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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20216H8481999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 190 & 187 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20212J0501999-09-21021 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Plant,Per GL 87-02,Suppl 1 ML20210U7831999-08-0404 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 189 & 186 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20210L8661999-08-0202 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting License 60-day Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20196F4261999-06-25025 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 188 & 185 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20195K1481999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Relief Request RV-23A for Duration of Current 10 Yr IST Interval on Basis That Compliance with Code Requirements Would Result in Hardship Without Compensating Increase in Level of Quality & Safety ML20205Q5291999-04-16016 April 1999 SER Concluding That Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1,can Be Safely Operated for Next Fuel Cycle with Weld O2BS-F4 in Current Condition Because Structural Integrity of Weld Will Be Maintained ML20205J6011999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Merger of Calenergy Co, Inc & Midamerican Holdings Co for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205F4791999-03-31031 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 187 & 184 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20205D4171999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 186 & 183 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20204D9751999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 185 & 182 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20198S6841998-12-22022 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Merger of Calenergy Co,Inc & Midamarican Energy Holdings Co.Nrc Should Approve Application with Listed Condition ML20196F8931998-12-0303 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 182 to License DPR-29 ML20196D9651998-11-30030 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief Requests CR-21 & CR-24, Respectively.Relief Request CR-23,proposed Alternative May Be Authorized,Per 10CFR50.55a & Relief Request CR-22 Was Withdrawn by Licensee ML20196A9761998-11-20020 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee 180-day Response to GL 95-07, Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-operated Gate Valves ML20153C5061998-09-21021 September 1998 SER Accepting Qualified Unit 1 Supervisor Initial & Continuing Training Program for Dresden Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20151T2711998-09-0404 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to NRC Bulletin 95-002 ML20237A1341998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-25 ML20216F0221998-03-0606 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request Re Temporary Use of Current Procedure for Containment Repair & Replacement Activities at Plant ML20203K5201998-02-25025 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 165 & 160 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20203H2441998-02-25025 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 166 & 161 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20202E2971998-01-0505 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 164,159,179 & 177 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20211P3151997-10-0707 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 178 & 176 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20216J8861997-09-10010 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 162 & 157 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20210Q4461997-08-21021 August 1997 SE Supporting Amends 161 & 156 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25, Respectively ML20197B9171997-07-23023 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Concrete Expansion Anchor Safety Factors for High Energy Line Break Restraints ML20141E5091997-05-16016 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting TR EMF-96-051(P), Application of Anfb Critical Power Correlation to Coresident GE Fuel for Plant,Unit 2 Cycle 15 ML20141E1681997-05-16016 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 159 & 154 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20138F2881997-05-0101 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 176 & 172 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20140E9741997-04-30030 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 157 & 152 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20138D1791997-04-25025 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 158 & 153 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20137R6431997-04-10010 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 156 & 151 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20137F7751997-03-27027 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 175 & 171 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20136G7731997-03-14014 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Amends 155,150,174 & 170 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20137G6071997-03-13013 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Changes to TS & Bases Ceco ML20135E1551997-02-28028 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 153,148,172 & 168 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20134H7601997-02-0707 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Rev 65c of Ceco QA TR CE-1-A ML20112E3921996-05-31031 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 144 to License DPR-25 ML20092M5091995-09-21021 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 140,134,162 & 158 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20092G9351995-09-11011 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 159 & 155 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20086C1941995-06-23023 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 136,130,157 & 153 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20085L6961995-06-14014 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 135,129,156 & 152 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20085H0301995-06-13013 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134,128,155 & 151 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20085K3391995-06-0808 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133,127,154 & 150 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20084R6411995-05-30030 May 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 153 & 149 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20078S8681995-02-22022 February 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 126 to Licenses DPR-19 & DPR-25,respectively ML20078S8301995-02-16016 February 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 131,125,152 & 148 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20149F4151994-08-0404 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Unit 1 Can Be Safely Operated During Next Operating Cycle (Cycle 14) ML20070G4541994-07-13013 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 149 & 145 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20071G1671994-07-0606 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 128,122,148 & 144 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively 1999-09-23
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEAR05000254/LER-1999-004-03, :on 990910,CREVS Air Filtration Unit Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Airflow Rate in Excess of TS Allowable.Airflow Was Adjusted During Performance of Surveillance Procedure Qcos 5750-021999-10-12012 October 1999
- on 990910,CREVS Air Filtration Unit Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Airflow Rate in Excess of TS Allowable.Airflow Was Adjusted During Performance of Surveillance Procedure Qcos 5750-02
05000254/LER-1999-003-05, :on 990907,noted That HPCI Was Inoperable Due to Manual Closure of HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve.Cause Indeterminate.Suppl LER Will Be Issued Upon Determination of Root Cause of Control Switch Failure1999-10-0707 October 1999
- on 990907,noted That HPCI Was Inoperable Due to Manual Closure of HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve.Cause Indeterminate.Suppl LER Will Be Issued Upon Determination of Root Cause of Control Switch Failure
SVP-99-204, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20249C8491999-09-30030 September 1999 1999 Third Quarter Rept of Completed Changes,Tests & Experiments Evaluated,Per 10CFR50.59(b)(2), for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. with ML20216H8481999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 190 & 187 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212J0501999-09-21021 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Plant,Per GL 87-02,Suppl 1 SVP-99-179, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210U7831999-08-0404 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 189 & 186 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20210L8661999-08-0202 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting License 60-day Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs SVP-99-155, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210R6081999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Dresden Nuclear Power,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20209E1291999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20210D3071999-06-30030 June 1999 Corrected Page 8 to MOR for June 1999 for DNPS Unit 3 ML20209J3481999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Second Quarter Rept of Completed Changes,Tests & Experiments, Per 10CFR50.59.With SVP-99-148, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20196F4261999-06-25025 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 188 & 185 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively 05000265/LER-1999-002-04, :on 990527,station Personnel Discovered Unsealed One Inch Diameter Pipe Penetrating Secondary Containment.Caused by Lack of Proper Work Control.Util Will Permanently Cap Spare Subject Pipe by 9907151999-06-25025 June 1999
- on 990527,station Personnel Discovered Unsealed One Inch Diameter Pipe Penetrating Secondary Containment.Caused by Lack of Proper Work Control.Util Will Permanently Cap Spare Subject Pipe by 990715
05000254/LER-1999-004-02, :on 990521,reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by Steam Intrusion Into Scram Discharge Volume.Procedure Qcop 12200-11, RWCU Sys Startup & Pump Operation, Revised1999-06-18018 June 1999
- on 990521,reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by Steam Intrusion Into Scram Discharge Volume.Procedure Qcop 12200-11, RWCU Sys Startup & Pump Operation, Revised
ML20195K1481999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Relief Request RV-23A for Duration of Current 10 Yr IST Interval on Basis That Compliance with Code Requirements Would Result in Hardship Without Compensating Increase in Level of Quality & Safety SVP-99-123, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195G6381999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20210H3501999-05-25025 May 1999 Rev 1 to Quad Cities Station IPEEE Submittal Rept ML20207E1621999-05-25025 May 1999 Rev 1 to Quad Cities IPEEE, Consisting of Revised Chapter 4.0 Re Internal Fire Analysis ML20195B2591999-05-19019 May 1999 Rev 66a to CE-1-A,consisting of Proposed Changes to QAP for Dnps,Qcs,Znps,Lcs,Byron & Braidwood Stations 05000254/LER-1999-001-04, :on 970715,three Spare Valves Were Determined to Require Monthly Verification in Accordance with TS SR 4.7.A.2.Caused by Inadequate Review of Procedure Rev. Surveillance Revised to Ensure to Continued Compliance1999-05-12012 May 1999
- on 970715,three Spare Valves Were Determined to Require Monthly Verification in Accordance with TS SR 4.7.A.2.Caused by Inadequate Review of Procedure Rev. Surveillance Revised to Ensure to Continued Compliance
SVP-99-102, Summary Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed, Covering Period 990201-0430. with1999-04-30030 April 1999 Summary Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed, Covering Period 990201-0430. with SVP-99-104, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206N2821999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20205Q5291999-04-16016 April 1999 SER Concluding That Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1,can Be Safely Operated for Next Fuel Cycle with Weld O2BS-F4 in Current Condition Because Structural Integrity of Weld Will Be Maintained ML20205J6011999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Merger of Calenergy Co, Inc & Midamerican Holdings Co for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 SVP-99-071, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205N7491999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20206B1901999-03-31031 March 1999 First Quarter Rept of Completed Changes,Tests & Experiments Per 10CFR50.59 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. with ML20205F4791999-03-31031 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 187 & 184 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20205D4171999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 186 & 183 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20205C5671999-03-19019 March 1999 Simulator Four-Yr Certification Rept ML20204D9751999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 185 & 182 to Licenses DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively ML20207D2341999-03-0101 March 1999 Post Outage (90 Day) Summary Rept, for ISI Exams & Repair/Replacement Activities Conducted 981207-1205 ML20204B1571999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Quad Cities,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207M6921999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20207E9311999-02-26026 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Sprague Model TE1302 Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitors with Date Code of 9322H.Caused by Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitors.Affected Capacitors Replaced SVP-99-021, Quarterly Summary SER of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed, Covering Period of 981101-990131,IAW 10CFR50.59 & 10CFR50.71(e).With1999-01-31031 January 1999 Quarterly Summary SER of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed, Covering Period of 981101-990131,IAW 10CFR50.59 & 10CFR50.71(e).With ML20199M0891999-01-22022 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Square Root Converters.Caused by Failed Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitory Spargue Electric Co (Model Number TE1302 with Mfg Date Code 9322H).Sent Square Root Converters Back to Mfg,Barker Microfarads,Inc ML20199C8951998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Dnps,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20199D3261998-12-31031 December 1998 10CFR50.59 SER for 1998-04 Quarter, of Changes,Tests & Experiments.With ML20205M7061998-12-31031 December 1998 Unicom Corp 1998 Summary Annual Rept. with ML20205D1311998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Decommissioning Funding Status Rept for Yr Ending 981231 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REGARDING CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR SAFETY FACTORS F03 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK RESTRAI)(Li CDPtiONWEALTH EDISDN COMPANY.AND I
MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3 OVAD CITIEL h E EAR POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET N05. 50-237. 50-249. 50-254 AND 50-265
1.0 BACKGROUND
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed), the licensee of Dresden and Quad Cities nuclear power plants, stated in a document dated August 23, 1996, that a safety factor of two for concrete expansion anchors was used in the original design of the high energy pipe whip restraints at Quad Cities Nuclear Power plant. Although the document does not mention Dresden by name, it is understood that the issue also applies to Dresden. Comed also stated that it had used a minimum safety factor of four for the design of new concrete expansion anchors for high energy pipe whip restraints since the issuance of the NRC IE Bulletin 79-02, " Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts," (Bulletin) which requires a minimum safety factor of four for concrete expansion anchors.
However, the licensee did not upgrade or re-evaluate those concrete expansion anchors for hinh energy pi>e whip restraints which were designed and installed prior to the issuance of tie Bulletin. Comed provided its reasons for not upgrading or re-evaluating those anchors as follows: (1) the Bulletin specifically addresses the safety factor of concrete expansion anchors for safety related pipe su) ports only, and does not address the safety factor of concrete expansion anciors for other types of applications, such as high energy pipe whip restraints, (2) the loading condition on high energy pipe wipe restraints is equivalert to a faulted loading condition and, therefore, a safety factor of two for cencrete expansion anchors is consistent with that of the structural steel and concrete design under similar loading conditions, and (3) the NRC allows a safety factor of two for wedge type concrete exnnnsion anchors to be used as operability criteria for safety related pipe supports at Quad Cities, and this justifies the use of a safety factor of two for concrete expansion anchors for high onergy pipe whip restraints because they are ENCLOSURE
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subjected to a one-time accident load only, which is similar to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake load for the safety related pipe supports.
In addition to the above three reasons, the licensee indicated that the actual forces expected at the high energy pipe whip restraints would be less than those calculated for the design of concrete expansion anchors and, therefore, provide an additional margin of safety for the concrete expansion anchors.
-The licensee listed sources for which the calculated forces at the restraints were greater than the actual forces. These conservatisms included:
1 the forces at the high energy pipe whip restraints were calculated assumin(g)that the pipe break was'an instantaneous phenomenon which resulted in very large pipe break loads at the restraints rather than the actual pipe condition of leakage before the break which would result in much smaller loads at the restraints, (2) the pipe whis restraint forces were calculated by simple linear analysis techniques wiich resulted ic larger forces than the more realistic forces had the more rigorous nonlinear analysis techniques been used. (3) the pipe wall will deform locally when it breaks and this deformation will absorb energy and reduce the pipe whip restraint force - this phenomenon was ignored in the calculations of pipe break and pipe whip restraint forces, (4) many relatively low pressure / temperature high energy lines with smaller diameters-can be shown to be unable to cause a pipe whip, and (5) NRC Generic Letter (GL) 87-11, ' Relaxation in Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Rupture Requirements" would allow elimination of a significant number of the arbitrary intermediate breaks and, thus, a large number of high energy pipe whip restraints are no longer required.
The licensee argued that the safety factor of two for concrete expansion anchors for high energy pipe whip restraints should be acceptable because no licensing commitment on the safety factor for concrete expansion anchors for high energy pipe whip restraints was made for Quad Cities, and because of the technical reasons and discussions presented above.
2.0 U ALUATION AND DISCUSSION The staff commends the licensee's action for using the safety factor of four for designing its concrete expansi n anchors for high energy pipe whip after the issuance of the Bulletin, alti., A it believed that a safety factor of two should be adequate. The staff agrec with the licensee that the Bulletin specifically addressed the concrete expansion anchors for safety related pipe supports, as the title of the Bulletin stated. Since many safety related pipe supports had used concrete expansion anchors, and the staff was not aware that concrete expansion anchors were also used for high energy pipe whip restraints at the writing of the Bulletin, the title of the Bullet'n addressed pipe supports only.
However, it has been the staff's position that the requirements in the Bulletin are acceptable for concrete expansion anchor design in all types of supports for safety-related piping or equipment.
The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the Quad Cities and
-Dresden Station-in Section-3.8.4.6, " Concrete-Expansion Anchors", states; "A mixture of wedge-and self-drilling-type concreta expansion anchors have been
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used in safety-related areas (at Quad Cities Units 1 and 2). TLe minimum embedmont depth for wedge type expansion anchors is *-1/2 anchor diameters.
Self-drilling anchors were predominately used prior to 1977. All concrete expansion anchors were specified to be installed in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations."
This implies that all expansion anchors were installed in accord 6nce with manufacturer's recommendations.
In a conference call on June 19,1997, the licensee stated they did not follow the manufacturer's recommendations for j
high energy pipe whip restraints.
The licensee also stated that Section 3.8.4.6 is nearly word-for-word their response to NRC IE Bulletin 79-02.and that Section 3.8.4.6 applies only for pipe supports as addressed in the Bulletin. However, the UFSAR is silent with respect to the fact that i
Section 3.8.4.6 is only for pipe sup> orts covered by the Bulletin and not other concrete expansion anchors suci as those used for the high energy pipe whip restraints.
While the staff agrees with the licensee's assertion that the loading condition on high ener y pipe whip is equivalent to a faulted loading condition, the staff d sagrees with the licensee's statement that a safety factor of two for concrete expansion anchors was consistent with that of structural steel and concrete design under similar loading conditions. This is because the safety factor used in the structural steel and concrete vesign has a different meaning or definition from that of concrete expansion anchors.
This difference is explained below.
Steel is usually designed to fail in tension. Tensile yield stress is usually specified as a limit in structural steel design. Concrete is usually designed to fail in crushing. Compressive strength (crushing stress or strain) is usually specified as a limit in concrete design. The allowable stress for 4
steel and concrete for Category I structures during normal operating conditions, including Operating Basis Earthquake or wind, are set at about one-half of the steel yield stress and concrete crushing stress. Therefore, if the safety factor is defined by the ratio of failure stresses-(yield in steel and crushing in concrete) to stresses at plant operating condition, it can be said that Category I structures posses a safety factor of roughly two
. to allow mainly for extreme loading conditions, such as Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) or tornado loads. The yield stress of steel and compressive strength of concrete materials are usually obtained in a quite reliable manner, especially in nuclear construction where quality control and quality assurance programs are required. Therefore, the safety factor of two is quite reliable and, thus, judged to be adequate.
However, the failure load of concrete expansion anchors can not be precisely i
and reliably predicted due to many factors.
Concrete expansion anchors are used to resist tensile or/and shear forces at an anchcrage. The tensile force of a wedge type concrete expansion anchor depends on the friction force between the steel bolt and surrounding concrete. This type of frictional force is-influenced by the type of aggregate, especially its hardness =, used in concrete, and the-degree of compaction of concrete around the steel bolt.
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This kind of influence on anchor capacity is difficult to address in practice, and has been ignored by bolt manulacturers in their catalogs and by design engineers in their calculations. The tensile capacity of a concrete expansion anchor is reduced by concrete cracking near the wit,.and the amount of reduction depends on the size, length, location.-and amount of concrete cracking.
Concrete cracking in the future is difficult to predict, especially as to the size, length, location, and the amount of cracking. The individual tensile capacity of concrete expansion anchors in an anchorage is also reduced if the steel bolts are closely spaced, and the amount of reduction depends on the spacing of the bolts. The same kind of influence and reduction also applies to the shear capacity of concrete expansion anchors although to a lesser degree.
Safety factor in concrete expansion anchors was introduced to allow for variations in aggregates hardness, concrete compaction around the steel bolts, bolt embedmont length between specification and actual installation, and concrete strength between specification and actual condition, for possible future concrete cracking, for bolt spacing effect, and other effects, such as dynamic loading. Major anchor manufacturers, such as Hilti, Inc., have chosen one fourth of the tensile and shear load capacities from a single boit embedded in concrete with no cracking and pulled by a static loading device at their laboratories as the allowable loads.
Therefore, the 1/4 of the test capacities, or conversely the safety factor of four, simply reflects the need for covering the many,ariabla physical conditions that may reduce the anchor capacity in the field from its test value in an " ideal" condition. The meaning of safety factor in concrete expansion anchors-is not to provide allowance for extreme loading conditions, such as SSE or tornado loads or the faulted loaj condition as indicated by the licensee.
The licensee has used the NRC allowance for a r.afety factor of two as operability criteria for safety related pipe sLpports at Quad Cities as a technical justification for the adequacy of using the safety factor of two for concrete expansion anchors for high energy pire whip restraints on a permanent basis. The licensee has misinterpreted the latent of the NRC allowance for the operability criteria. The provision of an operability criteria is intended to provide the licensee an opportunity to fix or upgrade those anchors meeting operability criteria by the next refueling outage for non-accessible supports. Meeting operability criteria does not mean those anchors are technically sound on a permanent basis, as the licensee indicated.
With respect to the first three sources listed by the licensee that could potentially reduce the anchor loading for the high energy pipe whip restraints, the staff recommends that the licensee perform the analysis to establish the new anchor loads.
If the total reduction of anchor loads from these analyses can be shown to be equal or more than one half of their original values, then this would be equivalent to increasing the safety factor from two to four. However, statements alone without analyses can not justify the acceptance of the safety factor of two. With respect to the rest of the sources listed by the licensee that could eliminate many high energy pipe whip restraints for consideration or evaluation, the staff-encourages the licensee to do so.
For those anchors the licensee can not eliminate, they need to be
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i l upgraded to meet the manufacturer's recommendations. The staff does accost t se criteria listed in the Bulletin for the use of concrete expansion anciors for high energy pipe whip restraints. The anchorage criteria in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP, Revision 2, for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 develo) ped by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group and approved by the staff is also acceptable.
3.0 CONCLUSION
The UFSAR fur both Quad Cities and Dresden indicates that all concrete expansion anchors were installed in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations; however, the licensee said the high energy pipe whip restraint concrete expansion anchors were not installed in accordance with manufacturer's reconnendations.
Comed stated that it designed its new concrete expansion anchors for high' energy pipe whip restraints with a safety factor of four after the issuance of the Balletin, but believed that the criginal design with a safety factor of two prior to the issuance of the Bulletin should also be acceptable. The licensee submitted its technical arguments. The staff has reviewed the submittal and does not agree with the licensee's technical arguments as stated above.
The licensee must meet the manufacturers recommendations to confonn to the UFSAR. The criteria for concrete expansion anchors in Bulletin 79-02 and GIP, Revision 2, are both acceptable for meeting these recommendations for high energy pipe whip restraints; and the staff has determined that the licensee could perform additional analyses and/or upgrade its anchor capacity for high energy pipe whip restraints. The licensee should provide a schedule as to when they will either conform to the UFSAR, complete the calculations for their additional analyses or complete the anchorage capacity upgrade.
Principal Contributors:
J. Ma R. Pulsifer Date: July 23, 1997
,