ML20206S350

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Summary of 980617-18 ACRS Advanced Reactor Designs Subcommittee Meeting in Rockville,Md Re Review of Advance FSER Chapters 4,5,7,8,11,13 & 18,level 1 AP600 Pra,Itaac & Associated ACRS Open Questions
ML20206S350
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 06/26/1998
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-3115, NUDOCS 9905210102
Download: ML20206S350 (7)


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RDA CERTIFIED BY: J. Barton - 7/9/98 Date Issued: 6/26/98 ,

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS ADVANCED REACTOR DESIGNS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES JUNE 17-18. 1998 ,

ROCKVILLE MARYLAND The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Reactor Designs met on June 17-18. 1998, at 11545 Rockville Pike Rockville. Maryland in Room T-2B3. The purpose of the meeting was to review the advance Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) {

chapters 4. 5, 7. 8. 11, 13. and 18: the Level 1 AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): the inspections. tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria j (ITAAC): and associated ACRS open questions. Mr. Noel Dudley was the l cognizant ACRS staff engineer for this meeting. The meeting was convened at  ;

8:30 a.m. and recessed at 5:00 p.m. on June 17, 1998: reconvened at 8:30 a.m. l and adjourned at 10:50 a.m. on June 18, 1998.

ATTENDEES ACEi i J. Barton. Chairman D. Powers. Member G. Apostolakis Member R. Seale. Member M. Fontana Member J. Carroll. Consultant D. Miller Member N. Dudley. Staff Engineer I

NRC STAFF T. Quay. NRR A. Levin. NRR T. Kenyon. NRR J. Wilson NRR W. Huffman. NRR M. Snodderly. NRR J. Lyons. NRR G. Georgiev NRR WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY O l B. McIntyre. Westinghouse T. Schulz Westinghouse hN S. Sancaktar. Westinghouse E. Piplica. Westinghouse C7\ '#.1 There were no written comments or requests for time to make oral statements received from members of the public. An attendance list of the NRC staff and public is available in the ACRS office files and will be made available upon request.  !

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n 1 Advanced Reactor Designs Subcomittee 2 June 17-18. 1998 SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN INTRODUCTION Mr. John Barton Subcommittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 8:30 a.m. and noted the agenda items for the two day meeting.

1 PRESENTATIONS Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) - Mr. Jerry N. j Wilson, NRR: and Mr. Eugene J. Piplica. Westinghouse i Mr. Jerry N. Wilson NRR explained that the goals of design certification ,

were to achieve a stable and predictable licensin; nrocess. resolve safety 1ssues, maintain resolutions with a restrictive change process, and agree on a verification process before construction. He presented the two part review process that consists of Tier 1 information and ITAAC. The Tier 1 information is derived from the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) and is in effect though out the life of the plant. The ITAAC are used to verify that the as-built facility conforms to the approved design. The ITAAC have no ,

regulatory significance after fuel load. Mr. Wilson outlined the regulatory  !

requirements for Tier 1 and the present status'of the Tier 1 review. The  !

Subcommittee Members and Mr. Wilson discussed the usefulness of Tier 1 and ITAAC, and the mechanism for changing Tier 1.

Mr. Eugene J. Piplica. Westinghouse, described how the ITAAC were selected.

He explained the organization of the ITAAC which include an introduction.

system based design descriptions, non-system based design descriptions, interface requirements, and site parameters. Mr. Piplica presented an example of the ITAAC using the certified design material for the system based passive core' cooling system. He stated that revision 5 of the AP600 Tier 1 information was issued on May 8. 1998, and that revision 6 would be issued to close confirmatory items.

The Subcommittee Members.'the staff, and Westinghouse discussed:

the extent of staff inspection of the ITAAC:

which documents constitute the design-basis of the AP600 design:

.- skills of the review team that developed the ITAAC:

. plant features and functions covered by the ITAAC;

. extent of staff inspection of ITAAC compliance prior to fuel load:

existence of an ITAAC database:

. regulatory requirements for making changes to the design; and

. the reason for eliminating design acceptance criteria (DAC) for human factors, instrumentation and control, piping, and radiation protection.

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O Advancec) Reactor Designs Subcomittee 3 June 17-18. 1998 Closure of ACRS Concerns - Messrs. Thomas J. Kenyon and William C. Huffman, Jr., NRR: and Mr. Brian McIntyre. Westinghouse The Subcommittee Members and the staff discussed the following issues related to advanced FSER chapters 4. 5, 7. 8. 11, 13. and 18 related to the reactor coolant system. I&C and electrical systems, and human factors.

the lack of tornado protection for the diesel generator radiator.

. boring of turbine generator rotors.

long term effect of smoke on digital I&C components.

the s,,f used in calculations related to high burnup fuels, and

. smoke migration through 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire doors.

Mr. William C. Huffman, Jr., NRR, explained why the staff did not require Westinghouse to perform an analysis of a break downstream of automatic depressurization system (ADS) stages 1-3 discharge piping.

Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) - Dr. Selim Sancaktar.

Westinghouse Dr. Selim Sancaktar. Westinghouse presented the results from the AP600 Level 1 PRA for the contribution of events to the core damage frequency (CDF),

initiating events, and dominant accident sequences. He described in details the intermediate loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) event including the related event tree, system success criteria, dominant accident sequences, and cut-sets.

Dr. Sancaktar explained that a THERP-based model was used for the human reliability assessment and that only rule-based operator actions were credited. He stated that human error probabilities (HEP) were modeled in terms of the cognitive phase, action phase. and recovery phase. Dr. Sancaktar presented examples of pages from the AP600 HEP Summary Results. These pages included a comparison of the contributions to CDF with and without credit for operator actions for different initiating events.

Dr. Sancaktar presented the databases used in deriving the probabilities in the PfS. He stated that failure data is generally derived from the Advanced Light Water Reactor Utilities Requirement Document. He explained that human error factors were derived from NUREG/CR-4550. Analysis of Core Damage Frequency From Internal Events." and NUREG/CR-2728. " Interim ReliSility Evaluation Program Procedures Guide."

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.Advanecd Reactor Designs Subcomittee 4 June 17-18. 1998 f Dr. Sancaktar provided information regarding Westinghouse's estimates of common cause failures for software based digital I&C systems. He described how the explosive valve failure probability was calculated. He justified why the orifice plugging failure mode is considered not credible.

The Subcommittee Members and Westinghouse discussed: j 1

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. risk insights and the results of external event and hazards assessments.

. how to characterize events with extremely low probabilities.

- uncertainties associated with extremely low probability events.

. calculation of common cause failures for squib valves and software.

. failure to account for operator errors of commission.

. treatment of line break downstream of ADS stages 1-3 discharge piping.

. derivation of human error probability and the time to complete actions.

. relationship between action time (T ) and time window (T,).

. difference between conditional and unconditional. .

. . basis for statement that plant does not depend on operators.

. sensitivity of CDF to plant monitoring system reliability, and

- derivation of squib valve reliability.

Containment Spray System - Mr. Terry L. Schulz. Westinghouse Mr. Terry L. Schulz, noted that the containment spray system was not required for design basis-accidents but did provide additional severe accident management capability. He described the design and operation of the system.

He explained that the system could operate for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and reduce iodine 131 release by about 50%. Mr. Schulz presented the containment spray system's interactions with other systems and test requirements. ,

The Subcommittee Members, the staff, and Mr. Schulz discussed:

. design restrictions regarding the fire protection system water sources.

. effects on the water in the containment cavity during severe accidents.

. production of nitric acid in the containment during severe accidents.

. human errors of commission, and

. adverse systems interactions.

Adverse System Interaction Evaluation - Mr. Terry L. Schulz Westinghouse Mr. Terry L. Schulz, Westinghouse, explained that adverse system interactions were evaluated by considering functional, human-intervention, and spatial l interactions and by assessing passive safety and active nonsafety systems. He

! described the different types of functional interactions, presented a matrix i

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Advanced Reactor Designs Subcomittee 5 June 17-18. 1998  ;

of passive and active systems interactions, and discussed the example of how the reactor coolant pumps were evaluated. Mr. Schulz described the systematic considerations and bases for determining adverse interactions caused by human intervention and spatial interactions. He concluded that the AP600 design l effectively separated systems, uses passive features to reduce the number of l system interaction issues, and improves fire protection inside containment.

The Subcommittee hembers, the staff, and Mr. Schulz oiscussed evaluation of interactions among active-nonsafety systems, inconsistencies between adverse

! interaction tables and PRA and sensitivity of the design to operator errors of commission.

Security Design - Mr. Brian A. McIntyre. Westinghouse Mr. Brian A. McIntyre. Westinghouse, presented the security design modification, which was made in response to ACRS concerns. He noted that some equipment was relocated, which provided greater flexibility to operations and maintenance personnel in carrying out their daily functions.

CLOSURE OF ACRS CONCERNS - Mr. Brian McIntyre. Westinghouse The Subcommittee members agreed that the following ACRS questions were answered during the Westinghouse presentations:

. details of the digital controls for the radiatica monitoring system.

. ~ marginally adequate" design of the containment spray system.

. effects of smoke on digital equipment.

. databases used to determine operator reliability during plant events.  ;

. M used in codes to calculate reactivity changes during plant events. )

. submergence of floor drain line penetrations in sumps.

. presentation of the adverse system interactions evaluation, and  :

. requirement for evaluating site-specific meteorological characteristics.

SUBCOMMITTEE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Mr. James Carroll. ACRS consultant, stated that the evaluation of adverse systems interactions was comprehensive.

Mr. Carroll stated that security is a highly specialized area. He recommended that a person with an operational background should be on future security design review teams.

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Advanced Reactor Designs Subcomittee 6 June 17-18. 1998 STAFF AND INDUSTRY COMMITMENTS The NRC staff agreed to brief the ACRS on its review of the modifications to the security design after Westinghouse dockets the necessary information.

Westinghouse agreed to respond to the remaining open ACRS question at the July

7. 1998 Advanced Reactor Designs Subcommittee meeting.

SUBCOMMITTEE DECISIONS The Subcommittee requested that the staff and Westinghouse present a summary of the information provided during this meeting regarding the ITAAC, adverse system interactions evaluation, and the Level 1 PRA at the July 8, 1998 ACRS j meeting.

E0LLOW UP ACTIONS Subcommittee members identified the following items to be considered at the July 7, 1998 Subcommittee meeting:

. How the fire protection design that includes 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> doors and ventilation dampers prevents the spread of smoke.

How Westinghouse calculated the concentration of trisodium phosphate in 1 the containment sump? Specifically, how was the radiolytic formation of nitric acid in the containment during severe accidents calculated (i.e.

what was the atmospheric g value for nitric acid formation)? l 1

PRESENTATION SLIDES AND HANDOUTS PROVIDED DURING THE MEETING The presentation slides and handouts used during the meeting are available in the ACRS office files or as attachments to the transcript.

BACKGROUND MATERIAL PROVIDED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment updated through revision 11 issued March 1998.
2. Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report revision 22, issued on April 6,1998.
3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advance Final Safety Evaluation Report on the AP600 issued on May 2. 1998.

l 4. Report dated April 29. 1998. from Richard Sherry, Senior ACRS Fellow. to ACRS Members.

Subject:

Initial Results of Review of AP600 PRA.

[Predecisional]

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Advanced Reactor Designs Subcomittee 7 June 17-18. 1998

5. Report dated' April 30. 1998. from Richard Sherry, Senior ACRS Fellow, to

-ACRS Members.

Subject:

AP600 Explosive Squib Valves Failure Probability. [Predecisional]

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NOTE: Additional details of this meeting can be obtained from a transcript available in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street. N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20006. (202) 634-3274, or can be purchased from Ann Riley & Associates, LTD., 1250 I Street N.W., Suite 300. Washington, D.C. 20005,-(202) 842-0034.

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