ML20134L653
| ML20134L653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1996 |
| From: | Evans A Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#496-18048 95-710-01-REN, 95-710-1-REN, REN, NUDOCS 9611210123 | |
| Download: ML20134L653 (22) | |
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. 1 966 "o
- DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA % trov 13 All *.10 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIMISSION i A'1VMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE Cr SECRETARY DOCKEItNG & SERVICE Before Administrative Judges:
BRANCH '
1 Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kline Dr. Peter S. Lam
)
In the Matter of: )
)
GEORGIA INSTITUTE )
OF TECHNOLOGY ) Docket No. 50-160-Ren
)
Atlanta, Georgia ) ASLBP NO. 95-710-01-Ren
)
Georgia Tech Research )
Reactor )
)
Renewal of License No. R-97 )
)
THE GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY'S REPLY TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF (1) GANE, AND (2) THE NRC STAFF MICHAEL J. BOWERS Attorney General DENNIS R. DUNN Senior Assistant Attorney General ALFRED L. EVANS, SR.
Senior Assistant Attorney General PLEASE ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO:
ALFRED L. EVANS, JR.
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
232 Judicial Building Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300 (404) 656-3389 e
9611210123 961113 PDR 0
ADOCK 05000160 PDR 393 2
ft.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l NUCLEAR REGULATORY CODMISSION l l ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ,
1 Before Administrative Judges:
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kline Dr. Peter S. Lam
)
In the Matter of: )
)
GEORGIA INSTITUTE )
OF TECHNOLOGY ) Docket No. 50-160-Ren
)
Atlanta, Georgia ) ASLBP NO. 95-710-01-Ren
)
Georgia Tech Research )
Reactor )
) l Renewal of License No. R-97 ) )
)
THE GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY'S REPLY TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF (1) GANE. AND (2) THE NRC STAFF L.
GANE In prefatory comment to its Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, the Georgia Institute of Technology set forth its view (immediately before launching into the 68 pages of those proposed findings and conclusions), that in light of the ultimate facts in the case being entirely undisputed, the detailed findings of fact it was presenting to the Board were really quite unnecessary to the Board's decision. Id. , at pp .
iii to xii. Georgia Tech premised its position upon what the
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l ultimate issue alleged by GANE was, this being the measuring l 1
rod upon which the substantive merits of GANE's intervention necessarily depended. Plain and simple, this ultimate and controlling issue ia whether: "the management problems at GTRR are so great the public safety can not be assured. " It was the unifarm testimony of all thirteen expert witnesses testifying on the point, including the two expen witnesses profered by GANE, that GANE's assertion was without merit. Since the uniform expert testimony on this
- the ultimate and dispositive question was not contradicted by any expert opinion to the contrary, it is, under customary rules of the law of evidence, legally binding upon a judicial or quasi-judicial fact-finding body as this honorable Board.
The rules of evidence involved are, as we pointed out in the preface to our proposed " findings," threefold:
(1) A party (here GANE) who proffers witnesses (here Copcutt and Boyd) is bound by the testimony of those witnesses save in extraordinary circumstances which are nowise involved in this case. See , p . xi .
(2) Positive testimony as to a particular fact, where it is as here uncontroverted, cannot properly be disregarded or rejected by the " fact-finder "
Here we have thirteen expert witnesses (including I
those called by GANE) saying the same thing about the same ultimate issue. Id. , at p . xi .
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5 (3) Public officials (as Dr. Karam) enjoy a rebuttable presumption of their performing their official duties (here operation of the reactor in a manner which safeguards public health and safety) in a proper manner, a presumption which has not been rebutted in this case by any evidence to the contrary. Id. , a t p . xii .
We respectfully submit that the ouroorted " Proposed Findings of Fact" which GANE has since filed but reinforces the correctness of our position that the unanimity of expert opinion on the ultimate question GANE presents obviates the need for any detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
GANE's submission continued to fail to set forth anyfactual evidence which in any way controverts or contradicts the uniform opinion of the thirteen experts testifying on the matter--including the two experts proffered by GANE itself.
Indeed, GANE's purported " Proposed Findings of Fact" are really not " findings of fact" at all in the ordinary sense of numbered paragraphs setting forth contended evidentiary " facts" of record supported by record references. It is essentially more of the same unsupported and subjective perceptions, feelings, contentions and argument which we have heard all along. To illustrate, GANE states at p. 2:
"It is our contention, stillstrongly held, that management at Georgia Tech does not offer the public the highest level of protection to which wefeel they are rightly entitled." (Emphasis added).
A " contention" no matter how "strongly held," and no matter how one may " feel" about it, is not even remotely an evidentiary fact of record as is supposed to be the subject of proposed
" findings of fact."
The same is true with respect to the " management structure" which GANE informs us has caused it " trepidation," namely the Manager of the Office.of Radiation Safety reporting to the Director of the facility rather than to some one higher.up in the management structure. Id. , at p . 3 . We are told that this
" provokes more concern and uncertainty" on GANE's part. Id. , at
- p. 3.
. While GANE points to the unremarkable fact that experts associated with Health Physics orefer an organization where they have more operational independence (does this really come as a' monumental surprise?), GANE in no way negates, contradicts, or controverts the uniform testimony of. all of these experts (including the two proffered by GANE), that their preference is n2L to be equated with'an opinion or belief that there " preference" goes to the safe operation of Georgia Tech's reactor under the differing structural organization which it, along with various other research reactors, uses. In sum, GANE's so-called " Proposed Findings of Fact," etc. do not live up to their title. They are not what could by any stretch of the imagination reasonably be considered to be the " Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" called for by this Honorable Board in.its Memorandum and Order" of July 3, 1996.
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For all.of the reasons stated here and in our previously filed proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law we respectfully l submit that GANE's submission is of no moment and should be discounted entirely. "
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II NRC STAFF The NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are a model of thoroughness, accuracy, and ;
professionalism. We agree with the Staff's " findings" in all material respects, and certainly we agree with the ultimate conclusions of law the Staf f has drawn from these facts, in toto.
We would not, on the other hand, want to convey the impression that out agreement and indeed admiration of the Staff's submission is sans critical review, and but a visceral i i
response or a proforma stamp of approval, simply because we l like the end result. We have reviewed the Staff's presentation in detail. As would reasonably be expected in 150 pages dealing with very complex matters, we do find two points (extraordinarily few given this complexity and the mass of materials covered), where we believe that some clarification or modification is appropriate in order to prevent a hurried or less critical reading resulting in a misunderstanding, or in j the possibile drawing of erroneous inferences, from the wording l
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1 of the proposed " findings" of the Staff. We do wish to emphasize that both matters are right trivial. Both relate to events in 1987 and 1988 and have nothing at all to do with l GTRR's post-restart operations from November 1988 to date. We simply thought that it nonetheless might not be amiss to mention the two problem areas briefly en passant.
- 1. Was the cadmium contamination air-borne and widespread?
The NRC Staff's review of the cadmium 115 spill which
-occurred at GTRR in August 1987 is thoroughly detailed at pp.
46 to 58 of its " findings." As to the spill itself, the Staff did not dispute, but rather agrees with, GTRR's contemporaneous assessment that as spills go it was a relative minor occurence, not of that level of severity to cause it to have been a
" reportable" event under either Licensee Technical j Specifications or federal regulations. hi, at p. 58. As the Staff's " findings" make clear, the real problem was not the spill perse, but what it revealed respecting inadequacies and deficiencies at GTRR involving:
"Both operational and health physics issues related to the pre-experiment review and calculation of dose rate 1 levels for the topaz and cadmium container, as well as l health physics issues related to post-accident i radiation surveys and evaluation of personal !
exposures." hi, at p. 49; see also, pp. 50-53. I Georgia Tech agrees with the NRC Staff's assessment of what the problems were at GTRR before, at the time of, and following the spill in August 1987 up until the January and March 1988 " shut down" orders.
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1 The one aspect which we believe merits clarification-does l
.not in any way relate to the Staff's overall analysis and j j assessment of the critical facts of the matter. What it does ;
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have to do with is a memo of one of the disgruntled radiation j l
safety technicians implying that the contamination from the -
- August 1987 Cadmium spill had become air-borne and widespread l j throughout the containment building. It is the Sharpe Memo.
Id. , at pp 4 7 - 4 8 . Dr. Karam, along with his Assistant Director ;
{ (McDowell) subsequently.came to question both the accuracy and I
l truthfulness of this " inference" by a very hostile radiation j safety technician of widespread air-borne contamination. For a i number of reasons satisfactory to them, they concluded that i
Sharpe had inaccurately, and quite probably deliberately (given i the level of hostility on the part of the HP staff, including I 1
Sharpe, towards GTRR generally and Dr. Karam in particular
- during the summer and fall of 1987 following "reorganizaton"), )
e j attempted to magnify the seriousness of the spill by making it I j appear that it had become (1) air-borne, and (2) widespread
! throughout the containment building.
j The precise point of our clarity question has to do with
! the wording of a sentence which we assume relates solely to the Staff's own evaluation about the reliability and accuracy of i
the Sharpe Memo, which differs from that of Dr. Karam. The sentence in question reads:
, "Thus, absent any other documentation, there does not i
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appear to be any convincing reason to doubt the :
accuracy or reliability of Mr. Sharpe's memorandum." I
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. 1 We would quite agree that in a courtroom sense there is no ,
1 conclusive evidence either May on the matter. It may also well i be that " convincing reason," like " beauty," lies in the eyes of the beholder. Nor do we in any way suggest that the NRC Staff could not reasonably reach the conclusion it did reach on the j matter, i. e. that it saw no " convincing reason" to doubt the accuracy or reliability of Mr. Sharpe's Memorandum. The l problem we see in the wording of the sentence as it presently i exists is that it could readily suggest, or raise an inference,
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that Dr. Karam 's contrary evaluation was any less predicated on a reasonable basis than that of the NRC Staff. While we don't want to be straining at the obvious, certainly Dr. Karam ;
i had a very reasonable basis for arriving at hia opinion l
notwithstanding the fact that others (including the NRC Staff) ]
l might with reason and logic come to a contrary view. The following are some of the reasonable bases for Dr. Karam's opinion that the Sharpe Memo's inference of widespread I air-borne contamination was erroneous and probably knowingly 1 false:
- 1. First of all, the decomposed cadmium involved in the spill was granular in substance, not the sort of dust or fine l i
powder likely to float in the air. Kamm, Tr. 3425. The l l
weight of the particles, coupled with the laws of gravity, would have caused them to drop, not float in the air. Karam, Tr. 3425, 3465. The Staff's reference to Dr. Karam having recognized the possibility of transportation by air from the
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top of the reactor to the floor below (Staff " findings" at p.
56), while technically. accurate is rather misleading in its import if it is suggesting that the fact that something which j- can be pushed horizonally by air currents is the same as saying l it.is' air-borne. A tennis ball placed at the top of the reactor would doubtless have been pushed over the edge by air currents and would drop to the floor below. This does not mean d
that the tennis ball is " air-borne" in the sense of having the ability to float elsewhere within the containment building. We believe that Dr. Karam's testimony on the point is perfectly i clear. At p. 3425 of the transcript, he referred to the fact that Mr. Downs was opening the can right at or near the edge of 5
the top of the reactor, and that since the material in it was granular, when he poured it out some of the grains may have
! -indeed fallen on the floor below the reactor. As he said in response to a question about the possibility of "some air current" transporting particles down to the floor (Tr. 3465),
was that the consensus at ti.at point in time was that how the particles reached the floor below the reactor could have been a combination of the two, i.e., particles falling directly down upon the floor and other particles on the top of the reactor being " pushed" by the flow of the ventilation over top of the reactor down to the floor below. None of this, of course, even remotely suggests that the cadmium particles were air-borne in the sense of floating in the air to other points in the containment building.
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- 2. This likelihood of the adherence of the particules of '
disintegrated cadmium to the laws of gravity is supported by the location of the contamination from the spill as shown by the Daily Masslinn surveys, See GT-11. These surveys showed that the contamination from the spill of the particles, as one might reasonable anticipate, was confined to an extremely small
- area in the containment building which was immediately adjacent l I
to the reactor. Karam Tr. 2723 Insert, p. 40.
- 3. .In addition, neither subsequent August 1987 Masslin surveys of the containment building nor of any of the daily air sample analyses taken at a nearby point (i.e. 15 feet away on the floor below from the reactor) ever reflected so much as a trace of contamination See GT-11.
- 4. While the HP unit had made the Sharp Memo (which implied widespread contamination) available to the NRC :
Inspector (Mr. Kuzo) during the December 1987 inspection, as Dr. Karam found out later during a January 1988 enforcement conference, the August Masslinn survey report showing the contamination to be limited to the small area adjacent to the reactor) had been withheld by the HP Unit from the NRC. Kuzo, Tr. 1881-1882. Director Karam would have to have been oblivious to the world around him if he did not wonder why the contemporaneous survey report had been withheld by the HP Unit from NRC.
- 5. Upon finding out about the withholding of the Masslinn survey from NRC by the HP Unit (and furnishing the report to 10 -
e NRC) Dr. Karam initiated an investigation. In view of the 453-day half-life of certain cadmium isotopes, Dr. Karam knew that had the contamination been air-borne and widespread as the Sharpe Memo implied, there would likely have been some traces in the ventilation system. He had dead air spaces in the ducts examined. This included a louvered air intake only a few feet from where the particles had fallen. There were also cut-outs of air filter samples. There were no traces whatsoever of the contamination which one would reasonably have thought would have been uncovered had the contamination really been air-borne and widespread as Sharpe had implied. Karam Tr. 3207-3209, 3468-3470. Dr. Karam is a well recognized expert in nuclear engineering, including nuclear safety, and his opinion as to what is more likely or less likely to occur in an area where no conclusive proof is possible either way is entitled to considerable weight.
- 6. Finally, it appears that some of the facts which Dr.
Karam considered in his assessment may not have been weighed the same by the NRC Staff. This is seen, for example, in the consideration which the Staff gives to the fact that Geiger Counters produce audible clicking sounds to indicate the presence of contamination, thereby suggesting that the three members of the HP staff would have readily known (from the absence of the clicking) if they were engaged in decontamination efforts in areas which were not contaminated.
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o With all due respect this seems at least a little bit naive i given the volatility of the situation which existed concerning the HP staff, particularly in the time period following the July 1987 reorganization. Dr. Betty Revsin, while conducting and NRC investigation of GTRR the preceding April, indicated to 1
] Dr. Karam that the level of animosity between the operations T
staff and radiation safety technicians had reached the point where she~thcught that the HP Unit, or at least some of-its members, actually wanted to close down the facility. Kanun,
- Tr. 2723, Insert, p. 23. Certainly, the HP Unit's giving NRC the Sharpe Memo (implying widespread air-borne contamination) and withholding the contrary survey information, would have j been more helpful than harmful to the agenda of the three
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' unhappy employees of at least embarrassing Dr. Karam and the facility before NRC, if not closing it down. This overriding fact of a " sense of the situation" to which the NRC Staff
- appears to have given little or no weight, and perhaps did not understand fully would, we would suggest,.have been a highly compelling reason, when viewed along with the other known facts i- .noted, to have led Dr. Karam to a very well reasoned conclusion i
-of his own the Sharpe Memo having been more likely than not knowingly false.
i In sum, while of no particular relevance to the overall j situation, we would think that the sentence in question should I be modified so as to clarify that.the NRC Staff's perception that there did not appear to be "any convincing reason" to l
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doubt the accuracy or reliability of the Sharp memo was reflective solely of NRC's own, perhaps equally reasonable assessment, and in no way to be taken as an inference or suggestion that Dr. Karam's basis for reaching his contrary opinion was without any reasonable basis.
- 2. The district courts' order Millspaugh v. Karam.
There is hidden danger in the NRC Staff's review, at pp.
65-66 of its " findings," of the litigation brought by Messrs.
Millspaugh and Sharpe against Dr. Karam on February 17, 1988 (to which Dr. Stelson was subsequently added as a party defendant by plaintiffs). The danger is that without giving close heed to the technical niceties and distinction between such words of art as " termination" and " removal," one could easily and erroneously draw the conclusion that in that litigation the United States distinct covet determined that the remowzl of the two technicians from their erstwhile positions at GTRR via lateral transfer to other positions at Georgia Tech, i the personnel action which actually occurred, was " retaliatory" l
for their having informed NRC during a December, 1987 l inspection, about the Cadmium spill the preceeding August. The district court, of course, made no such finding or determination.
The key to the clarification necessary to preclude misinterpretation or erroneous inference starts with paragraph 2.2.9.8 on p. 65 of the NRC Staff's proposed findings: b f
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, "On February 11, 1988, Dr. Karam handed l l letters of tennination to the two health l l physics technicians, Paul Sharp and Steven !
Millspaugh, effective February 25, 1988. l j Three days later; however, following ;
discussions with-counsel [who had concerns !
i about the niceties of procedural"due i process") Dr. Stelson rescinded the .
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termination notices, pending a hearing; and the HP technicians were thereafter
- reassigned to other duties outside the ;
l NRC." [ Emphasis and bracketed matter added). )
4 With recision of the termination having come so quickly
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! upon its notice, and long before its effective date of February. j
!. 25, 1988, the situation was found by the district court to'be -
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- "As a result of Dr. Stelson's letter, the
- Plaintiffs never were actually
- terminated from employment from Georgia Tech. Instead,
- they were initially placed in the Tech 1 1
personnel office and subsequently were t assigned to other jobs." See Order (Staff
! Exhibit 25), at p. 21.
It should be noted first of all'that these events concerning the rescinded terminations and the decision to make lateral
} transfers of Millespaugh and Sharpe to other positions at 1
' Georgia Tech occurred before suit was filed. The district
. . i court therefore carefully confined what it viewed to be L .
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- i. -" retaliatory" to the initial and quickly-rescinded (prior to 1 i
j its effective date) "tennlistion" decision, and not with respect 4 i to the removal of the two technicians from the GTRR via lateral i;
transfer - - the personnel action which was in fact carried . ,
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[ out. As the district-court put it:
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"The court finds that Plaintiffs' report of I the Cadmium spill to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors in December, 1987, ,
taken together with the negative publicity !
Georgia Tech received in January, 1988, was a j substantialfactor in the initial decision ofDr. Stelson to j tenninate the employment of Plaintfs. " order (Staff l Exhibit 25), p. 25. (Emphasis added).
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1 In noting that it was Dr. Stelson's initial and later aborted decision to " terminate" the plaintiffs which the Court thought !
l would not have been made but for the intervention of the l
reports of the Cadmium spill to NRC and the widespread negative publicity which Tech received in January and early February, 1988, the Court plainly removed Dr. Karam from involvement in the retaliation question when it noted that Dr. Karam had recommended termination of the entire unit on December 9, 1987, which was prior to the NRC inspection later that month, not to mention even longer before the announced results and l
consequences of that inspection which came in late January 1988, coupled with the media publicity in January and February, i
I 1988, hi, at 26.
The Court expressly concluded that the removal and lateral transfer which actually occurred would have happened had the NRC actions and media coverage of January and February, 1988 never occurred and hence could not be deemed to have been retaliatory. hl. at pp. 26-27. As the district court put it:
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"In summary, the court FINDS and DECLARES that the referenced activities of the Plaintiffs in December of 1987 and January of 1988 were speech l protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments l of the United States Constitution; that the i Defendants' initial decision to terminate l Plaintiffs' employment uvuld have violated Plaintifs' l rights, had it been implemented; however, the l Defendants' decision was retracted before it l became effective." (Emphasis added).
The district court did grant prophylactic relief respecting ,
retaliation against the two plaintiffs in their unw positions of employment at Georgia Tech following their removal from GTRR based upon their having initiated litigation, or in connection with their exercise of protected speech in their DEW Positions outside of GTRR. Moreover, this relief was directed not against Dr. Karam, but against Georgia Tech's ercLwhile vice-president, Dr. Stelson and all persons acting in concert with Dr. Stelson. Id. , at p . 2 8. Following their removal from l
GTRR Millspaugh and Sharpe, would not, of course, have been l subject to the supervision of, or the taking of any personnel action against them by Dr. Karam.
Actually, the prophylactic relief granted as to Dr. Stelson was entirely moot. Dr. Stelson had prior to the time of trial resigned from his position as Vice-President at the Georgia l l
Institute of Technology in order to accept a consulting l position in Hong Kong. It should be noted that being in l perfect agreement that any retaliation against Millspaugh and l
Sharpe in their new positions following their removal from GTRR i
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would have been highly improper, no objection was ever interposed to the district court's grant of this prophylactic only relief.
Finally, it appears from a footnote (i.e. #64) on p. 67 of the Staff's " findings," that it has some reservations concerning Dr. Karam's testimony that he and Dr. Stelson
" prevailed" in the litigation - -
something we had thought perfectly obvious from the fact that the relief sought by plaintiffs in bringing the suit (monetary damages and reinstatement) had been rejected by the district court intoto.
The comment that the litigation resulted in a judicial termination that retaliation had occurred is likewise not entirely accurate. The district court's finding, more precisely put, was that " retaliation" wouldhave occurred had the initial determination decision of Dr. Stelson not been rescinded in favor of removing the two technicians from GTRR via lateral transfers to other positions at Georgia Tech - - which is what happened. Id. at pp . 2 5 - 2 8 .
Perhaps a better word than " prevailed" would have been that the case was " won". It was plaintiffs Millspaugh and Sharpe who having lost in the district court appealed that lower courts' final decision and judgment to the Eleventh Circuit--which in turn affirmed the decision of the district court in favor of Drs. Karam and Stelson, among other things taxing costs against the losing parties, namely
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Plaintiffs-Appellants Millspaugh and Sharpe. See Staff Exhibit
- 26. Of. course, the very highest and best evidence, entirely unimpeachable, that Dr. Karam did'indeed win (i.e. " prevail")
is that upon going home that evening after receiving a copy of l 1 \
tiua district court's order, counsel opened a bottle of I
champagne. Counsel only opens a bottle of champagne when he wins. When he loses he is more inclined to drink black ink.
4 i CONCLUSION i'
For the reasons stated herein, the so-called "fi14 dings of j fact" and " conclusions of law" submitted by GANE (which are
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essentially mere expressions of fears, concerns and argument
, rather than an enumeration of facts of record), must be l
. discounted in its entirety because of its total failure to in any way controvert the uniform opinion of all thirteen experts
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addressing the matter (including two experts proffered by GANE) that GANE's position Board is without merit.
With respect to the proposed " findings of fact" and
" conclusions of law" of the NRC Staff, with the exception of the two picayune matters discussed herein (which are of no particular relevance in the big scheme of things anyway), we are in complete agreement with the Staff's detailed presentation of the facts and its conclusions of law. They are, as to the ultimate question before the Board, in complete
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accord with the uniform opinion of all of the experts testifying on the matter. Based upon the totality of the evidence, the Board should conclude and hold that there is no t
evidentiary basis to support GANE's " management contention",
its intervention should be dismissed, and the renewal of Georgia Tech's Operating Licence No. R-97, ought not be denied or further withheld based upon the matters presented and I adjudicated in this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted, 1 MICHAEL J. BOWERS 071650 Attorney General JEFF L. MILSTEEN 509820 Deputy Attorney General DENNIS R. DUNN 234098 i Senior Assistant Attorney General ALFR$b L. EVANS, JR. M 14'00 Senior Assistant Attorney General PLEASE ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO:
' ALFRED L. EVANS, JR.
40 Capitol Square Room 232 Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300 Telephone: (404) 656-3389 l
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, DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '96 NOV 13 All :10 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COBMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE CF 5,ECRE TARY DOCKEI!NC U RVICE Before Administrative Judges: BRAhCh Charles Bechhoefer, Chainnan Dr. Jerry R. Kline ;
Dr. Peter S. Lam l
)
In the Matter of )
)
GEORGIA INSTITUTE )
OF TECHNOLOGY ) Docket No. 50-160-Ren .
)
Atlanta, Georgia ) ASLBP NO. 95-710-01-Ren
)
Georgia Tech Research ) l Reactor ) l i
)
Renewal of License No. R-97 )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Reply to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law have been served upon the following persons by U.S. Mail, except as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirement of 10 C.F.R. Sec. 2.712:
Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Peter S. Lam Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Jerry R. Kline Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l l
Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. Randy A. Nordin, Esq.
Susan S. Chidakel, Esq. E. Gail Gunnells, Esq.
Office of the General Counsel Georgia Institute of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Technology Commission 400 10th Street l Washington, D.C. 20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30322 Glenn Carroll Of fice of the Secretary (2) l i Georgians Against Nuclear Attn: Docketing and Service l Energy Mail Stop: OWFN-16 G15 Post Office Box 8574 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Washington, D.C. 20555 Adjudicatory File (2) Dr. R.A. Karam l Atomic Safety and Licensing Neely Wuclear Research ;
Board Center Mail Stop: T-3 F23 900 Atlantic Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0425 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 This day of November, 1996.
/
f c
ALFRED L. EVANS, JR .' 7 Senior Assistant Attorney General