ML20207T192

Press Release Discussing Criminal History Checks for All Individuals Granted Unescorted Access to Nuclear Power Facilities or Access to Safeguards Info

ML20207T192
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/07/1986
From:	NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA)
To:
Shared Package
ML19310E127	List: ML20204G579 ML20205F299 ML20207B348 ML20207E812 ML20207S675 ML20207S684 ML20207S696 ML20207S748 ML20207S967 ML20207S972 ML20207S983 ML20207S995 ML20207T007 ML20207T022 ML20207T044 ML20207T063 ML20207T079 ML20207T095 ML20207T101 ML20207T116 ML20207T135 ML20207T149 ML20207T192 ML20207T233 ML20207T244 ML20207T257 ML20207T269 ML20207T300 ML20207T314 ML20207T337
References
FRN-51FR40438, RULE-PR-73 AC27-2-26, PR-86-156, NUDOCS 8703230296
Download: ML20207T192 (2)

Text

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NUCLEAR DEGULATORY COMMISSION

! V f5l WM/ office of Pubus Attenre Washington, D.C. 20M

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86-156 FOR D91EDIATE RELEASE No.

Tel. 301/492-7715 (Friday, November 7,1986)

NRC PROPOSES CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECX REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSEES The Nuclear Regulation Consnission is considering amendments to its regula-tions which would implement Public Law 99-399. "The Omnibus Diplomatic Security cnd Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986." The Act requires utility owners of nuclear power facilities, or applicants for licenses to operate nuclear power facilities, to obtain criminal history checks for all individuals who are to be granted unescorted access to nuclear power facilities or who have access to Safeguards Information. The law also requires that the NRC issue requirements to establish conditions for the use and control of the criminal history data received from the FBI.

Safeguards Information is detailed information regarding licensee plans for the protection of special nuclear material and/or security measures for the physical protection and locations of plant equipment vital to safety.

As proposed, the NRC would require applicants and licensees to fingerprint each individual requiring unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or who have access to Safeguards Information. The fingerprints then would be submitted, through the NRC, to the Attorney General of the United States for a criminal history check.

Licensees would be required to use information obtained as part of a criminal history records check solely for the purpose of detennining an individual's suitability for unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information.

As proposed, a final determinatien to deny an individual access could not be based solely upon: an arrest more than one year old for which there is no

. information of the disposition of the case or an arrest that resulted in dismissal nf the charge or an acquittal.

Further, any dental, revocation, or suspension of unesenrted access to a nuclear power facility or to Safeguards Information resulting from a criminal history check would have to be based solely upon consideration that the individual has been arrested or corvicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses indicating criminal tendencies.

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Licensees also would be prohibited from using the inforination obtained as the result of a criminal history check for any purposes except those described ,'

and licensees, or any other person, would be prohibited from engaging in any activities that would infringe upon the Constitutional rights of any individual or in any activity that would discriminate against an individual on  :

the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age. ,

The proposed rule also would establish procedures for processing of

. fingerprint checks, for individuals to have correct and complete information about their criminal history checks, and for protection of the information obtained as a result of the checks.

Written consents on the proposed amendments to Part 73 of the Commission's regulations should be received by December 8,1986. They should  ;

i be addressed to the Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.

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CCL Docketing and Scr/ico Branch Socrotary of the Ccmission UllTC-1411 U. S. Nuclear Regulator / Ccmission Washington, CC 20555 Ccetas m 10 GR 73.57 Pursuant to Fodoral Psiister 40440, data! Novmber 7,1986, Proposed Pulos, the following contmnts aro hereby autmitted on 10 C R 73.57 (proposed). *

" Individuals who do not havo unoscorted acccas after 10 CR 73.57{b)(1)

, shall bo fingerprinted by the licensco and the results of the criminal hinter / records check shall be used in nuking a detozmiru-tion for granting unoscortel access to the nucioar power facility."

The proccoding statumnt gives the irpressicn that the crim12ul hister/ check nust bo returned to the licensco prior to the datorminatien being .mado to grant unescortal access. The ecmission is wil aviro of the necessity to process largo nuntors of personnel for unescortal access rapidly for an outago. Tho averai;c turnaround tima given is 25 working days to recoivo the criminal histcr/ check. Unicn Electric is fimly cppesod to this requircimnt. The rulo should allow tho granting of tr.eucertal access upcn sutnittal of the fingerprints. In tho event the crimuul histcr/ check produces grounds for ravckin; uncacorted access, it can bo dono upon recolpt of tho crimhsi histor/ check.

10 CTR 73.57(b) (5 t 6) - indicates the samo, i.e. , the licensco ahall utili:o the check in mking tho determination prior to tho granting of unescortal access.

10 CR 73.57(c) (i) (11) - indicates that cortain critoria may not to sololy usal to deny unescartal accans. Tho guidanco is scmhat arrbiguoua in tlut it deos tot appnir to ecver plea bar;aira, numrcus arrests for similar charyca, Morred inpenition of sentence, etc. Miny carcar criminals nunipulato tho crininal justico system with plea bargaining arrangmonts and appur to havo no aorious convictions ovon though they continucualy violato the law.

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t UIMC-1411 i Novernber 20, 1986 Page 2 In conclusion, it is the opinion of Union Electric that licensees not be given arrest information on personnel applying for unescorted access or access to safeguards information. The information released by the justice department should be restricted to conviction information.

his method best ensures tha". the individuals are afforded due process of law in that they have been ajudicated guilty by a court of law and only the information is utilized in determining their eligibility for unescorted access.

C C Gf D. Naslurd

• er Operations Support ~

Ct.N/JAC/tfr cx:: Mr. C. W. Hehl, Chief 1

Project Section 2A U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Ccamission

, Region III

799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Bruce Little callaway Pesident office 3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatcry Ccmmission

PR$1 Staecknan, 10 65077 Paul O' Conner Office of Nuclear Reactor Pagulation ,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission j Mail Stop P-316 i

7920 Norfolk Avenue  !

Bethesda,PC 20014 a

j Nicholas A. Petrick Executive Director SiUPPS j

5 Choke cherr/ Poad Rockville, 10 20850 i

Manager, Electric Cepart:nent Missouri Public Service Ccrmission

! P. O. Box 360 i

Jefferson City, .t 65102 I

bec: N. Dato (S. L. Austcr$s (470) 34M-0021. 6 G56.37 CCN Chrono CP/N-1 '

D. P. Schnell ,.

R. J. Schukai S. E. Miltenberge:-

' Licensing (A. C. Pasruator/D. E. Shafor/D. J. Walker) (470)

Ccrpliance (J. E Davis)

Quality Assurance (P. D. Fiold, A. P. Neu.\114to, R. L Powers)

NSPS (S. L. Auston) (470) .

H. Wucrttabaccher (100) e J. H. D*dth (Bechtel) ,

O. M1ynsed (EC&E)

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S A LTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC 'X*E' CHARLES CENTER P.O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

~86 CEC -5 All :59 HrRsERT D. Coss, JR. Cf:

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Secretary of the Comission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing Service Branch The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company respectfully submits comments ,

regarding the proposed rule, 10CFR73.57, Requirements for Criminal History Checks of Individuals Granted Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or access to Safeguards Information by Power Reactor Licensees, published in the November 7, 1986, Federal Register.

This letter transmits and summarizes our Corporate position regarding the proposed rule. Our detailed comments and suggested ward changes are included in Attachment A. I We would be pleased to discuss these comments with the NRC staff or answer any questions which may arise.

Sincerely, v dm H. D. Coss Vice President General Services s

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• Page 1 of 2 s1 4 Comments Concerning The y -

-Requirement'for Criminal History Checks Federal Register Vol. 51, No. 216 November 7, 1986

' 10 CFR 73.57 c,

Item I. - Commission Question (page 40439), "Should fingerprinting be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?"

BGsE Comment - Recommend fingerprinting all individuals granted unescorted s

access to the nuclear power f acility.

. Item II. - Proposed Regulatory Statements t A. 73.57(b)(ll, "Each licensee subject to the provisions of this section

, shall fingerprint each individual, except NRC employees and individuals responding to a site emergency in accordance with the provisions of .

'c 73.55(a), who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power f acility or access to Safeguards Information."

BG&E Ccaments - We recommend the NRC publish guidance on acceptable methods and procedures for obtaining fingerprints of contractor employees who are not located on the licensee's premises but have a requirement for access to Safeguards Information.

B. 73.57(b)(3) " Fingerprints need not be taken, in the discretion of licensee, if an individual who is a permanent employee of a licensee, contractor, manufacturer or supplier have been granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or to Safeguards Information by another '

licensee, based in part on criminal history records checks under this section."

BG&E Comments - We recommend the NRC establish a clearinghouse process to g s . advise licensees submitting an individual's fingerprints, that the c '

, individual (s) had previously been granted unescorted access at more than one r facility. We further recommend including a' time period such as, " granted unescorted access within the last 365 days" or "has possessed continuous

, unescorted access since the criminal record check was conducted."

l C. 73. 57 (d) (3) " Fees for processing of fingerprint checks are due upon

application.

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BGEE Comments - We recommend the NRC/ FBI afford the nuclear industry the same privileges offered chartered banking institutions (PL 92-544), securities and exchange industry (PL 94-29(15 U.S.C. 78q)) and the Commodity Futures Trading Connission (7 U.S.C.12a) . Since monthly billing is more efficient and economical than issuing daily checks.

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Att0chment A Page 2 of 2 D. 73.57(e) (2) ",If af ter reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect-or incomplete in any respect and wishes changes, corrections, or updating of the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the licensee shall inform the individual of proper procedures for reviewing the record or including explanation in the record."

BGEE Comments - Revise this paragraph to reflect that at the licensee's discretion.any revisions to the records may be required to be made at the individuals expense and on the individuals own time. Additionally, that unescorted access or access to Safeguards Infdormation will be held in abeyance pending resolution of the matter (s) .

E. 73.57(f) (4) "The licensee shall make criminal history records obtained under this section available for examination on-site by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws".

BG&E Comments - Recommend revising this paragraph to permit retention of criminal history check information at either the corporate headquarters or on-site. Most sites possess only a badging capability. When a criminal history record contains adverse information, the final decision on granting unescorted access is normally made at the corporate headquarters where the vice-presidents and legal counsel are located and not at the site.

Item III. - Additional Comments Temporary access - Recommend adding a paragraph 73.57(b) (7) " Temporary unescorted access may ba granted not to excecd 180 days in any 365 day period. This temposary clearance may be granted based on, (a) psssing a psychological evaltation within the last 365 days, (b) completion of a credit check, (c) recommendation of one developed character reference check with an individual who has had frequent contact with the applicant, (d) fingerprints were submitted to the NRC prior to granting the access.

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W SM YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (51fA44Q%yll.yo*l,J'00 FYC 86-016

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1671 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massdchusetts 01701 ,;r Dece g r gg g 6A1C :40 86 DEC -8 6 Secretary of the Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission ;Fi -

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Washington, DC 20555 E '

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Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Rule, " Requirements for Criminal History Checks" (FR Doc. 86-25393)

YankeeAtomicElecbricCompany(YAEC)appreciatestheopportunity to coment on the subject proposed rule on requirements for criminal history checks. YAEC owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts.

Our Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services for other nuclear power plants in the Northeast, including Vermont -

Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook.

We believe that information obtained from the crimina.1 history check required by this proposed rule may contribute to the ability of licensee management to assess and determine the reliability and trustworthiness of its employees. We comend the Commission for recognizing the need for less stringent security controls at construction sites than operating plants and the need for a flexible approach to screening employees and/or contractors from other licensed facilities. The rule as proposed, hcwever, is silent on an issue critical to making this a rule that can be realistically implemented by licensees.

'Ihe proposed rule does not set forth a provision en temporary clearances.

As we understand it, NRC and NUMARC have agreed that submission of fingerprints constitutes adequate action to warrant granting of temporary clearances.

This provision is very important. Such an approach would allow licensees to more efficiently deal with planned and unexpected outages. Without this provision, an individual'n employment status would be held in abeyance during processing of the fingecprint form. Furthermore, protracted turnaround times for processing the fingerprints would lenghton the hiring process such that a licensee could be effectively prevented from hiring the best qualified candidates in some cases. Additionally, when faced with an immediate need for temporary workers,a licensee could well be prevented from hiring enough and thus incur prolonged and costly outages. To preclude such negative impacts, we strongly urge the Commission to incorporate a provision for temporary clearances along the lines discussed between NUMARC and the Staff.

We also recommend that a provision be incorporated for grandfathering individuals permanently employed by a licensee for at least five continuous years from the effective date of the final rule. This allowance would certainly be in line with NRC's past acceeptance of industry's use of a statement of good standing (the so-called " good guy" letters) when hiring contractors or bcrrowing other licensee's employees, and in line with ,

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Secretary of the Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Page 2 the Comission's endorsement of the NUMARC guideline on access authorization, which requires that certain aspects.of the background investigation span an individual's past five years. Furthermore, grandfathering would preclude the consequences of an enormous administrative burden that would be thrust upon the licensee, NRC and FBI by the initiation of such a program.

In conclusion, we urge the Comission to incorporate in this rule provisions which will allow licensees to grant tenporary clearances and which will also recognize the established patterns of trustworthiness and reliability already inherent in existing employees. Such provisions will allow licensees the flexibility needed to more efficiently manage '

plant operations.

. Thank you for the opportunity to coment. Attached is our response to the specific question asked in the proposed rule.

Very truly yours, D. W. Edwards Director of Industry Affairs DWE/jac Attachment l

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. Attachment 1 NRC Questioni Should fingerprinting be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?

We recommend that the Comnission allow licensees to decide for themselves whether they will fingerprint only individuals requiring unescorted access to vital areas or all individuals having access to the nuclear power facility.

From a Part 100 consideration or safety perspective, licensees must protect vital areas from sabotage: nonvital areas are primarily an economic concern.

Therefore, licensees should be required to fingerprint as a minimum all individuals requiring unescorted access to vital areas.

In reality, we believe that most licensees will implement a fingerprint requirement for all employees having access to the nuclear power facility.

However, such action should not preclude licensee implementation of a program more limited in scope, as long as it results in a level of safety that was intended by this proposed rule for vital areas.

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p O Box 52034

• PHOENIX. AAIZONA 85072-2034 December 5, 1986 'O AlC:5g ANPP-39246-JGH/DAL/gS.05 GCC- ,

Secretary of the Commission -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 '

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Suoj ect: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528 (License NPF-41)

STN 50-529 (License NPF-51)

STN 50-530 -

Comments on Requirements for Criminal History Checks, Proposed Rule 10 CFR 73.57 File: 86-056-026

Dear Sir:

Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) is submitting the attached comments on proposed rule 10 CR 71.57, as published in the Federal Register of November 7, 1986, Vol.

51, No. 216, page 40438. We request your consideration of the attached comments prior to publication of final rulemaking.

Please contact Mr. W. F. Quinn of my staff, if you have any questions on this matter.

Very truly yours.

J

. C)emi wS Si'.f J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/DAL/rw Attachment cc: 0. M. De Michele (all with attachment)

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-Attachment to ANPP-39246 ATTACHMENT Comments on Proposed Rule, 10 CFR 73.57 Arizona Nuclear Power Project'(ANPP) generally supports the requirement to fingerprint each individual who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility. The requirement to fingerprint individuals with. access to Safeguards Information will create an inordinate administrative burden in the following cases:

1) Those individuals who access Safeguards Information on a relatively infrequent, need-to-know basis, and, '

2) those individuals who are not permitted unescorted access to the facility, but who are engaged in work on Safeguards Information, or Safeguards Systems, as contractor or vendor employees.

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Decer,1ber 5,1986 3F1286-10 Secretary of the Commission Attention: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. OPR-72 Requirements for Criminal History Checks as Published in the Federal Register Volume 51, Number 216, Page 40438

Dear Sir. ,

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) offers the following comments on the requirements for criminal history checks.

1. A backfit analysis in accordance wi th 10 CFR 50.109 is necessary regardless of legislative mandate. In developing the backfit rule, there was never any consideration to not performing a backfit analysis when a requirement was required by the legislative branch. The NRC must evaluate the most cost-effective means to implement the law. The GMB clearance request for FO-258 stated it would require 86,666 responses involving over 31,000 manhours to implement. This rule will have significant impact on the i ndus try , and this method of impl ementation needs to be proven. FDC estimates approximately four additional new positions per utility will be required to implement the final rule.

2. The proposed rule states it will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register (FR). We disagree with this time schedule because of the tremendous administrative burden the rule will impose. To allow the indus try time to develop a program that is based upon the final rule, we request at least a minimun 90-day ef fec tive date after publication in the FR be provided.

up GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 Thirty fourtn street south . P.o. Box 14042 . St. Petersburg Fionda 33733

• 1813) 866 5151 A .%nda Progress Company

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3. The purpose of the $15.00 required by Part 73.57(d)(3) is not clear in the proposed rule. The discussion in the " Supplementary,Information" is contradictory. The legisl ative history indicates the FBI will charge an additional fee for processing record checks, whereas the NRC position is the fee will be utilized to offset NRC and FBI costs. FPC assumes the NRC interpretation of the language in the . law is the correct one. Th,e $15.00 fee is the only charge we can expect.

4 The proposed rule does not recognize any utility efforts which are already in place to accomplish the same objective. FPC investigates all potential employees to determine whether they are . suitable for employment at CR-3 The proposed rule could impose a restriction on use of personnel provision be added pending the official check by the FBI., FPC suggests a to the final rule to allow the utility's investigative program to serve as the basis for determining unescorted access for a grace period of 90 to 180 days in order to permit processing and receipt of the FBI , report with minimal adverse impace on licensees. We believe our investigative program is at least as complete as the FBI's, and our program will satisfy the intent of the public-1aw.

FPC also suggests the rule allow for the collection and initial evaluation of fingerprint information to be done by non-licensees.

Where a licensee allows a separate entity to collect and evaluate the in formation, the licensee will maintain responsibility for the collection and evaluation of individuals with unescorted access.

a provision will Such allow the licensee to have contractors supply fingerprint data and make a determination whether or not to even consider a request of the licensee to allow unescorted access. Where the contractor recommends unescorted access, the licensee will require the fingerprint date and the FPC report in order to verify or audit the contractor's evaluations.

Addi tional ly, FPC suggests the rule endorse the NUMARC. "Indus try Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs" as sufficient to meet Rule requirements, with revisions to the proposed Rule to assure there are not conflicts.

5. Part 73.57(a)(2) should state "

. . . fingerprint cards shall be submitted for those individuals who have access to Safeguards Information or require access authorization." This change would make this section consistent with 73.57(b)(1) and 73.57(d)(1).

December 5, 1986 3F1286-10

. Page 3 ,

6. Parts 73.57(b)(1) and (b)(2) - The rule is not clear regarding use of employees while the criminal history check is underway. During a refueling outage, FPC employs large numbers of temporary employees who m'ya not have worked at another nuclear power facility. These employees have an average length of employment of two months. FPC believes that the turnaround time expected for the FRI check will normally exceed the employment time. As previously stated, the rule should provide licensees the opportunity to allow unescorted access to the facility pending receipt of the FBI check.

Providing escorted access to many refueling outage work items is not realistic because of increased radiation exposure. This approach would be a negative influence on the ALARA program. If the NRC believes the "grandfathering" provision of this section is acceptable for security -

interests, then FPC believes it is appropriate to allow unescorted access during the period of the FBI check. FPC, as stated earlier, supports the recommendations of NUMARC " Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs".

The last sentence of Part 73.57(b)(1) is unclear. As written, it implies all individuals who do not have unescorted access must be fingerprinted. This is clearly not the intent of the Rule as explained in the supplemental in formation . FPC suggests the following as a repl acemen t.

"Ninety days after (date of Rule issuance), individuals desiring unescorted access or access to Security Safeguards In forma tion shall be fingerpri n ted . The licensee may grant temporary unescorted access for up to 180 days provided the fingerprint card has been submitted to the NRC and all other Security Plan requi rements for unescorted access have been satisfactorily compl e ted ."

7. Part 73.57(e) should clearly define the obligation of the licensee to provide for an administrative appeals process for job applicants where the licensee has denied unescorted access (and, therefore, employment) to the external job applicant, i

The same standard specified in Rev. 8, NUMARC " Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorizatinn Programs", Section 7.1,

" Review Process", should be recognized, i.e., a review process will only be required for a pemanent employee of a utility.

8. Part 73.57(f)(3) details under what circumstances a criminal history check may be transferred. The criteria (iii), that any termination must have been favorable, has nn basis in the Obnibus Diplomatic i

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December 5, 1986 3F1286-10 Page 4 ..

Securi ty and An ti-Terrori sm Act of 1986 If the intent of this requirement is protection of individuals from misuse _ of criminal history records, ,this . requirement is unnecessary. It should be up to the individual to decide if a prior employer. can transfer the information. This requirement (iii) could be unnecessarily penalizing a terminated employee by requiring additional criminal history checks.

Sincerely, i .

I E. C. Simpson W .

Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering and Licensing JWT/feb

azu unman)RM m .a c, L S/ PA 444g)

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company._

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Two North Ninth Street

• Allentown, PA 18101 e 2151770 515f

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'86 CEC -g 41 :48 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/77J-7502 gr p"r.c' CEC 0 5 886 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-2764 FILE R41-2/A17-11 50-388

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company has the following comments on the proposed rules on requirements for criminal history checks (51 FR 40438).

73.57'b)(1) and (5)

The proposed rule states that for individuals who do not have unescorted access after the published date of the rule, the results of the criminal history records check shall be used in making a determination for granting unescorted access. This is contrary to the NUMARC Industry guidelines, paragraph 6.4d which would allow the granting of temporary unescorted access once the request for a criminal history check has been submitted. Failure to provide for temporary unescorted access would have significant impacts on licensees, particularly during outages. The final rule should be reworded to permit unescorted access pending receipt and review of criminal history records.

73.57(b)(3)

The wording proposed in this section does not adequately address the transfer provisions contained in the NUMARC guidelines, section 8.1. It is recommended that the wording of this section pertaining to the transfer of unescorted access authorization information be consistent with section 8.1 of the NUMARC guidelines. Additionally, this section of the proposed rule addresses the issue of temporary unescorted access authorization in an ambiguous fashion.

It is recommended that the addressing of the te.mporary unescorted access authorization be clearly worded to be in accordance with section 6.4 of the NUMARC guidelines.

While this section addresses the transfer of unescorted access authorization from one licensee to another and attempts to address the temporary unescorted access authorization, it misses one key element contained in the NUMARC guidelines. Section 8.2 of the guidelines provides for reinstatement of an m _sw

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File R41-2/A17-11 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk

! -l unescorted access authorization if certain conditions are met. The reinstatement provision allows for reinstating of an unescorted access.

authorization if that authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the previous unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions. No such provisions are contained in the proposed rule, and in the absence of addressing this particular-issue, it may be determined that the rule will prevail over the guidelines. Therefo're, the reinstatement provision which was established during the NUMARC/NRC discussions would be overtaken by regulatory requirements and.thus negated as an. option available to licensees. PP&L

, recommends that this provision of the proposed rule be revised to be consistent with the NUMARC guidelines. . The proposed 73.57(b)(3) needs to be made consistent with 73.57(f)(3) and the NUMARC Guidelines.

73.57(b)(6)

The language in this section implies that the FBI check of fingerprints is only part of the criminal history records check. It has been discussed at industry meetings with members of the NRC staff that the FBI fingerprint criminal history records check satisfies the entire criminal history requirements for.a background investigation. It is recommended that the provisions of this section clearly spell out that the FBI criminal history records. check satisfies all background investigative requirements with respect to a criminal history check.

73. 57 (c) (1) (1) '

This section of the proposed rule limits the use of. arrest datasto'one year

( unless there is information indicating the disposition of the case. Our experience in conducting criminal history checks through other means has shown that ': is not unusual for attorneys to routinely employ-delaying tactics to

avoid or delay trial dates. It is not uncommon to find a case as not having

gone to trial within one year of the date of arrest. It would appear that i

this limitation somewhat restricts the ability of the licensee'to handle those i

. situations in which is it apparent that attorneys are employing tactics to-delay or avoid trial. If this provision becomes known, then for future cases involving workers requiring unescorted access to nuclear power facilities, we may expect additional emphasis by the legal community on delay t'o attempt to circumvent the provisions of this rule.

73.57(e)(1)

. This section provides the applicant for unescorted access the right to correct and complete information which is returned as a result of the criminal history records check. It would appear that nji adverse action may be taken while the l individual is challenging the record to correct it. Also with regard to the

individual right to complete, correct and explain the information contained in

the criminal history records check, the supplementary information outlines

this individual's right prior to any final adverse action, whereas in the proposed regulation, the licensee nust make records available to the i

n;p'

p' ;" g' gg Page 3 SSES PLA-2764 File R41-2/A17-11

, Mr. Samuel J. Chilk individual for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information prior to any adverse action. The proposed 10 CFR 73.57(e)(2) states that no final adverse action may be taken against an individual who has challenged the FBI records until it has been resolved through the various noted means, whereas the supplementary information would seem to establish that this must be done prior to any adverse action. The final rule should be reworded to prohibit only final adverse action. It is PP&L's belief that we must have the flexibility to suspend or withhold access where warranted pending f.inal resolution.

73.57(e)(2)

Similar to 73.57(e)(1), this section should be clarified to explicitly state whether an applicant for unescorted access authorization who chooses to change, correct or update an alleged deficiency in the criminal history records should be granted or denied unescorted access while such a change, correction or update is being accomplished. This section addresses that a ,

reasonable amount of time must be allowed for such a process to take place; however, it does not address whether or not access is or is not to be granted during such a challenge. The provision with respect to providing a reasonable amount of time seems to provide a very arbitrary and ambiguous time frame which will be individually interpreted according to the discretions of the many licensees. It is recommended that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission safeguards staff define a reasonable amount of time to provide standardization to the industry in this regard. Again, PP&L believes it must have the flexibility to suspend or withhold access where warranted pending final resolution.

73.57(f)(4)

The proposed rule would require that criminal history records be available casite for examination by NRC. The regulations should not be so prescriptive.

PP&L would plan to maintain these records at the corporate headquarters where security clearances are processed and records are maintained. The final rule should be revised by deleting the word "onsite."

Additional Comments o NRC requested specific comments on whether fingerprinting should be required only for unescorted access to vital areas or for unescorted access to the facility. It has been PP&L's experience that in over 70% of the cases, those personnel authorized unescorted , access to the protected area also require access to vital areas of the plant. Based upon our experience and the fact that the proposed NUMARC guidelines establish only a single level of access authorization, it is our recommendation that fingerprints be submitted on all persons who are granted unescorted access to either protected or vital areas. It is also pointed out that the requirements to fingerprint personnel who have access to safeguards information could be better met if there is a single level of coverage for vital and protected area unescorted access because it may be assumed that

Q{C Q i l0gg Page 4 SSES PLA-2764 File R41-2/A17-11

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk if a person is granted access, they have complied with the fingerprint requirements for access to safeguards information.

o The proposed rule does not permit grandfathering. Howe'ver, the NUMARC guidelines, in section 11.0, establish a grandfathering provision. The proposed rule should provide a grandfathering provision for those personnel who have been granted unescorted access on the date of their amended security plan approval or those who were granted unescorted access authorization within the 365 days prior to that date. A recent EEI survey indicated that 41 of 55 nuclear licensees favored grandfathering of the criminal history records checks which had previously been conducted through means other than a fingerprint card submission to the FBI.

o PP&L is concerned about the provisions of the rule which require criminal history checks for those who require access to Safeguards Information. We understand that this provision was imposed by Congress, and that NRC is not able to eliminate this requirement without legislative relief. PP&L strongly encourages NRC to seek that relief. In the meantime, additional guidance would be appreciated when the final rule is issued. Our specific concerns involve several areas.

1. A number of clerical personnel who do not work at the facility handle Safeguards Information in the normal course of their duties. These individuals do not have unescorted access and therefore are not investigated for a clearance. It appears that these personnel must now be fingerprinted and subjected to a criminal history check.

Because of personnel turnover and to avoid having to constantly verify whether or not a particular clerk has been fingerprinted, we will probably have to fingerprint all our clerical personnel as a condition of assignment to the Nuclear Department.

2. NRC employees are exempted from the fingerprint requirements, but it appears that NRC contractors are not. This may result in delays for NRC contractors since we will have to submit their fingerprints to NRC before allowing access to Safeguards Information. The proposed rule does not provide for transfer of these records from NRC. If we must submit fingerprints for NRC contractors, provisions should be made so that we do not have to pay the $15 fee.

We hope that you will address these concerns in the final rule.

nCgg3;ggg' Page 5 SSES PLA-2764 File R41-2/A17-11

,_ Mr. Samuel J. Chilk PP&L appreciates this opportunity to comment on the propdsed rules. If you have any questions concerning our conunents, please contact Mr. R. M. Harris at (215) 770-7862.

Very truly yours, H. W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations cc: Mr. M. C. Thadani USNRC Mr. L. R. Plisco USNRC 4

AJGEEI M PRmag NM'aine woe NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 P O Box 63 LYCOMtNG, NY 13093 TELEPHONE (315) 343-2110 December 3,1986

'86 DEC -8 Pl2 :20 Secretary of the Commission ll.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 I_'CA:

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ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir / Madam,

The following comments are presented, in reference to Proposed Rule CFR 73.57, Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information by power reactor licensees.

1. It is our belief that in some cases, such as at Nine Mile Point, the time required to fingerprint the necessary individuals (4000 +),

utilizing inexperienced personnel and conventional methods, will require more than 180 days to complete. It is suggested that extensions be granted, if the need arose.

This company has examined and is considering the purchase of electronic fingerprint equipment which would greatly speed up the fingerprinting process and reduce the usual rejection percentage.

However, the FBI has said they will probably not complete their evaluation of this new technology before June 1987. As it stands, we are not in a position to wait for this decision and will have to take fingerprints in a conventional manner.

2. CFR 73.57 (b) (1) as written, appears that individuals fingerprinted after the date of implementation of this rule may not be badged for unescorted access until the results of the criminal history checks have been received and reviewed by the licensee.

This provision, if not amended, will have a devastating effect on temporary employees in outage situations, since it would require that l they be escorted until their criminal histories are received by the licensee (25 days).

Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

l Yours truly, p &'

97 Howard G. Christensen Supervisor, Nuclear Security Clearances HGC/djp

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'86 DEC -8 P 139 U=.

CCC December 3, 1986 Secretary of the Commission Aten: Docketing and Service Branch US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'.Jas h ing ton , DC 20555 MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLUT Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-232 License Nos. DPR-42 Comments Procosed Rule on Requirments for Criminal History Checks Northern States Power Company has reviewed proposed changes to NRC regula-tions related to requirements for criminal history checks published in the Federal Register on November 7. 1986. Our comments are provided in the attachment to this le tte r. Please contact us if you have any questions related to the comments we have provided.

CM O-.

David Musolf Manager Nuclear Support Services c: G Charnoff Attachment Y

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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPA.Tf Comments regarding proposed 10 CFR 73.57.

1. In answer to the request for a specific response, fingerprinting should be required of individuals for unescorted access to the nuclear power facility,'and should not be limited only to those with unescorted access to vital areas. The latter would be an administrative nightmare.

2. Regarding (b) (1) - Grandfathering should be allowed. NSP feels that fingerprinting of all those who currently have unescorted access to the nuclear plants, or Safeguards Information is unnecessary.

Interim access is not addressed in this proposed rule. It states that "... results of the criminal history records check shall be used in making a determination for granting unescorted access to the nuclear power facility." Does this mean temporary clearance as well as permanent? If we are to we.it for a records check prior to making a clearance decision, our plants will be impeded in work efforts because of the inability to find enough cleared workers. Waiting an average of 25 working days for clearance is way beyond our current waiting period of 9-10 working days. Even the best planning efforts would not prevent the problem of getting the required number of workers into the plant at a given time.

Both grandfathering, and interim clearance are permitted under the NUMARC Access Authorization Guideline, Rev. 8.

This document does include fingerprinting. Our reports have '

been that the NRC will be releasing a policy statement to all licensees to adopt the NUMARC Access Authorization

' Guideline into their security plans. As it is written, the NUMARC Access Authorization Guideline would not comply with proposed 10 CFR73.57. The two issues of grandfathering and interim clearance need to be addressed in the final rule.

2. Regarding (b) (3) - The last sentence regarding " temporary employees" is confusing, and should be deleted, or clarified. Temporary workers can encompass all or a large portion of the employees mentioned in the first sentence of (b) (3) . If no fingerprints are taken because they have been taken at another utility within the past 180 days, which utility is responsible for their retention?

3. Regarding (e) (2) -

If the purpose of these records checks is to prevent potential saboteurs from gaining unescorted access, it seems unreasonable to go ahead and grant unescorted access to a person whom we would usually deny based on criminal records simply because they are contesting the record. This could be a giant loop hole for potential

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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPATY saboteurs. We feel that individuals contesting their record (if it contains data which would preclude clearance) should not he granted unescorted access until the situation is resolved.

4. Regarding (f) (4) - On site storage of fingerprint cards would be administratively difficult for NSP to accomplish.

l  ; Workers may have access to both plants and new workers are processed at both plants plus through our Corporate Otfice.

NSP would find it most efficient to store the fingerprint cards in a central location. The paragraph should be changed to omit the word "onsite".

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Wisconsin Electnc pow coen 231 W WCNGAN P O box 20463AILWAUkEE.WI53201 1414)277 2345 December 4, 1986 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

DOCKET NOS. 50-226 and 50-301 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE REQUIREMENT FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS -

Wisconsin Electric has reviewed the above subject proposed rule, Federal Register /Vol. 51. No 216/ Friday, November 7, 1986 and concurs with this rule as drafted.

In response to your specific question: "Should fingerprinting be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?" - Wisconsin Electric prefers that all personnel be fingerprinted who are granted unescorted access to the protected and vital areas of a nuclear power plant.

Very truly yours,

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T. J. Cassidy Executive Vice President cra'%%-

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December 5, 1986 86 DEC -8 P4 :38 CFF Mr. Samuel J. Chilk CCC' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H. Street N.W.

Washington, DC. 20555

Subject:

Proposed Rule: Requirements for Criminal History Checks - 10 CFR 73.57 (51 Fed. Rec. 40438. November 7. 1986)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

This provides Commonwealth Edison Company's (" Edison")

comments on the subject rule proposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or " Commission"). The rule would enable licensees to check the criminal history records of certain employees by requiring licensees to fingerprint those employees. Such fingerprinting is authorized by Section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. (" Atomic Energy Act") and was added to the Atomic Energy Act at the urgings of the nuclear industry. The industry believes that the criminal history records obtainable through fingerprinting provide a valuable addition to the ongoing screening programs which are part of each nuclear power plant's NRC-approved security plan. Moreover, Edison believes that an effective security program requires the fingerprinting of all individuals who have unescorted access to the plant and not be limited to those with unescorted access to only vital areas.

However, the proposed rule sweeps too broad to require the fingerprinting of more individuals than is necessary for the Commission to meet its " obligation to promote the common defense and security and to protect the public health and safety." Where the Commission finds that this obligation has been met without the need for criminal history checks, the Commission is explicitly authorized by Section 149b to exempt individuals from the fingerprint requirements. The failure to exercise this exemption authority where warranted is inconsistent with Congress's clear directions provided in the explicit language of the Conference Report, which directs the Commission to " implement a practical program" for carrying out the purposes of Section 149. H. Rep. No.99-793 (Conf.

Rep.) 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Red. H5944, H5967 (daily edition, August 12, 1986). This Congressional directive in conjunction with Section 149, gives the Commission broad discretion to provide for exemptions from the fingerprinting requirement.

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In spite of this broad discretion to exempt individuals from fingerprinting, the NRC's proposed rule would include many individuals whose fingerprinting is neither necessary to the promotion of the common defense and security nor reasonable for the implementation of a practical program. These are the individuals who have already been screened under an NRC approved program and who have demonstrated their trustworthiness with at least five years of service, in many cases under continual behavioral observation by supervisors trained to spot aberrant behavior. For such trusted employees, a criminal history check would start with stale records at least five years old and, thus, would provide almost no additional assurance of trustworthiness. Indeeed, even if a record check were to reveal that a previously unknown offense had occurred more than five years ago, that offense, in most cases, would be given little weight in any review of acces3 authority. And failure to report that offense would be discountes'by the individual's record for honesty during the subsequent years of observation on the job.

For these reasons, the fingerprinting of employees who were screened at least five years ago under an NRC-approved program and were granted either unrestricted access to a nuclear power facility or access to safeguards information is wasteful because the checking of such employees' criminal records will do very little, if anything, to promote the common defense and security. Therefore, these considerations constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying an exemption. While neither the statute nor the Conference Report requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances to justify an exemption, the presence of such circumstances further supports an exemption. Accordingly, Edison suggests that proposed section 10 CFR 73.57(b)(1) be modified as proposed in the attachment to exempt such employees from the fingerprinting requirement. This modification would ensure that the criminal history program satisfies Congress's explicitly stated expectations of practicability.

Edison's comments on specific aspects of the proposed rule are provided in an attachment.

t -( Amw Dennis Farrar

, Nuclear Licensing Director

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ATTACHMENT Ed[sonbelievesthat the practicalities of keeping records of multi-plant licensees were not adequately appreciated. Section 73.57(f)(4) requires a licensee to make available on site any records obtained under this program. This requirement is intended to ensure that the NRC has ready access to the records to determine licensee compliance. For a utility which operates a single plant, this purpose can be achieved readily by storing the records on site. But for a multi-plant utility like Edison, such a requirement ,

would require substantial duplication of facilities and records with no increase in NRC accessibility. The NRC could just as readily determine licensee compliance by examining all the records at one common storage area. Accordingly, Edison believes that deletion of the word "onsite" from 10CFR 73'.57(b)(1) would result in a more practical and cost-effective program without impairing the NRC's ability to monitor compliance.

The reference in 10CFR 73.57(c)(2) to First Amendment rights under the Constitution in puzzling. First Amendment rights provide protections only against certain governmental actions; private actions are not subject to such rights. Thus, there is no basis for including in a rule addressed to private corporations any reference to First Amendment rights. Accordingly, that reference should be deleted.

No criteria have been provided to implement the exemption provision of Section 149b. It is just the purpose of rulemaking to provide such guidance by fleshing out the bare bones of the statutory provision. By failing to provide such guidance, the NRC has left licensees in a quandry on how to proceed to obtain necessary exemptions. For example, how are licensees to go about obtaining exemptions from having to fingerprint State governors and other state officials who have access to Safeguards Information associated with the transportation of spent fuel? Answers to such questions should be provided in a final rule.

Section 73.57(b)(1) provides that individuals who have unescorted access authorization will retain such authorization so long as fingerprint cards for them have been submitted within 180 days of the date of publication of a final fingerprint rule.

However, no parallel transition provision was provided for individuals who have access to Safeguards Information. Section 73.57(b)(1) should be amended to provide for parallel interim treatment of individuals who have unescorted access authorization or Safeguards Information.

1 i

ATTACHMENT Suggested Revision to 10 CFR 73.57(b)(1)

(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of this section shall fingerprint each individual, except NRC employees t (and) individuals responding to a site emergency in accordance with the provisions of 73.55(a)[,) and employees who have been screened under existina procrams before--------------------(insert date 5 years before effective date of rule) and been cranted access to a nuclear power facility or to Safecuards Information. who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information. All other [i]ndividuals who have unescorted access authorization--- .

Note: add underlined material

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• E6 F~ ao A10 :40 sensmummmma KMC Inc.

801187H STREET. N W SutTE 300 WASHINGTON. O C 20006 (202) 293-4200 December 8, 1986 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Comments on Proposed Rule " Requirements for Criminal History Checks", 51 Federal Register 40438

Dear Sir:

KMC, Inc., on behalf of the 27 utility members of the Physical Security Coordinating Group'(PSCG), is pleased to offer comments on the proposed rule which would require each licensee to obtain criminal history records of individuals granted unescorted access to its facility or access to safeguards information. A listing of the utility members of the PSCG is attached as Enclo-sure A.

It is our understanding that NUMARC will be providing comments on potential conflicts between this proposed rule and the access authorization policy statement; hence, the comments herein will be focused mainly on those aspects related to safeguards information.

The proposal to obtain criminal history information is one element of the overall program to obtain improved personnel screening for persons to be granted unescorted access in nuclear power plants.

Utilities recognized that early personnel screening efforts could be enhanced if provisions were made to obtain Federal criminal history records in place of the more limited State and local records that were available. Congress recognized this shortfall and in Public Law 99-399 of August 27, 1986, authori::ed the NRC to act as the intermediary with the Department l of Justice in obtaining criminal history cheeks from the FBI on i

behalf of nuclear power reactor licensees. Unfortunately, in the passage of that law, checks were expanded beyond thatthe purpose and scope of the criminal history for those persons requiring unescorted access at nuclear power plants to also include those 1

permitted access to safeguards information. This expansion adds a i

l totally new dimension to the original intent of this program and the NRC rule to accommodate the law must recognize that a licensee C1 ,%1 \f i ou U w

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cannot directly hdbtrol every contractor employee who designs, .

assembles or operates all the equipment? under the defined umbrella' of safeguards information of 5 73.21. We believe the 11RC was prokided sufficient flexibility in,the legislation to accommodate

>~L all .of our 'aubsequent suggested changes to the rule. 'Specifically ,

< Sec' tion 149(b) of the new. law states "7he Commission,7by ' rule, may rsileve peisons from the obligations imposed specified terms, conditior.s, and periods, if the Commission finds by'this section, upon that.such actionfis consistent with its obligatiens to promote the

, common of defense und security and to protect the health and safety the puulic."=

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The -prohoned;fule would,, as feritten, require s licensee to i- .act on behalf ^of any company's haployce'who might have access to safeguards information. The NRC'u current ' regulation of 10 CFR

' ,Part 73.21 defines what constitutes safcgcards information. The i

' definition is quite bmad, and for example inbludes: " details of- ,

i alarm system layoutu shewing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessm4nt equipment. . . . "; '* details of the l on-site L  ; and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes";

- ." lock combinations /and mechanical key design"; "por-

.tions of the facility guard-qualification and training. plan which <

disclose physical security system or response procedires." Under j 'this umbrella a number to safeguards information of vandors from aor contracthrs~could number of ficilities. have access

i. must racognize that ra licensee simply cannot directiv c'ontrolrule The i

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contractor,or,yendors7saployees supplying, for example, "on-site  ;

' and off-sita communication systems that are used for security purposss,"

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i information is"provided and that the contractor assign only properly screened person ~s in the course of completing the con- '

tract. If.-the rule permitted the contrnctor,tc/directly,dubmit *

' fingerprint cards to the NRC, the contractorel'cself could E$ke a suitability determination of its 64n employoas. This could be accomplished by changing the languaga of Section 73.57(b) to read "the licensees granting unescorted. access and licensees or con-tractors required to protect safegcArds information shall. . . . " ,

We would also propose that employees currently granted ~~

unescorted access or currently perrhtted access to safeguards i

information should be exempt from the requirement for obtaining criminal history information. A grandfathsr provision for a ,

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current employee who has been in 2Ltrusted position for a number-L of years without any problems is currently incorporated in most i* t o '

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not all security plans. A similar provision for fingerprints l would therefore be cor11 stent with the mandate to promote the- '

k ~ common defense and security and, to protect the health and safety I

of the public and thus'.is permitted by Section 149 (b) of statute.

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i. person granted unescorted access to retain that access provided the fingerprints ars.submittnd within 180 days. We believe it an

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.r having access to safeguards information. Therefore"we believe, for those employees who would not meet the criteria to be set for grandfathering, that the clause for extension of the time which will be allowed for'chec, king current-employees having unescorted access also include those having access to safeguards information.

We would also comment that the rule as currently worded in 73.57 (b) (1) has language which appears cin conflict with permitting tempora'ry access.

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We would suggest modification to the last c sentence access which reads " Individuals who do not have unescorted after shall be fingerprinted by the licensee and the results of the criminal history records' check shall be used in-making a determination for granting unescorted access to the nuclear of power temporary access. facility," should be modified to permit the granting Section 73.57 (d) (2) application containing omissions or evident errors. indicated the Commission We suggest that the Commission return those that have substantive errors but those having typographical, errors or minor errors be corrected by pen by the NRC after telephone conversations with the applicant.

Section 73.57 (e) (1) relating to the right'of an employee to correct information on the FBI records ' states that the licensee must permit the correction-process prior to any adverse action.

This could be interpreted to state that a licensee could not immediately rescind an individual's unescorted access if the record check reveals substantial criminal activity. We believe this~section needs to beiclarified such that, for example, temporary. reassignment and removal of unescorted access would be permissible pending the review.

We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you.

Sincerely, 3

w S n w /*/L A '

Donald F. Knuth President Encl.

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q PHYSICAL SECURITY COORDINATING GROUP {

-American Electric Power Service Corp.

' Arizona Public Service Company 4 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

s.

Carolina Power & Light Co.

s Commonwealth Edison Co.

Consolidated Edison Co.

• - d Consumers Power Co.

': Detroit Edison Co.

s Duke Power Company Duquesne Light,Co.

Plorida Power & Light Co.

.. Nebraska Public Power District Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

Northeast Utilities Service Co.

c Northern States Power Company Omaha Public Power District Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.

' -: Portland General Electric Co.

Public Service Co. of N.H.

A Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

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Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

Sacramento Municipal Utility District Southern California Edison Co.

Toledo Edison Co.

Wisconsin Electric Power Company Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

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{ j NRC-86-155 WPSC (414] 433-1234 V TELEX 5101012698 WPSC GR8 TELECoPIEA [414) 433-1297 EASYUNK 62891993 WISCONSIN PUGUC SERVICE CORPORATION Ef O 600 Nortn Adams

• PO Box 19002 + Green Bay. WI 543o7-9002

'86 DEC 10 All :29 Iddi December 8, 1986 Secretary of Commission Attention: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentleman:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Proposed Rule on Requirements for Criminal History Checks

Reference:

10 CFR 73, Requirements for Criminal History Checks, Federal Register Volume 51, Number 216, Dated November 7, 1986 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission published proposed rulemaking (reference 1) defining the requirements for criminal history checks for individuals granted unescorted access to nuclear power plant facilities or access to security safe-guards information. The rule proposes to implement a program for the control and use of criminal history data received from the Federal Bureau of Investi-gation (FBI) as part of background checks conducted by licensees. The rule is required by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act signed by the President on August 27, 1986. Wisconsin Public Service Corporation has reviewed the proposed rule, and offers the following comments for your consideration.

The Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee (NUMARC) has presented the NRC with guidelines which the industry is willing to implement in the area l

' of nuclear plant access authorization. Among the many elements of the guide-lines are procedures for instituting an FBI criminal history check program. In particular, the guidelines allow grandfathering of individuals holding current unescorted access authorizations. The guidelines further allow licensees to grant temporary unescorted access to individu;1s prior to receiving results from the federal government. In such cases, the licensee must evaluate various other elements of the individual's background check, including credit histories, character references, and psychological exams, and must retain evidence of sub-mission of FBI criminal history requests. The granting of temporary unescorted l gW

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SGeretary of Commission December 8, 1986 Page 2 access is particularly important when considering the impact that long turn-around times may have on delaying planned and unplanned outaoe work. Wisconsin Public Service Corporation urges that the proposed rule allow implementation consistent with the various elements of the NUMARC guidelines.

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation also believes that the requirements of the proposed rule should apply only to individuals with unescorted access to vital areas, but should not limit licensees from obtaining criminal histories on all persons granted unescorted access to non-vital areas in nuclear plant facilities.

The underlying intent of background authorization checks, including criminal histories, is to protect the public health and safety. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations defines a vital area as an area which contains any equip-ment, system, device or material, the failure, destruction or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exoosure to radiation. Thus by definition, limiting the proposed rule to vital areas will continue to protect the health and safety of the public, and will provide licensees with the flexibility to reduce the impact and cost of implementation.

Sin erely, M

D. C. Hintz Vice President - Nuclear Power MSL/msl "

cc: Mr. Robert L. Nelson, US NRC Mr. G. E. Lear, US NRC

gm cagna Electnc & Gas Company Dan au n cg.gg29218 CCMT M8tf g,, . NWar Cwamns SCE&G

"'" ~' moicSEDautEii\-Yd December 8,1986[f/ FMf 4N N

'86 DEC 10 Pi2:21 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Comission (

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

. Washington, DC 20555 ATTH: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Virgil C. Sumer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Proposed Rule: Requirements for Criminal History Checks 10 CFR Part 73

Dear Mr. Chilk:

C South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) has reviewed the proposed rule

" Requirements for Criminal History Checks" (51 FR 40438, November 7,1986).

We appreciate this opportunity to.coment and offer the following for your consideration:

1) In response to the question "...should fingerprinting be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?," SCE&G feels that all individuals granted unescorted access to the protected area should be subject to the requirement to be fingerprinted. The purpose of fingerprinting is to provide an additional method of eliminating the "knowledgable insider." The

" insider" could cause sabotage even though he does not have access to vital areas by providing information/inside assistance to a terrorist group which could attack the station. All prospective employees should be fingerprinted regardless of their need for access, because individuals who do not have access to Vital Areas / Safeguards Information may be transferred or promoted to a job wrare it is required. Having to retrofit fingerprints could cause an unnecessary delay in filling positions. A requirement to fingerprint all individuals is consistent with the Nuclear Utilities Management and Human Resource Comittee (NUMARC) " Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs," Revision 8, dated October 3, 1986, which proposes only one type of clearance.

2) 10 CFR 73.57 (b) should be revised (in a manner consistent with the criteria contained in the NUMARC guidelines referenced above) to allow temporary access authorization, to address unescorted access for individuals during cold shutdown conditions, and to clarify "Grandfathering" of individuals.

yp t

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 8, 1986 Page 2

3) 10 CFR 73.57 (f) (4) should be revised to allow fingerprint records to be kept at off site locations. This would help facilitate many utilities which have multiple nuclear sites and have their records centrally located at corporate headquarters.

Again we appreciate this opportunity to coment. Should you have any questions, please contact me at your convenience.

ruly y rs, N ,- _

D. A Na ' n-TRW/ DAN:Jez c: 0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols,Jr.

E. H. Crews, Jr.

E. C. Roberts

0. S. Bradham J. G. Connelly, Jr.

D. R. Moore W. A. Williams, Jr.

Group Managers W. R. Baehr C. A. Price H. J. Sefick C. L. Ligon (NSRC)

R. M. Campbell NPCF File

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'86 CEC 10 P3 :12 December 5,1986 L-86-497 Secretary of the Commission b

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docket and Service Branch Re: Proposed Rule - Requirements for Criminal History Checks 51 Fed. Req. 40438 - 40441 (November 7,1986)

Florido Power and Light Company (FPL) hos reviewed the proposed rule on implementing a program for the control and use of criminal history dato published .

in the Federal Register and has prepared the folicwing comments. -

GEbERAL COMMENTS FPL concurs with the intent of the proposed rule. However, FPL strongly disagrees with the requirement to fingerprint individuals already granted access who have demonstrated trustworthy and reliable service. We support NUMARC Access Authorization Guidelines that exempt individuals who have been continuously employed for three years from the fingerprinting requirement.

The proposed requirement of the fingerprinting of all individuals having access to sofeguards information oppears to impact current requirements for the handling of safeguards information as stated in 10 CFR 73.21. The proposed requirements will burden the licensee with the responsibility of ensuring criminal history checks are completed on all individuals hcving access to safeguards information. These  !

individucts include proprietary clericci, reproduction, and records maintenance '

personnel, as well as contractor organizations (such as engineering and construction firms and their support personnel). In addition, it would seem to require the upgrading of the control of safeguard information to the some level as l that currently of forded National Security Information and Restricted Octo. '

In this regard, the definitions of what constitutes safeguards information need to be revised and more closely defined so as to ensure the intent of the icw and to deter terrorist activity are met. FPL feels that the rule, os written, regarding fingerprinting for access to safeguards information is unduly burdensome on the licensee, unwieldy regarding enforcement by the NRC, and does little to deter terrorist activities at the nuclear power fccilities.

Finally, certain portions of the proposed rule and the prelimincry discussion to the rule indicate that licensees may be subject to constitutional constraints in their actions. For example, Section 73.57 (c) (2) prohibits a licensee from using the FBI information in a manner that would infringe upon an individual's rights under the First Amendment. Private employers and businesses are not normally subject to l the strictures of the First and Fifth Amendments. However, the NRC seems to be O( \3 pm f 'at L ,

Page 2 Proposed Rule'- Requirements for Criminal History Checks 51 Fed. Req. 40438 - 40441 (November 7,1986) implying that, in performing its responsibilities under the proposed rule, a licensee is acting in the role of a federal government agency. Because of the serious implications of the NRC approach, FPL asks the NRC to delete any reference to constitutional rights in its proposed rule.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS Section 73.57 (b) (1)

Provision should be made in this section for temporary unescorted access during the period of time. required to process and return the submitted prints to the licensee for new employees. This should be keyed to the NUMARC Access ,

Authorization Guidelines relating to temporary access which requires successful completion of psychological evaluation, credit check, developed personal references, and submission of fingerprint cards.

The NRC should consider having the fingerprint requirement apply to all individuals requiring access to vital areas. While all individuals granted unescorted access to the plant do not require access to vital areas at all times, the vast majority will require it sometime during their tenure. Requiring fingerprinting of all personnel granted unescorted access to the facility would be considerably easier and more effective than trying to track each individual's access requirements and verify it when vital crea access is needed. Additionally, any individual granted access to the protected area would also have access to safeguards information, such as security system details (i.e., clarm device types, locations, and monitoring stations), and locations of creas containing vital equipment just by casual observation of the plant environs.

This section states that the licensee "will . . . review and use the information received from the FBl" in deciding whether to grant or deny unescorted access.

NRC should clorify the word "use" in this section because the section, as proposed, implies that the FBI information con be used to develop further information. if this were the meaning, then the proposed rule allows a licensee to use the FBI information to develop further information in the course of determining whether to grant unescorted access. A situation could develop where the FBI information would not prohibit access but further information developed from it may lead to denying access. We urge the NRC to clarify the meaning of the proposed rule with respect to this issue.

Section 73.57 (c)(1)(i) & (ii)

This section prohibits licensees from basing a decision to deny access " solely" upon an arrest more than one year old for which there is no information on the disposition of the case, or an arrest resulting in acquittal or the dismissal of the charge. The NRC needs to clarify whether the use of the word " solely" means that, even though the arrest is more than one year old or has resulted in acquittal or dismissal, the licensee con deny unescorted access if it has obtained

7 Page 3 Proposed Rule - Requirements for Criminal History Checks 51 Fed. Reg. 40438 40441 (November 7,1986) information as a result of the arrest record which worronts access denial. For example, pleos of nolo contendere do not constitute admissions of guilt, and of ten result in the withholding of an adjudication of guilt. Nevertheless, o court considers the evidence of guilt before accepting a nolo contendere pleo, which sometimes is convincing. Con a licensee rely on such evidence in denying access, even though there was never a technical conviction? Moreover, while on individual may be acquitted of a crime, he may have admittedly engaged in certain conduct which, criminal or not, worronts the denial of unescorted access.

Again, con a licensee rely on this information for denici? -

Section 73.57 (c) (2)

This section clearly states that a licensee may not use the FBI information to disguise illegal discrimination. However, what is unclear is the question of

" disparate impact" discrimination, i.e., when a facially neutral policy causes on adverse impact upon the employment of minorities. The courts have of ten considered illegal the reliance on a block applicant's arrest record to deny him employment. (See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 523 F. 2d 1290 (8th Cir.1975)). NRC should provide guidance on whether licensees should regard most, or all, felony convictions as primo facie evidence that unescorted access should not be granted. The NRC should also indicate whether the stringent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission balancing test of considering various factors in reviewing a person's conviction, when it is job-related, should be applied. (See, e.g., EEOC Decision 78-35, June 8,1978,27 FEP Cases 1755).

Section 73.57 (e) (2)

There should be added to this section the right of a licensee to supend or modify any access given pending resolution of any correction or oppeal process initated by the subject of the criminal history check.

The wording that on individual be granted "a reasonable amount of time" to correct, complete, or explain a criminal history record is too vague. A fixed appeal period of one hundred eighty days should be stipulated since it gives the

[ individual sufficient time to obtain correction of the record.

Section 73.57 (f)

This section should be written to allow a licensee to centrally locate o records repository for the collection, maintenance, and protection of criminal history and other background screening data. There should be no requirement that these t

records be maintained on site, only that the site maintain documentation that the record requirements have been met and are on file in a centrol respository ovalloble for inspection.

l

l i

I Page 4 Proposed Rule - Requirements for Criminal History Checks 51 Fed. Rec. 40438 40441 (November 7,1986)

Subsection (2) restricts access to the information to "those who have o need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process of granting or denying unescorted access to the nuclear power facilty or access at (sic) Sofeguards Information". This longuage strongly suggests that routine dissemination of the information to contractor employers is not permitted. The NRC needs to clarify if licensee contractors fall under this section or are exempt.

Thank you for allowing FPL the opportunity to respond to the proposed rule.

Very truly yours, L$

~

r C. O. Woody Group Vice President Nuclear Energy COW / DAB / cob i

F l

N IS M E ARMGIlgAWi O8 [

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.MY lowa E!cctric Light and Power Company - -

December 5, 1986 NG-86-4247 86 DEC 11 P2 :46 m

E Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Re: Duane Arnold Energy Center

Subject:

Requirements for Criminal History Checks; . Proposed Rule File: A-119 -

Dear Sir:

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company (IELP) hereby submits coments concerning a proposed new rule published at 51 Fed. Reg. 40438 (Novenber 7, 1986). The proposal is to add to 10 CFR Part 73, a new regulation,10 CFR 73.57, to implement Section 606 of the Onnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (Puo. L.99-399). That legislation added a new section to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 149. The new section requires that individuals granted unescorted access to nuclear power facilities or access to safeguards information be fingerprinted; that the fingerprints be submitted to the Attorney General; and that the licensee use the FBI criminal history checks thereby obtained in determining whether such access-should be permitted. Except for certain limitations on the use of the information obtained, the legislation leaves the determination whether to grant or deny access to the licensee employer. The legislation requires that the NRC implement it by regulation.

Basically, therefore, the proposed new regulation effectuates legislation which should provide employers with additional information usefui in determining whether to grant or deny access to specific individuals. As such IELP favors it. However, it believes the regulation can be improved in a number of respects.

First, with exceptions only for NRC employees and individuals responding to a site emergency, the regulation requires all individuals granted unescorted access to be fingerprinted. It would therefore require the fingerprinting of personnel who have worked for a utility for many years, demonstrating reliable ano trustworthy behavior throughout and have previously been granted unescorted access. Many such employees have already undergone background investigations or polygraph examinations. IELP i

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Dec: ember 5,1986 NG-86-4247 '

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recommends that the regulation _ include an exemption for such individuals from the fingerprinting requirement, whether direct. employees of the utility or- contractor employees at the facility. The exemption would be limited to individuals with a history of a minimum number of years of such service -

say three years, and who have been granted unescorted access based.on then-existing screening requirements.

Subsection b. of the new Section 149 authorizes the Comission to

" relieve persons from the obligations imposed by this section" if it " finds that~ such action is consistent with its obligations to promote the comon defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public."

IELP believes that the grandfathering proposed is consistent with those obligations and that the Commission may so find. In this connection we note that Section 11 of the " Industry _ Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs" (Rev. 8; 10/3/86) prepared by the Nuclear Utility. -

Management and Resources Comittee. (NUMARC) contains a "grandfathering" provision consistent with these recommendations.

Second, IELP also recomends that the provision _for interim unescorted access authority contained in proposed Section 73.57(b)(1) be enlarged.

This provision permits interim access for individuals who have access authorization on the date the final rule is published in the Federal Register if their fingerprints are submitted within 180 days thereafter.

However, the regulation does not provide for interim unescorted access for individuals who will not possess such access authority on the date the final rule is published - for example, individuals employed at a later date.

Again, we note that the NUMARC Guidelines, Section 6.4, provide for a 180-day temporary authorization for an ' individual for whom the request for a criminal history check has been submitted to the NRC on the basis of a psychological evaluation, a credit check and the recommendation "of one developed character reference who has had frequent and direct association with the applicant." This is not limited to individuals possessing access authorization on the date the final rule is published. IELP recomends that the regulation incorporate a similar provision.

Third, proposed Section 73.57(c)(2) would prohibit a licensee from using information obtained from criminal history checks in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual' under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States nor shall the licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex or age.

We believe that this provision should be eliminated because it is in part redundant and unnecessary and in part unclear. Most utilities are already prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex or age by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

5 '2000e-1, et seo., and by the Age Discrimination in Employnent Act, 29

1 December 5,1986 NG-86-4247 Page 3 U.S.C. 623, et seg. In addition, these utilities which are Government contractors are required to sign an Equal Opportunity Clause undertaking not to so discriminate. We are not aware of the necessity for the.NRC also to undertake to police existing prohibitions against discrimination.

The impact of the limitation on the use of criminal checks "in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Anendment to the Constitution . . ." is unclear. We understand that, generally, the First Anendment is a guarranty against federal governmental action and, by incorporation into the Fourteenth Anendment, against state action. We do not understand that action by a private employer constitutes state action even if the private einployer is a utility extensively regulated by the Government. .If the' purpose of the provision is to protect use of the criminal history checks against " whistle-blowers," Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5851) already addresses the problem.

If the purpose is to protect union members, the National Labor Relations ~

Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq., already provides such protection. If there are other possible misuses of the information that are intended to be covered, the regulation should specify them. Otherwise, the vagueness of the provision could lead to wholly unnecessary litigation.

In closing, we believe these improvements will make the proposed rule more wrkable and, at the same time, meet the intent of Section 606 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act.

Very truly yours, e

~! f) ..

7/

Richard W. McGau#ghy Manager, Nuclear Division RWM/ SLS/pjv*

cc: S. Swails L. Root L. Liu H. Denton R. Gilbert NRC Resident Office

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GPU Nuclear iO0 intereace ea,xway H Mws e Parsicoany New Jersey 07054 201 263-6500

,86 CEC 11 P12:06 TELEX 136 wraer 3 o,,-482 ect 0,3, numaen aff 00Cc.

& December 8, 1986 JRT-86-244 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Reouest for Comments on Reouirements For Criminal History Checks Proposed Rule The staff of GPU Nuclear Corporation herewith submits comments on the subject proposed rule. Comments were reouested in a November 7,1986 Federal Register notice (51 FR 40438).

As a general comment, we support the proposed rule, but would suggest the following modifications:

o The rule should be modified to permit "grandfathering;"

i.e., fingerprinting of persons already cleared for onescorted access or access to safeguard information as of the effective date of this rule should not be reouf red, o With respect to " unescorted access," the rule should define this term as unescorted access to Vital Areas.

o With respect to " access to safeguard information," this term should be defined as " persons charged by the licensee with the preparation, classification and control of safeguards infornation."

o While fingerprinting would be reouired for persons to be granted unescorted access or safeguards information access after this rule's effective date, initial clearance pending return of the FBI report should be permitted.

Sincerely, J. R . Tho rp e Director Licensing & Regulatory Affairs JIT:RPJ:ng:15999 a e 3ererat o e umes System

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WeStingh0US8 power Systems sa 355 Electric Corporation " w " m e2m32, 86 CEC 11 P3 :10 I.S&S 86 151 ep C+: J e 8,1986 GOCL Secretary of the ca =i== ion U. S. Nuclear Regulatory en=4== ion Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

Westinghouse Electric Corporation appreciates the wiu.Inity to comment en the proposed rule changes to 10CER73 involving requi.wts for crimiral history checks published in the November 7,1986, Federal Register (51ER40438).

WestinghmLa= endorses the use of firgerprint cards to check en an individual's crimiral history record. 'Ihis will enable the industry to utilize a standard quality informatioral resource to improve the safeguards and security of nuclear reactors. Such action will have a direct benefit to the health and safety of the public.

In response to your specific questien en requiriry firgerprinting for ,

unescorted access to vital areas only, Westinghouse rherds that protected areas be included within this requirement. 'Ihe p.W rule should apply to all individuals requesting unescorted access status for both protected and vital areas at an cperating nuclear plant.

Regarding the crimiral record check preposed regulation, Westinghcuse requests that the Comission include centractors, ranufac~m and suppliers within this program by granting contractors, manufacturers and suppliers authorization to use the program specified in 10CFR73.57 cn an equal basis with Part 50 licersees. 'Ihe e m icaicn currently permits Part 50 licersees to accept employe screening checks ccepleted by centractors, ranufacturers and suppliers provided they meet the criteria specified in the specific nuclear plant safeguards plan. As writ *an, the preposed part 73.57 excludes contractors, ranufacturers and suppliers who constitute the largest worker population granted unescorted access status at operati.g nuclear plants. Westinghouse requests that the Ccmission genuinely corsider extersion of this privilege to contractors for the follcwing reason:

-.w. ,-,. . , - - - - - - - - - -

Secretary of the c'emniaion (2) IS&S86-151 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory r'==4=aion _ h z 8, 1986

i. Westinghouse believes that the concerns for privacy of personal information and the control of di--~4 nation of this information is better served by collecting and maintaining this specific information with the individual's actual employer, rather than have the information held by other organizations. The contractor, manufacturer or supplier would provida verification to each utility as nar==may that the criminal record check was ocupletad; however, the actual criminal records would not be released but would be available for audit by each utility (licensee). This current

' practice has been operating effectively for several years and the additicn of this criminal record check using firgw.sint cards would enhance the s wuam.

A If contractors, manufacturers, and suppliers are extended the criminal record check privilege and the current screening -

verification process is continued, the frequency of transferring personal, private information would be significantly rachM resulting in enhanced control of the information and lessening the potential for mieta= and litigation.

If the above authorization is not paminalble urder the puW Part 73.57, Westinghouse requests that NRC licensees, both Part 50 and Part 70, be granted authorization to use the firg.asint cards with access to FBI checks. This would enable NRC licensees, scme of which are also centractors, to provida the same level of safeguards on workers assigned tasks requiring a-a to NRC licensed power reactors or special nuclear material.

Your consideration of these requests will be beneficial to the nuclear power plant safeguards program and enable centractor, manufacture and supplier personnel to respond to plant requirements in a timely manner with minimum delays.

Respectful ycktrs, 07 v A. T. Sabo, D e r Licensing, Safeguards &

Safety ATS/dh l

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Docketing and Service Branch December 8, 1986 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS PROPOSED RULE SlFR40438 This letter is in response to the NRC request for comments on- the proposed addition to 10CFR Part 73 set forth in the Federal Register, 51FR40438 dated November 7, 1986.

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) agrees with the intent of the proposed rule, however, there seems to be some negative aspects for the following reasons:

1. Under this rule the utility submits prints to the NRC who submits same to FBI and when the check is complete they are sent back through the NRC to the utility. It is hard to believe that this process will be completed within the stated 25 days considering the fact that the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources Committee (NUMARC) document on " Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs" (Revision 8 dated October 3, 1986), allows 180 days for criminal history checks.

2. The NRC is concerned about history of alcohol and drug abuse, felony convictions and a history of misdemeanor convictions.

Historically FBI files in this regard would not be complete and identifying aberrant behavior would become nonexistent.

A more realistic approach would be to work through the various States' Attorney Generals to allow access to criminal history information. A more complete criminal history check would be conducted with a much faster turnaround time.

In response to your request concerning fingerprinting, SWEC believes there should be one unescorted access rule for the nuclear power facility and fingerprinting for all individuals.

have separate unescorted access rules. Protected and vital areas should not Users of Safeguards Information should also be incorporated into the single rule.

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6

. 2  ;

t Specific comments concerning the proposed rule are as follows:

Section 73.57(a)(2) and (d)(3) - Some SWEC employees have access to Safeguards Information for more than one applicant. Under the proposed rule, each applicant must submit fingerprint cards and pay the processing fee. Some provision should be made in these cases so that the criminal history checks and fees are not duplicated.

Section 73.57(f)(4) -

In the current proposal there is no provision for prints to be submitted by other than utilities, nor is there a pro' vision ' allowing the utility to turn over criminal history information to an agency who is completing the remainder of the background investigation.

There should be a provision allowing utilities to pass on criminal history data to the agency that is completing the remainder of the background investigation for unescorted access. In this way the complete file on an individual would be stored in one place and would be much more accessible for audit by the utility and the NRC.

We appreciate the oppor: unity to comment on the proposed rule. We hope the. -

comments will assis: you in its finalization.

14 R. B. Bradbury Chief Engineer t

Nuclear Technology and Licensing Division RTM ht t

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@ Pennsylvania Power &gUght Company Two North Ninth Street

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Secretary to the Commission Attention: Docketing & Service Branch US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Since the spring of 1985, the Nuclear Utility Management and .

Resources (NUMARC) Working Group on Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Staff have developed the Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs.

These guidelines are the result of extensive exchanges of information between these two groups, and in June 1986 were approved by the Commissioners in lieu of the proposed 10 CFR 73.56. These guidelines contain the substance upon which nuclear licensees will base changes to their current security plans and which reflect the collective efforts of the industry and the NRC's safeguards staff.

The NUMARC Security Working Group offers the following comments with respect to proposed NRC regulation 10 CFR 73 (Federal Register 40438). The comments are limited to the impact of the proposed regulation upon the NRC/NUMARC-developed Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs primarily to call to your attention inconsistencies between the access authorization guidelines and the proposed regulation, o The provisions of the proposed regulation in sections (b)(1) and (b)(5),

coupled with the supplemental information preceding the proposed regulation, appear to be inconsistent with sections 6.4 and 10.0 of the access authorization guidelines. The wording of the proposed regulation in effect eliminates the provisions for temporary unescorted access authorization and the provisions for access authorization to protected or devitalized areas when a nuclear power facility is in a cold shutdown, refueling or devitalized status, o Section (b)(6) of the proposed regulation indicates that a criminal history records check conducted in accordance with this proposed regulation is only partly accomplished through submission of fingerprint cards through the NRC to the FBI. It has been our understanding and continues to be our understanding that the FBI fingerprint criminal history records check satisfies the entire criminal history requirements for a background investigation which is recuired under the NUMARC access authorization guidelines. The language of the proposed regulation would indicate that other actions are recuired to satisfy the criminal history records check portion of the background investigation.

I l

Secretary to the Commission December 8, 1986 o Section (e)(2) of the proposed regulation provides a " reasonable amount of time" for the subject of a criminal history records check to correct, complete or explain the criminal history records or decline to do so. The term " reasonable amount of time" is vague and indefinite. The term should be defined in clear and unambiguous language, o Section (f)(3) of the proposed regulation in addressing the transfer of criminal history records data from one licensee to another does n'o t adequately reflect the conditions under which transfer may take place as defined in the NUMARC guidelines on access authorization section 8.1.

o Section (f)(4) of the proposed regulation requires that criminal history records obtained under this section be available for examination on site.

The NUMARC access authorization guidelines do not designate a location for background investigation data to be maintained. This requirement is unnecessarily burdensome for licensees with corporate level conducted for multi-plant programs and licensees. Consistency of records maintenance with the NUMARC guidelines on access authorization is suggested.

o The NUMARC access autharization guidelines section 8.2 allows for reinstatement of unescorted access authorization under certain conditions.

The provisions of the proposed regulation do not recognize or address this feature. It is recommended that the reinstatement provision of the NUMARC guidelines be adequately addressed in the proposed regulation.

o The . proposed regulatten reoufres each licensee within 180 days of the effective date of the regulation to submit fingerprint cards on all individuals who are determined to require unescorted access at a nuclear power facility or access to safeguards information. Section 11.0 of the NUMARC guidelines allows for grandfathering of those personnel who were previously granted unescorted access within the past 365 days or who are currently granted unescorted access upon the effective date of amended security plan approval. It is recommended that the proposed regulation be modified to allow for grandfathering consistent with provisions of Section 11.0 of the NUMARC guidelines, o A thorough examination of the proposed regulation and its accompanying supplemental information leaves extremely ambiguous whether a person is to be granted or denied unescorted access authorization to a nuclear power facility while that person challenges the criminal history records. This is an extremely important issue and should be adequately addressed so that the industry is consistent in its application of these requirements.

Secretary to the Connission December 8, 1986 These coments provide a brief analysis of consistency and comparison with respect to the proposed 10 CFR 73 and the NUMARC Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs. NUMARC requests the opportunity to discuss these points with the NRC Safeguards staff prior to publication of the final regulation.

Sincerely, r+ ewn BruceD.Kenyo(n, Chairman NUMARC Working Group en Security cc: Mr. J. H. Miller Mr. W. H. Owen l

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USNRC W :shing t on . D.C. 20555 86 DEC 11 P3 :31

Dear Ms Kristina Jamgochian:

GF* '; . 4, Please accept this letter as my comment on 10CFR Part DCCM ., y . , 'u 73," Requirements for Ci-iminal History Checks." *-

The FBI files and the cther criminal history files which you have depended upon in the proposed rule contain a large amount of inaccurate information. For instance. the Philadelphia criminal computer has files on two females of the name. Marvina Lewis.

When my name is entered. the criminal history of these two women is displayed. Luckily. I am not the Marvina Lewis in the Ph i ladelph ia comp..itar ; however, that is not always the case with criminal history chects.

Aside fiom the errc>3 in mistaken data, the e are much mere sei-icus errors in the actual data in the various computers.

Menneth Laudon of New York University details these mo,re sericus and basic errors in his recent book."DOSSIEP GOCIETY."

The rolis* that I submit for inclusion in the pioposed ruta is that alI computer clats used in the determination of fitnest of an empicyee must be shown to the affected employee.

Respectfully submitted.

Marvin I. Lewis -

7801 Roosevelt Blvd.nea Phila.. FA 19152 jg S ,

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(215? 624 1574

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'86 CEC 11 Pl2:18 MURilAY R. EDELMAN SA. VICE PatSCENT ),F; NUCLE A R i#U ' '

December 8, 1986 -

PY-CEI/NRR-0563 L Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 .

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Comments on Proposed Changes to LOCFR73 51 Fed. Reg. 40438 (Nov. 7, 1986)

Centlemen:

On November 7, 1986, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a notice of a proposed rule which would require the use of criminal history data for individuals to be granted unescorted access to nuclear power facilities.

We are pleased to submit comments on this proposed rule ( Attachment 1).

If you have any questions, please feel free to call.

Very truly yours, J kJ

!urray R. Edefman Senior Vice President l Nuclear Group MRE:nje Attachment cc: Jay Silberg, Esq.

Paul Leech (2)

K. Connaughton t

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. Attachment PY-CEI/NRR-0563 L Comments on Proposed Rule 73.57

't) 73.57(a)(2) - Requiring fingerprinting and a criminal history record check for all persons who have access to Safeguards Information.

This should be clarified to specify that only those responsible for.

controlling Safeguards Information be subject to the ' rule. Access to Safeguards Information on a need to know basis usually occurs on short notice and attempting to predict who this may include and applying the rule to them would not be practical.

2) 73.57(b)(1) - Requiring application of the rule to individuals who .

currently have unescorted access authorization.

Individuals who currently have unescorted access authorization should ~

be grandfathered. These individuals are under a Continual Behavior Observation Program. - The summary of the proposed rule states that a purpose of the rule is to help assure that individuals with criminal histories impacting upon their reliability and trustworthiness are not permitted unescorted access. A purpose of the Continual Behavior Observation Program is to detect behavioral traits and patterns that may reflect adversely on an individual's trustworthiness and reliability.

This program and the local criminal checks that were performed prior to granting access to currently authorized persons provide adequate assurance as to the trustworthiness and reliability of these individuals.

A provision for grandf athering is included in the proposed NUMARC

" Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization,"

Revision 8, Section 11. The Observation Program is described in Section 9.

3)- 73.57(b)(1) & (b)(5) - Requiring the review of information received from the Attorney Generai (FBI) and considering it in making a determination for granting unescorted access:

This proposed section of the rule will hinder the access by at least 25 working days.

There must be a provision allowing for interim unescorted access while the FBI criminal history is being processed. It should be noted that a local criminal record check, completed within the allowable laws, will still be done.

A provision for interim access is made in the proposed NUMARC, " Industry Guidelines for Nucleae Power Plant Access Authorization", Revision 8, Section 6.4 It states temporary unescorted access can be granted for 180 days if the fingerprints and request have been sent to the NRC/ FBI.

Attcchsent PY-CEI/NRR-0563 L

4) 73.57(d)(3) - Requiring a processing fee to be submitted with each application.

The coordination of the amount of the check with the fingerprint cards will be difficult at best. Either the check is prepared and a batch of fingerprints cards accumulated to match the amount or a check is prepared to match a previously accumulated batch of fingerprint cards. The time delay in either case will be costly unless provision is made for interim access as discussed in comment number 3 above.

The rule should be changed to either bill the licensee on a periodic basis or to establish a deposit account against which processing fees are charged as cards are submitted. For an example of a deposit account, see the regulations in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulatory - Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights.

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ACns~I %MN5 -

Atomic Industrial Forcm -

7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda. MD 20814-4891 [/Q /

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Telephone- 8301)654 9250 TWX 71082496o2 AT0lVIC FOR OC CMU

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l __ I'~ December 10, 1986 gf ggg 11 p2:43 Secretary of the Commission J-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555.

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rule: Requirement for Criminal History Checks (10 CFR 73.57)

Dear Sir:

The NRC published in the November 7, 1986, Federal Register, the proposed rule, 10 CFR Part 73, " Requirements for Criminal -

History Checks" (51 FR 40438) and solicited comments on the proposed rule. The Atomic Industrial Forum's Committee on Power Plant Design, Construction and Operation has reviewed the proposed rule and offers the following comments for your consideration.

General Comments The nuclear industry supported and urged the passage of a law which would provide licensee access to FBI criminal records.

Subsequently, Public Law 99-399 was passed and signed into law August 27, 1986. This law added Section 149, Fingerprinting for Criminal History Record Checks, to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. We believe that the criminal history records obtainable from the FBI through fingerprinting provide a valuable addition to personnel screening programs. However, the proposed rule that implements the law requires the finger-printing of more individuals than is necessary to assure adequate safeguards of nuclear power facilities. Section 149 b.

of the law allows the NRC, by rule, to provide for exclusions from the fingerprinting requirement. We believe the rule should allow for exemption of utility and contractor employees who have already been screened under an NRC approved program and who have demonstrated their trustworthiness with at least five years of continuous service with one employer.

Specific Comments We recommend the following changes to new Section 73.57:

(b) General performance obiective and requirements.

Change first sentence of paragraph (1) to read as follows (underlined words added);

Secretary December 10, 1986

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"Each licensee subject to the provisions of this section shall fingerprint each individual, except NRC employees, individuals responding to a site emergenc with the provisions of Paragraph 73.55(a)y,incertain accordance contractor employees subject to the conditions of paragraph 73.57(b) (7), and utility and contractor employees who have been screened under an existing NRC approved program before ------- (insert date 5 years before effective date of rule) and have been granted access to a nuclear power facility or to Safeguards Information, who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information." -

Reason: We believe it would be a wasted effort to finger-print trusted and valuable employees who were screened at least five years ago under an NRC approved program and were granted either unrestricted access to a nuclear power facility or access to safeguards information. Also, Section 149, paragraph b., of the new amendment to the Atomic Energy Act allows the NRC, by rule, to relieve persons from the obilgation imposed by this section, upon specified terms, conditions, and periods, etc. We believe criteria for implementing such exemptions should be provided in the rule.

Change second sentence of paragraph (1) to read as follows (underlined words added):

"All other individuals who have unescorted access authorization or access to Safeguards Information on -----

will retain such access pending licensee receipt of the results of the criminal history check ..."etc.

Reason: This section indicates that individuals who have unescorted access authorization will retain such authori:ation as long as fingerprinting cards for them have been submitted within 180 days of pubitcation of the final rule. However, no parallel provision is provided for individuals who have access to Safeguards Information. We believe the rule should be amended to provide for parallel interim treatment of individuals who tave unescorted access authorization or access to Safeguards Information.

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.Seccetary is ' b-December 10, 1986

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Add new pArstrapb (7). under General performance objective

" and requiremertts as follows: .

(7) The licensee may delegate"to' contractors the ,

responsibility-for fingerprinting their employees and '

using criminal history records to determine- <

authorization for access to Safeguards Information i subject to licensee audits of contractor programs.

U' Reasen: Licensees cannot directly control every contractor employee who designs, assembles or operates umbrella,all the equipment under the tjefined of, Safeguards Information of.Section -

I-73.21. ..

0 (c) Prohibition ' i -

Change paragraph (2) to read as follows ([ delete] words in brackets):

"(2) A licensee may not use info:tation received from a-

' criminal history check obtained under this pection -

(in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the-First Amendment to the

' Constitution of the United Stativ nor shall the licensee use the information] .iti'enyl way which would

' discriminats among individuals on the basis of race, _1 religion, nati~onal ori' gin, sex,, or age."

' Reason: That part of the paragraph regarding First Amendment rights shouldioe deleted because this

' protection is applicablei n government agenciep  :

, and not to private organizitions.

i (d) Procedures for processing of fingeirprint checks. 4 5 Add new se tance at end of paragraph (1) as follows:

Priviously submitred fingerprint cards that meet the reqdirements for' quality and legibility may be resubmitted in lieu of submitting new fingerprint entds.

Reason:- This would be an administrative conveniencend a wou;d be more efficient than resubmitting new fingerprint cards.

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Secretary- December 10, 1986 J

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Change first two sentences of paragraph (3) to read as follows (words underlined added, words in brackets deleted):

"(3) Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon [ application] receipt of monthly billing.

Licensees shall. submit payment twith the '

application}

...."etc.

for the processing of fingerprints Reason:

This would be an administrative convenience and would be a more efficient method of billing. ,

(f) Protection of information Delete the word "onsite" in paragraph (4)

Reason: This section requires a licensee to make available onsite any records obtained under this program. For a multi-facility utility, such a requirement would require substantial duplication of facilities and records with no increase in NRC accessibility. The NRC could just as readily determine licensee compliance by examining all the records at one c'ommon storage area.

Sincerely.i o l J. W. Williams, J. .

Chairman Committee on Pow (er Plant Design Construction and '

Operation l

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December 8, g 6 DE 12 E:48 G

Secretary of the Commission Docketing and Services Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 iciLNRC 86-230 Ret Docket 50-482 Subj: Comments on Proposed Rule on Criminal History Checks Dear Sirs o On November 7, 1986 a proposed rule requiring criminal history checks for all individuals having access to a nuclear facility or access to Safeguards Information was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 40438). This draft regulation was published in response to Section 606 of "the Onmibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986" which required the NRC to issue regulations to establish conditions for the use and control of criminal history data received from the FBI.

Kansas Gas and Electric Company has reviewed the proposed rule and offers the attached comments for your consideration.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. O. L. Maynard of my staff, p Very truly yours, 4 4 1,0 -

l Glenn L. Koester Vice President - Nuclear GLK:see Attachment cct P0'Connor (2)

JCummins 201 N Marxer - wicnita. Kansas - vasi Accress: po eau 20s wocnta. xansas 67201 - Teteanone: Area coce a re) 261 6451

I Att:chment to KMLNRC 86-230 Dec:aber 8, 1986 Page 1 73 57(a)(1)

Comment 1 The proposed rule would require Licensees to fingerprint all individuals who have access to any Safeguards Information. While Licensees should be able to comply with this requirement for their own personnel, it will be extremely difficult (if not impossible) to effectively administer a program that covers all of the contractors and subcontractors that may have access to Safeguards Information. There are several large contractors such as Architec t/ Engineers, NSSS vendors, security contractors, equipment manufacturers, and othere that have numerous engineers, technicians, and clerks in their offices who have access to Safeguards Information for a number of Licensees.

Currently, 10CPR73.21 is worded such that these contractors and vendors are required to have mechanisms in place to control and protect the handling of Safeguards Information. However, the proposed 10CPR73.57 places the fingerprinting requirements totally upon the Licensees. The proposed rule should be modified to either exempt certain catergories of Safeguards recipients or allow a mechanism whereby the contractor or vendor can have their own program for meeting the requirements of 10CPR73 57. At most, the Licensee's responsibility should be limited to verifying that these contractors and vendors have a program in place to meet the regulatory requirements.

KG&E believes that if this modification is not made, the Licensees and the NRC will encounter several significant problems related to compliance with and enforcement of the proposed rule. The following examples point out some of these potential problems.

1. A licensee cannot be reasonably assured that the fingerprints of all new employees of a non-licensee company handling Safeguards Information are submitted and approved unless he asks for transfer of criminal history check records for all employees every time services are purchased.

2. For ongoing service contracts involving Safeguards Information in the possession of a non-licensee company, the licensee may be in violation of the rule if the company hires a new employee and allows him access to Safeguards Information.

Comment 2 The responsibilities of the licensee are not clear if an employee or a contractor had access to Safeguards Information before this rule goes into effect and subsequently left the company.

Att:chment to KMLNRC 86-230 Dec:mb r 0,1986 Page 2 j e

At the present time,- the concept of " escorting" does not apply to access to Safeguards Information in the manner that it does for access to the facility.

Comment 3 I KG&E believes the new rule should address how Safeguards Information submitted to non-licensee companies prior to implementation of this rule is to be handled. KG&E suggests .that all information distributed before issuance of the new rule be " grandfathered" under the old rule and exempted from the new requirements and that persons who had access to Safeguards-Information before this rule who no longer have access be exempted from fingerprinting.

73 57(b)(1)

Comment 1 The requirement to fingerprint each individual who has access to Safeguards Information could create a tremendous burden of delays and paperwork for the .

licensee. At the present time, the concept of " escorting" does not apply to access to Safeguards Information in the manner that it does for access to the facility. Additionally, there are no explicit provisions to establish the level of importance of a safeguards document (i.e., very sensitive, somewhat sensitive, contains some small detail which makes the document safeguards) . Thus all persons requiring access to any safeguards document would be required to be fingerprinted.

KG&E typically treats any document which may be considered to border on Safeguards Information as a full fledged Safeguards document. The new draft rule would penalize any Licensee which takes this approach by requiring massive paperwork to handle these documents. One possible consequence may be that many licensees, while remaining in compliance with the regulations, would relax their interpretation of the definition of Safeguards Information to reduce the number of Safeguards documents. This has the potential for a resulting decrease in the overall security program effectiveness not only for individual licensees but for the nuclear security industry in general.

Comment 2 The existence of any one Safeguards document could result in a whole new set of individuals requiring fingerprinting. For each licensee, several security vendors, contractors, manufacturers and Architect / Engineers (A/E) have access to Safeguards Information. Microwave (intrusion detection) vendors have access to microwave locations, microwave terminations and some interfacing terminations; closed circuit television (CCTV) vendors have access to the CCTV layout, CCTV terminations and CCTV switching; security computer vendors have access to all software, all computer manuals and the

Att chment to KMLNRC 86-230 De::mber 8,'1986 Page 3 majority of the interfacing terminations: A/Es (sometimes more than one per utility) have access to all of the abovel control console vendors / manufacturers have access to all console terminations and layouts.

All of these companies' employe:s with access to this information would have to be fingerprinted.

Also KG&E considers its Security Gutzdhouse plans Safeguards Information.

Under the new rule a plumber whc works on the drains in the Security building would require fingerprintir( since he needs access to safeguards drawings which show the locatice 'f drain lines, even if he was escorted because he didn't have plant access.

Comment 3 KG&E believes the requirements of this section may limit the number of available sources for vendor services performed in security areas and on security components. The number of bidders on security projects or services .

could be reduced since fingerprints of their employees would have to be submitted to and returned from the NRC before they could receive the small number of safeguards documenta nec-led to prepare a bid. Many small companies may find the increaset restisints not worth their effort. This could also cause effectiveness.

significant ceiays in restoring security system Comment 4 KG&E believes that the definition of Safeguards Information should be modified if this rule is implemented. The portion of 73.21 which requires that equipment locations (i.e. microwaves and CCTV) are Safeguards should be delet ed. This would remove a large portion of information possessed by intrusion detection and CCTV vendors from the Safeguards category.

Comment 5 KG&E believes some provision needs to be added to the rule to provide for an interim screening process. If a facility, during normal operation or during an outage, has a sudden unexpected equipment failure, a large number of personnel may be needed immediately to fix the problem. Escorting a large number of people during a very busy time period is impractical and if the work is in radiation areas, a large number of escorts is not consistent with the ALARA concept. A 25 day delay for fingerprint verification which prevents a plant from starting up could cost millions of dollars. If people with less technical expertise are used solely because they have access, this could reduce the margin of protection of the health and safety of the public.

KG&E recommends modifying the draft rule to allow the option of a 130 day interim screening period provided that all other screening processes as identified in the utility's Security Plans are completed. This is consistent with the Access Authori:ation Plan as proposed by NUMARC.

'At'tath0:nt to KMLNRC 86-230 December 8, 1986 Page 4

.73 57(b)(3)

-The proposed rule states that temporary employee's fingerprints need not be taken so long as the individual has been fingerprinted within the last 180 days. KG&E believes this requirement should be 'from the time of discharge, not from the time he was last fingerprinted. It is conceivable that a temporary employee could work at the facility for over six months, be laid off for a month, then be rehired. KG&E believes that the individual should not have to be fingerprinted unless the break in service was longer than 180 days.

73.57(d)(3) . - _

Typically, all on-going processes (MMPI, Psychological Interviews, Background Investigations, etc.) are paid for on a monthly billing. cycle.

KG&E believes that a monthly billing cycle would be cost effective for both the NRC and the licensee. The proposed rule would_ require the licensee to~ -

modify ' accounting and cashier processes in order to prevent further delays in receiving the results. Such modifications would -weaken preventive measures established to protect against misappropriation of funds, etc.

73 57(e)(2)

KG&E believes that the process _ of _ resolving challenges to information-obtained in criminal history record checks is necessary to preserve .the rights of individuals but it may compromise overall' security system effectiventes.

One' area of potential difficulty is acquiring vendor services via the bidding process, which is required of many public utilities. If the bidding process involves access to Safeguards Information, each employee of the bidding vendor with access to -this information would be required to be fingerprinted.

In cases where employees of a bidding contractor choose to challenge the

'results of- a criminal his tory - records check, since the proposed rule specifically forbids taking final adverse action in this case, the licensee may be forced by the bidder to delay the closure of the bidding process until the challenge has been resolved. This would likely result in extensive delays in acquiring vendor services and could also cause significant delays in restoring security system effectiveness.

Attach %nt to KMLNRC 86-230 Decemb:r 8, 1986 Page 5 Supplementary Inforention The Supplementary Information Section of the draf t rule says that changes to the Security Plans are not required. KG&E believes that the Security Plans of some licensees are not compatible with all the provisions of the draft rule. KG&E recommends including a specific provision in the rule stating that changes to existing approved Security Plans are not required.

In response KG&E to the currently question raised in the Supplementary Information Section, screens all personnel with unescorted access regardless of their need for vital sector access. KG&E believes it would be inefficient to establish two.seperate screening programs.

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(8 l JUG GT M n E E PRa4 pCsne erar) C0CKE!E' Southem Califomia Edison Company ~M P. O. BOX 800 22 4 w*mur cROve Ave ~uc 16 OEC 12 A10:50 RoscMcAO. CAUFORNIA 91770 c."o, uul' E o,~,c ,,= December 10, 1986

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J',";' "j, Secretary of th'e Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1121, 1717 H Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361 and 50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3 The Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is pleased to provide comments on proposed rule 10 CFR 73.57, " Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information by power reactor licensees." The proposed rule in the Federal Register (51 FR 40438) will require licensees to implement a new program which will require use of criminal history data received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to nuclear power facilities or access to Safeguards Information.

We agree, in part, with the proposed rule in its application to persons who are screened for unescorted access to the facility or access to Safeguards Information at any time after the date of final rule publication.

Persons screened after that date should be subject to the new requirement.

We do not agree with the application of the rule to persons who have already been screened and successfully completed the requirements for unescorted access prior to the date of final rule publication. SCE believes that all persons in this status should be exempt from this new requirement.

' SCE has approximately three thousand persons in this category. These persons have been screened in accordance with the commitments specified in the NRC approved Physical Security Plan (PSP) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3, which meets the standard of ANSI 18.17, Section 4.3. These persons have also been subject to a continuous behavioral observation program by their supervisors from the time that unescorted access was granted. The cost of submitting fingerprints for this group, at the projected fee of fifteen dollars per person, will be approximately $45,000. We estimate that the associated administrative costs of preparing fingerprint cards, forwarding the cards to NRC, processing the criminal history data returns and evaluating the individual files will average at least twenty-five dollars per person.

Based on these estimates, the direct cost to SCE to reevaluate these three thousand persons will be about $120,000. This cost calculation does not m,mqQOs l() CAI bkO ) b Mp-Pb b

l Docketing and Service Branch include the indirect costs caused by diversions of these three thousand persons from their primary work assignment to be fingerprinted and to sign and confirm the data on the fingerprint cards. If the average time to complete this process of fingerprinting and verification is one half hour, which seems conservative, a total of 1500 work hours will be lost.

Additionally, SCE recognizes that some currently badged individuals may be identified as having committed criminal offenses since their previous screening. Section (b)(6) of the proposed rule provides that F8I criminal history records be used ' solely for the purpose of determining an individual's suitability for unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information.' A strict application of this provision would prohibit SCE from using the criminal history records to discipline an employee if deemed necessary. This could adversely affect SCE's current disciplinary policy as well as the safe and efficient operation of San Onofre in addition to other SCE facilities. Under SCE's current employment policies, a successful applicant who fails to reveal a criminal conviction is subject to termination for falsification of his employment application. Further, an employee who is convicted of a serious criminal offense may be subject to termination as well. Under this proposed rule, it is conceiv?ble that SCE would be made aware of a person who falsified his application for employment or who, while an employee, was convicted of a serious criminal offense, but would be unable to terminate his employment. If SCE would not be allowed to take action against an employee with a history of violent and dangerous behavior, SCE might be subject to significant liability. If for instance, the employee should injure a fellow employee or member of the public while on the job, SCE could be found responsible. Therefore, if the employee is determined to be unsuitable for employment once the FBI criminal history records check is completed, SCE would want to have the authority to terminate the individual's employment, not just prohibit unescorted access. While SCE's exposure will be lessened in future years because we will be able to screen applicants under this procedure, SCE's immediate exposure could be substantial since there is no provision for grandfathering and all individuals subject to unescorted access fall underto this the facility and access to Safeguard Information will immediately provision.

SCE respectfully requests modification of the proposed rule to provide that information regarding a criminal conviction obtained as part of the criminal history records check may be used not only to determine the individual's suitability for unescorted access to the facility, or access to Safeguards employment.

Information, but also to determine the individual's suitability for SCE recommends that the proposed rule specifically include criteria for granting temporary access to Safeguards Information, and to authorize temporary unescorted access to the protected area and vital areas, during the period required to conduct the FBI Criminal History data check. We recommend that temporary access to Safeguards Information be authorized from the time of the licensee's submittal of the fingerprint cards to the NRC for the FBI Criminal History Record check, based on certain additional Licensee actions.

These actions would include completion of a satisfactory credit check, and

Docketing and Service Branch telephonic or personal interview of one developed character reference who has had frequent and direct association with the applicant during the previous 12 months. This level of screening would permit an individual temporary access to Safeguards Information until receipt of the FBI Criminal History Record check results (not to exceed 180 days). The decision on granting permanent access to Safeguards Information would be based on the evaluation of the FBI records.

We recommend that temporary unescorted access to the plant protected area and vital areas be authorized from the time the licensee establishes the individual's reliability, stability and trustworthiness through the licensee's-currently approved access program for protected area and vital areas. As a minimum, these requirements should include 1) passing a psychological evaluation within the past year, 2) conduct of a credit check,

3) recommendation of one developed character reference who has had frequent and direct association with the applicant during the previous 12 months, and

4) evidence that a request for a criminal history check of the individual by the FBI has been submitted to the NRC. This level of screening would permit an individual access to the protected area and vital areas, until receipt of the FBI Criminal History check (not to exceed 180 days). The decision on granting permanent unescorted access authorization would be based on evaluation of the FBI records.

We request that the NRC define the term temporary, as used in 10 CFR 73.57(b)(3), which states "In the case of temporary employees, fingerprints need not be taken so long as the individual has been fingerprinted within the last 180 days." How is this employee distinguished from " permanent" employees of licensees, contractors, manufacturers or suppliers? From the perspective of the licensee, these persons are all temporary employees, usually engaged to support a specific construction or outage task.

SCE recommends that the NRC, in developing further guidance for application of this rule, coordinate closely with licensees to standardize a form / format (industry standard certification card) for transfer, and follow-up confirmation, that an FBI fingerprint verification was completed in accordance with the rule. This format should include the name of the individual, date of certification, name of the utility which performed the verification and the phone number of the utility contact for confirmation.

j SCE also recommends that the development of a process to i electronically transmit the fingerprint image to the NRC/ FBI and receive l response by electronic transmittal be examined for future application.

The federal register notice requested specific comment on the following question:

"Should fingerprinting be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?"

SCE policy currently requires screening for all persons who enter the protected area (nuclear power facility). We make no screening distinction l between persons who are authorized access to the protected area and those persons who are also authorized access to vital areas. The authority to enter

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r Docketing and Service Branch vital areas is evaluated every thirty-one days, and vital area access for the next period is limited to those persons who have a work related need to enter any specific vital area. We intend to continue our present policy, and will require fingerprinting of,all persons granted access to the protected area.

If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours, k

M. O. Medford Manager of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing TJM:7814F cc: Harry Road, NRC Project Manager F. R. Huey, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3 bec: (See attached sheet)

These records which identify all visitors to the NRC offices in the Matomic Building contain the names of some individuals who may have visited NRC personnel in a confidential capacity with the expectation that their identities would be held in confidence. Please handle those records in a confidential manner to avoid any unwarranted invasion of such visitors' privacy. It is possible that some l

individuals on these sheets may have entered the premises to --

seek the initiation of or assist in NRC investigations.

Disclosure of the record of the visits of these persons, if -

any, should be avoided so that NRC investigations are not adversely affected. .

u w neau maano su 3R 4 3 j f CS/FA.4643ff PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY qq.

2301 M ARKET STREET 'e P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 '86 DEC 12 P12:03 12151841-4000 December 8, 1986  ?!

00t. - ,f Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 50-352 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch '

SUBJECT:

Comments on Proposed Rule Regarding .

Requirements for Criminal History Checks

-(51 FR 40438) _

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On November 7, 1986 the Commission published a proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 which would add a new Section 73.57,

" Requirements for Criminal History Checks of Individuals Granted Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or Access to Safeguards Information by Power Reactor Licensees". In general, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) is in favor of such a rule and has supported the Edison Electric Institute and Commission's staff initiative in this regard. We do take exception to one area of the proposed rule because of the severe adverse impact it will have on licensees in certain instances. This area concerns individuals who do not have unescorted access upon the effective date of the rule.

Paragraph 73.57(b)(1) of the proposed rule states,

" Individuals who do not have unescorted access after effective date of rule shall bc fingerprinted by the licensee and the results of the criminal history records check shall be used in making a determination for granting unescorted access to the nuclear power facility."

The Supplementary Information section of the proposed rule indicates that tten-around time for obtaining criminal histories via the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will average 25 working days.

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Mr. SSzuol J. Chilk Daccmbar 8, 1986 Page 2 PECo's present situation can be. cited as an example of the potential adverse impact upon licensees. PECo is planning major outages at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in February, 1987 and at Limerick Generating Station in May, 1987.

as written will require that individuals who do not haveThe rule unescorted access privileges at the time the rule becomes effective have their fingerprints processed. The 25-day delay will be experienced in obtaining unescorted access privileges for these individuals because of the proposed fingerprinting requirement. We expect several hundred people who will be needed to support the outages to be prevented from working for 25 days.

The delay will introduce a degree of difficulty and confusion in contractor worker procurement and planning, which would influence outage length and will be quite costly.

As an alternative to avoid the negative impact of the proposed rule, we suggest that the licensees be permitted to temporarily grant unescorted access privileges after submitting ,

and while awaiting the resulcs of FBI criminal history checks if the remainder of the background investigation is acceptable.

Such relief in a Final Rule does not appear to be in conflict '

with the wording of the Public Law 99-399, " Omnibus Diplomatic -

Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986".

In addition, the Supplementary Information section of -

i the proposed rule requested a specific response to the question of whether fingerprinting should be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility. Although it is true that while a reactor is operating the majority of employees needing access to protected areas also need access to vital areas, this is not always the case during an outage. In fact, certain areas in a power plant which are vital areas during operation are not necessarily vital areas during an outage. Thus, limiting fingerprinting for unescorted access to vital areas only would be more appropriate. Therefore, we urge the Commission to recognize the potential improvement in security program effectiveness by differentiating between controls for vital areas and protected areas. Security controls are enhanced by permitting unescorted access to vital areas for a manageable numbar of persons and increasing clearance requirements on this group, as compared with increasing requirements for all persons permitted unescorted access to protected areas.

We hope that these comments will assist you in your consideration of the proposed regulation.

Very truly yours, W W CL J. W. Gallagher Vice President Nuclear Operations

" "R-M- g ama as (5/ FA A6431) f Consumers '

O Power aucumaws encanus PQWER$M x

x.no.. w s.ny c &ust General Offices 1945 West Parnall Road. Jackson, MI 49201 + (517) 7881636 OCC '

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December 10, 1986 Samuel J Chilk Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO 10CFR73.57 Consumers Power Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule regarding the requirements for criminal history checks published by the ~,

Commission on November 7, 1986 (51FR40438). After careful consideration by '

the individuals at Consumers Power Company who are directly involved with the security of our operating nuclear power plants, we have the following specific comments: _

1. As proposed Section 73.57 (b)(1) requires, "Each licensee subject to the provisions of this section shall fingerprint each individual ... who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility ...."

Consumers Power Company believes individuals who are currently employed by the licensee and who have five (5) or more years of continuous service should not be subject to the provisions of this section. All individuals who are currently employed by an NRC licensee are subject to the NRC-approved Fitness for Duty program and continuous observation procedures.

In addition, employees hired within the last ten years have been subjected to an NRC-approved background screening program, including psychological testing, a check of personal references and educational background, and, in the case of Consumers Power Company employees, submittal of their fingerprints to the Michigan State Police. These programs assure that individuals with behavioral problems or felony convictions are identified prior to employment.

Consumers Power Company believes that requiring employees with long records of service with a licensee, and in the absence of any other compelling reason, to be subjected to fingerprinting and a further back-ground check by the FBI would be costly in terms of employee morale and would provide no significant benefit.

2. 73.57 (b)(1) also requires that individuals with access to Safeguards Information be subject to the requirements of the proposed rule. In many cases, licensee employees with access to Safeguards Information are

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2 clerks, secretaries, or engineers who have only the limited access neces-4 sary to perform their assigned responsibilities. Since these individu-als do not have routine access to ths full range of Safeguards Informa-tion, and are already subject to the normal employee. screening process used by the licensee, they should net be subject to the requirements of the proposed rule.

Consumers Power Company recommends that this section of the proposed rule be modified by deleting the requirement that all employees with access to Safeguards Information be fingerprinted, and by the addition of a provi -

sion for escorted access to Safeguards Information for those employees who need only limited access to such information.

3. As proposed, 73.57 (b)(1) does not allow for temporary clearance of contractor personnel or new employees. Without such a provision, provid-ing access authorization to new employees or contractor personnel could be substantially delayed. Delays in the completion of the access authoriza-tion process, especially for contractor personnel, would complicate the outage planning process and could result in extending an outage merely to r allow for the completion of the fingerprint check. In addition, this .

provision contradicts Revision 8 to the NUMARC rules allowing a ISO-day interim access period. Consumers Power Company believes the proposed rule should allow for an interim access period'of up to 180 days for new -

employees and contractor personnel.

4. Proposed section 73.57 (c)(1)(1) prohibits a licensee from basing a final determination to deny an individual unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information solely upon an arrest more than 1-year old for which there is no information on the disposition of the case. This prohibition usurps a licensee's prerogative to grant unescorted access to its facilities.

Some felony cases have been delayed for various reasons, resulting in prolonged periods between an arrest and the final disposition of the case.

As proposed, the rule would require the licensee grant unescorted access to an individual who is charged and had not been tried with a serious crime only if the derogatory information discovered during the normal background check is an arrest with no final disposition over one year old.

Consumers Power Company believes that in cases where an employee has been charged with a serious felony, the licensee should be allowed to grant or deny unescorted access to its facilities based on its own judgement.

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Kenneth W Berry OC1286-0052S-NL01 I

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STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARDIENT OF NL' CLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE OF".

SPRINGFIELD 62704 GCCs.

(217) 546-8100 TERRY R. LASH otncma . December 9, 1986 The Secretary of the Commission

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

~ Attention: Docketing and Service Branch RE: Proposed Rule, " Requirements for Criminal History Checks;"

10 CFR Part 73; 51 Federal Register 20436-20441 e (November 7, 1986). -

The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) hereby submits its comments on the above-identified proposed rule concerning requirements.for -

criminal history checks.- IDNS is the lead State agency for regulating radioactive materials and assuring radiation protection in Illinois.

While the IDNS basically supports the NRC's effort to implement the

" Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986," Pub. L.99-399, -

the Department believes that the proposed new section 10 CFR 73.57(b)(1) should be redrafted so that licensees are not required to fingerprint those state regulatory personnel who are already fingerprinted by state law enforcement agencies.

Currently, several employees of IONS are permitted unescorted access to nuclear power facilities. These employees conduct inspections to assure compliance with Illinois law as well as perform maintenance and collect data from State owned environmental monitoring instruments. In addition to these employees, several other employees of the Department, including staff of the t

-Radiological Emergency Assessment Center and the Office of Environmental Safety have access to and receive Safeguards Information relating to shipments of spent radioactive fuel. Numerous local law enforcement officials also l receive this information. The Illinois Department of State Police conducts

' security checks on these State employees. IDNS believes such security checks, when they include fingerprinting, are sufficient to satisfy the Congressional

' mandate. The Department does not believe that it is necessary or desirable to have the fingerprint security checks done through the licensees when state investigatory agencies conduct equivalent programs for fingerprinting state regulatory personnel.

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For this reason, the Department suggests that the NRC redraft subparagraph (b)(1) as follows:

(b) General performance objective and requirements.

(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of this section shall fingerprint each individual, except NRC employees, state regulatory employees who have had a criminal history check by a state investigatory agency if that criminal history check included submission of the employees' fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and individuals responding to a.

site emergency in accordance with the provisions of Section 73.55(a), who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information. . . "

IDNS believes that this change would allow state regulatory personnel to exercise their duties without unnecessarily interfering with or burdening the regulated community.

Sincerely, .

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• Terr R. Lash Dir ctor TRL: bps

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DGCE POWER GOMP.LNY P.O. BOX 33189 a f, s C ; .

CH.ARLOTTE. N.C. 28242 ~

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. _ . . _ . (7 o 531 pA Oct 15 An :46 December 8, 1986 il, Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch .

Subject:

Proposed Rule --10CFR Part 73, 73.57 Requirements for Criminal History Checks

Dear Sir:

The216, No. NRCFR requested in a Federal Register Notice dated November 7,1986 (Vol. 51, 40438-40441),

comments on the subject proposed rule. In response, Duke Power Company offers the following for consideration.

Comments On Proposed Rule 10CFR 73.57 1.

Duke Power Company supports "Grandfathering" or exempting employees who now have unescorted following reasons.access from the criminal history check requirement for the o

This position is consistent with the NUMARC Guideline, Paragraph 11.0.

o All employees who now have unescorted access, have been approved for that access based on NRC approved programs.

o There is no proven need to conduct the criminal history check on all employees.

2.

10CFR 73.57 gives no indication that follow-up checks will be done; therefore, taking away from the stated intent to fingerprint all employees regardless of their time of service with the company.

3.

Rewrite the rule to make it consistent with the NUMARC Guideline:

o 10CFR 73.57 (b) (1) states that criminal history checks must have been completed and used to determine access authorization: NL%8dtC 6.4 requires that the request must have been submitted to the 51C.

o Add a paragraph to the proposed rule to allow " temporary" clearances., Reference 6.4 NUMARC Guideline.

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. .... , . .,.a

Dr. J. Nalccn Greco December 8,1986 -

Page 2

4. NRC employees are exempted from the criminal history check based on an equivalent program. "L" or "Q" clearances should not have to be rechecked.

5.

Reference paragraph 73.57 (b) (3); further definition is required for

" temporary" employee. Specifically, does this relate to time of employment or task assigned? Suggest criteria stated in NUMARC Guideline be used.

(

6.

There are cases where " temporary" employees coul'd' be required to be fingerprinted many times. This seems to be a vaste of time and money when ,

considered from the view of the NUMARC Guidelines relating to background '

investigations. Reference 10CFR 73.57 (b) (3).

7.

Reference 10 73.57 (f) (H), there seems to be no reason for maintaining records on site. Suggest "on site" be deleted.

8.

Suggest an addi~ tion to the proposed rule that defines the procedure for reinstatement of unescorted access. For example: an employee has a criminal?

• history check conducted. Then for some period, maybe a year or two, the -

employee works in.an area where unescorted access is not required so it is rescinded. Then the employee needs unescorted access; will the criminal history check have to be done again? ,

9. Reference 10CFR 73.57 (e) (2); specific guidance is needed as to what is a

" reasonable time".

10.

Reference 10CFR 73.57 (e) (1); definition is needed for " adverse action". Is this termination, out of service pending final review or reassignment with unescorted access taken away.

11.

Clear guidance is needed as to the status of an employee during the time hs/she is challenging the results of a criminal history check.

12.

Can the criminal history check data be transferred while the data is pending a challenge by the employee.

13.

The proposed rule, as it relates to access to safeguards information, is in conflict with NUREG 0794, paragraph 3.0, 3.1, and 3.2. Specific language in the proposed rule should address the inconsistency.

14.

It is suggested that the requirement for docket numbers on the transmittal letter be deleted. In a multi-plant utility, this requirement only adds administrative problems. Suggest showing the name of the licensee and the name of the " contact" in that this information has already been sent to the Division of Security.

15.

Will NRC contractor personnel be required to have the criminal history check completed prior to their receiving unescorted access? How will the licensee be notified?

4

Dr. J. Nelson Grace December 8, 1986

.Page 3

16. Reference 10CFR 73.57 (b) (1), last sentence: should access to safeguards information be added to the sentence or does it only apply to unescorted access to the nuclear power facility.

'17. Will the NRC provide guidance to procedures for handling a situation where the licensee receives information that there is an outstanding warrant on an employee?

18.

Close consideration should be given to the entire program relating to fin-gerprinting those who have or may have access to safeguards information.

Examples of problem areas are:

o What is the definition of access? Does this mean control over or simply being allowed to read the information.

o Control over who would have access to safeguards information in the area of contractors, suppliers, and manufacturers would almost be impossible for the licensee. _,

o Some licensees ship spent fuel. There is safeguards information associated with the schedules that the licensee provides to emer .

3 gency planning and response personnel including the Highway Patrol and the governor of the state. Does the intent of the rule include fingerprinting local law enforcement personnel and the governor and his/her staff?

19.

If some consideration or relief is not granted for " temporary" clearances; 10CFR 73.57 and NUMARC Rev. 8 are tied together; then there seems to be a conflict with the licensees ALARA programs in that large numbers of personnel will have to be escorted and thereby increasing exposure. There will also be the potential for exceeding the number of visitors (escorted personnel) per permanently badged personnel.

20. Suggest that the NRC, as funneling agency, develop a system to allow them to submit to the licensee a monthly billing for those cards submitted.

Vn appreciate this opportunity to provide you with our comments. Duke supports

{-

and endorses the comments submitted by KMC and AIF.

If there are any questions or problems concerning this subject, please advise.

j. Very truly yours, WA/Au g i Hal B. Tucker JWD/186/j gm

Dr. J. Nelson Grace December 8 -1986

' Page'4 bxc: T.K.-Anderson J.R.-Bavis A.V. Carr A.R. Franklin C.L. Harlin

• C.L. Hartzell E.O. McCraw-

.R.D. Madden N.A. Rutherford

-R.O. Sharpe P.F.' Guill J.S. Warren

. R.L. Gill GS-811.02 (14) 8 f

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM .,.c-P.O. Box 968

• 3000 George \\'ashington \\'ay

• Richland. \\'ashington 99352

'86 DEC 15 P2 :31 CF?

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December 11, 1986 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

PROPOSED RULE 1CCFR 73.57 - REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECK SlFR 40438 The Washington Public Power Supply System has reviewed the subject .

proposed rule and provides the following comments for your consideration. ,

As the operator of a commercial nuclear power plant, the Supply System is vitally interested in the proposed rule. We share the Commission's -

interest in assuring that those who have access to nuclear power plants are suitable for such work.

While we agree in concept with the use of a criminal history check, we do have some concerns with the proposed rule as noted below.

1. The proposed rule would require fingerprinting of all persons granted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to safeguards information. We recommend that the proposed rule be revised to " grandfather" (exempt from fingerprinting) those persons who are employed by the licensee and have been granted unescorted access or access to safeguards information at the time the proposed rule becomes effective.

In our case, many of these individuals have been employed by the Supply System for several years, during which time they have demonstrated their loyalty to the company and have been found to be trustworthy individuals. Additionally, they have been through a psychological evaluation and are continually under evaluation as part of our ongoing behavioral observation program. To require that these employees now submit to fingerprinting could be damaging to morale and is, in our opinion, not necessary. This feature (grandfathering) is a part of the NUMARC guidelines being prepared to address unescorted access authorization.

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Sac.ual J. Chilk Proposed Rule - Criminal llistory Checks Page 2

2. In the supplementary information preceding the proposed rule, it is stated that the routine turnaround time for the criminal history check is expected to average 25 workings days. Based on prior experience with Comission schedules, we fear that the 25 working days will typically not be met. In any case, a 5 week delay (25 working days) in being able to put an individual to work with unescorted access will result in a decrease in overall efficiency of operations. It is recommended that the licensee be allowed to grant unescorted access on'a temporary basis upon submittal of the fingerprints for a criminal history check. A final determination will then be made upon receipt of the results from the FBI /NRC.

In response to the question "Should fingerprinting be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?", we believe that the rule should --

require fingerprinting only for those persons seeking .

unescorted access to vital areas. Should a licensee decide that it is more cost effective to run a single access authorization program, the rule would certainly not prohibit -

that. However, it should not be required.

We appreciate this opportunity to coment on the proposed rule. Should you have any questions regarding our comments, please call me at (509) 372-5238.

Very truly yours, G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs

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m mm new=.-ayK-1L ggamegnar) 30 Carolina Power & Light CoEp's"nh

.0E010 $ DEC 15 P2 32 SERIAL: NLS-86-453 C F F:'-- l 00C t.i. ' I g .

Mr. S.J. Chilk l Secretary of the Commission I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission I Washington, D.C. 20535  ;

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch l

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Carolina Power & Light Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule 10 CFR Part 73.57, " Requirements for Criminal History Checks". Our comments are provided as an attachment to this letter.

Should you have any questions with regard to our camments, please contact Mr. Arnold Schmich at (919) 836-8759.

Yours very truly,

. . . Zimme man Nuclear g Section AWS/kts (5087AWS)

Attachment cc: Public Document Room (NRC) 1 1

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CP&L Comments Regarding Proposed Rule Change to 10 CFR Part 73.57 1.

The statement of considerations stated that the letter forwarding fingerprint cards to the NRC would contain among other information, the facility docket number.

Additionally, the facility docket number is to be included on each fingerprint card. Licensees with more than one reactor, at the same or different locations, have more than one docket number. In the case of CP&L, we have three facilities, and four docket numbers, and many employees, including non-licensee personnel who have unescorted access or access to Safeguards Information for all locations.

This proposal is therefore not practical for multi unit licensees. Another method for identifying the licensee should be provided that is not specific to the nuclear facility (unit).

2. The statement of considerations state that ". . . NRC personnel . . . do not need to be fingerprinted by the licensee because of an equivalent program for fingerprinting NRC em

. that "NRC employees"ployees are exempted forfrom FBI this criminal requirement. history A checks". 73.57(bXI) states precise definition i

of "NRC employee"is needed. Additionally, it is suggested that "non-NRC" employees (contractors) working for the NRC be identified by the Regional Administrator as requiring access to the facility or to Safeguards Information.

3.

Section 6.4.d of the NUMARC guidelines allows for the granting of a temporary.

unescorted' access authorization providing that the fingerprints have been submitted to the NRC. The last sentence of Part 73.57(bXI) indicates that the results of a criminal history check must be used to make a determination prior to granting access. This is a conflict which needs to be resolved.

4.

Part 73.57(bX3) concerns both " permanent" and " temporary" employees that have been granted unescorted access or access to Safeguards Information by another licensee. A definition of " permanent" employee (such as is in NUMARC 7.1) is needed to assure consistency in making this distinction.

1

, 5. Part 73.57(eXI) should be worded, " Prior to any final adverse action" to be consistent with the other provisions - (eX2) and (cXI) - of the proposed rule.

' H.R. 4151 provides that a licensee receiving a CHRC with an arrest not accompanied by a disposition may seek to determine the disposition. Part 73.57 (eX2) is specific in allowing the fingerprinted individual to correct, update, explain, etc., the results of a CHRC, but is silent on the licensee's rights to make this same determination. While it can be assumed that the licensee has the preceding right, the rule should be as specific as H.R. 4151.

l 6. Part 73.57(fX4) requires the retention of criminal history records "on site". For l

utilities with more than one nuclear site, this is not practical. Background

( information obtained in clearing our employees for unescorted access or access to safeguards information is kept at our Corporate Headquarters, not at the sites.

The rule should allow the licensee to maintain these files in locations chosen by the j utility.

7. '

Part 73.57(bXI) exempts the licensee from the requirement to fingerprint employees of the US NRC and individuals responding to site emergencies in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73.55(a).

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I Clarification should be provided as to whether there are any provisions to exempt the licensee from fingerprinting other individuals such as those included in 10 CFR Part 73.21(c) whenever they have an established need to know Safeguards Information. These include members of a duly authorized committee of congress; the Governor of a state or designated representative; representatives of the Internationai Atomic Energy Agency; and an individual to whom disclosure is ordered pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2.744(e).

8.

Section 13.0 of the NUM, ARC access authorization guidelines provides that the licensee must conduct an independent evaluation of contractor and vendor access authorization programs on an annual basis. However,10 CFR Part 73.57(fX2) does not specifically provide access to criminal history record information for auditors or agents of a licensee conducting this annual audit. Such a provision should be included in Part 73.57(fX2).

9.

Part 73.57(bXI) provides that individuals who have unescorted access authorization on the date the rule becomes effective will retain the access authorization pending the results of the criminal history check. It is not clear whether this would also allow for access to Safeguards Information. Clarification of this matter should be provided here and in other applicable sections.

10.

The establishment of prepaid processing fee accounts with the NRC should be investigated. This would alleviate the need to submit a processing fee for each application as required by Part 73.57(dX3).

11.

It is unclear how much time constitutes a " reasonable amount of time" when individuals challenge criminal history checks. Part 73.57(eX2) should be appropriately clarified.

12.

Part 73.57(fX2) is unclear as to how an individual's representative is to be '

designated and how many representatives an individual is allowed. Appropriate clarification should be provided.

(5087Aws/kts)

80CET W ' i -

, gg  %% David M. Varner 32 Roseclair St., #3 h/Nd dh%h

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Boston, MA 02125 December 12, 1986

, ,a,.

Secretary of,the' Commission "i' U.S, Nuclsar Regulatory Ccmmissien s Washington, D.C. 10555

'  % DEC 15 P3 :34 Attention: Docketing and , Service Branch

Dear SJr:

m hl ..

- 1 yM As a current employee of an electric utility company with unescorted accass wrivileges to a nuclear power plant, I'wlsh to provide you with my pers~onal comments on the proposed rule concerning requirements for criminal history checks (published in 51FR40438, dated November 7, 1986.) ,

I a.h not opposed to the use of fingerorinting to obtain a crimin11~ history chetrs as mandated by Puolic Law 99-399,' " Omnibus Dipicmatic SecurJ ty and Ant 3-Terrorism Act of 1986." However, I am'very concerned that sabmittal of my fingerpr'ats to the Federal Bureau af Investigation (FBI) for a criminal

, history check will rAsult in my fingerprint ~ hientification becoming a pern4nent part of the FBI data base on Indivibuals. 'The creation of a permanent file of 6 fingerprint identificatidn by the FBI would ce'En unwarranted Javasion of my privacy and would co nothing to benef t t the proposed rule's goal of Assuring "that individuals with criminal 'istories n

impacting upon their reliability and trustworthiness are not permitted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Informa tion. " As currently written, the proposed roe does not adequately assure that the collected information will be used soisly for its intended purpose.

Reannable precautions should be taken b entbre that the FBI and the Attorney General of the United States are unable.to misuse the fingerprint

~

iden'tificaticn collected under the provisions of this proposed rule. ,

Specifica11'y, it is recommenNd that tha fingerprint cards collected by the ~ '

licensee ba identified only by the utility name and a numerical code which the licensee can mat *:h with tha individual's name. Thus the fingerprint cards would be sent to the NRC ,for criminal history clie,cks in a blind condition. If ,

a positivt criminal history is discovered, the licensac can then be asked by the NRC to identify tne individual using the numericai code. The individual

t -

should be notified by the licensee whenever it becomes necessary to inform the NRC of the identity of his or har fingerprint card. And in no case should the '

FBI or Attorney Genaral be notified of the identity of a fingerprint card. ,

With the licensee controlling the identity of each fingerprint card, better assurance can be made that no information will be improperly used. .

failure to provide such precautions will potentially result in harm to the individual undergoing a criminal history check. The co1Netion of any persor.al identifidtton data by the government or any private agency has a ~

1arge potential for misusef Unless a scbstantial benefit to the puolic can be -

demonstrated, the uncontrolled collection of personal identification data is

~

an improper invasion of the individual's privacy.

I hooe that these comments prove.. to be useful in developing an effective rule, which is sensitive to the rights to privacy of individuals.

gg Very truly yours,

, UJ d DW L Y .flPl & f a

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_a-December 12, 1986 s

l Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch '

Comments on Proposed Rule 10CFR73.55 ' '

" Requirements for Criminal History Checks"

Dear Sir:

Following are my comments on the subject rule:

1. Paragraph (a)(2) of the rule requires that licensees. submit fingerprint cards for those individuals who have access to ,

Safeguards Information as well as those requiring unescorted.

access. The rule does not appear to recognize that che licensee .

in many cases cannot directly control the actions # d,r

'ee' -^t O for instance when designing a sub-assembly for a /

security system. The individual does not pose a threat to '

security, but m , ,, ., m - s, - -

nevertheless is subj ect to the same FBI check. +

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2. The rule requires that all persons c #:n.rt y granted unescorted access or currently permitted acces; a( eguards Information shall be fingerprinted,- I conter.d cm be a wasted effort to recheck an employee who has been a trustworthy employee of the company for many years. I propose that all persons currently e

possessing unescorted access and those with access to Safeguards h Information _ .

- - . I also note that the clause for extension of the time which will be allowed for check current employees is only applicable, as now written, to those persons having _ _ . - ~2. . . ~ - . ~e

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- At the very least, the b

rule should be modified to include those employees as well.

3. The rule does not make allowances for -- - "- - -- -

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or Access to Safegusrds

-'~ '- -i C. Information. This is not consistent with the proposs-J MIARC 9 guidelines which permits temporary unescorted access for a period g q n i1 ( HIC h c4 Mi/ I b Acknowte 'ged by card....O.E.C . .'rrm. 4m,.e 2W 3I

Stcrstary of tha Commission December 12, 1986 Page12 not exceeding 180 dbys if evidence that a request for a criminal history check of the individual by the FBI has been submitted to the NRC. I propose that the rule be revised to be consistent with the NUMARC guidelines for temporary unescorted access and that it includes temporary or interim access to Safeguards Information as well.

4 There is some inconsistency between paragraphs (f)(3), (f)(4),

and (f>(5). Understandably information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check may be transferred to another licensee (f)(3), however, (f)(4) states that "the licensee shall make criminal history records obtained under this section available for examination on site by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws" and (f)(5) states, "the licensee shall retain all fingerprint cards and criminal history records received from the FBI on an individual (including dates indicating no record) for three (3) years after termination or denial of unescorted access to the nuclear facility or access to O Safeguards Information." My concern is that if I e

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SN 157B t.cokout Place

~B6 DEC 29 P5 21 DEC 22 StW 2ecretaryoftheCommission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission . .

Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Oear Sir:

TVA is pleased to provide the following comments on the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 about requirements for criminal history checks as noticed in the November 7, 1986 Federal Register (51 FR 40438-40441).:

1.

Proposed 10 CFR section 73.57(b) would require each licensee to submit fingerprint cards through NRC on individuals cleared for unescorted access within 180 days of the effective date of the rule and subsequently thereafter as other individuals are processed for. unescorted access clearances. As a Federal agency TVA has long submitted criminal history requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in accordance with TVA's security suitability investigations conducted under Executive Order No. 10450. This program is equivalent to the program proposed by the rule. To utilize NRC as a middleman for such requests would place a redundant and unnecessary administrative and financial burden on TVA with no accompanying benefit.

Accordingly, TVA requests that it be allowed to take credit for criminal history checks previously completed pursuant to Executive Order No. 10450 Qj and be further al4oweCtecontinue-4ts prograwof> subettting"such requests.directly' to"the'-FBh* This suggestion could be effected by revising section 73.57(a)(1) to read as follows:

(a) General. (1) Each licensee who is authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor under Part 50 shall comply with the requirements of this section; provided, however, that any !icensee currently processing criminal history requests through the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to Executive Order No. 10450 shall not be required to also submit such requests to the NRC under these regulations.

2. Proposed 10 CFR section 73.57(d)(3) would require fees to accompany each fingerprint card.

He suggest NRC revise this requirement to require a monthly-ot, ni quartedy.-payment. It is believed that payment of fees as each C card is submitted poses unnecessary and expensive accounting difficulties for licensees.

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Secretary of the Commission DEC 22 E86 3.

Within the supplementary NRC asked the following: information that accompanied the proposed rule, Should fingerprinting be required of {

individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the entire nuclear power facility including protected areas?

S TVA believes that the criminal history check should,-be-reqWeddoe-Mtal and, protected nea.uneSCortWRCCRTF, however, the application of this .

position with respect to NRC's proposed rule is unclear. If NRC's definition of " nuclear power facility" includes more than vital and .

protected areas,  !

i.e., nonprotected areas such as access roads or certain switchyard broad; however, areas, TVA believes the scope of the proposed rule is too if it is intended to include no more than the protected area, the word " facility" should be changed or defined accordingly.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY h

. k&tLA.-

. L. Gridley, Director Nuclear Safety and Licensing

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.o .o PR- 7J Mae.ama Power Comoan,

( f/ a e u r) j VA No in tsen Stree Pop Office Bau 2641 . *

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Te +pt'one205 250-1835 R P Mcdonald

'86 OEC 29 PAlbBamaPower smer vice Presicen' *-. wwo weoc Setem NA-86-0708 Ex -

December 19, 1986 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

Alabama Power Company hereby submits the following coments regarding proposed rule 10CFR73.57 which was written to implement the criminal history record Act checks required under the " Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism of 1986."

(b) (3) This paragraph states that fingerprints need not be taken if an individual who is a permanent employee of a licensee, contractor, manufacturer or supplier has been granted unescorted access to another nuclear power facility based in part on criminal history records check under this section.

Coment:

This implies that if a contractor or supplier working for Utility X is fingerprinted by Utility X and granted unescorted access by Utility X based on the criminal history records check by that m

utility, a second utility (Utility Y) can grant unescorted access to this individual without repeating the criminal history records

@ check. If this is true, how-muetrtime-cam elapsa-af tac-the UttLity X cacords-check is_ccmniated.before Anewrecords-check wouJd.b&raqu. iced.by anathac.utLLtty,?

(b) (3) This paragraph states that temporary employees need not be fingerprinted so long as the individual has been fingerprinted within the last 180 days.

Coment: This does not clearly state who-ts-a-temporary empicyee and C-- implies that fingerprinting is not required within 180 days of the last records check unless the individual becomes a permar.ent employee of a licensee.

Clarification is needed to fully understand the intent of this sentence. There are a lot of short term individuals utilized by major nuclear contractors to do nuclear work because of the cummulative effect of radiation exposure. The rule should also apply to these temporary contractor employees.

. 5 1987 AcknowW by card. ...JAN. . . . rr. r.o W

a Proposed 10CRF73.57 NA-86-0708 Page 2 (e) (2) This paragraph states that the individual who believes that information returned in the records check is incorrect or incomplete, must be informed of proper procedures for revising the record or getting an explanation included in the record.

Coment: It is not-eleerly-stated-that-it-+the-resportstDtitiiy wi-C+

Indiv4duaLto. contact thatprov.iciing agency-and get-Faleien>mede to-tWer6 It should be clearly stated in the rule that the licensee does not have any responsibility for the correctness or accuracy of the information obtained from the records check.

(f) (4) This paragraph states that the licensee shall make criminal history records obtained under this section available for examination onsite by an authorized representative of the NRC . . . . .

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Coment: Due to the nature of these records, they would normally not be

<ainrtT1tNTrartsh Alabama Power Company feels that it would be more reasonable to have these records kept in a secure, limited access location where other personnel records are maintained.

These records would be accessable to the NRC for audit, but would not be necessarily onsite.

Coment: There is no provision in the rule for temporary authorizations as provided in the NUMARC document " Industry Guidelines for Nuclear

/7N Power Plant Access Authorization Programs." The rule should i b. aHow-e-temporarkauthor.ization.-to-be-granted-based.on submittal O of fingerprints to the NRC for processing, passing a psychological assessment, completing a credit check, and interviewing one developed reference. This would allow expediting of authorizations during plant shutdowns when unescorted access is needed for individuals but an emergency does

, not exist as provided for in 10CFR73.55(a).

Yours trul j

/ /

R. P. Mcdonald RPM /JGS:pm /1.5 IV cc: Mr. L. B. Long Mr. L. S. Rubenstein Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. W. H. Bradford Mr. E. A. Reeves

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.- Decerter 22, 1986 El ' . VP-86-G183 Secretary of the Cccr.ission U. S. Nuclear P.egu'atory Ccamission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

References:

1) FetTai 2 ITIC Docket No. 50-341 t:RC Licence No. NPF-43

2) Federal Register Volume 51, No. 216, Pg.

40438, dated November 7, 1986.

Subject:

Detroit Fdison's Resp:nse to Proposed Pulino for 1GCFR Part 73 m Reference 2 requested ccments on a prcposed rule

i. '

amending 10CFR Part 73 and prescribing to power reactor licensees the reccrc:mendation for criminal history checkc. The proposed rule,10CFR73.57, has been '

reviewed by the Detroit Edicon !bclear Security Department and the following corrent: provided.

With regard to the question in the Faderal Recister l'etice, "should finger printing be required of individuals for unescorted access to vital areas only or to the nuclear power facility?", Detroit Edison believes-timi-li.mhurf Asied fe Is-@r-peintis9-to only-those-persons needing.r.ccm m_ vital. areas would not-benefit the.iicensee.,, In many cases the work being conducted at a power reactor facility requires workers

to be assigned to work in vital areas en short notice.

I Since many of these workers may not routinely be assigned vital area access, they would be precluded from irr,ediate availability for work in these areas. Detroit Edisen believes a more broad-based approach to effectively include all persons with uneccorted access to be fingerprinted is more appropriate and permits the licensee a greater amount of flexibility. Further, Detroit Edison believes that the program should be consictent with provisions set forth in the proposed hu: ARC Guidelines for Access Authorization. .

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lt. Elinor G. Adensan Deccober 22, 1986 VP-86-0183 Page 2 Specific ccccents on the propoced 10CFR73.57 are as follcus:

o ICCFR73.57 (b) (1). Ccu cn:: Within this section, Detroit Edison believes that specific e.

previsions should be made to pemit the licensee o to gsant-interierrtspdft"f"Utfecct7:ted-access privileges once the licensee has sutraitted the record finger prints for the necessary records check. This would pemit necessary feasibility to allcw unescorted access in the shortest time L possible, permitting the licensee to accomplish work in a cost effective manner. Other programs, i.e., The Continual Observation Program are already in place and would serve to compliment the records check process. In addition, Detroit Edison believes that interim or t mporary access to safeguards infomation should be granted once the (need to know) criteria as well as applicable company program guidelines have been satisfied and the licensee has sutraitted the record finger prints for the stated records check.

) o 10CFR73.57(f) (2). Comment: Detroit Edison believes 2*

that s w i iu- w L a . -e 6 M be-ma&iL_,

to p me-te4 Hee-whicWtri:r the --

finger p,mm.r=~ r4 by, y= r- =t h ice & to assu g,.y,cgg gorv m H ='a, _L a u e """'er -

g g A<-nrwon ec, Detroit Edison appreciates the opportunity to respond to the subject Federal P.egister !)otice and hopes these ccaments prove to be benefitial to your analysis.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact it. Steven Frost at (313) 586-4210 Sincerely,

~&d* S cc: Mr. W. G. Po;ers Mr. J. J. Stefano Mr. G. C. Wright US!:EC Docunent Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

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Seston. Massachusetts 02199

'87 31 -7 P2 :09 January 5,19875.

James M. Lydon BECo 87-001 Chief operating Officer Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing 'and Service Branch Proposed Rule: 10CFR 73.57, Requirements for Criminal History Checks (51 FR 40438)

Dear Sir:

On November 7, 1986, the NRC published the subject proposed rule for public comment. This proposed rule identifies the NRC requirements for implementing Public Law 99-399 " Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986". Boston Edison personnel have reviewed the pubile law and the NRC proposed rule. He wish to offer the following comments on the proposed rule for your consideration.

1. Section 73.57 (b) (1) states that individuals who do not have unescorted access after the effective date of the final rule shall be fingerprinted and the results of the criminal history records check shall be used in making the determination of granting unescorted access.

This section does not specify the time limit that the licensee should wait for the fingerprinting results or what type of access may be permitted in the interval while awaiting such results. The supplementary information states that the typical processing time would be 25 business days. The rule does not specify the licensee's action if the results do not become available from the processing center (NRC). For example, can the licensee grant unescorted access to individuals while awaiting the results from the FBI, or should the licensee wair 10 days and then terminate the employee!

Without a specific time limit or direction, the proposed requirement leaves the licensee without a previously agreed upon course of action to take. Boston Edison suggests that the licensees should have the option to grant unescorted access pending the results of the fingerprinting check, provided that: (1) the individual in question qualifies in all other aspects of the access authorization guidelines implemented by the licensee; or (11) that the Individual has been granted unescorted access at another licensed facility within the previous 12 months, and the licensee has established the positive identification of the individual; of (111) the individual meets other NRC established criteria which can be substituted at the beginning of emoloyment in lieu of the fingerprinting.

2. Section 73.57 (b) (3): In the absence of a prescribed definition of

" permanent" and "temcorary" employees, the time limit of 180 days for the fingerprinting requirement of temporary employees raises the following

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FN BOSTON EDISON COMPANY January 5, 1987 Secretary of the Commission Page Two a) If the temporary employee was fingerprinted prior to 180 days, does the individual still have to be fingerprinted?

b) Does an individual who was fingerprinted in a period greater than 180 days before requiring unescorted access qualify as a temporary employee?

c) What is the duration of the validity of the fingerprints?

d) Can a licensee employ an individual that had successful fingerprinting results from the FBI which were several years old?

This section is confusing regarding the requirements for " permanent" and

" temporary" employees. Boston Edison requests that the following changes be incorporated.

(i) In the first sentence, "who l_s a permanent employee" should be -

Stated as "Who was a permanent employee" (11) NRC should provide clarifications for the definition of

, " permanent" and " temporary" employees.

(iii) The time limit of "180 days" should be eliminated for temporary employees. Boston Edison recommends that both " permanent" and

" temporary" employees be treated the same regarding fingerprinting requirements.

3. Throughout Section 73.57, the phrase "under this section" shedid be inserted appropriately to emphasize that the requirement applies only to criminal history information obtained through fingerprinting required by 73.57, and not to criminal history information obtained through any other State or Federal program or requirement. For example in Section 73.57(f)(3) insert the words "Under this section" following the word "obtained". Similarly such an insert would be appropriate in Section 73.57(f)(5).

4. 10CFR 73.57 (e) Right to correct and complete information. In item (1) add " relative to unescorted access" after " Prior to any adverse action".

The adverse action referred to is related to ' unescorted access";

therefore, it should be clearly stated.

5. 10CFR 73.57 (f)(3)(111) Add "and" after " previous 365 days" to make the paragraph grammatically correct, and to have the correct meaning of the sentence.

6. The proposed rule, Section (d)(3), outlines a fee system and a method of payment with each application through corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, or money order, etc. Would it not be more expeditious, and provide the utilities with an easier method of accountability with less paperwork, to allow the establishment of an account with the NRC which could be drawn upon with the submittal of individual fingerprint cards. Another means would be to bill the utilities on a quarterly or annual basis as with inspection payments.

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY January 5, 1987 Secretary of the Commission Page Three

7. No mention has been made about the possibility of a criminal history report coming back to a licensee and listing an individual with an outstanding felony warrant. There is a possibility that some utility personnel would not know how to handle this situation, i.e., it is not an arrest or conviction. The felony warrant might be more than a year old '

but not be invalid. In this case access would not be denied based on the proposed rule's wording. In reality, however, local or state law enforcement authorities should be notified to carry out the actions necessary with service of the warrant, and the individual should be removed from the site. This situation should be addressed in the final rule.

8. Regarding the question posed concerning the cost effectiveness of a single access authorization program vs. individual programs for protected and vital areas (FR40439, col. 3, Para. 3), Boston Edison believes that fingerprinting should be required of all individuals requiring access to -

the nuclear power facility, irrespective of the distinction between protected and vital areas.

9. The proposed rule, Section (f)(3), provides for transferring the personal information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check to another licensee: (1) Upon the individual's request to redisseminate the information contained in his/her file; and (11) if the gaining licensee verifles Information such as name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other identifying physical characteristics. All of the aforementioned characteristics of identification were invalidated by the Hill West case of 1906, at Leavenworth Penitentiary. This case established fingerprints as the only acceptable positive identification method. This is still true.

The gaining licensee has the individual. Why not take a right thumb-print of the individual and submit it to the last licensee he worked for who retains the per son's prints. This would provide positive identification in an expeditious manner. Boston Edison proposes that this method be written into the rule to replace the presently proposec (f)(3)(11). This should also be the basis for granting unescorted access for temporary employees in the event the results from the FBI do not become available within 30 days (See Comment #1).

Should you have any questions regarding our comments, please do not hesitate to contact this office.

Very truly yours, aw $

WGL/ pac