ML20154D846
Text
.
s e
.m-
<m m.
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION i.
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE REGION V i
Report of Inspection C0 Report No. 50-275/70-4 Licensee Pacific Gas & Electric Company Construction Permit No. CPPR-39 Category A Date of Inspection:
September 15 and 16, 1970 Date of Previous Inspection:
July 6, 1970 i
I O
Inspected by:
A. D. Joh son
'Date Reacto ' nopector lf N,V4,
l A
W W. D. Kelley, C0:11
.Date Reacedt' Inspector (Conett)
V i
/o.! [/7'
/
Reviewed by:
(k i e t cc-o G. S. Spencer Date Senior Reactor Inspector i
Proprietary Information:
None E.9.91.fr.
Type of Facility:
Pressurized Water Reactor Power tevel:
3250 net Location:
Diablo Canyon, San Luis Obispo j
County, California Type of Inspection:
Routine - Announced 8805200005 000520 PDR FOIA f
MCMILL ANDO-156 PDR
. - Scope of Inspection Pursuant to PI 3800/2 and the master inspection schedule: (1) continued inspection activities outlined in Attachment E, other Class I Structures (QA-QC review for f abrication and erection of steam generator supports),
I (2) review status of previously reported deficiencies, and (3) aside from j
normal inspection activities, Fk. Kelley Construction Inspector CO:II, independently reviewed, in general, procedures, NDT inspections and quality of workmanship associated with the construction of the containment liner and the liquid holdup tanks.
r S UKFIARY Safety Items - None i
Nonconformance Items - None Status of Previously Reported probices 1.
Subsequent to the previous inspection, a construction deficiency
)
notice was issued by CO:V regarding a deficiency in radiographic examination of velded seems in the plate material of the containment liner. The thickness of the reinforcement on several velds was observed to be greater than that permitted by the governing code, ASF2, Section i
VIII, Paragraph W-51 The licensee's subsequent investigation of the radiographed containment liner velds disclosed that 444 feet of liner veld required grinding and reradiographic examination.
This work had been complete by the time of the current inspection. Approximate).y 20 of the 444 radiographs showed defects requiring repairs.
(Section D. 1).
Other Significant Items 1.
Overall completion of construction activities was estimated to be 15% on September 15, 1970.
(S ection B.)
2 The licensee inspection of the identification stamping on the primary loop piping in storage failed in several instances, to meet the Westinghouse specification. Ilovever, the stamping vill be in compliance with the applicable code provisions providing the minimum design thick-ness has not been infringed upon.
This has yet to be determined.
(Section D.2)
~
t t
j '
3.
The primary piping at the Pismo Beach Storage area has been placed under cover to protect it from adverse environmental conditions.
(Section D.3) 4 The effect of the structural steel channels on operations of the containment spray system has been evaluated by engineering personnel and found acceptable.
(Section D.4) 5.
A special mockup section of the area between the wide beam flanges and the containment liner at the base of the containment walls has been constructed. During the inspection, the special concrete mix was being placed in accordance with the procedures to be used when concrete is placed in the corresponding area of the containment walls.
This project was being performed to provide assurance that concrete quality in the base of the containment walls will conform'to the design specifications.
(Section D.5) 6 A procedure is being formulated to delineate specific responsibilities within PG&E for verifying that all certification documents are valid and proper.
(Section D.6) 7 A review of the QA discrepancy reports indicated that the disposition of items has been in accordance with the PG&E QA standard procedure.
8.
The Murphy Pacific QA program for fabrication and erection of the i
steam generator supports appeared to include the necessary provisions when compared against the inspection guidelines provided in PI 3800/2, Attachment E.
9 A dye penetrant examinatica observed during the inspection was considered inadequate (Appendix A)
Mananement Interview The inspectors met with Messrs. Wrtsht, Farley, Hickman, Brady and other members of the PG&E site staf f on September 16, 1970 to review the significant findings of the inspection. The principle item discussed was the implications of Mr. Kelley's observations relating to a liquid penetrant test of a root pass of a weld on one of the liquid holdup tanks.
The inspector acknowledged that neither PSAR nor code requirements nor safety ramifications was in issue, but that the cbservation raised the issue as to the value of the QC inspection effort. The contract specifications require
.(
r
(.. _,_
s i
l i l
a liquid penetrant test of the root pass and both a PDM and PG&E inspector observed that test without raising an objection while both Mr. Kelley and Mr. Garvin indicated that the test was performed improperly.
(See Appendix A of the report.)
The inspector explained that activities associated with the construction of the holdup tanks was purposely chosen because of the absence of specific PSAR construction requirements and thus should show PG&E's normal practice associated with design and construction of a structure which will contain some radioactive materials.
Mr. Wright stated that the construction Department's policy was to assure that tests required by the contract were to be accomplished as specified whether or not the test is actually needed. He said that the QC inspector was without authority to decide whether a contractor could deviate from specified and accepted procedures and was responsible to report deviations from such procedures to the appropriate site engineer for evaluation and risolution in accordance with the provisions of the QA discrepancy procedure.
He added that both PDM's and PG&E's QC efforts related to work performance will be investigated to determine the circumstances and significance of the observed apparent deficiency in implementation of the QA program. He concurred that if the records of tests fail to truly reflect work perfornance the records are worthless.
In addition to the above item the inspector indicated that it appeared that appropriate followup action has been initiated concerning identified deficiencies noted during the previous inspection in June,1970.
In response to the inspectors specific question concerning the location at which the concrete is being sampled (as requested by CO:HQ memorandum dated 8/10/70), Mr. Farley stated that their evaluation has shown that sampling at the batch plant is preferable when all f actors are considered,
in the manufacture, sampling, transportation and placement of concrete at the Diablo site. He said they intend to continue sampling at the batch plant unless directed otherwise.
(See Section D.1. of C0 Report No. 275/70-2 for details concerning Iccation of concrete sampling.)
DETATIS A.
Persons contacted R. L. Wright Resident Electrical Engineer Acting Project Superintendent I
R. V. Tarley Resident Civil Engineer A. W. Hickman Resident Hechanical Engineer F. W. Brady QA Engineer R. W. Wood QA Engineer P. L. Bussolini QC Coordinator
v..4-,
-cer.-
I
~
5-B.
Construction Status Overall completion of construction of the Diablo Project was estimated by PG6E's Construction Department to be approximately 15% on September 15, 1970. Construction activities have been delayed during the past three months as a result of a 6 week dispute concerning a jurisdictional question between the carpenters and fitters.
A detailed review of the project schedule, and discussion with Fk. H.
Manning, Office Engineer, led the inspector to an independent estimate that the project was from 10 to 12 months behind its original schedule. A reasonable estimate of completion of construction appeared to be late spring of 1973, rather than the original estimate of the summer of 1972 PG&E site management chose not to officially state that the project was behind schedule, but agreed that.the inspector's estimate was not unreasonable, barring further unforeseen delays or events which possibly could advance the project completion date.
C.
Administration Since the previous inspection in June,1970, Mr. L. Carr, Quality Assurance Engineer, terminated his employment with PG&E to resume his duties as Professor of Mechanical Engineering at California State Polytechnic College located in San Luis Obispo, California. Also Mr. Murin, Quality Assurance Engineer, terminated to join Serris Power Company in Nevada.
Mr. R. W. Wood has joined Mr. Brady to replace Mr. Marin and the two l
individuals now form the current onsite Quality Engineering group.
Mr. Wood has been with PG&E for approximately one year and had previously been assigned engineering duties in San Francisco, on the General Construction Department side, Mr. Carvin the Quality Control Coordinator for onsite work (reporting directly to the Project Superintendent) has been transferred to San Francisco to assist Mr. Bain -
Construction Superintendent.
Mr. Bussolini, formerly a QC Engineer (Civil),
has been appointed as the onsite Quality Control Coordinator for the General Construction Department.
D.
Resolutions of Previous Tssues During the previous inspection several items were brought to the licensee's attention for evaluation and possible action. The following infornscion summarizes the licensee's disposition of the items.
1.
Inadequaev of the Radienraphie Exanination of Containment tJelds This item was the subject of a Construction Deficiency Notice (CDN) sent to the licensee on July 21, 1970 The licensee returned an adequate reply to the CDN dated August 17, 1970
(._...
.(,
~6-The records at the site showed that PG&E's inspection of the pertinent containment velds required that approximately 444 feet of welded seam be ground down to remove excess reinforcement to enable radiographic examination in accordance with the applicabic code provisions (UW-51).
Of the 444 feet of welds reexamined, 20
~
radiographs (each one foot in length) showed defects which required weld repair.
The nature of the defects detected after grinding were porosity, incomplete fusion, and slag.
2 Indentation Stamping of Class 1 Piping Indentifiaction rarkings on the primary loop piping in storage at the Pismo Beach storage facilities were to be of the "low-stress, interrupted - dot type mechanical stamping in accordance with Westinghouse requirements of WPS 83860LA".
The referenced specifi-cation requires that, "The impressions produced shall not exceed a depth of 1/64-inch and shall have rounded bottoms with a radius not less than one-fourth of the width of the impression at an impression depth of 0.010 inch".
According to Messrs. Brady and Hickman, PG&E's inspection of the impressions confirmed that the bottoms of the impressions were rounded, however, several impressions were found to exceed the depth specification of 1/64 (0.0156) inch. The maximum measured depth was 0.027 inch. A dial indicator depth gauge had been used to make the measurements.
In view of the findings.
PG&E has formally requested Westinghouse to demonstrate that the impression depths outside of the Westinghouse specification have not infringed on the minimum design wall thickness. Also, according to a communication from the Chief Mechanical Engineer to the Director of Quality Engineering, PG&E, the Vendor inspector group had been requested to verify that the fabricator is using the proper dies and techniques in the shop.
As a side note, during a recent compliance t
inspection of the particular pipe vendor, it was verified that proper i
dies were in use. However, it appears that the technique to prevent excessive depth may need further evaluation by the vendor which the l
licensee intends to determine during his ongoing vendor inspection program.
3.
Protection of Stain 1_ess Steel from Salt Air Environment In view of the proximity of the site to the ocean the question was raised during the previous inspection as to what detrimental effect, if any, the salt air environment would have on stainless steel
~
,... '....... {
~
_...2-
.h -- - -.
)
I j 1 I
component stored in the yard area without protection for an extended period of time. Mr. Hickman stated that the primary piping at the Pismo Beach storage area had been covered. However, he pointed out that a certain amount of chloride contamination from the air and handling was inevitable.
He said the components would be throughly clean and rinsed with chloride free water before installation. He also indicated that the tape used to cover the veld preparation ends while in storage had been specified to be chloride free. Further he said that all stainless steel components arriving at the storage would be evaluated to assure proper storage commensurate with component performance and safety functions.
Mr. Hickman added that as a practical matter, 60 ppm has been established as the chloride concentration limit in water used for hydrostatically testing equipment for non primary coolant system stainless steel components such as the liquid holdup tanks. Subse-quent to the hydro test, the equipment is required to be rinsed with water with chloride concentrations of less than 10 ppm and are to be rinsed until the rinse shows a chloride concentrations value of 10 ppm or less.
1.ater, the inspector learned that the correspond-ins Westinghouse chloride limit for primary piping was 1.0 ppm.
4 Effect of Structural Steel Channels an Oncration of Containment Spray The inspector was shown a letter from the Chief Mechanical Engineer answering the inquiry from the Director of Quality Engineering as to whether the leak chase channels on the inside face of the con-tainment liner were consistent with the design evaluation of the containment spray oystem which referred to a liquid film barrier (PSAR-2, page 64).
Engineering explained that there was no question of conformance or an unreviewed safety question as the record is explicit that the channels will be inside (PSAR-2, Page 5-50).
Thus, no corrective i
action was considered necessary. The Chief Mechanical Engineer's letter went on to point out that the paragraph at the bottom of-page 6-64 shows no intent to produce a flowing film of water down i
the f ace of the liner. Rather, the cold liner plate and any spray wall impingement would af ford a vetted surface which would have some qualitative value in trapping radioactive particles out of the containment atmosphere.
It would therefore be a better leakage barrier than would a dry surface. He further pointed out that the analysis takes no quantitative credit for wet valls, as had been made clear in the same section.
He wrote that the containment spray solution will be much more effective as droplets in free fall through the etnosphere. The layout of apray nozzles attempts to minimize the amount of spray impingement on the walls. Also of interest, he i
j
(
(
8-added that there was some value in post accident recovery in having the radioactivity remain in the containment (trapped en the channels) rather than circulating through the residual heat exchanger.
(Safety injection loop) in the Auxiliary Building.
5 Placement of Specini Concreto in Area Between Wide Beam Flannen
_and Containment Li n er The bottom section of the containment valls are to be constructed with wide beam flanges (20 feet in length) installed in the center of the concrete portion of the vall. The construction plans require that the flanges be installed and that a special concrete mix (see CO Report No. 50-775-3) be placed by dropping the concrete between the flanges and the containment liner over the installed reinforcing steel. To provide assurance that the placement procedures and design mix produce the desired concreto quality and structural integrity of this section of the containment walls, the licensee decided to construct a mockup section to enable analysis of the end product.
During the current inspection the inspectcre observed that a mockup section had been constructed.
The section appeared to be approxi-mately 20 feet in height and about 16 feet in width. All reinforcing steel was observed to be installed similarly to that aircady installed around the containment building.
Also the incactor observed a strain gauge had been installed in a location similar to that planned for installation in the containment vall.
Mr. Brady explained that the procedures used to pour the mockup section vill be identical to those used for placing the concrete in the containment wall.
He said this included time.
Plans for i
pouring the mockup section were ;.o pour a two foot elevation sect. ion each hour. Therefore ten hours had been scheduled to pour the section. Also Brady said the test section should provide information en possible effects placement of concrete might have on the strsin gauges to be installed in various locations throughout the contain-ment walls.
6 Verification of Quality Control Information on Certification Docurents In response to the question raised during the previous inspecticn, as to whether or not PG&E plans to have someone within the company confirm that the data provided on certification documents conform to the applicable specification and code requirements, Mr. Brady
(
.-.k
. - -. -. ~.
i i
l -
r stated that the company policy is to assure that the product meets the specifications.
Therefore, a specific procedure is being prepared to provide clearly who wfthin PG&E is responsible for this type of verification.
E.
0A Construction Deviation Reports The inspector reviewed the QA records of deviations and minor variations.
During the review the inspector confirmed that the disposition of identified discrepancies in construction activities have been processed in accordance with the licensee's QA discrepancy procedure. Since start of construction activities, the record shows 132 resolved minor variations and 32 deviations.
The substance of the more recent discrepancies appeared to the inspector to have been properly classified and appropriately resolved.
During the past several months the nature of discrepancies ranged from excessive slump of manufactured concrete (minor variation) to installation of materials contrary to the contreet specifications (daviation).
F.
Other Class I Structures - Steam Cencrater Supports (OA-0C Pronram)
Guy F. Atkinson Corapany has installed the anchorage for the steam generator supports.as discuesed in CO: Report No. 50-275/3.
Itowever, Murphy-1 Pacific Corporation. Oakland, California has been awarded the contract to furnish, f abricate and erect the structural steel to form the supports. Also Murphy-Pacific's contract calls for fabricating and installing the structural steel for the primary coolant pumps, pressuriser, main steam and feedwater supports.
i Hurphy-Pacific has selected Testing and Controls Inc., Oakland, California to provide the Quality Assurance program for the project in accordance with the PG&E and Murphy-Pacific contract prorisions. Testing and Control Inc.,
has prepared a QA manual which sets forch the progrtm to be implemented to -
assure that Hurphy-Pacific will be in the position to demonstrate to PG6E that 1
i the supports have been fabricated and erected in conformance with the contract j
specifications. PG&E has reviewed and approved the QA manual.
i Pursuant to PI-3800/2, the inspector reviewed the QA-QC lknual approved l
by PG&E for the work to be performed. A section of the manual described the general guidelines and program to be applied to the project. The section also appropriately delineated objectives, controls and responsibilities. A second section of the annual was devoted to detailed instructions pertaining to the various procedures required to provide the quality assurance program necessi-l tated by the contract. A third section provided the sample forms to be used i
during performance of the contract specification to assure appropriate docu-i mentation of the quality of the work performed.
~
~_
t
(
{
s
{
~
?
1,
The inspector confirmed that the provisions of the QA-QC manual had incorporated appropriate provisions for the work to be accomplished based on the inspection criteria outlined in PI-3800/2, Attachment E.
I l
The inspector also confirmed that the QA-QC manual had incorporated i
appropriate provisions (based on the inspection guideline provided in PI-3800/2, Attachment E) to demonstrato quality and performance of work as required by the contract specifications, i
I
,(
,I i
5 l
l 1
I l
?
4 f
I i
i I
.i f
l
r
(
(
I t
I I
I Pacific Cas and Electric Company l
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Stations Units 1 and 2 San Luis Obispo County, California l
APPENDIX A e
t i
Reactor Containment Liner and Liquid Holdup Tanks Welding and Nondestructive Testing W. D. Kelley Reactor Inspector (Construction)
CO Report No. 50-275/70-4 1
l 1
i
.. '. ' ' ~ ~ ~..
.7 ~
h SCOPE An announced inspection was made on September 15 and 16,1970, at the Pacific Cas and Electric Company (PG&E), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station (PWR), San Luis Obispo County, California.
The purpose of the inspection was to review i
the nondestructive testing procedures and techniques being utilized, the capabilities of the NDT inspectors involved and evaluate the welding of the reactor containment liner and the liquid holdup tanks.
S UMMARY Pittsburgh Des hbines Steel Company (PDM) has a quality control group at the site that is independent of construction and the nondestructive examination is performed by NDT tachnicians, not by the boilermakers.
(See Section B.)
The PDM welding procedures were written and qualified in accordance with Section IX of the ASHE Code at their Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, facilities.
(See Section C.)
The PDM weldors on the reactor containment liner were qualified at the site in accordance with Section IX of the code.
Two weldors were brought to the site by PDM and qualified for veld stainless steel in accordance with Section IX of the Code for welding on the liquid holdup tanks.
(See Section C.)
The radiographs of the reactor containment liner and the liquid holdup tank meet ASHE Code requirements; however, the liquid penetrant examination of the root pass of the liquid holdup tank was observed by the compliance inspector as being done incorrectly and witnessed by a PG&E inspector who had i
limited informal training in liquid penetrant examination.
(See Section D.)
Excessive grinding of the weld reinforcement of the liquid holdup tank was observed by the inspector. The grinding into the base material had not gone below minimum well thickness which was verified ultrasonically and was aceppted by the code inspector.
(See Section E.)
DETATIS A.
Persons Contacte(
PG&E j
F. Brady QC Engineer Mechanical QC Engineer H. Petersen i
R. Bafus Electrical QC Engineer QC Engineer R. L. White
~
, I B. Good QC Engineer R. V. Farley Civil Engineer R. L. Bussolini QC Engineer R. Maxwell Civil Engineer R. W. Wood QC Engineer A. W. Hickman Mechanical Engineer L. J. Carvin QC Engineer PDM G. Hendex QA Field Engineer G. Wooley QA Radiography Coordinator J. Muller QA Engineer B.
Quality Control The erection of the containment liner is being performed by PDM using boilermakers from San Francisco California Boilermakers Local No. 6 on their Contract No. 39711 with PG&E.
The PDM labor contract with the boilermaker San Francisco Local does not require that the nondestructive testing be performed by boilermakers as required by the National Transit Local of the Boilermakers Union.
PDM has estabitshed an independent quality assurance section that does all nondestructive testing and does not report to the site construction force but reports to the chief engineer at their Western Division office, Santa l
Clara, California.
C.
Welding The velding of the containment liner was done in accordance with welding procedures that were written and qualified in PDM's Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania, facilities where they have their Metallurgy and Welding Engineering staf f.
The velding procedures used are referenced on the erection drawing using the AWS weld symbols.
An attempt was made to weld the liquid holdup tanks on their side using automatic welding equipment and erecting the complete tank. The process proved to be too slow and the erection procedure was revised to arect the tanks in the vertical position using manual welding.
The welding procedure used for velding these tanks were qualified in PDM's Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, facilities.
The velders were qualified at the site in accordance with the welding 4
procedures that they would be using.
The veldor qualification test taken by
\\
(
.... (
. >+
E i
3 l
the weldors for welding on the reactor containment were for manual metal l
are welding of ASE P-1 carbon steel grade materials in the horisontal and vertical positions in accordance with Section IX of the ASME Code. About 457.
j i
of the boilern.aker weldors sent to the site by the Boilermaker Union failed
~
to pass these tests. After the weldor passed the qualification tests, the first ten feet of his production weld was spot radiographed and if 507. repair i
was required, he was discharged. A bar chart record is kept by the quality I
j control group of the total footage of welding of each weldor and the total i
footage of repairs.
If the repair rate exceeded 107., the weldor is subject l
1 to being discharged, J
j
{
The erection of the liquid holdup tanks is being performed by PDM on j
their Contract No. 39715 with PG&E. Two boilermaker veldors were brought to the site by PDM to weld these tanks and they are the only weldors e
permitted to do any welding on them.
t These two weldors, doing the welding of the liquid holdup cank, were qualified in the horisontal vertical positions for ASME P-8 stainless steel grade materials using the metal inert gas process' l
.I
)
The welding procedures and welding procedure qualification are on file
)
at the site and the file contains only those welding procedures and procedure l
l qualifications that are referenced on the approved erection drawings. The I
welder qualifications are on file and the file includes the record of those
{
l weldors r5.at failed the qualifications test as well as those who have welded on the two contracts.
i The welding procedures, welding procedure qualifications, and weldor i
qualification were reviewed by Region II inspector and '. hey met the require-ments of Section IX of the ASME Code.
}
D.
Nondestructive Testinn i
a the nondestructive testing of the reactor containnent liner and liquid
(
i holdup tanks is under the supervision of Mendez, QA Field Engineer, who is l
j certified as a Level III per SNT-TC-1A for radiography, dye penetrant, i
magnetic particle and ultrasonic. Mendez has had years of experience in the nondestructive field which included working for independent test laboratories.
i
}
The responsibility of assigning the taking of radiography, recordkeeping, j
interpretation of radiographs, and filing the radiographs are the responsibility l
^
of the QA Radiography Coordinator, Wooley, who is certified to Level II for j
radiography. The dye penetrant examination is performed and evaluated by
{
Huller, certified to Level II.
r i
The radiographs are presently flied at the site. Radiographs were
[
selected by the Region II inspector from the rollout drawings of the reactor l
containment and liquid holdup tanks and there readily obtained by Wooley. The i
i i
a
I f -
g i
I I
, i l
radiographs of both reactor containment and liquid holdup tanks set the i
requirements of ASPE Code for density, penetrameter placement and shimming.
j The Region II inspector agrees with the interpretation of Wooley on the j
l radiographic readout sheets.
t I
A visual inspection of the liquid holdup tanks was made while a dye penetrant examination was being performed by Muller on the grinded area of the root pass prior to welding the outside of Tank No. 2-2 Seans 1-H-1 and 1-H-2.
The application of the_ dye and the dwell time met the dye penetrant procedure but the cleaning in the area to be examined and the application i
of the developer were done improperly.
The dye was not removed sufficiently from the area being examined to prevent a pinkish cast to the developer when applied. Also the developer was being applied using an aerosol can in a high wind. The inspector Muller attempted to shield the spray from the high l
4 wind with his body which resulted in his inability to observe the application of the developer which resulted in too Itcht a cost.
A PG&E inspector, J. Domino, who had limited informal training in dye penetrant examination, was witnessing the dye penetrant examination; he was the replacement for the vacationing inspector who had been trained in dye penetrant examination.
4 E.
Excessive Grindint of Welds on Liould Holduo Tank A visual inspection of the liquid holdup tanks revealed excessive grinding of the welds reinforcement before radiography. The excessive grinding j
resulted in the thinning of the base material on either side of the weld.
Mendes stated that the area had been measured ultrasonically by the Magneflux
(
i Corporation.
i Mendes stated that the first ultrasonic technician sent to the site by f
Magnaflux was unable to get repeatability in his reading and Magnaflux was advised of his inability to get good date. The second visit to the site
~
l was Magneflux's NDT Supervisor, J. Ortega, who was certified to Level III 1
j per SNT-TC-1A for ultrasonics.
j A PG&E interoffice memorandum dated July 27, 1970, signed by J. T. Duffy stated that the design calculation recuired the minimum thickness of the i
bottcm head be 0.115 inch, the minimum thickness of the shell be 0.206 in'ch, and the minimum thickness of the top head be 0.099 inch. The top and bnttom I
head were fabricated from 3/16-inch plate and the shell from 1/4-inch plate, j
The Magnaflux report states that nene of the areas of excessive grinding are less in thickness than that required by the design calculation. The design requirement and Magneflux test results have been reviewed and accepted by l
the ASME Code Inspector, A. L. Quinn, of the Factory Mutual Insurance Company.
i 3
c c
facif t: Cas and Electri: Oompany Diablo Oanyon Nuclea r Sta tions tnits 1 and 2 San Luis Obispo County, Oalifornia APPENDIX A Reactor Oontainment Liner and 1,1 quid lloidup Tanks Welding and Nondest ructive Testing W. D. Kelley Reac tor Inspe: tor (Oonst ruction) 00 Report !:os. 50-275/70-50-323/70-i iO
3 i
t
?
I
{
j 3
S00PE k"
t An announced inspection was made on September 15 and 16,1970, at tho i
{
vacific Cas and Electric Company (PC6E), Diablo Janyon Nuclear Station j
(PVR), San Luis Obispo County, California.
The purpose of the inspec-tion was to review the nondestructive testing procedures and techniques being utilized, the capabilities of the NDT inspectors involved and j
evaluate the welding of the reactor containment liner and the liquid t
holdup tanks.
l T
Summary
)
i rittsburgh. Des !!oines Steel Oompany (PDM) has a' quality control group s the site that is independent of construction and the nondestructive examina. tion is performed by NDT technicians, not by the boilermakers.
j (See Section B.)
,l 1
[
j The PDM welding procedures were written and qualified in accordance with
}
]
Section IX of the ASME Code at their Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, f ac ilit ies.
i (See Section 0.)
f I
l The /DM weldors on the reactor containment liner were qualified at the 3
site in accordance with Section IX of the code. Two weldors were brought i
l to the site by PDM and qualified for weld stainless steel in accordance with Sectian IX of the Oode for welding on the liquid holdup tanks.
I
]
(See Section 0.)
l The radiographs of the reactor containment liner and the liquid holdup j
tank meet ASME Oode requirements: however, the liquid penetrant examina-I tion of tha root pass of the liquid holdup tank was observed by Region i
y II being done incorrectly and witnessed by a.'C6E inspector who had no j
training in liquid penetrant exanination.
(See Section D.)
4 Excessive grinding of the veld reinforce tent of the liquid holdup tank f
was observed by Region 11 inspector. The grinding into the tease material had not gone below ninimum wall thickness which was verifiect :altrasonically and was accepted by the code inspector.
(Sce Section E.)
j 1
i DETAILS t
A.
rersons Contacted
~
)
PG&E F. Brady. QO Engineer H. Petersen - Hechanical Q0 Engineer R. Bafus - Electrical ( O Engineer R. L. White 00 Engineer 9
i d
i I
C C
00 Rpt. Nos. 50-275/70- $0-323/70-B. Good "O Engineer R. V. Farley - Oivil Engineer R. L. Bussolini f.; Engineer R. Maxwell - Oivil Lngineer R. W. Wood - QO Engineer A. W. Hickman - Mechanical Engineer L. J. Ga rv in - ( ; Engineer cDM G. Mendez - CA Field Engineer G. Wooley - QA Radiography Ooordinator J. Huller. r A Engineer B.
Cual ity Control The erection of the containment liner is being performcw
- DM using boilcrmakers from San Francis:o Oalifornia Coilermakers Local No. 6 on their Oontra:t No. 39711 with /GLE. The rDM labor contra:t with the boilermaker San Francis:o Lo:a1 does not require that tha r.ondestructive testing ee.serformed by boilermakers as required by the National Transit Local of the Doilermakers tnion, rDM has established an hdc endent quality assurance se: tion that does e
all nondestructive testing and does not report to the site constru:-
tion for:e but reports to the chief engineer at their Western Division of fice, Santa Olara, Oslifornia.
O, Veldinn The velding of the containment liner was done in accordance with welding procedures that wure written and qualified in PDM's Pittsburgh, tennsylvania, facilities where they have their Metallurgy and Weldin-Engineering staf f.
The velding f rc:edures used are referenced on el.J ere: tion drawing using the AWS veld symbols.
An attempt was made to weld the liquid holdup tanks on their side using a utomat i: welding equipment and er::t ing the complete tank. The pro-cess proved to be too slow and the erection procedure was revised to ere:t the tanks in the vertical position using ranual velding. The welding procedure used for welded these tanks were qualified in.*DM's i
.'itt sburch, Pennsylvania, f ac ilit ie s.
The weldars were qualified at the site in ac:ordance with the welding pro:edures that they would be usin;.
The weldor qualif t:st ion test i
I
t
[
l
(
(
i f
4 l
00 Rpt. ::os. 50-275/70- j 50-323/70-f i
I
?
i taken by the weldors for welding on the reactor containment were for i
manual metal are walding of ASME P-1 carbon steel Orade materials in i
the horizontal and vertical positions in accordance with Section IX f
of the.412 Oode. About 457. of the boilermaker weldors sent to the site by the Doilermaker Union f ailed to pass these test. Af ter the weldor passed the qualification tests, the first ten feet of his pro-i 4
j dvetion weld was spot radiographed and if 507. repair was required, he j
was dis:harged. A bar chart record is kept by the quality control j
group of the total footage of welding of each weldor and the total i
footage of repairs.
If the.epair rate exceeded 107., the weldor is t
subje:t to being discharged.
i '
I
]
The ere: tion of the liquid holdup tanks is being performed by PDM on l
their Oontra:t !;o. 39713 with PGLE. Two boilermaker voldors woro j
brought to the site by (D:t to weld these canis and they are the only l
weldors permitted to do any welding on them.
4 i
These two veldors, doing the welding of the liquid holdup tank, were j
qualified in the horizontal and vertical sositions for AS!E t P stain.
less steel grade caterials using the n.etal inert gas process.
~
The welding jro:cdures and welding procedure qualification are on file at the site and the f11e contains only those volding procedures and procedure qualifications that are referen:ed on the approved ere: tion I
drawings. The weldor qualif t:ations are on file and the file in:1udes the record of those veldors that failed the qualifications test as j
well as those who have welded on the two contracts.
l The velding pro:cdures, welding procedure qualif teations, and weldor qualif t:ation were reviewed by Region II ins cetor and they cet the e
requirc* ents of Section IX of the ASME Oode.
I D.
l'ondest ructive Test inn j.
The nondestru:tive testing of the reactor containrent liner and liquid i
holduj tanks is under the supervision of 1:ende=, ' A Field Enginect, i
who is :artified as a Level III per Slit-TO-1A for radiography, dye j
I genetrant, ca;incti: article and ultrasoni:. Mendet has had rears of 6
I experien c in the nonJestructive field which in:1uded working for
(
inde/endent test laboratories. The responsibility of assigning the l
I j
taking of radiography, rc:ordkeepin;, inter /rctat ton of radiographs, j
and filing the radic;rashs are the responsibility of the CA R dicarajby 3
Ooordinator '.looley, who is certified to Level II for radiography.
6 l
The d:*e genet rant examinat ion is ecrformed and evaluated by liuller, j
eereifisJ to Level II.
i a
k i
)
=
20 Ryt. Nos. 30-273/70-4-
50-323/70-Tha radiographs are presently filed at the site. Radiographs were selected by the Region II ins pector f rom the rollout drawings of the rea: tor containment and liquid holdup tanks and there readily o'atained by Uooley. The radiograshs of both rea:tcr containment and liquid holdup tanks net the requirements of AS:I Ocde for dens ity, j : net ramet er plac ement and shimmin3 Region II inspector agrees with the laterar;tation of Wooley on the radiographi: reaJout sheets.
A visual inspection of the liquid holdup tanks was cade while a dye l
joncerant exanination was Scing performed by Muller on the grinded i
arca of tha root pass prior to welding the outside of Tank ::o. 2-2, l
S eams 1-11-1 and 1-H-2.
The appliestion of the dye and the du,11 l
tine met the dye penetrant sto:cdure but the 01 caning in the arca to be examined and the application of the develojer were done l
16ag rop e rl y.
The dye was not removed sufficiently fret the area being examined to prevent a pinkish cast to the develogor when applied. Also the developer was being agplied using an aerosol
- an in a high vind. The ins ce to r -lull ar at tem..t e d t o sh ie ld the e
spray f rom the high wind with his body which result ad in his inability to caserve the a,.ll:ation o f the develeger uh i:h result ed s
in too light a : oat, n v 7,C inspe: tor, J. Donino, 9ho had no t raining in dye senet rant exanination, was witne uing the dya genetrant examinat ion; ae was the repla:e ;cnt fer the va:ationing insge: tor who had been tra ined in dye penat ranc exa.c.inat ion.
1 E.
Ex:essive_Grindi_nr of Vel ds on Liquid Holdup Tank i
A visual inspectien of the liqu;d holdup tanks revealed ex: 2ssivc 3rinding of the welds reinfereccent Sefora radiografhy. The ex:es s ive grinding resulted in the thinning c f the Sa;2 nattrial on either side of the veld. Hendez stated that the area had been n:ssured ultrasnni: ally oy the !.agna flux Oorgerat ion.
l Mender stated that t!.e : test ultrasoni: te:hni: tan sent to the sit: n
.agnaflux was unable to get ra,.catabilit / in his reading and.agnailux l
was advised cf his inaSilit. to gat good nata.
The :e:cnd visit to '
t'.,e s ite was ::agna flux's :3T bejervisor, J. Crtoca, who uss crtifit to Leval III jer S iT-T;-la fer ultrasoni:s.
l
.,.di: intero f fi:c re; orsn jui dated July 27, 1970, signed by J. T.
Duft'y stated that the d:e i;;n :alatlat ion requir2d the tiinitum thi:kne:s l
c f c).e bottom head bc 0.113 in:h, the t.ini-um thicknes s of the shell c 0.200 in:h, and the inimun thickness of the top ocad a u.ON
0 0
k
(
00 a,.t. 1;os. 50 275/70-
-5 20-323/70-in:h. The top and bottota head were f abricated f rom 3/16-inch.ilate and the shell frcm 1/4-inch plate. The Magnaflux report states that none o f the areas of ex:essive grinding are less in thickness than that required by th.: design calculat ion.
The design requirement and
- agnaQux test rasults have been reviewed and a::cated by the AS:I Jode Ins, sector, A. L. r uinni. of the Fa: tory !!utual Insurance Oot.pany.
l l
l l
l i
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l l
(
I i
1
.