ML20207S675
| ML20207S675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/13/1986 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19310E127 | List:
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| References | |
| FRN-51FR40438, RULE-PR-73 AC27-2-03, AC27-2-3, NUDOCS 8703200164 | |
| Download: ML20207S675 (58) | |
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A CHAIRMAN'S ORAL
SUMMARY
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SU8 COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1985 MAY 13, 1986 8703200164 870318 51 40438 PDR
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Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, the Commission is pleased to testify before you on H.R. 3330, the proposed Nuclear Power Plant Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1985. I will summarize our prepared testimony on this subject which, with your permission, we would like to submit for the record.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission strongly supports enactment of H.R. 3330 as a highly cost effective and desirable means of improving safeguards at nuclear power reactors. Permitting nuclear utilities -
access to data contained in the FBI Criminal File for the purpose of employee screening will help assure that a criminally-motivated individual is not granted unescorted access to the most sensitive areas of a nuclear reactor. Enactment of legislation of this sort has been pursued by formal Commission initiatives since 1983.
Th'e NRC is committed to assuring the safe operation of nuclear reactors to maintain both the protection of the public health and safety and the environment in which we live. We believe enactment of H.R. 3330 will help assure this goal.
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In the safeguarding of vital equipment or components at nuclear reactors, one of the most difficult threats to protect against is the deliberate, malicious act that might be committed by site employees authorized access. Based upon the NRC's Safeguards Summary Event List, (N0 REG-0525), approximately one-third of safeguards-related events involving NRC regulated nuclear material and - facilities are attributable to the so-called " insider."
The NRC considers the . insider a serious threat which is adequately addressed by present security programs. However, for the reasons set forth below we believe that current programs to thwart sabatoge by insiders'would be enhanced if our power reactor licensees were given access to FBI criminal history data.
Currently, employees of our major fuel cycle licensees who have access to the protected area or who have access to strategic special nuclear material are cleared under national security investigations which include FBI criminal checks.
At present one of the ways licensees attempt to counter the insider threat is through employee screening programs which may include background investigations to establish personal trustworthiness and reliability. Obviously an important element of the background investigation is the criminal history check.
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One-of the Commission's goals is to achieve greater uniformity in ,
I the operation of' personnel screening programs throughout the ~
nuclear industry. -The disparity in licensee programs is perhaps greatest in the area of access to criminal history data. Local and state laws regulating dissemination of criminal history information have resulted in a wide variance in the type and quality of criminal history information available to licensees.
Enactment of H.R. 3330 would enhance and promote greater .
uniformity in industry-conducted personnel screening by providing licensees access to the nation wide criminal history data maintained by the FBI.
The Department of Justice has endorsed H.R. 3330, noting that in other in:tances Congress has specifically authorized finger-
.(- printing and criminal history checks with respect to certain bank
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employees, certain persons involved in the trading of commodities futures, and certain farm labor contractors. We believe these same safeguards should be applied to certain nuclear reactor employees for the protection of public health and safety.
The Commission believes this legislation will significantly assist the nuclear industry in not only maintaining but increasing our assurance in the adequacy of safeguards at nuclear reactors in this country, and we strongly urge enactment of this bill.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. We will be pleased to
- e answ r any questions at this time.
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QUESTION 1. (A) PLEASE PROVIDE FOR THE RECORD A LIST OF INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE OR TERRORISM AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, IDENTIFYING WHICH OF THESE INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN TIED TO SPECIFIC EMPLOYEES.
ANSWER.
THE NRC HAS NOT RECORDED ANY INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE OR TERRORISM AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECORDED SIXTY-SEVEN EVENTS OF VANDALISM AND TAMPERING. THESE INCIDENTS INCLUDE DESTRUCTION OR ATTEMPTED DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, PARTS AND EQUIPMENT WHICH DO NOT CAUSE RADIOACTIVE RELEASE. EIGHTEEN EVENTS ARE CATEGORIZED AS ARSON. A COMPLETE LIST OF INCIDENTS IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES IS ATTACHED. THE LISTING HAS BEEN ANNOTATED WITH A "T" IN THE RIGHT MARGIN IDENTIFYING ELEVEN INCIDENTS THAT HAVE BEEN TIED TO SPECIFIC EMPLOYEES.
UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
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OUESTION 1. (B) WHAT PORTION OF THE INCIDENTS IDENTIFIED IN (A) WERE:
(1) PREMEDITATED AND PROMPTED BY POLITICAL OR CRIMINAL MOTIVES, (2) PREMEDITATED AND PROMPTED BY SPITE AGAINST THE UTILITY, (3) SPONTANEOUS AND THE RESULT OF MENTAL INSTABILITY, (4) THE RESULT OF OTHER KNOWN REASON (PLEASE SPECIFY), OR (5) THE RESULT OF UNKNOWN REASONS?
ANSWER.
(1) ALL THE LISTED EVENTS APPEAR TO BE DELIBERATE. INFdRMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH NRC REPORTING CHANNELS TO INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT THE INCIDENTS WERE PROMPTED BY POLITICAL OR CRIMINAL MOTIVES.
(2) OF THE ELEVEN INCIDENTS TIED TO SPECIFIC EMPLOYEES, ONE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO A DISGRUNTLED EMPLOYEE.
(3) INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER THE INCIDENTS WERE SPONTANEOUS AND THE RESULT OF MENTAL INSTABILITY.
UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
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QUESTION 1(B). (CONTINUED) (4) FOR ONE INCIDENT, AN ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. THREE OTHER INCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING-UNION CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS OR PROPOSED PAY CUTS.
(5) THE REMAINDER OF THE INTENTIONAL TAMPERING / VANDALISM lNCIDENTS WERE THE RESULT OF UNKNOWN REASONS.
i UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
T . i QUESTION-1. (C) HAS THE COMMI5SION BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH ANY CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ACTS OF SABOTAGE OR TERRORISM IDENTIFIED IN (A) AND INFORMATION IN THE EMPLOYEE'S CRIMINAL HISTORY? IN OTHER WORDS, TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD.INFORMATION IN THE EMPLOYEE'S CRIMINAL RECORDS HAVE ALERTED THE i UTILITY OF THE EMPLOYEE'S PROPENSITY TO COMMIT ACTS OF SABOTAGE OR TERRORISM, HAD THE INFORMATION BEEN AVAI LABLE TO THE UTI LITY.
ANSWER.
BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN NO RECORDED INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE OR TERRORISM AS STATED IN THE ANSWER TO (A), NO EMPLOYEE CRIMINAL RECORDS HAVE BEEN EXAMINED. THIS WOULD BE DONE HOWEVER, FOR ANY EVENTS MORE SERIOUS THAN THE TAMPERING / VANDALISM EVENTS LISTED.
ENCLOSURE:
LIST OF INCIDENTS UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
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VANDALISM V-1 06/30/81 VANDALISM ,
V-74-01 02/22/74 Montague, MA The top 3/4 of a 500-foot meteorological tower was toppled by the deliberate loosening of the guying cables. The tower was instrumented to record environmental data.
V-74-02 Summer 1974 Trojan Portland General Electric Co.
Columoia County, OR Vandalism a problem during construction; an intricate web of hand-shaped copper tubes smashed by hammer.
V-74-03 Summer 1974 Zion Commonwealth Edison Co.
. Lake County, IL Valves and. switches found in wrong position; other valves repeatedly failed. Disgruntled employee suspected. Fuel present at site.
"I' V-78-01 05/29/78 Skagit Units 1 & 2
- Puget Sound Power and Light Co.
Skagit County, WA The 196-foot meteorological tower was toppled by the deliberate loosening of the four turnbuckles on the guy wires. The November 13th Faction, an anti-nuclear group, claimed responsi-bility. The event was timed to coincide with May 31 - June 1 Energy Conference in Seattle. Facility under construction; no fuel present at site.
V-78-02 12/13, 24 & 27/78 Summer l
South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.
l Fairfield County, SC Fires, due to apparent vandalism, occurred at the Virgil C.
Summer construction site. on December 13, 24, and 27,1978.
An auxiliary building wire run, one portable toilet located inside a building under construction, two exterior portable toilets located elsewnere on the site, one AC electrical panel, "J' and the control room roof were the locations of the fires. No personnel injuries resulted and total damage was estimated at less than $5,000. An emolayee believed responsible for at least one of the fires terminated his employment. Security measures were increased. Fuel not present at site. (See also Category VI, Item VI-78-01.)
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. TAMPERING / VANDALISM
- V-2 12/31/83 V-79-01 05/07/79 Surry Virginia Electric & Power Co.
1 Surry County, VA While conducting inspections of new fuel, the licensee found that plastic protective liners on 62 of 64 assemblies had been tampered with. Further inspection revealed that a white crystalline substance had been poured onto the assemblies. An y analysis performed at the site by the licensee indicated that I the substance was sodium hydroxide. The new fuel is stored along with spent fuel in a building which is locked and alarmed, and to which access is issued to site personnel after the completion of a background screening The licensee strengthened access control measures. program. On 6/18/79 two indivi-duals were arrested for their involvement in damaging new fuel-assemblies.
V-79-02 05/09/79 Surry Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Surry County, VA At 8:00 a.m., the licensee determined that an oscilloscope had been vandalized by a liquid solution of borax and water. j The oscilloscope, estimated value of S4,000, was in an unlocked protective case and stored in a locked building which is located outside the protected area. No relationship to the 7
vandalism of new fuel assemblies, discovered on May 7,1979, was establishec. Subsequently, an employee admitted to vandali-zing the oscilloscope, but did not admit any involvement in
, damaging. new fuel assemblies.
V-79-03 05/30/79 Midland Consumers Power Co.
Midland County, MI Approximately 20 electrical wires were apparently cut inten-tionally in four safety and non-safety related panels in the control room. It appeared that the wires were cut using electrical pliers. The control room was not normally manned during the night shift. In addition, glass was found broken in six electrical relay covers. The plant is under construction.
Fuel not present at site.
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VANDALISM
. V-3 12/31/81.
V-79-04 06/25/79 Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority Spring City County, 74 -
At 9:30 a.m., NRC was notified by the ifcensee that in the course of making cable checks, an electrical conductor within a single cable for the unit I containment spray system was found cut, with the sheathing replaced around the cut. In addition, two conductors in a unit 2 safety-related electrical panel were found with insulation cut away from the cable. Fuel not present at site.
V- 79-0 5 08/10/79 Saginaw City Government Saginaw, til A moisture density gauge containing 10 millicuries of cesium-137 and 50 millicuries of americium-241 was vandalized by some children at a road construction site in Saginaw, Michigan.
During the incident the gauge was dropped and damaged; the radioactive sources, however, remained intact. A survey made by the local county health department indicated no contamination or abnormal levels of radioactivity.
V-79-06 10/16/79 Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority s Spring City, TN At approximately 2:00 p.m., the ifcensee discovered that an unknown individual (s) had placed a 3/16" fron wire around a 480 volt AC bus in the auxiliary building. It was determined that touching the wire could have damaged the board and done bodily harm to the individual so doing. Fuel not present at site.
V-79-0 7 12/03/79 Quad Cities
. Commonweal th Edison Co.
Rock Island County, IL During a valve verification check performed by the reactor operator at approximately midnight, two valves were found closed for no apparent reason. The valves were immediately returned to the open position, which is the status specified by coerating procedures. 7he valves had last been verified in the open position at 8:00 a.m., and there was apparently no maintenance or surveillance testing performed on the system on the day in cuestion. As the valves switches are separated by at least six feet, it appears that this occurrence was the result of a deliberate act performed by knowledgeable pl ant empl oyee( s) . The licensee increased tne frequency of tne valve verification crocedure and notified tne Federal authorities.
Fuel present on site.
VANDALISH V4 06/30/81 V-80-01 01/23/80 Callaway Union Electric Co.
Callaway County, IL The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector that five cables were found cut in the cable spreading room. One of the cables was safety related. None of the cables were energized or terminated. Fuel present at site.
V-80-02 02/80 Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority Limestone County, AL An investigation was conducted of several unexplained reactor trips that were suspected to be the result of vandalism.
The investigation proved inconclusive. Fuel present at site.
(See also Category VII, Item VII-80-02.)
V-80-03 02/05/80 Commanche Park Texas Utilities Generating Co.
Somervell County, TX Apparent malicious damage to a part of the Unit 2 diesel 4 generator was discovered on 02/05/80. The vandalism apparently
- occurred over the weekend when someone used the overhead chainfall to loosen apparatus associated with the generator. -
Fuel not present at site.
V-80-04 03/01/80 Three Mile Island Metropolitan Edison Co.
Dauphin County, PA An employee was alleged to nave told a control room operator that on 7/13/79 he entered the site by boat, entered the pump-house and tripped a pump. An investigation found that a pump had tripped at 11:10 p.m. on 7/13/79 and no mechanical ~I" or electrical cause had been identified. During an interview the employees denied that he had entered the site on 7/13/79.
Tripping the pump (one of four) did not effect the safe operation of the plant. The pump is not located within a protected or vital area and is not under surveillance. Fuel present at site.
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. l VANDALISM V-5 06/30/81 V-80-05 04/18/80 Clinton Illinois Power Co.
Dewitt County, IL The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector that some vandalism and theft had taken place at the construction site on the second shift. The equipment affected was non-safety related and included the theft of copper ground cable, damage to and theft of tubing and valves from 10 instrument cabinets, a hydraulic motor smeared with anti-seige compound and the removal of supports from weld preheat installations. The licensee increased security. Fuel not present at site.
V-80-06 04/21/80 Wolf Creek Kansas Gas & Electric Co.
Coffey County, KS The site QA engineer notified NRC of the suspected vandalism of electrical cables. Twenty-four cables in a run of forty had been cut at the point where they penetrated the radwaste building rid were pushed back into the penetration opening.
All 24 cables wer,e cut through the external jacket to the conducter insulation and some were cut through the individual conductor insulation to the wire. The cables were non-safety related. Fuel not present at site.
V-80-07 09/10/80 Salem Public Service Electric and Light Co.
Salem County, MJ Following a reactor trip and initiation of auxiliary feed water flow, an anonymous caller notified the chemistry staff of prob-less with the hydrazine addition tank (which adds hydrazine to auxiliary feedwater). Samples were insectately taken of the tanks, which indicated sodium (500 ppm) and chloride (1,200 ppm) co'ntamination. The tank, which had not been used for chemical additions since the previous Unit I shutdown in June,1980, was removed from service. An extensive investigation of the probable vandalism was subsequently carried out. Fuel present at site.
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VANDALISM V-6 06/30/81 V-80-08 10/01/80 Browns Ferry Tenessee Valley Authority Limestone County, AL A fire hose located in the Unit 2 turbine building was found to have been cut in several places. Remaining fire hose stations and related fire equipment were checked and no further fire protection equipment damage was identified. Fuel present at site.
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V-81-01 01/05/81 Fitzpatrick Power Authority of the State of New York Oswego County, NY A burning piece of cardboard was discovered among benches located behind a turbine butiding ventilation fan. The fire, which was extinguished without fire brigade assistance, may have been intentionally set. Fuel present at site, V-81-02 01/27/81 Susquehanna Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Luzerne County, PA 4 The licensee reported that an electrical power cable located in the Unit I reactor building was found cut. The cable involved supplied control power to a reactor building closed water containment isolation valve. No fuel at site.
I Y-81-03 02/26/81 Callaway Union Electric Co.
Callaway County, M0 The licensee discovered a severed cable conductor (missing a three-inch length) in the rear of an equipment cabinet located in the control building. Fuel not present at site.
V-81-04 03/13/81 Callaway Union Electric Co.
Callaway County, MO On the above referenced date, the licensee discovered that several leads had been cut and several indicating lights rewoved from a safety-related switchgear cabinet. Fuel not present at site.
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VANDALISM V-7 12/31/81 V-81-05 06/06/81 Beaver Valley '
Duquesne Light Co.
Beaver County, PA A manual valve in the High Head Safety injection (HHSI) pumps' common suction Ifne was found shut during a routine operator tour at about 1:00 a.m. on June 6,1981, and was famedtately reopened. The valve had been verified open at 4:30 p.m. on June 5, 1981. The chain and padlock which normally secured the valve were not found. At 9:00 a.m. on June 5,1981, similar locks and chains were found removed from three auxiliary feed-water pumps' manual suction isolation valves, although the valves
, were in their norital positions. These locks and chains were not
, found. Fuel present at site.
V-81-06 08/18/81 Nine Mile Point N1agara Mohawk Power Corporation '
Oswego County, NY Ouring a routine diesel generator operability surveillance test, a diesel generator failed to start because a pst cock drafn on the fuel oil final filter housing had been tampered with. The
, pet cock was aligned correctly and the generator was subsequently started. Licensee personnel immediately checked the diesel genera-tor supplying the other power train for the unit in question and found the analogous pet cock misaligned. Subsequent investigation confirined that the generators' pet cocks were intentionally tampered with, but failed to identify the responsible party or parties. Fuel present at site.
V-81-07 10/03/81 Palisades Constaners Power Co.
Van Buren County, MI At approximately 6:40 p.m., a contractor employee discovered an electrical cable which had apparently been vandalized. The safety-related cable, part of modtfications being made during an ongoing outage, was found with the wire cluster insulation cut and approxf-mately one-half of the individual wires severed. Fuel present at si te.
V-81-08 10/14/8i Dresden Commonwealth Edison Co.
Grundy County, IL During routine rounds by an equipoent operator, the Unit 3 diesel generator energency fuel shutoff valve was found mispositioned.
The valve was immediately returned to its proper alignment. A check of the other diesel generators was made and the systems were verified to be operational . Fuel present at site.
O VANUALISM ~~
V-a 06/30/82 y-81-09 12/01/81 Perry
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Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Lake County, OH On the above date, a handful of metal filings was discovered in the SCRAM discharge volume piping during the initial system checkout and flushing operation. The Perry facility is under construction, with the Unit in question approximately 701, com-plete. No fuel present at site.
V-81-10 12/07/81 Fermi Detroit Edison Co.
Monroe County, MI On the above date, the licensee reported three cases of apparent vandalism in the RHR building. In each case, a blunt ob,1ect was used to dent small components (a 2-inch globe valve, a 1-inch stainless steel line and a 90-degree elbow). Fuel not present at site.
V-82-01 02/22/82 Perry Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Lake County, OH While installing cables in the emergency shutdown panel, '
construction personnel discovered that a factory-installed c,
wire bundle had been cut. Subsequent licensee inspection determined there was no other damage to other electrical panels.
Fuel not present at site.
V-82-02 03/05/82 Indtan Point Consolidated Edison Co.
Westchester County, NY An unlicensed source containing 8 microcuries of cesfum-137
! used to check survey instruments was found smashed in a bathroom in a controlled area. It had been taken from an instrument locker. Fuel present at site.
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VANDALISM V-9 06/30/82 V-82-03 04/28/82 Salem
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Public Service Electric and Gas Co.
Sales County, W At about 3:50 p.m., a steam generator feedwater pump tripped while the plant was operating at 100 percent power. Licensee
' inestigation detamined that an isolation valve and a vent valve were mispositioned. No manipulation of the valves had.
been authorized. The licensee concluded that this was a deliberate act to trip the plant. Labor union contract negotia-tions were in progress. Fuel present at site.
Y-82-04 05/01/82 Sales
' Public Service Electric and Gas Co, .
Salem County, W At 10:55 a.a. a control room operator, noting that the wide range level recorder for a steam generator had not been operating, initiated an inestigation. At 3:45 p.m., an instrument and control engineer found two teminals in the hot shutdown panel shorted by a metal cable clip. This had caused the failure of the wide range i level recorder for the steam generator. A review of the recorder trace revealed this failure occurred between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m.
on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, the licensee completed an ines-I tigation of work in the hot shutdown panel area and found that authorized modification work had been conducted in the cabinet.
Fuel present at site.
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Y-82-05 05/14/82 Brunswick Carolina Power and Light Co.
Brunswick County, IC Ouring an outage, twelve incore source range monitoring and intermediate range monitoring neutron detector tubes were found bent where the tubes exit the reactor vessel .
Licensee inestigation indicated that the damage occurred between May 12 and 14 when maintenance contractors were working below the reactor vessel on control rod assemblies. Fuel present at site.
VANDALISM V-10 12/31/82 V-82-06 8/9/82 Salem -
public Service Electric and Gas Co.
Salem County, NJ On August 9,1982, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit I was ordered tripped by the senior shift supervisor .due to steam feed flow mismatch and decreasing levels in the steam genera-tors. All safety systems responded normally to the manual
. trip. A subsequent investigation into the cause of the event determined that the No.12 Station Essential Controls Inverter Breaker was in the "off" position. Tests determined that this position was not ass:ciated with any automatic protection action but rather could, apparently, only be achieved manually.
Thus, deliberate action was suspected. The event did not involve major degradation of essential safety-related eq'uipment or reduction in the degree of protection of the public health and safety. As an immediate action, the licensee performed a number of surveillances of safety-related equipment for both units, including start verification of rotating Emergency Core Cooling System equipment, start test and loading of the Emer-gency Diesel Generators, critical valve lineup verification, inspection of various motor control centers and safety related panels, and increasing the roving patrols thoughout the power j block. No other discrepancies were found and the plant resumed operation at 8:50 a.m. on August '10. Fuel present at site.
e V-82-07 8/16/82 Salem Public Service Electric and Gas Co.
Salem County, NJ On August 16, 1982, at approximately 5:00 p.m., a shift equip-ment operator on tour in Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 found the manual isolation stop valves for each set of two air start motors (four total) for the 2C Diesel Generator in the shut position. This would have prevented automatic or manual start of the diesel generator (one of three). Su b-sequent investigation by site personnel found no reason.for the position of the valves to have been changed since they had been verified open at about 5:00 p.m. on August 15 during the previous operator tour. The event did not involve major degradation of essential safety-related equipment or major reduction in the degree of protection of the public health and safety. Due to the possibility of deliberate tampering, the licensee conducted operability checks of all remaining Emergency Core Cooling equipment, started and loaded all diesel generators, I
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VANDALISM V-11 12/31/82 inspected various motor control centers and safety-related electrical panels, and sampled all fuel and water tanks. The additional precautionary measures initiated in response to the
- August 9 event (see previous entry) had also been continued.
On August 18, the NRC issued a confirmatory action l'etter formally confirming licensee commitments to: 1) verify the operability of safety-related equipment; 2) remove from plant vital areas all personnel not essential to continued safe operation of the plant; 3) discontinue work in vital areas not essential to continued safe operation of the plant, to the satisfaction of previous comitments, or to meet the outage wrk schedule; and 4) implement more stringent controls for access to vital equipment. Fuel present at site. -
V-82-08 9/3/82 Salem Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem County, NJ Cn September 3,1982, licensee personnel, investigating the cause of an unplanned gaseous radioactive release from the Salem Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, found a drain valve on the vent line from the Volume Control Tank open. No authorization had been given to manipulate this valve and the licensee's initial conclusion was that this was an act of tampering. As an immediate action, the licensee conducted operability checks of essential safety-related equipment in addition to the precautionary measures committed to in the NRC confituatory action letter (see previous g entry). The total radioactive release resulting from the valve being open was estimated to be 19 curies of Xenon-133, which was well within the regulatory limits for routine radioactive releases, from approximately 11:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on September 3. The event did not involve tr.ajor degradation of essential safety-related equipment or major reduction in the degree of protection of public health and safety. The licensee subsequently conducted a detailed review and investigation which revealed that the valve would open after being repeatedly struck by a nearby cage door during entry into this area. The presence and contamination of a maintenance crew at the time the release began and the absence of knowledge or report of anyone else entering into the immediate area substanti-ated the conclusion that the valve opening was accidental rather than the result of tampering. Fuel present at site.
t V-82-09 11/18/82 Maine Yankee Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.
Lincoln County, ME An investigation by the licensee indicated intentional tamcering with the oil reservoir for the No.1 Reactor Coolant Pumo sometime after the evening of November 15, and before 2:30 p.m. , on November 18. Additionally, debris similar to that recovered frcm the oil reservoir was found in containment where pipefitting operations had taken place during tne current refueling outage. No further indication of e vnnarine wn found. Fuel cresertt at site.
TAMPERING / VANDALISM
- 06/30/83 V-12 ^
V-83-01 03/18/83 Washington University St. Louis, M0 A Hemotology Laboratory was found to have been vandalized.
Lab coats and upholstered furniture had been shredded and sulfuric acid had been poured on instruments. A vial which --
had contained 2-4 millicuries of I-125 was found almost empty.
Air samples taken showed airborne concentrations of I-125 were within regulatory limits. The licensee reported that a research I assistant admitted she was responsible for the vandalism. '
V-83-02 04/26/83 Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas and Electric Company San Luis Obispo County, CA -
The licensee discovered gouges in a coolant pipe about 3/16 inches deep which were possibily caused by an implement such as a hand rotary grinder. The pipe runs from a coolant pump to the reactor vessel at Unit 1. *There was no indication. as to who was responsible or how the gouges occurred. Fuel present at site.
J V-83-03 06/15/83 Beaver Valley Ouquesne Light Company Beaver County, PA With the plant in cold shutdown and with one reactor coolant pump maintaining reactor tenperature, the control room received a low seal flow alarm and lost indication of seal leak-off flow on one reactor coolant pump. Investigation into the cause of the problem found a valve closed. The valve, normally open, is located in containment on the basement level. The valve stands at approximately a 45' angle, two feet off the ground and is not located in a high traffic area. There was no major work going on in its immediate vicinity. The licensee immediately shutdown the reactor coolant pump, which was not required to be operating, and checked all required safety related systems. The licensee initiated an investigation in an attempt to determine the cause of the event and interviewed personnel working in containment at the time of the incident. An investigation by the FBI on June 17, 1983, concluded that there was no evidence of deliberate equipment tampering and that the valve could have been inadvertently closed.
Fuel present at site.
l TAMPERING / VANDALISM 12/31/83 V-13 V-83-04 06/20/83 Rancho Seco Sacramento Municipal utility District Sacramento County, CA During plant refueling, a quality control inspector was performing an inspection of cable termination in the new Nuclear Services Electrical Building (NSEB) (still under construction) when he discovered three non-safety-related cables that had been cut near their terminations. There were more than 100 electricians working in the building and over 300 of 650 workers had been laid-off during the previous two weeks, with another 100 expectild to be laid-off by June 25, 1983. On the day befcre, two meters on the front of equip-ment on another floor of the NSEB were found smashed. The licensee conducted an investigation to detennine who cut the caDies and smashed the meters, but the investigation proved to be inconclusive. Fuel present at site. p 1
V-83-05 06/28/83 Millstone Northeast Nuclear Energy Company New London County, CT A Stone and Webster craft worker discovered 20 severed cables which were located in an unfinished lower level of the control butiding, Unit 3, at the termination / penetration of a duct bank connecting to the intake structure. Eight of the 20 control cables were safety-related. The licensee conducted an investigation wnich proved to be inconclusive. Fuel present at site.
V-83-06 07/14/83 LaSalle Connonwealth Edison Company LaSalle County, IL During monthly surveillance testing, one of two level switches for low level setpoint in Division I failed to respond. The failed' level switch was one of two redundant switches which are required to trip to initiate the Division I energency core cooling systems. The cause of the failure was reversed electrical leads for the level switch. The previous monthly testing on June 17 indicated the leads were properly positioned.
Investigations by the licensee and NRC provided no definitive explanation for the reversed leads. The licensee corrected the problem and increased :urveillance in the area. Fuel present at site.
TAMPERING / VANDALISM 12/31/83 V-14 V-83-07 07/26/83 Susquehanna Pennsylvania Power and Lignt Co.
Luzerne County, PA A routine Itcensee check showed that a drywell sump was not being automatically pumped down. Further checks showed that the inboard containment isolation valve for the sump pump discharge would not open. Maintenance personnel found two leads reversed in the control circuit cabinet, preventing opening of the valve on signal. Because it was in the shut position, safety was unaffected. The licensee reviewed access records and questioned all technicians who were in the area during that time but found no significant results. The itcensee subsequently locked the panel in wnich the leads were found reversed. Fuel present at. site. '
V-83-08 08/31/33 0. C. Cook Indiana & Michigan Electric Company Berrien County, MI During major maintenance of the Unit i diesel generator, an oil gauge was damaged. Investigation indicated that it was -
j not damaged through routine repair. The licensee inter. viewed all individuals shown by the computerized access control T system to have been in the area during the time the damage I 5 was thought to have occurred. Three suspected individuals were terminated. During an FBI polygraph test, one of the three confessed to damaging the oil gauge. He was a tem-parary contractor hired as a fire watch. The other two individuals were reinstated. Fuel present at site.
l TAMPERING / VANDALISM !
V-15 05/01/85 l l
V-84-01 01/16/84 Trojan Portland General Electric Co. ,
Columbia County, OR l l
The licensee discovered that the hoses on two fire extin-guishers (hand held type) were cut. The licensee determined that they would not have functioned had they been called into service. The FBI was notified. Fuel present at site.
V-84-02 02/04/84 Hatch Georgia Power Co.
Appling County, GA During grinding operations to prepare a section of replace-ment recirculation system piping for installation, it was discovered that the motive air for the grinding tool con-tained a foreign, acidic substance. The grinding operation was being done in a pipe preparation area located outside the protected area. The tool air system is independent of the plant air systems. It was suspected that the introduction of the acidic substance was intentional. The FBI was informed.
Fuel present at site.
V-84-03 02/07/84 Palo Verde Arizona Public Service Co.
Maricopa County, AZ
-, Electricians found 22 instrumentation cables in the upper cable spreading room that appeared to have been deliberately cut. Inspection led to the discovery of more damage. In the west diesel generator room, several safety-related instrumen-tation conduits associated with diesel fuel measuring were found bent and mashed. In an area adjacent to the upper cable spreading room, two safety-related instrumentation cables were found cut. In the control room, six small vendor wires located in an annunciator panel were cut. In the rad-waste building, 20 to 25 small wires inside a panel were found cut. The FBI was notified. Unit 3 was about 60 percent complete at the time. No fuel present at site.
V-84-04 03/06/84 Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority Rhea County, TN At 10:15 p.m. , an engineer attempted to reactivate a 480-volt relay board in a shutdown board room of the auxiliary build-ing. After experiencing a loud noise accompanied by sparks, he found a singed 12 inch metal file laying on the floor of I
the electrical cabinet. Numerous individuals had been working on this system throughout the day. Suspecting vandalism, the l licensee notified the FBI. Fuel present at site.
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TAMPERING / VANDAL 2SM V-16 05/01/85 V-84-05 03/30/84 Palo Verde Arizona Public Service'Co.
Maricopa County, AZ Three safety-related wires were found cut in an elec.trical cabinet in the computer room of Unit 3. The FBI was notified and $20,000 in rewards was offered by APS, the Bechtel Power Corp., the Phoenix Building Trades Council and El Paso Electric Co. for information leading to the arrest and conviction of responsible parties. No fuel present at site.
V-84-06 04/18/84 Maine Yankee Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.
Lincoln County, ME A member of the plant staff found a new 2.5 inch long nail wedged into the windings of the main generator during a shutdown for refueling. Evidence suggested that the nail had been recently entered. The generator was located in a non-vital area and was unattended during non-working hours. ,
The licensee posted a security guard in the area during non working hours and increased surveillance in vital areas. \
Fuel present at site.
V-84-07 05/22/84 Midland 4 Consumers Power Co. .
Midland County, MI i
During a routine surveillance the licensee discovered in the low cable spreading room, three non-safety related electrical cables that were partially cut with an attached sign "10%
CUT." The vandalism is believed to have been prompted by a recently imposed 10% pay cut for manual craft workers. Fuel not present at site.
l V-84-08 06/20/84 Midland t.
Consumers Power Co.
, Midland County, MI Four non-safety related electrical cables located in a vertical cable tray in the turbine building were found cut.
A tag stating "10% CUT" was attached to the cables. A similar tag was found in an earlier incident. Fuel not present at site.
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O TAMPERING / VANDALISM V-17 05/01/05 V-94-09 07/01/84 Midland '
Consumers Power Co.
, Midland County, MI A security guard discovered a single, 4ut, non-safety related cable in the unit 2 electrical penetration araa. fhe cable was located in a readily visible area. This was the fourth occurrence of cut <nonsafety-related cables inj this area. The licensee increased' interior patrol'coserage and investigated,
. Fuel not present at site. '
V-84-10 07/04/84 Callaway Union Electric Co. '
Callaway County, MO '
At 3:10 p.m. , control room ventitutico and containment purge isolatico signals were initiated due to a loss of power to three process radiation monitors. Fyrther7,nvestigation 1 by the plant staff revealed manually opeaed, rather than trip,ed, power supply breakers in the 120 voit distribution parel which supplies the radiation monitors. Fuel preseitt at site.
V-84-11 08/22/84 Cook ,
Indiana and Michis.an Electric Ca.
Berrien County., MI At:12:01 a.m. , during an eighteen scath fire system test the
! licensee found that a supply damcer in the HVAC duct for the control' root cable vault had beeh' propped open with a piece of conduit. In this configuration, the dampJr would not have closed upon carbon dioxide system injection, thus rendering the fire suppression systee inoperable. The conduit was rer.oved and the damper tested satisfactorily. Fuel present at site.
V-84-12 09/05/84 Cembustion Engineering Hematite, MO A number of acts of vandalism were reported by the if censee.
Tires of a truck parked outside the protected area were -
punctured. The truck was loaded with a shipment of low-enriched uranium powder. On September 24, three lignts .
in a parking lot were shot out, apparently with a pellet gun.
Also 25 otner lights,. centro 11ed automaticarly, failed to turn on as scheduled. A car was also found blocking the entrance to the plant. These acts of iandalism may have been related-to a strike by union personnel which started on Sopr.embe/ 3. The State of Missouer was notified. .
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VANDALISM / TAMPERING 06/30/85 V-84-13 11/24/84 San Onofre Southern California Edison Co.
San Diego County, CA o
At about 5:30 a.4., an unidentified worker was seen posting a handwritten-notice inside a Unit 2 men's room.
The notice, dated January 1, 1985, was addressed to all
" hands" and cited the upcoming wage reduction for craft workers. It stated " Cut a wire or turn a valve for the wage earner." The notice was immediately removed and t_
turned in to the site security office. Fuel is present at "
the site.
V- 84-14 12/04/84 River Bend ' ' ' '"
Gulf States Utilities W. Feliciana Parish, LA The licensee discovered hardware pieces (5-inch knuckles used to clamp scaffolding pipres ;together) in 'a' residual heat removal test return line. Reduced flow in the line '*
had been observed for some time. The system was last opened in April,1984 when the pieces may have been accidentally or purposely placed in the pipe. Because A hundreds of workers could have had access to the area, identification of responsible person (s) was not possible.
i Fuel was not present at the site, V-85-01 02/15/85 LaSalle Commonwealth Edison Co.
LaSalle County, IL 8etween February 15 to 19,1985, station personnel iden-tified one safety-related and three non-safety related valves to be in off-normal positions. Also, a vital electrical bus breaker was found manually opened. An '
' investigation was conducted to determine whether inten-tional tampering was involved, but results.were incon-4 clusive. Fuel is present at the site.
V-85-02 05/14/85 Braidwood Commonwealth Edison Co.
Will County, IL More than 120 internal wires were cut in the nonsafety-related racwaste volume reduction control panel. The security department investigated the incident and a contractor was subsequently identified as a suspect in the case (see V-35-05). Fuel is not present at the site.
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u V-19 VANDALISM / TAMPERING 06/30/85 .
L V-85-05 05/15/85 Nuclear Fuel Services E rwi n ,~ TN -
Minor vandalism occurred in the employees change room.
This probably occurred as a result of union ~ contract activities. Negotiations for a new union contract had previously broken off and the existing contract was expiring at midnight. The FBI and local law enforcement officials were alerted.
V-s9-04 05/25/85 Braidwood Commonwealth Edison Co.
Will County, IL .
Nugerous gauges and meters were found broken and some HVAC instrumentation lines were cut in the 1A and 1B emergency diesel generator rooms. An investigation had been ongoing since an earlier vandalism incident on May 14, 1985 y
.(V-85-03). On June 12, 1985, a contractor employee was 8 identified as a suspect. The individual was confronted with the facts of the vandalism incidents and was told that he was being barred access to all Commonwealth Edison sites. The individual did not admit to the vandalism but did leave the site without incident. . Fuel is not present at the site.
V-85-05 06/05/85 Davis-Besse Toledo Edison Co.
Ottawa County, OH The licensee reported two unexplained incidents of misaligned equipment that had no effect on plant opera-tion. The first incident involved the misadjustment of a second stage reheat valve used for pressure reduction in the reheater lines. The second incident involved an open breaker for a motor operated containment spray isolation valve. Both anomalies were discovered by control room indicators. The licensee conducted an investigation,
~fncreased surveillance, and heightened personnel sensiti-vfty to potential anomalies. Fuel is present at the site.
V-85-06 06/21/85 Nuclear Fuel Services Erwin, TN Resulting from a hearing requested by the licensee, five union personnel were arrested, fined and received jail sentences for obstructing the progress and damaging buses 7 carrying NFS management personnel to and from the plant.
Additionally, a prospective employee was beaten by union oersonnel after leaving the plant, and found his automobile tires slashec.
ARSON VI-1 06/30/81 ARSON VI-71-01 04/11/71 Indian Point Consolidated Edison Westchester County, NY A fire, resulting from arson, caused SS million damage to Consolidated Edison's nearly completed Indian Point No. 2 plant. The fire was set on the first floor of an auxiliary building which housed control panels, cables, and pumps for the facility. The reactor building and y generator building at the site were not endangered by the fire and there was no release of radioactive material.
During the course of the investigation of this case, a group calling itself " Project: Achilles Heel," sent a '
letter to the New York Times saying " Indian Point Guerrillas" were responsible for the fire. An operating mechanic at the plant was arrested for the crime and later pleaded guilty to arson in the third degree. The man was on duty at the plant at the time and was reported to be one of the first persons on the scene of the fire.
Fuel present at site.
VI-75-01 07/23/75 Nuclear Fuels Services West Valley, NY Fire destroyed an equipment storage barn. Arson was sus-pected and investigated.
VI-78-01 12/13,24 & 27/78 Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.
Fairfield County, SC See Category V, Item V-78-02.
VI-80-01 03/23/80 Midland Consumers Power Co.
Midland, County, MI A suspicious fire occurred in two trailers used by contractor personnel . It was discovered that roses on fire extinguishers in the trailers had been cut. Fuel not present at site. (See next entry).
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ARSON VI-2 06/30/82 VI-80-02 03/26/80 Midland Consumers Power Co.
Midland, County, MI A fire occurred at the construction site in a complex of 23 side-by-side trailers. The fire started at approximately 2:45 a m. While making his round a security guard had passed through the trailer complex earlier and had observed nothing unusual. Approximately 10 minutes later he again entered the trailers and observed smoke. All 23 trailers were destroyed.
Fuel not present at site.
VI-81-01 04/20/81 LaSalle Commonwealth Edison Co.
LaSalle County, IL Suspected arson. At 7:15 a a., a fire in a cable tray riser was detected by the installed alarin system. The fire damaged several safety-related instrument cables before being extin-guished. An examination of the cable tray by the licensee revealed what appeared to be the residue of a petroleum product and some charred cardboard. The nature of the fire was considered suspicious and an investigation was carried out. Fuel present at site.
O VI-81-02 04/21/81 LaSalle
! Commonwealth Edison Co.
LaSalle County, IL Suspected arson. At 12:40 p m., a small fire was discovereo in two High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) control panels. The fire was extinguished with minimal damage. A plastic "Windex" bottle that contained a flannable liquid with a rag wick was found. The l fire started at floor level and was burning up towards the bottle l
l when extinguished. There was some damage to the HPCS (safety-related equipment) . Fuel was present at site.
VI-82-01 04/15/82 ~ Pilgrim Boston Edison Co.
Plymouth County, MA At about 10:00 p.m., two trucks parked in the contractor parting lot outside the protected area were firebombed. The fire was extinguished by the local fire department. A labor dispute was ongoing at the time. Fuel present at site.
l VI-3 ARSON 12/31/82 VI-82-02 06/30/82 Limerick Philadelphia Electric Co.
Montgomery County, PA i At about 7:00 p.m., smoke in the 239' elevation of the !
Control Building was traced to a fire in two non-safety- '
related cable trays located near the switchgear room. The fire was put out with dry chemical extinguishers. As the cables were cut as well as burned, the fire was determined to be a malevolent act. There was no damage outside the two cable trays involved. No fuel present at site.
VI-82-03 07/12/82 Waterford Louisiana Power & Light Company -
St. Charles Parrish, LA Suspected arson. A fire was discovered in a cardboard box in the cable spreading room. Investigation revealed that 19 to 27 cables had been damaged. The fire investigator indicated that the fire may have been deliberately set. Fuel present at site.
VI-82-04 11/19/82 Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Calvert County, MO .
Suspected arson. At approximately 4:16 a.m., a small fire was discovered by a contractor employee in the Outage Planning Room on the second floor of the South Service Building. This is an administrative building within the protected area but-neither is it near nor does it house any safety-related-features. A liquid appeared to have been poured on a table and a burnt match and a melted plastic cellophane tape dispenser wre fcund in the scorched area. Very little damage occurred. Fuel present at site.
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VI-4 ARSON
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06/30/83 VI-83 02/02/83
- LaSalle. i Consonwealth Edison Company ~
l LaSalle County, IL A fire was discovered in the Unit 1 Turbine Building in a non-safety-related area. The fire was extinguished within :
five minutes of discovery by the on-site fire brigade. The local fire department was notified of the fire, and assisted in the investigation. Twenty empty cardboard resin containers, one full container, and a metal locker containing protective clothing and miscellaneous material were either damaged or destroyed. There were no injuries. Radioactive materials were not involved. The building was not evacuated. Unit I was shutdown at the time. The Illinois Fire Mr.shall reported that the fire was of " suspicious nature" based on its rapid propagation which may be indicative of the use of an accelerant.
ll Fuel present at site.
i VI-83-02 03/08/83 Peach Botton Philadelphia Electric Company York County, PA A reactor operator observed a small smoldering fire in an area containing stored radwaste material in the Radweste Building. The material was being prepared for compaction and subsequent shipment. Preliminary investigation by the licensee revealed that one of the plastic bags had a small burned out area of approximately 1 square foot. The investigators found two burned out cardboard matches stuck to one of the unburned bags in the pile. Fuel present at site.
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ARSON VI-5 05/01/85 VI-84-01 02/14/84 . Diablo Canyon
~ Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
San Luis Obispo Co., CA A smoldering fire was spotted in a motor control center.for a motor driven fire water pump. The fire Brigade responded after the power to the center was secured and extinguished the fire within five minutes of receipt of the alarm. The cause was a slightly open contactor in the motor control center which did not close comoletely because of a foreign object that was stuck in the contactor. Minimal damage occurred and no loss of safety function occurred because the fire pumo was out of service for maintenance at the time. The plant was in Mode 5, preparing for heatup. Fuel present at site.
VI-84-02 02/23/84 Sequoyah -
Tennesset Valley Authority Hamilton County, TN Ouring routine rounds, the fire watch officer discovered a burn.ing trash bag containing contaminated materials. A fire alarm was sounded and the fire was extinguished within 6 minutes. The ifcensee, in their telephone report to NRC initially suspected sabotage because the contaminated bag was not supposed to be in the Unit 2 auxiliary building fan room.
Air samples and smear surveys in the immediate area of the fire identified no measurable radioactivity. No one was
! injured and no radioactive release limits were exceeded. The FBI was notified. Fuel present at site.
VI-84-03 04/16/84 Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
San Luis Obispo County, CA At about 3:45 a.m. , unidentified persons entered a part of tne owner controlled area and discharged 6 flares in different directions about 350 yards from the protected area. One of the flares landed about 400 yards from the fence and caused a small brush fire. A security officer extinguished it and the burned grass area measured 24 feet by 34 feet. Fuel present at site.
I-6 ARSON 06/30/85 VI-85-01 05/22/85 Hope Creek Puolic Service Electric and Gas Co.
Salem County, NJ Ouring the evening, five fires, one in an insulation storage shed and four in portable toilets, were identified and extinguished. All fires were outside the permanent plant structure and no plant equipment was damaged. Fuel is not present at the site.
VI-85-02 05/29/85 Braidwood )
Commonwealth Edison Co. i Will County, IL At 10:00 p.m., there was a fire in a dumpster loc'ted a outside the service building. It was promptly extinguished. Two books of matches were found at the scene. Fuel is not present at the site,
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QUESTION 2. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TYPE OF INFORMATION THE.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION WOULD AUTHORIZE THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO RELEASE TO THE UTILITIES. WOULD INFORMATION ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE (E.G., ACQUITTAL, CHARGES DROPPED, ETC.) BE INCLUDED WHEREVER THE RECORD SHOWS THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ARRESTED?
ANSWER.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FBI, IT IS THE NRC'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CONTENT OF THE FBI CRIMINAL FILE INCLUDES FEDERAL AND STATE CONVICTION AND ARREST DATA INCLUDING FELONY'AND.
SERIOUS MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES. DISPOSITION OF ARREST CHARGES IS I NCLUDED WHEN AVAI LABLE. FOR THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE DISPOSITION OF ARREST CHARGES IS UNAVAILABLE, THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION ,
PROVIDES THE INDIVIDUAL WITH THE RIGHT TO COMPLETE AND CORRECT INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO A CRIMINAL RECORD PRIOR TO ANY FINAL ADVERSE ACTION.
t UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86 4
QUESTION 3. WOULD THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SCREEN THE EMPLOYEE'S RECORDS AND RELEASE ONLY INFORMATION PROBATIVE OF THE EMPLOYEE'S TENDENCY TO COMMIT ACTS OF SABOTAGE OR TERRORISM OR WOULD ALL-INFORMATION IN THE EMPLOYEE'S RECORD BE' RELEASED?
ANSWER.
THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF AN EMPLOYEE'S CRIMINAL FILE WOULD BE RELEASED. IT WAS FOR THIS EXPLICIT REASON THAT THIS BILL WAS DEVELOPED WITH PROVISIONS REQUIRING THE NRC TO ISSUE REGULATIONS PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS AND PRIVACY. THESE REGULATIONS MUST INCLUDE PROVISIONS TO LIMIT THE REDISSEMINATION OF DATA, TO ASSURE THAT INFORMATION OBTAINED IS USED SOLELY FOR.
THE PURPOSES DESCRIBED I N THE LEGI SLATION, AND TO PROVIDE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO COMPLETE AND CORRECT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THEIR CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS PRIOR TO ANY FINAL ADVERSE ACTION.
l UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86 l
QUESTION 4. WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATION TO PROTECT EMPLOYEE'S CRIMINAL RECORDS FROM MISUSE?
ANSWER.
THE SAFEGUARDS PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATION TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES CRIMINAL RECORDS FROM MISUSE INCLUDE: (1) PROVISION FOR-THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATIONS BY THE NRC TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED AND (2) PROVISION THAT THE NRC IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DESIGNATE THE CHANNELING AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR FUNNELING DATA TO AND FROM THE FBI.
THE REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE NRC MUST INCLUDE REQUIREMENTS TO LIMIT THE REDISSEMINATION OF DATA, ASSURE THE INFORMATION IS USED SOLELY. FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE, AND PROVIDE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO COMPLETE AND CORRECT CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA PRIOR TO ANY FINAL ADVERSE ACTION. BY REQUIRING THE NRC, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A CHANNELING AGENCY, PROTECTION AGAINST MISUSE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING OF DATA IS FURTHER ASSURED.
UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
QUESTION 5. WHAT ROLE WOULD THE NRC ASSUME IN POLICING THE USE OF THESE RECORDS BY ITS LICENSEES?
ANSWER. -
THE NRC WOULD INSPECT FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCE THE NRC REGU LATI ONS IMPOSED AS A RESULT OF THE LEGISLATION. UPON PROMUL-GATION OF THESE REG'ULATIONS, APPROPRIATE LICENSEES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO AMEND THEIR NRC APPROVED AND LICENSED PHYSICAL SECURITY PLANS TO COMMIT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEWLY ISSUED REGULATIONS. COMMITMENTS MADE IN THESE PLANS ARE IN3PECTABLE AND ENFORCEABLE BY THE NRC. ,
UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
_ QUESTION 6. (A) WHAT OTHER PRIVATE ENTITIES HAVE BEEN GRANTED ACCESS TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S CRIMINAL FILES?
ANSWER.
AN AUGUST 13, 1983 MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE NRC INDICATED THAT "THE STATUTE AUTHORIZING MAINTENANCE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY FILES, 28 U.S.C. 534, EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATES EXCHANGE OF FBI CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES. UNDER SEC. 14(F) OF PUBLIC LAW 94-29 (15 U.S.C. 78(F))
SECURITY BROKERS ARE REQUIRED TO FINGERPRINT AND SECURE RECORDS CHECKS BY THE FBI IN CONNECTION WITH PARTNERS, DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF BROKERAGE HOUSES." FURTHER, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTED "THE CONGRESS HAS ALSO SPECIFICALLY
-AUTHORIZED FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS WITH
-RESPECT TO CERTAIN BANK EMPLOYEES (P.L.92-544), CERTAIN PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE TRADING OF COMMODITIES FUTURES (7 U.S.C. 12A) AND CERTAIN FARM LABOR CONTRACTORS (29 U.S.C. 1812(4))."
UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
QUESTION 6. (B) HAS THE AVAILABILITY OF THESE RECORDS DEMONSTRABLY STRENGTHENED THE ABILITY OF THOSE ENTITIES TO PREVENT WRONGDOING BY THEIR EMPLOYEES?
ANSWER.
YES.
ONE PERTINENT EXAMPLE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NRC RECENTLY BY THE FBI. IN THIS EXAMPLE, AN INDIVIDUAL HAD OBTAINED EMPLOYMENT AS A CLERK AT A BANK AND WAS UNDERGOING A FINGERPRINT CHECK AS PART OF ROUTINE EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES. THE FINGERPRINT CHECK DISCLOSED THE INDIVIDUAL HAD ASSUMED AN ALIAS AND WAS WANTED FOR FORGERY IN ANOTHER STATE. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ARRESTED BY FBI AGENTS AT HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT WHERE HE HAD JUST RESIGNED. THE INDIVIDUAL'S POCKETS WERE STUFFED WITH $5,000 IN CASH, A NEW $13,000 CAR WAS PARKED AT THE CURB, AND A $57,000 CASHIER'S CHECK WAS FOUND UPON SEARCH OF THE INDIVIDUAL. HE WAS CHARGED WITH BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT, (SEE ENCLOSED PRESS ARTICLE).
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN THE LIMITED INSTANCES WHERE NRC LICENSEES HAVE HAD ACCESS TO FBI DATA, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH STATE AGENCIES, IT HAS PROVED HIGHLY USEFUL. ONE INSTANCE INVOLVED AN ARMED GUARD WHO IN THE PAST HAD SERVED EIGHTEEN MONTHS FOR AUTO UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
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QUESTION 6'(B). (CONTINUED) THEFT AND A LESSER PERIOD OF INCARCERATION FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON A FEMALE. ACCORDING TO THE LICENSEE, THIS GUARD HAD FAILED TO INDICATE THESE CONVICTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT APPLICATIONS AND DURING INTERVIEWS AT THE TIME HE WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT. HE HAD BEEN EMPLOYED FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND DURING THAT TIME HAD BEEN ISSUED A COMPANY FIREARM, HAD PARTICIPATED IN A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAM, AND WAS PRIVY TO ALL OF THE SECURITY PROCEDURES AT THE NUCLEAR PLANT.
NOTHWITHSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE CONVICTIONS, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THE FALSlFICATION OR WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION IN THE PURSUIT OF EMPLOYMENT AT A NUCLEAR REACTOR REASONABLY IMPACTS UPON AN INDIVIDUAL'S TRUSTWORTHINESS AND RELIABILITY. THIS MAY HAVE A BEARING IN THE DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY THE INDIVIDUAL UNESCORTED FACILITY ACCESS.
ENCLOSURE:
PRESS RELEASE DTD 2/23/86 UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
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FD.JSO (Rev S-4 41)
(htceto seco, name of flid ST Y LEDIER
_ m,w W C / p. 26 ome: 2/23/86 Emeon.
Bank job print check J ~
nets embezzle suspect.;
By AL FRANE
}'A back fraud and embenlement.
IIis pockets were stuffed with McDonnellsaid anthonties belh
$5.000 in cash and a new car was all the money came from the baak parked at the curb when federal agents and are working with bank auditors.lg amved at a Newart bank to arrest 20 determine timore was stolen.
year old Kenneth Taylor, a spokesman for the FBI said yesterday. "It wt!! take as a httle while la figure out how much is involves.'f month Fing wh nats he eot Taylor submittedlast a job at the First m" McDonnell said. "It could very weit be .
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- deuty Bank on Broad Street discimed as wan oo Taylor. of Craceville, Fla., is tiel "p g 8" el {d* lleved to have spent time in Calife Calling the bank on Fnday to in- eta "so we have to see what be did out quire about his whereabouts, a eats there." McDomd. ,'s .
were told Taylor, of Newart, quit . After appeanag before U.S. Mag-his job on Thursday but just happened astrate C. DonaM Haneke in federal to be in the office cleaning out his dest court in Newark. Ta lor was cedered in the mortgage department where he held at the Metropo tan Corrections had worked as a ciert since Jan.13. Center in New York in lieu of 875 000 McDonnell said Taylor had gotten 'I' s the job under the name of Edward Authoritfe in Flonda said Ta' lor Moms and subrmited his fingerpnnts was wanted by the Leon County 5 er-as part of routine employment pro. iffs Office for forging his ex room.
cedures.
mate's name on at least 85.000 worth of when the prints were checked at checks drawn from the Flonda Federal the FBrs identification laboratory in Savtags and Loan of Tallahassee.
I d t eIm che[t for Dick Stmpeon a spokesman for the who was wanted in TaHheme for for.' department. said Taylor stole the gery and grand theft.
After his arrest on a federal war. % 's checkhook who he mond rant for unlawful flight to avoid prose. Taylor also used one of the cheet:
cution. T lor was searched. to open an account at another Tallahas In a ition to the 85.000, agents see bank and later asked the bank k also found a cashier's check in the wire ham money in New orleans. 34 amount of $57.000. McDonnell said. The son said. ,
car. he continued, was purchased for 113.000 three days ago. He said the state's attorney will file papers to extradite Taylor to face Taylor was then charged with forgery enarges.
2D
4 QUESTION 6. (C) IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THESE OTHER ENTITIES HAVE MISUSED THE INFORMATION IN THESE FILES?
ANSWER.
THE NRC KNOWS OF NO EVIDENCE INDICATING MISUSE OF THIS INFORMAITON
-BY OTHER ENTITIES.
UDALL/NMSS 5/1/86
QUESTION 7. (A) WHAT ALTERNATIVES TO THE APPROACH TAKEN BY THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION ARE AVAILABLE?
ANSWER.
THE AVAI LABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION INCLUDE:
(1) PURSUING LICENSEE ACCESS TO FBI CRIMINAL DATA ON A STATE RATHER THAN FEDERAL LEVEL, (2) INVOLVING THE NRC IN OBTAINING FBI DATA FOR NRC LICENSEES' USE, AND (3) CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT S
RUN CLEARANCE PROGRAMS ON INDIVIDUAL'S GRANTED UNESCORTED ACCESS TO POWER REACTORS. THE FIRST' ALTERNATIVE, WHILE FEASIBLE, IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY INEFFICIENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE OPTION OF FEDERAL LEGI SLATION EXI STS. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE REMAINING TWO ALTERNATIVES ARE DETAILED IN RESPONSES TO q QUESTIONS 78 AND 7C.
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' QUESTION 7. (B) WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PERMITTING PERSONS UNESCORTED ACCESS TO A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TO HAVE SUCH ACCESS GRANTED ONLY IF THE NRC FINDS (BASED ON A COMPUTER CHECK OF FBI FILES, CONDUCTED.AND EVALUATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM PROCEDURES) THAT GRANTING THE PERSON ACCESS WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO JEOPARDI ZE PLANT SECURITY?
ANSWER.
THIS QUESTION, INVOLVES TWO ISSUES. FIRST, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THE DECISION TO GRANT UNESCORTED ACCESS TO A NUCLEAR REACTOR SHOULD NOT BE MADE SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF A CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECK. FOR THIS REASON, THE COMMISSION HAS ENDORSED INDUSTRY SCREENING PROGRAMS WHICH INVESTIGATE OTHER ELEMENTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S BACKGROUND, SUCH AS EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATIONAL HISTORY, MILITARY HISTORY, AND DEVELOPED PERSONAL REFERENCE CHECKS. WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND ISSUE, INVOLVING THE NRC IN THE PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF FBI DATA FOR THE BENEFIT OF NRC LICENSEES HAS BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE PAST. THIS ACTION WOULD IN FACT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY DATA TO THE APPROPRIATE NUCLEAR LICENSEES. THE NRC DOES NOT ADVOCATE SUCH ACTION, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF PRIVACY ACT CONCERNS AND MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS.
IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY AN EMPLOYEE UNESCORTED FACILITY ACCESS RESTS APPROPRIATELY WITH THE LICENSEE.
UDALL/NMSS 4/29/86
- QUESTION 7. (C).WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES'TO REQUIRING ALL PERSONS ALLOWED UNESCORTED ACCESS TO A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TO FIRST OBTAIN A RELATIVELY LOW-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCE FROM THE NRC?
ANSWER.
THE PRIMARY ADVANTAGE OF REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS ALLOWED UNESCORTED ACCESS TO A NUCLEAR-REACTOR TO BE SCREENED UNDER A GOVERNMENT CLEARANCE PROGRAM 15 THE INCREASED ASSURANCE PROVIDED WITH REGARD TO THE INDIVIDUAL'S RELIABILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS. 'HOWEVER, THE NRC HAS REJECTED THE USE OF SUCH PROGRAMS AT POWER REACTORS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THE "Q" AND "L" CLEARANCES GRANTED BY THE COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON A FULL FIELD BACKGROUND INVESTI-GATION OR A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK, RESPECTIVELY. THESE CLEARANCES ARE GRANTED, HOWEVER, ONLY TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS REQUIRING ACCESS TO NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR RESTRICTED DATA. ACCESS TO AN UNCLASSIFIED REACTOR FACILITY DOES NOT PROVIDE A LEGAL BASIS FOR A "Q" OR "L" CLEARANCE. ACCORDINGLY,-IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO SCREEN REACTOR EMPLOYEES UNDER SUCH A PROGRAM. FURTHER, NUCLEAR I
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QUESTION 7 (C). (CONTINUED) INDUSTRY GROUP REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED TO THE NRC THAT THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DOES f1OT ADVOCATE A GOVERNMENT SECURITY PROGRAM, SUCH AS A "Q" CLEARANCE PROGRAM.
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- o INDEX OF STAFF GENERATED QUESTIONS FOR H.R. 3330
- 1. Of safeguards attributable to individuals, how many might have been averted had this legislation been in effect?
- 2. Will this legislation significantly improve security at nuclear power plants?
- 3. Will this bill assist in preventing terrorist attack at nuclear power reactors?
- 4. Since nuclear utilities and the NRC believe this legislation is necessary, does this mean present safeguards at power reactors are inadequate?
- 5. Do other non governmental agencies have access to the FBI Criminal File?
- 6. Has a channeling agency for submitting and disbursing the data to and from the FBI been identified or endorsed by the NRC7
- 7. What sort of data will be passed on to utilities as a result of the legislation and how will this data be used by licensees in making personnel decisions?
- 8. This legislation calls for the promulgation of implementing procedures by NRC regulations for the taking of fingerprints, the use of the criminal history information, the redissemination of the information and
- the protection of the individuals fingerprinted. What action, if any, has the NRC taken in this area?
- 9. How does the NRC contemplate protection of an individual's civil liberties if this legislation is enacted?
- 10. Has the NRC considered screening reactor employees through governmental security clearance programs, i.e. , those performed for Q/L clearances?
- 11. Why is it important to have uniformity in screening programs within the nuclear industry?
Chairman /NMSS 4/28/86
QUESTION 1. OF SAFEGUARDS INCIDENTS WH!CH ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO INDIVIDUALS, HOW MANY MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVERTED HAD THIS LEGISLATION BEEN IN EFFECT?
ANSWER.
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY HOW MANY INCIDENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVERTED IF THE BILL HAD BEEN IN EFFECT. HOWEVER, ONE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT EXAMPLE OCCURRED IN 1983. WHILE CONDUCTING SCREEN-ING FOR A GOVERNMENT CLEARANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A CONTRACT SECURITY GUARD HAD FAILED TO LIST TWO PREVIOUS ARRESTS ON A PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE. ONE OF THESE ARRESTS RESULTED (
IN HIS CONVICTION AND SUBSEQUENT INCARCERATION FOR " ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER." IN MOST CASES, UNDER PRESENT LIMITATIONS, THIS DATA WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO NUCLEAR REACTOR LICENSEES
! FOR USE IN DETERMINING AN INDIVIDUAL'S TRUSTWORTHINESS AND RELI-ABILITY. THIS BILL WOULD ASSIST LICENSEES IN MAKING A SOUND DETERMINATION IN THIS AREA BY PROVIDING THEM WITH SUCH ARREST AND CONVICTION DATA.
I CHAIRMAN /NMSS 4/28/86
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- QUESTION 2. W I LL TH I S LEG I S LAT I O'N S I GN I F I CANTLY IMPROVE SECURITY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS?
I ANSWER.
YES. ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ASSURANCE CONCERNING THE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AGAINST THE INSIDER THREAT IS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE, WE ARE CONTINUOUSLY ENDEAVORING TO INCREASE THAT LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE INSIDER THREAT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO PROTECT AGAINST AT NUCLEAR REACTORS, OR AT ANY STRATEGIC LOCATION. BARRIERS CAN BE SET IN PLACE, PROCEDURES CAN BE ESTABLISHED TO LIMIT ACCESS, AND SITE EMPLOYEES,CAN BE V I G I LANT . HOWEVER, THERE ARE FEW PROTECTION MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO GUARD AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT EMPLOYEE INTENT UPON THE COMMISSION OF DELIBERATE, MALIClOUS ACTS INVOLVING EQUIPMENT OR AREAS TO WHICH ACCESS IS AUTHORIZED. ONE MECHANISM THAT IS AVAILABLE IS INVESTIGATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S PAST HISTORY.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART OF PSYCHOMETRIC MEASUREMENT TOOLS, MANY EXPERTS BELIEVE THE BEST PREDICTOR OF FUTURE BEHAVIOR IS PAST BEHAVIOR. THE COMMISSION BELIEVES ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN AN INDIVIDUAL'S PAST HISTORY WHICH BEARS UPON THE DECISION TO GRANT UNESCORTED FACILITY ACCESS IS THE EXISTENCE OR LACK OF A CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD.
CHAIRMAN /NMS$
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QUESTION 3. WILL THIS BILL ASSIST IN PREVENTING TERRORIST ATTACK AT NUCLEAR. POWER REACTORS?
ANSWER.
SINCE THE NRC. DESIGN BASIS THREAT ACKNOWLEDGES INSIDER ASSISTANCE TO OUTSIDE ASSAILANTS, THE BILL MAY ASSIST IN PROTECTING AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACK. HOWEVER, THE THREAT WE ARE SEEKING INCREASED PROTECTION AGAINST IS NOT LIMITED TO THE TERRORIST-ASSOCIATED EMPLOYEE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT INDIVIDUALS WITH UNESCORTED ACCESS TO THE MOST SENS LTIVE AREAS OF A NUCLEAR REACTOR WHO ALSO HAVE A CRIMINAL HISTORY BEARING UPON THEIR RELIABILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS MAY POSE AN INCREASED RISK TO THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT.
CHAIRMAN /NMSS 4/28/86
QUESTION 4. SINCE NUCLEAR UTILITIES AND THE NRC BELIEVE.THIS LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY, DOES THIS MEAN PRESENT SAFEGUARDS AT POWER REACTORS ARE NOT ADEQUATE?
ANSWER.
NO. THE COMMISSION BELIEVES.THAT THE PRESENT SAFEGUARDS IN EFFECT AT POWER REACTORS PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST THE NRC'S DESIGN BASIS THREAT, WHICH INCLUDES AN INSIDER IN ANY POSITION. THIS DESIGN BASIS THREAT IS REVIEWED SEM -ANNUALLY BY THE NRC TO ASSURE CONTINUING ADEQUACY WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTUAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT IN THIS COUNTRY. ONE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS LEGISLATION WILL ENABLE NUCLEAR UTILITIES, IN A HIGHLY COST EFFECTIVE MANNER AND AT NO GOVERNMENT-EXPENSE, TO BETTER ASSURE A HIGHER CONFIDENCE IN PROTECTION AGAINST THE POSTULATED DESIGN BASIS THREAT.
CHAIRMAN /NMSS 4/28/86
QUESTION 5. DO ANY OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES HAVE ACCESS TO THE FBI CRIMINAL FILE?
ANSWER.
YES. IN AN AUGUST 13, 1983 MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF , l JUSTICE TO THE NRC IT WAS EXPLICITLY STATED THAT "THE STATUTE AUTHORIZING MAINTENANCE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY FILES, 28 U.S.C. 534, EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATES EXCHANGE OF FBI CRIMINAL HISTORY
, INFORMATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES. UNDER SEC. 14(F) OF PUBLIC LAW 94-29 (15 U.S.C. 78(F)) SECURITY BROKERS ARE REQUIRED TO I FINGERPRINT AND SECURE RECORDS CHECKS BY THE FBI IN CONNECTION l
WITH PARTNERS, OlRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF BROKERAGE l
l HOUSES." FURTHER, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTED "THE CONGRESS HAS ALSO SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN BANK EMPLOYEES (P.L.92-544), CERTAIN PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE TRADING OF COMMODITIES FUTURES (7 U.S.C. 12A) AND CERTAIN FARM LABOR CONTRACTORS (29 U.S.C. 1812(4))."
CHAIRMAN /NMSS 4/28/86
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, QUESTICN 6. HA'S A CHANNELING AG'ENCY[FCR SUBMITTING AND
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DISBURSING THE DATA TO AND FROM THE FBI MEN IDENTIFIED OR ENDORSED BY THE NRC?
A,NSWER. .
e i THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE 4 COMMl? TEE APPROVED IN FEBRUARY 1986 A PROPOSAL FOR THE INMM TO
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SERVE AS THE CHANNEL 1NG AGENCY e THIS GROUP HA3 INDlCATED,
- HOWEVER, THAT THEY EXPECT TO BE'PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO c' FINAL CUMMiTMENT.TO REVIEV ALL LEGAL iMPL1 CATIONS AR'lSING FROM THE 3 :
ACTIVITIES ~OF THE CHANNEL'ING AGENCY, SUCH AS, L.!TIGATIVE RISKS.?
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3 WHILE THE LEGISLATION CALLS FOR THE DEStGNAT'lON (jF THE CHANNELING AGENCY BY_THE COMMlSSION IN CONSULTATlON VITH THE ATTORNEY ,j GENERAL, THE COMM,1SSION BELIEVES IT lS AN INDUSTRY RESPONSIBiLlTY
, TO COME FO.tT,H WITH VI ABLE CANDIDATES FROM THE NUCLEAR SECTOR TO '
PERFORM THIS FUNCTION.- IN THIS REGARD, THE INMM IS~CONSIDCRED A 5 . i VIABLE, ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE. ,e l.
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e QUESTION 7. WHAT SORT OF DATA Wid BE PASSED ON TO UTILITIES AS A RESULT OF THE LEGISLATION AND HOW WILL THIS DATA BE USED BY LICENSEES IN MAKING PERSONNEL DECISIONS?
ANSWER.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FBI, IT IS THE NRC!S UNDERSTAND-ING THAT THE CONTENT OF THE FBI CRIMINAL FILE INCLUDES FEDERAL AND STATE CONVICTION AND ARREST DATA INCLUDING FELONY AND SERIOUS MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES. A PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE, BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT THIS TIME, OUTLINES CRITERIA FOR LICENSEE USE IN THE EVALUATION OF BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION INFORMATION.
THESE CRITERIA SHOULD BE USED IN DETERMINING IF AN INDIVIDUAL.MAY POSE AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY IF ,
GRANTED UNESCORTED ACCESS TO A NUCLEAR REACTOR. WITH RESPECT TO A CRIMINAL HISTORY, THE APPLICABLE CRITERION IS: "HAS (THE EMPLOYEE) BEEN CONVICTED OF ANY FELONY OR SERIES OF HABITUAL LESSER OFFENSES INDICATING CRIMINAL TENDENCIES." GUIDANCE ON THE PROPER USE OF THIS CRITERlON NOTES THAT THE NATURE OF A GIVEN CONVICTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING ITS RELEVANCY TO PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. IT IS INTENDED THAT INDIVIDUALS BE PROTECTED FROM DENIAL OF A CLEARANCE BASED UPON ISOLATED INSTANCES OF UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR NOT RELEVANT TO SulTABILITY FOR UNESCORTED FACILITY ACCESS.
CHAIRMAN /NMSS 4/28/86
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v QUESTIOM*8. THIS LEGISLATION CALLS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES BY NRC REGULATIONS FOR THE TAKING OF FINGERPRINTS, THE USE OF THE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION, THE REDISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION, AND THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUALS FINGERPRINTED. WHAT ACTION, I F ANY, HAS THE NRC TAKEN IN THIS AREA?
ANSWER.
s THERE IS A RULEMAKING BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT THIS Tl'ME THAT CONTAINS PROVISIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION COLLECTED AS PART OF A BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION ON NUCLEAR REACTOR EMPLOYEES. THIS PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE WAS DEVELOPED PRIOR TO FULL DEVELOPMINT OF THE LEGISLATION. WHILE THE PROPOSED
, REGULATION ACCOMMODATES SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES REQUIRED BY THE LEGISLATION WITH REGARD TO PROTECTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS AND PRIVACY, NOT ALL WERE FULLY CONTEMPLATED. A PUBLIC RULEMAKING WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FULLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LEG I S LAT I ON .
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QUESTION 9. HOW DOES THE NRC CONTEMPLATE PROTECTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CIVIL LIBERTIES I F TH I S LEG I S LATI ON IS ENACTED?
ANSWER. , ,
THE BILL REQUIRES THE NRC TO ISSUE REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR THE TAKING OF FINGERPRINTS AND ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF THE INFORMATION. PROCEDURES WOULD INCLUDE LIMITtNG THE REDISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL RECORDS, ASSURING THAT THE INFORMATION IS USED SOLELY FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE, AND PROVIDlNG INDIVIDUALS WITH THE RIGHT TO COMPLETE AND CORRECT CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA PRIOR TO ANY FINAL ADVERSE ACTION.
CHAIRMAN /NMSS' 4/28/86
e QUESTION 10. HAS THE NRC CONSIDERED SCREENING REACTOR EMPLOYEES THROUGH GOVERNMENT SECURITY PROGRAMS, 1.E., THOSE PERFORMED FOR "Q"/"L" CLEARANCES?
ANSWER.
YES. THE NRC HAS CONSIDERED THE USE OF SUCH SCREENING PROGRAMS AT POWER REACTORS, BUT HAS REJECTED THIS CONCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. THE "Q" OR "L" CLEARANCE IS ONE GRANTED BY THE' COMMISSION BASED UPON A FULL FIELD BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION OR A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK, RESPECTIVELY. THESE CLEARANCES ARE
' GRANTED, HOWEVER, ONLY TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS REQUIRING ACCESS TO NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR RESTRICTED DATA. ACCESS TO AN UNCLASSIFIED REACTOR FACILITY DOES NOT PROVIDE A LEGAL BASIS FOR A "Q" OR "L" CLEARANCE. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO SCREEN REACTOR EMPLOYEES UNDER SUCH A PROGRAM. FURTHER, NUCLEAR INDUSTRY GROUP REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED TO THE NRC THAT THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DOES NOT ADVOCATE A GOVERNMENT SECURITY PROGRAM, SUCH AS A "Q" CLEARANCE PROGRAM.
CHAIRMAN /NMSS 4/28/86
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QUESTION 11. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE UNIFORMITY!IN SCREENING PROGRAMS WITHIN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY?
ANSWER.
UNIFORMITY IN SCREENING PROGRAMS WITHIN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY WOULD ALLOW FOR-TRANSFER OF CLEARANCES AMONG' UTILITIES. SUCH RECIPROCAL PROGRAMS ARE MOST BENEFICIAL IN SCREENING TRANSIENT WORKERS (E.G., THOSE INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION OR MAINTENANCE) AT NUCLEAR REACTORS. WI TH RESPECT TO TH I S LEG I S LAT I ON, ACCESS TO NATIONWIDE FBI CRIMINAL DATA ALSO IMPROVES THE CAllBER OF SCREENING OF TRANSIENT WORKERS WHERE REVIEW OF CRIMINAL RECORDS IN ONLY ONE LOCALITY MAY BE INSUFFICIENT.
CHAIRMAN /NMSS 5/1/86