ML20198C017
| ML20198C017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1985 |
| From: | UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198C013 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-RV, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8511110046 | |
| Download: ML20198C017 (220) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:DOCKET NOS.: 50-443 50-444 SEABROOK STATION RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i j RELATING TO NUREG - 0612
" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" 1
_T ,7 9I $i . _ i M M M~ SEABROOK STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ! i SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE Prepared by l United Engineers & Constructors Inc. Revision No. 2 October 1985 {8A"i888R 83$88ha
DOCKET NOS.: 50 443 50-444 SEABROOK STATION
! RESPONSE TO NRC l GENERIC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO t
NUREG - 0612
" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" l SEABROOK STATION l ,
1
- PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE e SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE Prepared by United Engineers & Constructors Inc.
Revision No. 2 l October 1985
TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. NRC LETTER OF REQUEST
- 3.
SUMMARY
- 4. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.1 (ENCLOSURE 3 of NRC Letter) !
Ceneral Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems
- 5. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.2 (ENCLOSURE 3 of NRC Letter) l Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools
- 6. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.3 (ENCLOSURE 3 of NRC Letter)
Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment
- 7. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.4 (ENCLOSURE 3 of NRC Letter)
Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.
- 8. TABLES Table 2.1.3(C)-1 Tabulation of Heavy Loads Table 2.4.2-1 Load / Impact Area Matrices, Sheets 1 through 10.
- 9. APPENDICES Appendix I Westinghouse Analysis of RV Head Lifting Rig and l Internals Lifting Rig (Special Lifting Devices)
- 10. ATTACHMENTS i
l Attachment A Conduit and Cable Tray Review l l Attachment 8 Piping Review l Attachment C Safety-Related Equipment Peview l l Attachment D HVAC Review l
-i-i
r TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
- 11. LOAD PATH DRAWINGS 9763-F-805272 9763-F-805273 9763-F-805274
) 9763-F-805275 9763-F-805276 9763-F-805277 9753-F-805278 9763-F-805279 9763-F-805280 9763-F-805281 9763-F-805282 9763-F-805283 4 9763-F-805284 4 i I l l l 1
- iL -
- 1. INTRODUCTION This report is in response to the NRC generic request for a review of the control of heavy loads at nuclear power plants, as contained in their letter dated December 22, 1980, and included herein (less enclosures) in Section 2 for reference. The report documents the results of a comprehensive review of the load handling operations at Seabrook Station and specifically addresses Enclosure 3 of the above letter, " Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads." The informational content of the report is presented in a request / response format which follows the same general format of Enclosure 3.
The original issue of this report, dated September 1982, was forwarded to the NRC for review by PSNH on September 24, 1982 under letter SBN-331. Revision 1 to this report, dated May 1983, was an update prepared in response to the NRC's draf t technical evaluation of the original report, date November 23, 1982, and supplemented by the NRC's letter to PSNH, dated December 28, 1982. The present Revision 2 to this report, dated October 1985, responds to the letters submitted by the NRC, dated August 31, 1983 and October 14, 1983, respectively, as well as provides additional design changes and supplementary information which has been incorporated since Revision 1. Note that for the purposes of this evaluation, a heavy load is defined in accordance with NUREG-0612, as a load whose weight is greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool, i.e., a load greater than 2100 pounds.
- 2. NRC LETTER OF REQUEST The generic letter which follows was sent to all licensees of Operating Plants and Applicants for Operating Licenses and Holders of Construction Permits.
I f ( i ( l I l 1 I l I 6
3a .vg J' i, UNITED STATES
!? NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j\. kW.. E/ iM' l i JM!l3l98I WA>lNGTON. D. C, 20555 h,.'.'..' Oecemoer 22, 1980 TO ALL L:CE.1SEE5 ^F QPERATI.1G ?LANTS AND APPLICANTS FCR OPERATING LICENSES AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION ?ERMIT5' Gent!ecen:
Suoject: Con:rol of Heavy Loads
- n January 1973, the NRC Ouolisned NUREG-CliO entitled, "1RC Progran for One Resolution of Generic Issues Related to 'iuclear cwer Plants -
eccc: to Congress." As cart of this crogram, the Task ac tion Plan for L'nresolved Safety Issue Task No. A-36, " Control of Heavy L:acs '! ear Scen: Fuei , ' vas i ssued.
. e have ::=ois:ed our review of cad nancling ocera icns a quclear
- cwe- oian:s. 1 ecor: describing :ne results of this review has :een is saec as 1CREG-C612, 'C n rol of '-eavy Loads 3: Nuclear ?:wer !an s -
Resciuti:n cf 72? A-26. ' This re:or contains several -ec:mmenda-ions
- :'e imoiemen e: by all licensees anc applicants :o ensure :he safe an: ling of 1eavy 1:a:s. ,
- e rur:cse of :-is let:e- is o recues: *na: vou -eview vcur : ntrols
#P
- e F3nci*cc O f -elvv Icacs *o ce e-9ine -he etter! o van?C9 .e
;u'ce!'nes ' aciosure i are cresen:1v satisfied it .our facili v, anc
- ' en- 'y - e 0,snces inc cdi'ica:1cns :~a wcu!: e -ecuirec in Orcer : 'ul l y satisfy :nese cuicelines.
To ex:eci a ;'our ::coliance wi h :nis request, we nave encicsed -he icilewing: NU, REG-CEi2, "C:n:rol of heavy '. cads a: luclear : wer :Iants' ' Enclosure 0 f.
! a## 00si-ion .'q:3-in AC*fons #or ^ n: Pol Of -eavy '. ads (enc'.osure ESC;es: *:r AC i:icnal nf:rma:icn :n C0r:rol Of -eavy '.cacs (Enclosure 1;.
l *1 i ". 9
- e 3A 3-*.1 n **
~~
. 1:ensees *Or l9C1dn 20*n. I inc 3, I' n
- in: 2 j In: - ee '"It *IIld* I ~;M ie te -e T rev' Usl f l a r *. 1 e ". ; 3 - l l
t l Oececcer 22, !?3: 1:u are -ecues ed to imolament the fnt __ e 4 , i 2 as
'.e: ar.scan as cossiale out no later nan 90 cavs 'r:-ict ons des.: rice: de E--?,su-e ne :n e c' :n 3
- n er:er snould be to enacie mocified (10 -he CFRMRC to oceratine 50.54(f)), determine rea whether c:erati nc ifcenses ecuested to orovide the following: _
- r if:ensees are 1.
S_ubmit recuirec a recort nances an odi docurentino fi ca tion s . the results of vour; eview aa Inis recor snoulc of Enclosure satisfied. This recor: 3, an now the guidelines of NURE . according to One following schedule:should be submitted in we car s 3_urni: ne Section 2.1 infor a-ion within six man:ns fron :ne care of nis ie: er. , 1 Su:mi the Se:-ions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.1 infor a-ita wi ntn nine mentns. i. urnis. ::nfir a-icn witnin six men:ns na- fe:1emer 3-f en
- nose enances and recifications_you #ind are ascessaav si ' :<
- mren:e as scon as cosstole,wi nout waiting On sta#f -eview, so :na: all sucn cnanges, Deyond the a:ove interin 3::icns,
#tillr One be corole aboveed within two years of su mittal of Sec:icn 2.2 re:cr:.
- 3. :
.ccifications urnish fustf 93#tcati:n wouldaithin six months be recuired to fully for anv enan:es or satisfy ne tui:el1ces Of inciosure 1 wnicn vou believe are necessary. no:
I
: e :rd:eria Suchinacclican NUREG-0512 areto also acolicable ne 'nf:rma-ionto a::licar:s.# e eases. -c: este: 3 are exoected provide !! 'nci:sted in 2 above.cy frem 1 a ove and :o meet the same scnecule of imoleme
- Or *: . Any item for which :ne imolementation date is
- Esi:ere: :ne exce: ed date of issuance of an ooerating license will be to be 3 :rerecuisite to obtaining that license.
- P iny ta:e hat cannot te e!, furnish a crocosed revised da e.
justi#f:ati:n
- gring - e interim.for :ne deiay, anc any planned comcensating safety actions t
i his recues: for infor-.a: ion was accreved by GA0 under a blanket
- earance numcer RC072 wnich exoires 'lovemoer 30, 1933. Comments 4
cn durcen and ducifcati:n may be directed to the U.S. General 2 oun-ing Office, Regulatory Re;: orts Review, Rocm 51C6, dal G Street, ii.J., Wasning on, D.C. 20548. Sincerely, i - C f Darrell G/TE'isennut, Director Division oY Licensing
!i j in:!csures:
!. ?iUREG-C612
, I. 5:aff 70sition
- 5. Recuest for Additional
. Informa fon
- 4/o inclosure (1) 5ervice Lis:
1 4 f t I t r l r I l i l l m __._._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
- 3.
SUMMARY
A systematic evaluation of all load handling systems has been performed to determine the extent to which the guidelines of NUREG-0612 are satisfied for Seabrook Station. Since the principal causes of load handling accidents reported in the past include operator errors, rigging failures, lack of adequate inspection and inadequate procedures, greater emphasis has been placed in these areas in assuring safe handling of the heavy loads. The crane operator training program and periodic inspection and maintenance program for the cranes, monorail systems and lifting equipment meet the applicable requirements l outlined in NUREG-0612 and other standards such as ANSI B30.2, ANSI B30.9, ANSI B30.10, ANSI N14.6, ANSI B30.11 and ANSI B30.16 as discussed in this report. Load handling operations are governed by l approved procedures and safe load path drawings, as applicable. 1 A review of the plant general arrangement drawings indicates that, in general, either the cranes do not travel over spent fuel or safety related equipment, or the reliability of the load handling system is enhanced by providing increased safety factors and increased inspection of the critical components. In some instances, redundancy and physical separation of the safety related equipment continue to maintain the safe shutdown and decay heat removal capabilities following a load , drop. The following cranes and monorail systems have been upgraded and/or ) load-limited to increase their reliability, and consequently make the I i likelihood of a load drop extremely smalls (a) Emergency feed pump monorail. l (b) Primary component cooling water pump service monorails. 1 (c) Filter cask monorail. (d) CVCS heat exchanger service monorail. (e) Polar gantry crane. (f) Boric acid batching monorail. The spent fuel bridge and hoist, the manipulator crane a*4d manipulator crane auxiliary hoist and the service water strainer monorail hoist have been derated to 2100 pounds capacity to preclude inadvertent use of these load handling systems with heavy loads. The lifting devices for the spent fuel cask and the removable panels of the pressurizer enclosure wall have not yet been designed. The design of these devices will be in compliance with the intent of NUREG-0612 requirements. Some exceptions have been taken to the requirements of NUREG-0612 and Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter; however, these exceptions do not reduce the reliability of the load handling operations. Alternatives in lieu of literal compliance with these requirements are discussed to . j demonstrate their equivalency and/or adequacy. In conclusion, load handling operations at Seabrook Station meet the intent of NUREG-0612 in regard to assuring safe handling of heavy loads identified in this report. l
. 4. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.1 (ENCLOSURE 3)
CENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLINC SYSTEMS "NUREC-0612, Section 5.1.1, identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load-handling systems in the areas where the spent fuel is stored, in the vicinity of the. reactor core, and in other areas of the plant where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load-handling operations at a site and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-handling guidance." l l a
REQUEST 2.1-1
" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures or detailed structural analysis)."
RESPONSE TO 2.1-1 The overhead load handling systems identified during our plant review are listed below along with their capacities and locations: MAXIMUM HANDLING DESIGN CRITICAL TAC NO. SYSTEM CAPACITY LOAD (MCL) LOCATION MM-CR-3 Polar Cantry 420 Ton Main 210 Ton Main Containment Crane 50 Ton Aux. 25 Ton Aux. FH-RE-24 Radial Arm 2 Tons 2 Tons Containment Stud Tensioner Hoists (3) FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask 125 Ton Main, 125 Ton Main, Fuel Storage Handling Crane Two Aux. Hooks Two Aux. Hooks Building
@ 5 Tons each 9 5 Tons each CS-CR-5 Filter Cask 7.5 Tons 3.75 Tons Primary Monorail Hoist
- Auxiliary Building CS-CR-6 Boric Acid 4.5 Tons 2.25 Tons Primary l Batching , Auxiliary j Monorail Holst Building i
j CS-CR-13 CVCS Heat 5 Tons 2.5 Tons Primary j Exchanger Auxiliary Service Building Monorail Holst l {
.g.
MAXIMUM HANDLING DESIGN CRITICAL TAG NO. SYSTEM CAPACITY LOAD (MCL) LOCATION CS-CR-14A, Charging Pump 2.5/2.5/ 2.5/2.5/ Primary
-14B,-14C Service Monorail 6.0 Tons 6.0 Tons Auxiliary Hoist Building CC-CR-ISA, Component Cooling 5 Tons 2.7 Tons Primary CC-CR-ISB Water Pump Auxiliary Service Monorail Building Hoist CBS-CR-18A, Radioactive Pipe- 1.65 Tons 1.65 Tons Radioactive CBS-CR-18B Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel Monorail Holst MS-CR-25A, Main Steam and 7.5 Tons 7.5 Tons MS and W MS-CR-25B Feedwater Pipe Pipe Chase Chase Crane W-CR-2 7 Emergency Feed 5 Tons 2.5 Tons Emergency Pump Monorail Feedwater Holst Pump Building DC-CR-28A, Diesel Generator 8 Tons 8 Tons Diesel DC-CR-28B Service Crane Generator Building i
SI-CR-40A, Safety Injection 4 Tons 4 Tons Equipment SI-CR-40B Pump Service Vault (PAB) Monorail Holst l REQUEST 2.1-2
" Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result .in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
RESPONSE TO 2.1-2 The following load handling systems have been excluded from the above category because no safety related systems or components required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal are located in the areas served by these overhead hsndling systems: ' TAC NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION MM-CR-1 Turbine Building Crane 210 Ton Main Turbine 30 Ton Auxiliary Building MM-CR-2 Hester Bay Crane 100 Ton Main Turbine 15 Ton Auxiliary Building ES-CR-26 Cenerator Breaker Crane 5.5 Tons , Turbine Building CO-CR-29A To Condenser Water Box 4.125 Tons Turbine 29X Monorail Hoist Building CW-CR-22 Circulating Water Stop 10 Tons Service and Log Monorail Hoist CW Pump House CW-CR-23 Pump House Trash Removal 1 Ton Service and Basket Monorail Hoist CW Pump House l PAH-CR-17 Ventilation Service 1 Ton Primary Auxi-Monorail Hoist liary Building , l EH-CR-39 Equipment Hatch Monorail 5 Tons Primary Auxi-Hoist liary Building 11 - l
~ . - -. - -. . . . = . . - -. - - - -. . - _ .. . .- - . . _
l i i
; TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION 1 ,
t
- WS-CR-7 Waste Process General 4 tons Waste
- Service 80 Monorail - Processing Hoist Building l WS-CR-8 Waste Process General 4 tons Waste
?
Service 40 Monorail Processing I Hoist Building i RS-CR-12 Resin Sluice Service 2 tons Waste i l Monorail Hoist Processing l Building
} WS-CR-4 Solid Waste Handling 30 tons Waste ; Crane Processing .i Building j AAH-CR-20 Decontamination Service 5 tons Administration
] Monorail Hoist and Service l j Building
! MM-CR-30 RCA Shop Crane- 5 tons Administration i
and Service Building I j MM-CR-31 Training Center Annex 5 tons Training i j Crane Center Annex In addition, the following systema are excluded from further consideration since they do not handle heavy loads. A " heavy load" is defined in i accordance with Section 1.1 of NUREG-0612, i.e., a load whose weight is ' j greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool (a load greater than 2100 pounds). l i j TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION ' 4
, FH-CR-33 Jib Crane 0.75 tens Containment i
- FH-RE-5 Manipulator Crane 2.5 tons containment .
] (2100 lbs)* l Manipulator Crane 1.5 tons containment j Auxiliary Holst (2100 lbs)* 4
*Copacities shown in parentheses are the derated capacities.
l 1 1 r ? I 1
. . .. - - - . . _ - - - . ._ - - . _ ~ ?
4 TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION FH-RE-2 Spent Fuel Pool Bridge 2 tons Fuel Storage , and Hoist (2100 lbs)* Building i RH-C R-32 RHR, CS, SI Equipment 0.75 tons Equipment p Vault Monorail Hoist Vault (P.A.B.) i SW-CR-16 Service Water Strainer 1.7 tons Outside Primary Monorail Hoist (2100 lbs)* Auxiliary Building Tha manipulator crane auxiliary hoist, although rated at 1.5 ton, does not cerry heavy loads. The loads handled by this hoist such as control rod j drive shaft, drive shaft unlatching tool, shaft handling tool, guide tube cover and cover handling tool, thimble plug and the associated handling tool i etc. weigh much less than 2100 pounds. Similarly, the manipulator crane and l I tha spent fuel pool bridge and hoist handle only light loads, such as fuel i accemblies with or without control elements and their associated handling 1 tools, burnable poison rod assembly and its handling tool etc. ! i 3 Furthermore, daring plant operation phase, the manipulator crane auxiliary ) hoist and the spent fuel pool bridge and hoist will be derated by posting a
! 2100 pounds capacity rating on the unit to caution the operators against l j using these hoists to lift heavier loads. However, if over the life of the plent a situation arises requiring use of the hoists with loads greater than l 2100 pounds, it would be thoroughly reviewed by the Station Operating Review
- Committee.
4 i , j i 2 I CCapacities shown in parenthesis are the derated capacities. i . _ - - ~ . _ . , , - , - - - , . ,,,,._-,,_,.m., ,--.,..,-,...- . ,_ _ - _-.-. _ m.-. . . . _ _ , _ - - ,
i i REQUEST 2.1-3 i j "With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in
- the containment and the spent fuel pool area and those load-handling systems
{ identified in 2.1-1, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREC-0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific ! information should be included in your replyt l (a) Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel and safety-related equipment." l RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (a) i The following drawings depict the safe travel paths for heavy loads which, if dropped, could impact the irradiated fuel or components in the systems required for shutdown or decay heat removal. Also shown on these layout { drawings are the locations of the safety related equipment and spent fuel, where applicable. To the maximum extent practicable, handling of heavy j loads over safety related equipment is avoided in identifying the safe load paths. Also, in defining these load paths consideration has been given to the safety related equipment located on lower elevations below the operating floor for the load handling system in question. j Drawing No. Title l 9763-F-805272 containment Building a Elev. 25'-0" I Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 1 of 9) I i
; 9763-F-805273 Containment Building j Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 2 of 9) 9763-F-805274 Containment Building
, Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane r (Sheet 3 of 9) 1
Drawing No. Title 9763-F-805275 Containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 4 of 9) 9763-F-805276 Containment Building Elev. 25'-0" i Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane 1 (Sheet 5 of 9) 9763-F-805277 Containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 6 of 9) J 9763-F-805282 containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 7 of 9) 9763-F-805283 containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane 1 (Sheet 8 of 9) 9763-F-805284 Containment Building
; Elev. 25'-0" , Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 9 of 9) 9763-F-805279 Fuel Storage Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Cask Handling Crane ) 9763-F-805280 Primary Auxiliary Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Monorails 9763-F-805281 Primary Auxiliary Building Elev. 53'-0" Safe Load Paths for Monorails 9763-F-805278 Emergency Feedwater Pump Bids.
Elev. 27'-0" Safe Load Paths for Monorails 1 i
.- - - ._ . _ _~ _ .- -.
One of the requirements of Section 5.1.1-(l) of NUREC-0612 is that "these load paths should be clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled." NHY, however, takes exception to this requirement due l l the following considerations: The safe load paths have been delineated on the drawings listed above. During the crane operator training program, emphasis is placed on the need l l to adhere to these safe load paths. Heavy loads will be moved by the safest end shortest routes in accordance with the approved load haniling precedures I 4 end the safe load path drawings. The crane operator will be directed by a signal person using standard signals given in ANSI B30.2-1976 and ANSI B30.ll-1980. The signal person will ensure that the load is moved along the designated path; and any deviations, if required, will be handled per station operating procedures.
- Due to the number of paths and their configurations (particularly in the l
ccntainment) as well as the frequent utilization of the felt paper to
- centrol contamination, it is felt that marked load paths, in general, will not contribute to ensuring the safe aandling of the heavy loads at Seabrook.
j Therefore, load paths will not be marked on the floor. i t I l l 1 i 1 i { 1 ! I
REQUEST 2.1-3 (b)
"A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths."
RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (b) All heavy loads identified in response to Section 2.1-3 (c) (to follow) will be handled along the well defined safs-load paths. The drawings showing safe load paths will be referenced in the applicable load handling procedures which form part of the overall plant operation and maintenance procedures. Additionally, for those load handling systems for which the load path is not fixed, a reduced size print of the load path drawing (8i x 11" or larger) will be attached to the load handling procedure. The load paths identified on the layout drawings follow the safest and shortest routes with consideration given to maintaining safe distances from spent fuel and safe shutdown equipment. In general, a load will be moved as close to the floor as practical except to clear any equipment or other physical obstructions in the travel path. In addition, appropriate notes of ths precautionary nature are also included, as required, on the load path drcwings. Any deviations from these safe load paths or written procedures governing the load handling operations will be handled per station operating procedures. To summarize, loads will be handled along established safe load paths in accordance with the approved procedures by trained and experienced personnel under the supervision of competent maintenance supervisors. REQUEST 2.1-3 (c)
"A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, es a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (2)."
RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (c) Haavy loads that will be handled by the cranes and monorail-hoists identified in response to section 2.1-1, above, are listed in Table 2.1.3(c)-1. For ecch load handling system tabulated, the loads to be carried are included along with the estimated weight of the load, its designated lifting device, applicable load path drawing and the reference drawing /s. Esch ' specific' procedure (See Table 2.1.3(c)-1) contains detailed step-by-step instructions for handling a particular load including identification of required equipment, safety precautions and reference to safe load paths. Where a ' specific' procedure is not intended, a ' general' proed.are (See Table 2.1.3(c)-1) encompassing basic rigging has been developed to cover the handling.of miscellaneous loads. These procedures have been developed in eccordance with Section 5.1.' (2) of NUREG-0612. 1 REQUEST 2.1-3 (d) " Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3-C, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lif ting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (4) or 5.1.1 (5), are not met, deocribe any proposed alternatives and d:monstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability." RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (d) The various lifting devices employed in handling the heavy loads at Seabrook are identified in Table 2.1.3(c)-1. Of these devices, the following are categorized as special lifting devices: (i) Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig, Load Cell and Lcid Cell Linkage Assembly. (ii) Internals Lif ting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage Assembly. The reactor vessel head and internals lifting rigs and associated load cell and linkage assemblies have been evaluated by Westinghouse to verify compliance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6 and NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1. (4). The results of this assessment are included in Appendix I (Tab 9). ! The design of the spent fuel cask and lifting device and the pressurizer enclosure wall lifting device have not yet been finalized. However, subsequent to core load, only lifting devices that meet the requirements of NUREG-0612 will be used to lift the intended loads. All special lifting devices will be subjected to periodic testing and inspection to verify continued compliance in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978 with the following cicrifications/ exceptions. (a) The tests or inspections as outlined below in (c) will be performed prior to use of the lifting device if it is not used for a period exceeding one year. (b) Where the usage frequency is more than once a year, the tests and inspections will be performed annually. (c) A 100 percent load test using the actual load plus visual examination of critical velds and parts will be conducted as part of the lift. A periodic non-destructive surface examination of critical velds and/or parts will be performed to insure continued adequacy. (d) All special lifting devices will be visually inspected by maintenance personnel prior to each use instead of every three months (5.3.7) for indications of damage or deformation. Altarnative load tests and non-destructive examination frequency proposed cbove are based upon the following considerations:
- 1. Load testing to 150 percent of the total weight before each use would require special fixtures and is impractical to perform.
Therefore, these special lifting devices will be tested at 100 percent of the load to be carried. Also, with the use of load cell for the head and internals lift rigs, all lifting and lowering is monitored at all times. Therefore, these special lifting devices will be tested at 100 percent of the load to be carried. Also, with the use of load cell for the head and internals lif t rigs, all lifting and lowering is monitored at all times.
- 2. Access to the welds for surface examination, for most of these special lift rigs, is difficult as they are stored in containment or fuel storage building and some contamination is present.
- 3. The items that are welded remain assembled and cannot be used for any other lift other than their intended function. The devices are Stored in protected areas, away from adverse environmental conditions and physical abuse that could have deterimental effect 4
on the integrity and reliability of these special lifting devices.
- 4. Dimensional checking is not included since these structures are large and the results of dimensional measurements would always be questionable, and will not serve any useful purpose.
The standard lifting devices (which are not specially designed) listed in Table 2.1.3(c)-1, such as slings with or without spreader bars, shackles, etc. will meet the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971 and, where applicable, Saction 5.1.1 (5) of NUREG-0612. The standard lifting devices used to carry hacvy loads will maintain a minimum safety factor of five based upon nominal breaking strength. In selecting the proper sling size, the rated load used will be the sum of the static and dynamic loads, the dynamic load being the greater of 15% of the static load or 0.5% of static load for each foot per ninute of hook speed. NHY takes no exceptions to the requirements of B30.9-1971 or Section 5.1.1(5). In addition, whan handling systems are required to be single-failure-proof or its equivalent (inct eased safety fcctor) and handle heavy loads, the lifting devices will meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. 4 i REQUEST 2.1-3 (e)
" Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976 Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives".
RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (e) l A crane inspection, testing and maintenance program has been developed in l cccordance with the requirements of Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, as classified for standby service. Frequency of tests and inspections will be as per Section 5.1.1 (6) of NUREC-0612. 4 1 1 i l l l
d !5 4 REQUEST 2.1-3 (f) i
" Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the dsmonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided."
- RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (f)
Overhead and Centry Cranes (Top Running Bridae) The polar gantry crane and the spent fuel cask handling crane have been
; dssigned in accordance with the guidelines of CMAA Specification No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1967, Overhead and Cantry Cranes. At the time of design and fabrication of both these cranes, ANSI standard B30.2-1976 was not in
- existence. A comparison of design revisions of Chapter 2-1 from 1967 to 1976 edition and the review of United Engineers and Constructors crane i'
spacifications 9763.006-257-2 and 9763.006-257-3 indicates that the design of the cranes complies with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976. Menorail Systems and Underhung Cranes i l l Th2 miscellaneous monorail-hoists and the underhung cranes identified above in Table 2.1.3(c)-1 except the radial arm stud tensioner hoists, are designed to the following applicable ANSI standards: ANSI B30.11 - Monorail Systems and Underhung Cranes ANSI B30.16 - Overhead Hoists (Underhung) l In addition, the design complies with the following applicable specifications of Monorail Manufacturers Association (MMA) and Hoist Manufacturers Institute (HMI):
*1 23 -
_ _ _. _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _. _. _- . . ~ . .. - - __. _ _ . _ _ _ . .
._. ,=. - _- - - .- .
MMA Specifications for Underhung Cranes and Monorail Systems HMI-100-74 Standard Specifications for Electric Wire Rope Hoists i The radial arm stud tensioner hoists are designed to HMI-100-74 and W3stinghouse Specification 953432. Since the applicable volumes of the cverall general standard B30 for monorails and underhung cranes are B30.11 cnd B30.16, it is considered that the intent of the request 2.1-3 (f) in
- regard to the design of these load handling systems has been met.
l l :-
1 I i i i i 1 REQUEST 2.1-3 (a)
" Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification and conduct".
4 f RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (a) i No exceptions are taken to the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 in regard to qualification,' training or conduct of crane operators. The crane operators !
- are trained in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 2-3 of B30.2-1976.
A crane operator training and qualification program has been developed and J implemented. This program will play an important role in assuring safe i hendling of the heavy loads at Seabrook. I Crane operators are required to receive classroom instruction, and gain practical operating experience under the direction of other qualified operators, for each type of crane on which they are to become qualified. In 1 eddition to a physical examination as per Section 2-3.1.2 (b) of B30.2-1976, each operator trainee is required to pass a written examination at the end 1
! of the formal instruction program. The practical training continues until l the trainee can demonstrate competent operation of the crane and pass the
, practical test. Proper training records documenting this operator training are maintained at the plant site. The operators are required to requalify pariodically. i l d i l -, . - . - . _ - . - . - . - . - . .-. _.-.
i
- 5. Response to Section 2.2 (Enclosure 3) ,
I Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the ' Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools "NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.2, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of stored, spent fuel. Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to insure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I thru III". I l 4 i i 1
l REQUEST 2.2-1
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool."
RESPONSE TO 2.2-1 There are no such cranes. Bath the spent fuel pool bridge and hoist, and the cask handling crane in the Fuel Storage Building are excluded, and the justification is provided below in Response 2.2-2. i l 5 27 -
REQUEST 2.2-2
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes -in this. area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for eny failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel - storage pool." '
RESPONSE TO 2.2-2 i The fcilowing cranes are excluded from our response to 2.2-1, above: EQUIPMENT NO. CRANE MANUFACTURER CAPACITY i FH-RE-2 Spent Fuel Pool Dwight Foote Inc. 2 Tons (Derated Bridge and Hoist (Hoist by P&H) Capacity-2100 l lbs) FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Whiting Corp. 125 Ton Main Handling Crane (5 Ton Hoists 2 (a, 5 Ton Aux. by P&H)
! 1. Spent Fuel Pool Bridae and Hoist The spent fuel pool bridge and hoist does not handle heav'y loads.
1 The only loads carried by the hoist over the spent fuel pool are , the fuel assemblies with or without control elements and their associated handling tools, and burnable poison rod assemblies and handling tools. The hoist will be derated to 2100 pounds by l displaying new rated load on the unit, clearly legible from the
; operating position. Therefore, this load handling system has not been included.
- 2. Spent Fuel Cask Handlina Crane l
l The cask handling crane is excluded because of its location in the Fuel Storage Building relative to the spent fuel storage pool. l l I
The design of the layout of the cask loading pool, spent fuel storage area and cask storage and decontamination area eliminates the need to move the cask and other heavy loads over the spent fuel. Since both the cask handling crane rails are outside the boundaries of the spent fuel storage pool--both rails are on the east side--it is physically impossible for any of the three hooks to travel over the spent fuel storage pool. The cask loading pool is separated from the spent fuel storage area by a six foot thick reinforced concrete wall with a stainless steel liner on each side. An isolation gate is provided in the wall, with the lowest point of the gate opening being above the top of the fuel in the storage racks. The steel gate is in the closed position whenever the spent fuel cask or other heavy loads are t .2dled over the cask loading pool. Figure 5-1 shows approximate locations of the above areas and limits of travel of the main and auxiliary hooks. In the extreme position of the trolley, the centerline of the 125 , con main hook is 10 feet away from the spent fuel storage pool boundary. The cask design has not yet been finalized; however, use of the preliminary dimensions in the load drop analysis j indicates that in the unlikely event of a cask drop in the loading pool, integrity of the storage pool will not be breached nor would any damage occur to the stored spent fuel. A loss of spent fuel storage pool water will be prevented by the isolation gate in the wall. The centerline of the two $ ton auxiliary hooks, in the extreme position of the hoists, canr.ot move closer than 8'-8" to the storage pool boundary. b 0
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I l The auxiliary hook number 1 is normally used to handle single fuel l elements. The new fuel containers, each weighing about 6,700 pounds, are normally handled by auxilairy hook number 2. The area in the Fuel Storage building allocated to storage and handling of the new fuel containers eliminates the need to carry the containers near the spent fuel storage area or the cask loading pool. In the unlikely event of inadvertent carrying of the new fuel containers near the spent fuel storage area and coincident failure of the load handling system, the container will fall in the cask loading pool only since the center of gravity of the load falls approximately 2'-8" from the outer edge (or 8'-8" from the inner edge) of the spent fuel storage pool wall. NHY takes exception, on the basis of plant specific design, to the l 15 feet requirement for minimum distance of the hook centerline from the spent fuel pool boundary. The ten (10) feet separation presently allowed in the Seabrook Station design is more than sufficient, due to the physical layout, to ensure that the cask, if dropped, does not fall into the spent fuel storage pool or compromise its integrity. The limits imposed on the hook travel will again be reviewed, when the cask dimensions are finalized; and, if necessary, feasibility of moving the fixed mechanical stops to increane this distance will be examined. The cask handling crane is not a seismic Category I component; however, in compliance with R'egulatory Guide 1.29 the crane design parameters are specified to provide adequate quality control of fabrication and design so that in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) or Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), the crane will not fail in such a manner as to. impair the functioning of any plant feature designated as seismic Category I. The crane is prevented
-from being dislodged off its rails during the SSE by mechanical anti-derailing devices.
l i In addition, the cask handling crane includes the following safety features which contribute to the reliability of the load handling operations: a) Dual limit switches, each of different design, are provided in series to stop the main and auxiliary hooks in their highest safe positions and prevent a "two-blocking" incident. Limit switches are also provided to restrict the downward travel of the hooks. b) Low or no voltage for any motion automatically stops the motion and sets brakes. c) The drives for the bridge, trolleys and hoists are variable speed with an inching control on the main hoist. Controls for all motions are full magnetic, 5 step timed acceleration type. In addition, main hoist control includes magnet operated electric shoe type brakes to provide positive controlled speed regulation in both hoisting and lowering. d) The hoist motor shaft is provided with two electrically released, spring actuated double shoe type DC load holding brakes each rated at 150 percent of motor full load torque. e) The crane is designed for a minimum safety factor of 5 in accordance with CMAA Specification No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1967. However, taking into consideration the actual weight of the heaviest anticipated load handled, the factor of safety provided is expected to be more than five. Furthermore, the spent fuel shipping cask or other heavy loads cannot travel over any safety related equipment. The spent fuel pool cooling equipment is located in a separate area in the Fuel i l L
~
Storage Building beyond the operating area of the cask handling crane. Although no credit is taken in the above discussion for safe load paths, load handling procedures and other technical specifications; it is, however, pointed out that the administrative controls, proper operator training, load paths and procedures will help ensure the safe handling of the heavy loads, with loads being maintained as far away from the spent fuel pool boundary and as close to the floor as practical. Radiological consequences of a spent fuel cask drop accident are presented in FSAR Section 15.7.5. The results of a conservative analysis and a realistic analysis are summarized in Table 15.7-28. l l l l ! 1
REQUEST 2.2-3 i i
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREC-0612, Seciton 5.1.6 or partial i compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide t'he load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."
., RESPONSE TO 2.2-3 1 Rafer to Response 2.2-1. 4 t 1 i ] i 3 l I i } i
___ -- __. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____ _ _ . . ~ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ REQUEST 2.2-4 . I "For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, I demonstrate that the criteria of NUREC-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with criterien IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 i of this request. With respect to criteria I through III, provide a 4
- discussion of your evaluation of crane operr. tion in the spent fuel area and L
your determination of compliance. This response should include the following 4
! information for each crane."
i ]; RESPONSE TO 2.2-4 4 i Refer to Response 2.2-1. No cranes fall in this category. I I i < 1 1 3 1 i 1 i k [ I i i + 4 l 4 i 4 i 6 1 ! i
- - .--.-----r,.,------.,-,.-,-,-,,, -,,--.v,,..,.-,---_..,--,n,,_.,---- - .,. - - ,n ,-..., _ ,, .
- 6. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.3 (ENCLOSURE 3)
Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment "NUREC-0612, Section 5.1.3 provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of the reactor core. Information provided in . response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREC-0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III." t I l L I l REQUEST 2.3-1
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes i physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel."
RESPONSE TO 2.3-1 The followinF cranes and monorail-hoists can carry heavy loads over the reactor vessel: EQUIPMENT NO. CRANE TYPE CAPACITY MM-CR-3 Polar Cantry Crane Revolving Over- 420 Ton Main head Bridge 50 Ton Aux. FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud Monorail 2 Ton each Tensioner Hoists (3) I I l 1
. .. - __.-. = .
REQUEST 2.3-2
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by i
verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel." f RESPONSE TO 2.3-2
)
The following load handling systems are not li.sted above in Response 2.3-1. The justification for their exclusion is provided below: EQUIPMENT NO. CRANE TYPE CAPACITY FH-CR-33 Jib Crane Jib 0.75 tons I j FH-RE-5 Manipulator Crane Traveling Bridge 2.5 tons and Hoist (2100 lbs)* Manipulator Crane 1.5 tons Auxiliary Hoist (2100 lbs)* The jib crane is not capable of carrying heavy loads. It is used primarily J to handle studs, and tools required to unbolt and remove the reactor vessel head during refueling operations. The manipulator crane and manipulator crane auxiliary hoists handles only light loads such as fuel assemblies, control rod drive shaft, drive shaft unlatching tool, shaft handling tool, guide tube cover and cover handling tool, thimble plug and its associated handling tool etc Also, manipulator end the auxiliary hoist will be derated to 2100 pounds capacity to preclude in dvertent use of this hoist with heavier loads. The new (lower) rated espacity will be marked on the hoist units. l CC pacities shown in parenthesis are the derated capacities.
l I REQUEST 2.3-3 l
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have evaluated as
- having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial i~
compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment I." RESPONSE TO 2.3-3 The polar gantry crane and its auxiliary hook (except when handling the equipment hatch) have has been evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small. The basis selected for this evaluation is essential compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, supplemented by additional design features. In the case of , the auxiliary hook when handling the equipment hatch, an acceptable load drop analysis is provided (see Attachment B of Addendum 2 to this report). I The sections which follow contain our responses to information requested in the Attachment I referenced above. i e i i r l
l l l l A. Polar Gantry Crane
- 1. Rated Capacity Manufacturer Whiting Corporation Design Rated Load (DRL) 420 ton Main 50 ton Auxiliary Maximum Critical Load (MCL)
Main Hook 210 tons (See Note 1) .) 4 Auxiliary Hook 25 tons (See Note 2) Note 1: Maximum anticipated load with fuel in the reactor vessel is, however, 168 tons. Note 2: The only exception is the equipment hatch cover which weighs more than 25 tons. However, in the unlikely event of a load drop, resulting damage to the plant equipment will not affect the decay heat removal process, nor would there be any damage to the spent fuel. The equipment hatch cover will be handled only when the reactor is in cold shutdown, with the residual beat removal system removing decay heat. The analysis which evaluated the postulated equipment hatch cover drop can be found in Attachment B of the Addendum 2 to this report. i l i L__
. . _ . ___ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ ___ ._m _ . .- . _ _ _ _ _
b l
- 2. Point-By-Point Comparison with NUREC 0554 i
The following evaluation is a point-by point comparison of the design, fabrication, inspection, testing, and maintenance of the polar crane to j the requirements delineated in NUREC-0554. Where the design features j differ from those of *1UREC-0554, they are presented along with an explanation to demonstrate their equivalency and/or adequacy. 4 i , Section 1. Introduction Section 2. Specification and Desian Criteria 1I i 2.1 Construction and Operatina Periods i e Requirement: The allowable design stress limits for the crane ] intended for plant operation should be those indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA Specification No. 70 reflecting the appropriate duty cycle. 1 l Actual: This requirement is met. The allowable stresses used in the design of the polar crane are as per CMAA Specification No. 70 for Class A1 (Standby Service). 2.2 Maximum Critical Load (McL) i a 1 Requirement: The Design Rated Load (DRL) should be at least 15% greater than the Maximum Critical Load (MCL). i
- Actual
- The requirement is met. The DRL is 200 percent of the MCL, and is considered to be an important factor in proving the adequacy of the polar gantry crane.
1 1 ) ! i l 1 l
~ , , _ - . . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ , , . . _ . - . . _ . . _ _ _ , . . _ _ . . , . _ _ _ _ _ - . . , _ . . . _ . . - _ _ , _ _ _ , - . . - _ . _ _ -
2.3 'Operatina Environment Requirement: The operating enviornment including minimum and maximum pressure, maximum rate of pressure increase, temperature, humidity and emergency corrosive or hazardous conditions should be specified as well as proper venting and drainage requirements to avoid collapse and standing water. Actual: The crane design complies with this section of NUREC-0554. The following service conditions are specified in the Polar Crane Specification 9763-006-257-2: Design Temperature, Minimum -200F Design Temperature, Maximum +1200F
! Temperature (accident conditions) 2960F Wind Loading 35 mph (while in operation) l 110 mph (while not in use)
Pressure (normal operation) Atmospheric to 15.7 psia Pressure (accident conditions) 52 psig i Pressure (pressure test) 60 psig l i Pressure Change 4 psi /sec l l i
Relative Humidity 30-100% Radiation Dose 50 mR/ Hour Aqueous Spray pH 8.0-10.5 Boron (calculated as boric 4 w% ! acid) Sodium Hydroxide 1.75 w% All enclosed portions of the crane equipment have positive openings to the environment. 2.4 Material Properties
- Requirement
- Materials for structural members essential to structural integrity should be tested for brittle fracture per ASTM E-208 (Drop Weight Test) or ASTM A-370 (Charpy Test).
Minimum operating temperatures based on drop weight test should be obtained from paragraph NC 2300 of Section III or for Charpy test from paragraph ND 2300 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
, OR t
Cold proof load test should be performed. 1 Actual: Material testing for brittle fracture was in accordance with the above requirements. Load bearing members of cranes including weld metal and bolting whose failure could damage components were impact tested in conformance with United Engineers Specification No. 9763-MPS-2 including the following: Impact testing shall be performed in accordance with ASME Section VIII Division II, Article M-2 (including exemptions) as modified below: (a) Testing is not required for material thickness of 5/8" or less. (b) Testing is not required for all thicknesses of material for pipe, tube, fittings, pumps and valves with a nominal pipe size of 6" diameter or less. (c) Testing of support and crane welds when required shall be performed as required by Article T-2 as specified for Category B joints. (d) Impact testing of materials for cranes shall be conducted at 300F below the lowest service. tempera-ture. (e) The lateral expansion value in Table AM 211.1 shall be 0.025" in lieu of 0.015". 2.5 Seismic Desian Requirement: Crane should be designed to retain load during an SSE; and the bridge and trolley should remain on their respective runways with wheels prevented from leaving the tracks. Design should also be in accordance with
.- ._ =. . . - -.
regulatory position 2 of Reg. Cuide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification. Actual: Although the polar crane is not classified as Seismic Category I equipment, the design does include considera-tion of Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). The dynamic forces resulting from SSE and OBE accelerations corresponding to the i response spectra for the containment operating floor i were considered in the modal seismic analysis of the crane load bearing elements. The dynamic analysis was performed in accordance with the procedures stipulated in United Engineers Specification 9763-SD-257-2. The analysis assumed that the crane and trolley were both in the parked position and that the crane was unloaded. Due to the infrequent use anticipated for this crane, the combined probability of the event involving a heavy load lift and the occurrence of an SSE is expected to be extremely low. Therefore, this assumption is considered to be valid. , The crane design and construction is in accordance with regulatory position C2 of Reg. Cuide 1.29, i.e., the crane will not fail in such a manner as to damage safety related equipment or in any way prevent the performance of their safety function in the event of a seismic event equal to SSE. The bridge and trolley are equipped with earthquake restraints (up-kick lugs) which are designed to prevent the crane from overturning and leaving the rails during an SSE. 2.6 Lamellar Tearing Requirement: All weld joints whose failure could result in the drop of a critical laod, and the base metal at the joints susceptible to lamellar tearing should be non-destruc-tively examined. Actual: These requirements are met. The polar crane specifica-tion 9763-006-257-2 required the crane supplier to perform radiographic examination on the cover plate splice welds in the tension members of the bridge girders in accordance with the United Engineers Standard 9763-WS-3. All other welds were required to be examine'd by magnetic particle technique as per 9763-WS-3. All load bearing welds were specified to be full penetration type. 2.7 Structural Fatigue Requirement: Fatigue analysis for the critical load bearing structures and components should be performed. The cumulative fatigue usage factors should reflect effects of the cyclic loading from both the construction and operating periods. Actual: Construction usage was identified in the crane speci-fication 9763-006-257-2 and, therefore, was considered by the crane manufacturer in order to assure placement of the crane into the proper classification. The polar crane was designed in accordance with CMAA Specification No. 70. The allowable stress range values for the polar crane are in accordance with Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 which takes into consideration the number of loading cycles. The polar crane is classified as Al and meets the intent of Section 2.7. 2.8 Welding Procedures Requirement: Preheat and postweld heat treatment temperatures should be specified for all welds. Welds whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load should be postweld heat treated per Subarticle 3.9 of AWS Dl.1, Structural Welding Code. Actual: This requirement is met. Welding was performed in ac-cordance with United Engineers Specification 9763-WS-3 : which further makes reference to AWS Dl.1 as the applicable standard for welding, welding procedure qualifications and welder performance qualifications. All welding procedures and qualifications were approved by United Engineers. Section 3 Safety Features 3.1 Ceneral 3.2 Auxiliary Systems , Requirement: 1. Auxiliary hoisting systems employed to lift or assist in handling critical loads should be single-failure proof.
- 2. The main hoisting mechanism should be provided with redundant or dual components.
Actual: 162. The main and auxiliary hoists are not single-failure proof; however, they have sufficient design features to guard against a load drop. The hoists are equipped with dual upper limit switches to prevent two-blocking. The heavy loads identified in Table 2.1.3(c)-1 do not exceed 50% of the rated capacity of the hoists, with the exception of equipment hatch cover, thereby increasing the available safety factors to 10 or greater. A minimum safety factor of 5 will be maintained while handling equipment hatch cover with the auxiliary hoist and the hatch cover lifting device. The equipment hatch cover will be handled only when the reactor is in COLD SHUTDOWN with the residual heat removal system in operation. Technical Specifications also prohibit opening of the equipment hatch during refueling operations. In the unlikely event of a handling system failure resulting in a load drop, damage to the plant equipment will be limited, and will not affect the spent fuel or decay heat removal process. The Preventive Maintenance and Inspection Program to be implemented for all cranes will reveal any deterioration of the lifting equipment and allc,w for repairs prior to component failure. The analysis which evaluated the postulated equipment hatch cover drop can be found in Attachment B of Addendum 2 to this report. 3.3 Electric Control Systems Requirement: Provide fail safe controls and limiting devices such that when disorders due to inadvertent operator action, component malfunction or disarrangement of subsystem control functions occur singly or in combination during load handling, disorders will not prevent the handling system from stopping and holding the load. An emergency stop button should be added at the coatrol station. Actual: The crane design complies with this requirement. The polar crane is controlled from either the cab or from the operating floor by a push button pendant station. All push buttons and master switches are of the momentary contact or spring-return type. Release of the push button or switch automatically stops the motion and sets brakes and thus a positive operator action is required to initiate and sustain any crane motion. The controllers are equipped with start and stop buttons. The stop button may be used during an emergency to stop the crane, should it become necessary. 3.4 Emergency Repairs Requirement: Means should be provided for repairing, adjusting or replacing the failed component or subsystem, when failure of an active component or subsystem has occurred
^
and the load is supported an'd retained-in.the safe
~
(temporary) position. Alternatively, a means should be
, provided for safely transferring the immobilized hoisting system with its load to a safe laydown area.
Actual: -This requirement is met. Depending upon the failure, repairs can be made in place while load is safely suspended in a temporary position, or load may be transferred to a safe laydown area using improvised means if temporary or permanent repairs cannot be made.
Section 4 Hoisting Machinery 4.1 Reeving System Requirement: 1. Dual reeving system each providing separate load balance on the head and load blocks through a configuration of ropes and rope equalizers, is required.
- 2. Rope sizing should include effects of impact loads, acceleration and emergency stops. Maximum loads (including static and inertia forces) on each indi-vidual wire rope in the dual reeving system with MCL attached, should not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength.
- 3. Maximum fleet angle from drum to lead sheave in the load block or between individual sheaves should not exceed 3 1/20 at any one point during hoisting, l except that for the last 3 feet of maximum lift elevation, the fleet angle may increase slightly.
The use of reverse bends should be limited.
- 4. The pitch diameter of running sheaves should be selected in accordance with CMAA Specification 70.
Actual: 1. The main hoist reeving system is a 2-rope system using dual drums and two separate ropes, each reeved through upper and lower sheaves to an equalizer sheave and anchored to one drum. The reeving configuration consists of 32 parts (2 ropes x 16) of 1 1/4" diameter 6 x 37 IWRC extra improved plow steel wire rope.
l 1 l l
- 2. The ropes have been sized to include effects of impact loading, acceleration and emergency stops.
The maximum load on each of the individual wire ropes in the reeving system with the MCL attached, does not exceed 10% of the published breaking strength.
- 3. The reeving is designed such that the fleet angle relative to the drum or sheaves does not exceed 4.750 during any operating condition. As per Appendix C to NUREG-0612, Modification of Existing Cranes, larger thsn recommended fleet angles have been accepted for similar applications. The crane inspection and preventive maintenance program to be implemented at Seabrook will assure the continued integrity of the wire ropes.
- 4. The polar crane has been designed in accordance with CMAA Specification 70. The pitch diameter of all running sheaves is 24 times the rope diameter.
The auxiliary hook is equipped with a single rope reeving system employing a single drum and 12 parts of 5/8" diameter 6 x 37 regular lay wire center rope. The anticipated loads to be handled by this hook during plant operation are, with one exception (equipment hatch), less then 50% of its rated capacity and will provide design safety factors of-greater than 10. In the case of the equipment hatch cover for which a minimum safety factor of 5 is maintained an acceptable load drop analysis is - provided (see Attachment B of Addendum 2 to this report). 50 -
~
'4.2 Drum Support Requirement: The load hoisting drum should be provided with structural and mechanical safety devices to limit the
~ -
crop of the drum and thereby prevent it from disengaging from its holding brake system if the drum shaft or bearings were to fail or fracture. Actual: Each of the two load hoisting drums is supported at each ] end by a roller bearing mounted in a pedestal, and is driven through a gear and pinion at one end. The crane design does not include any special retaining features to limit the excessive drop of the drum in the event of a shaft or bearing failure. Therefore, depending upon the failure, the drum might disengage from the driving pinion, or alternatively in the case of a small drop it may still remain partially engaged. However, t.his failure is not credible because of increased safety margins allowed in the design of the polar crane. By i considering an MCL of 210 tons, the safety factor provided is 10. 4 4.3 Head and Load Blocks Requirement: 1. The load block assembly should be provided with two i load-attaching points, each designed to support a load of three times the load being handled without permanent deformation.
- 2. The individual component parts of the hoisting
, system should each be designed for a static load of 200% of the MCL. e
- - si -
-- - . . - - - .. -- - .~ , .. . ,
I t 6 1 3
- 3. Each load-attaching point should be load tested at i
e 200% of the McL. Dimensional measurements of the
! hook configuration should be made, and NDE should
.be performed both before and after the test.
4.- The load blocks should be non-destructively . examined by surface and volumetric techniques, and
, the results should be documented.
Actual: 1. The crane is equipped with a single attachment sister hook (main) with a pin hole and safety a
- latches. As per Appendix C to NUREC-0612, a safety factor of 10 is provided to compensate for loss of the single-failure proof feature.
- 2. The individual components of the vertical hoisting system are designed for a static load of 200% of
- the MCL.
i t I 1 3. The main hook including pin hole was load tested in 1 the shop at 150% of the design rating or 300% of ! the MCL. A longitudinal magnetic particle test and s ultrasonic inspection were performed as per above requirements. The load-attaching points were also subjected to a load test.in the field in accordance with ANSI B30.2 at 250'% of the McL. 1 1 ! 4. The load blocks were examined by magnetic particle and ultrasonic inspection techniques during manu- ! facture, in accordance with the polar crane speci-I fication and other applicable standards. The i
- results of the NDE have been documented.
i ( i i
, - , - , - - - . , , ~ . , . , - _ . , - , - - , . .---,,-.....--,--.c,--..--..-n., , - - - , - . ~ - , - - - - ~
i The 50 ton auxiliary hook is of the single prong
- type and is equipped with a safety latch. The increased safety factors provided for the auxiliary hoisting system enhance the reliability of the load hoisting system. The above load tests and NDE were also performed on the auxiliary hook.
i 4.4 Hoisting Speed Requirement: Maximum hoisting speed for the critical load should be limited to that given in the ' slow' column of Figure
- 70-6 of CMAA Specification No. 70.
Actual: The polar crane hoist speeds comply with the above ! requirement. 4.5 Design Against Two-Blocking Requirement: 1. Provide means within the reeving system located on the head or load block combinations to absorb or i control the kinetic energy of rotating machinery during a two-blocking incident. OR Provide two independent travel limit devices of j different design and activated by separate ' mechanical means.
- 2. The protective control system for load hang-up should consist of load cell systems in the drive j train or motor current sensing devices or mechanical load limiting devices.
i
f 4
- 3. The auxiliary hoist, if supplied, should be ;
equipped with two independent travel limit switches. Actual: These requirements are met. ,
- 1. The main hoist is equipped with dual upper limit switches to prevent two-blocking. One of the two load hoisting drums contains a screw type limit I
4 switch (which also limits the downward travel) in addition to a weight type limit switch which is
] directly actuated by the traveling load block.
l
- 2. A load cell on the main hoist provides load indication in the cab and is equipped with an adjustment feature. The power supply to the hoist motor is interrupted at a preset load value.
, 3. The auxiliary hoist is provided with two indepen-l dent travel limit switches. 4.6 Liftina Devices i Requirement: The lifting devices that are attached to the load block should be conservatively designed with a dual or i auxiliary device or combination thereof. Each device
- should be designed to support a load of three times the
! load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation. Actual: Refer to item 4 in this section on polar crane for a ' detailed evaluation of the lifting devices. ' a l h i
4.7 Wire Rope Protection Requirement: If side loads cannot be avoided, the reeving system should be equipped with a guard that would keep the wire rope properly located in the grooves on the drum. Actual: The proper operator training and load handling proce-dures will assure that the significant side pulls are avoided under all circumstances. 4.8 Machinery Alignment Requirement: Where gear trains are interposed between the holding brakes and the hoisting drum, these gear trains should be of single failure proof design. Actual: The hoisting machinery is not equipped with single failure proof or redundant gear trains. Depending upon the failure, a single active component failure in the gear train between the holding brakes and the hoisting drum could render the train ineffective in transmitting power or holding the drum with the brakes activated. However, increased factors of safety employed in the design of the gear case and other components will make such failures incredible. 4.9 Hoist Braking System Requirement: 1. The minimum hoist braking system should include one power control braking system and two holding brakes. Each holding brake should have a minimum capacity
of 125% of the torque developed during the hoisting operation at the point of brake application.
- 2. The holding brake system should be single failure proof.
- 3. Provision for manual operation of the hoisting brakes during emergency conditions should be included in the crane design.
Actual: 1. Both the main and the auxiliary hoist are each equipped with a separate braking system which is comprised of an eddy current brake and two DC load holding brakes. Each holding brake is rated at
,150% of the motor full load torque.
- 2. One of the two holding brakes is directly applied to the motor shaft and the other with a time delay is designed to apply to an intermediate shaft in the gear train. Following a malfunction or failure of one brake, the other independent brake is capable of holding the hoisting drums to eliminate the possibility of an accidental load drop. The interposing gear trains are discussed in 4.8, above.
The brakes are automatically applied upon power interruption or in the event of an overspeed or overload condition.
- 3. The holding brakes are not equipped with any lever or other design feature to aid in controlled lowering of the load under emergency conditions. Ifowever, the design of this crane makes the occurrence of an I
{ event requiring such action extremely remote. The
- main hoist and the auxiliary hoist each have an
! independent precision drive in addition to the l primary drive. However, should a manual lowering , of the load be required, one of several means of i j control of brake shoe adjustment could be locally devised to permit a controlled lowering of the load. i Section 5 Bridae and Trolley J l j 5.1 Brakina Capacity : I ! Requirement: 1. The maximum torque capability of the driving motor i f and gear reducer for trolley and bridge should not ' exceed the capability of the gear train and brakes ,
! to stop the trolley or bridge from maximum speed
- with DRL attached.
I
- 2. Mechanical drag-type brakes should not be used to j control movements of the bridge and trolley. {
Control and holding brakes should each be rated at I i 100% of maximum drive torque. l
- 3. Brakes should be activated in the event of a power shut-off, malfunction in the power supply or an overspeed condition.
i
- 4. Opposite-drive wheels on bridge or trolley should j be matched and have identical diameters.
- 5. Trolley and bridge speeds should be limited as per CMAA Specification No. 70.
4 1 I
l i j i Actual: The braking system is generally in accordance with the above requirements; and also complies with the { requirements of CMAA Specification No. 70. Each bridge drive motor is equipped with a Whiting 6" solenoid brake j type "SESA" (Covered), designed for a minimum torque of i 100% of the rated full load torque. The trolley brake l provides a minimum torque of 50% of the rated full load 3
; torque of the drive motor as per CMAA Specification t ) No. 70. Both the bridge and trolley brakes automatically !
j , apply torque and act as parking, fail-safe brakes upon l l loss of power or full release of the controller button. 1 Controls for all motions are specified to be full magnetic l 4 5 step, timed acceleration type. , 5.2 Safety Stops 3 Requirements Mechanical and/or electrical limiting devices should be ( provided to prevent over-travel or overspeed of the ' j trolley and bridge. Actual: The crane design complies with this requirement. Four , (4) fixed mechanical stops are provided at the end of s the trolley rails, and prevent overtravel of the trolley by coming in contact with spring bumpers attached to the ' trolley trucks. No stops are required for the revolving ) bridge. i Section 6 Drivers ard Controls i i I 6.1 Driver Selection j 0 i i
; Requirementt The maximum torque capability of the electric motor ,
i 1 i i ! l = l
1 4 l drive for hoisting should not exceed the rating or capability of the individual components required to hoist the MCL at maximum design speed. I I Actualt The electric drive motors were selected in accordance with the requiremente established in CMAA Specification No. 70 and meet the intent of this Section. 6.2 Driver Control Systems i i Requirement! If the crane is used to lift spent fuel assemblies, the control system should be adaptable to include interlocks that will prevent trolley and bridge movements while the : 1 1 load is being hoisted free of the reactor vessel or storage rack. l ! i Actualt The polar gantry crane does not handle spent fuel assemblies. , j 6.3 Malfunction Protection I Requirement: Means should be provided in the motor control circuits i { co sense and respond to excessive current, excessive J J temperature, overspeed, overload and over-travel. ; f Controls should be provided to absorb the kinetic energy ; of the rotating machinery and stop the hoisting movement ! if one rope or one of the dual reeving systems shoul. i fall or if an overloading or overspeed condition should 1 l occur. I
\ l l
Actual! The design of the motor control circuitry is in , compliance with the abovetrequirements and includes l 1, ! i
l necessary protection features such as overload relays, overspeed switch, load sensing devices and under voltage protection. 6.4 Slow Speed Drives Requiremenet If jegging or plugging is to be used, the control circuit should include features to prevent abrupt change in motion. Actualt This requirement is met. Precision or inching drives are provided to reduce the main hoist speed to 2.4 inches per minute and the auxiliary hoist speed to 22.8 inches per minute. The normal or slow speed for either hoist can be selected from the " NORMAL-INCHING" switch located on the control panet in the cab or from a similar switch J on the pendant station. The control system is considered to be adequate to protect against an abrupt change in motion. Also, the proper training program will stress the need to avoid any abrupt change in motion which could cause load swings. i ! 6.5 Safety Devices Requirement! Safety devices such as limit switches provided for mal-function, inadvertent operator action or failure should be in addition to and separate from the limiting means or control devices provided for operation. A,etuait The design of the polar crane complies with this requirement. The travel limit switches as discussed in the preceding sections are separate from normal control functions provided for operation. 6.6 Control Stations Requirement: The controls for normal operation, and provisions for emergency controls should preferably be located in a cab on the bridge. Additional operator stations, when provided. should have control systems similar to the main station. Electrical interlocks should be included so as to permit the crane operation from only one control station St any one time. Actualt The requirement is met. The polar crane is equipped with two control stations, a cab mounted on the underside of the bridge and a pushbutton pendant station. Both these stations have similar control functions with proper electrical interlocks as per above requirements. Manual transferring of the load is possible under emergency conditions. Section 7 Installation Instructions 7.1 Ceneral Requirement: Installation instructions should be provided by the manu-facturer. Actualt The requirement is met. Complete instructions for unloading, extended storage, erection and testing of the polar crane were provided by the manufacturer. 1 k
l l I l l I i 7.2 Construction and Operatina Periods Requirementt 1. The construction operating requirements should be i i defined separately.
- 2. At the end of the construction period, the crane l should be modified as needed for the performance requirements of the plant operating service.
- i
- 3. After construction use, the crane should be i
thoroughly inspected by NDE and load tested for the ! operat.3ng phase. ) i . 4. NDE extent and acceptance criteria should be defined in the design specification. 1
- 5. If allowable stress limits are to be exceeded during
^
construction, added inspection supplementing that
- described in Section 2.6 should be specified and developed.
- 6. During and after installation of the crane, the proper assembly of electrical and st/nctural components should be verified.
i
- 7. The integrity of control, operating and safety j systems should be verified.
i. Actual! The above requirements are met. t
- 1. The operating requirements for the construction phase were defined in the polar crane specification.
1 i i i 1
- 2. Modification of the polar crane is not required.
a
- 3. The polar crane will be thoroughly inspected and
, refurbished, if necessary. The crane will be reload tested if any modifications or alterations, temporary l or not, have invalidated the original load test. i Also, pursuant to the satisfaction of Section 7.2 l j of NUREC 0554, the polar crane will be retested for ' i the operating phase as follows: ' k
; Main Hoist ! A rated load test at 125 percent of the MCL (i.e.
l 1 i at 262.5 tons) will be conducted in accordance with , i 1 ANSI 830.2. In addition, an operational or no-load l j test will be performed in accordance with the
- requirements of ANSI B30.2.
e i Auxillary Holst : i ! A rated load test at 125 percent of the DRL (i.e. ! l' at 62.5 tons) will be conducted in accordance with ANSI B30.2. Also, an operational or no-load test 1 will be performed in accordance with the require-
- ments of ANSI 830.2 r
j
- 4. NDE extent and acceptance criteria were not defined in the crane specification for removal from con-
! struction phase to plant operation phase. These 1
l are defined in a written procedure. I l i l ! l 0 I
._ -. ._ . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _. ____. _ __ ___ m__ _ . _ _- _ - _
i t I I 1 I .' 5. Allowable stress limits will not be exceeded during ' the construction phase. l i i 6. Proper assembly of electrical, structural and : j mechanical components was verified. l
- 7. Integrity of control, operating, and safety systems will be verified during crane checkout and load l ;
test. l ) 1 Section 8 Testina and Preventive Maintenance i i i 8.1 General j Reauirementst 1. Make a complete check of all mechanical and l 1
! electrical systems of the crane before the tests.
i 1 2. Information concerning shop testing should be available I ! at the plant site. ; t I Actuait - These requirements are met. , I I l
- 1. All mechanical and electrical systems were thoroughly j inspected and checked out prior to the field acceptance t
tests. i
! 2. In addition to required tests and inspection as per j technical specifications, all hooks were load tested I in the shop to 1.5 times the design rating. A
{ longitudinal magnetic particle test and ultrasonic j inspection were performed on the hooks both before and after the load test. A no-load running test of l 4 l !
,en --,n.- n,. , - ~ _ . , - - - . . , - , , . .,.+.e---,+---,---,-n,,,..n--,.4 .,,n.- - - -. - - - - .,..- ,- -.-,-,n-n-,-n ~ - n n nw
all motors was conducted. The necessary documen-tation concerning these tests is available in QA files at the plant. 8.2 Static and Dynamic Load Tests i r Reeuirement! A static load test at 125% of the maximum critical load (MCL) should be performed. Full performance test with 100% of the MCL including verification of the proper i functioning of all limiting and safety control devices [ should be conducted. I i Actual For the main hoist and the auxiliary hoist, a static load test at 125% of the MCL and a performance test at or above 100% of the MCL will be performed as per above requirement. Proper functioning of all limit switches and other safety control devices will be verified. [ i, 8.3 Two-81ock Test Requirement 1. When equipped with an energy-controlling device between the load block and the head block, the complete hoisting machinery should be h11 owed to two-block. The test should be conducted at slow speed without load.
- 2. Crane should be tested for load hangup.
Actualt 1. Appendix C to NUREC-0612, allows the crane to be furnished with two independent travel limit switches in lieu of a design to withstand a two-blocking incident. This alternative is selected
for the polar crane; and the proper functioning of the dual upper limit switches was verified during rated load test and operational tests. Limit switches for the main hoist and the auxiliary hoist will be again verified for proper functioning at the time of crane turnover to operations, as part of the operational tests.
- 2. Interlock alternative as outlined in Appendix C is selected in lieu of load hang-up protection. An overload sensing system is provided on the main hoist with read-out and adjustment in the control cab. In the event, the hoist load exceeds the set-point of the load sensing device, power supply to the hoist motor is interrupted, thus preventing overloading of the hoisting machinery.
8.4 Operational Tests Requirementt Operational tests should be performed to verify the proper functioning of limit switches and other safety devices. Actual: The requirement is met. Inspection and operational tests were performed in accordance with ANSI B30.2. These tests including verification of proper functioning of all limit switches will be again performed at turnover to operating phase. 8.5 Maintenance kaquirement The critical load handling cranes should be continuously maintained above MCL capacity. The MCL should be clearly marked for each hoisting unit. Actualt The polar crane as well as other cranes and monorails are subject to a periodic inspectioit and maintenance program as outlined in this report. The crane inspection, testing and maintenance program is considered an extremely important component in the overall safe load handling operations at Seabrook. The MCL will be marked on the crane. l Section 9 Operating Manual Requirement Manufacturer should provide an operating manual for the crane. Actual! This requirement is met. Whiting Corporation provided a crane manual which contains information on checking, operating, and maintaining the polar crane. Section 10 Quality Assurance Requirement: A quality assurance program should be established to the extent necessary to include recommendations of NUREC 0554 for the design, fabrication, installation, testing and operation of the cranes. The applicable procurement documents should specify a quality assurance program consistent with the pertinent provisions of Regulatory 67 -
Guide 1.28, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Design and Construction)". Actualt A quality assurance program in accordance with the requirements of United gngineers Standard 9763-QAS-2, l which applies to non-nuclear safety (NNS) class items, was specified for the polar crane. A quality assurance ' L
; manual and written procedures such as welding procedurest ;
j welding procedure qualifications; heat treatment, NDE, test, inspection and cleaning procedures is a require-ment of this standard. Under this program, material l certifications or material test reports are required to satisfy code or specification requirements. The proce-2 dures and documents contain appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining compliance with the I applicable standards or specifications. Sufficient f records are prepared as work is performed to furnish documentary evidence of the quality of item. All [ f fabrication, inspection, and test operations performed ! by Contractors and their Subcontractors are subject to ) surveillance by the Engineer and the Owner. i b I l 1 4 e, . t
- 3. Seismic Analysis a
! The crane is designed to remain in place during and af ter the seismic event. As described above under point-by point comparison, both the bridge and trolley wheel trucks are equipped with anti-derailing devices which prevent the bridge and trolley from disengaging from their respective runway rails when the crane is subjected to seismic excitations. A general purpose computer program, ANSYS, was used to perform the modal dynamic analysis of the crane. A detailed description of the method of analysis and assumptions are given in Section RAI 220.23 (3.7(B).3) of the FSAR. I
; The mathematical model assumed the crane to be in e parked position at
! the time of the seismic event equivalent to SSE. Also, no lifted load I was considered in the seismic analysis. This assumption is based upon the fact that the crane will not be in use for a great majority of the time during plant operation phase. The seismic occurrence at the time j the crane is in use and carrying a heavy load, is considered to be a ! low probability event. f i f 4 , 1 I
d I ! B. Lifting Devices !
! l ! An evaluation of the lif ting devices for the polar crane with respect [ ; to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 is provided below:
1 ! I j (a) Standard Lifting Slings ' l j The standard lifting slings and associated fittings will meet the - l requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971 and, where heavy 1 cads are l handled, the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. In the ! case of the auxiliary hook while handling the equipment hatch, an 4 acceptable load drop analysis has been provided (see Attachment B l of Addendum 2 to this report) and lifting slings meeting the [ requirements of Section 5.1.1(5) will be used. i
, (b) RV Head Lifting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage Assembly 1 '
- Refer to Appendix I
\j , l f (c) Spreader Assembly ! l ! j ! { The spreader assembly is part of the RV head lifting rig and is , i used to handle reactor missile shleid during refueling operations. . Analysis of the spreader assembly is included in Appendix I. t I 4 q (d) Internals Lifting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage Assembly i i ! t .\ j Refer to Appendix I 1 i ! f (e) RC pump Motor Lifting Device, Equipment Hatch Cover Handling l Device, Reactor Cavity Seal Ring Lifting Device ! l l l These lifting devices meet the requirements of applicable standards, ANSI B30.9-1971 as supplemented by NUREG-0612. i i
C. Interfacing Lift Points An evaluation of the attachment points for heavy loads with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 follows: (a) Reactor Vessel liead and Upper Internals Refer to Appendix I, Analysis of Special Lifting Devices. (b) RC Pump Motor The four lifting lugs for the reactor coolant pump motor are designed with a safety factor of 6, based upon ultimate strength. In the event of a failure of a single lift point, the load will be transferred to the other two points with the safety factor reduced to 3 (assuming conservatively that only two of the three remaining lugs assume the full load). Because of a four lif t point system, the load is expected to be retained under these conditions. (c) Neutron Shield Panels Each shield panel is provided with three lifting lugs with a design safety factor of 8.6 based upon ultimate strength. Failure of a single attachment point would result in an uncontrolled move-ment of the panel, but not necessarily a load drop. The safety factor is considered to be adequate since the load would be insne-diately set down and not moved until repairs are made to the ialled lift point. 71 -
(d) Reactor Cavity Seal Ring j The seal ring is equipped with twelve (12) 3/4" shoulder eye bolts for lif ting purposes which are equi-spaced along the circumference with two bolts provided at each of the six locations. Failure of a single eye bolt is not expected to disturb the static balance or result in a load drop. I (e) Equipment Hatch Cover The equipment hatch cover is equipped with four lifting lugs with a safety factor of seven (7). Failur. of a single lift point would result in transfer of the load to two points with a reduction in safety factor by 50%. A load drop is, however, not expected to occur. (f) Removable Pressurizer Enclosure Wall (2 Sections) The lift point system for the two removable panels of the pressurizer enclosure wall with regard to the integrity of the lifting eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of safety of 6.7. t (g) Reactor (CRDM) Missile Shield The eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of safety of 7.2. (h) Pressure Enclosure Missile Shield The eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of safety of 7.3. (i) Reactor Coolant Pump Removable Concrete Plug (El . 25'-0" Containment Building) The eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of safety of 6.5. (j ) Plug for Incore Detector Drive (Containment Building) The eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of safety of 8.0. (k) CVCS Heat Exchanger Concrete Flow Plug (2 Sections, PAB) The eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of safety of 10. (1) Removable Concrete Flow Plug (EFP Building)
- The eyes and structure while being handled provides a factor of 4
safety of at least 10.
l
- 4. Summary j
i The preceding evaluation indicates that the polar crane is l substantially in compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0554, although some design features requiredo'y 0554 may not be present. This is further supplemented by the fact that the heavy loads anticipated during the plant operational phase do not exceed half the hoist design capacities. The increased safety factors, as a result, will contribute significantly to the overall reliability of the load handling systems in the Containment. In addition, the periodic inspection and maintenance program developed and implemented in accordance with the applicable standards, coupled with the comprehensive operator training program, proper load handling procedures and load path drawings will help assure the safe handling of the loads in this area. b
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ .._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. m _ _ . _ _ _ - - l l l j l REQUEST 2.3-4 1 j "For crancs identified in 2.1-1 above, not categorized according to 2.3-3, j demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1 are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your ] , response to Section 2.4 of this report. With respect to Criteria I through l III provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the ! 4 i containment and your determination of compliance. This response should ; include the following information for each cranes 1 a I j a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical ) interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under j which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the i j administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization i ) of such action. Discuss any related or proposed technical speci-I fication concerning the bypassing of such interlocks. '
- b. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations I j (e.g., refueling sequencing) provide present or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls
) provided to ensure the continued validity of such considerations. ! i l c. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with criteria I through j III should conform with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Appendix A. . i Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide Lt.a ( specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3 or 4, as i appropriate for each analysis performed." e I RESPONSE To 2.3-4 , i [ i ! The only other crane which is not categorised according to 2.3-3 above, is : 1 ! 1 the radial arts stud tensioner hulst. These three (3) stud tensioner holsts [ 1 2 y l ! i r t j ! ! k i
t of 2 ton capacity each are, however, not evaluated as per thin subsection. These hoists are excluded because of the following reasons: The stud tensioner hoists are used for removal and installation of stud ' tensioners during reactor vessel head removal and installation. In normal cperation, these hoists are not stored on the monorails attached to the underside of the head lifting device and, therefore, do not pose any safety , hazard. During refueling shutdowns, the hoists are suspended from the ! conorails and handle studs and stud tensioners. The heaviest load is the
) stud tensioner weighing about 2,500 pounds. Since these components are handled only when the head is sel11 covering the reactor vessel, no damage i can be caused to the irradiated fuel or safety related equipment. When the
- head is removed to its storage location, the stud tensioner holets are also i removed along with the head lifting device.
i Refer to Attachment A to Addendum 2 of this report for an analysis of a stud tensioner drop from the stud tensioner hoists during refueling operations. I l l I 76 -
- 7. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.4 (ENCLOSURE 3)
Specific Requirements for overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling "NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response to 2.1-3-C". REQUEST 2.4-1 4
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative er additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the lor.d-handling system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information_specified in Attachment 1."
RESPONSE TO 2.4-1 t The polar gantry crane has sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small. A detailed evaluation of the design, fabri-cation, installation, inspection, etc. of the polar crane appears in our l response to Section 2.3. The spent fuel cask handling crane and the stud tensioner hoists have been excluded for reasons given in the preceding sections. A comprehensive hazard evaluation of the remainder of the cranes listed in 2.1-1 is provided in this section.
- 1 i
l
6 REQUEST 2.4-2 ] "For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:
- a. The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential '
impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in 2.1-3-C. Impact J i areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or i by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical i matrix." J RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-a The load / impact area matrices showing loads that will be handled by the crane or monorail-hoist and the potential impact areas are included in Table 2.4.2-1, Sheets 1 through 11. l ; 4
REQUEST 2.4-2-b "For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations. Elimination on the basis of the afore-mentioned considerations should be supplemented by the following specific information: (1) For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function). (2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed. (3) Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedures or physical constraints invoked to ensure the continued validity of such considerations."
RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-b All load and impact area combinations for the following cranes have been eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment cnd other site specific considerations such as maintenance sequencing. (i) Charging Pump Service Monorail Hoists (CS-CR-14A, -14B and -14C) Three service hoists, each located in a separate room, are provided for maintenance of the charging pumps. A load drop can damage only a single pump which has already been taken out of service for repair or maintenance. Since normal plant shutdown can be accomplished with any one of the three charging pumps, a load drop in the event of a handling system failure cannot prevent the chemical and volume control system from performing its safety-related functions. (ii) Radioactive Pipe Tunnel Service Monorail Hoists (CBS-CR-18A and 18B) A separate monorail-hoist is provided to service the sump isolation valve and associated encepsulation vessel in each of the two independent and fully redundant trains of the containment spray system. The two trains and monorail-hoists are separated by a 24-inch thick reinforced concrete wall. In the unlikely event of a load drop in one area, the redundant system would remain functional. Therefore, a load drop will not result in the loss of safety functions of the containment spray system. (iii) Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase Cranes (MS-CR-25A and 25B) These cranes, 25A located in West Chase and 25B in East Chase, service the main steam and feedwater containment isolation valves l l l l l 4 . l l and are used only after the reactor coolant system has been cooled down, with the residual heat removal system removing decay heat. Therefore, any potential damage to the main steam and feedwater systems resulting from a load drop cannot affect the decay heat removal process. (iv) Diesel Generator Service Cranes (DG-CR-28A and 28B) 1 The two redundant diesel generator units and their associated auxiliaries are located in separate and independent enclosures within a seismic Category I building. One service crane is provided in each enclosure for repair and maintenance of the i diesel generator. Since only one diesel generator will be removed from service at any one time, a load drop could result in damage to only this one unit and/or its auxiliary systems. The redundancy of the other generator will allow for plant operations for 7 days, with no loss of safety-related functions. However, as specified in the Seabrook technical specifications, if the damaged unit cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, the plant will be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and to COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The above cranes and monorails are provided with features which prevent them from being dislodged off the rails in an unloaded condition during a seismic event equal to safe shutdown earthquake. (v) Safety Injection Pump Service Monorail Hoists (SI-CR-40A and 40B) The two redundant safety injection pumps are located in separate
- enclosures. One service crane is provided in each enclosure for repair and maintenance of the safety injection pumps. Since only 4
one safety injection pump will be removed from service at any one time, a load drop could only damage one unit. The redundant pump would remain functional. Therefore, a load drop will not result in the loss of safety functions of safety injection system. 4 l REQUEST 2.4-2-C 1 l "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4-2-b, above, identify ] any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely , 4 small and the basis for this evaluation'(i.e., complete compliance with i NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable
; alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, j provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information ! specified in Attachment 1."
i k RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-C i I The boric acid batching monorail, the emergency feed pump monorail, CVCS heat exchanger service monorail, filter cask monorail and the component cooling water pump service monorails are considered to have sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for i all load-impact area combinations. The basis selected for this evaluation ! is essential compliance with Section 5.1.6, NUREG-0612, including increased da' sign safrty factors. A detailed discussion of these five monorails j follows. 1 i. j BORIC ACID BATCHING MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-6)
! l The boric acid batching monorail system is designed for a capacity of 4.5 i cons. The normal loads anticipated for this hoist such as pallets of boric
- scid will be limited to 50 percent of the hoist capacity. That is, the
'l ronorail will be derated to 2.25 ton capacity. In addition, when handling haavy loads, the lifting apparatus will meet the requirement of NUREG-0612, j Section 5.1.6, or will be of redundant design.
' I
)
84 - I
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r EMERGENCY FEED PUMP MONORAIL 110IST (FW-CR-27) j The rated capacity of the emergency feed pump monorail hoist has been
- increased from 4 to 5 tons. This hoist is used to handle individual pump, turbine or motor components during maintenance or repair of the two
- energency feed pumps. All of these loads weigh much less than half the monorail capacity each, thus ensuring twice the required design safety factors as per applicable design standards.
4
! The pump motor (4800 pounds) or turbine (3900 pounds) if handled as a complete unit also weigh less than half the hoist capacity. The only load heavier than 5000 pounds will be the pump unit which weighs 5700 pounds.
However, the feed pump will be first disassembled and only individual pump ! parts such as casing, rotor etc. will be handled by the hoist. In addition, when handling heavy loads, the lifting devices will meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. i CVCS HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE MONORAIL (CS-CR-13) a The rated capacity of the heat exchanger service monorail has been increased from 3 tons to 5 tons. All the loads to be handled by this monorail weigh i less than half the hoist capacity. Therefore, available design safety fac-3 tors for the monorail track and the hand chain powered hoist are increased to twice the values required by the applicable design standards. In } sddition, when handling heavy loads, the lifting devices such as slings and i associated fittings will meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. As a result, the reliability of the load handling system is enhanced through increased safety factors; and consequently the likelihood of a load drop during load handling operations is considered to be extremely small. i 4 + I 85 - w-,- m_. -er-.--._ , - - _ . - - ,-r.m._,,e-- -, --+-._-4.-. w - 7 ve m-w p+-w-_,,-3.--.-_--,.,mw ,se,.--,,-vw- 3,- .,m.-v_...,,-,+,..~9., ,-- , , -.. ,., .
FILTER CASK MONORAIL (CS-CR-5) The rated capacity of the filter cask monorail has been increased from 4.5 tons to 7.5 tons. The new capacity is designed to provide increased safety margins for all loads, thereby contributing substantially to the overall reliability of this load handling system. The rated capacity of the mono-rail is such that the weight of the heaviest load, the filter cask, does not exceed half the hoist capacity, thus providing twice the required design safety factors. The hoist is equipped with safety control devices such as two independent l upper limit switches of different design, a lower limit switch, and an inching drive capability. In addition, when handling heavy loads, the lifting devices will meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP SERVICE MONORAILS (CC-CR-15A and ISB) These monorails have also been upgraded from an initial capacity of three (3) tons to five (5) tons to provide increased safety margins. The hoists are of the hand chain powered type, and are used during maintenance of the primary component cooling water pumps in the two loops. The monorail ecpacity and weights of the various loads such as the pumps, pump motors etc. are such that safety factors of approximately two times the required values will be assured during handling of these loads. In addition, when handling heavy loads, the lifting devices will meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. The design of the above five monorails prevents the hoists from leaving the tracks in an unloaded condition during a seismic event equal to safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The monorails are not designed to retain the lifted load during an SSE since occurrence of a seismic event at the same time when the hoist is in use and supporting a load is considered to be a low probability event. J 1 1 I ) l REQUEST 2.4-2-d l For interactions not eliminated in 2.4-2-b or 2.4-2-c, above,' demonstrate
! using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of
- sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREC-0612, Section 5.1, criterion IV). For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided
)
I (1) An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being l investigated, the ovefhead crane-handling system is designed and
, constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe i
shutdown earthquake (SSE). i (2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of i j NUREG-0612, Appendix A. (3) The information requested in Attachment 4. j RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-d 1 i No load and impact area interactions fall in this category. l. t i + i. L i l l-i ? l . .
. . _ - . .- _ . _ - . -- -~- - . . . , ._. _ .
TABLE 2.I.3(C)-l_ (Shest 1 of 5) SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS WEICHT LOAD HANDLING CRAut/ MONORAIL - HOIST LOAD IDENTIFICATION LOAD PATH (Ibs) LIFTING DEVICE DRAWING PROCEDURE REFERENCE SPECIFIC / GENERAL DRAWING CONTADRENT Polar Centry Crane let-CR-3 420 Tom Main 50 Tom Auxiliary Neutron Shield Panel (8) 10,000 each Whiting Corporation Main /Auz. Hook & 805284 Ceneral Slings F.F. 9815542 (See Note 2) Reactor Cavity Seal Ring 18,625 Main / Aux. Hook & 805273 Specific Stings F.F. #805556 (See Note 1) Reactor Missile Shield 40,000 Main Hook and and Support (plus CRDM 805282 Specific (with spreader Spreader Assembly F.F. #101933 cooling ians) asesably) Reactor Vessel need 356,218 (with Main Book, RV Mead and Attachments 805275 Specific F.F. f50234 lifting rig) Lifting Rig,Imad Cell, and Linkage F.F. f50246 Assembly laternale Lif ting Rig 18,350 Main Book, Load cell 805272 Specific F.F. 953998 and Linkage Assembly Upper Internals 152,000 (with Main Book, laternals 805272 Specific lifting rig) Lifting Rig, Load F.P. 950209 Cell and Linkage Assembly Lower laternals 340,000 (with Main HooN, laternals Not Required Specific / General - lif ting rig) Lifting Rig, Imad Cell and Linkage Assembly Jib Crane (includtag 3,000 Aemillary Book and hoist and trolley) 805272 Ceneral F.F. f54824 Stings Stud Tensioners 2,500 Aum. Book & Slings 805283 General F.F. f50215
TABLE 2.1.3(C)-1 (Sheet 2 of 5) " O SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TABULATION OF HEAVT 1AADS WEIGHT 1hAD MANDLINC CRANE / MONORAIL - HOIST IAAD IDENTIFICATION 14AD PAlli PROCEDURE (Ibe) LIFTINC DEVICE DRAU1NC REFERENCE SPECIFIC /CENERAL _.DRAWINC R.V. Stud Backs 7050 Aux. Hook & Stinge 805274 Ceneral - RC Pusep Motor 100,260 Main Hook & Motor 805277 Specific F.P. f50218 Lifting Device , RC Pump Motor Support 9,300 Main / Aux. Hook & 805277 Ceneral F.P. f50218 Stinge RC Pianp Internals 44,900 Main Hook & Slings 805277 Specific F.P. #50218 j RC Pussp Aeoembly 94,400 (including casing) Main Hook & S11nse 805277 Specific F.P. #50218 RC Pimp Removable Con- 37,000 Main nook & Slinge 805277 Specific /Ceneral crete Fluse (2 eactione) (neaviest) F.P. #101445 RC Pimp Randling Frame 10,000 Aux. Book & Slinge 805277 Ceneral 1868 E 98 Plus for In-Core 10,000 Aux. Hook & Slinge Detector Drive 805283 Ceneral - l 420 Tom Bolet Load Block 30,000 N/A N/A - F.P. f52461 Pressuriser Miselle 4,000 Aux. Book & Slinge 805276 shield (3 Sectione) Specific /Ceneral F.P. f101939 Neaviest Section 6 Equipment Batch Cover 85,150 Aum. Hook, Natch (including airlock) 805273 Specific /Ceneral F.P. #10552 Cover Mand!!ng Boom F.P. #10556 (Part of Polar Crane) and Watch Cover Handifeg Device Pressuriser tactosure 85,000 each Main Rook and Free- 805276 Welt - Two Removable Ceneral F.P. fl01939 Panele euriser Enclosure Wall Handling Device 1 t
TABLE 2.1.3(C)-1 (Shest 3 of 5) SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TABUTATION OF HEAVY TDADS LOAD MANDLING WEIGHT 1 DAD PATH CRANE / MONORAIL - NOIST PROCEDUBE REFERENCE TDAD IDENTIFICATION (Ibs) LIFTINC DEVICE DRAWING SPECIFIC /CENERAL' DRAWING Radial Aru Stud Tensioner Stud Tensioner 2,500 Slings Nelsta (3) RV Head Stud 805283 Ceneral F.P. #50215. 2 Tom Capacity each FUE1. STORACE BUILDING Spent Fuel Cask Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane (Cask design not yet finalized) 805279 Specific - FH-RE-1 New Fuel Shipping 6,700 Main /Auu. Hook #2 805279 Specific /Ceneral 125 Ton Main Container - 5 Ton Aux. (2) and Four-Leg Sling Whiting Corporation Assembly Crane Load Block 5,900 N/A I (125 Ton) - N/A - F.P. #55593 Irradiated Specimen (Design not yet finalized) Cask Failed Fuel Container -(Design not yet. finalized) PRIMARY AUITLIART SUILDING Filter Cask Filter Cask (CVCS 4,700 Stings Monorail Hoist system) 805280 Ceneral - CS-CR-5 7.5 Ton capacity Floor Flug 3,000 Stings 805280 Ceneral F.P. #805869 Boric Acid Batching Monorail Pallets of Boric Acid Less than Stings 805281 Ceneral Hoist CS-CR-6 4,500 lbs. 4.5 Ton capacity (Derated Capacity
- 2.257)
CVCS Heat Removable Concrete Floor 5,000 each Stings 805280 ceneral Exchanger Service Flug (2 sections) F.P. #101528 l Monorail Hoist CS-CR-13 Heat Exchanger Tube 2,150 Stings 5 Ton capacity 805280 Ceneral F.P. 850163 Bundle (Heaviest) (Unit #1 only)
TABLE 2.1.3(C)-1 (Shest 4 et 5) SEABROOK STATION - UNITS I & 2 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS 1AAD MANDLING WEICHT CRANEh00NORAIL - NOIST LOAD FATR PROCEDURE LOAD IDENTIFICATION (Ibe) LIFTING DEVICE DRAWING REFERENCE SPECIFIC /CENERAL _. DRAWING Charging Pump Charging Pump Service Monorail Slinge See Note 3. General Componente F.F. #50153 moist CS-CR-14A, 145 & 14C Charging Fmp Motor 4,905 2.5/ 2.5/ 6.0 Tom capacity Slings See Note 3. General Gear . 2,700 51inge F.F. f50153 See Note 3. General F.F. f50153 Component Cooling Primary Component Cooling 3,600 Water Pump Stings 805280 Ceaeral Water Pump F.F. f50626 Service Monorail Boist PCCW Pump Motor 5,270 CC-CR-15A 4 155 Stinge 805280 Ceneral F.F. #50626 5 Too capacity each F.F. #51153 IMERGENCY FEEDWATER FIDIP BUILDING
! Emergency Feed Emergency Feedwater 5,700 Slinge Fump Monorail 805278 Ceneral F.F. #22432 Fump golet F.F. f22433 FW-CR-27 Emergency Feedwater 4,800 $linge 805278 General 5 Tom Capacity Fump Motor F.F. #22435 amergency Feeduster 3,900 $linge Fump Turbine 805278 Ceneral F.F. f22431 6'-0" x 4'-6" Removable 4,000 Stinge 805278 Concrete Floor Flug Ceeeral F.F. #101660 F.F. f101664 Di' eel Generator Buildina Diesel Generator Miscelleseous Diesel -
Slinge Service Crane Generator componente See Note 3. General - DC-CR-28A & 285 8 Tom Capacity each Turbocharger (Heaviest 2,160 Slinge i anticipated lift) See Note 3. General - MAIN STEAM AIS FEEDWATER FIFE CEAR3 j Maia Steam and MS isolation Yelve Assembly 14,065 Slinge See Note 4. Feeduster Pipe A-160 Actuator General F.F. f23003 3,327 Slinge See Note 4. 4 Chase Crane FW Isolation valve General F.F. #23003
' 5,241 51inge See Note 4.
NS-CR-25A 4 255 Aeoembly General F.F. f20915 l
; 7.5 Tom capacity each FW 1eolation Valve 4,369 Clings i
See Note 4. General F.F. #20915 i i i
l TABLE 2.1.3(C)-1 (Shrst 5 of 5) SEAbROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TARULATION OF HEAVY 1AADS LOAD HANDLING WEICHT LOAD PATH PROCEDCRE CRANE / MONORAIL - HOIST LOAD IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE (Ibs) LIFTINC DEVICE DRAWING SPECIFIC /CEFER AL DRAWING RADIDAC*IVE PIPE TUrNEL Radioactive Pipe Sump Isolation Valve Less than Tunnel Service Slings See Note 3. General F.P. f90911 Topworks (16" CBS- 2,500 lbs. Monorail Hoist V8 and V14) CBS-CR-18A & 188 l 2 Ton Capacity each EQUIPMENT VAULT ( P. A.B. ) Safety Injection Pump 5,700 Pump Service Mor.orail Slings See Note 3. General F.P. #52936 Pump Motor 2,750 " " " " " Holst SI-CR-40A & 405 4 Ton Capacity each NOTES: l
- 1. Specific Procedure:
A specific procedure governa critical load handling operations requiring unique procedures, and provides detailed instructions for the movement and handling of such loads, or performance of complex tasks requiring greater detail to ensure l safe handling of loads.
- 2. General Procedure: A general procedure governs all crane and load handling operations not requiring a specific procedure, and may serve as a reference document for specific procedunes.
3. Load path is confined to the monorail track within a compartment that is separated by concrete walls from the adjoining compartment /s containing redundant equipment and associated monorails. 4. l Load path is the entire area of crane travel within the two rails. The load is handled only when the plant is in cold shutdown with l the residual heat removal system in operation. l
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 11) l CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: FILTER CASK MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-5) 7.5 Ton capacity ** LOCATION BUILDING : PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 3-5 AREA Column Line A-B Elev. 25'-0" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Filter Cask Assembly Floor Elev. 25' Seal Water Heat Ex- D (7500 lbs) -0" (Monorail changer, Seal Water Removable Floor Elev. 40'-6") Injection Filter, Plugs (3000 lbs Seal Water Return etch) Filter, Reactor Coolant Filter Demineralizer Pre-filter, all located in individual com-partments below 3' thick reinforced concrete slab.
CVCS piping and valves below 25' elevation. (Valve operators i.e. extensions for some drain valves and isolating valves for the above equipment are above 25' elev.) OS:e Sheet 11 of 11 ctDerated capacity - 3.75 T
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 11) f CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: BORIC ACID BATCHING MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-6) 4.5 Ton capacity ** LOCATION BUILDING : PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 5-6 AREA Column Line B-D Elev. 53'-0" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Pallets of boric acid Floor Elev. Boric acid tank D (Load in one lift will 53'-0" CS-TK-4B located not exceed 4500 lbs) (Monorail elev. at floor elev.
67'-0") 25'-0", below boric acid batching tank. cSee Sheet 11 of 11
*cDerated capacity - 2.25 T
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 3 of 11) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX llEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: CVCS HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-13) 5 Ton capacity ** LOCATION BUILDING : PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING LMPACT Zone: Column Line 2-4 . AREA Column Line A-B Elev. 2P -0" Hazard Safety Related E imination LOADS Elevation Equipment tstegory* Concrete Floor Plug in Floor Elev. 25' Letdown lleat Ex- D 2 sections (5000 lbs each) -0" (Monorail changer, Letdown Elev. 45'-6") Reheat HX, Letdown Chiller RX, Moderating RX , all located in individual compart-ments below 3' thick reinforced concrete slab. CVCS Piping and Valves located below 25' elev. (Valve operators i.e., extensions for isolating valves for above equipment are located above 25'-0" elevation) Heat Exchanger Tube same as above same as above D Bundle (2150 lbs - Heaviest Tube Bundle) cSee Sheet 11 of 11 00Derated capacity - 2.5 T
l
\
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 4 of 11) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX , HEAVY LO.GS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: CHARGING PUMP SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS, (CS-CR-14A, 14B, & 14C) 2.5/2.5/6.0 Ton capacity LOCATION BUILDING : PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 3-5 AREA Column Line C-D Elev. 7'-0" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Charging Pump Components Floor Elev. Charging Pump, B Charging Pump Motor 7'-0" (Rail Associated CVCS Gear Elev. 18'-7") Piping
*See Sheet 11 of 11
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 5 of 11) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS (CC-CR-15A & ISB) 5 Ton capacity ** l LOCATION BUILDING : PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 2-4 AREA Column Line A-C Elev. 25'-0" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Primary Component Cooling Floor El. 25'-0" PCCW Pumps and PCCW D Water Pump (3600 lbs) (Monorail El. System Piping. CVCS 35'-0") Piping and Valves below 2 to 4' thick PCCW Pump Motor (5270 lbs) reinforced concrete slab (El. 25'-0").
Valve operators i.e., extensions located above 25'-0" elev. , for isolating valves for:
- Letdown Reheat HX
- Letdown Chiller HX
- Letdown Flow Con-trol Valve PCV 131
- Seal Water Return Filter
- Regenerative Damineralizer
- Seal Water Inject-tion Filters (drain valves)
- Cation Bed Demineralizers
- 3" line from Moderating HX to RC Filter
- 3" line from RC Filter to RHR Pump CSee Sheet 11 of 11 ocDerated capacity - 2.7 T
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 6 of 11) l CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREC 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: RADIOACTIVE PIPE TUNNEL SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS (CBS-CR-18A & 18B) 1.65 Ton capacity i LOCATION BUILDINC : RADIOACTIVE PIPE TUNNEL IMPACT Zone: Piping Zone 28A AREA Pipe Tunnel Elev. (-) 34'-6" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS E: evation Equipment Category
- Sump Isolation Valve EL. (-) 34'-6" Valves 16" CBS-V8, B Topworks V14 & Piping
*See Sheet 11 of 11
l i TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 7 of 11) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPE CHASE CRANES (MS-CR-25A & 25B) 7.5 Ton capacity LOCATION BUILDINC : MS AND FW PIPE CHASE IMPACT Zone: East Chase Floor Elev. 3'-0" AREA West Chase Floor Elev. 3'-0" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- MS Isolation Valve EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and B,C Assembly main steam and feedwater piping MS Isolation Valve EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and B,C Actuator (A-260) main steam and feedwater piping FW Isolation Valve EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and B,C Assembly main steam and FW Isolation Valve feedwater piping l
i
*See Sheet 11 of 11
l l TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 8 of 11) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 5 2 C RANE: EMERGENCY FEED PUMP MONORAIL ROIST (FW-CR-27) 5 Ton Capacity ** LOCATION BUILDING : EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING t IMPACT Zone: Area around monorail in entire building AREA Elev. 27'-0" Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Emergency Feedwater Pump Floor El. 27'-0" Emergency FW D Parts turbine, pump, motor and feed-water piping.
Emergency FW Pump Motor Floor El. 27'-0" Emergency FW D (4800 lbs) turbine, pump, and feedwater piping. Emergency FW Pump Turbine Floor El. 27'-0" Emergency FW pump, D - (3900 lbs) motor, and feed-water piping. Concrete Floor Plug Floor El. 27'-0" Emergency FW pump, D (4000 lbs) motor, turbine, and feedwater piping.
*See Sheet 11 of 11 **Derated capacity - 2.5 T
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 9 of It) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: DIESEL GENERATOR SERVICE CRANES, (DC-CR-28A & 28B) 8 Ton Capacity LOCATION BUILDING : DIESEL CENERATOR BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 5-9 AREA Column Line A-E Elev. 21'-6" Hazard . Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Diesel Generator Parts EL. 21'-6" Diesel Generator, B and Assemblies Diesel Auxiliary Systems 9
*See Sheet 11 of 11 l
TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 10 of 11) CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP SERVICE MONORAIL HOIST 4 Ton capacity ** (SI-CR-40A & -40B) LOCATION BUILDING : EQUIPMENT VAULT (PAB) IMPACT Zone: Column 1-D AREA Hazard Safety Related Elimination LOADS Elevation Equipment Category
- Pump (-) 50'-0" Safety Injection B Pumps Pump Motor (-) 50'-0" Safety Injection B Pumps
*See Sheet 11 of 11
**Derated Capacity - 2.5T
l TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Sheet 11 of 11) LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 Hazard Elimination Categories A. Crane travel for this arca/ load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops. B. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area. C. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load / equipment combination. D. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e. section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied). E. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment. 1
l l APPEND 1X I ANALYSIS OF RV HEAD LIFTING RIG AND INTERNALS LIFTING RIG (SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES) (Prepared by Westinghouse) 1.0 Reactor Vessel Head and Internals Lift Rigs, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage 1.1 General An evaluation of the reactor vessel head and internals lift rigs, load cell and load cell linkage was performed by Westinghouse to determine the acceptability of these devices to meet the requirements of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978. The conclusions of this evaluation are summarized in this Appendix. These special lifting devices, for the most part, were manufactured under Westinghouse surveillance with identified hold points, procedure review and personnel qualification. 1.2 Comparison with ANSI N14.6 Requirements ANSI N14.6-1978 contains requirements for the design, fabrication, test-ing, maintenance and quality assurance of special lifting devices. A detailed comparison of these requirements with those used in the design, manufacture, inspection and testing of RV head and internals lift rigs was made, and a stress report was prepared in accordance with ANSI N14.6. Also, a critical iten s list which identifies the critical load path parts and welds, the material of these items and the non-destructive examination performed was compiled. This comparison shows that these special lifting devices meet the intent of ANSI N14.6 for design, tabricatioi. and quality control. The RV head
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~ .
and internals lift rigs and load cell were proof tested upon completion with a load of approximately 125 percent of the design weight instead of 150 percent of the rated load. Following the load test, all parts, particularly welds were visually inspected for cracks or obvious deformation and critical welds were magnetic particle examined. A 125 percent load test conducted in accordance with the requirements established at the time of fabrication, in lieu of 150 percent load test, is considered to be adequate to demonstrate the integrity of these devices. Tests and inspections to verify continuing compliance of these devices are discussed in Section 4 of the main report. A 150 percent load test or annual non-destructive tests and examinations required by ANSI N14.6 are not practical to perform annually or prior to ea:h use. A 100 per-cent load test, visual check and non-destructive examination will be performed as follows to verify continued compliance: (a) Reactor Vessel Head Lift Rig After reassembly of the spreader assembly, lifting lug and upper lifting legs to the upper portion of the lift rig, all load bearing welds will be visually checked. The vessel head will then be slightly raised above its support and held for 10 minutes. At this time visual inspection of the sling block lugs to the lifting block welds and spreader lug to spreader arm welds will be performed. If no indications are detected the lift will proceed. Simultaneously, the load cell readout will be constantly monitored throughout the duration of the lift. (b) Reactor Vessel Internals Lift Rig Similarly, visual inspection of all load bearing welds will be conducted. All critical bolted connections will be checked to
t i t. 1 insure adequate engagement. After connection to the upper or lower internals, the assembly will then be slightly raised above
- j. .its support and held for 10 minutes. At this time, visual inspection of the sling block lugs to the lifting block welds will be performed. If no indications are detected, the lift will proceed with constant monitoring of the load cell readout until completion of the lift.
(c) Non-Destructive Examination of RV Head and Internals Lift Rigs and Load Cell Linkage In addition to the 100% load tests using the actual loads and the concurrent visual inspection of critical welds and components, l periodic non-destructive surface examinations for these items will ) be performed to insure continued adequacy. Maintenance and inspection procedures will address Section 5.1.3 through 5.1.8 of ANSI N14.6 (Owner's Responsibilities) in conjunction with Westinghouse recommendations. These sections include requirements for scheduled periodic testing, special identification and marking, maintenance, repair, testing and use. , i 1.3 Stress Report A stress report was prepared for RV head lift rig, internals lift rig, load cell and load cell linkage in accordance with the criteria of f j ANSI N14.6. The design criteria of Section 3.2 were used for evaluating load bearing members when subjected to loading conditions resulting in j shear or tensile stresses. The resulting stresses are within acceptable I stress limits. i Appli' cation of these design load factors to other loading conditions is not addressed in ANSI N14.6. However, these stress design factors have j j
been used to determine the stresses in the load bearing members when subject to other loading conditions, viz. bearing and bending. This is an extremely conservative approach, and in some instances the resulting i stresses are not in strict compliance with the design criteria. These are, however, localized stresses and can be considered under Section 3.2.1.2 which states that the stress design factors of 3.2.1.1 are not intended to apply to situations where high local stresses are relieved a by slight yielding. None of the bearing or bending or combined stresses reach the yield stress, and in fact, all of these stresses meet the design criteria of AISC Code. In conclusion, these special lif t devices meet the ANSI N14.6 criteria for tensile and shear stresses and meet other appropriate criteria for loading conditions that result in combined and bearing stresses. 1.4 Conclusions (a) The ANSI N14.6 requirements for design, fabrication and quality assurance are generally in agreement with those used for these special lift devices. (b) The ANSI N14.6 criteria for stress limits associated with certain stress design factors for tensile and shear stresses are adequately satisfied. (c) The application of the ANSI N14.6 criteria for stress design factors are only for shear and tensile loading conditions. Other loading conditions are to be analyzed to other appropriate criteria, and these criteria are satisfied. (d) These devices are not in strict compliance only with the ANSI N14.6 requirements for acceptance testing, maintenance and verification of continuing compliance. Alternate equivalent and/or adequate l tests and inspection program, as permitted by NUREG 0612, will be
- l
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i implemented that should enable these devices to be considered in compliance with the intent of ANSI N14.6. In conclusion, the reactor vessel head and internals lift rigs, load cell and load cell linkage meet the intent of NUREG-0612 and 1 , ANSI N14.6-1978 for design, fabrication, inspection, assembly and ; operation. Initial acceptance tests and proposed tests and inspections to verify continuing compliance are considered to be adequate to satisfy the intent of NUREG-0612. 2.0 Interfacing Lift Points for RV Head and Upper Internals d I 2.1 Interfacing Lift Points for Reactor Vessel Head The lift point system for the reactor vessel closure head consists of three lugs spread 1200 apart on the outside surface of the closure head. The lugs are attached to the head by full penetration welds, and are designed with the following safety factors: 1 i Design Safety Factor i Type of Loading Based Upon Ultimate Strength (a) Based upon combined 6.5 stress (b) Based upon shear 8.9 stress (c) Based upon bearing stress 3.6 Note: The above safety factors are based upon 80 kai ultimate strength for the lug materials, SA-533 GR. B (Class 1). Ultimate strength i for SA-533 GR. B (Class 1) is given to be 80-100 ksi.
2.2 Interfacing Lift Points for Upper Internals i The detailed stress analysis of the internals lift rig including rotolock studs has been performed using weight of the low [b internals. l
- . The upper internals weigh less than one-half of the lower internals. !
The design safety factors for the rotolock studs based upon ultimate strength of the material and the weight of the upper internals are in excess of 10, for all loading conditions resulting in tensile stress, combined shear stress or bearing stress. ? l 4
h l ATTACHMENT A , (Sheet I of 2) I NUREC-0612: CONDUIT & CABLE TRAY REVIEW ! ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE l NO. NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS
- 1. MM-CR-3 Polar Cantry Crane CTMT 805052 Not Examined -
l 805053 Excluded by design. 805055 805056
- 2. RH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud CTMT 805054 Not Examined -
Tensioner Hoists Excluded by design.
- 3. RH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage 805058 See Note 1.
Handling Crane Bldg. 805059 l 805084
- 4. CS-CR-5 Filter Cask Mono- PAB 805215 See Note 1.
rail Hoist 805062 s
- 5. CS-CR-13 CVCS HX Service PAB 805062 See Note 1.
Nonorail Hoist
- 6. CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batch- PAB 805062 See Note 1.
l ing Monorail Hoist 805066
- 7. CS-CR-14A Charging Pump PAB 805061 See Note 1.
-14B Service Monorail 805065 l -14C Hoist l
l 8. CC-CR-ISA Component Cooling PAB 805062 See Note 1.
-15B Water Pump Service 805064 l Monorail Hoist 805066 l
l 9. CBS-CR-18A Radioactive Pipe Radioactive 805540 See Note 1. ! -18B Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel i Monorail Hoist (EL-34'-0")
ATTACHMENT A (Sheet 2 of 2) NUREC-0612: CONDUIT & CABLE TRAY REVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE NO. NLDiBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS
- 10. MS-CR-25A Main Steam & FW MS & FW 202063 See Note 2.
-25B Pipe Chase Crane Pipe Chase 202064
- 11. FW-CR-27 Emergency Feed Emergency 310453 See Note 3.
Pump Monorail FW Pump Hoist Bldg.
- 12. DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Cen. 202068 See Note 1.
-28B Service Crane Bldg. 202069 202070
- 13. SI-CR-40A Safety Injection Equipment 805060 See Note 1.
-408 Pump Service Vault 805078 Monorail Hoist (P.A.B.)
NOTE 1: Safety-related cable trays and/or conduits do not exist below this crane. NOTE 2: These cranes are excluded from detailed evaluation because of site specific considerations. NOTE 3: The likelihood of a load drop is considered to be extremely small because of increased design safety factors.
_ m . .m,=__ .. .-._.- _ __ _ __ __.._. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _.__ __ _ ___m _. _m . . _ _ _ _ __ _ _. ..._ _ _ ._ . _ _. - _ - . _ _ . - 1 l 1 i
, ATTACHMENT B (Sheet I of 2) -
NUREC-0612: PIPING REVIEW j ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE NO. IRBtBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS *
- 1. 106-CR-3 Polar Centry Crane CDIT 805051 Not Examined -
i 805052 excluded by design. '
- 805053 l l
l 2. FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud C*lMT 805055 Not Examined - Tensioner Hoists excluded by design. ) 3. EH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage Bldg. 805058 No piping below j Handling Crane 805059 this crane. i 805084 ! 805088 1 I l 4. CS-CR-5 Filter Cask FAB 805215 No piping below I Monorail Hoist this crane. 1 a i 5. CS-CR-13 CVCS HK. Service PAB 805215 No piping below ' 4 Monorail Hoist 805235 this crane. 805236 i i a
- 6. CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching PAB 805066 No other system '
] Monorail Hoist 805062 piping in this j 805063 area. ! 7. CS-CR-14A charging Pump Service PAB 805213 No piping below l -148 Monorail Hoist - 805214 this crane except ! -14C suction and dis-charge piping for ; the individual j pump served. , k i
i ATTACHMENT B (Sheet 2 of 2) NUREG-0612: PIPING REVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE NO. NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS
- 8. CC-CR-15A Component Cooling Water PAB 805215 No piping below
-15B Pump Service Monorail 805216 this monorail J Hoist 805213 except CC Water pump connections and check valves in the discharge lines.
- 9. CBS-CR-18A Radioactive Pipe Radioactive 805540 No other system
-18B Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel piping below this Monorail Hoist (E1.-34'-0") crane.
- 10. MS-CR-25A Main Steam & MS & FW 202063 See Note 1.
-25B FW Pipe Chase Pipe Chase 202064 Crane
- 11. W-CR-2 7 Emergency Feed Emergency 202296 FW-4613-01-1506-8".
Pump Monorail FW Pump Bldg. FW-4610-04-02-3". Hoist
- 12. DC-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 202070 No piping below
-28B Service Crane Bldg. 202068 this crane.
- 13. SI-CR-40A Safety Injection Equipment 805060 No piping below l -40B Pump Service Vault 805078 this monorail l Monorail Hoist (P.A.B.) except suct, ion and discharge piping for the individual pump served.
Note 1: These cranes are excluded from detailed evaluation because of site specific considerations.
ATTACHMENT C (Sheet 1 of 2) NUREC-0612: SAFETY-REI.ATED EQUIPMENT REVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE NO. NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS
- 1. 79t-CR-3 Polar Cantry Crane CDtT 805054 Steam Generators, 805051 Reactor Coolant 805052 Pumps, Pressurizer.
805053 805055 805056
- 2. FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud CTMT Not examined -
Tensioner Hoists excluded by design.
- 3. FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage 805058 No safety-related Handling Crane Bldg. 805059 equipment in this area.
- 4. CS-CR-5 Filter Cask Mono- PAB 805064 CS-E-5 Seal Water rail Hoist 805062 HX, Valve Operators, and piping.
- 5. CS-CR-13 CVCS HX Service PAB 805062 CS-E-5 HX, Valve Monorail Hoist 805011 Operators, CS-E-3 HX, CS-E-4 HX, CS-E-7 HX, CS-E-8 HX and piping.
- 6. CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching PAB 805062 CS-TK-4B, Boric Acid Monorail Hoist 805066 Tanks.
- 7. CS-CR-14A Charging Pump Service PAB 805061 See Note 1.
-145 Monorail Hoist 805065
-14C
- 8. CC-CR-15A Component Cooling PAB 805062 Valve Operators,
-15B Water Pump Service CC-P-1lA, 1IB, 1IC Monorail Hoist & llD.
- _ _ _ - _ _ = _ _ _
ATTACHMENT C l (Sheet 2 of 2) NUREG-0612: SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE NO. NIMBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS
- 9. CBS-CR-18A Radioactive Radioactive 805540 Motor operated valves
-18B Pipe Tunnel Pipe Tunnel 16" CBS-V14, V8.
Service Monorail (Elev. - 34'-0") Hoist
- 10. MS-CR-25A Main Steam MS & FW 202063 See Note 2.
-258 & FW Pipe Chase Pipe Chase 202064 Crane
- 11. FW-CR-27 Emergency Feed Emergency 202296 FW-V67, V68 Valves, Pump Monorail FW Pump IR-50 Instrumentation Hoist Bldg. Rack.
- 12. DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 202070 Fuel Oil Storage Tank
-28B Service Crane Bldg. 202068 26A & 26B, Valves Air Compressor.
- 13. SI-CR-40A Safety Injection Equipment 805060 See Note 1.
-40B Pump Service Vault 805078 Monorail Hoist (P.A.B.)
NOTE 1: These monorails are not evaluated in detail because of separation and redundancy of the safety l related equipment. NOTE 2: These cranes are excluded from detailed evaluation because of the site specific considerations. I l
l I i ATTACHMENT D i (Sheet 1 of 2) l NUREG-0612: HVAC REVIEW l l ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE NO. NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS l 1. PM-R-3 Polar Cantry Crane CTMT 604128 Not examined - 604129 Excluded by design. 604130 604131
- 2. FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud CTNT Not examined -
Tensioner Hoists excluded by design, i
- 3. Hi-R*-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage 604136 See Note 1.
Handling Crane Building" 604137 604143
- 4. CS-CR-5 Filter Cask PAB 604110 See Note 1.
Monorail Hoist 604111
- 5. CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching PAB 604109 See Note 1.
Monorail Hoist
- 6. CS-CR-13 CVCS liest Exchanger PAB 604110 See Note 1.
Service Monorail 604111 Hoist 604113
- 7. CS-CR-14A Charging Pump Service PAB 604111 See Note 1.
-14B Monorail Hoist
-14C
- 8. CC-CR-ISA Component Cooling PAB 604110 See Note !.
-155 Water Pump Service 604111 Monorail Hoist 604114 604115
_ _ . _ _ _ _ __ , _..,__.___.__._.____m._ . _ ___ _ _ . _ ATTACittENT D t (Sheet 2 of 2) NUREC-0612: HVAC REVIEW ITEM EQUIPNINT AREA REFERENCE NO. EtatBER EQUIPMENT MAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS
- 9. CSS-CR-18A Radioactive Pipe Radioactive 805540 See Note 1.
-188 Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel l Monorail Hoist
- 10. MS-CR-25A Main Steam & MS & N Pipe 604165 See Note 1. -l
- 255 Feedwater Pipe Chase 604168 Chase Crane 604171 f
- 11. N-CR-2 7 Emergency W Pump Emergency W 604141 See Note 1. l Monorail Moist Pump Bldg. 604142 l l
- 12. DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 604097 See Note 1. L l -283 Service Crane Bldg. 604098 '
l 604123 ' i
- 13. SI-CR-40A Safety Injection Equipment 604112 See Note 1. I
-40B Pump Service Vault Nonorail Hoist (P.A.B.) I Note 1: No safety-related HVAC equipment or ducts below this crane. I i
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DOCKET NOS.: 50-443 50-444 l ADDENDLM 1 SEABROOK STATION RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l RELATING TO NUREG - 0612 l
" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS"
=m_ 1 M
SEABROOK STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE l l l October 1985
_ . . _ _ . _ . _ . . . ~ ~ . . . ~ . . . . _. _ . . . . . _ . . . ._ - _ . . . _ _ __ _ _. i I. . TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 i i Section Page i i t
, l. INTRODUCTION 1 i
- 2. . RESOLUTION OF EVALUATION COMMENTS 1 2.1 Spent-Fuel Pool Area (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.2) 2 i
2.2 Containment Building (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.3) 6 a i 2.3 Other Areas (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.5) 7 2.4 Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems (NUREG-0612, 10 j Article 5.1.6) i I 4 1 I l 3 i J k f I 4 l \ l 4 i i i i
l
- 1. INTRODUCTION The revised response covering both Phase I and Phase II to the generic request for additional information on control of heavy loads was submitted to the NRC in May 1983. In this issue of the report, comments on Phase I as contained in an earlier technical evaluation report dated November 1982 were also considered and incorporated as applicable.
Technical evaluation of the May 1983 submittal was performed by EG&G,. Idaho, and the draft technical evaluation report (TER) was issued on August 31, 1983. Subsequently, the comments and concerns raised in this TER were discussed in a conference call on October 14, 1983 between the NRC, EG6G Idaho, Yankee Atomic Electric Company and United Engineers
& Constructors representatives. This Addendum reflects the resolution
, of these concerns as agreed, and provides additional information or commitment where required. The concerns and recommendations resulting from the evaluation are addressed in detail in the following sections with the statement of the concern appearing first, followed by the relevant information already provided in the May '83 report and the additional information/clarifi-cation or commitments to complete the response in accordance with the NUREG-0612 requirements.
- 2. RESOLUTION OF EVALUATION COMMENTS l
The comments and concerns identified in the TER fall in the following I four categories: l Spent-Fuel Pool Area (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.2) Containment Building (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.3) j 1
l l l Other Areas (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.5) Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems (NUREC-0612, Article 5.1.6) 2.1 SPENT-FUEL POOL AREA (NUREG-0612, ARTICLE 5.1.2) Areas of Concern - Page 10 of Draft TER Concern No. I "The applicant states that the radiological consequences of a spent fuel cask drop accident are presented in the FSAR. Since this material was not provided to EG&G, we were unable to evaluate this item. NUREG 0612 suggests that doses be equal to or less than 1/4 of 10CFR100 limits. We were unable to determine if this requirement is met." Relevant Information in the May '83 Response Page 33 Radiological consequences of a spent fuel cask drop accident are pre-sented in FSAR Section 15.7.5. The results of a conservative analysis and a realistic analysis are summarized in Table 15.7-28. Resolution / Additional Information The NRC will provide copies of FSAR Section 15.'/.5 including tables to , EG&G Idaho for their evaluation. (The offsite doses given in Table 15.7-28 are much less than 1/4 of 10CFR100 limits.) I Concern No. 2
" Mechanical stops used at Seabrook keep the main crane hook approxi-mately 10 ft. - 0 in, from the storage pool. NUREG-0612 rquirements are that a 15 ft. - 0 in. distance be used. However an adequate justification of the 10 ft. - 0 in. distance is provided."
- _ _. -- . - __ ~_. _ _ . _ ~ . _ ~ _ . _ . - - . - - . . .
l i
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- Resolution / Additional Information 4
No resolution or additional information is required. ) i i I > Concern No. 3 i i i
"In the extreme position the auxiliary hooks are 8 ft. 8 in, from -
j the storage pool. If the loads carried by these hooks are precluded from rolling into the pool then the intent of the guideline seems to be met for this situation." 1 Relevant Information in the May '83 Response i Pages 30 and 31 j The centerline of the two 5 ton auxiliary hooks, in the extreme i position of the hoists, cannot move closer than 8'-8" to the storage pool boundary. The auxiliary hook number 1 is normally used to handle single fuel . elements. The new fuel containers, each weighing about 6,700 pounds, I 1 are normally handled by auxiliary hook number 2. The area in the fuel l storage building allocated to storage and handling of the new fuel f containers eliminates the need to carry the containers near the spent ) fuel storage area or the cask loading pool. In the unlikely event of inadvertent carrying of the new fuel containers near the spent fuel storage area and coincident failure of the load handling system, the container will fall in the cask loading pool only since the center of j gravity of the load falls approximately 2'-8" from the outer edge (or 8'-8" from the inner edge) of the spent fuel storage pool wall. 3-
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Resolution / Additional Information The loads carried by the auxiliary hooks will be prevented from rolling into the spent fuel storage pool following a load drop. With the current limits on the hook travel, total overall horizontal dimensions of the loads have to be greater than approximately 5 ft. to strike the 6 ft. thick storage pool wall. The only load longer than 5 ft. which is likely to impact the top of the pool wall would be the new fuel container. However, even if a load handling system failure occurs when the auxiliary hook is in the extreme position, the container will still drop into the cask loading pool without rolling as approximately two-thirds of the container length falls on the outside of the outer edge of the concrete separation wall. As stated above, the center of gravity of the new fuel container is 2 ft. - 8 in, away from the outer edge of this wall. Therefore, in view of the sizes of the anticipated heavy loads and the limits imposed on the hook travel, it may be concluded that the loads handled by the two auxiliary hooks will not land or fall into the spent fuel storage pool. Concern No. 4 " Procedures for installation and removal of mechanical stops are not discussed. The stops appear to be in place at all times however this is not clear. Discussion of who is designated to allow bypass of stops was not provided by the applicant." Relevant Information in the May '83 Response The mechanical stops are discussed on page 31.
1 PSNH takes exception, on the basis of plant specific design, to the 15 feet requirement for minimum distance of the hook centerline from the spent fuel pool boundary. The ten (10) feet separation presently allowed in the Seabrook Station design is more than sufficient, due to the physical layout, to ensure that the cask, if dropped, does not fall into the spent fuel storate pool or compromise its integrity. The j limits imposed on the hook travel will again be reviewed, when the cask dimensions are finalized; and, if necessary, feasibility of moving the . i fixed mechanical stops to increase this distance will be examined. Resolution / Additional Information :
+
i The mechanical stops provided to limit the hook travel are permanently fixed in place, and remain in place at all times. There is no provision in the crane design for adjustment of their positions. That is, a design change will be required to physically relocate these fixed ! mechanical stops. Therefore, no procedures for their installation and removal are required or discussed in the response. l
} Concern No. 5 i,
t "NUREG-0612 5.1.2 2e requires that casks be carried no higher than j necessary and in no case more than six (6) in, above the floor level. i No information was available from the applicant on this requirement." 4 i Relevant Informacion in the May 'f-3 Response 6 Page 17 i l I l i The load paths identified on the layout drawings follow the safest and shortest routes with consideration given to maintaining safe distances ( from spent fuel and safe shutdown equipment. In general, a load will be moved as close to the floor as practical except to clear any equipment or other physical obstructions in the travel path. In addition, t ,
l i appropriate notes of the precautionary nature are also included, as required, on the load path drawings. Any deviations from these safe load paths or written procedures governing the load handling operations will be handled per procedure AQ l.002, Station Operating Procedures. Resolution / Additional Information The casks will be carried as close to the operating floor level as practical, and in no case will the cask be lifted higher than six (6) inches above the floor or any immobile object in the travel path. 2.2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING (NUREG-0612, ARTICLE 5.1.3) Evaluation Comment (Page 12 of Draft TER)
"The applicant's statement that the stud tensioner hoist can be excluded is probably cor.sistent with the intent of the guideline based on our opinion as to what the effects of a load drop from these hoists would be. However, without some sort of analysis this is just an opinion and is not backed up by any hard facts. A simple analysis of the effects of a load drop on the reactor or reactor head is recommended by EG6G."
Relevant Information in the May '83 Response Page 77 The stud tensioner hoists are used for removal and installation of stud tensioners during reactor vessel head removal and installation. In normal operation, these hoists are not stored on the monorails attached to the underside of the head lifting device, and therefore do not pose any safety hazard. During refueling shutdowns, the hoists are suspended from the monorails and handle studs and stud tensioners. The heaviest load is the stud tensioner weighing about 2,500 pounds. Since these components are handled only when the head is still covering the reactor 6-
vessel, no damage can be caused to the irradiated fuel or safety related equipment. When the head is removed to its storage location, the stud tensioner hoists are also removed along with the head lifting device. Resolution / Additional Information A confirmatory analysis of the effects of a load drop from the stud tensioner hoists is being performed. The stud tensioner, the heaviest load to be handled by these hoists, is assumed to land on the reactor vessel head in the worst possible orientation from the maximum drop height. The results of this analysis will be provided to the NRC. 2.3 OTHER AREAS (NUREG-0612, ARTICLE 5.1.5) Evaluation Comment (Page 14 of Draft TER)
"The cranes and hoist systems which service only one piece of safety related equipment are probably consistent with the guideline. However, the applicant should confirm our assumption that during servicing no loads can be carried over other items needed for safe shutdown.
Discussion of mechanical locks, electrical locks, and other procedures to prevent movement of loads over safety related equipment was inadequate in most cases. If the hoists and cranes are incapable of carrying loads over other safety related equipment then we feel that the four (4) types of handling systems mentioned are consistent with this guildeline." Relevant Information in the May '83 Response The four types of handling systems referred to in the technical evalua-tion are' discussed on page numbers 82 and 83 of the May 1983 report. The following is of relevance here:
(1) Charging Pump Service Monorails (CS-CR-14A, 14B and 14C) i Three service hoists, each located in a separate room, are provided for maintenance of the charging pumps. A load drop can damage only a single pump which has already been taken out of service for repair or maintenance. l l (2) Radioactive Pipe Tunnel Service Monorails (CBS-CR-18A and 18B) A separate monorail-hoist is provided to service the sump isolation valve and associated encapsulation vessel in each of the two independent and fully redundant trains of the containment spray system. The two trains and monorail-hoists are separated by a 24-inch thick reinforced concrete wall. In the unlikely event of a load drop in one area, the redundant system would remain functional. (3) Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase Cranes (MS-CR-25A and 25B) These cranes, 25A located in West Chase and 25B in East Chase, service the main steam and feedwater containment isolation valves and are used only after the reactor coolant system has been cooled down, with the residual heat removal system removing decay heat. Therefore, any potential damage to the. main steam and feedwater systems resulting from a load drop cannot affect the decay heat removal process. (4) Diesel Generator Service Cranes (DG-CR-28A and 28B) The two redundant diesel generator units and their associated auxiliaries are located in separate and independent enclosures within a seismic Category I building. One service crane is provided in each enclosure for repair and maintenance of the di'sel generator. l Resolution / Additional Information For load handling systems listed under (1), (2) and (4) above, credit is taken for physical separation and redundancy of safety related equipment to eliminate all load impact area combinations. During servicing of equipment belonging to one train, the loads cannot be carried over redundant train or other items needed for safe shutdown because each load handling system along with the equipment it services is located in a separate and independent enclosure. The movement of loads during handling operations will be confined to only one room or enclosure. Therefore these cranes or monorails are incapable of carrying loads over redundant safety related equipment due to permanent physical barriers such as reinforced concrete walls. Furthermore, no reliance is placed on any mechanical or electrical interlocks or procedures to prevent the movement of the loads over equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. For main steam and feedwater pipe chase cranes listed under (3) above, site specific considerations such as maintenance sequencing are credited in eliminating all load-impact area interactions. These cranes are used to handle heavy loads only during cold shutdown mode with the residuai heat removal (RHR) system in operation. The RHR system equip-ment is located in a separate building and is not affected by a load drop in either of the two pipe chases. Therefore, a load drop in the east or utst chase will not have any impact on the decay heat removal from the reactor core. Furthermore, a load drop in one pipe chase could cause damage to main steam and feedwater piping associated with only two steam generators, and the other two steam generators will be still available, if required. The east and west pipe chases are physically separated by a _9_
1 distance equal to the diameter of the containment building. Hence, an accidental load drop from either of these two underhung cranes will not impair the safe shutdown or decay heat removal capabilities. 2.4 SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF HANPLING SYSTEMS (NUREG-0612, ARTICLE 5.1.6) 4 Evaluation Comment (Page 24 of Draft TER) l "EG&G concludes from the information provided that the polar crane is consistent with the intent of the guideline except for the handling equipment hatch cover. We recommend that an analysis of the effects of i dropping the equipment hatch cover be performed." t' Relevant Information in the May '83 Response
; Page 48 -
The equipment hatch cover will be handled only when the reactor is in i COLD SHUTDOWN with the residual heat removal system in operation. Technical Specifications also prohibit opening of the equipment hatch during refueling operations. In the unlikely event of a handling l t system failure resulting in a load drop, damaga to the plant equipment j 1 will be limited, and will not affect the spent fuel or decay heat l f removal process. The Preventive Maintenance and Inspection Program to l be implemented for all cranes will reveal any deterioration of the lif ting equipment and allow for repairs prior to component failure. Resolution / Additional Information i i
.A detailed confirmatory analysis of the effects of dropping the equipment hatch cover is being performed. The safety related structures, systems and components that will be damaged by the hatch cover will be identified to determine the effect, if any, on the spent fuel or continued operation of the residual heat removal system. The i
. . - . . - . -- ~ _ - - .- -- . --- ..----- _ - . ..
I 1 i I. i evaluation criteria given in Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 will be used as a guideline to determine'the acceptability of the load drop in this case. It should, however, be noted that the RHR system equipment is located outside the containment in the equipment vault which is approximately j diametrically opposite to the hatch cover handling area. The results I will be submitted to the NRC upon completion of this analysis. t Evaluation Comment (Page 24 of Draft TER) 4 i "The remaining hoists mentioned in this section do not appear to meet f the requirements of the guidelines. However, if safety factors of ten (10) can be demonstrated along with the other safety features mentioned ' q by the applicant, then the intent of the guideline may be satisfied." Relevant Information in the May '83 Res ponse I The following five (5) monorails referred to above in the technical j evaluation are discussed on page numbers A4, 85 and 86 of the May 1983
)
i re port : (1) Boric Acid Batching Monorail (CS-CR-6) i (2) Emergency Feed Pump Monorail (FW-CR-27) l (3) CVCS Heat Exchanger Service Monorail (CS-CR-13) l (4) Filter Cask Monorail (CS-CR-5) (5) Component Cooling Water Pump Service Monorails (CC-CR-15A and ISB) ' i ! The rated capacities of these monorails are such that the heaviest load i carried by each does not exceed half the hoist capacity, thus ensuring i twice the required design safety factors per applicable commercial standards. In addition, the standard lifting devices such as slings and associated fittings.will maintain a minimum safety factor of 10, or
. __ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ ~ . =_.__ _ ___.___ _ _ _ .-
i i will be of dual or redundant design. Therefore, the reliability of the load handling systems will be enhanced because of increased safety margins; and consequently the likelihood of a load drop during load handling operations is considered to be extremely small. j Resolution / Additional Information A review of the following applicable design standards indicates that j the load bearing parts of the monorails including hoisting ropes are ; required to be designed so that the maximum stress, calculated for rated f load, does not exceed 20 percent of the average ultimate material
, strength:
l I ANSI B30.11 Monorails and Underhung Cranes j ANSI B30.16 Overhead Hoists HMI-100-74 Specifications for Electric Wire Rope Hoists HMA (1973) Specifications for Underhung Cranes and Monorail Systems e i 4 j This design recuirement applies to electric hoists and all monorail ' tracks including hanger rods and suspension fittings regardless of the i type of hoist supported by the track. The only exception is the hand chain powered hoists for which the stress limit is specified to be 25 $ percent of the average ultimate strength of the material. In our opinion, if a monorail system is designed for a certain rated load in accordance with the above standards and the maximum load actually j handled by the hoist is only 50 percent of this rated load, the corre-sponding stresses in the load bearing parts will be approximately 10 ! percent of the average ultimate strength for rails and electric hoists, i thereby assuring a safety factor of ten (10) with respect to ultimate strength. For hand chain hoists, the maximum stress will be 12.5 , percent of the average ultimate strength, thus providing a safety , l l 12 - t
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factor of eight (8). However, due to less severe duty cycle imposed on the manual hoists, a somewhat lower safety margin is considered to be adequate to guard against a load drop, which is still twice the value i required by the applicable commercial design standards. Furthermore, to preclude inadvertent handling of loads heavier than 50 percent of the rated capacity of the monorails, the derated capacities will be clearly marked on the monorail units along with the rated load actually used in the design per industry standards. Therefore, in view of these increased safety factors for the monorail systems and the use i of standard lifting devices with a safety factor of ten (10) or a i~ redundant design, the likelihood of a load drop is considered to be extremely small. f i .I i l l l l i i l
DOCKET NOS.: 50-443 50-444 ADDENDE M 2 SEABROOK STATION RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC REQUEST FOR i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION j RELATING TO i 1 NUREG - 0612
" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" x ar;I M
M l SEABROOK STATION l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE i SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE October 1985
! i i
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Pm
- 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1
I j: 2.
SUMMARY
OF STUD TENSIONER DROP ANALYSIS 2 i
- 3.
SUMMARY
OF EQUIPMENT HATCH COVER DROP ANALYSIS 3 & t l ATTACHMENT A STUD TENSIONER DROP ANALYSIS ATTACHMENT B EQUIPMENT HATCH COVER DROP ANALYSIS i 3 i ( i 4 i I ( t l l (' t E
.- . - . . - , _ . - - . . . . . , , - , . . . . _ . - - - . . , , . - - . - , . . . - . . _ , - , _ - ~ - . , , _ _ . - . -
-. - . , _ . - - - - _ - - . . _ - _ -..- ~ . - ._. . __-- .. ._
l-f 4 L 4 1. INTRODUCTION 4 Addendum II supplements the report, "NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads Seabrook Station", and provides the detailed supporting analysis comitted to by Addendum I to the report. In summary, Addendum I is a
- resolution of comments made on Revision No. 1 of the report (May 1983) i by EG6G, Idaho, on behalf of the NRC. In Addendum I all EG&G, Idaho /NRC comments were fully resolved except that a satisfactory evaluation of (1) the effects of a load drop from the stud tensioner hoists and (2) the effects of an equipment hatch cover drop was required.
l Addendum II includes copies of analysis evaluating these two situations i which both clearly show no impact on the ability to safely shutdown the . I j plant in the unlikely event of either of such load drops. i I i i I t i I i l i
i i l
- 2.
SUMMARY
OF STUD TENSIONER DFOP AMALYSIS This analysis investigated the effects of a stud tensioner drop from the stud tensioner hoists during refueling operations. Portions of the reactor vessel head which could be impacted and the reactor cavity seal ring were analyzed based on the principle of conservation of energy and momentum. The analysis concluded that the vessel head remains elastic and is able to withstand the impact while the seal ring must consider plastic impact in order to be able to sustain the impact. This analysis is included as Attachment A to this addendum.
)
I l l 1
l l l l l
- 3.
SUMMARY
OF EQUIPMENT HATCH COVER DROP ANALYSIS This analysis investigated the capability to preserve continued adequate operation of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System upon damage to safety related structures, systems, and components due to an equipment hatch cover drop. The worst possible (least likely) case is analyzed. This case evaluates the condition of an equipment hatch cover drop with a downward verticle penetration, damaging all items in its path. This analysis concludes that, in the unlikely event of an equipment hatch cover drop, damage to these items does not affect RHR system operation. This analysis is included as Attachment B to this addendum. l t
\
l
ATTACHMENT A STUD TENSIONER DROP ANALYSIS l l l l 1
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l ATTACHMENT B EQUIPMENT HATCH COVER DROP ANALYSIS t i (
oe ~ SEABROOK STATION NUREG-0612
- CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE Prepared By: =
- 1. Korut Responsible Engineer i -
A 4 . P. Siu Reviewer Approved By: F. Boorboor, Manager Nuclear Analysis Group ( UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS INC. 30 SOUTH 17TH STREET PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19101 l
1.0 BACKGROUND
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear power plants either operating or under construction submit a response of consistency with NUrEG-0612. " Control of Heavy Loads". The UE&C's revised response to the above generic request of NRC was submitted on May of 1983. Technical evaluation of the May submittal was performed by EG4C and the draft Technical Evaluation Report (TER) was issued. The comments and concerns raised in TER was discussed on October 14, 1983 between the NRC, EG&G Idaho, Yankee Atomic Electric Company and the UE&C representatives. The report issued on Nov. 18, 1983 by UE&C (Addendum I, MMf16771A) reflected the resolution of those concerna as agreed, and provided additional information or commitments where required. The present report is a response to the recousandation of EG&G that "an analysis of the effects of dropping the equipment hatch cover be preformed". O e i s 6 e 4 e _a,- _ __ ___ _ -_ ...__ ,
. __ __ . . _ . _ _- . - . . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ a.
4 2.0 SUleuRY I 2.1 Problem Statement: Identify the safety related structures, systems and components that will be damaged by the equipment batch
- cover drop. Determine the effect(s) on the continued operation of the Residual Best Removal System.
t 2.2
Conclusion:
4 t i The equipment, componesta, etc., affected by equipment hatch cover
! drop were identified. Damage to these items does not affect RER Systes's operation.
t i
}
f i 'l s i 4 I l l
- _ . - _ _ - - - - _ _ . _ _ - - - - - - _ _ _ - . . . - . . -_A--.___-- ._vw-a.% %.%n'a. a
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Generally, while at cold shutdown condition, decay heat from the reactor core is removed by the Residual Heat Removal System. During RHR System operation react'or coolant flows from the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the Residual Heat Removal Pumps, through the tube side of the Residual Heat Exchangers, and back to the RCS. The heat is transferred to the component cooling water circulating through the shell side of the Residual Heat Exchangers. In the unlikely event of Equipment Hatch Cover (EHC) drop, the extent of the physical damage depends on the position of the drop and existing structure, equipment, etc., which are located beneath the EHC. The EBC is handled by polar crane. The travelling path for this crane, while carrying EHC, was previously identified and depicted on DWG. 9763-F-805273 (DWG. 1, Response to NRC; Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444). Similar travelling path for elevations of O'-0" and (-) 26'-0* are marked up and attached (DWG. 2 & 3). No credit is assumed for existing floor covers and structures which are located beneath the travelling path. The worse possible (less likely) case is considered; that the ECH would drop, penetrate vertically downward, in its vertical path would damage all item located in its way and none of the existing structures would contain or trap it. t e D 4 t
d 4.0 METuoDS OF ANALYSIS
- 1. Various component affected by equipment hatch cover drop are identified.
- 2. Cogonents and System needed to maintain cold shutdown condition are identified.
~
- 3. The effect(s) of damage to items identified in #1 above, and their resulting effect(s) on items identified in #2 above are i dis cussed.
- 4. Conclusion is made based on finding (s) in #3 above.
4.1 Identification of Equipment, Ducts, Pipes, Cable Trays and Electrical ! Connections The travelling path of the equipment hatch cover is identified and depicted on Figures 1, 2, and 3. This path is located in annulus j area and contains different equipment, ducts, piping, etc., at different 1. elevations. These items are identified and listed in Table l 4.2 Identification of Component Required to Maintain RER System's Operation: Table !. provides a partial list of equipment required to attain / main-tain cold shutdown condition. However, the equipment hatch cover is removed when the cold shutdown condition is already attained. Considering . a) location of Accumulator Tanks TK-9A, TK-95 and TK-9D, and b) the travelling path of equipment hatch cover, the control valves related to the above accumulator can be eliminated 1 from, and need not t6 be included in Table 2. i 4.3 Effect(s) of EHC drop on different components identified in Table 18 3a - Equipment r 1) - Containment Cooling Units In the event of heavy load drop (ENC) during cold shutdown condition, the damage to containment cooling unit does not have any effect on RER System's operation. The containment area is already open and RER System is in operation.
- 11) - Pressuriser Relief Tank and Relief Pump g Pressuriser Relief Tank and Relief Pump is isolated from the RER System's operation during this period. Any danese to these components can be corrected in due time.
es as l E 2 _ _ _ .. . . _, , ,
4.0 METHODS OF ANALYSIS (cont 'd.) 3a - Equipment (cent'd.)
- iii) - RC Drain Tank Best Exchanger This component is not in use during RER System's operation and damage to it has no effect on RER System's operation.
iv) - Accumslator Tank Damage to this unit does not effect RER System's operation. This component is isolated from the System during cold shutdown condition. v) - Miscellaneous Instrument Racks Deange to these cosponents does not have any effect on RER System's operation. (~ 3b - Ducts All ducts located in the annular area of concern are listed in Table 1. Any damage to these ducts can be repaired with no effect on RER System's operation.
- 3c - Piping A list of pipes grouped together based on their functional system are presented in Table 3. Results of a separate analysis on Rupture of Eigh Energy Lines (Seabrook FSAR, Appendix 33, Vol. 6) is incorporated into this Table.
4.4 Discussion and
Conclusion:
As it was mentioned previously, danese to anjor equipasnt listed in Table 1 does not have any effect of RER System's operation. Damage to and rupture of large line, listed in Table 3, only can cause flooding that can be easily detected and corrected. The exceptions ares o Instruasnt Air Lines 2952-4-Al-2" and 2953-4-Al-2" o Steam Generator Blowdown Lines 1304-1-3" and 1307-2-1" o Safety Injection Lines 251-4-2", 263-1-3/4" and 222-1-1" o Feed Water Lines 4607-04-1506-16" and 4608-04-15-6-16" I .
.o Main Steam Line 4002-02-907-30" -
t Damage to the above two Instrument Air Lines causes interruption in } air supply into Loop "A" and Loop "B" (DWGs. 9763-F-500323). These
- Loops are located at elevations below 25'-0" and below 0'-0",
I respectively. The only effect would be interruption of air supply to i pneumatically operated control valves, in which case the valves would f fail on their respective safe positions. The damaged parts can be easily defected and isolated by asans of annually operated valves 2"- l V1190 and 2*-V1191 of Loop "A" and 2"-V1186 and 2"-V1195 of Loop *t", respectively. No damage is expected for RER Systes's operation since
~5-e e-e- -e m a g L,* - ._ . . , . . . .. _. _. . - - - - -
- - - _- . .-h
l i 4.0 E THODS OF ANALYSIS (coat'd.) j l 3 4 4.4 Discussion and Conclusions (cont'd.)
! RER valves that are pneumatically operated (RM-BCV 606, HCV 607, FCV 618 and FCV 619: DWG. 9763-F-805008) are supplied from a compressor located in Turbine Building and therefore, independent of Loops "A" J and *B" of Instrument Air supply. Damage to the Steam Generator
! Blowdown pipes 1304-2-3" and 1307-2-3" does not effect RER System's 4 operation, since during cold shutdown condition all upstrema valves r
! are closed (DWGs. 9763-F-805004, 805005, and 805024). >
$ i i Safety injection line 222-1-1" is isolated from the system, since ; i accumulator is not a part of RER System in cold shutdown operation (DWG. 9763-F-805009). Line 263-1-3/4" is a testline for accumulators ' j A, B, C, and D, and therefore,-isolated (DWG. 9763-F-805010). Line 251-4-2" is originating f rom Safety injection Pump SI-P-65. Damage
! to this section of the pipe does damage the check valve 2"-SI-V80 and isolating valve 2"-SI-V81 (DUC. 9763-F-805103). However, this damage j
will not effect the check valve 6"-SI-V82 (DWG. 9763-F-805122), since i j this valve is located inside priesty shield. N probability of an , j independent failure of this check valve coincide with the heavy load j drop is very small. Furthermore, any loss of water due to unlikely j failure of this check valve will be small and can be easily made up - i by the RER System. l ? ) Any potential damage to the Feedwater lines 4602-04-1506-16" and 4608- ) 04-1506-16" and main atsaa line 4002-02-907-30" (DWC. 9763-F-805108, j and 805-095) resulting from a heavy load drop cannot affect the decay
$ heat removal process.
j h equipment required to maintain cold shutdown condition are listed in Table 2. j N RER Pumps (RE-P-8A & 85) are located in equipment vault (DWG. 9763-F-805078), and are not affected by the REC drop. During cold {j shutdown condition accumulator tank SI-TK-9C (located within the annular area of concern, DWGs. 9763-F-805055 & 805051, elevation (-) 25'-10") is isolated from the RER System through valves SI-FV-32 and * ! SI-V36 (DWG. 9763-F-8005009). These valves are located outside of l annular area and therefore, are not affected by REC drop (DWGs. '9763-F-805104 and . 805122). Damage to accumulator tank valves 81-V-2477 and SI-V02486 can not have any effect on RER System's operation, since accumulator tank 9C is isolated during cold shutdown operation. , Valves 12"-RC-V22 and 12"-RC-V23 (Reactor Coolant Loop No. 1 DWG. l 9763-F-805003) are located inside and outside missile barrier, respec- ! i tively. hoe two valves are related to the Steam Generator RM-11A l j and located in N-W quadrant of the containment area (DWGs. 9763F- l ! 805120 and 805101). Similarly, valves 12"-RC-V87 and. 12"-RC-V88 ' i (Reactor Coolant Loop No. 4, DWG. 9763-F-805006) are located inside I and outside missile barrier, respectively. Nee two valves are l related to' the Steam Generator RC-R-11D and located in 8-W quadrant l L , ., 1
i I I i i 4.0 METHODS OF ANALYSIS (cont 'd.) i 1 4.4 Discussion and Conclusions (cont'd.) . of the containment ares (DWGs. 9763-F-805123 and 805101). Consequent-ly the EHC drop has no effect on these valves. The RER local sample valves, RH-V-8 and RH-V-44 are both located outside the area of possible impact (DWG. 9763-F-805008) and there-fore,'are not affected by the EHC drop. e I . e I
5.0
SUMMARY
OF CONCLUSION The equipment, components, etc. affected by EHC drop were identified. Damage to these items does not ef fect RdR System's operation. Rupture of large lines as a result of EHC drop can cause flooding of sump. Sump high level indicators will alert operator. . E 4 e e _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . . - - _ - - - - - ~ + - -
TABLE 1. Items Located Within Annulus Area Under Travelling Path of Equipment Hatch Cover. ITEMS AFFECTED NO. OF EQUIP./ DESCRIPTION ELEVATION REMARKS (DWG. NO.) 1 - Equipment Containment 2/ 0'-0" Cooling Unit 9763-F-805052 Pressurizer Relief Tank 1/ (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805051 Press. Rel. Tank Pump 1/ RC-P-271 (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805051 RC Drain Tank HI 1/ E-43 (-)23'-0" 9762-F-805051 Accunnlator 1/SI-TK-9C (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805051 Misc. Instru- 2/MM-IR-3 Below 25'-0" 9763-F-500323 ment Rack Below O'-0" 9763-F-805051 1/MM-IR-10C Below O'-0" 9763-F-805178 2 - Ducts 54"Dia.Recircu- 2, Vertically located BOD Elv. lation Supply 9763-F-6.04133 18'-4" Heater 4 54"Dia. Duet Vertically located Top Elv. 9763-604133 18'-4" 54"Dia. Cooling Boriz. located around BOD Elv Duet 9763-F-604129 Containment 18'-4" 22" x 16" Duct Horiz. located BOD Elv. 9763-F-604132 (-)16'-8" 3 - Piping from , Reactor (-) 26'-0"to Coolant 9763-F-805103 (RC) (-)15'-0" 130-1-A7-4" 9763-F-805104 114-1-A7-2" 133-1-A7-1 1/2" 112-1-A7-4" Liquid Drain (WLD) 2102-1-A7-3"
l TABLE 1. Items Located Within Annulus Ares Under Travelling Path of Equipment Batch (cont'd.) Cover. ITEMS AFFECTED ~ NO. OF EQUIP./ DESCRIPTION ELEVATION REMARIS (DWG. NO.) 3 - Piping (cont 'd.) from Safety (-)26 '-0" to 9763-F-805103 Injection (SI) (-)15'-0" 9763-F-805104 251-4-2" 218-2-B9-3/4* 263-2-B9-3/4" 263-1-3/4" Nitrogen (NG) 1667-2-A7-1" Demineral-ized Water (DM) 1581-1-A7-3/4* from Reactor (RC) (-)15'0" to Coolant 9763-F-805099 0'-0" 9763-F-805100 14-2-A7-2" 129-1-2508-3/8" 113-1-A7-2" Reactor Makeup Water (RMV) 1102-4-A7-2* 1102-5-A7-3* 1139-1-A7-2" Nitrogen (NG) 1660-5-A7-1" 1656-1-A7-1" 1663-1-32-1" 1667-1-A7-1" Instrument Air (IA) 2953-4-Al-2" Demineral- . ized Water (DM) 1608-37-A7-1"- >- 1608-27-A7-1 1/2" 1608-4-A7-2" 1583-1-A7-1" 1608-19-A7-1" Service Air (SA) 2914-11-Al-3/4" 2914-10-Al-3 1/2" Waste Process Liq. Drain (WLD) 2243-1-Al-3" , __z _ _ ____ __ __i-
~ ~ '
TABLE 1. Items Located Within Annulus Area Under Travelling Path of Equipment Hatch (cont'd.) Cover. ITEMS AFFECTED NO. OF EQUIP./ DESCRIPTION ELEVATION REMARKS (DWG. NO.) 3 - Piping (cont 'd.) from Comp. Cooling (-)15-0" to 9763-F-805099 Wat. Pri. (CC) O'-0" 9763-F-805100 7561-Al Steam Gen. Blowdown (SB) 1307-2-3" 1304-2-3" Safety Inj. (SI) 222-1-1" from Feed Water (FW) O'-0" to 9763-F-805108 4607-04-1506-16" 12'-0" 9763-F-805109 4608-04-1506-16" Nitrogen (NG) 1655-3-1" 1656-3-1" Reactor Makeup Water (RMW) 1111-1-A7-3/4" from Main Steam (MS) 12'-0" to 9763-F-805095 4002-02-907-30" 25'-0" 9763-F-805096 Reactor Coolant (RC) 54-1-A7-3/4" Fire Protec-tion (FP) 8124-4-M3-4" 8124-5-M3-4" 8125-1-M3-2 1/2" Comp. Cooling Water Pri. (CC) -
-778-1-6" 786-2-Al-6" 772-2-10" 779-1-10" 756-2-4" 753-2-4" 712-3-3" 840-2-8" 804-1-3" Reactor Makeup Water (RMW) ,
1112-1-A7-3/4" 6"6**@ T G ** * '4'
, * " ^
TABLE 1. Items Located Within Annulus Area Under Travelling Path of Equipment Hatch (cont 'd. ) Cover. ITEMS AFFECTED NO. OF EQUIP./ DESCRIPTION ELEVATION REMARKS (DWG. NO.) 3 - Piping (cont'd.) from Demineral- 12'-0" to 9763-F-805095 ized Water (DM) 25'-0" 9763-F-805096 1608-11-A7-1 1/2" Instrument (IA) Air 2952-4-Al-2"
- NOTE: Damage to Electrical Connections and Cable Trays will not have any effect on RHR System's operation. Therefore, components located in Annular Area are not listed in this Table (See DWGs. 9763-F-310577, 579, 581, 607 & 609).
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TABLE 2. Equipment Required Only to Attain / Maintain Cold Shutdown Condition
- DESCRIPTION DEVICE REF. DRAWING SI Accum.
TK-9A Isol.
~
Valves SI-FV-3 l 9763-F-805120 ~ " TK-9B SI-FV-17 9763-F-805121 TK-9C SI-FV-32 9763-F-805104 TK-9D SI-TV-47 9763-F-805104 SI-Accum. TK-9A Vent Valves SI-V-2*75, 2476 9763-F-805009 TK-9B SI-V-2482 2483 " TK-DC SI-V-2477' 2486 TK ,9D SI-V-2495, 1596 " RER Pump RH-P-EA 9763-F-805008 RER Pump RB-P-8B 9763-F-805008 RHR System Valves RC-V88 9763-F-805101 RC-V23 9763-F-805101 RC-V22 9763-F-805120 RC-V87 9763-F-805123 RER Local Sample Valves RH-V-8 9763-F-805201 RH-V-44 9763-F-805201
- FSAR, SEABROOK, VOL. 9 Chapter 7, Table 7.4-1
TABLE 3. Tabulation of Pipes located in the Area of Concern. FLUID LINE PRESSURE TEMP. ESSENTIAL SYSTEM PIPE IDENTIFICATION MEDIUM SIZE "C'LAIS"SIIIEC MAX. MAX. LINE CC 756-1-Al-4" Water 4 N NS 150 300 No CC 786-28-Al-3" Water 3 N NS 150 300 No CC 716-2-Al-6" Water 6 N NS 150 300 No CC 716-3-Al-3" Water 3 N NS 150 300 No CC 791-2-Al-3" Water 3 N NS 150 300 No CC 786-2-Al-6" Water 6 N NS 150 300 No CC 778-1-6" Water 6 3 I 150 300 No CC 756-2-4" Water 4 3 I 150 300 No - CC 772-2-10" Water 10 3 I 150 300 No CC 779-1-10" Water 10 3 I 150 300 No CC 776-2-6" Water 6 N NS 150 300 No CC 753-2-4" Water 4 3 I 150 300 No CC 712-3-3" Water 3 3- I 150 150 No CC 840-2-8" Water 8 3 I 150 300 No CC 804-1-3" Deleted - - - - - - DM 1608-11-A7-1 1/2" Water 1 1/2 N NS 120 100 No DM 1608-13-A7-1" Water 1 N NS 120 100 No DM 1581-1-A7-3/4" Water 3/4 N NS 120 100 No DM 1583-1-A7-1" Water 1 N NS 120 100 No DM 1608-19-A7-1" Water 1 N NS 120 100 No DM 1608-27-A7-1 1/2" Water 1 1/2 N NS 120 100 No DM 1608-4-A7-2" Water 2 N NS 120 100 No DM 1608-37-A7-1" DemWater 1 N NS 120 100 No FW 4607-04-1506-16" Water 16 2 I 1400 6 00 Yes FW 4608-04-1506-16" Water 16 22 I 1400 000 Yes FP 8124-4-M3-4" Water 4 N NS 150 104 No FP 8124-5-M3-4" Water 4 N NS 150 104 No FP 8125-1-M3-2 1/2" Water 2 1/2 N NS 150 104 No MS 4002-02-907-30" Steam 30 2 I 1107 557 Yes NG 1667-2-A7-1" N2 1 N NS 125 104 No NG 1660-5-A7-1" N2 1 N NS 125 123 No NG 1656-1-A7-1" N2 1 N NS 125 123 No NG 1663-1-B2-1" N2 1 N NS 700 123 No NG 1667-1-A7-1" N2 1 N NS 125 104 No NG 1655-3-1" N2 1 2 I 125 123 No NG 1656-2-1* N2 1 2 1 125 123 No IA 2953-4-Al-2"
- LA 2952-4-Al-2"
- RMW 1111-1-A7-3/4" Water 3/4 N NS 198 296 No RMW 1112-1-A7-3/4" Wster 3/4 N 198 NS 296 No RMW 1102-4-A7-2" Water 2 N NS 198 148 No RMW 1101-5-A7-3" Water 3 N NS 198 148 No RMW 1139-1-A7-2" Water 2 N NS 198 296 No RC 130-1-A7-4" Water 4 N NS 5 300 No RC 114-1-A7-2" .
Water 2 N NS 100 300 No RC 133-1-A7-1 1/2" Water 1 1/2 N NS 20 300 No RC 112-1-A7-4" Water 4 N NS 25 300 No
TABLE 3. Tabulation of Pipes located in the Area of Concern. (cont'd.) FLUID _ _ ,,LI_NE,,_ _ _ PRESSURE TEMP ESSENTIAL SYSTEM PIPE IDENTIFICATION MEDIUM SIZE CLASS SEISMIC MAI. LINE RC 14-2-A7-4" Water 4 N NS 3 300 No RC 129-1-2508-3/8" Water 3/8 N NS 100 300 No RC 113-1-A7-2" Water 2 N NS 100 300 No RC 54-1-A7-3/4" Water 3/4 N NS 1 300 No SA 2914-11-Al-3/4" Air 3/4 N NS 125 328 No
- SA 2914-10-Al-1 1/2" Air 1 1/2 N NS 125 328 No SB 1307-2-3" Water 3 2 I 1000 583 Yes SB 1304-2-3" Water 3 2 I 1000 583 Tes SI 251-4-2" Water 2 2 I 1785 296 'Yes SI 218-2-B9-3/4" Water 3/4 N NS 2235 296 No SI 263-2-B9-3/4" Water 3/4 N NS 2235 296 No SI 263-1-3/4" Water 3/4 2 I 2835 296 Yes SI 222-1-1" Water 1 2 I 680 329 Yes WLD 2102-1-A7-3" Water 3" N NS 110 180 No WLD 2243-1-Al-3" Water 3" N NS 10 104 No
*SEE Part 4; DISCUSSION
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 Drawing Numbers: 9763-F-101487 Containment Concrete Annulas Area Elev. O'-0" 9763-F-101488 Containment Concrete Elev. 25'-0" 9763-F-805052 Containment Structure Elev. O'-0" 9763-F-805053 Containment Structure Elev. 25'-0" 976 }-F-805051 Containment Structure Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805055 Containment Structure General Arrangement 9763-F-805056 Containment Structure Ceneral Arrangement 9763-F-604129 Containment Structure Cooling System Elev. O'-0" 9763-F-604130 Containment Structure Cooling System Elev. 25'-0" 9763-F-604132 Containment Structure Cooling System Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805100 Containment Structure Piping Zone 56B Elev. (-)15'-0" 9763-F-805099 Containment Structure Piping Zone 55B Elev. (-)15'-0" 9763-F-805103 Containnment Structure Piping Zone 55A Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805104 Containment Structure Piping Zone 56A Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805108 Containment Structure Piping Zone 55C Elev. O'-0* 9763-F-805109 Containment Structure Piping Zone 56C Elev. O'-0" 9763-F-805095 Containment Structure Piping Zone 55D Elev. 12'-0"
6.0 REFERENCES
s 6.1 Drawing Numbers: (cont 'd. ) 9763-F-805096 Containment Structure Piping Zone 56D Elev. 12'-0" 9763-F-604133 containment Structure Cooling System Sections - Shaet 1 9763-F-500323 Containment Builning Instrument Air Dist. P&I Diagram 9763-F-805008 RHR System, P&I Diagram 9763-F-805004 Reactor Coolant System, Loop No. 2, P&I Diagram 9763-F-805005 Reactor Coolant System, Loop No. 3, P&I Diagram 9763-F-805024 Steam Generator Blowdown System, P&I Diagram j 9763-F-805009 Safety Injection System Accumulators, P&I Diagram 9763-F-805010 Safety Injection System High Head, P&I Diagram 9763-F-805120 Containment Structure Piping Zone 43B Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805122 Containment Structure Piping Zone 45B Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805123 Containment Structure Piping Zone 46B Elev. (-)26'-0" 9763-F-805101 Containment Structure Piping. Zone 53A Elev. (-)26'-0* 9763-F-805003 Reactor Coolant System, Loop No.1, P&I Diagram 9763-F-105006 Reactor Coolant System, Loop No. 4, P&I Diagram 9763-F-805078 RER, Containment. Spray, SI Equipment Valut
6.2 Others
- FSAR, Seabrook Vol. 6
- FSAR, Seabrook Vol. 9
- Response to NRC Generic Request for additional information relating to NUREG 0612 " Control of Heavy Loads", May 1983, DOCKET NOS. 50-443 & 50-444.
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