ML20154C338

Petition to Suspend License NPF-39 Based on Listed Violations,Omissions & Possibly Deceptive Info Re Plant Operation

ML20154C338
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	02/28/1986
From:	Anthony R ANTHONY, R.L., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#186-292 OL, NUDOCS 8603050103
Download: ML20154C338 (7)

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U.S. NUCLE R REGULATORY COMMISSION PHILA. ELEC. CO. Licsrick Goa. Sta. Unito 1 & 2 DOCK 5T NO: 50-352,353 CC.

PETITION BY INTERVENOR R.L. ANTECN'f/F0E TO THE C05 CSSION TO SUSPEND CP.110.

NPF-39, ISSUED TQ PHILA,ELEC. ,10B CAUSE, AS SPICIFJD IN 10 CFR $0. log g Feb. #P1986

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SUSPENSION OF LICENSE. Anthony /F0E petitions tb Commispico un,ier the provi-cions of 10 CFR 50.100 to suspend the operating license, NPF-39,1MudfRRhy3.Q g l to PECo in August 1985, on the basis of cause,under the .specifi.: co.mplaints of violations, omissions and possibly deceptive information in PECo'Ihyeration of the Limerick unit 1. reactor set forth below. W-Se n 50.100 (above) states as cause,for revocation or suspension of a licenee any material false statement in the application...or other statement of  ;

fact required.... (2.) .. conditions revealed...or statement.. report, inspection, or other means,which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application....(3) or failure to .. operate a facility in accor-dance with the terms of.. license....(4) or for violations of,or failure to observe, cny of the terms and provisions of the act, regulations,licenec, permit,or order of the Commission. "

We present below the evidence on which the Commission should act to suspend license NPP-39 under the four categories lis*-d,in abbreviated form,from the pre- ,

vious paragra.ph. Our presentation follows tr.is orders (2.) " conditions revealed

....to refuse to grant a license.."(3)" failure to.. operate..in accordance with

. . license . . . . ( 4)* .Yiola,tions of,or failure to obe r ve. .the act,regul;tions,licenen, permit,or order..."(l.) .." any material falso statement..or other staterent of fact..."

We also review here the cumulative evidence which demands suspension of Lic.

NPF-39 from our appeale currently awaiticg NRC t.ction,and reinforce these with ovidence from curreat NRC inspection reporte,licenso event reporta , le t t e rs , e tc . ,

forth below. The following are the appeals in which wo era involved:

ce se{ LAB -819 is the 2nd PID and concerne external threats to safe operation.

LPB-85-14 involves flaws in,and violations of Offsite Emergency Plans.

ALAB 823 flooding and disabling control bldg. via openinga, Unit 2 to Unit 1.

ALAB 828 effluent releases to the environment from Limerick operation.

DD-86-1 review of 8 exemption of regulations threatening safe operation,Duit :

To NRR(1/17/86)vs. PEco requested changes of use limits for Schu Amendment No.l. to Lic. , exemption from T.S. 4.6 3 4 (1/30, 2/5, 2/ylkill water.12, 2/15/

N 85-3606 U.S. 3rd Cir. Court vs. exemption r offsite ergency exerqise.

c)$$ PEco Proposed Amend e t 50 F 53235 2  ? Anthony F0E petition 30 ASLB.

noc. These appeals are cited he[ow, accor.Rding to the ,

era or ates.

88 g CONDITIONS REVEALED WARRANTING REFUSAL OF LICENSE (2. above )

u 1. NRC would have refused PEco a full power license if it had evaluated the eithdrawal of confidence in PECo's ability to operate a nuclear plant (Brd.Notif.

Q< 85-070,7/22/85) stated thus: "the fundamental NRC concernis ...namely, inadequate

$c: canagemet t (PECo) control by the licensee of licensed activities performed by con-e a:n o tractors."(p.1.) An enclosure,(letter of T.E.Murley,5/30/85) gives details of two Severity Level III violations, Peach Bottom (App.A ) with assessed civil penal-ties $25,000 and Limerick (App.B ) assessed penalties 8 50,000. Mr.Murley further otates (5/30/85, p.2 ) :

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- tha Thasa violationo end throo ot,Pacch Botttm fccility d0monstrato thst iccdequ- ,

oto overoight cnd control cf centractor cetivitioc io not licitsd to the par-

. ticular f acility Jaanagement, but also involves corporatgmarage=ent. Further, the violations at Limerick represent the second instance a year of PEco's in-adequato control of contractor guard force activities.

2. A Januarg inspection of this year shows that the lack of guard protection continues and geall for suspensien of the license until safe guarding of the plant is assured.( Insp. 86-01,1/17/86 ) (p.l.) Enforcement action was consider- ,

cd on 2/7/86 under the instigation of T.T. Martin because of a openings and degradations of protected area / vital area barriers and to review allegations relative to security officers leaving their posts without being ,

relieved.

And Insp. 85-42 ( 1/27/86)(p.3) included a review of previous commitments made by the licensee to NRC Region I as... follow-up of allegations regarding the removal of potentially sensitive security drawings From % $ M M % listed above it seems obvious PECo does not control its guards.

3. uazagement's PECo apparent inability to profit from NRC instruction and in spite g

the assessed penalties of 3 25,000 and 8 50,ooO, abo <e,shows up further in Inspee. .

th 86-02(p.7)w he same discredited Radiation Work Permits system still being re-lied on, '" adopted,with .some modification,from the Peach Bottom station."

4. PECo's proposed restart of construction on Unit 2 involves threats to safe operation of Unit 1 which should prompt NRC to suspend the license until c11 provisions hs.ve been completed to isolate the construction from Unit 1 opera-ing tion. Our appeal, ALAB-823 highlights one of the ggflood ofn the contrcl builgregviaconstructionopeningsfromUnit2withthe,lossofcoolingequipment requ in ,

to keep the sensitive control systems g gtional, in order to 'be able to control snd shut down the reactor. Insp. 86-01 describes new breaches between Units 1 1 2.

Under the threat of water from Unit 2 and new construction openings adding aug- ,

cented hazards to Unit 1 operation, license NPF- 39 must be auspended since this license would not have been issued if these hazards had been known in August '85 5 Our appeal, ALAB 828, warns of the danger to the public from Limerick effluent releases. Current examples of PEco's careless, dangerous operation call ,

for iu:sediate suspension of the license. Inspec. 86-02(p.4) describes a radionetive relesse at dangercue levels directly to the environment for about 45 minutes via the north exhauet etack. PECo could not sample or record how high the levele cere (p4.) " due to locked security doors at the access to the north stack.."

This hazard is still open for another inspection. (86-02-01) '

6. Insp. 86-02 details more effluent releases >(p 4&5) 300,000 lbs/ water hr steam flow into the condenser and its bay with uncertain levels of radioeetive persee-ting to the outside, probably more than 100 gallons . PECo has no meseure of the damage resulting from these two releasec nor a spill (p 9)from drain lines on 1/8/86 when a " sink overflowed into a floor drain which was purped to the on-oite holding pond (which) is discharged to the Schuylkill River'.'(Open itec 86-02-05

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7. Ia codition to tho alarmieg nature of those rsicasco is f.ho concluston that FECo is handicapped in preventing repatitioom because " the licenase does not have a procedure to capture the .fseta reintive to potantial radiologtcal incidents and provide for a timely manEgemect revies of these incidents." Iger.

86-02. (Open Item 86-02-02). This situation calle for suspeneton of the license.

8. Purther evidence for immediate suspension come from the following inspec-  ;

tions: 85-30, radioactive sater spill (p14), resin-water epill (p 17),and un-certain drywell temperature control (unresolved 14e2 85-30-03, p. 19,20); and 5

85-36/85-09 (p 16-le) the possibility of flood water entry into the control struc- '

ture (see para.4. above) which"could impact personnel habitability and electronie -

oquipment throughout the control structure". This loss of tooling possibility forces a heretofore unconsidered threat to -operatioc 8Ddthe neceseity to"addrosefes) tha determination of ao effective temperature .... which would requi;re initiation

of a plant shutdown *(p 17). Uncertainties as to " permanent moli'fications (p 19)

...to preclude flood water entry,and the implementation of administrative controls alSo for opening of Unit 2 " ( unresolved item 85-36-02) needssitate license susyencior, 9 The preesst. continuing vulnerability of the Emergency Service Wster System poses a threat to safe operationwhich was not evaluated before issusace of the license in the way it can be now. In Insp. 85-36 fp 3) questic,8 in a BNL report on the need for a procedure to realign ESW cooling water" point up the ritska to safe operation which have not been sufficiently covered.( unresolved 85-36-01)

Ins p. 85-43 warns further of risks associated with ESW and cites a Level IV violation (App. A) of locking procedures on discharge valves.This witnesses to

.PECc's careless operation. Purtherrore,the prediction that "the loss of ESF Loop B also causes EPCI to be inoperable,along with two RHR and two Core Spray pumps (and)...the less of EST Loop A causes #RCIC to be inoperable,along with two RER and core spray pumps" rosas tha threat the loss of emergency power and cooling, ,

and the ability to safely shut down the reactor. (p 15) " The effect of the Limerick ESW system design for HPCI and RCIC room coolers is identified as an unresolved ites. (352/85-43-02) ".

Further warnings (p.15) come from PRA, 8/81,which " discussed dominant inter-est event contributors,and in particular the risk importance associated with,for ext ple,a 1c sc of HPCI or RCIC room cooling" and a .BNL review, 8/84, which " cov-cred ESW design,preoperational testing and operating procedures,and focased upon the EST system because of its PRA importance."

FAILUSS TO OPERATE IN ACCORDLNCE WITH THE LICENSE ((3.) under Sec. 50.100 above)

Our oix appests waiting for NRC action all involve failures by PECo to oper-cte in accordance with the terme of the 3 conse. A seventh is in the Third Cir-cuit Court for review of NRC's refusal to enforce its regulations on emergency 4

plerniog f or the safety of the public in case of a Limerick nuclear emergency . ,

10. Our a;feal, ALAB S28, demands that NhC insiet on pr otection of the public

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FEco'e Licerick radioactive emissions by adequate limits,and suspension of rea: tor operation until there is assurance against any more relenses such as  ;

that detailed ie Insp. 85-4e (p.3) and those in paragraphs 5,6,& 8 above. In

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para. 7 above (Jpen stem 86-02-02) .WhD currently finda tkst FECs in ac'3 stic

, to control auch releases because it is not equitpe? to analy4e thees failures. -

PFCo, therefore,should not be allowod to oporste under such riske $c the public,

11. In connection with the cooling water for the Unit I rssetor PEC9 is in violations of the environmental limitations of Appendia ) of Licess6 NFF 39 as ,

cet forth in our eppsal of 1/17/86 to NRR. We petitioned NRQ to stay the oFeration -

and su* pend the license until .PECe fulfills the requiremente of Append 17 3

12. Appeal LPB-f6-14 contains the evidence that the public is not protected, cnd the license should be suspend $d because the hssring process oo dfsite exer-gency p1soning was fleved and inadequate. The regulotions were cot fulfilled.

13 A further drastic threat to the public came in NRC's ref usal to enforce 1G CFR App. X, Sec. iv. 7.1. which requires a full partio$pation offsite ere -

eice to test the czergency evacuation apparatus. The exerci.se is required with-in a y6ar of the licence iceuance .Up to the prseent,19 aanthe have parsed since the last ererciee. There is 09 sosurance that en emergency evac 9ation not of the EFZ coald be undertaken or could suc0ced.Mesnwhi.le Cur etteopt to prctect the public is frustrated cy nRC's blocking of our petition to the 3rd Cir.Ct.,9 85-3606 7ne 11conce must te suspended until public evacustion can be tested ard assured.

14 NEC permitted a violation of License NFF-39 in issuing to PECo on 2/6/66 Amendssnt No,1 which extends the time for exc6as flow chech va17es testir.3,ar required ander Tech. Spec, 4,6 3 4, for 14 weeke. thereby leaving uncertain the functinning of etsectial sy6teme fr,r scfe opere. tion. The reactor must te e, hut down se == petitioned KRC on 1/jo,2/5,2/12,and 2/15/66, unsi these teste are sat sfied. PECo's had fcith and NRC's padleipation in this evasion of safety require = ente Je evidenced in the Jan. '66 operating report for Limerick, dated 2/14/86 which snows the reactor shut domu from 1/3 to 1/9 sud 1/14 to 1/70. During those 13 dsys the test cou3d apparently have been made and the risk of time ettention avoided. Any furths risk must be etopped by suspension of o;eration until the taste

• i 15 PECo proposes to furtber gantle with eenential leak rate tests of . rimary containment iesletion valves to a requ9et for extention of time from Marct to toe end of May, 50 y B. 33233 T. solation of the prJmary cootainment is a key eleoent in the safe shutdown of the reactor in case of a radiological accidet t .

Operation of the re. actor cust be suspended until thsr3 tea,ts are satisfied and

-this calls for 1rmediate sue. pension of the liceoes, We opp 9 erd the granting of this atandment for a time ertsntico in our subsission of a petition to inter-vene to ASLB on 2/26/86, There is added evidence of bad faith oo PEco's part in the r ccrd of reactor shutdown for 35 days from October through January, i.e.

22 m re days when these test could have been p*rformed beside the 13 in Jac.(per.14 FA!L' <5 OE VIOLATIONJ UNDER THE ACT,hEGULATIONS,LICEN&E,ORLS?.,((4) usder sea.50.1CO)

Tne fourth clause in 10 CPR $0.100 cites as a cause for su.epansion: "violatione

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cf yor failuro to churve,cny of tha the taras cnd pr?vioica3 of th3 ceteraguic-tiova, license,yermit,or order of the Ccamission."

16. Th, Atomic hergy Act prCvides for protection of the public health And ,

cafety by senring. the regulation of reactor operation to that end. Ths violations end hazards speciflei above ec:sprcaise thie asfe operation and theresten us and

$La public in the vicinity of Limerick,and eveo at the distanca shore intervenor AL. AMhony lives. Thetis violations aler ecse' der our rights for a safe environ- '

cent guarantead under NEPA. We petition for suspecolon of the Itcense until. the protection of our safety , health and lives under these acts te ande certain. ,

17 The violatione ced carelese raperation of the reactor sat forth above pro-

, vide conclusive evidence of the unsaf6 cperation of Ligerick,the risk of acoidents gzd the resulting threats to our henith end livse, and those in $he coundnity. We ripest he.re that NRC cas detted us pr^tectiot under the acta (above) by failure to oci to protect or with workable emet 6ecoJ Pl*38( LPI-95'14), lack of action to vinist ons via protec t the control buildingynd protect 17ait i f-regenne ruction openlogs from Unit 2 ( ALAE -S23),and failurs to protect ce;Sinst offsits effluent releeses(ALA3-SM) . g .

18. NEC i$geeted to oteerve the provia$oce of the act and the decimien of the NO. Circuit Coert ( USC 735 F 2d 1437 ( 1984 ) in the aremption fra an emerg.-

oncy offnite nereise and a hearing on this. ( par. 13 above.)fy 1 Cir. 85-3606.) ,

19 JtRC's cceperation with JSCo in finding " so rignificant effect on the quality of the huasn anyiror. ment" in I-ECo' amendment requests, 50 F.R 52374 and

• 50 F.R.53235.and refusal of proper ecrironmental assese:nent or impact, violates Qur righte und 9r ths acte above.

20. In a parallel way .our rights were violated in thegranting of exemptions ,

to 10 CP:t f art 50 require:uinte,(SO F.R. 27388!. These exemptions ignore the .

1,f. creased riek in operation a'id the threat to our besith and safety from the ,

teen poss iM a resulting acef ients. The acts above,therefore,t*%viole.ted and the lic-er. a cuet be tuspendsi. Wa opposed these exe:sptione, but NRC refused eny remedy in DD-36-1,

. The risks added by these ex*.spticae ha.ve compocnded by added exe.t.ptions and viointicas as set forth D cur text .above,speciff cally as .follnes (50 F.R.2736ah ;

Cre:ption B.concerne inciation valve riske as does 50 7.R. 53235 (15. above).

C. posea riska to ESW,RUR, and EURSW 3r.phast=ed further above ( S.) .E . involves caic steer isolation wher.e PEco'e.operr. tion is la datgerous trouble as shorn in  ;

Insp. 65-46 and 06.-02 ( 6.and 10. above). G.. involves the faulte in design thnt j prevent leek ra'.e testics MR valvee, cote cf the sene valv.ee endaogering the ,

sat'e oper& tion cf the Eiergety 1srvice Water eupply ( 9.) (% Insp. 85-43 ) j The emption.s (M-86-1) shout d never have been granted cud cur appeal agsinet  ;

the. xtst be betored vis th.e immediate su spension of the license.

I MAT 6 RIAL FALSE CTATi*'ENT OF FACT REQUIP.ED OF AMJ.ICANT ((1.) under Sec. 50.100 ). I no i We coceider,,wtne fire t clause in 10 CPh 50.160 in our final estegory of j evider.ce callir.g for the suspension of the licanee. The specific c5958 her. 1e l

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- idcutifica co " cny cot 0rici fclso chatsment in tho cpplicatice or licanas or in the supplemental or other ststement of fact required of the applicant." We casert that PECo,while it sa not have deliberately made false statemente,has created false impressions as Its ability to safely opergte the Limerick reactor chich Ere now Pe futed by the evidence and, therefore, require - an immediate sus-pension of the operating license.

21. FECo's record of a totcl uf 102 Licensee $ vent Reporto,LERs, in the year 1985 refutes the impreeston which PEco would hsva liked to create that it may be cettling into reliable, safe operation of the reactor. Indeed:the opposite is trues PESO has not developed reliable control of personnel performance or operating .

processes.. More than i of the LERs are due to personnel error and 15% additional can be attributed to faulty procedures or handlin6 of equipment. ,

22. The serias of LEta connected with the control room chlorine analyser pro-viJe evidence of PEco's incompetence and refute the deceptive assure. noes in these reports that PE0o has the operation under control. No competent management could  !'

ollow malfunctioning of this oestrol roca equipment for almo t sa year and . half, for a totsi of 21 itestical LEPs (see LER 86-06) without decisive action.devaluing This cituatico not only testifies to incomyetenca but seems to display a danBerous fs of distra:tions in th contrcl room which could contribute to confusion act panic in an emergeccy. The lack of ?ECo rem $gement controlls reinforced by the finea 4 cassaed by ERC (. Par. 1.) and NRCas finding that it " involves corporate management."

, 23 Phile the falso impressions above nsy not be seen se willft11 they show fundamental lacke in PECo's ability to operate safely and they call for suspencion.

4 Other aspects of P3co's autma:ssions in connection with the operating license and crendments seem to border on willfull deception. We refer specifically to PEco's regaeote to change the standards for withdrawal of cooltog vtter from the Schuyitill, cud PE0e's raquests for extention of time for test in 50 F.7352874 ana 53235(19.atov We opposee the former in our petitio'o to FRR,1/.lT/e6,rtich Ann not been answered to ca7 knowledge We assert PEco ued deception dn oe,111n6 for ways to manipulate the a=ount of water to be taken from the Schuylkill ie def ault of its commitment to the DRBC contract, approved I;7 NBC, to abide br the^ river folloeer" principle, including,of couree low flow cond1+1ons thich wotid prevent with(tawals.

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24. In conne: tion with the cuendment requestc from TEco for extentions of test schedules,PECo used deception and was not pYoceeding in good ftyr,a when it did no t take advantSEt of the 35 days the p*iant eas ska t down from October to Janucry to cosplete these tests. This appesta lo constitus. w111fs11 deception at3 consti-tutes adequata ceuse for suspension of the lioenee. ( 15.)

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, CRLEk TO SRCE CAUSE . S$nce there i s 6verwhelming evidenc e above for the suspenet on Ef~IEecse AH-Wiinder the prc e;'.utons of 10NR 50.100,ve petition NRQ for immedi- '

ote euepensioc,or as un alterno tiva to find under 10 CFa 2.201 (c)*, hat the public health safety 53C therefore,the andorderninterest the ttro' itimmediately r,e'ir10te; p

and that there underare willfull Sect. 2.202violations to issue a and shes cause order for the unspe aeion of License NPF-39.

Respectfu submitted, acr le6 Usylan,Pa.19065 gjg g$lyj;., fpfryu

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.r 16 19R -3 4151 ,

0FFICE Li DOChEiiht bR, i I certify tha*, copies of P.ETITION BY INTk:RYENOR R.L.OTHONY/F0E TO THE C0 EMISSION TO SUSPEND OP. LIC. NPF .39 have toen served os s BECs General Voucecl, Docketing and Service, H.Denton F.Romane, NER, ASLB, LEA .

Seetatarbf ALAN, Si Couna,1. Conner & Wetterhahn,

# 8 C N' 2/9/86 2

Box 186 Moylan,Pa. 1900(

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