ML20138K947

Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting 850510 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.3 Re Design for Automatic Actuation of Reactor Trip Breaker Shunt Trip Attachments.Proposed Tech Specs Requested,Per Generic Ltr 85-09

ML20138K947
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/09/1985
From:	NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20138K908	List: ML20138K904 ML20138K947
References
GL-83-28, GL-85-09, GL-85-9, NUDOCS 8510310087
Download: ML20138K947 (3)

Text

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SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION BEAVER VALLEY UNIT l-GENERIC LtliER 83-28, ITEM 4.3 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER. AUTOMATIC IRIP l

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INTRODUCTION Generic Letter 83-28 was issued by NRC on July 8,1983, indicating actions to  ;

be taken by licensees based on the generic implication of the Salem ATWS '

events. Item 4.3 of the generic letter requires that modifications be made to l improve the reliability of the reactor trip system by implementation of an o automatic actuation of the shunt attachment on the reactor trip breakers.

Subsequent to the review of the licensee's submittal, the staff issued a safety evaluation report indicating the acceptable and unacceptable aspects of the design and requested the licensee to resubmit it for the staff's approval. By letters dated January 14 May 10 and September 3,1985 the licensee provided -

additional and revised information in response to the staff's November 8, -

1924 Safety Evaluation.

s The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed design for the automatic actua-tion of the reactor trip breaker shunt trip attachments and fir.ds it acceptable. The licensee intends to implement the modification during the fifth refueling outage.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The staff identified the following concerns in its Safety Evaluation of Beaver Valley 1 issued on November 8,1984 (The item numbers referred to are keyed to

'this report).

(a) Submission of revised electrical schematics showing provision of bypass breaker position status lights on the main control board as noted in item 1.

The licensee has agreed to revise the design for this modification to include the provision of status indication lights in the control room for the bypass breakers. However, the position indicating lights for the bypass breakers were not interlocked with breaker cell switches. The basis for interlocking the indicating lights through the cell switch is: the lights should indicate only when the bypass breaker is in " Operate" position. These lights should not ina.cate when the bypass breaker is " racked out" or in " test" position. By letter dated September 3,1985, the licensee has agreed to interlock the position indicating lights through the cell switches. We find this commit-ment to be acceptable.

8510310087 851009 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P PDR

q (b) Confirmation that shunt trip components have been seismically qualified as noted in item 6.

The licensee has received the WOG Equipment Qualification Test Report but has not reviewed whether it is applicable to BVPS-1 design. W will address this issue in a future supplement.  ;

(c) Confirmation that testing of bypass breaker shunt trip attachments will be perfonned as noted in item 10.

The licensee notes that the procedures "have been revised to test the shunt trip attachment of the bypass breaker with the breaker in the test position, via the local trip pushbutton prior to closing for reactor trip breaker testing." We find this acceptable.

(d) Confirmation that bypass breaker testing will demonstrate proper operation of control board bypass position indication as identified in item 11.

The licensee will revise the bimonthly tests and the startup manual reactor '.

trip test to verify the proper operation of the bypass breaker position indicating lights. We find this commitment to be acceptable.

(e) Submission of proposed technical specifications noted in items 10 and 13, following implementation of this modification.

The licensee proposed a revision to the technical specifications Table 4.3-1,

'" Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements" which were responsive to the staff requirements noted in its Safety Evaluatien of November 8,1984. The staff has found that the proposed Technical Specifications address independent testing of the undervoltage and the shunt trip attachments during power operation for reactor trip breakers, and independent testing of the control room manual switch contacts during each refueling outage. The proposed Technical Specifications do not address testing of the automatic undervoltage trip at refueling outage frequency for reactor trip bypass

• breakers. The tests are necessary to ensure reliable reactor trip breaker w . operation. Generic Letter 85-09 which was sent to the licensee on May 23, 1985, provided the additional guidance.

CONCLUSION The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal of May 10, 1985 and notes that the proposed technical specifications address independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments during power operation for reactor trip breakers and independent testing of the control room manual switch contacts during each refueling outage. However, the licensee should submit proposed technical specifications for the testing of the automatic undervoltage trip at refueling outage frequency for bypass breakers as outlined in Generic Letter 85-09. In addition, seismic qualification of shunt trip components is an issue that needs to be resolved.

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Principal Contributors:

J. Basurto N. Trehan Dated:

October,1985 k

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