ML20206U607
| ML20206U607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1984 |
| From: | Shao L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Noonan V NRC - COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT (TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19284C882 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-59 NUDOCS 8607110038 | |
| Download: ML20206U607 (175) | |
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OCT 171984 l
P'.EMORANDUM FOR:
Vincent Hocnan, Conanche Peak Project Director FROM:
Larry Shao, Deputy Director, DET/RES
SUBJECT:
LIST OF COMANCHE PEAK CIVIL /MECHAf;ICAL ALLEGERS Enclosed is a list of Comanche Peak allegers in the Civil / Mechanical area.
The allegers are divided into two categories, depending upon the number and 1
relative importance of their allegation; those the TRT requests to close out i
the allegation in person and those the TRT believes could be closed out by telephone. The allegers the TRT requests to be interviewed in persun are further broken down into a category 3, these allegers are considered suffi-ciently important that they should be considered to be brought to Washington, D.C. for interview. This proposal is subject to NRC management approval, the NRC management may want to request the TRT to close out each allegation with the alleger in person.
Also enclosed is a summary of the, allegations (Attachment 2) made by each alleger. This surmutry identifies the category and allegation number, the TRT reviewer and the subject of the allegation.
Original Signed by L C. Shao L. C. Shao, Deputy Director Division of Engineering Technology Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
D. Eisenhut J. Scinto R. Wessman R. C. Tang A. Vietti DISTRIBUTION:
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ALLEGER _
CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT P2 AQP-3 R. Hubbard Incorrect whip restraint repairs.
l 44 AW-57, AW-64 D. Hansen Defective welds in vendor supplied PWR and excessive warpage.
44 AW-39 D. Hansen Defective welds on vendor supplied PWR located in pressure relief tank room unit.
46 AQW-74 R. Masterson Improper weld quenching techniques.
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17 AB-4 V. Ferrarini (a) Broken hilti bolts during installation l
(b) Bolts elongated and stripped.
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33 AH-3 R. Masterson Hanger material control.
l 31 AQW-73 R. Masterson Hanger material control.
47 AQW-75, AQW-76 R. Masterson Unacceptable vendor welds in pipe whip restraints.
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT i
26 AQW-2 R. Hubbard Unqualified welders 27 A0W-17 R. Hubbard Unqualified weld inspectors 2
AW-36 E. G. Thompson Adherence to welding procedures 43 AW-40, AW-42 C. D. Richards Fabrication and installation of fuel pool liners G
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION tlUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 33 AQW-71 R. Masterson Hanger material control 27 AQW-69 R. Hubbard Unqualified weld inspectors 17 AB-14 V. Ferrarini Signing off on bolts which had torque seal applied by someone else 2
AW-31 E. G. Thompson Adherence to welding procedures 2
AQW-10 E. G. Thompson Adherence to welding procedures W
ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 24 AQW-12 R. Hubbard Disorganized weld repair documentation 26 AQW-5 R. Hubbard Unqualified weld inspectors 16 AQ-64 J. Tapia Excavation overbreak/ seismic response 42 AP-12, AQ-32 C. D. Richards Weld repairs not in accordance with procedures; too many repairs, and ANI quit 6
AW-61 V. Ferrarini Welding with no inerting 12 AP-11 W. P. Chen Reactor vessel support blocks damaged 11 AP-4 W. P. Chen
" Cold springing" of piping systems 6
AW-46 V. Ferrarini The ground for welding was accomplished in such a manner that resulted in arc strikes 4
ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 4
AW-51 E. G. Thompson Weld rod control 4
AW-62 E. G. Thompson Weld rod control 31 AH-6 R. Masterson Hanger welding problem 44 AW-50, AW-58 D. Hansen Excessive gap when snubber and hangers welded in pl..
3 AW-52, AW-59, AW-62 E. G. Thompson Improper or defective pipe welds 1
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 15 AH-5 R. Masterson Hanger design problems G
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1 A22achment 2 ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 43 AM-11 C. D. Richards Fabrication & instr'lation of fuel pool liners 1
AW-38 E. G. Thompson Welding accomplished without procedure or incorrect procedure 32 AH-20, AH-21 R. Masterson Hanger fabrication deficiencies 15 AH-5 R. Masterson Hanger design problems 9
AQW-24 E. G. Thompson Ifoles drilled in incorrect locations in base plates, pipe supports; and cable tray supports are " plug welded" in an uncontrolled manner 43 AW-81, AW-82 C. D. Richards Fabrication and installation of pool liners 24 AQW-26 R. Hubbard Welding on rebar 26 AQW-2 R. Hubbard Unqualified welders 28 AQW-6 Malonson People working outside procedures 30 AQW-15 R. Hubbard Condenser tube sheets incorrect 18 AB-12 V. Ferrarini Upper lateral steam generator support anchor bolts were cut
'd 17 AB-7a V. Ferrarini liilti bolts torqued to lower values than required d
i 14 AW-47 W. P. Chen improper construction practices were employed during construction of main condensers 1
14 AP-6 W. P. Chen Crowbar dropped into pipe in reactor enro and never retrieved
ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 6
AQC-12 & AC-37 T. J. Langowski Rebar installed that was not properly inspected upon receipt 15 AC-18 C. Hofmayer Unauthorized cutting of rebar in non-specific locations 10 AP-8 W. P. Chen Pipe damaged by sledge hammer 13 AP-7 W. P. Chen Repairs to fuel pool (spargers) 1 AC-16 R. Philleo Rejected aggregate was incorporated in basemat of the Unit I reactor 17 AOC-45 R. Philleo Personnel produced incorrect readings on concrete batch plant scales by leaning on the wires connecting the weighing hoppers to the scales.
4 AC-25 J. Devers Hollow places were found to exist in the concrete behind the stainless steel liner of the Unit 2 Reactor Cavity e
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ALLEGER I
CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 45 AW-60 D. Hansen Defective welds on steam generator top head insulation support 45 AW-65 E. G. Thompson Circumferential butt welds in fuel transfer tubes 18 AB-7b V. Ferrarini Compone.. cooling water surge tank anchor bolts were bent 43 AQW-80 C. D. Richards Fabrication and installation of fuel pool liners e
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ALLEGER 9
CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 3
AQC-52 R. Philleo Field-cured cylinders which fail specification requirements 9
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION tiUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 2
AC-22, AC-23 J. Devers
" Bad concrete work" or " sloppy" placement of contra'*-
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4 ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT
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21 AQP-1 D. Hansen Pipe piece No. changed in effort to cover up l
unauthorized work and avoid NCR being written j
21 AQH-17 D. Hansen NCR initiated on valve and flange but never dispositioned d
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ALLEGER _
CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 44 AQP-22 D. Hansen NCR written and submitted but was never approved or distributed 31 AP-18 through AP-22 R. Masterson Hanger welding problems 32 AH-9, AH-11 R. Masterson Hanger fabrication problems 42 AW-41, A0W-33 C. D. Richards Weld repairs not in accordance with procedure; too many repairs, and ANI quit I
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Rt2achment 2 RLL'EGER I
CRTEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 6
AC-49 T. Langowski Reinforcement installed upside down in a building i
near the Unit 2 containment 10 AQC-48 R. Philleo Conc. Cyl. in the Hunt Lab moist room were allowed to dry 10 AQC-4 R. Philleo Required aggregrate testing equipment was sitting AQC-5 unused on lab shelves AQC-6 AQC-8 s
1 AQC-7 R. Philleo Concrete rejected for being over specification limit on time to discharge was placed in the circulating water intake structure e
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION REVIEWCi SUBJECT NUMBER NUMBER 10 AOC-11 R. Philleo Concrete cyl. with adequate strength were used to represent other placements 6
AC-30 T. Langowski No reinforcing steel was installed in a 6' x 6' section of concrete in Safeguards Building 12 AC-29 J. Devers A spillway pillar span or column was erected 75 to 80" offset 4
AC-28 J. Devers Fresh concrete was placed on top of crumbling concrete during the construction of spillway 1
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 17 ABQ-1 V. Ferrarini Q.C. Inspector was told to " buy of f" on hilti bolts.
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CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 15 AOC-1 C. Hofmayor Loan of rebar drills without proper documentation.
15 AQC-14 C. Hofmayer Unauthorized cutting of rebar in non-specific AC-40 locations.
5 AC-31 R. Philleo Hanger inserts were installed at improper angles.
11 AP-13 W. P. Chen Main steam line forced into position.
32 AH-10, AH-18 R. Masterson Hanger fabrication deficiencies.
6 AW-45 V. Ferrarini Welding was performed without inerting.
5 AC-36 R. Phillen Trash in the bottom of a form was covered with concrete.
5 AC-43 R. Philleo No new allegation.
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 6
AW-66 V. Ferrarini Welding and chipping were being performed in the same area.
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ALLEGER,
CATEGORY ALLEGATION tium 3ER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 18 AQB-3 V. Ferrarini S.G. support anchor bolts were cut because concrete was in hole.
20 A08-3 Malonson Heat number removed from bolt.
15 AQC-15 C. Hofmayer Unauthorized cutting of rebar in Fuel Handling Building.
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 2
AQU-28 C. D. Richards Adherence to welding procedures AQW-30 20 AQP-2 Malonson lost CMC 25 AqW-29 R. Hubbard Incorrect weld repairs on hanqers 13 AP-16
- 11. P. Chen Heating of out-of-round pipe 13 AP-15 U. P. Chen "8 uttering" of out-of-round pipe I
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 23 A0W-78 P. Hubbard Oxygen analyzer documentation destroyed 33 AQH-22 Malonson Pipe support material traceability
- 55 ADN-77 R; Masterson Miscellaneous weldino deficiencies
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ALLEGER W
2 CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 1
AC-20 R. Philleo Rejected concrete was placed in the turbine building.
9 AQC-9 T. J. Langowski Answers were given to tests prior to March 1977.
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ALLEGER.
CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 13 AC-44 R. Philleo Detrimental cracks exist in the concrete pad at the bottom of the reactor vessel.
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Attachm2nt 2 ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 25 AQW-25 R. Hubbard FNI documentation on steam generator welds 8
AW-63 C. D. Richards Reconstruction of a lost weld data card (VOC)
'k1 AP-9 N. P. Chen Localized heating of SS pipe I
AW-34 C. D. Richards Welding accomplished without procedure or
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incorrect procedure 10 AP-10 N. P. Chen Steam pipe damaged and hidden G
ALLEGER _l ll I
E CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 21 AQH-2 D. Hansen Instructions given to " buy off" on hanger or supervisor would find someone who would.
7 AW-48 V. Ferrarini A QC trainee was improperly using liquid penetrant.
17 AB-6 V. Ferrarini QC inspector improperly instructed to sign off on bolts.
32 AH-4 R. Masterson Hanger Fabrication deficiencies.
27 AQW-11, AQW-16 R. Hubbard Unqualified weld inspectors.
4 AW-49 f
E. G. Thompson Holes drilled in incorrect locations in base plates, pipe supports, and cable tray supports l
are " plug welded" in an uncontrolled manner.
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- ALLEGER, CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 33 AH-7 R. Masterson Hanger material control 10 AP-5 W. P. Chen Repair of gouged pipe' l
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- 1 AW-35 E. G. Thompson Welding accomplished without procedure or incorrect procedure 44 AW-53 E. G. Thompson A pipe hanger was " Rush" welded using weave welding and rod requisitions for anotper job.
7 AQC-10 J. Tapia Uncontrolled repair of concrete hole 9
AW-56 E. G. Thompson Weld rod control 2
AW-54 E. G. Thompson Adherence to welding procedures l
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 8
AQC-51 T. J. Langowski Cadweld tensile test., were reported by an inspector without actually performing the tests.
8 AQC-3 T. J. Langowski Aggregate tests were falsified (January 1976).
8 AQC-7 T. J. Langowski Compression strength test results falsified.
2 AQC-5^
J. Devers The " soupy" concrete was placed in the Auxiliary
.i Building in the summer of 1976.
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2 ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 3
AC-35 R. Philleo Concrete was placed during freezing weather.
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER
. REVIEWER SUBJECT 4
39 AM-29 lf. P. Chen Simplified analysis method deficient
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 14 AE-17
.1.Tapia Control room ceiling area deficiencies m
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ALLEGER CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 17 AB-5 V. Ferrarini a) Hilti bolts torqued to values lower than required b) Bolts welded to devices that they are supporting c) Bolts will vibrate loose after 40 years.
27 AQW-18 R. Hubbard Unqualified weld inspectors 27 AQW-19 R. Hubbard Unqualified weld inspectors h
1 4
Attachmsnt 2 ALLEGER _
CATEGORY ALLEGATION NUMBER NUMBER REVIEWER SUBJECT 34 AP-24, AP-25 R. Masterson Computer program verification for base plates 35 AP-26 through AP-28 R. Masterson Computer program verification for pipinq 16 AH-8 R. Masterson Intimidation to hanner redesign sugges'tions
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SEER WRITEUP DOCU.".EtiT C0!iTROL/ ROUTE SHEET a
Allega tion fiumbers
/4C-T 0[, /4 C' 36' Subject of Aliegation
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cc.;.rti fi cia jp fo< p >,, p, y c &
&,.,c,1. tv TRT Group
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Author:
- /f,'/ /'e'd This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
It stays with all revisions to the SSER writeup and serves as a routing and review record.
It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draft fiumber g,
Draft 1
2 3
4 5
Author KOf/.9///P./ F/' //Z/N M ff-S 11 ge Group Leader bM AL&h PGtfm W; M %
,b Tech. Editor
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J. Gaoliardo
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v r-Revision fiumber Final 1
2 3
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Author Tech. Editor Group Leader J. Gaoliardo T. Ippolito Administrative Writeup integrated into SSER Potential Violations to Region IV Workpackage File Complete Workpackage Returned to Group Leader 1
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FolAJ..i..u.,m
Draft 8 - 10/19/84 AC-24, AC-35/CP2 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 3 2.
Allegation Numbers: AC-24, AC-35, and AC-52 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that the placement of some concrete took place under the following adverse weather conditions: (a) during a rainstorm and without the approval of quality control (QC) personnel, and (b) during or immediately before freezing weather.
It is further alleged that (c) there are several examples of field-cured cylinders which failed specification requirements, that some standard-cured cylinders failed specification requirements, and that the Schmidt rebound hammer test was misapplied in resolving problems created by these deficiencies.
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
In assessing the allegation concerning placement during a rainstorm, the NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) examined concrete placement package 101-8805-013 for a placement on the dome of the Unit 1 Containment Building. This package i
indicates that the final batch of concrete placed on the evening of Janua ry 18 1979, was batched at 5:59 p.m.; that only about 300 of the required 450 cubic yards had been placed; that the crew abandoned the placement in a heavy rain at 7:30 or 8:00 p.m., leaving a gap,with a 30-foot radius in the middle of the placement; that concrete batching started again at 8:00 a.m. on January 19; and that 1
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-2 the lift was topped out at 12:21 p.m.
There is no account of any irregularity during the shutdown.
However, the craft personnel general foreman for the placement reported that the attempt to cover the partially completed concrete with plastic to protect it from the rain was not completely successful; that about a half cubic yard of concrete was washed out before the crew got the situation under control; that at about 10 p.m. he went to the batch plant, which was now empty because of the hour, dry-batched a half-cubic yard to the correct proportions, mixed it in two batches in the concrete laboratory mixer, and placed it on the dome. At this time, all quality control personnel had gone home and were not available to approve or oversee the operation.
This account of events was not refuted by the NRC Region IV investigation o'f this incident and is apparently correct.
The action constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II.
Following the completion of the dome, and after learning of the allegation of a violation, Brown & Root engaged Muenow and Associates to make an ultrasonic investigation of the portions of the dome potentially affected by the rainstorm.
They also engaged Erlin, Hime, and Associates to interpret the Muenow report. The incident and the investigation are discussed extensively in nonconfonnance report (NCR)
C-1418. The TRT reviewed NCR C-1418, " Final Report on the Concrete Evaluation in Dome Roof Section of Comanche Peak Unit 1" by Richard Muenow of Muenow and Associates, and " Discussion of Final Muenow Associates Report, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Reactor il
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. Dome Concrete Testing for Texas Utilities Service, Inc." by B. Erlin of Erlin, Hime, and Associates.
The investigation revealed some minor discontinuities at 4 to 5 inches from the surface, and at 10 to 12 inches from the surface, with a few voids at a maximum of less than i inch.
Correlation of pulse velocity data on the dome with test cylinders containing the same materials indicated compressive strength in excess of 4,000 psi; this high velocity, combined with the relative absence of voids, indicated a density in excess of 140 pounds per cubic foot. Accordingly, the structure as built satisfies the design requirements in the Final Safety Analysis Report. More convincing evidence of the acceptability of the dome concrete is provided by TUGC0's " Final Report on Structural Integrity Test for Unit 1 Concrete Containment Structure," CPDA-31, 792.
The containment structure met all criteria for displacement and cracking control as well as '
structural rebound when subjected to 115 percent of design pressure.
The allegations concerning concrete placed in freezing weather were in connection with the Safeguard Building basemat and the lowest level floor of the Unit I containment structure.
The TRT reviewed in detail the relevant concrete placement packages, namely 105-2773-001 and 101-2808-001.
(1) Placement package 105-2773-001 reports on the Safeguard Building basemat, which was placed on December 31, 1975. All surface temperatures in the records comply with the specifications.
However, it is alleged that on the seventh day of curing, when the ambient temperature dropped to 18'F, a portion of the concrete in place was not protected by insulation.
Brown & Root interoffice
' 1.:
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memo IM 4152 stated that all concrete was well covered with insulation except the edges, where it was difficult to place insulation because of protruding dowels, but that a careful examination of the concrete showed no evidence of damage caused by freezing. Of the 15 field-cured specimens tested at 28 days,12 failed the criterion of equalling or exceeding 0.85 of the laboratory-cured specimens. Of these, two failed the alternate criterion of exceeding the design strength by 500 psi.
However, all results exceeded the design strength of 4,000 psi.
To compare the concrete near the dowels with concrete whose protection is not in doubt, the R.W. Hunt Co. ran Schmidt hammer tests on both the suspect concrete and the acceptable concrete at an age of four months.
The results are recorded in HCP reports 10664 and 10849, which were inspected by the TRT.
For both series of tests rebound numbers ranged from 39 to 46. The results of field-cured test cylinders indicate that the cold weather slowed the strength gain, but that the protection was adequate to attain the design strength in 28 days.
The fact that 2 out of 12 failed to meet specification requirements is not serious for concrete such as this, which is not loaded at an early age.
Subsequent wanner temperatures provide all the strength required by the specifications. The concrete on the edge adjacent to the dowels, which was difficult to protect, is acceptable for the following reasons:
(1) it was not reported to be exposed to freezing temperatures for seven days; (2)concreteatthatageshould not be damaged by freezing; and, (3) Schmidt hanner readings were the same on suspect concrete as on well protected concrete.
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1 (2) Placement package 101-2808-001 reports on the concrete in the Unit I containment structure, which was placed on December 30, 1976. The evening following the placement the ambient temperature dropped below 20*F.
The records show a concrete surface temperature as low as 42*F during the first day and no surface temperatures below 50 F on subsequent days, in spite of the fact that ambient temperatures as low as 12*F were measured. The protection, as indicated by the records, complied with specifications.
However, the allegation was triggered by an event detailed in Brown & Root (B&R) interoffice memo IM 7700.
During the first evening, a TUEC QC inspector measured a surface temperature of 21*F.
The B&R QC inspector noted that the TUEC inspector used an uncalibrated thermometer with a large range and took the reading in such a manner that the thermometer was not protecte'd from the air so that in the B&R QC inspector's opinion the TUEC inspector was measuring ambient temperature instead of concrete surface temperature. Although the two discussed the adequacy of the technique, and a picture was taken of the technique, the records do not indicate that the matter was ever resolved.
To evaluate the condition of concrete alleged to have been exposed to freezing temperatures, the R.W. Hunt Co. ran Schmidt hamer tests on the suspect concrete and on concrete whose integrity was not in doubt.
The results are in HCP report 22014, which was examined by the TRT.
Rebound numbers for suspect areas ranged from 25 to 35, and in sound areas from 27 to 36. The differences are not significant.
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. The allegation concerning field-cured test cylinders, standard-cured test cylinders, and Schmidt rebound hammer tests, is contained in the attachments to a letter, dated September 20, 1984, to Thomas Ippolito, NRC,fromhrs.JuanitaEllis)PresidentoftheCitizensAssociation for Sound Energy (CASE).
The allegation states, " Based on a review of documents attached and already in the record, it is apparent that the quality and compressive strength of the concrete at Comanche Peak is indeterminate at best, and, in some cases appears to be deficient."
This observation is presumably supported by Attachment D to the letter, which lists 36 test cylinders in 18 placements with laboratory-cured strengths below 4000 psi. The alleger was under the impression that the concrete was designed for a strength of 4000 psi.
The TRT reviewed the records and found that all the cited concrete was of designations C-301, C-302, C-305, or C-306, all of which have a design strength of 2500 psi.
The lowest reported strength was 3267 psi.
Thus, all these strengths met the sirength specification by a wide margin.
Furthermore, the TRT has discovered no standard-cured test cylinders in safety-related structures which failed the strength requi rement.
The allegation that some field-cured test cylinders failed to meet specification requirements is correct. The project specifications, 2323-5S-9, para. 7.3, cited the requirements of ACI-318, the American Concrete Institute Building Code.
These requirements are very conservative and are intended for building construction where slender flexural members are required to sustain a large portion of their design load at an early age.
The requirement is that cold-weather protection shall be improved when the 28-day strength of field-cured c.
cylinders is less than 85% of the strength of laboratory-cured cylinders.
This requirement is more severe than ~is necessary for a massive structure. The definitive American Concrete Institute guidance on cold-weather protection is provided in ACI 306R-78, Cold Weather Concreting. That document states that items such as foundations, substructures, and massive sections not subject to early load, which will be subjected to favorable curing temperatures prior to receiving the full design load, should be protected for 2 days if they are not subject to freezing in service and 3 days if they are subject to freezing.
Protection is defined as maintenance of a temperature of 55'F for sections thinner than 12 inches, 50*F for sections 12 to 36 inches thick, 45*F for sections 36 to 72 inches thick, and 40*F for sections thicker than 72 inches.
No strength requirements are stipulated.
All the field-curing deficiencies cited in Attachment D, with three exceptions, fall into this less stringent category.
The three exceptions are a slab in the Auxiliary Building, in which the field-cured strength was 3891 psi, and two cylinders representing slabs in the Safeguards Building with strengths of 3407 and 3956 psi.
In all cases, the design strength was 4000 psi. The first and third had strengths sufficiently close to 4000 psi to eliminate any concern for sa,fety.
The second was in a region tested by the Schmidt rebound hanner and found to be equal in quality to sections of concrete whose 4
quality was not in doubt.
Even though more lenient criteria could reasonably have been established for much of the concrete, cold-weather protection was generally quite good.
The ACI criteria
for massive structures can produce field-cured strengths as low as 50%
of the design strength at 28 days if the concrete is maintained at 35'F after protection is terminated.
In contrast, most test cylinders at Comanche Peak exceed the design strength. Of 108 cylinders with a design strength of 4000 psi cited in Attachment D as failing to comply, 94% exceeded 3000 psi and the lowest strength was 2477 psi.
Of 17 field-cured test cylinders failing to meet the design strength of 2500 psi, 14 exceeded 2000 psi, and the lowest strength was 1820 psi.
It also may be noted that field-cured cylinders usually underestimate the strength of the in-place concrete they represent because they are not as massive and, therefore, benefit less from heat produced by hydration of cement during the curing process.
The allegation questioned the use of the Schmidt rebound hammer for qualifying sections of concrete in which field-cured test cylinders failed to meet specifications.
The above discussion makes the issue moot except for the single cylinder in a slab of the Safeguards Building.
The allegation correctly quotes ASTM C-805-79 in stating that rebound test results are not intended as an alternative for the strength determination of concrete.
The test reports at Comanche l
Peak would have been more in accord with accepted practice if they had 1
merely reported rebound numbers rather than converting them to strength values by the calibration curve provided by the manufacturer.
Conversion to strength values is permissible only when a very thorough I
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laboratory calibration has been conducted with job materials.
However, the test may be used to compare two concretes.
If one concrete whose strength is not documented produces rebound numbers as great as another concrete made of the same materials and having the same age and moisture condition and whose strength is known to be acceptable, the undocumented concrete may be presumed to have adequate strength.
ASTM C-805 states, "The rebound number determined by this method may be used to assess the uniformity of concrete in situ, to delineate zones or regions of poor quality...." Paragraph 7.3.e of the project specifications states, " Evaluation of test results shall be in accordance with Section 17.1, 17.2, and 17.3 of ACI 301."
Section 17.3.1 of ACI 301 states, " Testing by impact (Schmidt) hammer, soniscope, or other nondestructive device' may be permitted by the architect / engineer to determine relative strengths at various locations in the structure as an aid in evaluating concrete strength in place or for selecting areas to be cored.
Such tests, unless properly calibrated and correlated with other test data, shall not be used as a basis for acceptance or rejection." Thus, the method has general acceptability and is specifically permitted by the Comanche Peak construction specifications as an aid in evaluating concrete l
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strength in place.
Hanmer results are normally not permitted as a substitute for laboratory-cured test cylinders, which form the basis for acceptance of the concrete.
They may be used to judge the adequacy of protection or to determine when a portion of a structure may be safely loaded.
The ACI Building Code and the Comanche Peak specifications do not provide for the rejection of concrete on the basis of low-strength, field-cured cylinders. They merely require that protection be improved and that critical elements be cured for a longer period of time before being loaded. With the exception noted above, the low field-cured strengths were not in critical elements.
The statement in Attachment D to the allegation that Schmidt hammer tests were not conducted on sections of concrete when both field-cured and laboratory-cured cylinders were below 4000 psi is meaningless since there are no sections cited where both field and laboratory results were below the design strength.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: Although these allegations are true, they should be closed for the following reasons:
(a) The Unit I dome was proved sound both by ultrasonic testing and by structural integrity testing.
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(b)
Sections of concrete alleged to have been exposed to freezing temperature at an early age were shown by in-place strength tet'.s to have substantially the same strength as concrete whose prote:: ion was not in doubt.
f (c)
The field-cured test cylinders demonstrated adequate protection for the type of concrete placed, with the exception of one slab in the Safeguards Building, which was shown by Schmidt hammer f
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testing to be adequate.
i Thus, these allegations have neither safety significance nor generic i
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i 6.
Actions F.eouired:
None.
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Attachments:
None.
I 9.
Reference Documents:
l 1.
Concrete placement package 101-2808-001.
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2.
Concrete placenent package 101-8505-013.
3.
Concrete placement package 105-2773-001.
t 4.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Cr'terion II.
i 5.
NCR C-1418.
i l
6.
Richard Muer.ow, " Final Report on the Concrete Evaluation in Dome j
l Roof Section of Comanche Peak Unit No. 1."
l 7.
B. Erlin,
- Discussion of Final Muenow Associates Report, Comanche Feat Steam Electric Statier., Reactor #1 Ocme, Concrete Testing for Texas Utilities Services Inc."
8.
Final Test Report on Structural Integrity Test for Unit 1 Con-crete Containment Structures, CPDA-31, 792.
9.
Brown & Root Interoffice Memo IM 4152.
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10.
Bronn & Root Interoffice Memo IM 7706.
11.
Hunt Report ICP ICC64 1
12.
Hunt Report HCP 10249.
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13.
Hunt Report HCP 22014.
14.
Letter with attachments, dated September 20,.1984, to Mr. Thomas Ippolito, NRC, from Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President of Citizens Association for Sound Energy.
15.
Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings, ACI 301, American Concrete Institute.
16.
Cold Weather Concreting, ACI 306R, American Concrete Institute.
17.
Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, ACI 318, American Concrete Institute.
18.
Standard Test Method for Rebound Number of Hardened Concrete, ASTM C 805, American Society for Testing and Materials.
10.
This statement prepared by:
Robert E. Philleo Date Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date Approved by:
T. A. Ippolito Date
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5 SEER WRITEUP DOCUMENT CONTROL / ROUTE SHEET
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Draft Number Draft
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Draf t Number Dra f t 1
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DCP3 SSER Allegation 10 DRAFT 8 - 10/20/84 SSER i
1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No.10 2.
Allegation Numbers: AQC-4, AQC-5, AQC-6, AQC-8, AQC-11, and AQC-48 3.
Characterization: It is alleged that the following violation of testing procedures occurred:
Equipment required for aggregate testing was sitting unused a.
on laboratory shelves (AQC-4).
b.
Shortcuts were taken on tests involving grading of aggregate (AQC-5).
During the placing of a 6600-cubic-yard section of the basemat c.
for Unit 1, some concrete was placed without the required testing i
(AQC-6).
1 d.
Concrete cylinder compression tests were run at a faster loading rate than permitted by NRC regulations (AQC-8).
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Concrete test cylinders with adequate strength were used to represent other placements (AQC-11).
f.
Concrete test cylinders in the Hunt laboratory moist room were allowed to dry (AQC-48).
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
a.
The test equipment that allegedly remained unused at the project laboratory was for the test for Potential Reactivity of Aggregates (Chemical Method), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
C 289. Test Lab Manual TLM-004 (CP-QP-0.5), which was in effect during most of the construction activity, required that the test be run once for each 4000 tons of aggregate. The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) inspected " Folder 1 - Potential Reactivity, 4000 Ton Test" and learned that between May 6,1975, and July 12, 1978, there i
were 60 tests for potential reactivity. This period covers the bulk of heavy construction and the entire employment period of the alleger.
The testing rate during this period exceeded one test per l
4000 tons of coarse aggregate. The longest interval between consecutive tests was 60 days, and only one other interval exceeded one' month. Thus, testing was at a higher rate than required by the testing requirements.
The falsification of aggregate records is dealt with in Civil and Structural Category No. 8 (AQC-3).
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b.
The shortcut alleged is that TUEC used a hot plate for drying aggregate in its sieve analyses of coarse aggregate rather than an oven, as specified in the test method ASTM C-136. Note 4 of that method contains the following information:
Samples may be dried at the higher temperatures associated with the use of hot plates without affecting results, provided steam escapes without generating pressures sufficient to fracture the particles, and temperatures are not so great as to cause chemical breakdown of the aggregate.
The alleged shortcut, then., is permitted by the provision just
- cited, c.
The TRT inspected all batch tickets and test records for the 6600-cubic-yard basemat placement and physically inspected those portions of the mat still accessible. A placement that size requires 66 sets of test cylinders, with associated data on fresh concrete.
There were 67 sets of records in the file, all of which showed compliance with specifications.
While little of the placement was available for inspection, that portion that could be seen was in excellent condition. The falsification issue is dealt with in Category No. 8.
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d.
Cylinder strength testing must be done in accordance with " Method for Compressive Strength of Cylindrical Concrete Specimens," ASTM C-39.
That method permits any rate of loading during the first half of the loading range, but restricts the rate of loading at fracture to the range of 20 to 50 psi per second. A higher rate of loading may produce a higher indicated strength.
The definitive work on investigating the effect of rate of loading on indicated strength (Watstein, D., "Effect of Straining Rate on the Compressive Strength and Elastic Properties of Concrete," Proceedings, American Concrete Institute, Vol. 49, 1963, p. 279) demonstrated a significant increase in indicated strength for very high dynamic rates of loading. However, a rate 100 times that specified produces an indicated increase in strength of only 10 percent. The testing machine used to break cylinders on the Comanche Peak project, a Forney Model CAC-50-DR, if run at maximum capacity, could achieve a testing rate no greater than 20 times the specified rate. This rate could produce an apparent increase in strength of about 6.5 percent.
For 4,000 psi concrete the apparent increase would be about 250 psi.
In a detailed check by the TRT of several placement packages, and a spot check of others, the 4000 psi concrete averaged more than 5000 psi, and individual results exceeded 4500 psi. Thus, if some tests were conducted at too high a loading rate, no results were changed from failing to passing.
If there were tests within 6.5 percent of the design strength not detected by the TRT, the strength could be expected to gain 6.5 percent within a few weeks.
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In the absence of details, the TRT could not make a specific investigation of the allegation.
The alleger stated that the switch occurred after "a good sample was found." When the sample cylinders were tested, at most two extra cylinders remained for which the test results could be switched to the testing data for other placements.
Thus, even if data were improperly transferred, their significance would be small because of the consistently high quality of the concrete at Comanche Peak.
f.
To investigate the allegation that concrete cylinders in the laboratory moist room were allowed to dry, the TRT examined the current procedure for documenting moist room conditions and interviewed a Level Il inspector who was present throughout the period when the laboratory.was operated by the Hunt Company.
At present there is a thermometer which provides a permanent temperature record. While there is no quantitative measurement of humidity, there are daily obss.vations of the presence or absence of fog in the room.
These observations are also a part of the record.
During the Hunt operation, temperature was recorded, but there apparently was no documentation of humidity. Batch plant inspectors were required to note the condition of the moist room, but there is no record of their observations. There is a history of breakdowns in the water supply to the laboratory, and a shutdown as long as 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> has been documented. With the door to the moist room closed, g,
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there would be a negligible drop in humidity during such a period.
As long as the relative humidity remains above 90 percent, concrete curing conditions are favorable.
It is pertinent to note that any drying that might occur would produce conservative results in that measured strengths would be lower than actual strengths.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: The TRT concludes that these allegations have no impact on safety and should be closed for the following reasons:
a.
All required tests for ASTM C-289 were performed.
. b.
The alleged shortcut in carrying out aggregate grading tests is permitted by the provisions of the specified test method in ASTM C-136.
c.
All required testing was carried out in connection with the 6600-cubic-yard basemat placement.
d.
Although this allegation may have been true, the fastest possible loading of test cylinders would have increased the indicated strengths by no more than 6.5 percent and would have had no affect on 'the acceptability of the concrete.
e.
The alleged substitution of test cylinders would have affected so few cylinders that even if true, it could have no material effect on the overall test results.
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Although the allegation that the laboratory failed to maintain the l
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water supply at all times may be true in that there were brief l
i shutoffs of water to the moist room humidifiers, these periodic l
breakdowns would not adversely affect the strength of the concrete.
Accordingly, these allegations have neither safety significance nor generic implications, i
I, i
6.
Actions Required:
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Attachments:
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l 9.
Reference Documents:
1.
Test. Lab Manual TLM-004 (CP-QP-0.5).
i 2.
Folder 1 - Potential Reactivity 4000-Ton Test.
L l
i 3.
Concrete Placement Package 101-2805-001 1-21-76.
1
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4.
Watstein, D., "Effect of Straining Rate on the Compressive Strength and Elastic Properties of Concrete," Proceedings, American Concrete Institute, Vol. 49, 1953, p. 279.
5.
ASTM C-39, Compressive Strength of Cylindrical Concrete Specimens.
6.
ASTM C-136, Sieve Analysis of Fine and Coarse Aggregates.
7.
ASTM C-289, Potential Reactivity of Aggregates (Chemical Method).
- 10. This statement prepared by:
Robert E. Philleo Date Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date Approved by:
T. A. Ippolito Cate
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SEER WR]TEUP DOCUMENT CONTROL / ROUTE SHEET Al1egation Humbers A C-n~, A c-7 V, A C- %
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Author:
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It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draft h' umber Draft i
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SEER WR1TEUP DOCUMENT CONTROL / ROUTE SHE.f Allegation Hambers A C-7 $~, A C-z. ', A (- M A (- 7d. Oc-005-O C -C'09 9
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Author:
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This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
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It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draft Number Dra f t 1
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Author Tech. Editor Group Leader J. Gagliardo T. Ippolito Administrative Writeup integrated into SSER Potentiel Violations to Region IV Workpackage File Complete Workpackage Returned to Group Leader J
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Draft 7 10/20/84 DCP3 sser concrete voids / cat. 4 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 4 2.
Allegation number: AC-25, AC-28, AC-32, AC-33, AC-34, DC-008, and DC-009 3.
Characterization: It is alleged that the following concrete deficiencies occurred at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES):
a.
Hollow places existed in concrete behind the stainless steel liner of the Unit I reactor cavity (AC-25).
b.
Fresh concrete was placed on top of crumbling concrete during the construction of the spillway (AC-28).
c.
The repair of a 20-ft x 20-ft honeycombed area located in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building was inadequate (AC-32).
d.
Cracks existed in the concrete basemat of Unit I and in floor slabs in the plant buildings (AC-33).
e.
There are numerous concrete voids in building walls that can be located by tapping the walls with a hammer and listening for a hollow sound (AC-34).
f.
A void was identified in the Unit 1 Reactor Building Steam Generator Compartment Wall (DC-008).
g.
On concrete placement 002-7810-002 of the 810-foot elevation of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, embedded foreign material was located with a flex drill (DC-009).
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
a.
The alleger originally stipulated that the hollow places were located behind the stainless steel liner of Unit 1 Reactor Cavity, but when interviewed by the NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) he stated that he meant Unit 2.
In assessing the allegation, the TRT interviewed the TUEC chief structural engineer who stated that when forms were removed from one section of the Unit 2 containment structure, honeycombed areas were discovered on the side of the structure accessible to visual e'xamination. Because of the concern that the honeycombing indicated inadequate concrete consolidation in this section and that the possibility existed that there might also be voids on the opposite side of the containment wall which were not
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accessible to visual examination, TUEC examined that section of the concrete wall ultrasonically. The examination revealed the existence of voids behind the stainless steel liner.
Their existence and the required repair procedures are documented in Design Change Authorization (DCA) No. 6663.
Repairs were being performed by TUEC at the time of the TRT review. The TRT concluded that since the honeycombing was an isolated instance, the problem did not appear to be widespread.
b.
There are two spillways at the CPSES, one located near the safe shutdown impoundment (SSI), and the other located at the Squaw Creek Dam.
The allegation did not specify which was intended, but the SSI spillway was eliminated from consideration because it was constructed after June 1978, while the period cited in the allegation was 1976 and 1977, The Squaw Creek Dam spillway was constructed from August 1976 to January 1977.
The TRT review of placement documentation indicated that the Squaw Creek spillway was placed in a single " lift"; therefore, no l
new concrete could have been placed on hardened or crumbled concrete.
During the interview with the alleger, it became apparent to the TRT that from the types of placements being described he had a i
general concern about the adequacy of cold weather placement practices during construction of the Squaw Creek Dam and i
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appurtenant structures.
However, he was unable to identify a specific spot where specifications were violated.
The TRT examined documentation for cold weather protection for several placements during its investigation of other CP5ES allegations.
Those examinations confirmed that cold weather protection was adequate'.
Furthennore, the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9
3.2, Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems, indicates that the Squaw Creek Dam is not a seismic Category I structure.
Its failure would not affect safety during a safe shutdown earthquake.
c.
The concrete honeycombing referred to in the allegation is documented in Nonconformance Report (NCR) C-1034.
The architect-engineer's direction was to remove the honeycombed area dowr; to sound concrete and then fill the void area with dry-pack concrete or small size coarse aggregate concrete, all in accordance with a standard, engineer-approved, repair procedure for such work. The repair is documented in Region IV Inspection Report 50-445/79-26.
The NRC Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI) observed various phases i
j of the repair work from August 1978 through January 1979, when the repair was finally completed. The RRI noted that the work was being done in an acceptable manner and in accordance with the approved instructions.
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The TRT inspected documentation pertaining to the honeycombed area in the Auxiliary Building for concrete placement 002-7852-007 and verified that the area had been repaired.
The TRT review of this concrete placement package revealed no documentation discrepancies concerning the repair.
d.
The existing cracks in the Unit 1 concrete basemat have been the subject of a great deal of attention by the NRC and the designer.
They have been documented in numerous NCRs, such as NCR C-650 and NCR C-1034.
The TRT reviewed a random sample of the concrete placement packages for the Unit 1 Containment Building, Auxiliary Building, and both Safeguards Buildings, and found no evidence of specification violations during the concrete placement.
The TRT also inspected the cracks documented in NCRs 1034 and 650.
Cracks documented by NCR C-650 are evaluated in Civil and Structural Category No.13. The crack documented by NCR C-1034 is a small hairline crack that cannot impair structural behavior and capacity, e.
The NRC Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI) at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) investigated this allegation (Region IV
' Inspection Report 50-445/80-16and50-446/80-16).
The RRI learned that the alleger had worked for five weeks early in 1980 in the Unit 1 Safeguards Building at the 790-foot elevation.
The RRI found two locations at that location where a hollow sound J
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could be obtained by tapping a wall with a haniner.
He infomed TUEC of this condition and they found several more locations in the same general vicinity, all at the 790-foot elevation.
Each area was marked and excavated to approximately 2 inches, that is, to the depth behind the first layer of reinforcing steel. The RRI observed several excavations and saw nothing abnomal about the concrete. He also queried the craft personnel who were excavating when he was not present and was infonned that all excavations revealed nothing except uniformly solid concrete.
The RRI tapped the concrete after it had been excavated to a depth of approximately 4 inches and could no longer detect a hollow sound. The allegation apparently was based on the premise that what the alleger interpreted as a hollow sound indicated a void in the wall.
Excavactions of the areas in ques, tion revealed no voids in the concrete.
f.
This item was not the subject of an allegation. The TRT reviewed its disposition because it involved an issue similar to those raised in other CPSES allegations.
Nonconforr.ance Report (NCR) C-82-00858, which was reviewed by the TRT, indicates that a void did exist in the generator compartment wall of the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The matter was reported to Gibbs & Hill (Office Memorandum CPPA-21495, July 20,1982) and they concluded that the wall would perfom both its structural i
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and radiation shielding functions whether or not the void was filled. The TRT agrees with the assessment. However, to ensure that no safety issue could be raised, Brown & Root filled the void with nonshrink grout in August 1982, as documented in Inspection Report IR-C-6682.
g.
The alleged deficiency was documented in NCR C-82-01432, which was reviewed by the TRT.
The TRT learned that a worker drilling holes for anchor bolts in a floor of the Auxiliary Building encountered an apparent void and debris.
The debris appeard to be plywood chips. A Brown & Root examination of the area revealed that the drill had hit an embedded drain pipe and had removed some of the foam insulation from around the piping.
The driller had mistakenly identified the foam as plywood. The disturbed insulation and concrete were then replaced, as 4
documented in Brown & Root Report IR-C-7035.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions:
l All allegations except Item a were found to have no safety signifi-cance and were closed as follows:
i a.
The allegation of hollow places in concrete behind the stainless steel liner of the Unit 2 Reactor Cavity is true and the hollow places are currently undergoing repairs.
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b.
In the absence of a specific allegation, the TRT reviewed documentation for several placements done in cold weather and concludes that the protection was adequate.
In addition, the allegation has no safety significance, since the spillway is not safety-rel ated.
c.
The allegation of honeycombing in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building is true and the repairs made were in accordance with approved procedures. Therefore, the allegation has no safety significance.
d.
While the allegation of cracking in the concrete basemat is accurate, it is not correct to assume that detrimental structural consequences will result from the cracks.
The structures are designed to tolerate cracks of the magnitude and location of those found.
e.
The allegation of numerous concrete voids was not substantiated.
I f.
The allegation of a void in the generator compartment wall of the Unit 1 Reactor Building is true. The void was filled even though it did not require filling from the standpoint of adequacy of design.
The TRT agreed after its review of the G8H evaluation of the condition.
l l
l g.
Although the allegation was correct in identifying foreign material in the concrete, the area was adequately repaired so that this condition will have no impact on safety.
The honeycombing discussed in Item a is currently undergoing repairs, f
and the repairs must be inspected and approved by the NRC Resident Inspector before the TRT can determine that this issue has no safety significance. The other allegations have neither safety significance nor generic implications.
l 6.
Actions Required:
The repairs and the repair documentation to the honeycombing discussed in Item a must be inspected / reviewed and approved by the NRC Resident Inspector before the TRT can determine that this issue has no safety significance. This shall be accomplished and approved by the NRC Resident Inspector prior to low-power operations.
l 1
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Attachments: None.
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Reference Documents:
1.
Concrete Placement Packages:
Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Safeguard Building 1.
002-2785-001 1.
105-7852-005 2.
002-2790-003 2.
105-4790-002 3.
002-5790-001 3.
105-9790-002 4.
002-5790-003 & -015 5.
002-57900-002 Unit #1 Containment (Ext.)
6.
002-7852-003 1.
101-5805-002 7.
002-7852-001,-002 & -006 2.
101-5805-008 8.
002-7852-004,-005 & -010 3.
101-5805-014 9.
002-7852-007 10.
002-4852-001 Unit #2 Containment (Ext.)
11.
002-5852-001, -002 & -024 1.
201-5805-002 12.
002-7873-003 & 002-8873-001 2.
201-5805-008 13.
002-5883-001, -002 -0003 8-004 3,
201-5805-014 i
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Deficiency and Disposition Reports */Nonconformance Reports DDR No.
NCR No.
310 1000 C-82-00888 311 1001 C-82-01432 340 1034 342 1170 450 84-00327 499 82-00125 519 1294 650 3.
Specification 2323-SS-9, paragraph 8.2.6.1.
4.
Inspection Report IR-C-6682.
5.
TUSI Office Memorandum CPPA-21495, July 20,1982.
6.84-006 Testimony dated March 7, 1984.
7.
QA-83-011 (NRC Report).
8.
IE Inspectior. Report 50-445/79-26, 50-446/79-25.
9.
IE Inspection Report 50-445/80-16, 50-446/80-16.
- 10. Brown & Root NCR No. C-82-00858.
- 11. Brown & Root NCR No. C-82-01432, Revision 2.
12.
nspection Report IR-C-7035.
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- 10. This statement prepared by:
John K. Devers Date Robert R. Philleo Date i
Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date Approved by:
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T. A. Ippolito Date h
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work package when the writeup is published.
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t Draft 7 10/21/84 SSER Allegation 13/CP3 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 13 2.
Allegation number: AC-44 3.
Characterization: It is alleged that detrimental cracks exist in the concrete pad at the bottom of the reactor vessel.
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance: The existence of these cracks is documented in Nonconformance Report (NCR) C-650.
The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) examined concrete placement package 101-2812-001, placement 101-2812-002, and NCR C-650, and found that there were no violations of specifications during the concrete placement, which occurred on March 21, 1977. Subsequent to placement, however, vertical cracks occurred that extended ho-izontally to the edge of the reactor cavity. The Gibbs & Hill (G&H) design engireer stated on May 11, 1977 that he found the cracks during his investigation. He attributed the l
cracks to the mass, configuration, and formwork on the interior circumferential face, all of which.nrecluded normal shrinkage, and stated that the' cracks were of no structural significance. An NRC Region IV structural engineer als) presented his evaluation of the cracks during t
l the ASLB hearing conducted on June 9, 1982. The TRT reviewed this testimony, along with that of G&H engineers given on June 7 and
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Civil and Structural No.13
. and 8,1982, and agreed with the assessment contained in their testimony.
The doughnut shape of the concrete section and the rigid form in the opening made it virtually impossible to avoid cracking if the entire section was placed at once, as it was.
However, the structure is adequately reinforced so that the cracks will not impair structural behavior and capacity.
The cracks have been repaired at the surface with epoxy resin for operational, rather than structural, reasons.
The TRT inspected the concrete and found it to be in excellent condition.
The TRT review of the design indicated that the concrete section was originally designed as two sections, with construction joints at the locations where the cracks occurred. The contractor was given the option of placing the concrete either in two sections with construction joints, or in one section without joints. The cracks that formed are not greatly different from the construction joints whicn would have been present if the two-placement option had been adopted; thus, the concrete in place essentially conforms with the original design.
One of the cracks is near the center of a deep beam spanning a 20-foot cavity in the bottom of the containment structure.
Reinforced concrete beams must crack in the bottom tensile zone when load is applied.
If flexural stresses were kept l
Civil and Structural No.13 D below the tensile strength of concrete, less than 20 percent of the strength of the steel would be utilized.
In design, the reinforcement is distributed so that the cracks are numerous and very narrow, both for the sake of appeatance and to prevent corrosion of the steel.
The occurrence of a pre-existing crack merely changes the distribution of cracks; the total width of the cracks in the tensile zone remains unchanged. A crack in the upper compressive stress zone closes when load is applied and is tendered innocuous.
The beam section must also be capable of carrying shear stresses. The cracks observed should not produce a critical situation because shear stresses are low nesr midspan and because crack planes are normally irregular so that eggregate interlock, particularly in the tightly closed compressive zone resists shear stress. The biggest defense against s
shear, however, is the fact that the concrete is heavily over-reinforced.
l The critical inad condition is not the static load condition, nor even the earthquake condition, but the differential pressure resulting from a postulated at.cident condition.
For this condition all the load is carried by the steel, with no credit given to the concrete, and the presence of cracks in the concrete is innaterial. The design of the section is controlled by thickness requirements for shielding. The section it thicker and, therefore, stronger than required to carry the loads.
The cracks do not make the steel vulnerable to corrosion because the upper surface, which provides the most likely ingress for water, is sealed, ind the bottom surface is in a dry environment.
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Civil end St ructural fio. 13 4
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: Although the allegation is correct in citing the existence of cracks, it is not correct in imputing detricenul structural consequences to them.
The safety of the structure is not adversely affected by the cracks.
Accordingly, this allegation has neither safety significance nor generic implications.
6.
Actions Required: fione.
l 8.
Attachments: f;one.
9.
Reference Documents:
1 l
1.
Concrete placement package 101-2812-001.
2.
fiCR C-650, 3.
ASLB Testimony Ar.s 7, E. and 9,1982.
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Civil and Structural No. 13 5-
- 10. This statement prepared by:
Robert E. Philleo Date Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date Approved by:
T.A. Ippolito Date e
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Draft i CF'3 10/22/84 Category No.14/AE-17 i
SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 14 2.
Allegation Number: AE-17 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that the field run conduit, the drywall, and the lighting installed in the area above the ceiling panels in the control room are classified as non-seismic and are supported only by wires and that, thus, these items may fall as a result of a seismic event.
4.
Assessment of Allegation: The Technical Review Team (TRT) electrical group reviewed the electrical aspects of this allegation (Electrical and Instrumentation Category No. 4).
The Civil and Mechanical group of the TRT evaluated the seismic aspects of this allegation.
General Design Criteria No.19 requires that safe occupancy of the control room during abnormal conditions be provided for in its design.
The Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) control room is in a i
seismic Category I structure, with certain seismic Category II and non-seismic components located in the ceiling.
Seismic Category I refers to those systems or components which must remain functieral in the event of an earthquake. Seismic Category 11 refers to those systens or
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components whosc continued functioning is not required, but whose failure could redt:ce the functioning of any Seismic Category I system or component (as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29) to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the control Seismic Category 11 systems or coriponents are, therefore, designed room.
and constructed so that a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) will not cause such failure or injury.
In assessing this allegation, the NRC TRT reviewed the CPSES nonsafety-related conduit, lighting fixtures and the suspended ceilings installed in the control room.
Three types of suspended ceiling exist in the control room:
drywall, louvere,d, and acoustical. The following list designates those ceiling elements present in the control room and their seismic category designation:
1.
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
- Seismic Category I f
i 2.
Safety-related Conduits
- Seismic Category I 3.
Nonsafety-related Conduits
- Seismic Category II 4.
Lighting Fixtures
- Seismic Category II 5.
Sloping Suspended Drywall Ceiling
- Nonseismic 6.
Acoustical Suspended Ceiling
- Nonseismic 7.
Louvered Suspended Ceiling
- Nonseismic
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a 5.
The TRT also examined the control room ceiling system, pertinent design drawings, and met with cognizant Texas Utilities Electric Company (TVEC) engineers on July 31, 1984, to discuss the specific seismic analyses performed for the ceiling elements.
In addition, the TRT held a conference call on August 1, 1984, with principal Gibbs & Hill (G&H) design engineers (at which TUEC representatives were present) to discuss the design and calculation procedures for the ceiling elements.
The TRT determined that none of the suspended ceiling elements were considered to be either seismic Category I or 11; however, TUEC had modified the sloping suspended drywall to add more support.
G&H could not provide back-up calculations to support this modification, nor could TUEC provide justification for their position that the remaining suspended ceiling elements (i.e., the louvered and acoustic elements) would not fall and cause an incapacitating injury to operating personnel.
The TRT requested new back-up calculations for the sloping suspended drywall.
TUEC provided the new calculations on August 3, 1984 along with the calculation packages for the lighting fixtures, the nonsafety-related conduits larger than 2 inches in diameter, and the stfety-related conduit.
The TRT reviewed these calculations, except those for the safety-related conduit since they were designated as seismic Category I and therefore excluded from the scope of this review.
t The TRT found that nonsafety-related conduits that are less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter are not supported by redundant seismic Category II cable restraints.
The TRT also verified the adequacy of calculations for the nonsafety-related conduits larger than 2 inches in diameter.
-4 The TRT found that the G&H calculations were based on the equival static load method, which involves multiplication of the dead weight o an item by an appropriate seismic acceleration coefficient.
i This equivalent static load calculation did not take into account the influence from the adjoining suspended ceilings on the calculated response.
This is significant because redundant cable supports are not provided for the suspended louvered and acoustical ceilings, and the impact from the accelerations of the lighting fixtures was not conside in any analysis.
The ceiling, as a whole, manifests a more ccmplex configuration than that assumed in the equivalent static load analysis i that the effects from adjoining suspended ceilings were not conside ed r
A justification based on the seismic response characteristics of the entire ceiling, which would account for the, frequency content and
-p amplification characteristics of the seismic motions, as represented c
I' floor response spectra, is required to justify the value of the seismic '
acceleration coefficient used.
T 5.
Conclusions and Staff Positic.r : Tr.e TRT found that not all items in the Control room ceiling fall urcc.
.he seismic Category I or II designation.
Specifically, these items are the suspended drywall, acoustical and
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louvered ceilings.
These components designated as nonseismic do not satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 since they were not designed to accommodate seismic effects.
Nonsafety-related conduits 2
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inches in diameter and less were also not desicned to acco
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effects. TUEC presented no evidence which showed that the effect of failure of these items had been considered.
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The TRT also concludes that calculations supporting the seismic Category 11 lighting fixtures do not adequately reflect the rotational interaction with the non-seismic items.
In addition, the fundamental frequencies of the supported masses were not calculated to determine the influence of the seismic response spectrum at the control room ceiling elevation.
6.
Actions Required:
TUEC shall provide the NRC with the following information:
(1)
The results of seismic analysis which demonstrate that the nonseismic items in the control room (other than the sloping suspended drywall ceiling) satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.78.2.8.
(2)
An evaluation of seismic design adequacy of support systems for the lichting fixtures (seismic Category II) and the suspended drywall ccil:t; (nonseismic item with modification) which accounts for pert' tr.t floor response characteristics of the systems.
(3)
Verification that those items in the control room ceiling not r
installed in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29 sa.tisfy applicable design requirements.
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prcblers are not applicable to other Catecc.ry 11 and nonseismic M
structures, systems and corg nents elsewhere in tFe plant.
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TUEC shall receive E approval of the results of these a,ialyses, of any C
structural radifications resulting from these analyses, cnd of completicn
-2 of such mdifications prior to fuel loading.
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8.
Attachments:
None 9.
Reference Documents:
1.
Calculation No. SCS-171C, Set No. 2, " Seismic Restraint of Lighting Fixtures," pages 1-37, dated January 14, 1981.
2.
Design Change Authorization No. 10757, dated August 10, 1981.
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
4.
Texas Utilities Services, Inc. (TUSI) letter CPPA-11, 410, dated July 22, 1981.
5.
Gibbs & Hill letter GTT '965, dated August 7, 1981.
6.
TUSI memorandum CPPA-40, 224, dated August 3, 1984.
- 10. This statement prepared by:
J. I. Tapia Date Reviewed by:
Group Leader Date Approved by:
Project Director Date
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5 SEER WR]TEUP DDCUMENT CONTROE/h0T E SHEET l
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Allegation Numbers
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g,g Draft Number Dra f t 1
2 3
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2 3
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Draft 6 - 10/21/84 s
SSER AC-44 Allegation 17/CP3 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 17 2.
Allegation number: AQC-45 3.
Characterization: It is alleged that personnel produced incorrect readings on concrete batch plant scales by leaning on the wires connecting the weighing hoppers to the scales.
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
The allegation refers to "some type of sampling machine that tells.whether there are good samples or bad samples in the concrete." The information is attributed to a friend of the alleger's who was an equipment operator at the concrete batch plant.
In NRC Inspection Reports 50-445/83-01 and 50/446/83-03, the allegation is clarified when the equipment operator is reported to have " charged that some personnel biased the operation of the concrete batch plant scales by leaning on the wires connecting the scales to the sensors."
The concrete plant during the major construction phase of the project consisted of two identical batching systems, one feeding a mixer drum and one batching directly into ready-mix trucks. Although the system with the self-contained mixer was removed prior to the NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) review, the other system was still in use at the tine of the l
Civil / Structural fio. 17
=.
2 TRT review.
A batching system includes three mechanical lever dial scales, each controlled by a wire connected to the weighing hopper with which it is associated. Each wire enters the scale room over a pulley at the top of the room and runs downward vertically about six feet to the loading lever of the scale. The scale dials face the control room, from which they are visible through a large window.
An electronic sensor connected to the scale provides a digital readout of each scale reading in the control room.
It is possible to decrease the scale reading by entering the scale room and horizontally deflecting the vertical wires.
The TRT interviewed the concrete plant maintenance man who was present during most of the construction and who, at the time of the review, was also serving part' time as operator because of the small amount of concrete production. He stated that the scale room was enclosed, well illuminated, and provided with a large window so that all parts of the enclosure were visible,from the control room, making it easier to prevent surreptitious tampering with the scale mechanisms. Thus, it would be obvious to everyone in the control room and to many outside the control t
room if anyone opened the scale room door, entered, and deflected the wires.
The maintenance man was not aware that such an incident had ever occurred.
+ - - -
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Civil / Structural No. 17 s Since it was not possible to rule out such tampering completely, the TRT investigated the potential consequences of such tampering.
During a concrete placement a member of the TRT entered the scale room when all hoppers were loaded and deflected each scale wire as far as could be conveniently done by one person. The scale readings were affected as follows:
Normal Deflected Reading Reading Aggregate scale 14,500 lbs 14,400 lbs Cemeat scale 3,150 3,050 Water scale 1,040 990 The manner in which the scales are constructed makes possible only a decrease in readings, not an increase, if the scales are tampered with as alleged. This arrangement rules out the most common allegation of fraud in concrete batch plants:
inflation of the cement batch weight. If the cement scales were tampered with, it would be necessary to add extra cement to satisfy the stipulated batch weight. Moreover, the possible change in aggregate weight is within permitted tolerances and may be ignored. The only ingredient of concern is water.
Tampering with the water scale could cause an extra 5% to be batched, which would increase l
l
1 Civil / Structural f c.17 '
the water-cement ratio from 0.50 to 0.525.
However, water is the one ingredient in concrete whose abuse in batching is most easily detected in fresh concrete.
A 5% increase of water would increase the slump by nearly two inches.
The good control of slump, as verified. by test data in the many concrete placement packages reviewed by the TRT, strongly indicates that there was no tampering with the water scale, the only scale vulnerable to the type of tampering alleged which would adversely affect safety.
Thus, the evidence suggests either that tampering did not occur or that it was confir.ed to scales where ttmpering would have either no effect or a beneficial effect on the concrete.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: The TRT interviewed relevant personnel, observed the layout of the scale room, conducted a demonstration of the tampering alleged, reviewed test data on freshly placed concrete, and examined two NRC inspection reports in evaluating this allegation.
Based on its findings, the TRT concludes that the allegation cannot be verified.
Accordingly, this allegation has neither safety significance nor generic implications.
6.
Actions Reauired:
None.
8.
Attachrents: None.
Civil / Structural No. 17 9.
Reference Documents:
1.
IE Reports 50-445/83-03 and 50-446/83-01.
- 10. This statement prepared by:
Robert Philleo Date i
Reviewed by:
Group Leader Date Approved by:
Project Director Date l
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Draft 8 - 10/21/84 SSER Allegation 1/CP3 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 1 2.
Allegation Numbers: AC-16, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC-27, and AC-47 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that the following violations of specifications occurred at various times:
a.
Rejected aggregate was incorporated in the basemat of the Unit I reactor (AC-16).
b.
Truck drivers added unauthorized quantities of water to concrete used in the basemat (AC-19).
c.
Rejected concrete was placed in the turbine generator building (AC-20).
d.
Concrete with excessive slump was placed in containment walls (AC-21) e.
Some concrete was placed in the Circulating Water Intake Structure after the concrete was rejected for being over specification limit on time to discharge (AC-47).
AC-27 contained no new allegations; it merely reiterated those already mde.
1
' 4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) cannot determine whether or not the allegation that " rejected" aggregate was used is valid (AC-16). The only item appearing in the record is Deficiency and Disposition Report C-446 (December 9, 1976), which states that an untested pile of aggregate, rather than an unacceptable pile, was used.
Its acceptability is unknown.
In addition, the allegcr states that the equipment operator scraped aggregate off the floor of the storage area and dumped in on the conveyer belt so that it bypassed testing.
The significance of this alleged infraction is best judged by its effect on.the properties of fresh and hardened concrete. The purpose of controlling aggregate grading is to maintain concrete of unifonn workability and strength.
A TRT examination of the concrete basemat placement record packages revealed that workability and strength were satisfactory throughout the placement.
Less than 3 percent of the concrete was rejected for improper slump, and all concrete tested met the specifications for compressive strength.
If any aggregate did not comply i
with specified grading, the deficiency did not materially affect the concrete properties.
Construction Procedure CCP 10, para. 4.10.5.6, requires the signature of a representative from both the contractor and testing laboratory when water is added to the concrete after it leaves the plant (AC-19). The
, batch weights are such that it is possible to add some water to the batch in the ready-mix truck without exceeding the maximum permitted
4.
4 water-cement ratio.
The amount of the addition pennitted is printed on the batch ticket.
However, before the addition is made, the written pennission of the testing laboratory is required.
The TRT examined all 268 batch tickets and discovered in Concrete Placement Package 101-2781-001, 7-17-75, that seven batches had water added. For these tickets, the only signature filled in belonged to the contractor
. representative; none was for the test laboratory respresentative.
In each case, the volume of water added was within the range permitted.
Although the contractor erred in not getting test laboratory approval, the additions should have had no adverse effect on the concrete. A TRT examination of test results indicated that all were within specification guidelines:
slump values ranged from 1 inch to 2-3/4 inches; air content was from 2.0 percent to 3.2 percent; and 28-day compressive strengths ranged from 5340 psi to 6671 psi.
In addition, the TRT examined parts of the basemat which were still accessible. While only a small portion could be examined, the portion examined was in excellent condition.
The alleger did not indicate where in the turbine building the infraction occurred (AC-20).
The building contains over 700 small concrete placements, and all are well documented.
The TRT examined a random selection of 65 concrete placement packages and found no irregularities.
l However, the turbine generator building is a non-safety-related structu re'.
The final Safety Analysis Report, Sec. 3.2, " Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems," indicates that the turbine-generator building is not a seismic Category I, structure.
Its structural failure would not affect safety during a safe shutdown l
earthquake; therefore, the activity alleged to have occurred would not I
affect the safety of the plant.
i
. Apparently the alleger was unaware of the details of the slump requirement in the specifications (AC-21). Gibbs & Hill (G&H)
Specification 2323-55-9, Revision 4, Section 5.2, states:
A tolerance of up to 1 inch above the indicated maximum shall be allowed for individual batches provided the average of all batches tested or the most recent 10 batches tested, whichever is fewer, does not exceed the maximum limit, i.e., 4 inches. Whenever the measured slump exceeds the indicated maximum by more than 1/4 inch, successive batches or truck loads as deposited shall be measured until the slump is within the maximum limit.
The alleger claimed that a batch with a slump of 4-1/4 inches was placed.
However, such placement is pennitted as long as the average of 10 batches does not exceed 4 inches and individual batches do not exceed 5 inches.
No violation of this slump requirement was documented.
l The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) reviewed 51 (33%) concrete packages out of the 140 concrete packages for the Circulating Water Intake l
Structure (AC-47). Of the 51 reviewed,13 batches of concrete were j
rejected, 9 for test failure (air, slump, temperature), and 4 for being l
over the specification limit on time to discharge.
It was noted on the batch ticket of each rejected batch of concrete where the concrete was dumped. None was placed in the circulating water intake; it was placed in temporary slabs which the contractor was placing at the time.
i L
i
. 5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: Eased on a review of pertinent 4
documentation, test results, and a random sampling of 65 concrete placement packages, the TRT concludes that if non-conforming aggregate l
was used in the basemat of the Unit I reactor, it did not adversely i
i affect its concrete properties.
The TRT also fcur.d that any water which 4
i l
was added to the concrete was within the stipulated limits, thus ensuring that there was no adverse effect on its properties.
In their examination of the random samples of concrete placements in the turbine building, i
i which is a non-safety-related structure, the TRT found no evidence of i
j irregularities.
Batch placements were within tolerances specified by 1
G&H, and the TRT found no documentation that these slump requirements had l
i been violated. Since the batch tickets state that none of the rejected l
l l
concrete batches was placed in the circulating water intake and that the Circulating Water Intake Structure is classified as nonsafety-related, in l
l accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Volume IV, Section 3.2), the TRT concludes that the allegation is without i
foundation.
r Accordingly, the TRT concludes that these allegations have neither safety j
significance nor generic implications.
l 6.
Actions Recuired:
None.
N l
s.
6
't 8.
Attachments: None.
9.
Reference Documents:
1.
Brown & Root Deficiency and Disposition Report C-446, 12/9/76.
2.
Basemat Placement Package 101-2781-001, 7-16-75 3.
Basemat Placement P:
age 101-2805-001, 2-21-76 4.
Construction Procedure CCP 10, para 4.10.5.6 5.
Gibbs and Hill Specification 2323-SS-9, Revision 4, Section 5.2.
6.
Circulating Water Intake Structure Placement Packages.
d
- 10. This statement prepared by:
Robert E. Philleo Date Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date Approved by:
T. A. Ippolito Date
+ - -,, -
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c' SSER AC-26 /CP3 Draft 6 10/21/84 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 5 2.
Allegation numbers: AC-26, AC-31, AC-36, and AC-43 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that the following irregularities occurred in connection with concrete construction:
(a)
Equipment was set on grout before the grout properly gained strength through aging (AC-26),
(b) Hanger inserts were installed at improper angles (AC-31), and (c) Trash in the bottom of a form was covered with concrete (AC-36).
AC-43 did not include any new allegations; it merely reiterated those made in AC-26, 31, and 36.
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
Allegation AC-26 concerned grouting of steel plates which were baseplates for frames to support parts of the internal assembly in Unit No. 2 when they are removed from the reactor pressure vessel.
The implied safety significance of this allegation is that, if the grout were damaged by the steel plate being, loaded prematurely, the damage would occur immediately, while the grout was weak.
If the grout survived the loading operation without damage, it would probably not suffer damage in use since it gains strength rapidly while it is fresh and at a decreasing rate as it ages.
. All elements of the internal assembly were located at the 860-ft.
elevation.
The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) inspected all the grouted plates at the 860 and 862-foot elevations and found no evidence of grout failure. While the allegation may be true, all the grout survived the initial loading without damage.
It was alleged in AC-31 that Richmond Insert anchor bolt inserts were installed between the 860 and 905-foot elevations in Unit I at angles not perpendicular to the concrete surface and that this condition was compensated for by use of tapered washers.
The allegation referred to discrepancies as great as ten degrees. The allegation was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/83-27, which was reviewed by the TRT.
Brown & Root Procedure CP-CPM 9.10. " Fabrication of ASME-Related Component Supports" states in Section 3.3.2:
Surfaces of bolted parts in contact with the bolt or nut shall have a slope of no more than 1:20 with respect to a plane normal to the bolt axis. Where the surface of a high strength bolted part has a slope of more than 1:20, a beveled washer shall be used to compensate for the lack of parallelism.
. Thus, inserts may depart 3* from perpendicularity without any com-pensation and may depart further if beveled washers are used. The procedure mentions no upper limit on lack of perpendicularity, but that is controlled by the fact that the predrilled holes in the tubular steel hanger supports may not, in the case of safety-related supports, be enlarged without prior approval. The TRT inspected 150 anchors between the 860 and 905-foot elevations. The inspection consisted of a visual check of perpendicularity of the "as-installed" anchors, the appropriateness of non-perpendicular inserts without compensation via use of beveled washers, the maximum extent of insert deviation from perpendicularity and evidence of hole enlargements.
The TRT found no violation of the installation procedure. The allegation was correct in its assertion that some anchor inserts were not perpendicular to the concrete surface, but that in itself did not constitute a violation of the procedures.
Allegation AC-36 was concerned with trash from a Christmas party on December 2, 3 or 4, 1978 that was thrown in the form and covered with concrete as it was being placed on one of the two containment structures. The alleged incident is extensively discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/79-20, which was reviewed by the TRT.
Interviews with alleged participants recorded in that report cast considerable doubt as to whether the party actually occurred. The TRT
~..
o obtained a printout of all concrete placements on the containment structures and determined that the only placement which occurred during the period in question was on the dome of Unit 1 on December 3, 1978. The TRT examined concrete placement package 101-8805-002, that contains a complete narrative of the placing operation by the placing inspector.
Nothing unusual is noted. Both formwork and cleanliness are checked as satisfactory on the checkout card. Moreover, the placement took place over 200 feet above the ground on a restricted sloping surface -- an unlikely location for a Christmas party.
If anything unusual did take place, such as dumping of trash, it had no
~
adverse impact on the dome concrete.
The dome was proven adequate both in strength and structural capacity as indicated by the Unit I structural integrity test discussed in Civil and Structural Category No. 3.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions:
The TRT concludes that these allegations have no safety impact and should be closed for the following reasons:
(a) All the grout in question survived the initial load application without failure.
(b) No infraction of installation procedures for anchor inserts was found.
i (c)
It is extremely unlikely that a Christmas party was held 1
at the top of a containment structure 200 feet above the j
i ground in the winter, and even if true, the containment l
structure concrete, including the dome, was proven adequate and acceptable in the in-situ structural j
integrity test.
Accordingly, these allegations have neither safety significance nor generic implications.
6.
Actions Required:
fione.
i 8.
Attachments:
flone.
9.
Reference Documents:
1.
t;RC Inspection Report 83-27.
2.
liRC Inspection Report 79-20.
3.
Bro.<n & Root Procedure CP-CPM 9.10 Section 3.3.2.
10.
This staterrent prepared by:
P.cbert E. Phillao Cate
e t
Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date Approved by:
T. A. Ippolito Date O
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5 j
SEER WRITEUP DOCUMEfiT CONTROL / ROUTE SHEET M
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TRT Group,_Civg / $ Tao _cmh Author:
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BI SEER WRITEUP DOCUMENT CONTROL / ROUTE SHEET Allegation Numbers AC-22 i AC-2 3 (CATE W
- Subject of Allegation "% com e wot:te* n.ac> ~.toppv" PLA06 oF CD4cfETEE TRT Group C_ ROIL Author:
~_TcMe K DeVe12.s This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
It stays with all revisions to the SSER writeup and serves as a routing a'nd review record.
It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draft Number Dra f t 1
2 3
4
- 5.,,
Author M 1/30/84 s/s Q
C Group Leader dQihh W
7 Tech. Editor V~
(#.T g/.10 Wessman/Vietti it w f/m J. Gagliardo T. Ippolito Revision Number Final 1
2 3
4 5
Author Tech. Editor Group Leader J. Gagliardo T. Ippolito Administrative Writeup integrated into SSER Potential Violations to Region IV Workpackage File Complete Workpackage' Returned to Group Leader e
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DCP3 SSER Concrete Placements Cat. 2 DRAFT 9 10/22/84 SSER 1.
Allegation Group:
Civil and Structural No. 2 2.
Allegation Number:
AC-22, AC-23, and AC-50 3.
Characterization:
a.
It is alleged that " bad concrete work" and " sloppy" placement of concrete occurred at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),(AC-22,AC-23).
b.
A second allegation specifically cites placement of " soupy" concrete in a slab in the Auxiliary Building in the summer of 1976 (A'C-50).
4.
Assessment of Safety Significar e,:
In testimony at an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing, the first alleger did not identify a particular structure or concrete placement that had " bad concrete work" or that exhibited " sloppy" placement of concrete. However, on July 28, 1982, ASLB Board Judge Miller stated that the balance of the testimony of the alleger would stand as admissible (Ref. ASLB Testinony dated July 28, 1982, page 2924). Given this lack of specificity, and to adequately encompass. the concerns raised in this allegation, the Technical Review Team (TRT) reviewed random samples of concrete placement records packages from three safety-related buildings to determine if the allegations were valid.
s
\\ A review of 14 packages from the Auxiliary Building and 3 packages each from the Unit 1 Safeguards Building, the Unit 1 Containment Building (exterior) and the Unit 2 Containment Building (exterior) revealed that the quality control (QC) inspector accepted the forms and reinforcing steel placement prior to each concrete placement. Of the placement packages reviewed,10 had 15 nonconformance reports (NCRs) related to concrete placement. One package had four NCRs, two other packages had two NCRs each, and the remaining seven each had one NCR.
Seven NCRs were resolved with the designation "use-as-is," seven with " repair," and one with " reject." The seven placements indicating " repair" were for concrete honeycombing and those indicating " reject" were for the removal of concrete from a small pad.
In addition to a records review, the TRT performed a walk-through inspec. tion of the safety-related buildings and concluded that all observable concrete surfaces showed no degradation in quality.
The TRT also interviewed two QC inspectors at Comanche Peak who were concrete placement inspectors on some of the concrete placements in the Auxiliary Buildir.g reviewed by the TRT. Both QC Inspectors stated that they were not cognizant of any " bad concrete work" and/or " sloppy"'
placement of concrete at CPSES. They stated that all personnel with construction and concrete placement responsibilities would meet prior to each placement to resolve any potential problems. They stated that for the concrete placements they were involved with, the work was done in accordance with project procedures and other pertinent requirements.
They also stated that placement crews cooperated with requests from QC personnel.
% To investigate the allegation of " soupy" concrete in an Auxiliary Building slab, the TRT examined the following three placement packages, which included all the slab concrete placed during the summer of 1976:
002-7785-001, 002-2790-003, and 002-2790-004. The TRT noted that before placing the first section, the contractor requested permission, which was granted, to place mortar rather than concrete in one area heavily congested with reinforcing bars. This might have been the soupy concrete cited by the alleger.
During placement of the three sections, five batches of concrete were rejected for excessive slump.
In four cases, two or three cubic yards had been placed by the time the slump test had been completed; however, 70 to 80 percent of each batch was discarded.
This type of occurrence is considered a normal procedure in concrete placement work and is judged to have no effect on safety.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: The TRT reviewed th2 non-specific allegations by reviewing a random sample of concrete placement record packages, by interviewing two former concrete placement inspectors, and f
l by conducting a walkdown inspection of finished concrete work in three 1
i safety-related structures.
This level of evaluation was deemed necessary I
to adequately encompass the potential scope of the allegations, which l
were not specific about where at Comanche Peak the " bad" and sloppy" concrete work had been perforned.
In its records review, the TRT found i
l some discrepancies in concrete placements that were identified and resolved by established QC procedures; for those cases the allegations l
have merit. However, the discrepancies found are not uncommon in concrete work; the TRT walkdown showed that the discrepancies were t
j
. l 4
resolved and that the concrete shows no degradation.
The TRT l
investigated the specific allegation concerning " soupy concrete" by l
reviewing all the relevant concrete placement packages and found the allegation to be unfounded.
The alleger may have been unaware that f
mortar had been authorized in lieu of concrete for a small portion of the I
structure.
Accordingly, these allegations have neither safety significance nor generic implications.
6.
Actions Required: fione.
8.
Attachments:
fione.
I l
l 1
l 1
5 0
. 9.
Reference Documents:
1.
Concrete Placement Packages A.
Auxiliary Building 8.
Unit 1 Safeguard Building (1) 002-2785-001 (1) 105-7852-005 (2) 002-2190-003 (2) 105-4790-002 (3) 002-2'/90-004 (3) 105-9790-002 (4) 002-5790-001 (5) 002-5790-003 & -015 (6) 002-5790-002 C.
Unit 1 Containment (Ext)
(7) 002-7852-003 (1) 101-5805-002 (8) 002-7852-001, -002 & -006 (2) 101-5805-008 (9) 002-7852-004, -005 & -010 (3) 101-5805-014 (10) 002-7852-007 (11) 002-4852-001 D.
Unit 2 Containment (Ext)
(12) 002-5852-001, -002 & -024 (1) 201-5805-002 (13) 002-7873-003, & 002-8873-001 (2) 201-5805-008 (14) 002-5883-001, -002, -003, &004 (3) 201-5805-014 2.
Procedures (1) CP-QP-11.0 Civil Inspection Activities.
(2) CP-QP-11.1 Concrete, Soils, and Reinforcing Steel Testing Activities.
(3) CP-QP-18.0 Inspection Activities.
s' I 3.
Deficiency and Disposition Reports */Nor.conformance Reports DDR No.
NCR No.
(1) 310 (9)1000 (2) 311 (10) 1001 (3) 340 (11) 1034 (4) 342 (12) 1170 (5) 450 (13)84-00327 (6)499 (14)82-00125 (7) 454 (15) 1294 (8) 519 4.
ASLB Testimony, July 28, 1982, page 2924.
DDR was a forerunner to the NCR
- 10. This statement prepared by:
John K. Devers Date Reviewed by:
Larry Shao Date I
l l
Approved by:
T. A. Ippolito Date
/
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4 d l Y [' - M SEER WRITEUP OCUMEtiT C0fnROL/ ROUTE SHEET c,,:,Vskhu,l} 4 f
'd 559 Allegation ?! umbers A sc - 3 0
'L Subject of Allegation o4ce4Tsouco F4 PA. R-cc coJcasTE-TRT Group cav L / M E c H A d < 4 t-Author:
J. f. TA P t A This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
It stays with all revisions to the SSER writeup and sarves as a routing and review record.
It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draf t liumber Draft 1
2 3
4 5
Author
. ru Group Leader H o/-7/rM.64c
- *d "YC e Tech. Editor
[d ni'g'//7 WalFee'/4.h)
W'E0 10/L" Wessman/Vietti
'W
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J. Gaaliardo
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Ippolito K
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Revision fiumber Final 1
2 3
4 5
Author Tech. Editor Group Leader J. Gaoliardo T. Ippolito Administrative Writeup integrated into SSER Potential Violations to Region IV Workpackage File Complete Workpackage Returned to Group Leader 0
44
.~
i-Draft 6 - 10/22/84 AOC-10 Category 7 - CPI SSER 1.
Allegation Group:
Civil and Structural No. 7 2.
Allegatier. Number:
AQC-10 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that the removal of a hilti-bolt from the floor at the 852-foot level of the Safeguards Building resulted in a cone-shaped section of concrete being removed which was later repaired in an " uncontrolled manner."
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
In assessing this allegation, the Technical Review Team (TRT) examined NRC Investigation Report 81-12
( April 16,1982), which described the observations of an NRC investigator and the senior resident inspector of the area in question.
They concluded that the floor was repaired with a surface patch rather than being repaired all the way through.
The TRT concurs with these findings based on its observations of the floor area in question. Nevertheless, the TRT performed an independent evaluation of the safety significance of a 14-inch diameter hole extending through the floor slab adjacent to pipe support No.
CC-1-137-700-E63R, as alleged.
However, this hole is located in the Electrical and Control Building and not in the Safeguards Building, as alleged, and as reported in NRC Investigation Report 81-12.
..-.n..
i
\\ Civil and Structural No. 7 For the worst-case analysis, the TRT assumed that two reinforcing steel bars (rebars) were cut in the process of removing the hilti-bolt. To account for the unknown quality of the material used in the repair, the TRT computed the ultimate moment capacity of the floor slab with and without a 14-inch section of slab removed. These estimated strength capacities were compared to the strength requirements necessary to resist the actual moments resulting from the slab design loads.
The adequacy of shear capacity was also verified in a similar manner.
From these analyses, it is evident to the TRT that the capacity of the slab in question to resist actual design loads has not been impaired, even though the most conservative engineering assumptions concerning cut rebar and a 14-inch hole were made.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Position:
Based on observations made by the TRT, the floor slab does not show any sign of degraded capacity or of poor repair practices.
The slab appears continuous and composed of good material s.
An independent TRT analysis of the slab capacity, based on conservative engineering assumptions, confirmed that the structural integrity of the slab would be maintained under its design loads.
Accordingly, this allegation has neither safety significance nor generic implications.
6.
Actions Required:
None.
( Potential Violations:
None]
lu
}-
4 Civil and Structural No. 7.
i 8.
Attachments: None.
9.
Reference Documents:
1.
Brown & Root Drawing No. BRHL-CC-1-EC-020.
2.
Brown & Root Drawing No. CC-1-137-700-E63R.
3.
Gibbs & Hill Calculation No. SAB-103C.
4.
NRC Investigation Report No. 81-12, April 16,1982.
- 10. This statement prepared by:
J. I. Tapia Date Reviewed by:
Group Leader Date Approved by:
Project Director Date i
w.9 - c.e -
b SSER WRITEUP DOCUMENT C0tiTROL/R0'JTE SHEET Allegation Numbers 4GC-l A Q C-7.
AQ c-3 Agt.g Subject of Allegation cate u ~ as a po_1s,c u t. w,p p,g,3 4
~ '
TRT Group c.:w:l/ % W.ei Author: 'Te <.y Lo nA k; This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
It stays with all revisions to the SSER writeup and serves as a routing and review record.
It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draft Number N
Draft 1
2 3
24 5
id M-M t DL S 41 XCnptobt 8-11 3( M i ' QC Sh t-ofd t/w T3 L io/s, 3p r it.,
Author Group Leader peg Su FAT /n. '
.e 'f/u o44; Tech. Editor lu G 7/92 LJFc /0//7 Wessman/Vietti ALV S /4-J. Gaoliardo T. Ipoolito Revision Number Final 1
2 3
4 5
Author Tech. Editor Grouo Leader J. Gaoliardo T. Icoolito Administrative Writeup integrated into SSER Potential Violations to Region IV Workpackage File Complete Workpackage Returned to Group Leader RO '.3
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6Z36
O DCP2 sser aqc-1, aqc-2, aqc-3, aqc-7 DRAFT 5 - 10/22/84 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 8 2.
Allegation Number: AQC-1, AQC-2, AQC-3, AQC-7, AQC-46, and AQC-51 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that the following records were falsified at various times:
a.
Concrete air entrainment records (AQC-1).
b.
Concrete laboratory test records (AQC-2).
This allegation consisted of four separate parts:
(1) that slump records were falsified, (2) that lab tests (air, slump and temperature) for i
concrete placements of 10 cubic yards or less prior to 1978 wera l
not perfonned, (3) that lab tests were signed by a Level II inspector not present at the time the tests were performed, and (4) that the alleger signed a pressure gauge qualification test l
that he was not qualified to certify.
c.
Aggregate tests (January 1976). The alleger maintains that he and his foreman falsified these tests. (AQC-3) d.
Compression strength tests, at the direction of the general foreman and laboratory manager.
(AQC-7) l 1
t e.
Midpour tests during the placement of the Unit 1 Containment Building basemat on February 21, 1976.
(AQC-46) f.
Cadweld tensile test records were reported by an inspector without the tests actually being performed during the spring and summer of 1976.
(AQC-51) 4.
Assesement of Safety Significance:
a.
In assessing this allegation (AQC-1), the TRT reviewed documents contained in Brown & Root (B&R) Deficiency and Disposition Report (DDR) No C-488 R1 and R. W. Hunt Company QA Report HCP 21697 on concrete acceptance test results. The records show that on January 20,1977, a 3.9 percent air content value was recorded in the concrete acceptance test report (HCP 21697) as 4.3 percent by a Level I inspector. The incident was reported to R.W. Hunt management by a co-worker.
R. W. Hunt then issued a DDR identifying the placement of out-of-specification concrete and corrected the air entrainment value in the acceptance test report. The Level I inspector was subsequently fired for his action.
To assess the possible safety significance of the falsif' cation, l
the TRT examined the compressive strength test results for the cencrete placement in question (105-7785-001) and found that l
. the results ranged from 4905 psi through 5414 psi, and were well above the design specification strength of 4000 psi.
The out-of-specification air content had little effect, if any, on the strength of the concrete placed b.
(1)
The TRT cannot determine if slump test results are or are not falsified based on an examination of test records (AQC-2). To assess whether the records, if falsified, could have adversely affected the strength of the concrete, the TRT reviewed the results of compression tests performed on the concrete placed between April 11 and 13, 1978.
(These dates correspond to the dates of the alleged falsification.) The TRT found the compressive strength to be consistent with that of concrete placed before and after the dates and within the specification.
i (2)
The allegation that laboratory tests (air, slump, and temperature) were not performed on placements of concrete 10 cubic yards or smaller was investigated by the NRC Region IV staff (IE Inspection Report 78-07). This i
allegation was made in April 1978. The NRC Region IV l
staff reviewed log books that were the personal property of a number of laboratory personnel, but could not
. substantiate the allegation even though the alleger stated that such a review would be revealing. The TRT reviewed all the concrete pour packages for the Pipe Tunnel, the Condensate Storage Tank and the Service Water Intake Structure, which are classified as safety related, to determine if any of the concrete placements were 10 cubic yards or less.
The TRT identified eight concrete placements (111-1794-003, 111-1797-009, 111-1797-010, 111-1802-001, 111-9810-001, 035-9796-001, 035-9796-002, and 035-9796-003) that were placed prior to 1978 and consisted of 10 cubic yards or less. The dates of these placements were between August 1976 and February 1977.
The eight concrete pour packages contained records showing field and lab tests results, but there was no way of determining whether the field tests were actually performed. However, for each of the above placements, concrete cylinders were also made and tested; the results demonstrated adequate strength.
Identifying placements of 10 cubic yards or less in the Containment Structure, Fuel Handling Putiding, Auxiliary Building and the Safeguards Building was achieved by identifying nonconformances concerning concrete repair work (voids, honeyconb etc.)
because the placements made in these areas prior to 1978
. would be 50 cubic yards or larger. The TRT identified four concrete placements which needed concrete repair, but were repaired by means of " dry-pack" or " grout." The TRT interviewed four former R. W. Hunt employees who were involved in concrete testing activities at Comanche Peak during the time period in question. These four employees are currently employed on site with another employer, with three currently working in the concrete testing lab. All four stated that they did not participate in or observe any falsification and/or failure to perform required concrete tests.
(3)
The allegation that a Level II inspector signed reports for tests performed on September 3 and 4, 1977 that he could have had no knowledge of was also reviewed by NRC Region IV personnel (IE Inspection Report 78-07).
The alleger stated he had obtained this information from another individual who thought the falsification occurred in December 1977.
The Region IV inspectors reviewed the daily payroll records of all laboratory personnel for the first 10 days of September and all of December 1977.
The 1
Level II inspector was present every day in September, but was absent December 4, 5, 11 and 18 through 31.
Region IV
~ _ _ _ - -
. staff could find no reports validated by the Level II inspector for the days alleged. The TRT reviewed the Region IV inspection report and concurs with the approach taken and concludes that it accurately reports the results of the investigation.
(4)
The allegation that the alleger signed a pressure certification test that he was not qualified to certify (on August 15,1977) was investigated by NRC Region IV personnel (IE Inspection Report 78-07). Through an interview with Brown & Root calibration facility personnel, the NRC Region IV investigator learned that the pressure gauge was calibrated by Brown & Root personnel in accordance with their procedures.
The calibration record was an R. W. Hunt fonn signed by the alleger who observed the test in accordance with the R. W.
Hunt procedure.
Prior to the Region IV investigation, B&R issued a DDR (February 17,1978) that described this situation as a pre-existing and continuing problem in general and proposed corrective action. The NRC Region IV staff concluded that while the allegation was substantiated, there were no safety consequences. The TRT reviewed the Region IV inspection report and concurs with the approach taken and concludes that it accurately reports the results of the investigation.
O
. c.
The allegation (AQC-3) was first evaluated by the NRC Region IV staff (IE Inspection Report 79-09).
The alleger stated that the falsification by him and his " foreman" occurred during the first 3 or 4 weeks of his employment, beginning January 19, 1976. The NRC Region IV staff reviewed the prequalification tests performed by Texas Industries, the aggregate supplier, on the material r.upplied to the site between January and May 1976 and also examined the results of in-process concrete testing. The results complied with the specification requirements.
It was also determined by the NRC Region IV staff through discussions with a TUEC representative that the " foreman" was not, in fact, in any management position, but rather a Level II inspector in charge of the work.
The NRC Region IV staff concluded that any falsification of test results on the part of the alleger would not have had a significant adverse impact on the quality of the concrete. The testing performed by Texas Industries was for the purpose of material qualification, whereas the tests performed by R. W. Hunt Company were to monitor the material for any deviation from the specification and to assure concrete of uniform workability and strength. The tests performed to verify concrete workability and strength are the test for slump and the cylinder test for compressive strength.
. l In addition to reviewing the Region IV report, the TRT examined I
the results of slump and compressive strength tests for the i
period in which the falsification was alleged to have occurred.
The test results were within specified limits and were consistent with concrete produced before and after this period.
d.
The two individuals making the allegation (AQC-7) and 13 other individuals were questioned by Region IV personnel between April 5, 1979 and May 7, 1979, regarding.the allegation (IE Inspection Report 79-09).
One of the allegers denied the allegation, stating he was misquoted in the newspaper. The other stated that he did not falsify concrete records himself but knew of other inspectors who had. One of the other 13 individuals interviewed stated he thought that falsification occured but did not know when or by whom.
In addition, the NRC Region IV staff examined the test result statistics of the concrete produced prior to and during the period of the alleged falsification and did not find any apparent variation in the uniformity of the concrete.
The NRC Region IV staff concluded that because of the uniformity of the concrete produced, and the concurrent testing by other laboratory personnel, the allegation could not be substantiated.
The TRT staff reviewed slump and air entrainment test results of
t
.g.
concrete placed during the period the remaining alleger was employed (January 1976 to February 1977) and also did not find any apparent variation in the uniformity of the parameters for concrete placed during this period, e.
According to an article that appeared in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram (April 1979), three R. W. Hunt Company concrete inspectors alleged that during the placement of 6600 cubic yards of concrete for the Unit 1 Containment Building basemat on February 21, 1976, some~ concrete was not tested, but instead the results were written in as averages (AQC-46). The concrete specification in force at this time required that slump, air content, temperature and cylinders be taken every 100 cubic yards. The TRT reviewed concrete pour package (101-2805-001) for this placement and found 67 sets of test cylinders with the associated results of slump, air content, and temperature as per the specification. However, the TRT cannot detennine from a review of these records whether the field tests were actually l
perfonned. Since the results of compression tests performed on the concrete cylinders would be the final measure of its acceptability, the TRT reviewed these results and found them to be acceptable and within the specification.
l
. f.
The TRT reviewed the entire (440) Cadweld tensile test results for 1976 and identified 30 tests that were performed by the inspector in question (AQC-51).
Twenty-eight of these tests were perfonned on one single day (October 13,1976), while the other two tests were performed on two different days (July 21, 1976 and August 20,1976). The other 410 tests performed by other inspectors all met the tensile strength requirements.
The 30 Cadwelds tested were removed from the first layer of the exterior wall of the Unit 1 Containment Building at the 832-ft., 6-in.
elevation. The TRT reviewed tensile test results of other Cadwelds performed by the individuals who made the Cadwelds in question. The results were found to be satisfactory. The Cadweld rejection rate for the 21 Cadwelders in question ranged from zero percent to four percent, with one at six percent.
5.
Conclusions and Staff Position:
The allegation (AQC-1) that a concrete air entrainment record was falsified is true.
Even so, the compressive strength of the concrete in question was within specification.
. The allegation (AQC-2) that slump tests on April 11 and 13, 1978 were performed incorrectly and that the results were falsified could well be true and cannot be refuted.
The the TRT examined the compressive strength test results of the concrete in question and found that they were within specification and were not of safety significance.
The allegation (AQC-2) that laboratory tests for small placements were falsified was found to have no safety significance since in addition to the recorded laboratory tests, the validity of which was questioned, cylinder strength tests were also performed to demonstrate adequate strength.
In addition, in interviews with the TRT, former employees of the R. W. Hunt Co., who worked during the time period in the allegations, denied the validity of the allegation. Furthermore, the limited number of concrete placements of less than 10 cubic yards, even if improperly tested, would have little safety significance.
The allegation (AQC-2) that an inspector signed tests results for which he could have had no knowledge was found not to be valid because no reports could be found validated by the inspector for the days alleged.
1
+
.n____.,_._
, The allegation (AQC-2) that the alleger signed a pressure gauge test which he was not qualified to certify was found to have no safety significance since the alleger did not actually perform the calibration.
The TRT cannot refute the allegation (ACQ-3) that concrete aggregate tests were falsified.
Nevertheless, the concrete placed during the period cited in the allegation was consistent with that of concrete placed before and after this period.
The allegation (AQC-46) that midpour tests were falsified during the placement of the Unit 1 Containment Building basemat cannot be refuted. The results of compression tests indicate that the concrete placed was of high quality.
The allegation (AQC-51) that Cadweld tensile test results were falsified cannot be refuted.
If this falsification did indeed occur, the structural integrity of the exterior wall of the Unit 1 Containment Building has not been violated because (1) the tensile strength of other Cadweld test specimens performed by the 21 Cadwelders were found to be satisfactory, (2) the Cadweld rejection rate for each Cadwelder is at an acceptable level, (3) and the containment structure met all the criteria for displacement and
= - ~
j
? cracking control as well as structural rebound when subject to 115 percent of design pressure, as stated in CPDA-31, 792 " Final Report on Structural Integrity Test for Unit 1 Concrete Containment Structure."
/
Accordingly, all of the above allegations have neither safety significance nor generic implications.
The allegation (AQC-7) that compressive strength test results were falsified cannot be closed at this time.
The TRT agrees with the-Region IV staff that the uniformity of the concrete placed during this period minimizes the safety significance of this issue.
However, this conclusion is based on air content, slump and strength tests, all of which have been alleged to be falsified. The issues regarding air content and slump, as well as other allegations discussed above, were resolved on the basis of the concrete strength test results. Due to the importance of the concrete strength test results, the TRT concludes that additional action by TUEC is necessary to provide confirmatory evidence that the reported concrete strength test results are indeed representative of the strength of the concrete placed in the Category I structures.
1
--?-
--m
i l
. 6.
Actions Required:
With regard to item (d), TUEC shall determine areas where safety-related concrete was placed between January 1976 and February 1977, and provide a program to assure acceptable concrete strength.
The program shall include tests such as the use of random Schmidt hammer tests on the concrete in areas where safety is critical.
The program shall include a comparison of the results with the results of tests performed on concrete of the same design strength in areas where the strength of the concrete is not questioned to determine if any significant variance in strength occurs.
TUEC shall submit the program for performing these tests to the fiRC for review and approval prior to performing the tests.
TUEC shall receive t;RC approval of test results prior to low-power operations.
l 8.
Attachments:
None.
9.
References:
1.
Nrown&RootUDRC-488RI.
2.
Brcwn & Root QA Report HCP 21697.
3.
IE Inspection Report 78-07.
4.
Concrete testing data management records for Mix Design 133.
5.
IE Inspection Report 79-09.
. 6.
Concrete testing data management records for January 1976.
7.
IE Inspection Report 79-09, 8.
Concrete testing data management records for January 1976 to February 1977.
9.
Concrete pour package 101-2805-001.
10.
Concrete pour packages 111-1794-003, 111-1797-009, 111-1797-010, 111-1802-001, 111-9810-001, 035-9796-001, 035-9796-002, and 035-9796-003.
11.
440 Cadweld tensile test reports.
12.
Cadweld inspection reports for 1976.
13.
Cadwelders splice log b~ook.
14.
Gibbs & Hill Specification 2323-SS-11.
15.
Brown & Root as-built Cadweld drawing BR 10502 QA.
- 10. This statement prepared by:
Terry Langowski Date Reviewed by:
i Group Leader Date I
Approved by:
l Project Director Date i
=
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SEER WRITEUP DOCUMENT CONTROL / ROUTE SHEET
's Allegation Numbers AGC-4 Subject af Allegation vec. tL u4 s
- 4. < d... A ees
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JM 7 TRT Group C is_,il /t..d... :.s i Author: I Le -.s..., c k.
o This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
It stays with all revisions to the SSER writeup and serves as a routing and review record.
It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draft Number Draft 1
-m2 3
4 5
CAClolW TJL 8-G 41 V T'/L#-W'f LC i-l3J-84 Wl I416 C.HH l' th. *v j,,
Author
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\\g Draft 6 - 10/22/84 AQC-19 CP2A SSER 1.
Allegation Group:
Civil and Structural No. 9 2.
Allegation Number: AQC-9 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged by two fomer R. W. Hunt employees that after a March 1977 NRC investigation, recertification tests of R. W. Hunt inspectors were done "open book" with answers given.
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance: This allegation refers to recertification testing that was required because a Region IV inspection report (50-445/77-02) questioned the most recent certification of R. W.
Hunt Level I and II inspectors. The NRC Region IV staff found that R. W.
Hunt had negated the minimum 2-year experience requirement for qualification as a Level I concrete inspector, as required by the ASME Code to which they were comitted by the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). The R. W. Hunt Skills Training Certification manual states that " Experience requirements may be reduced if the individual can demonstrate capability in a given job through previous perfomance or satisfactory completion of an examination and orientation training."
Also, the Region IV staff found that the Certification of Qualifications l
issued to each Level I and II inspector did not include the activity they were qualified to perform and the basis used for certification, as was required.
Each candidate for certification was required to
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2 demonstrate proficiency in performing specific practical tests on one or more samples approved by the Level III examiner.
The Region IV staff.
found that R. W. Hunt had permitted a Level I inspector to perform concrete cylinder compression tests and aggregate sieve analysis without evidence of demonstrated proficiency and approval in accordance with the above requirements.
As a result of this investigation, Brown & Root (B&R) audited R. W. Hunt training and certification activities and required each inspector to be recertified by attending specific training sessions ~ and by closed book testing. The work performed by the personnel qualified under the previous provisions was reviewed by B&R QA personnel and also by Texas Utility Electric Company (TUEC) and Gibbs & Hill (G&H) site QA personnel and was found'to be within the specification requirements.
In addition B&R assigned a Civil QC engineer to work full-time.w.ith R. W. Hunt on site to ensure full compliance with project requirements.
Between April 3, 1979, and May 7, 1979, NRC Region IV inspectors interviewed 15 individuals associated with concrete testing activities regarding this allegation, including the two individuals who originally made the newspaper allegations (April 1979). The individual, who stated in the newspaper article that, after the NRC investigation of March 1977, the recertification of inspectors to test cylinders was "open-book", did not mention open-book testing when interviewed by the Region IV inspectors. He stated that he had failed a level 1 soils test, that he
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i then repeated the soils test using the notes he had taken.
He also stated that to obtain his recertification (after March 1977) he needed only to have a supervisor sign the recertification form.
The individual who alleged in the newspaper that he had been given the answers to tests was not employed by R. W. Hunt at the time the recertification tests were given. His allegation would most probably be referring to tests given prior to March 1977, and therefore not be germaae to the recertification tests.
This allegation (regarding tests given prior to March 1977) was supported by two other individuals who were later interviewed by Region IV inspectors. One of these individuals was not employed by R. W. Hunt at the time the recertification tests were given; the other stated that the recertification tests were administered properly.
In summary, the allegation that recertification tests were administered "open-book" was supported only by the individual making the allegation.
The allegation that answers were given to' tests taken prior to March 1977 was supported by three individuals.
Eleven other individuals who were questioned did not support the allegations.
The TRT reviewed the personnel file of the individual who made the allegation concerning the recertification tests and learned that he was employed from August 16, 1976 to June 28, 1978.
Therefore, he was among those inspectors whose previous work had been reviewe.d and found s
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m 4 acceptable. The.TRT also found copies of tests taken by the individual
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for recertification in concrete and soil inspections.
The TRT reviewed the test the individual had taken relating to concrete cylinder tests and could not determine whether the test had been administered properly.
The 6
TRT also examined test result statistics for concrete placed from 1975 to 1978 and found that the concrete placed was of uniform quality and strength and that there was no apparent variance in the test results.
Approximately 35 different inspectors were involved in concrete testing between 1975 and 1978; more than seven inspectors conducted concrete corapression tests on a rotating basis during this period.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: The allegation that answers to tests were given prior to March 1977 cannot be refuted. An NRC Region IV Inspection Report (IR 77-02) questioned the cualifications of the R. W. Hunt inspectors. The work perfonned by the R. W. Hunt inspectors prior to March 1977 was reviewed by B&R, G&H, and TUEC and found to be within specifications, a fact subsequently reported to NRC Region IV staff.
Therefore, the TRT concludes that this allegation has no safety l
significance.
(
The allegation that the recertification tests to test concrete cylinders were given "open book" also cannot be refuted.
This allegation was not i
supported by any of the other individuals questioned, which suggests it was an isolated occurrence. The work perfonned by this individual prior i
to March 1977 was audited and found to be satisfactory, which would l
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indicate the individual possessed the knowledge required to properly
'In addition, the test results for concrete perform the required testing.
placed, including the concrete compression tests, were contributed to by These test i
many inspectors whose qualifications were not questioned.
Based results showed the concrete was of uniform quality and strength.
I on the fact that the inspector's work had previously been reviewed and found to be acceptable, and that a number of inspectors contributed to the test results, which showed the concrete to be of uniform quality, the i
t TRT concludes this issue to have no safety significance or generic implications.
I i
6.
Actions Reauired:
None.
~~
8.
Attachments: None.
9.
Reference Documents:
1 1.
IE Inspection Report 50-445/79-09; 50-446/79-09.
2.
IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-02; 50-446/77-02.
Concrete testing data management reports 1975 to 1978.
3.
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. 10. This statement prepared by:
Terry Langowski Reviewed by :
Group Leader Date i
Approved by:
Project Director Date l
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Draft 7 - 10/22/64 h
i AC-41 Category 11/CP3 SCER 1.
Allegation Grcup:
Civil and Structural No. II 2.
Allegation Number:
AC-41 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that there was poor workmanship regarding the use of elastic joint filler material ("rotofoam") as a temporary spacer during construction to maintain the required air space between seismic Category I concrete structures.
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
TUEC informed NRC Region IV on November 23, 1977 of this allegation, which TUEC received anonymously in a telephone call on November 22, 1977.
A Region IV inspector reviewed the allegation during an inspection conducted between November 28 and December 2,1977, and concluded, based on the infonnation available to him at the time, that all temporary rotofoam had been removed from the areas identified.
The matter was left open pending a Region IV review of the Brown & Root (B&R) QA/QC inspection and documentation program, which was being initiated to assure that the required seismic gap between Category I structures was being maintained.
Rotofoam is used as a temporary spacer during construction to me intain this gap.
Once the concrete has hardened, the rotofoam is removed to eliminate any load transfer or dynamic interaction between buildings.
If the relative motion between buildings is small and the presence of rotofoam is 3o
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4 Civil / Structural No.11 considered in the dynamic analysis of the building, leaving the rotofoam in place may not have a significant impact on the dynamic performance of the buildings.
During an inspection between January 3 and 13, 1978, the Region IV inspector reviewed B&R procedure CP-QCI-2.4-9, " Inspection of Elastic Joint Filler Material Removal," Revision 1 (December 12, 1977) and B&R inspection reports for December 15, 1977 and January 3,1978, and had no fur 4.her questions regarding this matter.
The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) attempted to obtain a further clarification of the concerns expressed by the alleger; however, neither '
TUEC nor the Region IV office had records of the alleger's telephone conversation other than what is stated above.
The TRT determined, however, that prior to the time the allegation was made there was a misunderstanding as to whether or not the rotofoam should remain in place
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as part of the final construction. A letter from Gibbs & Hill (G8H) of I
September 6,1977 (GTT-1543) indicates that construction was proceeding on the basis that the rotofoam could be left in place.
The letter l
further stated that this assumption was not made in accordance with the 1
i facility design drawings and design concept and that expansion joints l
I above grade'should consist of a clear gap between buildings, e.g., free of rotofoam As noted in the Gibbs & hill letter, it was intended that I
the rotofoam be left in place below grade.
Since construction had l
proceeded abcve grade, TUEC instructed Brown & Root, in a letter of
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q Civil / Structural No.11 October 7, 1977 (TUS-5012), to remove the rotofoam.
As noted, B&R procedure CP-QCI-2.4-9 was also implemented to verify removal of the rotofoam.
Based on discussions with TUEC and Gibbs & Hill engineers, the TRT found that the rotofoam was to be left in place for the expansion joints above grade between the Safeguards Building and the Reactor Building.
If properly implemented, B&R procedure CP-QCI-2.4-9 should have provided an adequate inspection record for demonstrating that the air gap between buildings was adequately maintained.
However, the TRT could only find a
two inspection reports relating to this procedure (the December 15, 1977 4
and January 3,1978 reports referenced). These reports do not fulfill the complete inspection requirdments of CP-QCI-2.4-9. Furthermore, this procedure was deleted on July 18, 1978 (B&R memo IM-14835). A G&H memo of January 30, 1978 (GHF-2390) indicated that an inspection was made on i
November 23, 1977, and stated that the removal of the rotofoam from the subject areas was acceptable.
However, the memo could only relate to construction at that point and did not provide any documented evidence of the inspections that were made.
A B&R interoffice memo of February 19,1978 (IM-12934) discusses an inspection of the seismic gap between the Auxiliary Building and the Containment Building for Unit 1.
It indicates that the removal of i
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~4 Civil / Structural No. 11 i rotofoam was not completed and requests further removal and/or engineering evaluation.
TUEC engineers apparently did investigate this matter; however, the TRT could find no formal documentation indicating the resolution of this matter.
Between September 14, 1978, and October 17, 1978, additional inspections of the air gap between seismic Category I structures were made by a B&R QC inspector.
Six different areas were inspected.
In five out of the six areas the inspector indicated unsatisfactory conditions due to the presence of foreign material in the air gap, such as wood wedges, rocks, clumps of concrete, and rotofoam. These unsatisfactory inspection reports were officially resolved on April 18, 1983, in response to NCR C-83-01067 (April 13, 1983). The disposition of this NCR notes that
" field investigation reveals that nost of the material has been removed."
Based on discussions with TUEC engineers, it is the TRT's understanding that field investigations were made but that no permanent records of these investigations were maintained.
TUEC engineers did provide the TRT with five pages of field measurements made between March 15 and March 24, 1983, which indicated that investigations of the air gap between the Auxiliary Building and the Fuel Building were conducted.
These l
measurements appear to indicate that the required air gap is not provided to the 813-foot, 6-inch elevation (the required elevation in procedure CP-QCI-2.4-9).
Even though the measurements indicated a nonconforming l
nm
-0 Civil / Structural No.11 condition, TUEC could not provide any documentation indicatiro whether an engineering analysis was performed to justify this nonconformance or whether the material was subsequently removed.
The TRT attempted to inspect the air gap between the structures but could not because in most cases the final joint sealer or roof flashing had already been installed.
In several areas between the Auxiliary Building and the Safeguards Building the air gap could be observed and appeared to be clear of any obstructions.
In one doorway between the Safeguards Building for Unit 1 and the Auxiliary Building at the 830-foot, 6-inch elevation the air gap was clear to an observer looking up. However, a wooden board and other debris were observed when viewed straight in and downward.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: Based on the review of available inspection reports and related documents, on field observations, and on discussions with TUEC engineers, the TRT cannot determine whether an adequate air g+a has been provided between concrete structures. Field investigations by B&R QC inspectors indicated unsatisfactory conditions due to the presence of debris in the air gap, such as wood wedges, rocks, clumps of concrete and rotofoam. The disposition of the NCR relating to this matter states that the " field investigation reveals that most of the material _has been removed." However, the TRT cannot determine from this report (NCRC-83-01067) the extent and location of the debris remaining between the structures.
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Civil / Structural No.11 Based on discussions with TUEC engineers, it is the TRT's understanding that field investigations were made but that no permanent records were maintained.
In addition, it is not apparent that the permanent installation of elastic joint filler material ("rotofoam") between the Safeguards Building and the Reactor Building, and below grade for the other concrete structures, is consistent with the seismic analysis assumptions and dynamic models used to analyze the buildings, as these analyses are delineated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The TRT, therefore, concludes that TUEC has not adequately demonstrated compliance with FSAR Sections 3.8.1.1.1, 3.8.4.5.1, and 3.7.B.2.8, which require separation of Seismic Category I buildings to prevent seismic interaction during an earthquake.
Depending on the extent of nonconformance with FSAR Sections 3.8.1.1.1 3.8.4.5.1, and 3.7.B.2.8, the allegation is judged to have merit and potential safety significance.
Prompt remedial actions as delineated below should be implemented.
6.
Actions Required: TUEC shall:
(a) Perform an inspection of the as-built condition to confirm that adequate separation for all Seismic Category I structures has been provided.
(b) Provide the results of analyses which demonstrate that the presence of rotofoam and other debris between all concrete structures (as me u
r, 1
dc+c rined by irs ectic"5 cf the a:-h il+ ccndititrs) d es not rrsult ir any sigrificant increase in seis-'c resp;rse or alter tFe d.naric j
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resparse cheracteristics cf the Categcry I structures, c
- r,ero s and pipirg when compared with the re nits of the origir.el analyses.
l TUEC shall receive NRC approval of the results of these analyses prior to fuel lcading.
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1 Civil / Structural No. 11 10.
IRC-7707, dated October 11, 1978.
11.
IRC-0320, dated September 14, 1978.
12.
IRC-0319, dated September 14, 1978.
13.
IRC-7705, dated September 20, 1978.
14.
IRC-7708, dated October 3, 1978.
- 15. NCR C-83-01067, April 13,1983.
- 16. 8&R Field Measurements concerning "As-Built on Concrete Inside Seismic Gap OA-F," 5 pages, dated between March 15 and 24, 1983.
- 17. GHF-2390, dated January 30, 1978.
10.
This statement prepared by:
C. H. Hofmayer Date Reviewed by:
Group Leader Date i
l Approved by:
Project Director Date i
l l
t
1
.J...
3 sser aqc-13/14/15, ac-18/40/CP5 4
Draf t 6 - 10/22/84 SSER y RQp L p,..pq 3g,Q 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No. 15 2.
Allegation Number: AQC-13, AQC-14, AQC-15, AC-1 and AC-40 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that undocumented and unauthorized holes were drilled through reinforcing steel (rebar).
The issue includes allegations relating to:
the loan of rebar drills without proper documentation (AQC-13),
a, b.
the unauthorized cutting of rebar in non-specific locations (AQC-14,AC-18,AC-40),and the unauthorized cutting of rebar used in the installation of c.
the trolley process aisle rails in the Fuel Handling Building (AQC-15).
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance: AQC-13 concerns the loan of rebar drills allegedly used for the unauthorized cutting of rebar.
During the NRC investigation of this matter, the NRC Office of Investigation i
(01) interviewed nine individuals alleged to have knowledge of unauthorized cutting of rebar. These individuals provided sworn I
statements denying any knceledge of this activity.
These statements are a part of 01 Report A4-83-005 (liay 20,1983), which concludes that
/
I "there was no testimony received indicating that holes were drilled or d 4 S fra"
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2-i rebar was cut without proper documentation, and no evidenc,e was found to contradic?; the testimony of these individuals." One instance of possible unauthorized cutting of rebar is discussed in a supplement to the 0! report (September 7, 1983). This instance is discussed below in relation to allegation AQC-15.
Because the alleger did not specifically identify who made unauthorized cuts of rebar, or where this cutting took place, the TRT attempted to quantify the amount of rebar that allegedly was cut without authorization.
In discussions with the TRT, the alleger estimated that approximately five percent of the diamond core drill bits ordered by him were used in an unauthorized manner.
He further estimated that one drill could be used to cut up to five rebars, depending upon the extent of cutting required. Although he could not be specific as to how many drills he ordered, the alleger thought that i
the number would be in the thousands. The NRC Region IV Investigation of this issue indicated that 415 diamond core drill bits were i
purchased during the period in question (IE Report 83-27). Using the actual number of drill bits purchased, together with the infonnation provided by the alleger, the TRT estimated that there could be I
approximately 100 alleged unauthorized rebar cuts. Considering the large amount of reinforcing steel used in the plant, and the fact that l
the structures consist primarily of heavily reinforced concrete walls and slabs, the TRT believes that, if such unauthorized rebar cutting did occur, the amount involved would have an inconsequential effect on the safety of the structures.
m-,_ - _,--.--.%,
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1
. Allegations AQC-14, AC-18 and AC-40 also raise questions regarding the unauthorized cutting of reba,r, but do not identify specific locations.
n:= w v -
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During the course of the NRC Region IV investigation of this matter, the alleger provided a log book which, it was reported, would identify the unauthorized and undocumented rebar cutting. However, the Region IV inspector could not identify ene rebar cut listed in the log that was not authorized. The TRT also reviewed the icg and came to the same conclusion.
In discussing this matter with the TRT, the alleger confirmed that there was documentation supporting "ninety nine and three quarter percent" of the rebar cuts identified in the log. As part of Report 83-27, the NRC Region IV investigator traced 32 authorizations, approximately half of the documents noted in the log for the rebar cutting. He fcund that in all cases rebar cuts were properly identified on a des 1}n change authorization (DCA) or on a component modification card (CMC).
In addition, the rebar cuts were traced to and identified on specific building structural drawings, with the corresponding authorizing document number. The TRT reviewed ter. CMCs and confinned the findings of the Region IV investigation.
In reviewing authorizations in the log, the TRT noted that certain CMCs involved a number of rebar cuts in one area, and selected these for review.
In one case, seven different CMCs (3307, 3664, 3665, 3666, 3667, 3668 and 3669) seemed to pertain to one area and accounted for 68 rebar cuts. Upon reviewing the documentation,
. the TRT found that these cuts were made in a tunnel area in the Fuel Building.
(The alleger identified this as a location wher? a large n' umber of rebar was cut.) However, the 68 cuts were arranged such that only nine bars actually had to be cut.
In another case, the log indicated 25 rebar cuts pertaining to CMC 00979.
In this case, the TRT determined that all the cuts were made on one reinforcing bar in a support beam. Finally, the log indicated eight rebar cuts pertaining to CMC 3022. Once again, these eight cuts were to one bar in a support beam. All cuts were made in accordance with the rebar cutting criteria provided by Gibbs & Hill. These examples also illustrate the point that a large number of rebar cuts recorded are not necessarily synonymous with an identical number of rebar &ctually being cut.
In all cases, one bar was cut a number of times, but adjacent bars were not. Thus, the cuts were arranged to minimize the 4
overall effect on the strength of the structure, i
The TRT estimates that approximately 335 rebar cuts are indicated in the alleger's log. Discussions with the alleger revealed that he believes he cut approxinately five percent more rebar than was authorized, a number that corresponds to approximately 17 unauthorized rebar cuts. As noted earlier, such a number would have little effect on the safety of the structures.
l As noted above, allegation AQC-15 identifies a specific instance of the possible unauthorized cutting of rebar.
In this case, a former Brown & Root employee stated he possibly drilled holes through rebar r:
3 r --
e r in a concrete floor without a component modification card (CMC) or a designchangeauthorization(DCA).
He explained that in January 1983 he drilled approximately 10 holes about 9 inches deep while installing "
22 metal plates with a core drill. He said the metal plates were used to secure the trolley process aisle rails located on the 810-foot, 6-inch floor level in Room 252 of the Fuel Handling Building.
The TRT inspected the trolley process aisle rails and its anchoring system and observed no violations of project drawings or specifications.
The TRT reviewed the reinforcement drawings (2323-5-0800 and 2323-5-0820) for the Fuel Handling Building to determine the location of rebar. The drawing showed three layers of reinforcement in the upper part of the mat, which consisted of a No.
I 18 bar running in the east-west direction, in the first and third i
layers, and a No.11 bar running ia the north-south direction, in the second layer.
The review of the reinforcement drawings (2323-5-0800 and 2323-5-0820) revealed that the layout of the east-west reinforcement and the trolley process aisle rails war, such that the east-west reinforcement would interfere with the drilling of holes at only one location.
Howev,er, if 9-inch holes were drilled, both layers of the No.18 i
\\
reinforcing bar would be cut. Design Change Authorization (DCA) No.
l 7401 was written for authoriza*. ion to cut the uppermost No.18 bar at only one rail, but it did not reference the authorization to cut the l
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Tad '4' lowerinost No.18 bar. The DCA (No. 7041) also stated that the expansion bolts and base plates could be moved in the east-west direction to avoid interference with the No. 11 reinforcement running in the north-south direction. The information described in DCA No.
7041 was substantiated by Gibbs & Hill calculations. The DCA approval was based on the understanding that only the uppermost No. 18 reinforcement would be cut.
If the 10 holes were actually drilled 9 inches deep, then the allegation that reinforcement was cut without proper authorization may be valid.
I t
The DCA notes that the holes were drilled to accomodate 1/2-inch Hilti-bolts, which require a minimum embedment of 5-1/2 inches (as noted in Fig. 39, Sh. 5 of 5, attached to DCA-7041).
Since there was no need to drill the holes deeper than 5-1/2 inches, the alleger
[
may not be correct in stating that the holes were drilled 9 inches deep.
5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions: Allegations AQC-13, AQC-14, AC-18 and AC-40 should be closed for the following reasons:
The allegation was not specific as to who made unauthorized cuts a.
of rebar or where the cuts took place, b.
The number of unauthorized rebar cuts alleged, if true, would have an inconsequential effect on the safety of the structures.
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i Allecetic". A^"-15 will re c i n o p e r, u n t i l +' F e 4 r < rR- +< 4 c n rez ested of Teias Utilities Electric Cc~;ary (TUEC) in "A.: tic 3 pequirec" is provided.
F 6.
Actions P -> ire"-
7'crche.
prev 3de try n),-
s
.i n,. o rn t i e r
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3 concerning the elle;ed drilling of helee
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--3 inStdllation Of the trolley prccesS aisle rails in the Fuel andlirE w
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'ho tm.
u 1:^ rein.orcin? Steel cn bcth the firs t c
p and third layers is cut.
e TUEC shall submit this infomation to NRC a"d rust receive NRC a;prcval of the resolution cf this issue prior to ler.-poner operation.
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. 9.
Reference Documents:
1.
IR 83-27, 9/28/83.
2.
IR 83-03, 3/28/83.
3.
01 Report A4-83-005, 5/20/83.
4.
Testimony of A11eger, 4/14/83.
5.
Alleger's Log. " Start of New Crew and New Operation Rebar Cutting Detail."
6.
Telephone Interview with A11eger, 3/7/84.
7.
OI Report A4-83-005, Supplemental, 9/7/83.
8.
01 Report Q4-84-001, 1/9/84.
9.
Affidavit of A11eger, 2/3/83.
- 10. TRT Interview with A11eger, 8/2/84.
- 11. CMC-00979.
- 12. CMC-2889.
- 13. CMC-3022.
- 14. CMC-3307.
- 15. CMC-3664-3669.
- 16. GTT-2863, 10/16/78.
- 17. GTN-29823, 9/5/78.
- 18. GTT-2874, 10/17/78.
- 19. GTN-29641, 8/25/78.
- 20. Fuel Building Rebar Cutting Dwg FSC-1000, Sht 1.
9
.g.
- 21. DCA-7041, Rev. 9, 11/10/82.
- 22. G&H Calc. Book Number SFB-107C Set 1, Set 10-24.
- 23. Reinforcement Dwgs. 2323-5-0800.
- 24. Reinforcement Dwgs. 2323-5-0801.
- 25. Reinforcement Dwgs. 2323-S-0820.
- 26. QI-QP-11.2-1.
I
- 10. This statement prepared by:
C. H. Hofmayer Tg.T Date j
Tan,a w.muv J, eta K. Devers I T Date 6
Te44,,,aA gg,w sv Reviewed by:
L 6hsoj,
Group Leader Date b
Approved by:
- v. Noon w s
l Project Director Date i
I I
I
{
l I
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.\\,,o,gNh7[f
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u
,p SEER WRIT EUP L'OC!"'.Ef.1 C0f; TROL /RO'JTE SHEET i
f f.,v All ega tion ilombert A6L -_ 64 Subject of Allegation E & ff D.d c/E u g '/ w rc RIs%E TRT Group CIVtL / MEMcAL Author:
Jcspit
- 1. 4p t A.
This sheet will be initialed by each reviewer.
It stays with all revisions to the SSER writeep and serves as a routing and review record.
It will be filed in the work package when the writeup is published.
Draf t tiumber Draft 1
2 3
4 5
Author II);fvf4 d/t fy/ 6/zi y
Group Leader Tec h. Editar i
UR., e if
.n1Sch d 4 Qu 'Iy/G '
y')
Wessman/Vietti
,//
/
J. Gagliardo
// 1/11 T.
Ippolite
/
G44/Q Revision fiumber Final 1
2 3
4 5
Author Tech. Editor Group Leader J. Gagliardo T. Ippolito Administrative Writeup integrated into SSER Potential Violations to Region ly Workpackage File Complete Workpackage Returned to Group Leader W
g
,,I
- ,,,,, 4,,,.,. ;.' w.
a
) sus 237
- W
i DRAFT 6 - 10/22/84 SSER Category No.16/CF3 SSER 1.
Allegation Group: Civil and Structural No.16 2.
Allegation Number: AQ-64 3.
Characterization:
It is alleged that over excavation and improper fill under the Unit 1 Containment Building cou.J invalidate the expected seismic response of the foundation due to the change in properties resulting from the removal of in-situ materiai, i
4.
Assessment of Safety Significance:
During an investigation conducted in 1984, the NRC Office of Investigation (01) interviewed the alleger (84-006, 3/7/84, A-7) and reference was made to over excavation and improper repairs in the foundation rock for the Unit 1 Containment Building.
The alleger stated that the excavation was erroneously made 6 to 8 feet too deep and that upon realization of the error, the repair technique was simply to throw the loose rock back in the excavation and fill it in with concrete.
The TRT reviewed NRC inspection reports, the FSAR and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing transcript, where this concern was the subject of contention No. 7 and was admitted into the hearing on June 16, 1980.
.g 9 By order of March 5,1982, the ASLB granted sum ary disposition of contention No. 7 based on the finding that no genuine issue as to any l
material fact was shown by any of the filings.
The TRT also reviewed the i
affidavits and statements filed by TUEC and by the NRC in support of the i
motion for sunnary disposition. These documents adequately describe rock i
overbreak, accompanying fissuras and subsequent repairs. Affected areas l
were backfilled with concrete having a minimum compressive strength of 1
2,500 pounds per square inch at 28 days, or were grouted to maintain continuity of the competent rock in which fissures were identified.
The procedures utilized'to replace fractured rock with dental concrete and to i
grout surrounding fissurcs were reviewed by the TRT, as were the l
accompanying compressive test results.
FSAR figures 2.5.4-33a through 2.5.4-35 are maps of the excava. tion showing the location of fractures and the extent of dental concrete backfill.
They show that the area of l
overexcavation represents a small portion of the entire excavated area.
FSAR figure 2.5.4-37, sheets 1 through 21, show photographs of the excavated walls.
The NRC inspector present during the excavation process l
was interviewed by the TRT and verified the conditions presented in the i
FSAR.
The TRT has independently evaluated the potential impact on the seismic response *of the Unit I containment foundation due to the replacement of a limited amount of original rock with dental concrete from the standpoint of possible changes in foundation stiffness.
Because of the fact that (a) the dental concrete's behavior, stiffness, and structural strength
l
. are essentially ider.tical to those of the natural rock replaced at the site, and (b) the area affected by the replacenient work is relatively small (refer to FSAR Figures 2.5.4-33a through 2.5.4-35), the TRT concluded that no appreciable impact on either the static or dynamic l'
response characteristics of the foundation has resulted from the over excavation.
This conclusion is supported by an affidavit prepared by
~
a geotechnical engineer in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor l
Regulation.
He provided his evaluation of the effects on static and dynamic foundation stability of replacing undisturbed limestone and claystone foundation rock with dental concrete.
He concluded that the ability of the repaired foundation materials to withstand seismic disturbances had not been impaired.
L, 5.
Conclusion and Staff Positions:
The over excavation of a small portion of the Unit 1 Containment Building foundation and the subsequent replacement of the affected area with 2500 psi strength dental concrete and grout did not affect either the static or dynamic characteristics of the foundation.
Therefore, the expected seismic response has not been invalidated as alleged.
The excavation and repairs have had nc safety impact upon foundation integrity.
Accordingly, this allegatior, has neither safety significance nor generic implications.
6.
Actions Recuired: None.
1
e f
4-8.
Attachments:
None.
9.
Reference Documents:
1.
NRC Inspection Reports 75-05, 75-06, 75-07, 75-09, 76-05.
2.
ASLB Hearing Transcript pages 789 to 1259.
3.
ASLB Order Granting Summary Disposition of Contentions 2 and 7, March 5, 1982.
4.
CPSES-FSAR.
5.
Affidavit of Owen Thompson Contention 7.
- 10. This statement prepared by:
J. Tapia Da te Reviewed by:
Group Leader Date Approved by:
Project Director Date
,