ML20204B998
| ML20204B998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/15/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2425, NUDOCS 8607300546 | |
| Download: ML20204B998 (22) | |
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. h3.gl c u' vaps hg g;;;) CERTIFIED MINUTES DATE ISSUED: July 15, 1986 MINUTES ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON REACTOR OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, D. C.
JUNE 3, 1986 A meeting was held by the Reactor Operations Subcommittee. Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on May 16, 1986, with a re-vision to this notice sent May 28, 1986 (Attachment A). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B. The list of attendees is in Attachment C. A list of the meeting handouts is in Attachment D. The handouts are filed with the office copy. H. Alderman was the Designated ACRS Staff Member. The meeting was convened at 8:30 a.m.
Principal Attendees J. Ebersole, Subcommittee Chairman C. Michelson G. Reed C. Wylie NRC Staff D. Allison G. Lanik H. Bailey E. Weiss V. D. Thomas E. Licitra M.S. Wegner R. Baer R. J. Kiessel R. Hernan Introductory Statement - Subcommittee Chairriiari, J. Eber sole Mr. Ebersole introduced the Subcommittee members that were in attendance. He asked if any of the Subcommittee members had any comments at this time.
There were none.
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' - MINUTES / Reactor Operations 2 Meeting, June 3, 1986 April 11, 1986, Pilgrim - Failure to Isolate RCS from RHR, - M. Wegner, IE This event concerned leakage of all three valves which isolate the Reactor Coolant System from the low pressure B-RHR/LPCI line; primary containment isolation actuation and reactor scram with the mode switch in startup at 880 psig; and failure of MSIV's to open following a scram.
Safety Significance o Potential for Inter-System LOCA outside containment o Inadequate corrective action for precursor events in each problem area o Unnecessary challenges to safety systems l
Causes:
o The mode switch /pcis is still being investigated o MSIV failure to reopen was due to disengagement of the pilot poppet due to installation error o The RHR valve leakage problems were caused by the licensee's concern with meeting the technical specifications for leakage without adequately addressing the reasons for the requirements:
over-pressure protection of low pressure piping.
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MINUTES / Reactor Operations 3
. Meeting, June 3, 1986 Corrective Actions:
o The mode switch problems remain to be addressed by the licensee o The proper installation of the set screws should eliminate the problem of the failure to open of the MSIUS due to the pilot poppet falling off.
o Corrective actions on RHR valve leakage must address the over-pressurization of the low pressure RHR line.
April 3,1986, Fort St. Vrain, Loss of Control Power Following Grid Distur-bances, C. Lank, IE .'
This event concerned the loss of certain Class IE equipment due to grid disturbances. This occurred during a severe snowstorm when repeated loss and
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restoration of offsite power lines during severe spring snowstorm caused fluctuation of one phase of the 480VAE power. This caused temporary loss of voltage (Class IE) on individual 120 VAC control and interlock circuits.
Single phases of the off-site power lines were lost and the circuitry that monitors for undervoltage on a three-phase system usually takes a two out of three logic. The result of this was control was affected for bearing water pumps for the circuitry.
- MINUTES / Reactor Operations 4 Meeting, June 3, 1986 In addition there was a temporary loss of the helium purification train due to the inlet valve being closed due to control problems.
Follow up activities include:
NRR is investigating to see if the control logic for the bearing water pumps should be on uninterruptible power.
Some of the design problems of the Ft. St. Vrain plant will be discussed during a Ft. St. Vrain Subcommittee meeting.
April 13, 1986, San Onofre Unit 3, - H. Bailey, IE This event involved premature criticality of this reactor. The operating crew was starting up after being shutdown for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. There was a signifi-cant amount of Xeron present a trainee was operating the controls. The xenon tables for cycle 1 were used instead of cycle 2. The startup rate was the main parameter being monitored. The current rate and log power were recorded on slow speed strip chart recorders.
The control room supervisor was on a four hour holdover from the previous shift. He was in the process of being relieved.
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. , MINUTES / Reactor Operations 5 Meeting, June 3, 1986 This is a violation of their procedures which states that there won't be any turnover or other special operations going on while you are trying to go critical.
The significance of this event is criticality occurred prior to the designat-ed rod position and, there was a inadequate control of procedures (xeron tables), and there was a failure of following approach to critical proce-dures.
Follow up actions:
o An investigation by the region is in progress o The reactor startup procedures will be modified to require an inverse count rate ratio plot and a prediction of critical count rate during rod withdrawal o Engineering procedures for control of nuclear design data book xor.ch tabics) has been strcr.gther.ed o TFr strir (La t recorders will be modified for two speeds. The fast speed will be monitored when withdrawing rods, o The event was reviewed with all operators.
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- - MINUTES / Reactor Operations 6 Meeting, June 3, 1986 i
April 30, 1986, Browns Ferry Unit 1, Undesirable Systems Interaction as a Result of Fire Suppression Spurious Actuation, R. Clark, NRR This event concerned two actuations of the fire suppression system which resu'.ted in the ECCS actuation and flooding of the basement.
Unit I has been defueled for over a year with the reactor vessel and drywell open.
On April 30, 1986, replacement of a fire hydrant in the cooling tower area resulted in depressurization of the fire header. When pressure in the header was restored, deluge valves to three cable tray fixed spray zones in Units 1 and 3 actuated. The spray system should have remained inactive. The spray wetted down cable trays, pumps and panels including the reactor protection system instrumentation panel in Unit 1.
On May 3, 1986, there was an inadvertent actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESFD) on Unit 1 due to a false high drywell pressure signal caused l by an electrical short in two pressure switches. The same actuation occurred about two hours later and early on the next shift.
t The cause of false pressure indication was determined to be moisture in pressure switch junction boxes due to inadequate seals. All other junction l
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MINUTES / Reactor Operations 7 Meeting, June 3, 1986 boxes in Units 1 and 3 spray affected areas were inspected and no water found.
The spray system actuation was caused by leaking check valves. Two check valves in water supply which holds the deluge valves closed leaked allowing the deluge valve to open, which sprayed trays when pressure in the header was restored.
Follow up included:
o Licensee walkdown of all conduit junction boxes and R.P.S. cabinets to verify seals o The licensee to review implications of this event on their E.Q.
program o The licensee is replacing the affected charging water check valves, overhaul and inspection of other like model valves.
May 19, 1986, Pilgrim, Single Failure could disable all redundant RHR pumps,
- Eric Weiss, IE This event involves the discovery that a single failure of the mini flow logic could disable all redundant RHR pumps.
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MINUTES / Reactor Operations 8 Meeting, June 3, 1986 This plant has two loops for the Residual-Heat Removal System connected with a cross tie. Each loop has a flow sensor which is used to close the miniflow bypass lines which are used for pump protection. An "0R" gate logic closes the miniflow valves if there is flow. The problem is any failure of the logic will close all the miniflow lines. With this single failure, the RHR pumps will be " deadheaded."
The consequence of RHR pump loss is loss of long term cooling with RHR heat exchangers, and other functions including:
o Shutdown cooling mode o Low pressure cooling injection o Containment spray o Torus spray
'o Suppression pool cooling which eventually would cause loss of:
Low pressure core spray -
High pressure coolant injection
- Reactor core isolation cooling The General Electric fix is to eliminate the "close" signal to miniflow valves, i Follow up actions:
o IE Bulletin 86.01 issued 5/23/86 l
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. . MINUTES / Reactor Operations 9 Meeting, June 3, 1986 o IE and GE are determining the generic significance o NRR will review resolution for plants with problems, including Technical Specification issues May 12, 1986, Salem Unit 1, Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps, - W. Jones, IE This event involved a limit switch causing loss of both main feedwater pumps and a trip. The limit switch monitors the valve position. The valve prevents overpressurization of the hot wells. If the contact is open, it
- indicates the valve is open, and the feedpump interlock causes both main feed pumps to trip. The valve itself was administratively controlled and was locked closed. There was a previous history of problems with the limit switch and a nylon cord was installed to tie the contacts closed. On May 12th the nylon cord broke and both feedwater pumps tripped.
After the May 12, 1986 trip, the Unit 1 interlock was disabled by removing the leads. This was also performed on Unit 2.
Follow up:
o Region I has reviewed licensee actions and feels licensee is adequately concerned about the event. Event is the result of holdover from previous practices.
o Full licensee evaluation of possible similar problems in progress
' MINUTES / Reactor Operations
. 10 Meeting, June 3, 1986 o Licensee has a program in places to address possible challenges to safety system, which includes single - channel BOP inputs.
June 1985 Trojan, Repeated Snubber Failures - T. Chan, NRR This discussion involved steam generator hydraulic snubber locking up due to design in adequacy.
During the 1985 refueling outage, Trojan inspected all 16 of their steam generator snubbers, two of which failed the surveillance test, and thus all i
16 were declared inoperable. These are hydraulic snubbers manufactured by Anchor Hall. They are 900 KIPS snubbers. This was the first time Trojan was required to inspect their snubbers for the life of the plant, since 1975.
They were just issued a technical specification, in early 1985, to inspect them.
During this 1985 refueling outage it was also discovered that a lateral member of a vertical hot leg pipe whip restraint had been pulled out about 5/8 of a inch from the wall. All of the snubbers were rebuilt, retested, met the acceptance criteria, were re-installed and the plant was then started up.
In 1985 Trojan asked their consultants to postulate the lockup of the steam generator snubbers from a cold condition to a hot condition. The consultants found that lockup, during the thermal growth, during heatup, would account
' * , MINUTES / Reactor Operations 11 Meeting, June 3, 1986 for both the pressurizer surge line movement and/or the damage to the pipe whip restraint.
The licensee claimed (1985) that although hot leg stresses exceeded ASME Section III allowables, Strain is within 1% limit, which was NRC approved limit for Songs-1 an seismic criteria and methodology.
Follow up:
o Snubber control valves to be replaced with a new design o Licensee to perform pre-startup walkdown of RCS in a hot condition o NRR to review RCS piping stresses and applicability and acceptabil-ity of licensee's analysis May 19, 1986, Reactor Trip, Palisades - T. Wambach, NRR This event concerned multiple failures following the reactor trip. The turbine bypass valve failed to open, one steam dump valve failed to open, the backpressure regulator in the letdown line failed to close, the pressurizer
- spray valve failed to fully close, and the variable speed charging pump tripped five times.
The significance of this event and the concern about the event was the unnecessary challenges to safety equipment and the increased burden on i
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MINUTES / Reactor Operations 12 Meeting, June 3, 1986 operators to compensate for failed or deficient, and the implications con-cerning the quality of maintenance and post-maintenance testing.
Prior to the event, maintenance was being performed on the turbine cabinet control fans. In order to perform the maintenance, the fan has to be un-plugged. After unplugging the fan, the turbine valves closed. The reactor tripped about a minute later on high pressurizer pressure. The turbine then got a trip from the reactor trip.
The licensee found in trouble shooting after the event, that when they unplug the fan it would cause an overvoltage trip on the power supply for the electrohydraulic controllers.
Follow up:
o Region III issued a confirmatory action letter requiring Region III approval prior to restart o Region III formed an augmented inspection team with headquarters o The licensee formed a task force to study implications on plant maintenance.
' - MINUTES / Reactor Operations 13 Meeting, June 3, 1986 March 13, 1986, Palo Verde Unit 1, Broken Pipe Support on Main Feedwater Line, - M. Hartzman, NRR On March 13, 1986, a broken street-type pipe support was found on the 24 inch main feedwater line to the steam generator number 2 of Palo Verde Unit 1.
'The characteristics of this failure were that the welds between two members had broken completely and there was a significant deformation of the flanges.
The safety significance of this event is that the support failed under operating conditions. It failed under dead weight and thermal expansion loads. The other supports have to carry additional loading and the load carrying capacity of the other supports may be exceeded under seismic or other dynamic loading.
In this case, there was total separation of the pipe from the support. The pipe didn't appear to show excessive stress. The pipe remained integral and did not appear to be deformed in any manner.
The root causes that were hypothesized for the event was that there were some unknown loads, possibly due to water hammer or other sources which had not been taken into account in the design of these supports.
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/ MINUTES / Reactor Operations 14
. Meeting, June 3, 1986 The welds between the upper and lower flanges were not welded all around but only along two edges. This induced certain prying effects which are not usually accountable in the standard weld design methodology.
The licensee has taken corrective actions. They have performed calculations to confirm the deficiency of the hanger as originally designed. Stress calculations for this hanger were revised to account for the additional loading at the weld in all three units., Metallurgical studies were per-formed on the broken welds and the results indicate failure which occurred from ductile overload and not fatigue.
The hanger was modified by stiffening flanges and adding required weldment.
The flanges were stiffened by placing additional plates.
The following events were selected for full Committee presentation.
- 1. May 19, 1986, Pilgrim, minimum flow logic problems that could disable RHR pumps.
- 2. June 16, 1985, Trojan, repeated snubber failure
- 3. May 19, 1986, Palisades, complications following May 19, 1986 on site as of May 22, 1986.
The meeting was adjourned at 12:10 p.m.
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a i MINUTES / Reactor Operations 15 .'
Meeting, June 3, 1986 NOTE: A transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 N. Capitol Street, Washington, D.C.
20001 (202) 347-3700.
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Federal Register Notice 7590-01 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON REACTOR OPERATIONS Revised The Federal Register published on May 16,1986(51FR18053) contained notice of a meeting of the ACRS Subcomittee to be held on Tuesday, June 3, 1986, 8:30 A.M. - 12:00 Noon, Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.
To the extent practical, the meeting will be open to public attendance.
However, a portion of the meeting may be closed to discuss elements of the Palo Verde Security Plan. All other items regarding this meeting remain the same as previously announced.
Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time hl' lotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr. Herman Alderman (telephone: 202/634-1413) between 8:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual one or two days before the scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule, etc., which may have occurred.
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Date Cp+ Y I ' -
' Morton W. Libarkin, Assistant
' Executive Director for Project Review
Fediril Regist;r / Vol. 51, No. 95 / Friday,'May 16, 1986 / Notic;s sEAD53 result, States will have increased framework which defines and (Place: Room ast, National Academy of l }'
- flexibility to move resources among authorizes the current administrative Sciences.21st and Pennsylvania Avenue -
program categories, among quarters financingmystem. Any proposals for NWJaahington.DC. .% .
within a fiscal year, and among cost such long-term changes will be Type of Maeting: Open. ..
categories. States will not be held Contact Person: Dr. M. Crant Cmas, published separately for notice and accountable by specific cost category, comment in the Federal Register before Erector. Nei o of Dcean Sciencaa.Rnom but rather on a bottom line basis, and State managers will gain the flexibility the Department makes any decision,s.
Signed at Washington. DC, on May 12.
$n on Telfph : /357-9639.
Summary MinutesMay be dbtained from to use UI admirustrative resources 1900. the contact person.
based on State assessment of needs. Stoberts T. Jones, Purpose of Committee: To preide udvice The Department will focus its and recommendations conoeming Deputy Assistant Secretary ofLdbor.
monitoring on State performance een graphic research and its support by '
{FR Doc. 86-1U69 Filed 5-15-48,8 45 am) outcomes rather than on expenditure by the NSF Division of Ocean Sciences.
cost category. Requirements for grant ai m e m esio- Sas ,
officer's prior approval of expenditures Ag contained in Federal regulations (41 The Committeewill hold morning and CFR. 29-70.103) will be delegated to the NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION afternoon Sessions on both days.
States. States will continue to be Following opening remarks ~and general required to provide additional Advisory Committee for Engineering; introductions-the Committee will hear information to the Department on any Open Meeting several presentations and status reports requests for supplemental funding to of current and topicalinterest from justify the need for increased funds for In accordance with the Federal changes in State law or for increased Advisory Committee Act Pub.L 92-483,' various officials arrdtepresentatives from NSF, other departments and salary costs; the Department has the National Science Foundation agencies, and other organizations active streamlined its procedures for handling announces the following meetings:
in ocean science matters.ne such requests. Name: Advisory Committee for Committee will also hear reports from Decision 4: Consolidate contingency Engineering. .. subcommittees ranging from Manpower categories and contingency overhead Date and Time: June 5-e,1988. e.00 a.m.- to Oversight Review and determine a funding. Many commenters criticized the 5 p e5 9 a citn e daion
p per course of action based on the G ini rmation and circumstances present contingency system as too ggg, p g,e complex, and urged simplification. The DC 20s50 presented.The committee will also Department will consolidate Type of Meeting Open. discuss scheduled revisions of the Long-contingency financing and reporting Contact Person. Mrs. Mary poets, Range Plan for Ocean Sciences and categories consistent with reduced Executise Secretary. Advisory Committee for formulate guidance and direction for the overall financial planning and reporting Engineerms. Room 537, National Science continuing planning process.'The requirements, as outlined in Decision 2. Foundation. Washington. DC 20550, , Committee will also conduct necessary .
Contingency support resources for Telephone: (2021357-0571. administrative functions in accordance nonpersonal services. U1 support, and Summary Mmutes: Mrs. Mary Peats at the with established custom and practice admmistrative staff and technical abos e address. with respect to: approval of the minutes resources will be provided as a flat Purpose of Advisory Committee Meeting: of the previous meeting; determination percentage add.on to direct workload To provide advice, recommendations, and of time and place of the next meeting; as
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entitlement. This change will simphfy and reduce State reporting. increase
'*",[,""*(8 p , , and well as any other appropriate business.
M. Rebecca winkler, State flexibility in the use of resources activit Summa,,'rized Agenda: Discussion on issues. Comm/ttee Afanogement Officer.
and reduce Federal workload.This opportunities and future directions for the May 13,1988.
change will result in more stable and Engineering Diredtorate discussion of the predictable resource expectations for gyg poc, ge_1123 Filed 5-1546. a 45 am)
Engineering Research Centers Program; States and simplify State planning for discuuion of Engineering Directorate budget aim em mute anticipated workload increases, situation u well as other items. _
The Department plans to implement M. Rebecu Winkler, these decisions as soon as possible. Committee Afancgement Officer. HUCLEAR REGULATORY Decision t is expected to be Ma y 13.1986. MMISSION implemented in field office instructions
[FR Doc. 86-11122 Fded 5-16-86. 8 45 am) Advisory Committee on Reactor within the next few weeks. Revised 8" N CN " "'*
- planning and reporting instryctions will Safeguards Subcommittee on Reactor be issued as soon as possible to Operations; Meeting implement Decision 2. Field office Advisory Committee for Ocean ne ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor guidance to implement Decisions 3 and 4 Sciences (ACOS); Meeting Operations will hold a meeting on June will be issued as soon as possible, with 3,1986, Room 1046,1717 H Street, NW, the objective of implementing Decision 3 In accordance with the Federal upon issuance and Decision 4 effective Washington, DC.
Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L 92-463.
October 1.1987, as amended. the National Science The entire meeting will be spen to The Department is continuing the - Foundation announces the following public attendance.
public discussion on possible long term meeting: The agenda forthe subjectaseeting revisions to the administrative financing
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Name: Advisory Committee for Ocean shah k as foHows: TuW, Ane 3.
systern as a result of commenters' JG86-aJO a.m. unti/J2:00 noon.
Sciences ( ACOS).
suggestions on changes to the current Date and Time: June 5. 6.1986-8.30 a.m. to The Subcommittee will review rec'ent '
allocation system and to the statutory Soo p m each day, evens at operating plants.
'18054 Fed;ril R; gist:r / Vol. 51, No. 95 / Frid y, May 16,1986 / N; tic;s J
- Oral statements may be pr;sented by Ch:irmin; written stat;ments will be Or:! st:t:m:nts m:y be presented by members of the pub!!c with the accepted and made available to the members of the public with concurrence concurrence of the Subcommittee Committee. Recordings will be permitted of the Subcommittee Chairman; written Chairman; written statements will be only during those portions of the statements will be accepted and made accepted and made available to the meeting when a transcript is being kept, available to the Committee. Recordings Committee. Recordings will be permitted and questions may be asked only by will be permitted only during those only during those portions of the members of the Subcommittee,its portions of the meeting when a meeting when a transcript is being kept, corisultants, and Staff. Persons desiring transcript is being kept, and questions and questions may be asked only by to make oral statements should notify may be asked only by members of the members of the Subcommittee,its the ACRS staff member named below as Subcommittee,its consultants, and Staff.
consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring far in advance as is practicable so that Persons desiring to make oral to make oral statements should notify appropriate arrangements can be made. statements should notify the ACRS Staff the ACRS staff member named below as During the initial portion of the member named below as far in advance far in advance as is practicable so that meeting the Subcommittee, along with as practicable so that appropriate appropriate arrangements can be made. any of its consultants who may be arrangements can be made.
During the initial portion of the present, may exchange preliminary During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee may views regarding matters to be meeting. the Subcommittee, along with exchange preliminary views regardm.8 considered during the balance of the any of its consultants who may be matters to be considered during the meeting.
balance of the meeting.The present, may exchange preliminary I The Subcommittee will then hear views regarding matters to be Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions presentations by and hold discussions considered during the balance of the with representatives of the NRC Staff, meeting.
with representatives of the NRC Staff its consultants, and other interested and other interested persons regardmg The Subcommittee will then hear persons regarding this review. presentations by and hold discussions this review. ,
Further information regarding topics
, Further information regarding topics with representatives of the NRC Staff, to be discussed, whether the meeting its consultants and otherinterested h tbe th
(( disc sse d,,,hd Chairman's ruling on requests for the
{ has been cance!!ed or rescheduled, the Chainnan a ruling on requests for the persons regard'ing this review.
Further informa tion regarding topics pp rtunity to present oral statements to be discussed, whether the meeting opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be and the time allotted therefor can be has been cancelled or rescheduled, the obtained by a prepaid telephone call to btained by a prepaid telephone call t Chairman's ruling on requests for the the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr.
the c gnizant ACRS staff member, Mr.
opportunity to present oral statements Herman Alderman (telephone 202/634- Dean Houston Delephone 202/6M267) and the time allotted therefor can be between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p m. Persons 1414) between 8:15 a m. and 5.00 p m. obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Persons planning to attend this meeting planning to attend this meeting are the cognizant ACRS Staff member, Mr.
are urged to contact the above named urged to contact the above named Sam Duralswamy (telephone 202/634-individual one or two days before the individual one or two days before the 3267) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
scheduled meeting to be advised of any scheduled meeting to the advised of any Persons planning to attend this meeting changes in schedule, etc., which may changes in schedule, etc., which may are urged to contact the above named have occurred. have occurred. Individual one or two days before the Dated: May 12.1988. Dated: May 13.1980s scheduled meeting to be advised of any Morton W. tabarkin, Mort a W.IJtakin, changes in schedule, etc., which may A ssistant Executive Daectorfor Project Assistant becuuve Directorfor Project have occurred.
Review. AI' "-
Dated. May 12,1988.
[FR Doc. 86-11118 Filed 5-15-86, a 45 am] Morton W. IJbarkin,
[FR Doc. 86-11119 Filed 5-15-88. 8 45 am) selmo coo rseHi-en **G C00' *"
Assistant Executive Directorfor Project Review.
Advisory Committee on Reactor Advisory Committee on Reactor [FR Doc. 86-111:!0 Filed 5-15-88. 8 45 am)
Safeguards; Subcommittee on Severe Safeguards Subcommittee on Safety sea coos issus-as (Class 9) Accidents; Meeting Research Program; Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Severe The ACRS Subcommittee on Safety Applications and Amendments to (Class 9) Accidents will hold a meeting Research Program will hold a meeting Operating Ucenses involving No
, ort June 3,1986,1717 }{ Street, NW, on June 4,1986, Room IMO 171711 Significant Hazards Considerations; Bh Washington, DC. Street NW., Wash:ngton, DC. Weekly Notice The entire meeting will be open to The entire meeting will be open 'o public attendance. public attendance. Correction The agenda for the subject meeting The agenda for subject meeting shall be as follows;. Wednesday, /une 4. In FR Doc. 86-10031 beginning on page shall be as fo!!aws: Tuesday./une 3, 16919 in the issue of Wednesday, May 7' 1988--t00p.m. until5.00p.m. 1986-830 a.m. until the conclusion of 1980, make the folIowing correction; The Subcommittee will review final business.
draft of NUREG-0956," Reassessment of The Subcommittee will continue its On page 16940,in the third column, the Technical Bases for Estimating discussion on the proposed NRC Safety under the heading "V,irginia Electric and Source Terms." Research Program and Budget for FY P wer Company . . . ',in the twenty.
r Oral statements may be presented by 1988 and 1989. It will discuss also a second bne," April 24" should read h,l members of the pablic with the Draft ACRS report to the Commission " April 22".
[p concurrence of the Subcommittee on this matter. s u ocoosisowses s
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May 27,1986
. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR ACRS MEETING ON JUNE 3, 1986, 8:30 a.m. -
,RCOM,1046, 1717 H STREET, WASHINGTON, D.C.
8:30 a.m. Introductory Remarks - Subcommittee Chairman RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Date Plant Event Presenter ,
8:40 a.m. 4/11/86 Pilgrim Failure to Isolate RCS from M. Wegner, IE RHR & Mode Switch Problems 492-4511 9:00 a.m. 4/3/86 Ft.St. Loss of Control Power Following G. Lanik, IE Vrain Grid Disturbances 492-9007 9:20 a.m. 4/13/86 San Unexpected Criticality and H. Bailey, IE Onofre 3 Reactor Trip 492-9006 9:40 a.m. 4/30/86 Browns Undesirable Systems Inter- R. Clark, NRR Ferry action as a Result of Fire 492-8298 Suppression Systems Spurious Actuation 10:00 a.m. 5/19/86 Pilgrim Minimum Flow logic Problems E. Weiss, IE that Could Disable RHR Pumps 492-9005 10:20 a.m. BREAK 10:30 a.m. 5/12/86 Salem 1 Loss of Main Feedwater Pump W. Jones, IE 492-7613 10:50 a.m. 6/85 Trojan Repeated Snubber Failure T. Chan, NRR 492-7136 11:10 a.m. 5/19/86 Palisades Complications following T. Wambach 5/19/86 AIT on site as 492-8049 of 5/22/86 11:30 a.m. 3/13/86 Palo Cracked main steamline J. Fair Verde header 492-4509 11:50 a.m. 5/14/86 Palo Disruption of Offsite Power E. Licitra, Verde Lines NRR 1&2 (CLOSED SESSION) 492-8599 .
12:10 SUBCOMMITTEE DISCUSSION 12:20 p.m. ADJ0 URN e
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..- . H. ALDERMAN fNlbfWC ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON REACTOR OPERATIONS 1
LOCATION ROOM 1046, 1717 H STREET, hW., WASHINGTON, D.C.
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H. ALDERMAN ACR5 %UBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON psicrop cp3ngn , :c_- _
L0 CAT,10:1:
ROOM 1046, 1717 H STREET NW. , WASHINGTON, D.C.
N#IC JUNE 3, 1986
. DATE.
ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT:
NAME BADGE NO. AFFILIATION .
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ATTACHMENT D HAND 0UTS - REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JUNE 3, 1986 NRC STAFF PRESENTATIONS
- 2. Fort St. Vrain - Loss of Control Power Following Grid Disturbances, April 3, 1986, G. F. Lanik, IE
- 3. San Onofre Unit 3, Premature Criticality, April 13, 1986, H. Bailey, IE
- 4. Browns Ferry Unit 1 - Undesirable Systems Interaction as a Result of Fire Suppression System Spurious Actuation, April 30, 1986, R. Clark, NRR
- 8. Palisades - Reactor Trip, May 19, 1986, T. Wambach, NRR
- 9. Palo Verde Unit 1, Broken Pipe Support on Main Feed Water Line, M.
Harteman, NRR