ML20115G448

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Intervenor Exhibit I-GANE-47,consisting of 880226 Minutes of President Crecine Address to General Facility
ML20115G448
Person / Time
Site: Neely Research Reactor
Issue date: 05/30/1996
From:
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
References
REN-I-GANE-047, REN-I-GANE-47, NUDOCS 9607190144
Download: ML20115G448 (6)


Text

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/8 1:0 Dr. Crecine began by relaying events in chronol 6%ElC~oiasEiTARY DJCKElfNG d SIWici i

He said that in March of 1987, Ga. Tech got a letter!fSo Fthe NRC that stated the NRC was concerned about safety at the reactor and the lack of management control.

t In response to that letter, a reorganization of the Neeley Center was proposed in May of 1987 by Dr.

Tom Stelson and Dr. Ratib Karam. In June of 1987, the reorganization was adopted with the intent to correct the following 2 areas:

1. The Reactor Safety Group before the reorganization this group reported directly to Dr. Stelson.

The NRC 's message was I

lack of management, and they wanted to fix that. It was aimed at The Reactor Safety Group - a 3 person group which reported to Dr.

Stelson. According to Dr. Stelson, this group had very little i

supervision and that's what the NRC meant by lack of management control.

2. To better define the separate reporting function of the Radiaticn Safety Committee. There was some confusion about the division of labor - under the new organization, the Radiation Safety Group reported to and was supervised by Dr. Karam as 1 of 4 subunite at the Center.

The radiation Safety group also had a reporting relationship a

new committee that was formed. The intent was to keep the channels of access open to the Radiation l

Safety Group and the intent was to keep the reporting channels the same.

The day to day supervision (budgets, etc.) were shifted to Karam under the new organization. Dr. Crecine said he had memos in his j

possession that s:ty that reporting issues to the President would remain the same as it was previously.

If there is a

safety

problem, The Radiation Safety Group functions as the " front-line watchdogs". There's is the day - to

-day responsibility. And under the new system, they were to go to the President as always;ho' wever, the normal way to deal with a i

problem would be to deal directly with line management-beginning with the PI or person doing the experiment and then move up the line if there is no response.

If the problem remains, then you go to the President.

Some confusion has arisen over this. The Manager of Radiation Safety Group did not feel he had the authority to go directly to the President.

Dr. Crecine said there is an obligation to go to him and that'there is a memo which says this.

Failure to tell those in authority is a dereliction of duty.

l "If the problem doesn't get dealt with within the university.

l then it's okay to go outside."

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No.

8 d -/ 6 0- 8.S A)

EXHIBIT No.

47 9607190144 960530 in the matter of MA L 1, DR ADOCK 0500 0

0 Staff O Applicant 94rftervenor O other Q12fentified [}fre'ceived O Rejected Reporter Gf m/

Date $/3 ch & Witness O

d t

Further, the reporting is simultaneous. There is no ambiguity in the memos he has seen. He doesn't understand where the Radiation Safety group got that idea (

that they couldn't go directly to him).

The objectives of the reorganization were

1) to Eliminate ambiguity
2) Better supervision of the Radiation Safety Group REACTIONS First, The representatives of the committee that was abolished were very upset. They charged that Radiation Safety had been down graded, and they now reported to a lower level.

Dr. Crecine Said " symbolically that might seem plausible" j.

Also, there was opposition on the basis that by the Radiation Safety Group reporting to a person who was operating experiments at the facility that this was like the fox guarding the henhouse".

Dr. Crecine's response to this, as an outsider, was "

Gee what's the worst thing that can happen to a Director of a Nuclear Center

- a reactor safety problem! Therefore, it's an integral part of his responsibility.

It's crazy to think that the Director would not be interested in safety.

Dr.

Karam has a

dual role. Dr.

Crecine acknowledged there could be a problem with Dr. Karam il l having the role of PI (on an experiment),

but as far as the l

overall mission, he sees no reason why Dr. Karam would be less concerned with safety than anyone else.

It makes sense to give

?

him more authority so he can exercise it over the Radiation Safety Group.

NOVEMBER :

He didn't think the reorganization was unusual on the i

surface, although the reaction was not uniformly favorable.

There was a

briefing in NOV and at that time he was told of unrest in the Reactor Safety Group. He was told that :

1. There were really bad relations between health physics and the operations people.

That didn't surprise him at all, because in ll the service roles such as secretaries.or the Physical Plant

'l employees, there is always a problem.

6 i

2. Graduate Students had animosity.

QUESTION OF QUALIFICATIONS l

He said "To be honest I was amazed to learn that only 2 of 3 l

people principally responsible for reactor safety had undergraduate

degrees, and their degrees were not directly i

related - they were not in' health physics. They were not even in i

areas where he thought they'd have an idea about health i

physics.

He acknowledged that it was superficial of him to think that say, j

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l So, when he was told about the disquiet in health l

physics / Radiation Safety. it seemed sensible to him to upgrade.

This would demonstrate a stronger management commitment.He said it seemed "not stupid" to upgrade.

His interpretation was "It wasn't foolish.

Then there was another discussion in December.

The desire to I

upgrade was discussed with members of the Radiation Safety Group

)

and was also discussed widely at the Neeley Research Center.

Dr. Karam and Dr.

Stelson 's thinking was that it would show a reaction to the NRC's criticism.

During, Oct., Nov., Dec. time period, because of the animosity, an industrial psychologist was brought in to work with the

problem, and see how to make it better.

The industrial psychologist gave a

confidential report.

His report was consistent with management's decision to upgrade.

So the decision was made to do that (to upgrade) in December.

Dick Fuller, Dr. Bourne, Dr.

Stelson, Dr.
Crecine, and maybe Dr.

Stevenson (he couldn't remember) met about this decision. They thought it was not a major issue, and should be done after the February 23 enforcement

hearing, or maybe be part of the

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presentation to the enforcement meeting on February 23.

They discussed REASSIGNMENT of the employees at that time.

JANUARY Tech got another letter from the NRC on January 20, 1988 that outlined additional concerns.

At-that time, with regard to the rebuilding, no one wanted to defer any longer.

Then came the newspaper report and TV interviews. The Reactor Safety Group had started going public and " it looked like their hands were tied"-

(with regard to upgrading). "IT looked like then the reassignments would be done by the book."

However, the reassignments were not done by the book." Events moved quickly."

The Director of Personnel was out of town in Germany. Tom Stelson was out of town, The supervisor issued the letter. It was "a Chinese Fire Drill". So the termination letters went out.

Dr. Crecine first saw the letter 3 days later.

He saw it was wrong and rescinded it. He decided to do what they wanted to do to begin with (reassign the e mployees ).

The firings were in violation of procedures, Dr. Crecine was not happy about it either publicly or privately.

He ha s taken lumps, and it's been costly.

REITERATE SAFETY He's not concerned that Tech has safety problems.

He close the

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l' reactor because of publicity and folks "trying to cover their own best interests".

He said it was not a condition for good safe activity and they couldn't resolve the real issues.

He wanted to take a

" time out",

" cool down" and

" sort out the situation under calmer times".

However, the rest of the world continued to " stir up" the issues.

The NRC grinds forward on, although forward is too strong a term.

His position is that this issue has to drive our actions. the other stuff is secondary. he believes, increasing the size of the reactor staff and improving the educational qualification and background is Tech's strongest move.

As for reporting access "Yes you have the right and the obligation to report safety problems to him".

The reassignment of employees : it has been done badly. Tech has been accused of firing the employees for whistle blowing. He wants to know "Who blew the whistle, -to whom, and to what about?

You have to have an issue to blow the whistle to someone.

The issue is absent. No one approached him.

He got a message today that Dr. Fuller gave him. It was a memo from Bob Boyd. That was the first time any concerns have been raised to him and it's being dealt with, by Dr. Karam and Dr.

Stelson.

He had heard nothing prior to today.

He thinks it's a " red herring". "If l

there was whistle-blowing and it wasn't simultaneously with Tech management, was that right?

What are the motives here? Were Tech's best interests in mind?"

The NRC is smothering the campus with investigations and interrogations.

There is a set of litigations.

C o mi..e n t s t )

you make can make you a subject of litigation _

have cauti when you talk to people-because it will show up in court."

Situation with Press He has set up a management group for press contacts. Dick Fuller heads and coordinates interviews, etc.

Refer inquiries to Dr.

Fuller.

Lessons learned 1.

He is still convinced it's a

political issue.

It's disappointing to him.

t

2. The reaction of health physicists has been strong. They have a t

sense of health physics as under siege.

They have reacted strongly and he is not sure why. They are declaring

" holy war" and sometimes that is self fulfilling.

Nuclear Engineering is involved.

There are seamy faculty politics.

His assessment is he doesn't like it. Administrators

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faculty and staff - all can share the blame - lots of people have f

l made mistakes.

Too few people thought about what was good for l

Ga. Tech, what was good for safety.

The situation has gotten

)

rapidly out of control.

He doesn't want his 1st year to be spent l

dealing with this situation.

It really is people trying to get i

at each other - people trying to get at each other through third parties.

There is animosity. We're doing it to ourselves.

Member of the Tech community should have the same objectives. This is not the way it's going to be-people trying to do each other in. There has been a lack of openness.

There has been a lack of willful initiative.

It is easy to pass the blame UP rather than share the responsibility.

It's a problem to work on.

It's been confined to a f ew areas of the university. It is not j

his management style. He likes initiative, likes locals to have initiative.

QUESTION AND ANSWERS 1.Dr. Eichole from NE.

He is disturbed that NE has not been consulted.

It is not unusual to have confrontations between those who run jobs and those who supervise.

There were 1

personality conflicts ( Crecine said he agreed

) There was no doubt about that.

Health Physics should be separate from Operations. The reorganization is counter to good practice.

The decision to put the budget under Karam should be reconsidered.

Dr. Crecine interjected the "the reorganization was an experiment that didn't work well".

Further, if we have a situation where a i

problem is not discussed through normal

channels, it's not possible for a committee to take on line responsibility.

As far as Down's contamination, there were faulty procedures, but in the i

view of the press they were linked buy should be separate.

The President said, "Yes there was a failure to follow adequate procedures, but after the incident

occurred, everyone behaved responsibly and took the right steps to prevent radiation exposure.

All parties, including the Reactor Safety Group the Committee Chairman, and the Neeley Director decided it was not serious enough to report to the NRC. As of this time, the NRC has not decided whether it was serious enough to report. The NRC is not as concerned with safety as they are lack of management controls.

To address this issue you can do several things:

l change structure, change personnel, change both.

He will change both.

If it were up to him alone, he would change the structure l

But form a historical dimension - have we run unsafely? NO.

now.

Is it unsafe now?

The worse thing they could do would be to knowingly run an unsafe reactor.

This issue was fueled by quotes from people at Ga.

Tech.

Our own people were saying it's not safe. So he decided to shut it down.

In answer to costs, etc.

they can't continue to incur PR costs.

l

2. Dr. Stacey (Director of NE School) i l

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He said Dr. Crecine should distinguish between reactor safety and radiation safety - that they are two entirely different issues.

If there was bad blood between NE and HP, he was not aware of it existing.

Health Physics was on the safety committee - no one of operators.

Crecine interjected "I thought there were 100 or so students at the Neeley Center.

It's not the purpose to name names." Dr. Stacey said he was aware of no animosity on behalf of those students.

NE Views (Dr. Stacey read a statement to the group)

Then the President went over the alternatives to be considered :

1.

restarting the reactor, 2.

delay starting until better controls are there and set up for use with lower fuels,

3. Sustain reactor operations,
4. decommission and dismantle.

May/ June will be the earliest restart date.

Political costs will continue to be incurred.

The political costs may outweigh the advantages.

Dr. Thomas Director of Physics stood up and said he had isotopes in

Physics, and who was he supposed to go to now? He didn't know." No one knew. The President looked around

- he looked at Bob Boyd, he looked at Bernd Kahn. Seconds passed. Finally, Dick Fuller, said I believe that's the committee. But he never did answer the question. Then the President said "Well you can see why we need to get this straight.There's definitely a problem" Dr. Thomas replied "I've never had the problem before - for 25 years I've known exactly who to go to and who to call.Now I don't."

ANNOUNCEMENT Dr.

Crecine is going to Europe.

He's appointing a

search committee for an executive Vice President.

Dr.

Stelson will be leaving in the future.

.