ML20149M530

Marked-up Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Exemptions from App R

ML20149M530
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/11/1987
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20149M480	List: ML20149M478 ML20149M511 ML20149M530
References
GL-86-10, NUDOCS 8802260099
Download: ML20149M530 (33)

Text

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i ENCLOJURE SAFETY EVALUAT!0N BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATIVE TO APPENDIX R EXEMPT!0h5 REQUESTED FOR QUAD CITIES STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 00cxET NO. 503254 AND 50 265 3

1.0 INTR 000CTION By letter dated December 18, 1964, the Licenses submitted their Appendix R Aeverification Interim Cospensatory Measures and Exemption Requests. By letter dated December 4,1985, the Licensee transmitted additional exemption requests and modified some of their previously submitted exemption requests. On April 8,1986, a meeting w6s held at the kRC offices in Bethesda, Maryland. The Licensee received tAe latest NRR staff interpretations of Section !!!.G to Appendix R in Generic letter (GL 66-10). Based on these new interpretations, the Licensee withdrew certain esemption requests and modified others. These actions are eccumented in Revision 2. June 1986, of the Licensee's Appendix R submittal which was sent to the NRC by letter dated June 25,1946. By letter dated July 22,1986, the Licensee submitted a new exemption request as a result of receiving Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice 86-25 arising from In order to expedite the thedrywellexpansion9apfireatDreseenUnit3. review of the Licensee s Appendix information, site visits were conducted on September 9,1986 and February 23, 1987. This evaluation is based on the information provided in the Licensee submittals as well as information made available during the site visits.

Section !!!.G.1 of Appendix R requires fire protection features to be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown and capable of liritting fire damage 30 that;

a. One train of systees necessary to achieve and w intain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damspel and

b. Systees necessary to achieve and mainta'in cold shutdown from either the control room er emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Section 111.6.2 of Appendix R requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown be Nintained free of fire t

dow ge by one of the following means:

1 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 8802260099 080219 4 PDR ADOCK 050 F

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a. Separati e of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits cf redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3. hour rating. Structural steel feming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected te provide fire resistance equivalent to tnat required of the ba rrier.

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a hortrontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fin halteds. In addition, fire detectors ano an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area,

c. Enclosure of cable ana equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of one In addition, redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1. hour rating.

fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.

If the above conditions are not met, Section !!!.G.3 requires that there be an alternative shutdown capability independent of the area of concern. It also requires that a fined suppression system be installed in the tres of concern.

These alternative requirements are not deemed to be equivalent; however, they provide equivalent protection for those configurations in which they are accepted, locause it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires may occur and propagate, the design basis protective features rather than the design basis fire are specified in the rule. Plant-specific features may In requ' re protection different from the measures specified in Section !!!.G.

tech a case, the Licensee sust demonstrate, by means of a detailed fire hazards enelysis that existing protection er existing protection in conjunction with proposed modifications will provide a level of safety equivalent to the technical requirements of Section !!!.G of Appendix R.

In summary, Section !!!.G is related to fire protection features for ensuring  !

that systems and associated circuite used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free of fire daage. Either fire protection configurations must meet the specific requirements of Section !!!.G or an alternative fire protection configuration must be justified by a fire hatarts analysis. Generally, the staff eill accept an alternative fire protection configuration if:

e The alternative ensures that one train of equipsent necessary to achieve het shutdown from either the control room er emergency control stations is free of fire damage, e

The alternative ensures that fire damage to at least one train of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown is limited so that it can be repaired within a reasonable tism (minor repairs using components stored enthesite),

e Fire-retardant coatings are not used as fire barriers, e Modifications required to meet Section !!!.G would not enhance fire protection tehty levels above that provided by either existing or proposed alternatives. l l

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o Modifications required to meet Section Ill.G would be cetrimental to overall facility safety.

Guidance to the industry and the NRC's position on certain requirements of Appendix R are covered by various documents, one of them being Generic letter m.33, dich has recently been superseded by Generic Letter 8610. "The laterpretations of Appendix R' and 'The Responses to Industry Questions." two sections of E 8610, am written to facilitate industry implementation cf Appendix R and represent the hRC's position on all issues covered. I 2.0 Fire Ama RU 1 o Fire Zooes 1.1.1.2 and 11.2.2. Unit 1 Reactor Building 3 H and 1.1.1.f Unit 1 Reactor Buildino q l

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o m

Southerti(1.1.1.19[.5) nd Northem (1.1.1.1N) Torus Level m -

h ector lutiding uen Line 18 Fire Arse RB C o Fire Zomes 1.o.2.2 and 11.3.2, Unit 2 Reactor Building ter Building o Fire Zones 1.1.2.1.5 and 1.1.2.2. Unit Z j

o Southerft(1.1.2.15)an korthern(1.1.2[) orus level . Unit 2 ,

Reactor Building Colusri e 0 l

2.1 Enesotices ReevestM

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Esemptions were requested fror. Section !!!.G.2 of Appendix A to the extent that it requires mdundant safe shutdown components to be soprated by complete Mour fire Mted barriers.

2.2 Discussion 2.2.1 Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1112.2. Unit 1 Reactor Building Fire zone 1.1.1.2 is located on elevation 595 feet (grade level) and, in part. <

is directly ever fire tone 11.2.2. which is on elevation 554 feet. Both tones .

)

are enclosed by reinforced concrete barriers. However, in the ceiling of fire l anne 11.2.2 there esist penetrations in the fors seuim ent 241:h n 1 l stainsay, and unseeled mechanical penetrations. TheTeiTnghTsi is a uQ M m A +

he t. -_

me fire load in fire zone 1.1.1.2 is less than 30.000 Stu per square foot and. 1 l

tm fire zone 11.2.2. it is less then 20.000 Stu per square foot. Both of these l fire loedings are les and are equivalent to a fire severity of about 19 minutes as represented by the A5TM t-119 fire test curve. The combustibles are in the h re of cables and oil in the RNR penes.

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@AD CITIES 1 AND 2 l

Safe shutcown equipsent consists of Division II RHR puPps and Cables irThe fire sone 11.2.2 and redundant Division ! RHR cables in fire tone 1.1.1.2.

concern for these to fire Zones is that a fin in either fire Zone comunicati to th gau wf)gg A M g ,A 4,q stee egmpen nts Aa 6hVLjdlj W hdirche,N b TN N O $4T gh /4 h k '

Fire protection isT < n sn1 form of a coraleteMr memn 6 stem Tor nreFurTt er, fire zone tones 1.1.1.2 excluding the steam tunnel %11.1.2. y has an area wide avtomatic fire suppress'on systee to preclude fire spread from Firt hose stettons and fire extinguishers are sone 11.2.2 to zone 1.1.1.2.

also available to heth fire tones.

2.2.2 Fire Zonas 1.1.1.15 and 1.1.1.2. Uni _t.1 Rea: tor Byildinn i

F one 1.1.1.1S ocated on elevation 554 In the feetceiling (the torus) of fireand zonefire1.1.1'.15 rene

... i atton 596 feet (grade).

there esist wastaled mechanical penetrations and HVAC ducts without fire rated dee$ers that pass lato, fire zone 1.1.1.2.

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The fire load in fire zone 1.1.1.1S is negligible and for fire zone 1.1.1.2 it is low (about a 19 minute fire Severity). The combustibles are in the fem of cable insulation materials.

Safe shutdown compenents located in these two fire zones co sone could cessnuniste between the zones and desyge the redundant RHR cables, A he barrier that interfaces between these two zones is the ceiling of fire zone 1.1.1.15.

/

l Tys Fire retecti nd sclose in the form of a linear thermal ft M det to the cable trays routed in fire z 1.1.1.15(t 'u s

% 1 ' 'he sma) . Fire ne 1.1.1.2 has an area =16e fire 6etection  :

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stoestic fire suppression system is inst' ailed ' n tre zon e stagle cable tray M eer that penetrates the flocr/ ceiling  ;

['",J#qYd between the two fire tones to preclude fire spread free fire zone l

I 1.1.1.1 to fire teet 1.1.1.2. The Hser is sealed with a fire resistive fe r onntlanterial lesnual fire fighting equipment is available to both zones, i

> ic hu, Samthern And herthern focus i.evel. Unit 1 Reactor Building r e 3 2.2.3 id cavan 1.me 15 f F L415 The torus arte has been previously described in section 2.2.2 above.

,,nr u,De torus includo the cablet Safe shutdoom system components

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esscciated with the RHR system. ivision EctFu are routed n the southern portion of the tems. Division # ' re1M- Addi Jd to na 4 R functional lly " Q redundancy es's located over 125 feet apert. undeeM, Ene 1 ,tMht Division I J 1.1.1.z. l ge61es are located in the northeast corner room a reinforced  ;

This comer room is seperated from the general -

to d  ;

t eencet+= V -*f,r_aad a he3 q a 1- cur tre r ted arr er to 1

Intseveng Tam t ys are ene sed intain a etnieur of 20 feet' without intervening costustibles around column IIh' 10' {}[,3 hiN [!

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l The fire protection festares anc fire load for the torus area tre giver in section 2.2.2 aoove. )

i 2.4 Fire Zones 1.1.2.2 and 11.3.2. Unit 2 Reactor Building the description of l Unit I and nit of11.2.2 the same design in section 2.2.1 also app and, thereforeIies to fire zones I fire zones 1.1.1.2 a ne fire pectoction l QG ." 1.1.2.2'and 11.3.2. features and fire loadings are also i fp Jg identical. Finally s

se fire protection roncern is identical to Unit 1 in that

[o(& M unsealed penetrati exist in the ceiling of fire zone 11.3.2 that coerunicate fim zone 9f m Shrop .

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Firy Zones 1.1.2.1.5 and 1.1.2.2. Unit 2 Reactor Buildin; i p IftsWWp

,1.44% haits 1 and 2 are of the same design, therefore, the description of fire zones

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I:$:$:2.

.uthe floor .h/ ceiling aIb I nean,L.a HVAC cucts without fire rated dagers pass w through ion, and am 1 i

between fire zones 1.1.2.1.5 and 1.1.2.2. 3 g ,.

2.2.6 Southern and_ Northern Torus level Unit 2 Xeactor Buildino [ g v;c g yab d

GoTumn u ne 19 Units 1 and 2 are of the same design and, therefore, the descriptt'en of th in M N f southern and northern torus level in Unit i reactor reactor building put fo *,,/ p # l in section 2.2.3 also applies to Unit 2. The fire protection features, fi W M 'p  !

loadings, and safe shut 60wn concern are also identical to that for Unit 1.

2.3 Evaluation l The fire protection in the above described six fire zones / areas does not coeply l with the technical requirements of Section 111.8.2 of Appendix R because '

complete 3-hour fim rated barriers do not separate redundant divisions of safe [ '

shutdown components. )M i There was a concern that a fire in one of these fire zones could spread to the <

redundant safe shutdown component in an adjacent fire zone. However, the fire loading in all of these fire zones ranges free negligible to low and, in no case, does the equivalent fire severity exceed 19 minutes. Because of the low i a fire of significant magnitude or duration is not combustible loading, espected to occur. Fire detection is available for all affected zones.

Also, in fire zones 11.2.2 and 11.3.2 there exists an area wide automatic fire sup rossion system. Fire suppressias systans oretect the area adiacent to the wmm r r.m  %

g ,e ruer da

.. = w =dflMMTtTT~

uppression cEiiiber ( pressure (UTT6T an L.1.2 3 r r,um m nlas t a sphere dilution (ACAD) air compressor in fire zonesthere 1.'l.1.2 and 1.1.2.2. Therefore he rol roor The f s g would be qud kly de uppression sys n ist edi

,g Jori use of the low coneustible loadings. would ex ngu fi p

Prior to fire extinguishment, the law fuel loadin s, concrete barriers, high j

ceilings, space volume, and 1-hour fire rated cab e tray enclosures in the 5 12/10/87 l

) QUAD CITIES 1 AhD 2 l

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lE;.'.1 *I' '.":'.7 tE HEijki (Ehiis EEin:,;,- ,

l torus a*eas wo lo prevent the fire from spreading beyond the clace of oicin

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anc/cr damaging redundant RHR safe shutdown system corponents locatec in otner fire zones. l The staff finds that the provision of complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers woulc not significantly upgrade the level of fire protection for these fire zones or s m s areai. l 2.4 Conclusion 84 sed on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protection features and fire zone barriers in the reactor building provide a level of f1N protection equivalent to the technical requirements of Section

!!!.G.2 of Appendix R. Themfore, these exception requests can be granted. )

3' o Unit 1 Reactor Building / Turbine Building Interface Iou  ?

hi o Unit 2 Reactor Building / Turbine luilding Interface Soun ry[ l l

j 3.1 Exemptions Rem ested Demptions wert requested from Section !!!.G.2.s of Appendix R to the extent l that it requires 340ur fire rated barriers to separate redundant safe shutdown '

lystem components.

3.2 Discussion I

3.2.1 Unit 1 Reactor Building / Turbine Building Interface Soundary Wall i The Unit i reactor building shares a common bounda u ng.

This is generally a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier w artain xceptions. TheseA d bj'j' $

, wnten asceptions include fire zones 11.1.3. 11.2.3. 1- 2.1.e d. 1.1.1 onc te plugs and contain unrated enchanical penetratics seals a v 1 1.1.1.4, which has a partial 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated barrier se ra ng #es%AaQ80 switchpoor and 1.1.1.5. which het HVAC ducts to the turbine building without fire dampers, and the steam chase in 1.1.1.2 within the Unit I reactor building. Of these firs tones, only fire zones 1.1.1.4. 1.1.1.5 and the steam chase are of concem with respect to redundant safe shutdown system component separation. That is to say, the reactor building / turbine building well j separates redundant divisions of RHR only for these fire zones. '

In fire zone 1.1.1.2, all walls are 3-hour fire rated except for the portion that separatas the steam chase in 1.1.1.2 from the turtine building (the floor /

ceiling assemeltes em part of an emanation presented in section 2.2.2). The

" steam chase is separated from the tur$1ne building by shield walls with metal access doors. Fire zone 1.1.1.5 is separated from the turbine building by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barriers except fnr HVAC ducts that lack fire rated dampers. Also, from elevation 623 feet to 630 feet, a small section of the wall is 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire reted in the precoednantly 3-hour fire rated wall.

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QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 i

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! Fire protection for fire Zone 1.1.1.2 cludes an area wice fire dettCtio9 system except insioe the steam tunneband autoMtic fire typpression over two oI't u (re ting i

equipment is available for the fire zones. Fixed fire suppression and fire detection systems are inst 411ed in the turt>1ne building fire zones adjacent to I the steam chase.

The fire loading for fire tone 1.1.1.2 is tw (30,000 Btu per square foot),

dien corresponos to a fire severity of 23 minutes on the ASTM E 119 fire test cu rve . The staan cease per se has a negligible fire load as well as fire zones 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.1.5.

Fire zone 1.1.1.2 contains Division 1 RHR cables that serve as part of a n o t .mafe anohn method for fire tone 8.2.6. A ing adTaYint to them cR1rtpart or t.a.mDThe steam wh<

hase has no h h

1

• • "'"N ,c,gy gk, s ""l#8 because comp e e 3409r t re ra d barriers between it and the turt>1ne building and other adjacent fire tones in the reactor butiding are not provided. I (Certain of.her fire zone barriers in 1.1.1.5 and 1.1.1.4 are the subject of I other exemption requests Presented in section 4.2.5 and 4.2.4.)

3.2.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building /Tyrtine Building Interfere Boundary Wal_1 l gn. T refo th discu ton 3.2.

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tg1}4 ase s tpplicable to Unit 2 as i pertains to fire zones {1.1.2.2 (steam chase), t,lJ. 5 141 Is l.1.2.4,1.1.2.5,jeadfiretone8 .6.E.

3.3 Evaluatie  :

The f re protection in the above g i r ;ed rier _not_nanarats redundant divtainan of safe

• *

• ef M M"~"C V' shutdown components. swM* *'

• w m Nra "patasJ. k m w,,+n c3 9 .ac a in a aq.mtfIe w.

'( /Qur principal concern was that a fire in tN turbine butidino could conggic#

Luf th the reactor buildine via the shared interface wall.fAsine/ statecctorin sectt n 311, ly Ptai firt 1 s are effected beceu e the t o asi m n

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20 f I locause of the nestigible to low fire loedings in the affected fire zones and 2, a fire of i nifi ant ni i

_ T_ Uni ur. x 23 m nutes sny one and, n the g' y no ev ~T x steam chases, i is negligible. The fire tones of interest in the turbine In the

, hr buljdifm.alLhave fire _ detection 43dfire suppression systees(. thus, greatly srinteitLng the fire hataWaWits consequences. Fire zone 1.1.i.z nas an1.5 area VUdtf I P

- w e? a. ase d fi to 1. and of tw l vid tre 5 and es MM ese areas ve n is e 1 n .

. 1. o no , but '

e 1.1.1.4 do not contain safe shutdown components. This situation is also WA If for Unit 2. i i

The deficiencies in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 3-hour fire raten turbine / reactor butleing interface wall include:

7 12/10/87 QUA0 CITIE5 1 AND 2

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1. two unratec penetrations in the steam chase, which are in the fort of an airlock having two heavy metal doors to the turbine butidirg and a singlemettidoortothereactorbuilding(hote: tnis sr411 door is normally open during plant operation) 2.. a sr411 section of 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated well from elevation 623 feet to 630 feet (fire tones 1.1.1.3 nd 1 .

3. per o es in f .to .1.1.1 antit 1AS- -

,.4$ dyc ai s._1n.

se p u m pp en m w hotg15 For the steam chase metal door acGk No Mtu i #fWltte- -

Min bu idi side fixed fire suppression systejes are insta' jacent to the steam chest; Cou led wi ledM_ingA L o 1t ire uld to .i.1t is G catin be a the reactor

.and tu sine tui . portion of no concern because of the neglitlible fire oeds adjacent to it.

o 2 hour fire rated rface wall is His is Ql also the case for the location hav'ng the HV due penetration withou a fire deeper. For Unit 2, the foregoing evaluatio Ids true.

I 3.4 Conclusion x_ ,-

Based on the above evaluation, it is conc 1 Weed that the existing fire protection features and fire rated barrier between the turbine and reactor building providt a level of fire protection equivalent to Section !!!.G.Z of Appencia R. Therefore, these exemption requests shoula be granted.

4.0 o Fire Zooe 1.1.J.1. Unit 1 Resttor Buildine. Eleva_ tion 554_Fetta 6 Inchel o Fire Zoes 1.1.1.2. Unit 1 Reactor Buildina, Elevation 595 Feet.

O InCnGE o Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. Unit 1 Reactor Building. Elevation 623 Feet _1 G IRChg o Fire Zope 1.1 d.4. Unit 1 Reatic_r l_t)(_inni u Elevition 647 Feet, e Inche o Fire Zoes 1.1.1.5. Unit 1 Reactor luildine. Elevation 666 Feet, 6 Inches o Fire Zone 1.1.16. Unit 1 Reatic_r buildina, Elevation 690 Feet, 6 Inches _

l o Fire Zone 11.1.3. Unit 1 Reacter lutiding. Elevation 554 Feet, 0 inches o Fire Zone 11.1.1. Unit 1 Reactor lutidina. Elevation $54 Feet. 0 Inches o Fire Zone 11.L2, Unit 1 Reaclar lutidinn. Elevation $5A Feet. 0 Inenes 8 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2

i o N et Zone 11.2.3 Unit 1 Reactor Buildins. Elevation 55a Feet. O Inches n j Fire Zone 11.2.4. Unit i Reactar Buildins, Elevation 554 Feet

! e FireZone1.1.2.1.Vnit2ResctorBuilding. Elevation 554 Fee.6$c

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! o rir, Zone 1.1. .i. unit 2 Rese u r iutiains, sievation 5,5 ree b 4 ei o Firt Zone 1.1.2.3, Unit 2 Reactor twildinn. Elevation 623 Feet, 0 Inches o

Fire 20Dne 1.1.2.4. Unit 2 Reactor tw11dina, llevation 647 Feeti 6 Inches e t, 6 ches ire one 1. 2.5.d2 ReMuildM1eva $64 6 Firt Zone 1.1.1.6. Unit 2 Reactor Buildina. Elevation 6905I Feet g i

Fire Zane 11;L4. Unit 2 Detter Is0dinAIltaaticeAl4 FAsti klnchas

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Firt Zone 11.3.1. Unit 2 Reactor Swilding. Elevation 554 Feet. O Inches 0 enches o Fire Zone 11.312. Unit 2 Reactor luildina. Elevation 554 Festi o

Firt Zone 11.3.3. Unit 2 Reactor Building._ Elevation 554 Feet. 0 Inches o Fire Zone 11.324. Unit 2 Reactor twildiN. Elevation 554 Feet 0 Inches 4.1 [seections Reesssted fuerations were requested from Section !!!.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of automatic fire detection systems and ftoo n Suppression systems in an area room or tone for which alternativ capability is prevised.

g g' w a s a II ,! f n 4.2 Discussion _ & v n.: .I & v4.1s 4.2.1 un 1 Reactor lutidina Terus levol Elevation 554 Feet. O Inches {,tw g g tw, oo,;a p ,

II.Z.,

H Pe Iones 1.1.1 1. 11 1 3 11 2.2. 11.2.3 G and e n.I.11.Z._4_f-- &

The south, east, and west walls are reinfo M ed concette and artseaserter walls / 4 axcept for the part of the well that separates fire3 zones 11.2.3)and aed-11.2.4)(a11 part of 11.1.f The north watt separates fire zones 1.1.2.1, 11.3.1 eat 11.3.21.1.1.1,11.2.k1 part of Unity and is 4 unit 1) from fire senes 4 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated wall with penetrations sealed properiy. TCceTling fbove/4k these fire genes is the floor of fire zones 1.1.1.2, 8.2.6.A. eed-8.2.6.C. and ,t ,s  ?./

is of reinforced concrete. Unrated seals anc concrete plugs exist in the l

portion of the calling that separates fire 30nes 1.1.1.1,11.2.4,11.2.3, frem.

I 8 2 6.A and 8.2.6.C. Q \

Fire protectien n the fem of lineer themal fire setection for fire zones l 11.2.1. 11.2.2, 11.2.3, and 11.2.4.  !

Linear fire detection exists in 1.1.1.1. A fixed automatic water fire suppression system is provided in fire l l none 11.1.3 for the HPCI puso and turbine ett hazard and in the southeast I corner room of the torus, which is fire sont 11.2.2 and at the single vertical l

i 9 12/10/87 l QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 l

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cable riser below the 595 foot elevation. Manual fire fignting ecuipwnt is available for all of those areas.

The fire loading in these fire zones is low to negligible except for fire zone 11.1.3. unich has a lube oil fire hazard (1,041 gallons).

Inde:e' idea.t alternative shutdown mthocs that are physically separated from these fire tones are provided to assure safe plant shutdown in the event of fire in any one of the zones (see Sections 2.0 and 3.0 for additional details onthisseparation).

Unit 1 Raaetor Buildien Elevation 575 Feet, 0 Inches O' 3[d 4.2.2

m ee Zote 1.1.1.0 rinfened concn e serior war Tne soutn f i re z oarriers n e .a a u c a she mour fire nted F%th, eueptb. ,h_ g_

tw a s the Poor q the steam tunnel " ,>

1.1.1.3),

n ne co m n (whichistheflooro walls. The ceiling has pen staire, hatches, and unsea :hanical r penetrations. The electrical penetrations are sealed with no e rated /d Ng['g ' g' e j /

noncombustible materials. hrhr s,. inL VI UL N

• N Fire protection is in the form of an automatic firt suppression f the i over O thFire g)

, e air compressors.

steam tunnel. Manoel fire fighting equipment is available to this zone. I f*'""'

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• l Independent alternative shutdown sethods that are physically separated f rom

/ 4'I these fire zones are provided to assure safe plant shutdown in the event of fire in any one of the zones (see lections 2.0 and 3.0 for additional details onthisseparation).

The fire loading in this fire tone is low (30,000 8tu per square foot), which se Q correspones to a fire severity of 23 minutes per the ASTM t 119 fire test turve.

[0 4.2.3 Unit 1 Reactor Buildina Elevation 623 Feet. 0 Inches

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! The south and east walls are re nforced concretem etterior wall is a essplete 3. hour fire rated bartlers Ty _ u er*

walls ine and the nort es r w -

- turbine building and it is a onp1 te 3. ou rated barrieq.

info con te peneirated by ope)

(~y-

-< adf r t :r , a n ,

1

! c- s s, hatches, and unsealed mechanical penetra tre protection is in the fore of a fire detection syster, nual f P UC , ,- -

l, c, e i fightteg capebility is available to this fire zone.

om a

4p #' I q dependent alternative shutdown methods tnat are physically of etails. 8 sepa w' Afire in any one of the zones (see Sections 2.0 and 3.0 for additional jg i '\l (-(j j

f yenthisseparation).

J y.

gh L

a Ael/

[.

/7 gg 10 QUAD CIT!!5 1 AAD 2 f

l l

30 , 4m u %.

Tre fire loscing in this fire zone is low less snan 20,000 Stw car s n are foot), wHen corresponds to a firt severity of 15 minutes per tne ASW E.119 4

fire test carve.

4,2.4 Jnit 1 Ratactor twileira Elevation 647 Fett. 6 Inches Fire Zone 1.1.:.4 Tne scutr and east walls are rtinforced concrete exterior walls ano the north

' wall is a conclete 3. hour fire rated barrier. The west wall separates tne reactor bwileing f ree the turbine building and is also a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire ratec barrier except for a portion of the well between coluen line 13 and 15 anc f rom The floor and ceiling art of reinforced dia foot to 663 foot elevation.

concrete but have unprotected sechanical penetrations, open stair wells, and hatches.

Fire protection is in the form of annual fire fighting equipment and there are no fire detection er fixed fire suppression systems installed.

Incependent alternative shutdown rathods that are physically separatec from these fire senes are provided to assure safe plant shutdown in the event of fire in any one of the zones (see Sections 2.0 and 3.0 for additional details enthisseparation).

There are no safe shutdown cables or equipment in this zone.

The fire tc.ssing in this fire sont is negligible.

4.2.5 Unit 1 Rasctor luildine tievation 666 Feet, 6 Inches Firt Zoni 1 1.1.5 I2 The south and east walls are reinforced concrete exterior walls that are 7<

equivalent to a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating. The nort.h wall is 3. hour fire rated except for three standby its treatment system line penetrations. The west wall*

separates the turb ne building from the reactor build' - . Msuaown  ? "Ts t i

rated except for HVAC duct penetrations. Fire lone W drywell with a well that is at leent 5 foot thick a f ^*f*L reinforced *

• t'

> .,m concreta.

hatches,The fleer and and ceilin mechaniceg unsealed of this fire sene ha t

penetrations connected #oMegTWWunT_hA_ ,

4 below. ,

- -. ~ pm Fire protection is in the form of annual fire fighting equipment and there are no firt detection er fixed fire suppression systems installed. NrC%

The firs loading in this fire zone is negligible. 1 I 4.2,6 Unit 1 masctor Building Elevation 690 Feet. 6 Inches Fire Ions 1.I.1 d -

l This fire zone is the entire refueling flocr on elevation 690 feet, 6 inches.

l and oest walls are constructed of insulated metal siding on The north, neuth,l steel and these walls have ne fire rating. The west well

' esposed structurafrom elevatten 690 feet, 6 inches to elevation 700 feet. 0 inches is 1 f thick reinforced centrete. This partion of the well separates the reactor j building from the turbine building. From elevation 700 feet to the roof of the 4

i 11  !?/10/87

@AD CITIE5 1 AhD 2 t

l

reactor building, this well is of insulatec retal siding on structural steel.

The floor of this fire tone nas open stairways, hatches, and unsealed mechanical penetrations connected to Zones in both Units below.

Fire protection is in the for'n of menwel fire fignting equipment and there are no fire detection er suppression syster.1 installM.

There are no safe shutdown cables or equipment in this zone. The fire loactrg

• is negligib)e in this tone.

4.2.7 Unit 2 a M IT re Jongs 1.1 7.1. II .T. m . II.3.Z. 11.3.J. 11.3.4, anc 11.1.4 Unit 2 is of he siis ,i sht1" s hSNfoN t N NE Nf$t i . fire protecti tu loadin , and saf shut con ens icentical to that p en n .

4.2.8 Unit 2 Reactor Building Elevation 595 Feet. 0 Inches Ffre Zo M l.l.Z.I Unit 2 is of the same desifin as Unit 1 and, therefore, the area description, fire protection features "ire loadings, and safe shutdown concerns are identical to that presented in section 4.2.2.

4.2.9 Unit 2 Reactor let1dino Elevation 623 Feet. 0 Inches F1rt leM l.l.T.T l

i Unit 2 is of the sare design as Unit 1 and erefore, the area ser tion, fire protection features, firt loadings, d safe shutdown concerns are _ _ _ _

ietntical to that presented in section 4 Tga pt r tV vie s dat pene M ,,,

, 4.2.10 Unit 2 Racetor luildinn Elevat V 47 FN'NacheI F1re IoM 1.1.I.4 Unit 2 is of the same design as Unit 1 and, therefore, the area description,

(

fire protection features, fire loadings, and safe shutdown concerns are identical to that presented in section 4.2.4. }(

4.2.11 Unit 2 Racetor lut1 dine Elevation 666 Feet. 6 Inches Fire IoM 1. , . I .T l """jd4Wctm"M*Wr:M entu.itoyat,,esented4nsect.i.n4.2.l.

iE;" "-

[ 4.2.12 Unit 2 Resctor Building (levation 690 Feet. 6 Inches F1rt 164_l.l.Z.5 Unit 2 is of the same 6esign as Unit 1 and, therefore, the arte eescription, l

fire protection features, fire loadings, and safe shutdown concerns are ---

j L teentical to that presented in section 4.2.6. .

.3

-,,,-2 tetaivateen _

,2 ,2,,,,,,

de 4

l

- J l

The fire protection in the above 6ese ibed 12 fire zon coes not coroly witr G

l the technical requirements of Section i G. of Ao cia R because fixes fire suppression systems and/or fire detection t ave not been installec in tones for which an alternative safe shutoown capability is providad.

The principal concern was that a fire in one of these fire acnes could cause a

loss of nomal safe shutdown capability. Although two of these fire zones 11.1.3 ano 11.1.4 have e high fire load, the fin loading is due to lubricating oils in tne turbine and the HPCI pump. In addition, these hign fire loads are protected by automatic firt uppression system (s). The cable tray wraps in tne torus area near Column Line 16 (Unit 1) and Column Line 10 (Unit 2) provide 20 feet of separation without intervening cas6ustibles and also serve as a fire stop to the potential sprt'd of fim. With the exceptions of the oil fire hazards, the fire loads racia fra neg1tgible to low and, in no case, do they exceed sn equivaleet fire severity of 23 minutes. Because of these low fire loacings, and given that the ett fire hazards are contained and protected by fire suppression systems, a fire of significant magnitude or duration is not espected to occur. Fire detection is provided for all tones containing safe shutdown equipment. Autcastic fim suppression is provided for protection of specific hazards as discussed above. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of th ae fire zones will be detected in its early stages and extinguished by the fire brigade befort adhcent safety.related locations are threa tened. The fim zones that do not have either fire detection or fixed 4 fire suppression systees have either negligible fin loads or no safe shutdown system components er both. The existing barriers and space volumes in these fire zones em sufficient to contain the sinimal fim hazard associated with these fire senes.

16 a tre ma any nt hut esipo nts n an one of these noces (note, no safe shutdown equipment is located in zones 1.l g l.4 1.hl.lo l.l.1.6.J,1.2dJ1.1.2.5 sc.14C before it is est ..... he

)

~~1ndependant alternative shuteown capabili (the ice a utdown pump y ab' av lab > a eve and maintain safe hutdown. s s e ned that ths=e is reasonable assurance that a

, fire in any of these fire senes will not spread beyond the zone from which it originates and themfere will not rosvit in the less of alternative safe shutdown capability. The staff has also detarerined that the installation of additional fire detection and/or fiaed fire suppression systems would not 4

significantly incrosse the level of fire protection in these fin tones.

4,4 ConclusiDn i

based on the abo u evaluation, the steff concludes that the existing fire

! protection and physical featums caseined with the independent alternate

, snutdown capability provide an acceptable level of protection. Therefore, the j saveptions should be granted, i

5.0 i e Fire Zone 1.0, Units 1 and 2 Control Room i

l 1

4 QUAD Clf!LS 1 AND 2 13 12/10/87 l

i

l .

l o Fire Zone 4.0. Units ! are 2 Auxiliary Coefuter Rooe I

• o Firt Zone 6.3. Units 1 anc 2 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room 5.1 Exe7 tion Requested 4

lxe-Stion were n euested from Section !!!.G.3 of Appendix A to the extent that it requires installation of a fixed firt suppression system in fire zones for

' which an alternative shutdown capability is provided.

i 1.2 Discussion The control room (CA) and the auxiliary electric equipment room (AEER) are both located in the service building (58). The 58 is located to the far touth side of the turbine butiding and is divised into two fire areas, vis., $8 ! and 38.!!. The 55 has three basic floor elevations and theand $81thefireAEER.

area Thecontains cable the CR, auxiliary assputer roca, cable spreading roos spreading room is )ocated below the CR and above the IEER and each are located on top of one another. The auxiliary computer room is enclosed by the AEER.

These rooms are separated from the balance of the 54 by complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire Mted barriers. The north well of the $$ (and of each of these three roors) is adjacent to the tu nine building trackway. This wall is a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire i

rated barrier. The floors / ceil' ngs between the CR, MER, and cable spread '

', roor.s elevations am unrated.

Fire protection features in the CR auxiliary computer room and AEER include a semplete automatic early warnir.g fIrv detection system. The cable spreading room has a fire detection system and also an automatic fire suppression system.

Nor641 fire fighting equipment in the form of fire extinguisheis and hose stations art availette to the CR, euxiliary computer room and the AEER. The CR is continuously manned during plant operation, i

The CR has a fire less than 25,000 Stu per square foot, whereas, the AEER has a firi of ss 76.000 Stu per square foot, and the auxiliary caputer roos I ds a Lire loadin then 21.000 Stv/f t. Therefore, the fire severity 'or 6 irt sones is han 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> as represented by the A$TM E 119 fi tes curve, e$

tkSt system components are located in

.? O nodundant divili normal lefft both fire zones 2.0 6 .

"We... a single fire could damage redundant divisions. For this event, the 1.icensee has provided an altamative safe shuteown path that is physically and electrically indepensent of these fire sones and for the balance of the 581 fire area.

l 14 12/10/87 QUAD CITIE5 1 AhD 2 i i i

1 .- - - - - . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _

. 5.3 Evaluatien The fire protection in these fire zones (control rooe, auxiliary computer reor, and auxiliary electric equipment room) does not coeply with the technical l requirerents of Section 111.G.3 of Appendix R because s fixed fire suppression systee is not installed in the control recrt or the auxiliary electric eqsipment r00T.

The prisry concern for these fire zones was that a fire in the auxiliary i

' electric equipment room (AEER) and the control room (CR) could cause the loss  !

ef nomal shutaoen capability. However, should a fire occur within the CR '

l er the AEER, it is expected that it would be pmmp ly detected by the automtic fim detection system, one of the station personne , or the firt brigade.

Should fire damage be extensive, then the independent alternative safe shutdowe 3

systee can he utillged to safely shutdown the plant. Because the CR and the )

MER am all part of . fire area 141 which is surrounded b 3ndhour ' >fin rated 2 cable Un barriert, except for insulated metal h t pres o ad,ja t fL tunnels, it is 16 no s ff fi a that the installation of a fixed suppression syste cam y

!:!$- a"S rease the evel of fire protection. j

. ereen

j l.4 Conclusip Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing bilit firevided protection features combined with the 41temative ' shutd ect alen

for the afemmentioned fim x Ap it R. There ore, the

' ct  !!!.G.,

ternpti from med fire uppression in the centre room -demettuusam6-4 n

. =f L 71. i n tN '.!!R c-d !M r ' Py -

1  : m c . shool be 6.0 4 kV SWs Duct Penetrations 4.1 Enerotten Reanested An exemptioe was r$4uested free Section !!1.G.I.a of Appendix R to the extent that it requires rgeundant safe shutdown components to be separated by coselete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers.

6.2 Otacussion A 4-kV bus euct from the diesel generator (DG 1/2) to an associated switchgear l

($WGR 23-1) is routed through the Unit 2 reacter building and the turbine '

building operating floor. The 4 kV bus duct penetrates certain fire rated l

barriers as follows:

i FIRE ZONES l

! BARRIER 4

.3/4, .0 l

g Rea r tu ding it 1.

f p Unit 1 and 2 teactor lutiding Common Wall 1.1.2.ff1.1.1[  ;

r S.E '

r F .

12/10/87

@AD CITIE5 1 AMD 2

)

1 .

i i

i

\

, ~

4 Shutdown paths betagen these related Zones utilize redundant civisi 'y The tus duct enclosure is constructed of retal 1/8" thick and is n fastenac at t.he wall penetration locations. At tne wall, there is .

,(

ste 1 o lar. Tne bus duct has no coseustibles within its enclosure l Fire zones 1.2.3 and 8.2.8.0 art provided with corplete autas c' -

detection re zone 8.2.7.0 is protected by autostatic sprinkl r$Manu Che . -ON beM

< fig ing pawnt is available to the affected fire zones.

s fire load in the affected tones is low and there are, based o a ite sin action, no firt hatares located near the bus duct penetrations.

'j '

> f , ac:\

p , ,. 6 [ valuation I.e fire protection in the fire zones having the 4-kV bus duct penetrations lb l l

)"c.',# k, Th s not comply with the technical requirteents of Section !!!.G.2.a of

1. g '/ Ao ndia R because a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier is not provided between P,

undant divisions of safe shutdown system cogonents. I

\p'{i

,s  !

e principal concern with a fire in one of the fire zones having a bus duct V.,',,6 netration is that the fire could spread through the bus duct penetration.

( g

I cause of the low fire laadings in the affectee fire tones, a fire of major Ip *, $#j proportions is not expected to occur. Further, all affected fire zones have an l

/ early warning fire detection system or an automatic sprinkler protection. '

Hence, a fire would be guickly detected and the fire brigade would be

@ dispatched. The but duct estal enclosure would be resistant to small fires and, as is the ca6e with HVAC ductwork, the bus duct would not likely fail for up to a one hour time peMod. This inherent fire resistance is enhanced by the fact f that each side of bus duct is mechanically fastened to the wall. The lack of combustibles insi6e the bus duct suurt that a spread of fire would not occur internally through the auct. The installstion, therefort, of a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated bus dxt penetration would not significantly increast the level of fire protection for these fire tones.

6.4 Conclusion lesed on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the existing fire protection features and physical characteristics of the 4 kV bus duct provide a i

' level of fire protaction equivalent to the technical requirements of Section 111.G.2.s of Appendix R. Therefore, this exemption request should be granted.

7.0 e Standby Gas Treatment System Piping Penetrations e teactor Building Vent System Piping Penetrations I

l i

16 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES : AhD 2

,. ...:. ~,..., ,<.. . * .n,,:......

~ ~~

. T.. t,...  ::m;: i, ..N...

.:-* a

i ::..i.

r . .; . i 7.1 ExeGtions ilea.atstid Exe ;tions were reeuested frot Section !!!.G.2.s of Appendix R t: the extent that it requires redundant safe shutdown components to be separated by compivte 3-hour fire ratec barriers.

7.2 Discussion the staneby gas treetsent (SBGTS) and reactor building vent syste'n piping run from the Unit 1 and 2 reactor buildings and drywells through the turbine The standby gas treatment

> building and, finally, out through the stack. C reactor building vont piping penetrations art located as follows:

FIRE ZONE $ sf[msnea/

BAAR!tt PEh!itATIOk ikksh n

}j, f g, '

1.1.1.5/1.1.2,5 Unit 1 and 2 5IGT5 Suction Crositie <

)

l (24in.)

Unit 2 SIGTS Fan Discharge t.ine 1.1.1.5/1.1.2'5 A /#*

(24in.)

1.1.1.5/1.1.2.5 No/A 8 Unit 1 and 2 $8GT5 Fan Suction Crositie (8in.)

Unit 2 $5GT5 Turbine Building suction 1.1.2.3/8.2.7 C /r M '

(6in.) V //0 Unit 154GT5 and Reactor Building Vent Systen 1.1.1.4/1.2.1 l )

OrywellSuction(14in.)

Unit 2 SIGT5 and Reactor Building Vent System 1.1.2.4/1.2.2 #'!#

{

DrywellSuction(14in.) '

Unit 1 Reacter lutiding Vent Exhaust Fan Svetion 1.1.1.4/8.2.? N'/

J ,j (18in.) f/i/I Vf L l Unit 2 Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Fan $uction 1.1.2.4/8.2.8 (18in.)

ructed of The SIGTS piping and the reactor building vent system piping is ce 1 ek, pipe is mechanically restr ned at the est a s c les i ea here is no pe tration The pt g syst have w

' continuity of conhttibles in the sonstrat ns.

On each side of the barriers where a pipe penetrates, there esist a fire -

i detection systee sed /or an 4WMtic fire suporettua awatee.fmanual r n.

71cnt' ng umr.,m u sys11ao ,e T,e we sirvate fire zones.

ted v ones low neer tn covers of a The lose the i

ns ys .

] 12/10/s7

{ QuA3 C1T!ES 1 AND 2 17 l

l

As stated in section 4.0 of tnis report, fire zones 1.1.1.5, 1.1.2.5, 1.1.1.a.

and 1.1.2.4 do not have safe shuteewn system components located therein. This then, rssolves most of the penetration locations listed above. For the rtraining firt zones, there exist 46 inoependent lafe shutdown path for the division of safe shutdown concorents located therein.

7.3 Evaluation i

The fire protection in the fire zones having the StGT5 and reactor building vent system piping penetrations does not comply with the technical n%irements of Section !!!.G 2.a of Appendix R because a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> firt rated Darrter u stem coeponents.

is not provided between redundant divisions of ge '

Our primary fire p cti e n on 1 66 i at a re th the trati loca of the fir

.fi Asv nedullin_of me, jot ligt!ificencejsjot_

dings in the affect,etfirt expected to ectur.JFurther #affected fire tones have en early warning fire _/

6etection system sed /or a fire suppression system. Hence, a fire wculd be_. _ _J i((liuteAly detected and the fin brigade would be dispatched

~

V ent stes i 41 wou res fe o T a VA ductwork, the F heat role rt . As in t e ca piping proper would not feil for up to a one hour tise period. This inherent g ) I fire reetstance is enhanced by the lack of cashestibles within the piping 4 j7 systee. With respect to the 5BGT5, an testalled 44mper could fail close and g possibly degrade the system, which could increase ths Itkelihood of a radioactive roleste. The inst 411ation, thertfert of a 3-hour fire rett d deeper would not signific4ntly increase the level,of fire protection for these fire tones.

7,4 Conclusion lated on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the existing fire protection features and physical characteristics of the 58GT5 and reactor tuilding vent syntam piping penetretions provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the technica requirements of Section !!!.G.2.a of Appendix A.

Therefort, these esemption requests thould be trented.

8,0 Drywell Expansion Gap, Unit 1 and Unit 2 4.1 Czeretian teamasted An exerption was requested free Section !!!.G 3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of automatic fire detection and fixed fire

! suppression systems in an area for which an alternative shutdown capability is i

j proviesd.

5.2 DiscusL12n

The drywell is constructed of a steel containment shell that is surrounded by a concreta shield strveture. The steel containment shell is spherical on the bottos and cylindrical at the top. The normal operation of the reactor (or accidents) will cause the steel shell to expend in all directions. Tnts I

l .

1 t er;ansion has :o be accoercastec anc it is done se by providing a 2 iaca space '

(gsp) arownd tne steel shell except f or the bottor, unich rests on a cectat c' ,

sare, in orde= to cm ate this 2 ince ga; during constrwetion, polyurethare l

1 An escay fon- snee n were installed over the exterior of the steel smell.  !

impregnates fiberglass tape was used over the joints and then 1/4 anc 3/4 inen - I thict fiberglass epony prefabricated Cover panels were installed over the f sneets. Concrete was placed over this material and, when hardenec, the sanc ichec asterials serve as the 2 inch gap because they are c er pur as tna 14 gg&#.g4 l

steel containrent shell expands. The fose Nterial se g4 '

in the , inch gap. However, fire n er is no e prot . on estectors are located in the reacter building fire ma m " -" * & *" l' .(I000 elettrical and mechanical drywell penetrationf manual fire figh ing equipment l in vait ble t row t t a res ter build ng. " [

ngaphreelec '

The only safe shutdan :orponents located in the expan condwetors inside the electrical penetratioh asleely anisters ectrical anconductort W y_

instrwnentation taps in techanical per.etrations. These _

are alleciated with valves requirso for hot and cold shu n and levelassociated N ha'l , ', '

I cables for automatic RNR system functions. The taps for re nical penetra ns.pknNih I indicating switches and pressure indicators are routed in est nd d M The f tr, load in the 2-inch gap is :escolod of the polyurethane /p fiberglass cover penels. The urethane is cos6ustible. The t inch gap ' k k y a bt' bounded on one sies by the steel shell and on the other side by a 4 foot tn in Unit I the concrete wall separates the reinforced concreta shield /well.

drpell gap frw fire area RS 1 and, for Unit 2, from fire area R8 2.

An The sitetrical penetrations all have the seme basic configuration. I electrical assently is sited so that it can be inserted into the electrical I penetration nottle. The nozzles are 12 inch, schedule 80 pipe which has a steel shell well thickness of 0.640 inches. EachassemblyisInconformnteto the ASME Sc11er and Pressure Code, lection !!!, Class B Yessela. The penetrations extend 1 foot toyend the drywell well on both sidet. The drywell mall in the vicinity of the penetretions is about 6 feet thick.

The mechanical penetrations are of two types, viz., het and cold. The hot onn are designed to aceoerodate therval expansion sM have gward pipes between the line and the penetration nonte. The sechanical penetration's are also constructed of thick walled steel pipes and plates. The penetration nozzles conform to the ASME Pressure Vessel Code Section Y111. The nozzle walls are l welded to t,he steel shell contairment structure. l 4

8.3 Evaluation The fire protection in the drpell expansion gap does not coeply with the

' technical requiresents of Section !!!.G.3 of Aspendix R because a fixed fire suppression and fira detection system have not Deen installed in an area for l which an alterNtive shutdown syltam has been provided, l 4

l There was o concem that a fire event within the drywell expansion gap could esmag a safe shutdemn rtistes perretrations (electrical and/or mechanical)

I 19  !!/10/87 i

QUAD CITIES 1 AM 2 i

J l

Be:awse of the co4Wstible material sandwiched within the 2. inch experstomA ga fire. l it is possisle that a fire could develop and spread throwgbout the gas.

of inil ratWrt nas previoWily oCCWPrec at OMsden Unit 3 ard se !&( Inferrdtion hotice 46 26 was issWed pyrsuant the N to.

The fire protect.a ,oncern for the drywell espansion gap censists of two  ;

parts.

The first concern is whether or not i fire in the gap can spread est of l j The second concern i the gap and into a separate fire ama or fire sone. revolves around whett.

safe shutdown capability by damaging the penetMtions directly.

For the case of a firt in the drywell expansion cap spreading into other areac,

.' it is mitigated by the fact that the 2 inch gap 's sandwiched between tre steel shell contailunent, structure, which is massive, and the 4 to 6 foot thickThe reinfoMed concrete shield well. The serve as a heat sink and dissipate auch of the drywell gap fire energy.

penetrations consist of steel penetration nottles that aM beld firely in place by welds and the concrete wall. Therefore, the gap.

this forms a coe9j Should a fire in the drywell I

into the drpell is not possible because of ' t.

gap somercy spread into the reactor building side, then it would only af fect one fire arts of 6ay one Unit and, therefore, an independent soft thwtdown path woulc be av411sble. This was discussed and evaluated in Sections 2.0 and 4.0 ]

of this M pert.

I l

The seconc part of the fire protection issue deals with the effects of a  !

drpell gap fire ce the penetrations and the possible degradation l shuteown capability.

and their weld attachment to the steel containeent l l

)

pipeI) she1 heavy that the penetr6t metal platesIons (electrical ard mechanical) would be significan:

l damaped incaired.

by an expossion gap fire to theThese extent that their funcl were listed l

safe shutdown functions contained within the penetrations. submittal.

out in detail within Tables 8.t 3 tad 8.t.4 of their June,1944 The impatraent of either Unit 1 or Unit I safe shutdown capab11Ity would n:

?

Mault because of the following roesens:

l l The safe snuteown M14ted RHR valves that are powered by caples routed i (1) through the penetrations are merently inIva closedtot positten and a fault or l I j ctMu rt .

j In the event 6 valve position changes, manual actions can be perfopred to r

(2) operate the assectued ve11tLfor n- the hrURem systeri.br," cM Thu ,

\ n ui ,u s hre o n e e n t d u hL Oei - -eenteel.7E t,,cai cabies a4 e A A t uob w k MsWe  !

tee-t ote Hy-operatec-by seis # tett 1

T su ! cal function of the Tar 1n-p c., a m u me saf a.,1mec A

, m.ain aves e.

@f

-, 1 , ,,

j

! 4

- l J

($\ Nonr. ally closed valves that are serviend by cables routeG througn tRe penetrations are in series with another closed valve but these valves are not a high/ low pressure interface and the valve does not need to be operated.

(6) There exists an independent system to supply reactor water makeup that would not be affected by a drywell gap fire.

f Also, in the gap space there are taps for reactor water level indicating switenes and reactor pressure indicators. A fire 1d out of these instroents. However, the corre t- t divisions adin coul still be obtained because the spacing between the di routed through the 41 ~ The ainount or writnane is ~

pap is 45 feet for Unit I and 29 feet for U sie at a C e the  ;

liniteo and the fim vov1d involve only one .

urn o esterial burned away from a penetration the u uld

'embient level. In the Dresden Unit 3 gap fire investigative report dated May, +

1966, this was found to be the cast and, further, it was also concluded that I plant safe shutdown capability would be maintained given a drywell expansion gap fire. This is also applicable to the Quad Cities Units 1 and 2.

A final reason that a fire detection ans a fixed fire suppression system should not be requireo.for. the drywell expansion gap space is that it would be physically tgpossible to renove the existing foem and install the fire protect 4n' 4ysterm In any event, the installation of a fire detection system ene a fixto firt suppression would eet significantly upgrade the level of fire protectinn for etther Unit 1 or Unit 2.

8.4 gn4 1g jign lased on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the existing fire protectien features and physical characteristics of the drywell expansion gap and its boundaries provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the ts:hnical requireeents of Section !!!.G.3 of Appendix R. Therefore, this ex m tion request-een be grant 6d.

W.0 Southern and Central Zone Groups. Turbine Suilding, Units 1 and 2 9.1 Exte$tiy Reuested An exception was requested froa Section 111.G.2.a of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the %stallation of complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers b6twuin redvedant divtstons of safe shutdenen system components.

21 12/10/87 QWC cit!!S_1 AND 2

l 9.2 Discussion The turbine building is one large fire area that is subdivided by extensive reinforced concrete snield walls. The turoine building consists of three nfor floor elevations and two partial basement elevations. The turbire building is separated from the reactor building by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier with exceptions that are covered by exesotion rwquests presented in Section 3.0 of this evaluation.

The licensee has divided the turbine building, with the exception of tne operating floor into three fire zone groups. These are the northern zone group (Fire Area TB-1), the central zone group (Fire Are T8-II), and the southern zone group (Fire Area TB.111). The operating floor is open between Unit 1 and Unit 2. The only safe shutdown equipment located hereon areThis the is Mdurdent divisions of switchgear (4-kV and 480-V) for Units 1 and 2.

the focus of a separate exenption mquest presented in Section 12.0 of this report.

The Central Zone Group consists of fire zones 5.0, 8.1. 8.2.6.C. 8.2.7.C. and 8.2.10, which are en the ground and anzzanine floor levels of the turbine building. The Central Zone contains cabling related to Unit 1 and Unit 2 safe shetdown. The Central Zone is separated from the Northern and Southern Zone Groups by complete reinforced concrete shield walls on the ground and mezzanine floors with the exception of the corridor that penetrates these barriers en the ground level. The reinforced concrete shield walls do not have a formal fire rating but they are equivalent to a 3-hour fire rating because of their rast.

Personnel access between zone groups is through substantial, locked, unlabeled metal personnel acesss doors. Automatic fire detection an re su ression rri ors do t rNdY fi n s fire protection will provice a coetai safe shutdown equipment or cables ~

gp 4 han f dor spa e, tk s,+e se < uu c y

@ C, @ VI$n. skwp s'l. W M At the mezzanine level, the Southern Zone 4 Md separated by continuous shield walls with metal, cc do s that are kept locked. All penetrations are sealed with nonfire r ed ne d ...*1e meterials. Sprinkler systems are installed in fire zones on shield wall oncept for a portion of fire zone 8.2.7.C .entral Zonein the '4th side troup. Fire zone 4.2.7.C contains The the a ea Zone Group has fire zones 6.1. A. 61.8, 7.1, 8.2.1 of combustible.

nd --

l[u Q

4.2.3.A.8.2.3.B.4.2.4,8.2.6.A.and8.2.6.5,(whichcontaincablingThe basic sepa equipment for Unit 1. M ne Group is described in the preceding para raphs. l.,2.f'4'\

MMV A Other specific boundsry borders snared by Sou Group an N 6)j Central Zone troup include an open doorway to the %r ,e$w n the was Unit 1 rn CRD 9.I; U la an portion of the Central Zone Group (Fire Zone 8.2. .C)fe sa ut cabling 1  ;

Zone 8.2.3. A in the Southern Zone Group. The ,y . i , g',

equipment within 20 feet of the doorway in th Central one o is the alternate food to the DG 1/2 cooling water . The ormal d runs th gh RC) the Southern Zone Group. Automatic sprinkler tect on is p ded for re g J.l stibles betwee o gr sone 8.2.3. A and there is no continuity of 4 it 1/L dwaste tunne fi f

-fd' h at this point. Another shared border is the QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 22 hp /M r N

< 6

[

_ _ __ _ ., _--_ _ - ~._ _ ____. __.~ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _

v:....  :.

..i..m, n: : m .:C;- ;;, ... .. ,,_,

f, i

tones 8.2.3,8anc8.2,2.5). This tunnel has open hatches and pipe chases ano runs underneath the Central Zone Group and connects with the Northern Zone Group. The radnests tunnel has ne safe shutdown related cables or equipwnt enc negligible conhustibles. Finally, at the 626 foot elevations, separation i' of the Central and Southern Zones (fire zones 8.2.10 and 14.1.1) er, is b ese walls with metal, personnel access doors that are locked shut. H g it fire zones contain no safe shutdown cables and the combustible 1 negligible (1,000 3,000 Stu's per square foot). QgmOg s

The Central Zone Group on the ground and mezzanine levels cont cabling for both Units. However, the necessary cabics ano equ ..w 6 _

r .u not the ACIC shutdown path for Unit 1 anc the RCIC shutdown path , e C!

located in the fire zones within the Central Zone Group. Theref shutdown paths are available for shutdown of both units for a fire 2,-

area.

The Southern Zone Group contain only Unit 1 cables and equipment, except for the Diesel Generator 1/2 cooling water pump and alternate feed. This alternate feed is fire wrapped in the Southern Zone Group to the MR seWice water vault .

11.1.1.B. This vault For has 3-hour fire rated walls, except for the heavy steel a fire in this tone group, the safe shutdown makeup pump l water-tight door. )

path can be utilized, which is independent of this zone group. l 9.3 Evaluatio_n The fire protection in the Central and Southern Zone Groups does not comply 1 with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R because a coglete 3. hour fire rated barrier has not been provided between redundant divisions of safe shutdown system components as described above.

The principal concem for a fire in either the Central or Souther'n Zone Group  ;

is tha.t a fire could deveig and spread to an atacent zone group and damage secessary safe shutdown system components.

However, these two fire zone groups l (Central and Southern) are separated by reinforced concrete shield walls.

Openings in the fire barriers consist of locked unrated metal personnel access doors that are kept locked, unrated penetration seals, open hatches, a doorway and an open connecting corridor. These exceptions have compensating features in the fem of fire detection and fire suppression either at the barrier of concern or nearby in an aCacent fire zone. The open connecting corridor has more than 50 feet protected by complete fire suppression and detection systems to prevent the spread of fire between zone groups. The open connecting corridor does not contain cables that will prevent achieving safe shutdown if damaged by fire. The metal personnel access doors are substantial and kept closed aad locked end would assist in the prevention of spread of any expected l

fire. For the cases of open hatches and the one open doomey, no safe shutdown equipment or cables are located in the vicinity negligible combustibles are located in the im'ediate area. An automatic fire sup one side of the open door in the Central Zone Group (pression sy firezone8.2.6.C).

1 23 12 M l QUAD CITIES 1 MD 2

~ ~ ~

. . :. . . . .  : . . . . ..e. . c . ., . . ..,.. . . . . . . . . ...

Overall, the fire lose is low except for areas of combustible concentration whien are protected by automatic water suppression systems. For this reason, a 7 fire in either the Central or Southern Zone Groups is expected to develop slowly and remain small. Its heat would disripate to the surroundings without spreading to an adjacent zone group. Either the fire detection or fire suppression systems would detect the firs and susunon the fire brigade. The fire brigade could extinguish the expected fire.

Since a fire in either the Central or Southern Zone Group would not damage an alternative safe shutdown path located out of each of the zone groups and/or spread to the adjacent zone group, the provision of complete 3-hour fire ratee barriers between the Central and Southern Zone Groups would not significantly upgrees the level of fire protection is these tac zone groups.

3.4 Conclusion based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protection, physical barriers, and redundant safe shutdown paths available f outside of the zone group of concern provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the technical requirement of Section 111.G.2 of Appendix R.

Therefore, this exemption request can be granted.

10.0 SOUTHERh AND MORTHERN ZONE G400PS TURSINE SUILDING, UNITS 1 AND 2 10.1 Exarption Reassted An exception was requested from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of cosplete 3-hour fire rated barriers between redundant divisions of safe shuteown system components, i

j 10.2 Discussion i A description of the turbine building operating floor and the Southern Zone Group has been previously discussed in Section 9.2 of this report. The N(:rthern Ione Group consists of Fire Zones 6.2. A 6.2.5, 7.2, 8.2.1.8. 8.2.1.0, 8.2.2. A, 8.2.2.8, 8.2.5, 8.2.6.0, 8.2.6.E, 8.2.7,0, 8.2.7.t. 9.2, 11.1.2.A. 11.1.2.8 11.1.2,C, and 14.1.2. All floors of the Northern Zone Group contain only Unit 2 cabling and equipment. The interface between the Northern and Southern Zone Groups involves the Unit 2 cable tunnel (Fire Zone 8.2.5), which is part of the Northern Zone Group. It runs undernseth Fire Zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.6.8 of the Southern Zone Group and the ra b ste pipe tunnel where Fire Zones 8.2.2.8 and 8.2.3.8 ewet.

TheUnit2cabletunnel(FireZone8.2.5)p er h r d there are unprotected access poin int ,

. e ca e tun is constrveted of retoforced con w al' electrical penetrations sealed w l 3-hour fire rated esterials Fire Zones 8.2.6. Ai The cable tunnel is als "g t,4.4 provided with complete fire tect and automatic wet p1pe protection at t '

ceiling level and in each lev the two ints where the Unit 2 t

cable tunnel accesses the Southern Zone sp, wit he M 53  :

24 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 l

, _ . . _ . . _ .__.___ _ __ _ _--__ _ _ _ . ___ _ _ i

s me tal checkered plate. Also, fire detection and fire suppression systets are proviced above the access points in the Southern Zone. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable tunnels are separated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated block walls. A fire cannot spread fret the Unit 2 cable tunnel to the Southern Zone Group through the two access hatches since fire detection and ceiling level sprinkler protection are provided above and imediately below the plates.

With respect to the interf ace between the radwaste piping tunnel and the Northem/ Southern Zone Groups, the redweste tunnel preper contains no safe shutdown cables or equipment. Also, there an negligible combustibles containec in the redweste piping tunnel. The unrated ceiling of the radwaste piping tunnel is of crete. There are unprotected openings into both the Northern and Sou', roups. In the fire tones contained within the Worthern and ,% Zone ps that are adjacent to the raoweste piping g tunnel, there u ic sprinkler systems installed. ,

{~ pability M1stive to the Northern and Southern k The issue of s hu Zone troups is to at for a fire in one of the zone groups, the other zone group is free of fire damage.

10.3 Evaluation The 'tre protection in the Northern and Southern Zone Groups does not comply w% Wtion !!!.G.2.a of Appendix R because a complete 3-hour fire rated bmier has not been provided between redundant divisions of safe shutdown system components.

Our primary fire protection concern for a fire event in one of these zone groups is that a fire could develop and spread to the adjacent zone group and damage cable or oggipment necessary for safe shutdown.

The Southern and Northern Zone Groups border each other only along portions of the Unit 2 cable tunnel and the ra hasta piping tunnel. For the Unit 2 cable tunnel, the barrief has a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating except for the accesses into the Southern Zone Group. Houever, the access points have heavy metal covers and utoenatic fire detection and suppression system coverage on both sides.

Therefore, should a fire develop in either zone group or the cable tunnel, it would not spread between the two tone groups because it would have to overcome Wo separate fire wppression systems. Essentially, the barrier is 3-hour fire Mted and the metal covers serve as edequata passive barriers. The fire estection system (s) would detect the fire in a timely manner and the automatic suppression systems and fire brigads would extinguish the fire prior to the esed for reliance en the concrete barriers and the metal plates.

Part of the korthern/ Southern Zone Group interface is with the radwaste piping tunnel that has unprotected openinga into both of the zone groups. In this tunnel, a fire could start but, because of the negligible fire load, it would not develop into a fire of significant magnitude or pose a thMat to either zone group. Also, if a fire originated in either the Northern or Southctn Zone troup, then it could not spread tc the adjacent zone group via the tunnel for this saae reason. Finally, there is added insurance in the form of fire suppression systems in the fire zones of both zone groups that have unprotected openings into the Pedweste piping tunnel.

QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 25 12/10/87

' s The staff fincs that the provision of a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier between the Northern and Southern Zone Groups would not significantly upgrade the level of fire protection in these two zone groups. Cn the basis of the previously described fire protection.

10.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire j protection, physical barriers, and the location of one division of power feec '

to the safe shutdown pump in each zone group provide a level of fire protection I equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.a of Appenoix R.

Therefore, this exesstion can be granted. l i

11.0

~

o NORTHERN ZONE GROUP, TUR8INE BUILDING o CENTRAL ZONE GROUP, TUR81NE 80lLO!NG o OPERATING FLOOR TUR81NE SUILDING c SOUTHERN AND B0RTHERN ZONE GROUPS (FIRE ZONES 8.2.I A,11.1.1. A. AND

• B.t.7.0) 11.1 Exaections_Reeuested Exemptions were requested from Section 111.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in areas for which alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability has been provided.

11.2 Discussion By letter dated April 25, 1986, the NRC issued Fire Protection Generic Letter 86 10. The purpose of this letter was to clarify fire protection issues and render the latest BRC positions on Appendix R issues. Enclosure 1 to GL 86-10 contains six Appendix R interprwtations and one of these (number 5) deals with the issue of automatic detection and fire suppression systems. The NRC ,

position is that wfficient fire detectinn/ suppression must be installed to protect against the hasards of the area and less than full area coverage may be acceptable. If partial coverage is provided, then the 1.icenset must provide an evaluation justifying same and, if no coverage is provided, then an exemption I is required. Hence, for partial coverage situations such as in the case with l Quad Cities, an exer 9 tion request is not required for these three plant areas. i The evaluations subsitted in their June,1986 submittal, however, qualify as a basis for justifying their partial coverages in the four subject plant areas.

Therefore, no evaluation is required for these exemption requests because they are not required.

26 12/10/07 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2 i

l

, l l

11.3 Evaluation hot required.

11.4 Conclusion These exemption requests are not required per the guidan:e contained in GeneHe Letter 86 10 dated April 25, 1986, however, they should be evaluated at the time of the Regional Inspection.

12.0 OPERATING FLOOR. TUR8thE BUILDING (FIRE ZONES 8.2.8.A. 8.2.8.8 8.2.8.C. AND 8.2.8,0), ELEVATION 639 FEET 12.1 Exerction Reonested_

An exemption was requested from Section !!!.G.2.a of Appendix R to the extent that it requins the installation of coeplete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers between redundant divisions of safe shutdown system components.

12.2 Otscussion The turbine butiding and the operating floor layout has been partly discussed in Section 9.0 and 10.0 of this report. The operatin l zones (8.2.8A,8.C,0,andE)withFireZone8.2.8.gfloorhasfivefire t having no safe shutdown I system corponents. Fire Zone 8.2.8.E is the major portion of the operating l floor and holds the turbine equipeant. The major equipment on the operating l floor includes the turbine generators, MG sets, and both divisions of 4kV and 480V switchgears for both units. The switchgears are the only safe shutdown equipmentonthiselevation(639 feet). The turbine building is open between j Units 1 and t at celuem row 13.

The switchgoer on the operating floor has been separated by three partial barriers having a rating of 3-hours in conjunction with a water spray (water ,

curtain)systas. The water curtain us s 1 to de v i goe per lineer foot of opening. The ea o r o e of the three eatectors (one photos r,1c nd two ion 17atien. in the area. 4 l Shields are provided to prevent s 6f he switchgear. Detectors are located

.. F{reZeges .2. .

2.g83.8.C. ,

on each side of and between the sh .0m.'

=*  ;

and 8.2.8.0 are ads cent to each o re col 1k nd vall of the turbine building from celuen 1 between column lines G and H Also, thert(, a' -hour f re rated barri(er ch w 33e-separates each Unit s 480V switchgear atTol _ line 13 east of column line O Each division of 4kV switchgear for each i separated by a partial fire L barrier. Switchgear 131 and 24-1 are separat an ut tic water curtain '

Ug >

The 440Y switchgear area is separated from the reac r by a cornplete t- or 3-hour fire barrier with Class A fire doors.

The separation of Fire Zone 8.2.8E from the other fire zones on the operating floor is by the ute of a there411y actuated water spray system protecting the curbed area surrounding the M6 sets snd by the use of a sprinkler system above /g L >

the a sets.

J 27 12/10/87 l QUA0 CITIES 1 AND 2 l

1 l

l l

l

)

Witn respect to safe snutdown capability, a fire event in any of the fcur fire tores that contain safe shutdown equipments / cables would only affect one unit.

A safe shutdown path for the affected fire zone is available that uses indepencent cable; and equipment. Specifically, given a fire in: l (1) Fire Zone 8.2.6. A - only Unit 1 would be affected and safe shutdowr.

capability is with the safe shutdown pump and RHR Division 1 Metned D.

(2) Fire Zone 8.2.8.8 - only Unit I would be affec:ed and safe shutdown capability is with the safe shutdown pump and RNR Division 2 Method A.

)

(3) Fire Zone 8.2.8.C only Unit 2 would be affected and safe shutdown capability is with the safe shutdown pump and RNR Division 1 Hethod C.

(4) Fire Zone 8.2.8.0 - only Unit 2 would be affected and safe shutdown capability is with the safe shutdown pump and RHR Division 2 Methoc K.

All four fire zones in the area have complete fire detection and the MG sets have redundant automatic suppression installed. Also, fire hoses and fire extinguishers are available.

The fire load in the four fire zones is negligible in the vicinity of the switchgear and them is no continuity of cables or combustibles between any of the four fire zones.

12.3 Evaluation The fire protection on the operating floor of the turbine building does not comply with Section !!!.G.2.a of Appendix R because a complets 3-hour fire rated barrier has not been provided between redundant divisions of safe shutdown system colgoneMs.

There was a concern that a fire in one of these fire zones could spread to the redundant safe shutdown component in an adjacent fire zone. However, the floor loading in all of these fire zones is negligible. Because of the low a fire of significant magnitude or duration is not expected ur. Fire detection is availab e for all four zones having safe ding, firuj- ,

~~

shutdown end turM e components. Also, all fire hazards nearty, such as the MG sets p m tected by suppression systems. Therefore, a fire would be ickly e and annunciated in the control room. The large open area on

% ::: e loor would serve as an adequate heat and smoke reservoir for the fire until i is extinguished by the fire brigade or the suppression systems.

Until the fire is antinguished, the partial 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers sno sne water curtain installed between the fire zones serve as adequate passive '

protection. These barriers, the negligible fire load, high ceilings and space volume, and the installation of an alternative power feed from Unit 1 to the Unit 2 RHR Division 1 room cooler fan for fire would prevent the fire from spreading and affecting redundant divisions of safe shutdown system components.

The staff finds that the provision of complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers around each of the five fire zones would not significantly upgrade the fire protection level.

28 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2

o l

(

12.4 Conclusion lased on tP.e above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protection, physical barriers, water curtains, and the provision of an alternative power fetc for Fire Zone 8.2.8.C provide a level of fire protection equivalent to Section !!!.G.2.a of Appendix R. Therefore, this exemption can be granted.

l 13.0 FIRE ZONE 11.1.1.8 - WATERTIGHT 000R )

13.1 Exception Recueste_d An exemption was requested free Section 111.G.2 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires recundant safe shutdown components to be separatec by complete

3. hour fire rated berriers.

13.2 Discussion Fire Zone 11.1.1.8 has a floor, ceiling, and all walls with a 3-hour fire rating except for the east well that contains a metal, watertight door. This T door leads into Fire Zone 8.2.1.A. which is Southeni Zone group MR c ris(keptclosedandisheldclosed n

ya report. The e>etal we', rtigh d .

nurcer of latches he door is built of steel about 1/2-inch thickw, Fh a >4 //j /N we nd o /

Fire Zone 11.1.1.5 con" in v Division 11 RHR service water pump. 1so, is zone has the swing a generator cooling water pump and its auxiliaries. Fire Zone 8.2.1. A contains the sssin and reserve power feeds to the swing (1/2) diesel generator cooling rf water pump. The reserve feed is protected with a 1-hour fire rated wrap. In 7u the event of a fire in either fire zone, an alternative safe shutdown path is available. This alternative safe shutdown path is independent of the zones.

Cooling water for the swing diesel generator is provided by ait diesel generator 1/2 cooling water pump in Fire Zone 11.1.1 e a fi eutsies Fire Zone 11.1.1.8 or the diesel generator 1 co waterpumpAqFiry//b7g Zone 11.1.1.A. The swing diesel 1/2 reserve feed in F Zone 8.2.1.Ajis on protected with a 1 ar fire rated wrap. The Dtvision Division't RHR a)e1Ntactedbyusingtheotherunit me s, of servi cal re I

/ ll l'js)WYes A

) Fire Zone 11.1.1.5 s complete area coverage by a fire detection (rate p at% cors) and automatic fire suppression system. Fire Zone

, p e tres coverage by an automatic fire suppression system.

Fi hose stations nd fire extinguishers are available to both zones.

The fire load in be h firt tones is negligible (less than 2,500 STUs per squa foot).

b QUA0 CITIES 1 AND 2 29 12/10/87

.r....  : ....-c. ......

t 13.3 Evaluation the fire protection in Fire Zones 11.1.1.8 and 8.2.1.A does not comply witn t technical requirement of Section ll!.G 2. of Appendix R because a cocclete I 3-hour fire rated barrier is not provided between redundant safe shutdown system Components.

The principal fire protection concern for these fire zones was that a fire could start in either fire zone and spread However, theto the fire unaffected load in either tone fireis zone througn an unrated, metal, watert.ight door. Therefore, negligible and both tones have automatic fire suppression systw.s.The watertight d a fire would not develop into significant In the eventproportions.of of fire da:r, age is substa these tones with or without sprinkler protection.

to safe shutdown components in either zone, an alternate safe shutdown available independent of these fire zones.

It is found that upgrading the existing watertit)ht door to a 3-hour fire ra would not significantly increase the level of f tre protection.

13.4 Conclusion Based on the evaluation, it is concluded that the exi zones provide a leeel of fire protection equivalent to for the aforementioned zone can be granted.

14.0 NORTHERM/CEMTnAl.10 TIE GROUPS AND FIRE ZONE 8.2.8,0 14.1 Exemption Reemssted_

An exemption was requested from Section III.G.2 of A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers.

14.2 01scussion The Northern and Central Zone Groups have been The discusse 10.2 of this report.

Zone 8.2.8.0, has been discussed in Sections 9.2 and 12.2 of this reprt.

Central Zone Group Fire Zone 8.2.7.0 and the No on the Turoine Building operating floor.

There are safe shutdown cables in Fire Zone 8.2.

4.2.7,0 and 8.2.7.! of the Morthern Zone Group. Fire fire zones, there fc an independent alternative safe shutdown' It has ansystem.

Zone 8.2.8.0 also eentains safe shutdown 4kV switchg alternative shutdoem path in place for Fire Zones 12/10/87 30 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2

a The basic fire protection featurts for the four fire zones oiscusteo above nave In brief, Fire Zone 8.2.8,0 (4kV been switchgear previously) 23-1 stated in this report.has its fire hazards protecteo by complete automat Tne detection in addition to redunoant suppression systees for the MG sets.

floor in the imediate vicinity of switchgear 23-1 east of the MG sets is 3-hour rated in fire zone 8.2.8,0. In Fire Zone 8.2.7.C of the Central Zone Group, fixed (water) fire suppression is provided throughout the area except for the western portion whics has negligible combustibles. The portion of Fire Zone 8.2.7 C which is located beneath zone 8.2.8.0 is protected by automatic sprinklers anc fire detection. The portion of Fire Zone 8.2.7.0 below on. In is protected b t tic sprinklers in addition to partial fire d ' a /

4rt ' (gp t 8.2.7,0 and 8.2.7.E < y ' G Madn the Nort5rn ZM;ur i e tae41l addi ti^^ , b su 46 l es. Fire Zones p vi ed with autoestic sprinklers and/or fire detection (aTd protectY .

A

, ft hazards are covered ._

14.3 Evaluation

-- -~

p g The fire protection in the Northern / Central Zone Groups and Fire Zone 8.2.8,0 on the turbine building operating floor does not comply with the requirtrunts of Section 111.G.2 of Appendix R because a conglete 3-hour fim rated ba rier has not been provided between recundant divisions of safe shutdown systeu components.

Our principal fire protection concern for these plant areas is that a fire could develop in either the Central (Fire Zone 8.2.7.C) or korthern (Fire Zones 8.2.7,0 or 8.2.7.E) Zone Groups and spread to the turbine building operating floor (Fire Zone 8,2.8.0) and vice verse. This concern exists because each of these plant areas has a portion of the alternative safe shutdown system component > that a m utili3ed for a fire in one of the other fire zones.

The fire barrier of concern is the turbine bui161ng operating floor, which is the ceiling of Fire Zones 8.2.7.C. 8.2.7.0, and 8.2.7.E. This is not a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier, however, the floor in the isinediate vicinity of switchosar 23-1 of concern (fire zone 8.2.8.0 east of the MG set) is 3-hour rated. En addition, because the hazards below the operating floor (Fire Zone 8.2.8.D) are contained in reservoirs and are protected with automatic fire detection and fim suppression systess, an expected fire would be detected early and controlled / eatinpished my the fire suppression systems.

Also, these areas are open and accessib e to the fire brigade. Fire Zone 8.2.8.D has a negligible fire load (excluding the MG sets). This zone is protected by coglete auteenetic fim detection and redundant automatic fire suppression systes coverage over the MG sets. Therefore, a fire would not spread downuard through the operating floor (Fire Zone 8.2.8.0) because of these featums and, also, t,ecause there is no continuity of combustibles through the floor slab. The operating floor slab, therefore, has water fire Suppression system provided below Fire Zone 8.2.8.0 and for the MG set in the Ione.

The staff has determined that the provision of a complete 3-hour fire rated barrier between the subject fire zones (turbine building operating floor) would not significantly upgrade the level of firt protection for these plant fire tones.

t 31 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2

14.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluatica, the staff concludes that tne existing fire protection, physical features, and the availability of an alternative safe shutdow system independent of the fire zones under consideration provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the technical requirements of Section 111.G 2.a of Appendix R. Therefore, this exemption can be granted.

15.0

SUMMARY

Based on our evaluation, M find that the level of fire safety in tne areas listed below is eqsivalent t, that achieved by coacliance with the tecnnical requirements of Section 111.6 of Appendix R and, therefore the Licensee's request for exemption in these areas should be granted:

(1)

Unit 1 Reactor Building (Fire Zones 1.1.1.2,11.2.2,1.1.1.1.5 - Torus South,1.1.1.1N Torus North) and Unit 2 Reactor lutiding (Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 11.3.2, 1.1.2.1.5 Torus South, and 1.1.2.1N Torus North) to the extent that cosplete 3-hour fire rated barriers are not provided.

See Section 2.0 for additional information.

(2) Unit 1 Reactor Building / Turbine lutiding Interface Boundary and Unit 2 Reactor Building / Turbine Butiding Interf ace Boundary to the extent that 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers are not provided. See Section 3.0 for more infomation.

(3) Unit 1 Reactor Building (Fire Zones 1.1.1.1. 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.5,1.1.1.6,11.1.3,11.2.1.11.2.2,11.2.3, and 11.2.4) and Unit 2 Reactor Building (Fire Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5 11.1.4,11.3.1,11.3.2,11.3.3,and11.3.4)totheextentthatautomatic fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems are not provided. See Section 4.0 fw additional infomation.

(4) Units 1 and 2 Control Room (Fire Zone 2.0), Unit i and 2 Auxiliary (Fire Computer Room, and Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Zone 6.3) to Se extent that a fixed fire suppression is not provided.

See Section 5.0 for additional information. l l

(5) 4-kV Bus Duct Penetrations to the extent that complete 3-hour fire ratec barriers are est provided. See Section 6.0 for additional information.

(6) Standby Sas Treatment System and the Reacter Building Yent System Piping Penetrations to the extent that a complete 3-hour fire rated barrier is not provided. See Section 7.0 for additional information.

(7) Orywell 2xpansion Gap in Unit 1 and 2 to the extent that autostic fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems are not installed. See Section 8.0 for aeditional infomation.

32 12/10/87 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2

[ .

.e l

Units 1 and 2 Turcine Building Southern and Central Zone Groups to the See l (5) extent that a complete 3 heur fire rated barrier is not provided. l Section 9.0 for additional information.

I (9) Units 1 and 2 Turcine Building Southern and Northern Zone Groups toSee the )

extent that a complete 3-hour fire rated barrier is not provided. l Section 10.0 for additional information, I (10) Turoine Building Operating Floor (Fire Zones 8.2.8.A. 9.2.6.8 rated barriers are not proYid9d. See Section 12.0 for &dditional information.

(11) Watertight Door (Fire Zone 11.1.1.5) to the extent that a corplate 3-hour fire rated barrier is not provided. See Section 13.0 for additional information.

(12) horthern/ Central Zone Groups and Fire Zone 8.2.8.0 to theSee eatent Section that a complets 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier is not provided.

14.0 for additional information.

John Stang and D. Notley 16.0 PRINCIPAL CONTR18VTOR:

This safety evaluation was prepared based on a Technical Evaluation Report prepared by Frank 11a Research Center (FRC) under a contract with the 0.5.

Nuclear Regulatory Corsaission (NRC).

Dated:

l 1

l 4

1 I

- 12/10/87 l 33 QUA0 CITIES 1 AND 2 l

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