration.

1. No, the modification to the pump shafts consist of material, configuration, and fabrication changes which will not affect the fit-up, structural integrity or function of the pumps.
2. No, the Reactor Coolant System has been evaluated for a combination of pump malfunctions, (FSAR 14.1.2.6). The modifications to these pumps should not create a different type accident than already addressed in the FSAR.

3 No..the performance of the pumps should not be compromised by the modification.

NOTE: There will be no 10CFR50.59 report for the removal and replacement of the shaf ts on RCP-1A and 18. ' Removal and replacement of RCP-1A and IB shafts was considered a maintenance action since the replacement shafts were identical to those removed.

ARTS Bypass Setpoint Raise the arming threshold setpoint for (86-04-21-01) Anticipatory Reactor Trip (ART) on the Turbine Trip Bypass bistable from 20% to 30%

power.

1. No, this modification will reduce the f possibility of unnecessary challenges to plant safety systems. Therefore, the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunc-tion of equipment important to safety, j as previously evaluated in the FSAR, is not increased.
2 No, this modification will reduce the

! possibility of any undue risk on equip-ment important to safety caused by l

unnecessary challenges to the pl ant safety systems. Therefore, the possi-bility for an accident or malfunction of a different type, than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, has not been i

created.

l i

i 0015JWT1/ND126-3 FACILITY MODIFICATION ' DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 86-04-21-01 (Continued) 3. No, the margin of safety,. as defined in the basis . of any technical specifica-tion, is not reduced because the new setpoint of 30% power for the Turbine Trip Bypass bistable is considered safe and acceptable. .It ~ has been determined that' the plant; is, successfully capable of a turbine . trip- runback at power

-levels less than 30% without a reactor trip due to high pressure. In fact, the new setpoint will . avoid unnecessary challenges to the plant safety systems and result in fewer plant trips..

Addition of L.P. Nitrogen Tank Install an additional L.P. Nitrogen Tank and And Pad on East Side of Beam its supporting concrete pad on the east side (86-06-24-01) of plant directly north of the existing L.P.

Nitrogen Tank. Vendor (Liquid Ai r) will deliver tank, place it on pad, anchor it to pad and do all piping cross connects. In addition, they will add another pressure regulating valve which will be identified as NGV-259. Therefore, this MAR installs the concrete pad foundation only and also the .

vehicle guard posts on east side of new pad.

1.- No, the installation of an additional L.P. Nitrogen Tank enhances the plant's capability to provide nitrogen to the core flood system tanks. Therefore, the probability or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is reduced. .

2. No, installing an addition L.P. Nitrogen Tank will not create any possibility for an accident or malfunction. The addi-

. tional tank will provide adequate storage reserves for enhanced plant performance.

3. No, the Liquid Nitrogen Tanks are not defined in the basis for any Technical Secification. Therefore, the installa-tion of an additional tank will not affect any margins of safety.

- D015JWT1/ND126-3 . _ _ .

L FACILITY MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • Modify New Fuel Storage Rack Modify the existing new fuel storage rack by (86-11-07-01) " blocking out" one row of each of the Type

'E' racks ~. Modification will utilize a carbon steel plate clamping device that will prohibit any attempts to insert fuel into the upper openings of the (2) rcts in question.

1. No, the new access platform for FHCR-7 will be designated to Seismic Class I requirements which ensures that equip-ment or components identified as safety related per FSAR 9.3.2.2 are not jeopardized.

R2. No, FSAR Section 9.3.2.2 evaluates the factors regarding the performance of various components near the Spent Fuel Pool. The addition of the access plat-form does not change any accident condi-tions or scenarios that were previously evaluated.

3. No, the original design basis for the Spent Fuel Pool and components has not been changed.

0015JWT1/ND126-3

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PROCEDURE CHANGE- DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • Meteorological System SP-157-A, page 11 and 12, Enclosures 3 and 4 Surveillance'(Daily) state that the best source of backup data, if t

-(SP-157-A, Rev. 3) .. for any reason the ensite meteorological-data system becomes unavailable, is from the Cross City National- Weather Service Station.. How-ever, there is no available measurement of atmospheric stability from that source. For-this information, data must be obtained from the National Weather Service in Tampa Florida.

1. No, only the ' location of weather sta-tions has changed which - will not increase -the probability of. an accident-or malfunction of equipment.
2. No, the weather station location change does not create the probability of a.

different type accident or malfunction of equipment.

3. No, Technical Specifications are - not affected.

Radioactive Shipment Certificates A revision is necessary to the procedure to

-of Compliance update it to current regulations and. add new

-(WP-102, Rev. 11) casks.
1. No, this revision insures all equipment is handled the same as that evaluated in the FSAR.
2. No, this change only affects the type casks evaluated in the FSAR and similar ones.
3. No, this procedure has no effect on any Technical Specification.

i

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e I

i ), -j r 1 1 ,

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! - Dd15JWT1/ NG126-3 A

PROCEDURE CHANGE DESCRIPTION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • Reactor Coolant, Makeup, and Decay By remaining within tolerances of other Heat System's Chemistry analyzed parameters, total solids are not a Scheduling Program concern.

(CH-410, Rev. 8)

1. No, other analyses normally run will monitor the RCS for solid content.

2 No, removal of the Total Solids require-ment while maintaining other chemical parameter within limits does not create a different type of accident.

3. No, the margin of safety is not reduced by maintaining other chemistry limits.

Secondary Coolant System The FSAR must be revised to reflect the Chemistry Scheduling Program analyses that are performed at CR-3. By (CH-424, Rev. 8) remaining within the tolerances of the other parameters that are analyzed, total solids are not a concern.

1. No, other analyses normally run will monitor the feedwater for solids content.
2. No, removal of the Total Solids require-ment and increasing the pH limit by 0.3 pH does not create a different type of accident as evaluated. These are feed-water chemistry limits. Other param-eters are monitored to insure problems do not exist.
3. No, maintaining other feedwater chemistry limits and raising pH by 0.3 units will not reduce the margin of safety.

0015JWT1/ND126-3 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N00-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 5.6.4.3.2 Isolatiu Valve 1. No, the test requirement eliminated by Test Fre;1uency this proposed revision will be satisfied by other Surveillance Procedures at CR-3.

2 No, the same tests will be performed.

3. No, proper surveillance of Containment Isolation valve closure times and leak-age characteristics will be maintained.

Various FSAR Editorial Change 1. No, editorial changes are the changes Sections being made.

2 No, editorial changes only are being made.

3. No, editori al changes are the only changes.

Various Chapter 3 1. No, the Reload Report SER's for these Sections changes have been issued by the NRC. It has been determined that these changes are bounded by existing analyses in the FSAR.

2. No, the SER's for these changes have been issued by the NRC and these analy-ses are bounded by existing FSAR analysis.
3. No, the Reload Report SER's have been issued by the NRC. Margin of safety is not reduced by these changes.

D015JWT1/ND126-3 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N00-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 7.4.5.C Occupancy 1. No, use of existing furniture has been evaluated and found to be within accept-eLle fire loading parameters.
2. No, no new types of accident or malfunc-tion are created by this change.
3. No, Technical Specifications margin of safety concerns are not impacted by this change.

5.6.4.3 Isolation Valves 1. No, the isolation valve testing require-ments meet 10CFR50, Appendix J and full ESAS testing is performed during refuel-ing.

2. No, no changes in isolation valve position or function are being made.
3. No, the Technical Specification requi rement to perform surveillance testing is not affected by this change.

Chapters EFIC and Emergency 1. No, this change incorporated a descrip-7 & 10 Feedwater tion of the Emergency Feedwater Initia-tion and Control (EFIC) System. This system is requi red by NUREG-0737 to reduce accident consequences.

2. No, the EFIC system design has been .

installed to reduce the accident consequences.

3. No, this change is a description of a system already approved by Technical Specification for use at CR-3 D015JWT1/ ND126-3 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N0D-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION
  • Appendix 12C . Licensed Operator 1. No, there has been no reduction in the Requalification scope, du ration , or frequency of the Training Program program.

Description

2. No, there has been no change in the technical content of the program.
3. No, training is not defined or described in the basis of any Technical Specifica-tion.

7.4.5 Flame Test 1. No, flame testing of cables is done in accordance with applicable industry standards as addressed in Design Bases documents.

2. No, this change to the FSAR allows the FPC the latitude to use the latest industry standard for flame testing.'
3. No, flame testing is defined in the Technical Specification basis.

12.1 Organization 1. No, organization structu re change to agree with corporate policies.

2. .No, organization structure does not change plant operation philosophy.
3. No, change in organization is aimed at strengthening management control.

12.4 Emergency Plan 1. No, documentation change to indicate latest revision of the Emergency Plan (EP) which has been approved by the NRC. ,

1

2. No, documentation change to indicate latest revision of the EP.
3. No, documentation change to indicate latest revision of the EP.

D015JWT1/ND126-3 1

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N0D-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 6.1.2.1.1 High Pressure 1. No, the accident analyses remain the Injection same.

2 No, failures in HPI and RBI&C are ade-quately covered in the FSAR.

3. No, procedures SP-135A, B, & C are in full accord with the STS basis.

Chapters Fuel Handling 1. No, this change is being made to bring 389 4% Enrichment the FSAR into agreement with the Techni-cal Specification approved by Amendment No. 92 to the operating license.

2. No, a different accident has not been created since this change brings the FSAR into agreement with the operating license.
3. No, the Technical Specification was approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 92 to the operating license.

, 2.6.1 Radiological 1. No, this change to the FSAR is to update Environmental the document with current requi rements Monitoring Program imposed on CR-3 by Amendment No. 69 to the Technical Specification.

2. No, this change is an administrative update to the FSAR associated with sampling stations of the environmental monitoring program as required by Amend-ment No. 69 to the Technical Specifica-tion.
3. No, this change is to assure that thr; FSAR stays current with the Technical-Specifications.

0015JWT1/ND126-3 I

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N0D-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 2.6.4 Radiological 1. No, the radiological environmental moni-Envi ronmental toring p rogram, as per the Technical Monitoring Program Specifications' Bases, is a supplemental monitoring program to verify that the measurable concentrations of radioactive materials and levels of radiation are not higher than expected on the basis of the routine radiological effluent measurements and controls. Therefore, the elimination of the 3% of annual average 10CFR20 dose action point in the FSAR does not di rectly affect the controls or criteria by which effluents are managed. The 3% action point is an after-the-fact feedback mechanism to enhance the information gained on nuclide concentrations in environmental pathways, and has no direct impact on the mitigation of an accident.

The existing radiological environmental monitoring program has established limits and action points in the Techni-cal Specifications which are- based on NUREG 0472 evaluations. The concentra-tion limits and measurement criteria listed in the Technical Specificati ons are designed to provide information on radionuclides in those exposure pathways which lead to the highest potential radiation exposure for an individual member of the public due to effluent releases from CR-3. Once triggered, the Technical Specification action statement requires a Special Report be submitted to the NRC providing details on the problem and action taken to enhance treatment system performance to reduce the radionuclide concentration in the envi ronment. This type action is more effective than the actions presently requi red by the FSAR once 3% of the annual average dose is exceeded.

D015dWT1/ND126-3

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..v.

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N00-11' J

. FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 2.6.4 (Continued) 2. No, the ' elimination of, the 3% of annual

! average dose requirement from the FSAR does not create any new potential acci-dent conditions, nor does it reduce the ability to detect potential problems due to radioactive effluent releases. The existing-_ Technical Specifications require actions to be taken in a timely manner. that are more directly relatable to the reduction of radioactive effluent releases, and therefore, provide a more rapid reduction of off-site dose.

3 No, the . FSAR 3% dose trigger is not

. reflected in the Technical Specifica-tions and therefore, its elimination

, does not impact the margin of. safety as defined in the Technical Speci fication Bases.

1.5.8, Documents and 1. No, these changes incorporate B&W docu--

4.2.2 & Abbreviations ments located throughout the FSAR text 4

7.3.2 into one Table in Chapter 1. An indus-c try accepted abbreviation is added to F the text.

2. No, these changes are considered edito-rial in nature and do not affect acci-dents or malfunctions. T I 3 No, these changes are editorial and do

- not affect the Technical Specification.

I j 7.2.3 & ICS & EFIC 1. No, these changes are editorial and i 10.2.1 clarify the function of the ICS and EFIC systems.

2 .No, the EFIC system was designed to mitigate steam and feedwater breaks and these changes clarify the FSAR wording.

3. No, these changes are to clarify the relationship between the ICS and EFIC
systems and the margin of safety is not
reduced.

] 0015JWT1/ND126-3 .

a 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N00-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • Various FSAR Appendices 1. No, no changes have been made to the content of the pages. To account for all pages in the FSAR, page numbers have been changed or added.
2. No, no material has been added or deleted to the text. Only page numbers have been added cr changed.
3. No, the margin of safety is not reduced by making page number changes or additions.

2.4.2.3 Hurricane Tide 1. No, the revision to the FSAR does not Analysis require any physical modification to the plant facility, it redefines and clari-fies the FSAR description of the intake canal dimensions.

2. No, a revision to the FSAR which clari-fies the intake canal dimension does not create the possibility of any type of accident or malfunction.
3. No, the revision to the FSAR does not affect any requirement of the Technical Specification.

8.2.3.3 Offsite Power 1. No, the addition of a new battery at Reliability CR-2 serves to provide protection for CR-3's offsite power reliability. This battery will support the functions and load originally analyzed in the FSAR.

2. No, the FSAR analysis depends upon the functioning of a battery to provide protection of offsite power sources.

The new battery performs this function.

D015JWT1/N0125-3 , _ , _ _ _ - - _ . -. _ _ .

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N0D-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 8.2.3.3 (Continued)- 3. No, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.a will be met by addition of this new battery. Surveillance of this battery will be the same as presently required.

These actions will not change the bases for insuring operability of ' AC ' and DC power sources.

10.2.3 Portable Boiler 1. No, the modification was completed using Tie-In construction standards and materials equal to or better than the existing piping and maintains the same reliabili-ty as the original system.

2. No, the modification does not alter the function or operation of any equipment evaluated in the FSAR.
3. No, this modification does not affect any Technical Specification bases.

Figure 8-9 Emergency Diesel 1. No, this change shows the actual diesel Generator generator control that was initially evaluated.

2. No, this is a drawing change only and occurred because of a drafting error.
3. No, the control system remains the same as previously evaluated.

1 1.7 Quality Program 1. No, this proposed change to reflect the reorganization of the Nuclear Operations Department is an editorial change only.

No changes to plant operations or equip-ment are involved.

2. No, this proposed change to reflect the reorganization of the Nuclear Operations Department is an editorial change only.

No changes to plant operations or equip-ment are involved.

D015dWT1/ND126-3 , . . --. -. - - . - _ - _ _ - - . . . . - . .-

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS ON FSAR CHANGES PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE N00-11 FSAR SECTION IDENTIFICATION / SAFETY EVALUATION

  • 1.7-(Continued) 3. No, the frequency and scope of the quality activities performed as required by the plant Technical Specifications are not changed by this editorial FSAR revision.

1.7 Quality Program 1. No, the proposed change involves clari-fication to codes and standards previ-ously committed to. The change is administrative in nature.

2. No, the proposed change involves clari-fication to codes and standards previ-ously committed to. The change is administrative in nature.
3. No, the proposed change is administra-tive in nature and has no relevance to the margin of safety.

Table 5-4 Isolation Valves 1. No, this is an editorial change which makes Table 5-4 consistent with the flow diagrams.

2. No, no modifications to the plant are involved therefore there are no changes to systems or hardware.
3. No, this change does not affect the Bases section of the Technical Specifications.

1.1 Introduction 1. No, these changes clarify the require-ments under which the FSAR was submit-ting by defining applicable data.

2. No, there are no changes to equipment or procedures, only clarifications to sub-mittal dates.
3. No, the Technical Specifications are not affected by these changes since the change only establish submittal dates.

0015dWT1/N0126-3

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