ML20129J561
| ML20129J561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1996 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129J553 | List: |
| References | |
| 95-704-01-REN, 95-704-1-REN, REN, NUDOCS 9611070011 | |
| Download: ML20129J561 (166) | |
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d 00CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '96 0CT 28 PS :22 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD;CE E "CRrMRY DOCKEI!HG LRVICE In the Matter of ) BF AEH
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GEORGIA INSTITUTE ) Docket No. 50-160-Ren l OF TECHNOLOGY ) ,
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(Georgia Tech Research Reactor) ) ASLBP No. 95-704-01-Ren l
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l (Renewal of License No. R-97) )
l NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW l
i l
Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff October 25,1996 i
9611070011 961025 PDR ADOCK 05000160 Q PDR
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-i-i TABLE OF CONTENTS i
I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION .................1 -
II. GANE'S MANAGEMENT CONTENTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A. Preliminary Analysis ..........................9 l B. Events During 1987-1988 ....................... 16 .
(1) Background ........................... 16 ;
i (2) NRC Inspection Report 50-160/87-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 t
(3) Further NRC Inspections Pnor to December 1987 ......................30 (4) Reorganization of the Health i Physics Function in July 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
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(5) The Cadmium-115 Spill in August 1987 ...... ................. 46 ,
1 (6) The NRC's Discovery of the Cadmium Spill and Dispatch
, of a Special Inspection Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 (7) Reportability of the Cadmium-115 Event ..................... 56 (8) The NRC's Order Modifying the l License (January 1988) and Confirmatory Order Modifying the License (March 1988) ................. 58 (9) Termination of Two Health Physics Technicians, and Investigation by the NRC's
- Office of Investigations ...................61 f
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-ii-TABLE OF CONTENTS (10) Allegations That GTRR Personnel Were Instructed By Management Not to Document Perceived Safety Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 i
l (11) The Licensee's Resolution
! of Identified Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 (12) The NRC's Issuance of a Notice of Violation, Imposition of a Civil Penalty, and Authorization to Restart Reactor Operations (November 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 (13) The Effect of the 1987-1988 Events on License Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 C. The Licensee's Performance Following Restart in November 1988 ...................... 79 (1) Background ..........................79 (2) The NRC's Inspection Program for Research Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 (3) The Licensee's HRC Inspection ;
and Enforcemen' History in the !
Period Following November 1988 ............. 84 (4) The Significance of the Violations ,
Identified in the Period Following i Restart Authorization in November 1988 ......... 94 D. Hardware and Reporting Issues ..................99 (1) Background ..........................99 (2) The Bismuth Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
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(3) The Fuel Element Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
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-lii-l TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
i (4) Environmental Monitoring Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 i
E. Intmsion by the Film Crew of " A Current Affair" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 F. Adequacy of the Licensee's Management Organizational Structure ....................... 108 j 1
(1) Background . ......................... 108 (2) Applicable Regulatory Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 (3) The Licensee's Current Management Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 i (4) GANE's Concerns Regarding the Potential For Abuse Inherent in the l Director's Authority Over the MORS . . . . . . . . . . . 118 (5) GANE's Concerns Regarding the Nuclear Safeguards Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 )
(6) The Licensee's Testimony Concerning l the GTRR Management Organizational S tructu re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 l (7) The Staff's View of GANE's Concerns i l Regarding the GTRR Management l Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 (8) Conclusions Regarding the Adequacy of the Licensee's Management of the GTRR . . . . . . . . 151 G. Beneficial Uses of the GTRR Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 i
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10/25/96 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
GEORGIA INSTITUTE ) Docket No. 50-160-Ren OF TECHNOLOGY )
) ,
(Georgia Tech Research Reactor) ) ASLBP No. 95-704-01-Ren l l
)
(Renewal of License No. R-97) ) {
l NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW l I
I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 1.1. These findings and nilings address all outstanding contentions in this
! proceeding, concerning the application filed on April 19,1994, by the Georgia Institute l of Technology (" Georgia Tech" or "the Licensee") for renewal of its license to operate the Georgia Tech Research Reactor ("GTRR") located on the Georgia Tech campus in i i l
Atlanta, Georgia. Under the terms of its license (Operating License No. R-97), as )
l l amended, the GTRR is authorized to operate at power levels up to 5 megawatts (thermal) for research and development activities, in accordance with the conditions specified therein. The Licensee's application seeks authorization to continue operating the GTRR 4
8 Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.109, the Licensee timely filed its application for license renewal, thereby effectively extending the expiration date of its current license pending i a final determination by the Commission with respect to its license renewal application. l l
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for an additional period of 20 years beyond the scheduled expiration of its current license, I l.e., until June 6,2014. Licensee Exh.19; Staff Exh.13. ;
1.2. Notice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)'s receipt and l l
consideration of the license renewal application was published in the Federal Register on September 26,1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 49098. The notice advised the Licensee and any person whose interest might be affected by the application of their right to request a hearing by filing such a request and/or a petition for leave to intervene within 30 days.
l On October 26, 1994, Georgians Against Nuclear Energy ("GANE") timely filed a petition for leave to intervene in the proceeding.
1.3. On November 18, 1994, this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was established to rule upon GANE's intervention petition and to preside over any adjudicatory proceeding that might be held in connection with the license renewal application. 59 Fed. Reg. 60849 (Nov. 28,1994). On November 23,1994, the l l
Licensing Board issued a Memorandum and Order requiring GANE to amend its petition j with a demonstration of its standing to intervene, and to supplement its petition with a statement of the contentions it wished to litigate in the proceeding.
1.4. On December 30,1994, GANE filed its amended petition for leave to intervene in this proceeding, in which it sought to represent the interests of numerous l
i individuals who reside and/or work in the vicinity of the GTRR, and set out the l
L contentions which GANE wished to litigate herein. GANE's amended petition was
- accompamed by the affidavits of two of its officers indicating that GANE had authorized
,1 i Ms. Glenn Carroll to represent GANE in the proceeding, along with the affidavits of I
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j numerous persons who authorized GANE to represent their interests herein.2 Responses in opposition to GANE's amended petition were filed by the Licensee and the NRC Staff
(" Staff"), and a prehearing conference was held in Atlanta, Georgia on January 31 -
February 2,1995, at which GANE's standing to intervene and the admissibility of its contentions was discussed. Tr.1-419.
1.5. GANE's amended petition presented 10 conte " ions which GANE sought 1
l to litigate in this proceeding, raising issues in the following areas: (1) nuclear safety and 4 1
accident analyses (2) radiation releases during normal operation and certain postulated )
accident scenarios, (3) radiological contamination of the Atlanta sewer system, l
(4) unstable geologic conditions at the site, (5) inadequate security and the risk of terrorism during the Olympic Games scheduled to be held in Atlanta in 1996, l (6) inadequate radiological monitoring by the Licensee and the State of Georgia, (7) inadequate emergency plans and emergency response training, (8) potential contamination of a water reservoir in the vicinity of the GTRR, (9) inadequate management of the facility, and (10) the financial expense associated with operation and eventual decommissioning of the facility, and the purported lack of benefit to be derived from the facility's operation.
l 2 None of the affidavits filed by GANE demonstrated that the affiants had personal standing to intervene, which was required to support GANE's admission as a party to the proceeding based upon representational standing to intervene. See " Memorandum and ,
Order (Telephone Conference Call,1/10/95)," dated January 11,1995. GANE then filed !
the supplemental affidavit of Robert Johnson, one of its members, which corrected this deficiency. !
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l 1.6. On March 3,1995, the Board issued a " Memorandum and Order (Request l for Additional Information on Security Contention)," which, inter alia, requested the parties' views concerning the relevance of 10 C.F.R. 9 73.60(f) to GANE's security i
! contention. That provision, of interest to the Board with respect to security provisions during the 1996 Olympic Games, provides as follows:
l (f) In addition to the fixed-site regoirements set forth .
in this section and in 73.67, the Commission may
! require, depending on the individual facility and site conditions, any alternate or additional measures deemed necessary to protect against radiological i sabotage at nonpower reactors licensed to operate at ,
or above a power level of 2 megawatts thermal. j t
Responses to the Board's Memorandum and Order were duly filed by all parties. j 1.7. On April 26, 1995, the Board issued its "Prehearing Conference Order l (Ruling on Standing and Contentions)," in which the Board determined that GANE had demonstrated its standing to intervene in this matter, and that two of its contentions --
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Contention 5 (security) and Contention 9 (management) -- satisfied the Commission's l l requirements for admission as contested issues in this proceeding. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-6,41 NRC 281, 289-99 (1995).3 GANE's remaining eight contentions were rejected for failing to meet the Commission's requirements governing the filing of contentions. Id. at 299-308. A Notice of Hearing was issued shortly thereafter. See 60 Fed. Reg. 24934 (May 10,1995).
i 3 The decision to admit GANE's security contention constituted the decision of a j majority of the Board; a dissenting opinion was filed by Administrative Judge Kline.
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1.8. On May 11,1995, the Licensee and Staff filed appeals from the Board's ;
Prehearing Conference Order, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. f 2.714a. Discovery on the i
security contention was then suspended by Commission Order dated June 9,1995, in order to allow the Commission to receive and consider the parties' views with respect to certain questions it raised concerning the Licensee's and Staff's requests for a stay. ,
1.9. In a separate but related matter, on June 16, 1995, the NRC issued an
" Order Modifying Facility Operating License No. R-97" (" Conversion Order"), pursuant to which the GTRR operating license was modified to authorize the conversion from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in accordance with I 10 C.F.R. f 50.64, in response to a proposal which had been submitted by the Licensee.
See 60 Fed. Reg. 32516,32517 (June 22,1995). On July 6,1995, GANE filed a request ,
for hearing on the Conversion Order, and a separate proceeding was then commenced for i
consideration of that request. 60 Fed. Reg. 37909 (July 24,1995).* That proceeding was subsequently terminated on November 22, 1995, upon the issuance of an Initial I
l Decision denying GANE's petition for leave to intervene. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-23,42 NRC 215 (1995), Comm'n review declined (Jan. 5,1996).
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! ' The Licensing Board established to rule upon GANE's request for hearing on the l Conversion Order was comprised of the same members as the Licensing Board in this
- proceeding. See Id.
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t 1.10. On July 25,1995, the Licensee transmitted a letter to the Secretary of the L
Commission, clarifying its intentions to convert to LEU fuel and to remove the HEU fuel from the site. The Licensee stated as follows:
l This is to advise the Commission that Georgia Institute of Technology will remove the HEU fuel from its reactor before the start of the Olympics in July 1996 and will not bring LEU fuel to its facility until after the conclusion of the Olympics. The estimated date for removal of the HEU fuel is late January /early Febmary 1996. In any event, there will be no nuclear fuel at the Georgia Tech site during the Olympics.5 u
! 1.11. Based upon the new information provided by the Licensee concerning its ,
l plans to retain no fuel on-site during the Olympics, on July 26,1995, the Commission vacated the Board's decision admitting the security contention, and remanded the contention to the Board for further consideration of the contention's mootness. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-10,42 NRC 1 (1995).
1.12. In a pleading filed before the Licensing Board on August 31, 1995,6 GANE conceded that its security contention was largely moot in light of the Licensee's l
l commitment to have no fuel at the site during the Olympics, but asserted that the l
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l 5 The Licensee's letter clarified two previous statements it had made concerning this matter. - See (1) " Georgia Institute of Technology's Response to Commission's Order Issuing Housekeeping Stay," dated June 21,1995, at 1; and (2) " Georgia Institute of Technology's Clarification of Response to Commission's Order Issuing Housekeeping Stay," dated July 12,1995, at 1.
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" Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) Comments on Security at the Georgia l Tech Reactor Facility Following Georgia Tech's Decision to Remove the Reactor Fuel Before the 1996 Olympic Games," dated August 31,1995.
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presence of Cobalt-60 in a building adjacent to the reactor continued to present a security concern which was not mooted by the Licensee's removal of reactor fuel from the site.
l GANE recognized that the Commission had transferred regulatory responsibility for i
byproduct materials such as the Cobalt-60 to the State of Georgia (an " Agreement State" under i 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended (the "Act")) -- but it argued that the i
Commission should reassert regulatory jurisdiction over this material pursuant to f 274j of the Act,42 U.S.C. f 2021j.7 7
Id. at 3-4, 6. Section 274j of the Act states, in pertinent part:
- j. (1) The Commission, . . . may terminate or suspend all or part of its agreement with the State and -
l reassert the licensing and regulatory authority vested i in it under this Act, if the Commission finds that (1) such termination or suspension is required to protect the public health and safety, or (2) the State has not complied with one or more of the requirements of this section. . . .
(2) The Commission, . . . may . . .
temporarily suspend all or part of its agreement with the State . . . if, in the judgment of the Commission:
l L (A) an emergency situation exists with l respect to any material covered by such an i
agreement creating danger which requires immediate action to protect the health or safety of persons either within or outside of t
the State, and (B) the State has failed to take steps necessary to contain or eliminate the cause of
< the danger within a reasonable time after the
! situation arose.
(continued...)
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1.13. On October 31,1995 (as corrected November 1,1995), having given full consideration to the parties' views concerning the mootness of GANE's security contention and the applicability of f 274j of the Act, the Board issued its " Partial Initial Decision (Mootness of Security Contention)." Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-19, 42 NRC 191 (1995), Comm'n review declined (Jan. 5,1996). Therein, the Board mled that the security contention was mooted by the Licensee's commitment to have all fuel removed from the site during the pendency of the Olympic Games, and that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the Cobalt-60 material which under the State's regulatory authority. Id. at 194-95. Further, the Board found no reason to recommend that the Commission should exercise its authority to suspend or terminate the State's regulatory responsibilities over the Cobalt-60. Id. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the security contention was resolved, subject to the successful and timely completion of the Licensee's commitments concerning fuel removal. Id. at 195.8 7(... continued)
A temporary suspension under this paragraph shall remain in effect only for such time as the emergency situation exists and shall authorize the Commission to exercise its authority only to the extent necessary to contain or eliminate the danger.
8 On November 10,1995, following the dismissal of the security contention, GANE
, filed a request before the Commission, asking it to review the " Agreement State" status
! of the State of Georgia, with respect to the State's authority to regulate Cobalt-60 at the i GTRR site, and "to take authority for the cobalt-60." "[GANE] Request for Commission Review of State of Georgia Agreement to Regulate Cobalt-60 at Georgia Tech," dated November 10,1995 at 3. That request is outside the scope of the Licensing Board's authority to consider.
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l 1.14. While the Licensing Board was considering the potential mootness of GANE's security contention, the Commission completed its consideration of the
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Licensee's and Staff's appeals from the Board's Prehearing Conference Order. On October 12,1995, the Commission issued its decision, affirming this Board's rulings that GANE had sufficiently demonstrated its standing to intervene, and that GANE's management contention met the Commission's minimum threshold requirements for the filing of contentions. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor),
CLI-95-12,42 NRC 111 (1995). Accordingly, litigation of the management contention I proceeded forward, with the filing of interrogatories and document requests, and ;
l deposition discovery.'
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j II. GANE'S MANAGEMENT CONTENTION l A. Preliminary Analysis.
2.1.1. As filed, GANE's Contention 9 asserts that the Licensee's management is inadequate to provide reasonable assurance of the continued protection of the public l
1 health and safety. In this regard, the contention asserts that:
' On November 10, 1995, GANE filed a further contention challenging the
- Licensee's ability to provide security against acts of sabotage and terrorism, based upon
! the intrusion into certain areas of the reactor facility in October by a Fox Television "A Current Affair" film crew. This contention was rejected by the Licensing Board on November 15, 1995, without prejudice to GANE's ability to refile the contention with a proper discussion of the five factors governing late-filed contentions. See Tr. 555-58; "Second Prehearing Conference Order (Funher Schedules for Proceeding)," dated November 29,1995, at 8. GANE did not refile this contention, but instead litigated this
) issue as part of its management contention, discussed infra at 105-08.
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i l Contention 9. Safety concerns at the Georgia Tech j reactor are the sole responsibility of Dr. R. A. Karam. l l Dr. Karam is the director who withheld information i I
about a' serious accident from the . NRC (1987 l cadmium-115 accident). The NRC was advised of the l 1987 cadmium-115 accident by the safety officer at j that time, who was later demoted, and left the GTRR l operation claiming harassment. Since the incident, j l management has been restructured giving the director l
- l. (Dr. Karam) increased authority, including increased !
I authority over the Manager of the Office of Radiation ;
Safety. Although the safety officer has line to I higher-ups than the director, since he/she works for ;
the director on a day-to-day basis, the threat of i l reprisal would be a huge disincentive to defying the ;
l director. The Nuclear Safeguards Committee which l l has theoretical oversight of the GTRR operations has !
a distinct flaw in having no concern with health l issues. The Office of Radiation Safety Manager is !
sought for its knowledge of law more than its l l knowledge of health physics. j 2.1.2. GANE filed extensive responses to the Staff's and Licensee's discovery .
requests, which fleshed out the bases for its contention and formed the structural ;
framework for its challenge to Georgia Tech"r license renewal application. In its l discovery answers, GANE pointed, inter alia, to a large number of NRC Staff inspection j
! reports, several NRC enforcement actions, the minutes of the Licensee's Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC), and certain changes that had been made to the Licensee's management organizational structure, which it asserted support its view that the Licensee's management of the facility has been, and is, inadequate.
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" Georgians Against Nuclear Energy Perfected Responses to NRC Interrogatories j ,
and Request for Production of Documents [,] and Responses to Georgia Tech's Discovery i Requests," dated February 22,1996.
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- e 2.1.3. Hearings on this matter were held in Atlanta, Georgia, on May 20-24, 1996; May 29-31,1996; and June 24-28, 1996. In addition, limited appearance l
i statements were received from many members of the public, in special sessions held on May 20 and May 22,1996. Numerous witnesses appeared on behalf of the parties, as summarized below. At GANE's request (consented to by the other parties), GANE's L witnesses generally appeared first, followed by the Licensee's and Staff's witnesses.
L 2.1.4. In support of its contention, GANE presented the testimony of five l individuals. These were: Robert Boyd, the Licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) l l
from 1964 to 1987, and Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety (MORS) from 1987 L to 1988 (Qualifications, Post Tr. 2122); Dr. Brian Copcutt, who served as MORS for a four-month period in 1991 (Qualifications, GANE Exh.1); Anne Rebecca long, an NRC l Staff inspector who had conducted an inspection of the facility in early 1987; Glenn l
l Carroll (GANE's representative in this proceeding), who testified concerning a videotape she made of the Fox Television "A Current Affair" broadcast referred to supra at 9;"
i and John Galloway, a GANE member and undergraduate student who resides near the l
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" Ms. Carroll had previously proffered GANE's discovery responses as her 1 proposed testimony in the proceeding. This was rejected by the Board (except as to l
! evidence concerning her videotape of "A Current Affair"), due to Ms. Carroll's lack of )
l personal knowledge or expenise to present the interrogatory answers as her testimony.
i See " Memorandum and Order (Telephone Conference Call,5/15/96)," dated May 16, j 1996 (unpublished), at 2-3, l
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facility (whose testimony, concerning conversations he had with members of the campus police force, was later stricken from the record). 2 2.1.5. The Licensee presented three witnesses in support of its application.
! These were Dr. Nicholas Tsoulfanidis, a Profear of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Missouri-Rolla, who conducted an investigative evaluation of the GTRR l
management organization, at the Licensee's request (Qualifications, GT Exh.1, Post i Tr.1939); Dr. Rodney D. Ice, who currently serves as the facility's MORS and as an adjunct Professor in Health Physics at Georgia Tech (Qualifications, GT Exh. 3, Post Tr.1940); and Dr. Ratib A. Karam, director of the GTRR facility and a full Professor j of Nuclear Engineering at Georgia Tech (Qualifications, GT Exh. 4, Post Tr. 2723)."
i 2.1.6. The NRC Staff produced three panels of witnesses in this proceeding. i l
l These were as follows: Staff " Panel A" comprised of Douglas M. Collins, Paul E.
i I Fredrickson, Albert F. Gibson, and George B. Kuzo, all employed at NRC Region II in j Atlanta (Qualifications, Post Tr. 1740);14 Staff " Panel B" comprised of Region II l
l iz Follow ng the completion of Mr. Galloway's testimony (see Tr. 2068-2109, 22 % -2325), the Board granted the Licensee's motion to strike his testimony in its entirety, as speculative and lacking in probative value (Tr. 2313, 2338-44).
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3 Dr. Karam currently devotes approximately 20-25% of his time to his duties as Director of the NNRC, with the remainder of his time devoted to other activities.
Tr. 3398-99. Dr. Karam is currently planning to retire, and he has tendered his resignation from Georgia Tech, effective June 30,1997. Tr. 2790-10.
4 Mr. Collins is currently Deputy Director, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety;
- Mr. Fredrickson is Chief of the Special Inspection Branch, Division of Reactor Safety; j Mr. Gibson is the Director of the Division of Reactor Safety (a position which he has
- held since September 1985); and Mr. Kuzo is a Senior Radiation Specialist, Plant Support Branch, Division of Reactor Safety. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 1-2.
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l I employees Craig H. Bassett and Edward J. McAlpine, and Marvin M. Mendonca (the t
NRC Project Manager for the GTRR facility) (Qualifications, Post Tr. 2813); 5 and Staff " Panel C" comprised of Mr. Mendonca and Alexander Adams, Jr., also employed l in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at NRC headquarters (Qualifications, Post l
Tr. 3171).26 These panels addressed, respectively, (a) the Licensee's inspection and l
l enforcement history during the period of 1987-88, including the issuance of two NRC <
i Orders in early 1988, suspending reactor experiments and shutting down the reactor, and l
l a subsequent determination that restart of the reactor could and should be authorized; (b) the Licensee's NRC inspection and enforcement history following the NRC's l November 1988 authorization for Georgia Tech to restart the reactor, until May 1996; l
l and (c) the Licensee's management organizational structure and the acceptability of the current organizational structure under applicable regulatory requirements and guidance."
" Mr. Bassett is a Senior Radiation Specialist in the Fuel Facilities Branch, Division l
i of Nuclear Materials Safety, NRC Region II; Mr. McAlpine is Chief of the Fuel Facilities Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, NRC Region II; and Mr. Mendonca is a Senior Project Manager in the Non-Power Reactors and -
l Decommissioning Project Directorate, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 1-2.
" Mr. Adams is a Senior Project Manager in the Non-Power Reactors and l
! Decommissioning Project Directorate, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 1-2.
" During the course of the evidentiary hearings, the Staff provided certain information to the Licensing Board, in several brief, ex parte, in camera sessions, concerning allegations the Staff had received during the hearings related to the l management issue pending before the Board. This information was protected from public disclosure due to the informant's request for confidentiality. The allegations were
- investigated and resolved to the Staff's satisfaction prior to the close of the hearings, and are not relied upon in these findings and conclusions. See generally Tr. 1915-16.
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l 2.1.7. In the balance of this decision, the Board considers, first, the Licensee's performance in the 1987-88 period, the related enforcement actions taken by the NRC in l that period, and the NRC's authorization for restart of the reactor in November 1988; second, the Licensee's performance from the time the reactor was authorized to restart until the present; and third, the acceptability of the Licensee's current management
! organization structure.
l 2.1.8. In examining the events which took place in 1987-1988, it is important to note that those events were the subject of considerable NRC scrutiny and stiff enforcement action in 1988, which the Staff believes adequately resolved those matters.
Second, in the considerable period of time which has transpired since those events occurred, the Licensee has continued to operate the facility, producing a much more relevant performance record. Thus, as the Board cautioned the parties early in this proceeding, while the 1987-88 events appeared to be serious and may have involved the i
same facility director who is present now, "in order to prevail, GANE will h.tve to 1
! demonstrate that, inter alia, substantial management deficiencies persist." Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-6,41 NRC 281,299 I (1995).38 2.1.9. This cautionary instruction was reiterated with even greater force by the Commission, in considering the Licensee's and Staff's appeals from the Board's decision to admit the management contention. In affirming the Board's determination that GANE 8 The Licensing Board reiterated these instructions to GANE at various times during the proceeding. See, e.g., Tr. 1521-23, 2281, 2291, 2293-94.
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l had made the required minimal showing to support admission of its contention, the j l
Commission observed that "the entire past performance of [the] licensee" is appropriate l for examination upon the submittal of a license renewal application -- but "the past i
performance must bear on the licensing action currently under review." Georgia Institute j of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12,42 NRC 111',120 (1995).
The Commission thereupon provided the following guidance for the conduct of this proceeding:
l Allegations of management improprieties or poor " integrity," of course, must be of more than l historical interest: they must relate directly to the l proposed licensing action. Accordingly, this proceeding cannot be a forum to litigate whether Georgia Tech made mistakes in the past, but must focus on whether the GTRR as presently organized and staffed can provide reasonable assurance of l candor and willingness to follow NRC regulations.
. . This is a proceeding to extend a license for 20 years. GANE seeks assurance that the facility's current management encourages a safety-conscious attitude, and provides an environment in which employees feel they can freely voice safety l concerns. GANE's allegations bear directly on the Commission's ability to find reasonable assurance that the GTRR facility can be safely operated. If GANE i
can prove that the GTRR's current management either is unfit or structured unacceptably, it would be cause to deny the license renewal or condition renewal upon modifications.
Id. at 120-21 (footnote omitted).
! 2.1.10. For the reasons described herein, we find that the evidence supports a 4
conclusion that there are no substantial management deficiencies outstarxling at this time, I-. . -_ - _ _ - , . .. - , . - -
i
! = y l
l i i
< L and that the Licensee's current management provides reasonable assurance that the facility l l
l !
l can be operated safely upon license renewal. Further, we find that GANE has not carried j its required burden of showing that the GTRR's current management either is " unfit" or ;
l
" structured unacceptably." Our evaluation follows in the discussion below, f i
B. Events Durine 1987-1988.
L i (1) Background 2.2.1.1. Certain events occurred at the facility in 1987, which form much of the underpinning for GANE's challenge to Georgia Tech's license renewal application. f l L l Principal among these are (1) several NRC inspection reports in early 1987, which !
I identified numerous regulatory violations and programmatic concerns; (2) an attempt by
~t he Licensee to reorganize its health physics function in July 1987; (3) a Cadmium-115 spill which occurred in August 1987, and the NRC's identification of significant deficiencies in the Licensee's handling of that event; and (4) the Licensee's replacement l
l of its health physics staff in early 1988. Many of these events were to form the basis for l the Staff's determination to take significant enforcement action against the Licensee in 1988, and they were the subject of a considerable portion of the testimony in this proceeding.
l (2) NRCInspection Report 50-160/87-01.
2.2.2.1. Any analysis of the Licensee's management during the period of concern to GANE must begin with a discussion of the NRC Staff's inspection findings
! in early 1987, as presented by the NRC Staff's Panel A. The first such i.nspection was J
i
i documented in Inspection Report (IR) 50-160/87-01,' concerning an NRC inspection conducted by inspector Anne Rebecca Long on February 9-23,1987 (GANE Exh. 21).
2.2.2.2. The inspection described in IR 87-01 resulted in a finding of six violations (Severity Ixvel IV) with numerous examples of those violations, as follows:
- 1. Failure to provide or utilize procedures (seven examples);
i
- 2. Failure to control experiments as required by the Technical Specifications (TS) (four examples);
- 3. Failure to perform a weekly heat balance surveillance;
- 4. Failure to receive prior NRC approval for a change made to the facility, involving changes to the ,
Technical Specifications;
- 5. Failure to comply with the requalification program for annually documenting performance of operators under simulated emergency conditions for 1984, 1985, and 1986; and
[
l 6. Failure of the Nuclear Safeguards Committee
! (NSC) to perform its review and audit functions as required (four examples).
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 9.
2.2.2.3. The Licensee responded to this inspection report and notice of violation j i
in a letter dated May 25,1987; at the request of NRC Region II, the Licensee provided
! ' As is customary in NRC practice, inspection reports related to nuclear reactor !
licensees are generally issued in numerical sequence each year, designating the facility's docket number followed by the inspection report number. For purposes of simplicity in the balance of these findings and conclusions, references to NRC inspection reports omit j the GTRR docket number (50-160) from the inspection report number.
- y
-i a supplemental response with a more thorough discussion of each issue, by letter dated July 15,1987. Id. at 9-10; see GANE Exh. 23 (Enclosure).
2.2.2.4. The first violation involved deficiencies in written procedures for the i operation of the reactor and identified specific instances where the reactor operators failed
. to follow instructions. The Licensee admitted six of the seven examples. For the l
l example which the Licensee contested, it argued that the procedures were adequate and l t
! met regulatory requirements. NRC Region II accepted the Licensee's denial of the l
l contested example; however, the overall violation was upheld. Subsequent NRC inspections verified that the Licensee's corrective actions with respect to the remaining matters in this violation had been completed. Id. at 10. ;
- 2.2.2.5. The second violation, with four examples, related to the Licensee's i
l administrative controls for conducting experiments. The Licensee admitted three of the i
cited examples. One example was denied by the Licensee; NRC Region II accepted this denial based upon the Licensee's argument that the documentation for minor experiment approvals met regulatory requirements. NRC personnel subsequently reviewed the Licensee's revised and new procedures and closed this item. Id. at 10-11.
2.2.2.6. The third violation involved the Licensee's failure to compare the actual thermal output from the reactor with the indicated power level as required by the license. The Licensee admitted that the violation had occurred, and committed to audit this requirement. NRC Region II inspected the Licensee's records for the period of
- January 26, 1987 to July 13, 1989, and did not identify any discrepancies. Id. at 11.
- - . . . , _ . - - . , , , .., , ,, ., .- , , _g.. _
,..,y,, , y--
i * ,
I l
I 2.2.2.7. The fourth violation involved a change to the facility without prior l
NRC approval, in that the Licensee changed the cover gas for the reactor vessel from helium to nitrogen without first obtaining a license amendment to revise the technical l
specification's reference to helium. The Licensee denied the violation, stating that the type of gas was incidental to the requirement; NRC Region II did not accept the denial.
The Licensee submitted a request to change the wording of the TS requirement, and the NRC approved the request in a subsequent license amendment and closed this issue. Id.
2.2.2.8. The fifth violation concerned the Licensee's failure to document i
! operator requalification training as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 55. The Licensee denied j l l
! the violation based on its view that it maintained the required records. NRC Region II l
withdrew the violation on the basis that annual summaries of control manipulations were available and performance could be inferred from the records. Id. at 12.
2.2.2.9. The sixth violation involved the requirement for the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) to approve procedure changes, and to audit reactor operations and ,
l l records, and equipment performance. This violation was challenged by the Licensee as inaccurately stating the Committee's functions. After review of the Licensee's response, j I
NRC Region II agreed with the Licensee that the functions of the Committee needed to be clarified, and the violation was withdrawn. Id.20 ,
b 2
In sum, the Licensee admitted one violation and portions of two others, and it j- denied three violations and ponions of other two violations. The Staff's letter of l August 31,1987, accepted some of the Licensee's denials, but rejected the Licensee's i denials of Violation (D) and pan of Violation (A). See Staff Exh.10, Enclosure.
. _m _ - - - _ _ __ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _
. + l l l t
2.2.2.10. The NRC Staff concluded that, individually, the above violations !
(each of which was classified as Severity level IV) were not to be of sufficient safety l
- significance to warrant serious regulatory concern. Id. at 12; Tr.1737. In this regard, ,
the NRC Enforcement Policy in effect at the time categorized violations in Severity f i
levels I - V, with Level V being the least significant. It stated, in part.
l Severity Level I and II violations are of very I
significant regulatory concern. In general, violations I
that arc included in these severity categories involve actual or high potential impact on the public. i Severity level III violations are cause for significant concern. Severity levelIV violations are less serious.
but are of more than minor concern; i.e., if left l l uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious
! concern. Severity Ixvel V violations are of minor l
safety or environmental concern.
1 l l 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C (revised as of January 1,1988). Panel A, Post Tr.1740, I I
at 12.
l 2.2.2.11. Notwithstanding the Staff's conclusion that these violations were not individually significant, the Staff considered that, collectively, the violations provided substantial evidence of a lack of management oversight. Accordingly, the cover letter l
which transmitted the Staff's inspection report expressed concern about apparent l
programmatic weaknesses and the failure of the Licensee to complete certain corrective actions to which it had previously committed; and, reflecting this elevated level of concern, the letter was signed by the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, one level of management higher than normal. Id. at 13; Tr.1758.
-- . - . . . ~ .-- - _ - - - _ - . _ - . . . - . . - - - - ~_. ..
l 2.2.2.12. GANE called as a witness Anne Rebecca long, the NRC inspector l
who conducted the inspection described in Inspection Report 87-01 (GANE Exh. 21).
l Tr.1324.2 Ms. Long was produced as a witness by the Staff in response to GANE's ,
request, at the direction of the Licensing Board.22 2.2.2.13. Ms. Long received a bachelor's degree in Physics from the University 1 l
of Georgia and a master's degree in nuclear engineering from Georgia Tech. She has l been employed by NRC Region II since February 1986. Tr.1314,1544. At the time l
l she conducted her inspection of the GTRR in February 1987, she had conducted one other research reactor inspection, and had been employed by the NRC for about one year.
l Tr.1544,1708-09,1594.
I 2.2.2.14. Ms. Long testified that the NRC had received allegations concermng ;
I the facility which she was assigned to investigate as part of a routine inspection; she was i
l l
i 2
GANE sought to demonstrate at various times through the testimony of Ms. Long ]
! that certain persons in NRC Region Il may have been lax in their regulation of the Licensee. The Board ruled that such lines of questioning were irrelevant in this license renewal proceeding, and that the Licensee would be held to the proper standard of meeting regulatory requirements regardless of whether or not it had been lulled into lax regulatory compliance. See, e.g., Tr. 1470-73, 1478, 1480.
I 22 In 1988, Ms. Ieng filed a civil action against the NRC alleging that she had been the victim of sexual discrimination. Tr. 1388-89. A settlement agreement was reached in that action prior to the commencement of this proceeding. The Commission, through its legal counsel, advised Ms. Long that it did not object to her presentation of testimony
! in this proceeding regarding any safety issues of which she was aware, related to the i GTRR or NRC management's handling of those safety issues; but that the settlement agreement would prohibit her from testifying concerning any matters not related to nuclear safety, concerning her employment with the NRC. See Insert, Post Tr.1316.
~ - -- - . . _. .
_ . _. . ._. . . _ . ___...._ _ __ _._..~ _ _ _..___.._ _ _ _ _._
- + r instructed by her acting supervisor (H)," not to reveal to the Licensee the fact that allegations had been received. Tr. 1444, 1549. These allegations concerned an unreported power excursion and a report that the reactor had been running without a 1
licensed operator at the controls. Tr. 1446, 1449-50.24 2.2.2.15. Ms. Long testified that in writing the report, she was pressured to I l
l lessen the number of violations identified by grouping certain items together, and by 3 I
categorizing some items as unresolved items (URIs) and inspector followup items ]
l (IFIs)" rather than as violations. Tr.1346. According to Ms. Long, the number of violations listed in her inspection report was reduced because two of her supervisors, (H) j and (V), were concerned that the facility might be shut down if the NRC issued too many l
l violations Tr. 1344-45.
" Given the personal nature of Ms. Ieng's allegations concerning various individuals with whom she worked -- none of which is relevant to any material issue of fact in this proceeding -- references to the individuals mentioned in Ms. Long's testimony are generally made herein by letter designation.
24 Ms. Long's inspection concluded that the power excursion occurred, but did not constitute a violation. The allegation of the reactor running without an operator at the controls was referred to Georgia Tech for investigation, due to a lack of evidence for the Staff to pursue; Ms. Long concurred in this decision. Tr. 1449-50, 1451; Staff Exh. 9.
" An " unresolved item" (URI) is a matter for which additional inspection, I
information or evaluation is required before a determination can be reached as to whether it demonstrates a violation of regulatory requirements; a URI would subsequently have to be closed out with a determination as to whether or not there was a violation, and thus could ultimately (but not necessarily) result in the identification of a violation based upon the information obtained later. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 27; Tr.1565, 2931. An l
inspector followup item" (IFI) constitutes a matter for which additional information and followup is needed before it can be closed, but does not rise to the level of a URI; an IFI
- could ultimately result in the identification of a violation, although this rarely occurs.
Tr.1566; Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 38.
l l
l
. -~_ _ _ - , _ . -- - - _
- v .
i 2.2.2.16. Significantly, Ms. Long stated that she was satisfied with the i l
inspection report as issued because it addressed every issue she had identified, and would not have signed it otherwise. Tr. 1346-47, 1394-95. Further, Ms. Long testified that
/.*
i the inspection report was discussed by many different managers, and a consensus view i
was reached on the repon, which she was satisfied was "a fine and fair report that l l
l everybody could agree to live with," before it was issued. Tr. 1395, 1711. See Staff I l l Exh. 8; Tr.1540-41. Moreover, Ms. Long recognized that under NRC practice, an inspection report represents a consensus of management rather than the inspector's l
personal view as to whether a matter does or does not constitute a violation. Tr.1608, l
l 1609-10. Similarly, she recognized that an NRC inspection report is required to contain 1
-the judgment of the issuing organizational unit, and is to represent an institutional l
document rather than a personal document that reflects only the views of the inspector (s).
See NRC Manual Chapter 0610-04; Tr.1544,1547-48.
2.2.2.17. In addition, notwithstanding Ms. Long's assenion that two of her supervisors attempted to minimize the number of violations in the inst etion report, she I- indicated in cross-examination that one of these individuals (H) had supported her l
L findings in discussions within the NRC; and the other individual (V) had supponed one l i violation against the arguments of the facility director, and the violation stood in the final i
inspection report. Tr. 1551-52,1570,1576-77; GANE Exh. 21 (Report Details at 4-5). l Further, while Ms. Long stated that (H) had wanted to package the violations in a manner that minimized the total number of violations, Tr.1552, she recognized that the NRC ,
s- j Enforcement Manual policy at that time provided that multiple examples of the same non-
,. - - - . .- -- . . - - - ----- . . ~ - _ - . - - - . . - . -
- t l l
l compliance with a specific requirement during the inspection period should generally be i included in a single citation, and that where numerous examples of the same violation had l l
been identified, not all of the examples were to be cited. Tr. 1553-54. Moreover, while !
Ms. Long stated that (H) had sought to combine violations of different requirements into a single violation, she agreed that she was satisfied with the final inspection report.
Tr.1554-55. On the basis of this testimony, there is no reason to believe that the violations identified in IR 87-01 were reported or grouped improperly. ;
l 2.2.2.18. Ms. Long further testified that she recommended that the six 1.evel IV violations described in IR 87-01 be escalated collectively to Severity Ixvel III, which she believed was consistent with the NRC enforcement policy in effect at the time; she l
l claimed, however, that two of her supervisors, (H) and (V), rejected this approach because they were afraid the facility would then be shut down by the university.
Tr.1344-45,1364,1419. However, on cross-examination, Ms. Long acknowledged that one of her supervisors, (J) or (H), had advised her to speak to NRC Region II's Director of the Enforcement and Investigation Coordinator Staff (EICS), to solicit his view as to l
l whether escalation was appropriate, and that the EICS Director was the appropriate Region II official to be consulted for possible escalation of enforcement actions to Severity Level III or above. Tr. 1556-58, 1562. Consistent with NRC practice where an inspector believes a matter should be escalated, Ms. Long then spoke to the Director i of EICS -- and he advised her, prior to issuance ofIR 87-01 in April 1987, that the NRC l
J l enforcement policy in effect at that time did not support her recommendation for
, escalation. Tr. 1558-59, 1563, 1892, 1907 As a result, NRC Region Il management l
i
o ,
and Ms. Long ultimately reached a consensus agreement that the violations should not be escalated but should be reported in the manner reflected in IR 87-01. Tr.1563-64.
l 2.2.2.19. As discussed above, on August 31, 1987, NRC Region II accepted the Licensee's denials of certain of the violations. Ms. Long stated that she was not informed of this decision in advance, and she was dissatisfied with the decision to accept l
l l the Licensee's denials and to delete the violations from the NRC's tracking records.
! GANE Exh. 23; Tr.1330,1339-42,1356. Ms. Long believed that her former supervisor j (J) surreptitiously issued the letter of August 31,1987, when other cognizant officials ,
l were away from the office. GANE Exh. 23; Tr.1353. She stated that the issuance of 1
i this acceptance letter without consulting her (the lead inspector) and without following l the consensus which had been reached, was contrary to regional policy. Tr. 1415-16.26 2.2.2.20. In January 1988, following Ms. Long's discovery that certain of the violations she reported in IR 87-01 had been deleted, she sent a memo to Albert Gibson, Director of the Division of Reactor Safety in NRC Region II (GANE Exh. 25), contesting l
the decision to withdraw those violations. Tr. 1405, 1406-07. Ms. Long also met with !
Mal Ernst, then Deputy Regional Administrator in NRC Region II, who tasked !
Mr. Gibson with the responsibility of looking into and resolving Ms Long's assertions.
l Tr.1582; GANE Exh. 27. Significantly, Ms. Long stated that Messrs. Ernst and Gibson l responded appropriately and took action in response to her concerns, including numerous l
26 To be sure, Ms. Long never knew who had concurred in (J)'s letter of August 31, 1987, Tr.1571-72; and she was surprised to learn at the hearing that certain members of NRC management had, in fact, concurred in the acceptance letter. See Tr. 1573-75; Staff Exh.10.
l
- v l
attempts by Mr. Gibson to obtain her views and insight during the Staff's followup :
activities related to her concerns. Tr.1582-85.27 In addition, she was satisfied that appropriate action was ultimately taken, upon issuance of the Staff's enforcement Orders I of January and March 1988. Tr.1588.2s 2.2.2.21. In response to Ms. Leng's testimony, the Staff presented the direct testimony of Albert F. Gibson. Mr. Gibson has served as Director of the Division of Reactor Safety in NRC Region II from 1985 to the present; as noted above, in February l l l
1988, he was assigned the responsibility for inquiring into and resolving issues raised by I Ms. Iong concerning Region II's disposition of the findings reported in Inspection Report i
- l 87-01. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 2, 6. i l
2.2.2.22. Mr. Gibson explained that on or about January 27,1988 (five months after NRC Region II dispositioned the inspection findings listed in Inspection Report 87-01, withdrawing two of the six violations and parts of two others), Ms. Long sent him 27 f In her memo to Mr. Gibson, Ms. Long stated her personal opinion that, for many I l years, Georgia Tech ::ad displayed a disregard for regulatory compliance. GANE l Exh. 25 at 1. At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Long explained this statement to be a commentary on the fact that the Licensee had failed to satisfy numerous commitments it had made to take corrective action for previous violations, and had failed to provide an atmosphere which fostered an' attention to detail and proper record keeping -- all as reflected in IR 87-01. See, e.g., Tr. 1634-45, 1661-62, 1665-84. As noted in the text above, Ms. Long was satisfied with the Staff's enforcement actions taken with respect to the matters stated in IR 87-01.
28 ' Among the items deleted from IR 87-01 was a violation Ms. Long had identified concerning the Licensee's failure to estimate, on requests for minor experiment approval, how " hot" (thermally and radioactively) the device containing the sample would become
- during the experiment. Ms. Long believed that if this violation had not been deleted, the Licensee might have been more careful in estimating such exposures and might have avoided the disintegration which caused the 1987 cadmium spill. Tr. 1350-51, 1417.
I i
- O a memo expressing concern regarding the NRC's withdrawal of these violations (GANE Exh. 25), and then met with him in early February 1988 regarding this matter.
Mr. Gibson evaluated her concerns and found that the two violations should not have been withdrawn. He explained that while these violations had been withdrawn due to the view that there was an insufficient basis to support the citations, his judgment, made with the benefit of subsequent inspection findings and hindsight, was different. Mr. Gibson l
l directed the preparation of a reply memorandum to Mr. Ernst, dated February 12,1988, l
l which presented a detailed summary of his findings concerning the issues raised by Ms.
' Long over the handling of her inspection findings. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 13-14; Staff Exh.19; Tr.1753,1761,1901. Mr. Gibson's memorandum of February 12,1988, introduced into evidence by the Staff, fully corroborates his testimony concerning the handling of Ms. Long's inspection findings. See Staff Exh.19, at 1-3.
2.2.2.23. Although Mr. Gibson agreed with Ms. Long's view that the violations f should not have been deleted, he disagreed with her assertion that the Region failed to follow regional procedures in deleting the violations at issue, ' Rather, he testified that l l Ms. IAng's former supervisor (J) retained responsibility for the inspection report; that i
! (J) had a member of his staff solicit Ms. Long's comments on the proposed acceptance ;
of the Licensee's denials; that (J) considered but disagreed with her views; and that the l final Region II management decision was to withdraw the violations. Tr. 1760. i Although regional procedures do not explicitly require the inspector to be notified when i
his or her views are not accepted, Mr. Gibson stated his opinion that such notification should have been, but was not, made here. Tr.1760.
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- v ,
2.2.2.24. With respect to remedying the incorrect deletion of violations identified by Ms. Long, no further actions appear to have been required. Mr. Gibson observed that at the time Ms. Long raised her concerns, other significant inspection and !
enforcement events involving the GTRR were already well underway, which rendered l further action with respect to these violations unnecessary -- i.e., additional inspections l
[ -
had been conducted, an order modifying the license had been issued and an enforcement i
conference with Georgia Tech had already been scheduled. Thus, reissuance of these February 1987 violations was not necessary to achieve corrective action. No basis was found by NRC Region II management to take further action with respect to Ms. Ieng's ;
! concerns. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 14.
2.2.2.25. Subsequent to Ms. Long's discovery that certain of the violations 1
identified in IR 87-01 had been deleted, she made various allegations of wrongdoing by l NRC Region II, related to its handling of her irspection findings, to the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA). Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 14. OIA then investigated l
l those allegations. No basis was found by OIA or its successor (the Office of the Inspector General (OlG)), to warrant further action with respect to the issues raised by Ms. Long. Id. In this regard, the OIG " closing memorandum" of March 29,1990 (File 88-08) (a copy of which was introduced in this proceeding), concluded as follows:
The documents in the case file also indicate that Region II management followed regional procedures i during the review of GT's response and preparation l
of a reply. Although Region II management apparently did not accept the recommendations of the
- inspectors, there was no indication of NRC employee misconduct to warrant an Office of the Inspector
,,.n , - - - . - - - . . , - , , . - , -
, . , , ~e -
7 - - - > .- -- - - . , w ,
o t. ,
General investigation. Decisions on the close-out of the Region II GT inspection report were based on the judgement of Region II management. Reviewing the validity of decisions of this nature is a matter more ,
appropriately handled by the NRC technical staff and management. This is also true of information I received during OIA's review of this matter that l questioned the effectiveness of Region II's actions
! with respect to its regulation of GT.
l
[T]he inspection in question occurred three years ago L and since that time appropriate corrective actions as l determined by Region II management has been taken by GT. Additionally, there was no indication that Region II management acted improperly in its handling of GT's response to the inspection.
Consequently, there is no reason to conduct further i investigation into this matter. This case is closed in the files of this office.
GANE Exh.19, at 1-2.29 2.2.2.26. Having considered the matters referred to by Ms. Long, it is apparent that those matters have been appropriately reviewed and dispositioned by NRC Region U, and they have been investigated and closed by the appropriate investigatory arm of the l Commission. Indeed, Ms. long, herself, was ultimately satisfied with Mr. Gibson's handling of her concerns on behalf of Region 11 management and with the enforcement actions taken in 1988. There is therefore no reason to believe that these matters require 2'
Various other assertions were made by Ms. Long concerning statements allegedly made to her by Dr. Karam during her inspection. Tr. 1442-43, 1447, 1452-54, 1468.
l Dr. Karam, however, vigorously denied making those statements. Tr. 3494,3499-3500.
- In any event, regardless of whether Ms. IAng's allegations are correct, they do not affect j the evidence in this proceeding
- Ms. Iong stated that none of these statements had the effect of intimidating her, and they did not have an adverse effect upon her conduct of the inspection. Tr. 1454-55, 1476-77.
-em
e r . _ _ .!
i further action by this Board, or that they provide any basis to warrant the denial or conditioning of Georgia Tech's license renewal application. )
(3) Further NRC Inspections Prior to December 1987. l l
2.2.3.1. Insoection Report 87-02. The next inspection conducted at the GTRR l
was documented in Inspection Report 87-02, dated March 9,1987 (GANE Exh. 35). j This was an inspection of radiation controls and environmental protection, in which two ,
violations (Severity LevelIV and V) were identified: (1) a failure to follow health physics and surveillance procedures for securing the primary coolant sample line and for i
counting liquid scintillation samples, and (2) a failure to have an approved procedure for sampling liquid waste tanks. The Staff determined that the Licensee proposed acceptable
' corrective actions, which included retraining personnel regarding procedural adherence, t
j and developing liquid waste sampling procedures and guidance for implementing j l
procedural changes. In addition, the Licer:see committed to report the violation for i
failure to secure the primary coolant sample line to the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) so that the issue could be addressed during subsequent audits of GTRR operations.
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 15.
2.2.3.2. Inspection Report 87-03. The next inspection which appeared to l present any significant issues involving the Licensee's management of the GTRR involved a radiation protection inspection in April 1987, as documented in Inspection Report ;
i i
r
l l-
\ :
l 87-03." During the inspection, numerous violations of NRC requirements were l l
identified, including a failure to label a container of radioactive material, failure to J perform radiological surveys (two examples), failure to wear protective clothing as required by procedure (two examples), failure to wear required dosimetry, failure to implement Health Physics monitoring as required by a Radiation Work Permit, failure to obtain review and approval of experiments (two examples), failure to complete the l
f Experimenter's Checklist as required by procedure (two examples), failure to respond to l
a criticality alarm, and failure to survey radiation levels during handling of a pneumatic transfer device containing an irradiated sample. -Several of these failures had been self-identified by the Licensee, but adequate corrective actions had not been taken. Id.
at 16.
2.2.3.3. The number of violations and examples of violations identified in Inspection Report 87-03 was considered by NRC Region II to be unusually large, and led the Staff to question whether there were programmatic problems with the Licensee's program. Tr.1763-64. Accordingly, the findings in IR 87-03 were considered for escalated enforcement action; and an enforcement conference was held with Licensee l
management on May 4,1987, to discuss these findings. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 16; i
Tr.1764. This enforcement conference also addressed violations which had been i
" Inspection Report 87-03 described the inspection findings of then NRC inspector
- Betty Revsin, who was later hired by Georgia Tech to serve as the Manager of the Office
' of Radiation Safety (MORS), following her departure from the NRC.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ m ___._ _ .. _ .- - _ _ _ -____ _.-__.__._ _._._ _ _ ___
e <
identified earlier that year, in inspection Reports 87-01 and 87-02. See GANE Exh. 31, at 1; Tr.1529-30,1764.
2.2.3.4. At the May 1987 enforcement conference, documented in Inspection Report 87-M (GANE Exh. 30), the Licensee outlined actions to improve management L
oversight and self-identification of problems, including a possible reorganization to place the radiation protection function under the authority and responsibility of the Director of the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC) and the possible merger of the campus-wide l Radiation Safety Committee with the Nuclear Safeguards Committee. Panel A, Post t
Tr.1740, at 16-17,18.2 2.2.3.5. Following the enforcement conference, NRC Region II issued five Severity Level IV violations based on the findings of this inspection. The Staff further l
noted that these violations, and the violations described in the Notices of Violation l
accompanying Inspection Reports 87-01 and 87-02, raised concerns about the Licensee's management control and involvement in implementation of the Licensee's programs for radiation protection, reactor operations, and control of experiments. Id. at 17. The Staff asked the Licensee to respond in a comprehensive way to the indications of management control problems by indicating the corrective actions it had taken or planned to take to correct the programmatic weaknesses which had been identified relating to health physics 3 Ms. Long stated that the May 1987 enforcenent conference seemed to her to be i unduly oriented toward health physics, rather than operational, problems. She agreed, i however, that this may have resulted from the fact that the two most recent inspections (which led to the conference) were in the area of health physics. Tr. 1527-28, 1729.
l o
c.,. - , , -
^
i
\ o r and operations, and to describe how it planned to improve the working relations between ;
the health physics and reactor operations groups. Id.; Tr.1764; GANE Exh. 31 at 1. !
2.2.3.6. In addition,' the Staff noted that the Licensee had inappropriately expressed concern at the enforcement conference, that its employees had reported safety concerns directly to the NRC without providing Licensee managers an opportunity to l
i resolve perceived or actual safety problems. The Staff expressed support for the concept that the most effective way to resolve such issues is to have them brought directly to line l management, and encouraged the Licensee to promote the type of working conditions in l
l which employees feel their concerns will be appropriately addressed; however, the Staff l
l l reminded the Licensee that its employees had the right to provide information directly to the NRC, protected by Section 210 [211] of the Energy Reorganization Act, as implemented by 10 C.F.R. f 50.7. GANE Exh. 31 at 2: Tr.1531-32.
l 2.2.3.7. In a reply to the Notice of Violation (NOV) dated June 15,1987, the Licensee identified difficulties in communications and coordination of work activities l
! between the reactor operations and health physics groups at the GTRR, and continuing l
quarrels between the two groups, as the cause for several of the violations. The Licensee l
l also noted that the health physics group had identified problems and violations of NRC l
requirements, but had not conununicated them to the Director of the NNRC. The Licensee stated that a proposed corrective action for these difficulties was a reorganization, that had been under consideration for about a year, which would require l
i
the Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety to report to the NNRC Director. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 17.32 2.2.3.8. Additional NRC inspections were conducted at the GTRR prior to December 1987, as documented in Inspection Reports 87-04 and 87-05. These inspections did not result in the identification of any regulatory violations or any significant issues concerning the Licensee's management of the GTRR. Id. at 18-19.
6 Several events did occur in this time frame, however, which would significantly affect l i
the Licensee's operations: A reorganization of the Licensee's health physics function in July 1987, a Cadmium-115 spill in August 1987, replacement of the health physics staff in early 1988, and issuance of two NRC enforcement Orders in January and March 1988.
We turn now to a consideration of these events.
(4) Reorganization of the Health Physics Function in July 1987.
2.2.4.1. In July 1987, the Licensee implemented an organizational change which placed the health physics unit under Dr. Karam's supervision; the reasons for this reorganization were described in considerable detail in the testimony of Dr. Karam.
Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 21-30. As described by Dr. Karam, some time after he
' became Director of the NNRC in 1983, he became concerned over the technical 1
32 The Staff later learned, as discussed in Inspection Report 87-08, that the Licensee had implemented a reorganization of its management structure (specified in the Licensee's technical specifications) without receiving a license amendment or NRC authorization to do so. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 18; Tr.1775. See discussion infra, at 40. In other respects, the Licensee took appropriate corrective actions for the specific violations.
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 18.
k i
qualifications of the radiation safety or health physics (HP) staff; this concern was shared by the university's Vice President for Research, Dr. Thomas Stelson, to whom Dr.
Karam reported. Id. at 16,21; Tr. 2723. The HP group then consisted of three persons, who had varying degrees of practical experience, but lacked formal academic c
qualifications. Of the two HP technicians, one had no college degree at all, while the other had a B.S. degree obtained by correspondence; in addition, the head of the unit (Robert Boyd, the RSO) had only received a bachelor's degree in mathematics. Id. at 21; Tr. 2488-89. Dr. Karam believed that this lack of formal academic training resulted in a shallowness of the HP staff's knowledge of radiation safety. Id. In addition, he believed that this affected their relations with the better-educated graduate students who i
were using the facility; and a number of student complaints were received concerning the HP staff's attitude. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 21-22.33 2.2.4.2. In addition, Dr. Karam felt even more concerned over the strained relationship which existed between the HP unit and the operations staff, which had existed before he became Director and seemed to get worse during the period of 1984-1986. Id. at 22. Dr. Karam was concerned that the level of hostility between the HP and operations units had come to exceed th3 normal level of tension that might be expected between such groups, and could reach the point of compromising safety. Id.
i l
l l
33 The RSO, Mr. Boyd, disagreed with this assessment, stating that the two HP technicians were experienced and capable in maintaining radiation safety. Tr. 2158-59.
. Although he recognized that they lacked academic qualifications, Mr. Boyd said they i
" knew how to do practical health physics." Tr. 2159.
I l
i at 22-23." While Dr. Karam tried various methods of defusing the level of hostility, nothing he did seemed to work; and it appeared to him that the attitudes were simply too entrenched. Id. at 23; Tr. 2768. See also Tr. 2397-98.
2.2.4.3. Dr. Karam indicated he was troubled by the fact that although he was responsible for the overall operation of the facility (including radiation safety for the reactor), the radiation safety staff did not report administratively to him; rather, the HP unit operated independently, reporting to Vice President Stelson. Dr. Karam testified that he was uncomfortable being held responsible for the work of a unit over which he had virtually no control, and that he felt he could better deal with the level of hostility between the HP and operations units if he had managerial control over both. Dr. Karam l
was also troubled by the fact that Mr. Boyd's health physics unit received very little
! supervision from anyone else at Georgia Tech. Id. at 24; Tr. 2769.35 Accordingly, in l
the Fall of 1986 he initiated discussions with Dr. Stelson about a possible reorganization l
l l
to bring about this change. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 24-25.
i
" Dr. Karam stated that there were many instances of conflict, and that he and l Mr. Boyd had each called the campus police on various occasions to restore peace. ;
Tr. 2778. Mr. Boyd confirmed that such conflict existed, marked by verbal hostility ;
between the health physics and operations units, and he said that the level of hostility had j escalated due to poor communications between the two units. Tr. 2398-99, 2457-58. l 35 Neither the Vice President nor the President had a strong technical background in nuclear reactors, nuclear safety, or health physics. Tr. 2780, 2182, 2280, 2367.
i Mr. Boyd agreed that he was essentially unsupervised by anyone prior to the July 1987 i reorganization, other than receiving some general direction from the chairmen of the Radiation Protection Committee and the former Nuclear Safeguards Committee not j related to the conduct of his day-to-day activities. Tr. 2367-68.
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l i
1 2.2.4.4. On January 26,1987, Dr. Karam transmitted a written recommendation l
to Dr. Stelson, formally recommending a reorganization whereby both the HP and operations units would be placed under his control, to better deal with quarrels which could lead to safety problems. Id. at 25; GT Exh. 5; see Tr.1829,1832. On May 6, i
l 1987, Dr. Karam transmitted a second memorandum to Dr. Stelson, pointing out that the GTRR's technical specifications placed overall responsibility for both groups in the Director, and that this requirement was not being met since the HP technicians were independent of any control by the Director. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 25-26; GT Exh. 6.
2.2.4.5. As discussed supra at 30-32, a significant number of HP problems had been identified in NRC Inspection Reports 87-02 and 87-03, and an NRC enforcement j
conference was held with Licensee management on May 4,1987, to discuss these l l
l findings. At this conference (documented in Inspection Report 87-06, GT Exh. 7), the Licensee outlined various actions to improve management oversight and self-identification of problems, including a possible reorganization which would place the responsibility for radiation protection under the Director of the NNRC; the target date for the proposed reorganization was stated to be July 1,1987. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 26; Panel A, q Post Tr.1740, at 16-17; GT Exh. 7 (Enclosure at 1). ,
< \
2.2.4.6. As further discussed supra at 32, following the May 1987 enforcement l conference, the NRC issued a notice of violation (NOV) to the Licensee based on IR 87-03, listing five Severity Ixvel IV violations. The NOV stated that the violations
! identified in Inspection Reports 87-01, 87-02 and 87-03, raised concerns about the Licensed's " management control and involvement in implementation of the Licensee's I
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . ~ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
e .
programs for radiation protection, reactor operations, and control of experiments."
GT Exh. 8 (GANE Exh. 31), at 1. Further, the NOV stated that the inspection findings indicated a "need for improved management control" of licensed activities to ensure adherence to NRC requirements and safe performance of licensed activities," and asked the Licensee to address "the root cause" for the violations and the corrective actions the Licensee had taken or proposed to take to correct the " programmatic deficiencies" which i had been identified, and to describe how it planned to " improve the working relations between the health physics and operations" groups. Id.
2.2.4.7. The emphasis placed by NRC personnel at the May 4 enforcement conference on "the need for improvement in management oversight of facility programs" l l
(GT Exh. 7, Enclosure at 1), and the Staff's expression of concern in the NOV over the need for " improved management control" (GT Exh. 8, at 1), led Dr. Karam to believe that the NRC Staff agreed with his belief that the reorganization he had proposed was '
l needed. See Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 26-27. However, regardless of whether Dr. Karam correctly interpreted the Staff's statements," he implemented the reorganization based upon his own determination that belief that there were no other realistic means of exercising management control and improving relations between the
" No evidence was presented which would indicate that the Staff believed this particular reorganization was needed, or that the Staff's expression of concern over the need for improved " management control" equated to Dr. Karam's belief that the Director needed to control the health physics unit. Rather, the Staff expressed its concern as a need for improved management control, and others persons comprised " management" other than the Director. For instance, as Dr. Karam observed, the university President j ,
was responsible for overall safety, and was " number one, at the top" of the Licensee's
- organizational chart. Tr. 2769-70.
1 I
i l ,- , ,,
e , 1 i l i
i l HP and operations units, other than by putting the HP unit under his administrative l
control. Id. at 27-28.
l l
l l 2.2.4.8. The Licensee responded to the NOV in a letter by Dr. Karam dated t
June 15,1987, in which he stated that he shared the NRC Staff's concern over the problem of management controls, and discus 5ed his proposed reorganization as a means of resolving this problem and improving working relations between the HP and operations units. Id. at 29; GT Exh. 9. In his letter, Dr. Karam noted that he had submitted a l l
memorandum to Dr. Stelson on May 6,1987, formally requesting a reorganization, and !
that he expected a final decision in about two weeks. GT Exh. 9, at 1.
2.2.4.9. Under the proposed reorganization, Georgia Tech would abolish the Office of Radiological Safety and establish a new Office of Radiation Safety as a unit of l
the NNRC. In the revised organizational structure, the Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety (MORS) would report to the Director of the NNRC, as did the managers of Reactor Operations, Hot Cell Operations and Coordinator of Experimental Research; in turn, the Director would report to the Vice President for Research, who would report to the President. In addition, the Chairman of the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) would hold the title of Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), the NSC would report to the NNRC Director (with a communication line to the President), and numerous changes l
would be made to the responsibilities and authority of the NSC, as specified in the TS. l Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 12-13; see Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 21. ;
j 2.2.4.10. The proposed reorganization was discussed within the university l community, and proved to be quite controversial. Indeed, it was opposed by the RSO l
1
, _. . ~ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
i . ,
i (Robert Boyd) and his staff, as well as by other university officials at Georgia Tech, and was disapproved by officials at two other university research reactors with whom Dr. Karam spoke. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 29-30, 31; Tr. 2391, 2778-79.
2.2.4.11. Nonetheless, on June 19,1987, the Acting President of the university (Dr. Henry Bourne, Jr.) approved the reorganization, to go into effect on July 1,1987.
Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 30. On or about July 1,1987, the Licensee implemented its l
organizational change - without the prior issuance of a license amendment by the NRC.
However, by letter dated August 6,1987 (i.e., one month after the reorganization had
! been implemented), the Licensee submitted a license amendment request proposing to amend the GTRR organizational structure. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 21; Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 12.27 2.2.4.12. Under this reorganization, Georgia Tech abolished the Office of Radiological Safety and establish a new Office of Radiation Safety as a unit of the NNRC. Mr. Boyd (the former RSO) became the MORS and commenced reporting to the facility director, Dr. Karam -- as did the Managers of Reactor Operations, Hot Cell Operations and the Coordinator of Experimental Research. In turn, the chart indicated 37 The Licensee's implementation of changes to the organizational structure specified in the TS, without prior NRC approval, is discussed in IR 87-08 as an allegation followup item and was identified as an apparent violation. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 14. A violation was not issued, because the Licensee had previously informed the Staff of its intent to reorganize, and the reorganization was under review in NRC headquarters at the time IR 87-08 was issued. Tr. 1792-93. See GANE Exh. 21 ;
j (Report Details at 7); GANE Exh. 30 (Enclosure); Tr. 3519-20. The reorganization was j subsequently disapproved in part and approved in part (with other modifications) by the i NRC, in License Amendment No. 7, issued on July 12, 1988. Panel A, Post Tr.1740,
- at 21; Staff Exh. 23. l
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-1 1
)
the Director would report to the Vice President for Research, and the Vice President l would report to the President. At the same time, Dr. Bourne appointed Dr. Kahn to serve as the Chairman of the new Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC), which replaced l
two former committees (Nuclear Safeguards and Radiation Protection). Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 12-13; see Tr. 2182. In addition, the Licensee requested changes to the TS for the NSC, including changes in the requirements for membership, quorum, areas of expertise, maximum number of members permitted to be from the GTRR staff, and the scope of the NSC's review and approval responsibilities; and the proposal showed that the NSC (with the NSC Chairman also holding the title of RSO) would report to the NNRC Director, with communication to the Office of the President. Id. at 12-14.38 2.2.4.13. Mr. Boyd testified in this proceeding on behalf of GANE. See Tr. 2120-2295,2348-2551. Mr. Boyd received a Bachelor's degree in mathematics. He has not received any academic degrees in health physics, but has intermittently taken some health physics classes in non-degree programs. Tr. 2124-25, 2128-29. Mr. Boyd is not a certified health physicist, although he is a certified radiation technologist. ]
Tr.2130, Mr. Boyd commenced working in a health physics capacity for Lockheed Georgia Nuclear Laboratories in 1958, and he continued to do so until 1964. From 1964 to 1973, Mr. Boyd worked at Georgia Tech as a Senior Health Physicist. In 1973, he j i
l 38 An organizational flow chart prepared at that time showed arrows leading to Dr. Karam from the NSC, the MORS, and the President -- creating the impression that the President and NSC would henceforth report to Dr. Karam. Tr. 2484-85. The flow chart's indication that the NSC and President would report to Dr. Karam was disapproved by the NRC Staff, and was revised by the university President; it was also adversely commented upon by Mr. Boyd in this proceeding. Tr. 2484-85.
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l became the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Georgia Tech, working at the NNRC and 1
elsewhere on campus, and was simultaneously the RSO for Georgia State University. l l
. Upon Georgia Tech's reorganization in 1987, he became the new MORS at Georgia l
Tech. Qualifications, Post Tr. 2122, at 1-3.
j 2.2.4.14. Mr. Boyd was highly critical of the 1987 reorganization, and of the j i l manner in which he and his staff were treated in the ensuing months. He stated that the two HP technicians who worked for him were experienced and capable in maintaining .
l radiation safety, Tr. 2158-59; and he placed blame for the HP-operations conflict on the
, SRO (William Downs) rather than the HP technicians. Further, Mr. Boyd perceived
! his new position as MORS to constitute a demotion from his previous position as the j university's " Radiation Safety Officer." Tr. 2215,2376. In addition, he stated that his l feelings were hurt by the reorganization and the fact that he was no longer appreciated, i
- Tr. 2184-85, 2357; that he was greatly insulted by the manner in which the university President treated him, Tr. 2183,2279-80; that he and his family suffered for a long time
, i
- as a result of Georgia Tech's treatment of him, Tr. 2185; and that he still feels deeply l i
1 i
j 3' In Mr. Boyd's view, Mr. Downs demonstrated a hostile attitude toward health physics or to anyone telling him what to do, showed a total neglect for compliance with j procedures, and was subject to repeated outbursts of anger. Tr. 2165-68. Mr. Boyd 4 stated that Dr. Karam agreed somewhat with his assessment of Mr. Downs and probably
. spoke with Mr. Downs about the problem; but that since Mr. Downs continued to act
- improperly, Mr. Boyd was left with the impression that no serious action was taken.
j Tr. 2169, 2171. As discussed infra, at 90-91, certain actions were taken against i Mr. Downs in 1994; Mr. Boyd, however, was not aware of any actions Dr. Karam may l have taken with regard to Mr. Downs after May 1988. Tr. 2170.
i s
- 9 about the ill treatment he believes he received from Georgia Tech management, Tr.2374.*
2.2.4.15. More substantively, Mr. Boyd believed that the radiation safety function must be independent from the facility director, and that subjecting the radiation safety function to the facility director's authority resulted in a situation of "the fox -
guarding the henhouse." Tr. 2175-76. Funher, he was dissatisfied with the fact that under the reorganization, the radiation safety function would no longer report to )
upper-level university management in the form of the Vice President or President, as he had previously done. Tr. 2177,2181-82; GANE Exhs. 42,43. Finally, he believed that designating the NSC Chairman as the RSO was contrary to established NRC guidance.
Tr. 2176.d' 2.2.4.16. The NRC Staff performed an initial review of the amendment request l after it was submitted, and found cenain aspects of the Licensee's proposal to be
- Mr. Boyd telephoned Dr. Copcutt shortly after Dr. Copeutt became the MORS (two years after Mr. Boyd left the NNRC), and expressed his discontent with the management of the GTRR. Tr. 1200-01. Dr. Copeutt perceived that Mr. Boyd had a deep-set dissatisfaction and bitterness toward the facility. Tr. 1261-62. While Mr. Boyd j denied that he consciously harbors any vindictiveness, Tr. 2376-79, his feelings about how he was treated during and after the reorganization by Georgia Tech management must be taken into account in evaluating the extent to which his testimony in this proceeding may be affected by bias. See Tr. 2375.
d' Mr. Boyd was incorrect in his belief that NRC guidance recommended against
- designating the NSC Chairman as the research reactor's RSO. The guidance referred to by Mr. Boyd was Draft Regulatory Guide DG-0005 (proposed as a revision to Regulatory Guide 10.5). This guidance document applies to materials licenses, and not to reactor l licenses; and, in any event, the guidance does not discourage this practice if the committee chairman has sufficient time to perform the duties assigned to him. See 3 Tr. 2482, 2516-17, 2519-20.
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l
[ -M-problematic; the Staff then communicated several questions to the Licensee. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 14. The more significant issues raised with the Licensee related to the l
proposal's failure to conform to the recommendations contained in ANSI /ANS-15.1,'2 by (1) having the NSC report to the facility director rather than to level 1 management, (2) providing too few review and audit functions for the NSC, (3) not specifying the !
minimum number of NSC members, and (4) not prohibiting NNRC staff members from l
being a majority of the required quorum of the NSC. Id. at 14-15. l 2.2.4.17. The Licensee then submitted a revised organizational chart for the GTRR TS, which addressed the Staff's questions. In the revised organization, the NSC would report to level 1 management (Office of the President) and would communicate with the NNRC Director. Also, the Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety would report to the NNRC Director for supervision and administrative reporting -- but would report to the NSC en safety and safety policy matters. Id. at 15. In addition, the Licensee revised its proposed amendment to expand the scope of the review and audit responsibilities of the NSC to activities generally suggested by ANSI /ANS-15.1, and it
'2 See discussion infra, at 109-112.
Mr. Boyd similarly noted that certain aspects of the July reorganization were clarified by the university President in February 1988, in a memorandum and general faculty meeting. First, the President indicated that the NSC was to report to the university President; second, the MORS was responsible, under a revised organizational chart, to report safety problems to the NSC (as well as to the facility director) -- and if the MORS was not satisfied with how safety problems were being treated by others, he was to inform the President or Vice President for Research of those matters. GANE Exh. 47, at 1; GANE Exh. 46. This latter statement responded to Mr. Boyd's concern that his reporting line to the NSC had been eliminated under the July reorganization.
l Tr. 2259, 2277, 2403-06, 2410-11; GANE Exhs. 46,47.
i l
l 1 withdrew its proposal to delete the requireme c ;r. no more than a minority of the NSC members would be from the GTRR staff. Id. at 15-17, 18. ,
2.2.4.18. The Staff reviewed the Licensee's revised amendment application, and determined that (a) the proposed organization, in which the radiation safety staff reports to the facility Director, is successfully in use at other non-power reactors to streamline facility operation; and (b) the arrangement of giving the Director day-to-day supervision of the radiation safety staff, giving oversight responsibility to the NSC, and having the MORS report to the NSC on issues concerning safety and safety policy, allows the Director to have management control over the radiation safety staff while allowing for independent oversight that enhances radiation safety. The proposed organization also generally met the guidance of ANSI /ANS-15.1; and the Staff determined that the review and audit responsibilities of the NSC had essentially been changed to those of ANSI /ANS-15.1. On this basis, the Staff approved the revised amendment application, and the proposed revisions were incorporated in the TS by Amendment No. 7, issued on July 12,1988. Id. at 18; see Staff Exh. 23."
l l " The Staff later reviewed the implementation of these new TS, and found that the j organization was consistent with that described in the TS. The NRC's letter of November 15, 1988, authorizing a resumption of reacte operations and experiments, further stated that the NSC members were aware of their expanded responsibilities, and that the NSC had sufficient depth and breadth of review to ensure adequate third-party i* oversight. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 19.
(5) The Cadmium-115 Spillin August 1987.
t i 2.2.5.1. On August 19,1987, a graduate student employed as a pan-time health l 1
physics technician (Susan Sellman) reported finding a slight amount of contamination 1
while conducting a daily wiping survey on the reactor containment building floor.'5 l This was recorded by the student on a Daily Masslinn Survey Report (GT Exh.11).
Subsequent investigation on August 19 by the HP technicians also revealed contamination on top of the reactor of 20 mrem per hour. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 39, 40; GT Exh.11; Staff Exh. 25 at 9; Staff Exhs. 27,28; Tr. 2255-56,3420-21, 3422,3423-24.
2.2.5.2. At about this time, the SRO (William Downs) informed Dr. Karam that
. one day earlier (i.e., August 18, 1987), he had poured radioactive topaz out of an aluminum container (having an inner cadmium jacket), into a glass beaker on top of the reactor, in the vicinity of a lead " coffin" or " pig." Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 39; Tr. 3429, 3437." In doing so, he found that the cadmium jacket had panially decomposed and had disintegrated into particulate form, as a result of its having been irradiated in the experiment. As a result, when Mr. Downs attempted to pour the topaz d5 The containment building is a round steel shell, approximately 82 feet in diameter, with a dome on top; entry is made through two heavy steel doors. The steel shell enables the building to be sealed off. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 10; Tr. 3428. The reactor itself is located in a large concrete structure within the containment building, which has various ports through which materials are inserted into the reactor for experimental purposes.
The control room is located at the top of the reactor near the area in which experiments are conducted, and a catwalk surrounds the entire interior perimeter of the reactor building. Id. at 11; GT Exh.11; Staff Exhs. 27,28; Tr. 3427-28,3430-31. !
" The cadmium jacket is intended to remove thermal neutrons before they reach the I
topaz. Irradiation of the cadmium during the experiment causes it to absorb neutrons and to become radioactive. Tr. 3201-02, 1*~s,
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into the glass beaker, some of the decomposed cadmium also poured out of the aluminum container, and fell outside the glass beaker onto the top of the reactor. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 39; Tr. 3201-02, 3203-04.
2.2.5.3. Decontamination effons then ensued, which Dr. Karam placed under the direction of Mr. Boyd and his health physics staff. Tr. 3421. Approximately five or six persons were involved in this effort, including Messrs. Downs and McDowell from the operations staff, HP technician Sharpe, and two or three other persons from the HP l
staff. GT Exh.12; Tr. 2513, 2515, 3422, 3438. On August 24, 1987, Mr. Sharpe l wrote a memorandum to Dr. Karam detailing the locations and results of the post-spill I
l decontamination efforts. The memorandum stated: "Decon efforts in the form of masslinn mopping, wet mopping, and wiping down were concentrated in the areas of the reactor top, catwalk, control room area, and the main floor" - indicating that decontamination efforts had taken place in all of those areas." A subsequent disc smear survey of the areas showed that, while certain localized hot spots remained, the decontamination efforts were successful. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 40; GT Exh.12, at 1; Tr. 3432.
2.2.5.4. Mr. Sharpe's memorandum describing the numerous and varied l locations in which decontamination efforts were carried out implied that the contamination i i i
" The various decontamination techniques described in this memo are generally ,
l performed in sequence, commencing with masslinn mopping of small areas to identify i
the presence of contamination, followed by " wet mopping" with soap and rinsing of any I contaminated areas, and then wiping the areas down with a damp or dry cloth or masslinn I
fabric. Tr. 3438. !
a ,
i
'i had become air-borne and was widespread throughout the containment building. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 40; Tr. 2256, 3432. However, very little other documentation of the contamination from this incident was ever identified. See Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 22; !
t Tr. 2503, 3433. This would later result in considerable dispute over the extent and l
! I l '
l location of the contamination in the containment building.
i
)
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i (6) The NRC's Discovery of the Cadmium Spill i and Dispatch of a SpecialInspection Team.
2.2.6.1 On December 16, 1987, NRC inspector George Kuzo was sent to the GTRR to review and evaluate allegations which had been received by NRC Region II j l
regarding the GTRR management reorganization that reportedly had been implemented and other matters. During this inspection, Mr. Kuzo was informed of the August 1987 Cadmium-115 contamination event; however, at the time of this portion of his inspection, {
l detailed descriptions and evaluations of the event were not available. On January 4-5, 1988, Mr. Kuzo continued this inspection, at which time he reviewed and evaluated GTRR Operations and Health Physics technical radiation protection activities directly related to the Cd-115 contamination incident. As a result of these efforts, Mr. Kuzo identified significant reactor operations and radiation safety issues that required further NRC attention. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 19.
2.2.6.2. Based upon the findings of this inspection and the past poor l performance of the Licensee, NRC Region II management expanded the inspection effort i
and dispatched a special inspection team to review selected GTRR program areas during i
4 I
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! 49 the period of January 14-22, 1988.'8 The inspection team found numerous examples of l failures to follow or to have adequate procedures to implement the Technical Specifications (TS), and/or violations of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 health physics requirements associated with the August 1987 experiment and the resulting Cd-115 contamination event. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 19-20. These deficiencies involved both operational and health physics issues related to the pre-experiment review and calculation of dose rate !
levels for the topaz and cadmium container, as well as health physics issues related to post-accident radiation surveys and evaluation of personal exposures. Tr.1778.
I I
'8 Staff witness George Kuzo, the NRC inspector who had been assigned to inspect l
the Licensee's actions related to the 1987 Cadmium-115 spill and the adequacy of its related health physics efforts, served as a member of the NRC's special inspection team.
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 5, 6. This special inspection team was led by Staff witness Paul E. Fredrickson, who was assigned to serve as the team leader in January 1988.
Commencing in August 1988, Mr. Fredrickson alsc served as team leader for the special
- inspection that reviewed the Licensee's compliance with the terms of the January and March 1988 Orders (discussed infra, at 58-60).
d' j Mr. Boyd believed that his HP staff received an unfair amount of blame for the
l Tr. 2233-34, 2434. While he conceded that a large majority of the violations identified i
by the NRC were in the area of health physics, Tr. 2439-42, 2444-45, 2447, 2451, he asserted that Dr. Karam was "in charge of health physics" (and of Mr. Boyd's own HP staff) under the July 1987 reorganization. Tr. 2445, 2447. Mr. Boyd's testimony demonstrates his deep hostility to the 1987 reorganization. For his part, Dr. Karam did not dispute the health physics errors committed by Mr. Downs and the HP staff, as i discussed in the text above. With respect to operational errors, Dr. Karam stated that the l change in the physical form of the cadmium had not been anticipated; he conceded that i Mr. Downs failed to follow proper procedures in exposing the sample to a greater total
- number of megawatt hours than was authorized by the experiment form; and he stated l that Mr. Downs was careless in pouring the sample into the glass beaker, allowing a i portion of the cadmium to fall outside the beaker. Tr. 3202-03, 3216.
O ,
2.2.6.3. In general, the inspection findings identified continuing poor i performance by Licensee personnel regarding routine operations and health physics activities. Specific technical findings included a failure to have adequate procedures and j to follow procedures for handling and manipulating experiment material arxl for surveying and evaluating potential radiological hazards; a failure to conduct adequate radiation i surveys of the reactor building, and of personnel and their property potentially exposed 1
to radioactive contamination; a failure to conduct adequate air sampling and bioassay
]
analyses to evaluate personnel exposure to airborne radioactive contamination during experiment manipulation and decontamination activities in the reactor containment building; and a failure to document and maintain records of the radiological ,
contamination and personnel surveys which were conducted. By the time of the inspection, a complete and thorough evaluation of the August 1987 contamination incident j
had not been completed by the Licensee, nor had corrective measures been implemented l
to prevent recurrence during future experiments; the Licensee's failure to evaluate the i
incident and to implement corrective actions by the time of the inspection were perceived to indicate a lack of management involvement and control of operations and health j physics activities -- which had been consolidated under the facility director's control in I
1 the July 1987 reorganization. Id. at 20-21; Tr.1835, 3219-20. The lack of management l
involvement and control identified in IR 87-08 was perceived by the Staff to be detrimental to the safety of the facility. Tr.1782.
3 2.2.6.4. During this inspection, NRC Staff members determined that working l attitudes between health physics and operations had continued to deteriorate, and informal l
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training rather than procedures were used for many routine tasks. Operations personnel appeared satisfied with the NNRC Director's management efforts, but health physics ;
personnel indicated that the Director was involved too much in day-to-day health physics i
activities to the detriment of those activities.5 The inspection report concluded that ;
l there had been no significant improvement in the Licensee's performance since the May 1987 enforcement conference, and that the management control problem continued.
Panel A, Post Tr 1740, at 21; Staff Exh.12, at 1-2.51 l
l 2.2.6.6. Particularly troubling to the NRC Staff were certain findings it reached l
l concerning the surveys and bioassay performed by Licensee health physics personnel in response to the August 1987 cadmium-115 contamination event. In the course of his inspection, Inspector Kuzo identified numerous concerns regarding a lack of adequate health physics (HP) procedures and improper radiation protection practices associated i
5 At the same time, the Licensee had added an NNRC Deputy Director, which NRC Region II viewed as a positive development because the individual selected had an operations background and had not been involved in the prior conflict between the HP and operations staffs; and establishment of this position would assist the Licensee in improving its procedures and training. Tr. 1888-89. The Staff was not concerned that this individual later resigned from the facility, or that the position has been vacant from April 1992 until the present, because (a) there has been no degradation in Licensee performance since the Deputy Director resigned; (b) the position was most needed to assist in resolving the problems which existed at that time (involving revisions to procedures, programs to ensure regulatory compliance, and the functioning of the organization), and those problems have since been resolved; and (c) there was no licensing or TS requirement for the position to be filled. Tr. 1891, 2981-84.
i 58 This inspection also raised concerns over the Licensee's proposed organizational change, which, the NRC inspectors learned during this inspection, had been implemented
- on July 1,1987, without the prior issuance of a license amendment. Panel A, Post
! Tr.1740, at 21: Tr.1838. This matter is discussed supra, at 40.
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with the HP staff's surveys and bioassays conducted in response to the August 1987 .
cadmium-115 contamination event. These concerns formed the bases for the majority of i
( violations issued for failure to have adequate procedures and failure to follow procedures f
for surveying and evaluating potential radiological hazards associated with the event and i i
subsequent decontamination activities. Id. at 22; see Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 42. i I
2.2.6.7. To properly evaluate the hazards present in the reactor containment building as a result of the Cadmium-115 contamination event, the extent and levels of contamination needed to be accurately determined. However, the documented surveys l
l conducted and used by the Licensee to identify the extent and amount of contamination :
1-l - were limited and qualitative, and did not allow a proper understanding of how much ;
l contamination may have been present in the reactor building or which areas of that building were contaminated. Id.; Tr. 1795- % , 1799, 1886, 1906. Thus, the Licensee provided the initial results for limited masslin wipe surveys taken within the reactor building, but any additional surveys that may have been conducted were not documented.
Such limited and qualitative surveys did not allow adequate evaluations of the hazards within the reactor building which resulted from the contamination event, as is required l
by the applicable sections of 10 C.F.R. Part 20. This lack of detailed survey data and the failure to conduct air sampling to evaluate the potential hazards to personnel from the potential re-suspension of loose contamination during the cleanup efforts were identified as additional examples of improper radiation protection program practices and activities
- which did not meet 10 C.F.R. Part 20 requirements. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 22-23.
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2.2.6.8. Technical inadequacies also were identified in this inspection regarding personal contamination surveys and bioassays performed for the operator involved in the contamination event. These inadequacies pertained to (a) the chest (in vivo) survey of the l
operator which was conducted, and (b) the collection and analysis of the operator's urine (in vitro) sample for Cd-115 used to evaluate potential internal deposition of contamination. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 23-24; Tr.1800,1802; Tr.1803-05.
2.2.6.9. In Inspection Report 87-08, the Staff also determined that the Licensee l
i had not conducted adequate surveys and analysis of possible air-borne contamination in August 1987, after the incident occurred. Staff Exh.12, at 7,9; Tr.1884,1885-86.
The survey results reviewed by the NRC included the August 24,1987 memorandum to Dr. Karam from HP technician Paul Sharpe, who had served as the Decontamination Supervisor. (See discussion supra, at 47). This memorandum indicated that the cadmium l
used in the experiment was highly contaminated, that smearable (loose) contamination became somewhat airborne, and that decontamination activities were conducted successfully for the reactor top, catwalk, control room and main floor areas of the reactor building. Discussions by the NRC inspector with both Health Physics (HP) and Operations staff corroborated the information regarding the extent of the contamination provided in the memoranda. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 22-23.
l 2.2.6.10. Dr. Karam disputed the Staff's view that the contamination may have
- become air-borne. He testified that several months after receiving Mr. Sharpe's i
l August 24,1987 memorandum (GT Exh.12), he " discovered" that the memorandum was i
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" deliberately" incorrect in its suggestion that there was air-borne and widespread l i
l l contammation. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 40,43-45; Tr. 32%.52 2.2.6.11. Dr. Karam's conclusion that the contamination hau not become air-borne was based on an assertion that an air sample analysis in August 1987 showed no contamination, Staff Exh.12 (Report Details, at 8); and on an analysis he conducted .
on or about January 22,1988, after the conclusion of the exit meeting held concerning :
Inspection Report 87-08 (i.e., about five months after the Cadmium spill). In that i analysis, he cut out samples of certain air filters in the containment ventilation system, and found no trace of air-borne contamination resulting from the August spill. Id. at 44; Tr.3439. Dr. Karam believed it was technically possible to ascertain the extent of air-borne contamination through his January 1988 air filter sample analysis, because other radioisotopes of cadmium with longer half-lives would have been present along with the ,
more predominant but short-lived Cadmium-115 (with a half-life of 53.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />), and l l
would still have been detectable five months later -- and he cited, as an example, l !
l 52 Adding to Dr. Karam's belief that Mr. Sharpe's August 24,1987 memorandum was " deliberately" incorrect, and that the spill had been confined to a small area, was his belief that the HP staff had failed to give the NRC inspectors a copy of the initial masslinn survey conducted on August 19,1987 (GT Exh.11), prior to the inspection exit meeting which was conducted on January 22,1988. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 43-45; Tr. 3206. By letter dated January 22,1988 (GT Exh.14), Dr. Karam provided to the r
Staff a copy of that survey. Tr. 1879,1881. The NRC Staff had not previously received a copy of this survey, although Mr. Kuzo had asked the Licensee's staff (including Dr. Karam, Mr. Boyd, and the HP technicians), on January 5,1988, for any information concerning the event. Tr. 1882-83, 1903-04. The reason for this delay was never l explained; in any event, however, as the Staff witnesses stated, this initial masslinn survey was of limited usefulness, and it failed to prove the extent of contamination present in the reactor building either on August 19 or during subsequent decontamination )
activities. See Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 23; Tr.1886,1906.
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l I l Cadmium-109 (with a half-life of 453 days). Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 44-45; Tr.1801, l l
1887, 3208-11, 3467-69. Because no such contamination was detected, Dr. Karam inferred that there had been no air-borne contamination. Tr. 3207,3209,3439,3469-70.
! 2.2.6.13. While Dr. Karam disputed the accuracy of the August 24,1987 memo i prepared by Mr. Sharpe, he could offer very little persuasive evidence to support his i view that it was incorrect. Apart from Mr. Sharpe's memo, no other documentation of the surveys conducted during this effort could be found. Tr. 3433. Dr. Karam spoke with the operations personnel who were involved in the decontamination (Messrs. Downs and McDowell) about the locations in which contamination was found but, apparently, l
they did indicate that Mr. Sharpe's memorandum had incorrectly stated the extent of l
l contamination found. Further, while they relied on the surveys conducted by Mr. Sharpe l
to identify areas of contamination, neither they nor any of the three or four health physics
- . persons involved in the decontamination effort indicated at any time that they had been I I
told to decontaminate areas which were not contaminated. See Tr. 2513, 2515, 3434, i l
3436-37.53 Thus, absent any other documentation, there does not appear to be any l L l convincing reason to doubt the accuracy or reliability of Mr. Sharpe's memorandum. j l
2.2.6.14. In Inspection Report 87-08, the NRC Staff rejected Dr. Karam's
! reliance on the August 1987 air sample analysis, because the only area sampled was l
5' Further, radiological surveys performed at the GTRR in connection with the l
decontamination efforts included the use of a Geiger counter which produces an audible
- clicking sound to indicate the presence of contamination -- suggesting that the operations
! and HP staffs would have readily known if they were being told to decontaminate j uncontaminated areas. Tr. 2513-14, 3434-35.
t
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located in an area distant from where the cadmium spill occurred. Staff Exh.12 (Report i Details, at 9). Dr. Karam's January 1988 analysis of air filter samples is unreliable as l well, in that the location of the ventilation system blower above and behind the area in l
l which the cadmium spill occurred, and the location of the air returns below that area, 1
suggest that air currents may well have transported the cadmium from the reactor top down to the reactor floor. Also, the niters are located well inside the duct system, approximately 20 to 30 or 40 feet from the air returns; and Dr. Karam sampled only p.m i
layer, the " pre-filter" -- which is the least efficient of the three filter layers which are lined up in the ventilation system. GT Exh.11; Staff Exhs. 27, 28; Tr. 2511-12, 3441, 3444-50, 3472-74. Further, while some cadmium may have simply fallen from the top of the reactor to the adjacent floor area below, a consensus opinion was that it had been transponed to the floor by a combination of having fallen and having been transported l
by air currents; and Dr. Karam recognized that the possibility of transportation by air current could not be ruled out. Tr. 2511-12, 3423-25, 3465.
(7) Reportability of the Cadmium-115 Event.
l 2.2.7.1. As discussed above, the Licensee did not report the Cadmium spill to
- the NRC, and the NRC did not learn of it until Mr. Kuzo's December 1987 inspection.
l Dr. Karam explained he did not view the incident as a reportable event, in that the level l
of contamination did not appear to involve a significant health risk. It funher appeared
- to him that decontamination efforts would be neither dif5 cult nor extended in time.
I Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 40-41. He stated that he did, however, report the spill to the i
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-l Chairman of Georgia Tech's Nuclear Safeguards Committee and its ex officio RSO f (Dr. Kahn); that Dr. Kahn likewise did not consider the spill to be a sufficiently serious i
event as to be reportable to the NRC; and that the MORS (Mr. Boyd) agreed with this l
! assessment. Id. at 41."
l 2.2.7.2. For his part, Mr. Boyd testified that he did not view the Cadmium spill to be a reportable even', t in that it did not involve serious health impacts -- but that a l prudent course of action would have been to report the event to the NRC, in that this would have averted the Licensee's subsequent difficulties with the NRC. Tr. 2198-99, 2253, 2259, 2436-37. Further, because it was not a reportable event, Mr. Boyd stated his opinion that the failure to report the event to the NRC did not constitute improper '
withholding of information. Tr.2436. Mr. Boyd's view thus contradicts GANE's !
assertion that the Licensee's failure to report the Cadmium-115 event to the NRC prior to NRC inspector Kuzo's December 1987 inspection constitutes a significant failure by the Licensee's management.
2.2.7.3. The NRC Staff provided its views as to whether the Licensee was required to report the Cadmium-115 event to the Commission. Due to the limited data i
j " Mr. Boyd stated that Dr. Kahn called him on November 17, 1987, and wanted to speak to him about the Cadmium spill; according to Mr. Boyd's notes, Dr. Kahn " wanted l
to know details because he hadn't been informed." Tr. 2258-59. Mr. Boyd stated that l before talking to Dr. Kahn he requested, and received, permission form Dr. Karam to
- do so. Tr. 2259. Mr. Boyd's testimony tends to corroborate Dr. Karam's statement that he had informed Dr. Kahn of the cadmium incident (otherwise, Dr. Kahn would not have known to call Mr. Boyd to obtain further, detailed information). While this testimony l indicates that Dr. Karam had not informed Dr. Kahn of the " details" of the incident, it also indicates that Dr. Karam was not attempting to conceal the incident from the NSC.
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available to the Staff, definite conclusions regarding the reportability of the actual hazards !
present could not be made by the NRC inspectors. However, after careful consideration, i
based on estimated personnel exposures, follow-up surveys of the reactor facility, personnel involved and their property, the Staff determined that the event was not reportable under either the Licensee's Technical Specifications or 10 C.F.R. Pan 20
- requirements. Panel A, Post 1740, at 24; Tr.1784,1785-86. q l 4 2.2.7.4. We find no basis to disagree with the Licensee's and Staff's conclusion i
that the Cadmium-115 event did not constitute a matter which the Licensee was required to report to the NRC. Accordingly, while Mr. Boyd may be correct in his belief that a l
l prudent coursc. 'f action would have been to report this event to the NRC, the Licensee's failure to do so did to' w-z.titute a regulatory violation and does not provide any basis to deny or condition the renewal of its license.
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(8) The NRC's Order Modifying the License (January 1988) and Confirmatory Order Modifying the License (March 1988).
l 2.2.8.1. On January 20,1988, the NRC issued an " Order Modifying License, l
Effective Immediately," which suspended all further irradiation experiments. Staff l Exh.13; Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 25. The Order stated that the Licensee's actions after the May 1987 enforcement conference had not been sufficient to address the management control problems, which continued. The Order described the specific operations and health physics violations related to the August 1987 contamination event, and stated that the Licensee had failed to complete a thorough review of the event l
- regarding its cause(s), and had not taken any corrective measures to prevent recurrence 4
1
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l L during future experiments. The Order required the Licensee to cease utilization of the '
! reactor facility for any irradiation experiments until the following requirements were met: l i
! (1) assessment of management controls over facility l operations; i (2) review of records for similar occurrences and identification of root causes; (3) assessment of personnel exposures during the contamination and decontamination; 1
(4) review of facility health physics and operating procedures for inadequacies; l
(5) identification and scheduling of corrective actions; (6) development and implementation of a training l program; and l (7) submission of the results of these assessments and reviews to the NRC for review.
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 25.
2.2.8.2. On February 15, 1988, the President of Georgia Tech directed the immediate suspension of all reactor operations pending adequate resolution of all safety l questions. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 45-46.
l 2.2.8.3. An NRC enforcement conference was held with Licensee management i
on February 23,1988. During this conference, the NRC representatives presented their view that a serious management problem existed at the NNRC, which was not limited to the facility's health physics organization. The Staff also expressed concern as to whether i certain recent changes made at the facility, involving the replacement of health physics I
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personnel and the addition of an operator, would really solve the Licensee's principal problems; and the Staff stated that the Licensee's management needed to provide an expectation of excellence by direction and example. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 25-26; Tr.1806. The NRC representatives also expressed the view that the Licensee's failure l
l
! to coordinate survey data collection related to the cadmium incident, and to thoroughly I
investigate the incident and evaluate its seriousness, indicated a lack of effectiveness of l
l Licensee management. Further, the Staffindicated that Georgia Tech's lack of regulatory sensitivity and its communications with the NRC did not compare favorably with other l major research reactors located in NRC Region II. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 26.
l l 2.2.8.4. During the course of the enforcement conference, the Licensee's President stated that he had decided the reactor would not restart until the Licensee and l
the NRC were both convinced that operations and health physics activities could be safely conducted; and the Licensee presented an action plan to the NRC. Id. at 26.
2.2.8.5. On March 17, 1988, based on the Licensee-initiated shutdown of the l facility and its commitment to conduct an independent evaluation of the nuclear reactor program, the NRC Staff issued a Confirmatory Order Modifying License (Staff Exh.13).
This Order set out additional conditions that had to be met prior to restart of the reactor. ;
l These conditions were: (a) the Licensee was to submit a written identification of the root I causes of problems that could impact safe operations of the reactor, and (b) the President of Georgia Tech was to submit to the NRC a written description of the corrective actions taken to resolve the problems, as well as the reasons he believed the facility should be j allowed to restart. Id. at 26-27; Staff Exh.14 (GT Exh.15).
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! l (9) Termination of Two Health Physics Technicians, and investigation by the NRC's Office ofInvestigations. l l
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2.2.9.1. The July 1987 reorganization, discussed supra, at 39-41, caused J l considerable animosity and hard feelings at the GTRR, particularly among the health j 1
physics staff which was then headed by Robert Boyd -- whose title was changed from 1
RSO to MORS, and who thereafter was required to report to the NNRC director, in whose hands the responsibility for radiation safety had been placed. GT Exh. 6 l (Figure 1); GANE Exhs. 42, 43.55 l
l 2.2.9.2 Within a three-month period following the July 1 reorganization, a l
number of incidents occurred at the NNRC which led Dr. Karam to believe that someone on the GTRR staff was engaged in " dirty tricks" or deliberate acts to damage the facility or impair its ability to function. These acts included damage to an expensive liquid i scintillation counter, the erasure of floppy diskettes containing important data, the theft of two cases of batteries, placing a bag of human feces in a staff refrigerator, and slashing a large container of algicide causing the contents to spill on the floor. More significantly, in September 1987 a 500-watt light bulb above the 20-foot deep Cobalt Storage Pool was smashed,56 causing glass fragments to fall into the pool where they l
l 55 Dr. Karam recognized, during the evidentiary hearings, that the reorganization had l produced further problems and did not improve the pre-existing situation. Tr. 2773.
l j 56 The Licensee is authorized under its State licerse to possess a specified quantity l of Cobalt-60, which it stores in a " Cobalt Pool" under approximately 20 feet of water.
- From there, the cobalt is transported by mechanical means to a " hot cell," where various i items are exposed to the gamma rays it emits. Special windows (composed of two plates
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of lead glass, each two inches thick, with a transparent but dense liquid Zinc Bromide solution in between) permit the process to be observed. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 11. l l
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l could interfere with the water filtration system; and three safety switches in the cobalt I
storage area were turned off at the same time, thereby disabling the associated safety alarms which were required under certain conditions to aven human exposure to lethal Cobalt radiation. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 31-33.57 Although there had been hostilities at the NNRC prior to the reorganization, these events were more serious than any incident that had occurred previously. Tr. 2785, 2786.
2.2.9.3. Dr. Karam believed that the act of turning off the three Cobalt Pool switches was extremely serious from a safety standpoint, and was consistent with sabotage. Accordingly, he consulted with the Campus Police Chief (who also served as Deputy Chairman of the NSC), who suggested the use of a polygraph test. Dr. Karam then discussed polygraph testing with the entire NNRC staff in late September 1987; all agreed to taking the test, except for the two radiation safety (HP) technicians in Mr.
Boyd's unit -- whose response was, "see our lawyer." Id. at 33-34; Tr. 2786, 2788.
2.2.9.4. The two HP technicians' resistance to taking the polygraph examination adversely affected Dr. Karam's confidence in them and caused him to wonder if they had been involved in these incidents. In the following two months, hostilities between the HP and operations units continued. It also seemed to Dr. Karam that the two HP technicians' work performance was declining, that they were " disgruntled," that their attitude s' Two of the three switches monitored the level of the Zine Bromide solution in the
" hot cell" windows, while the third measured the level of water in the Cobalt Pool.
When turned on, the switches would set off an alarm in the NNRC and the Georgia Tech Police Station if the level of Zine Bromide solution in the hot cell windows, or the level of water in the Cobalt Pool, fell below a certain level. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 32-33.
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l bordered on insubordination, and that this could affect nuclear safety. Id. at 34-35; Tr 2789-90. Dr. Karam spoke about this situation to Dr. Stelson, who stated that he had heard similar statements about the HP staff from the NRC. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 35; l Tr. 2791.5s l 2.2.9.5. On December 9,1987, Dr. Karam advised Dr. Stelson that he believed l the situation had deteriorated to the point that nuclear safety was involved, and in his opinion the HP staff should be replaced as quickly as possible with interim personnel.
Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 36; Staff Exh. 25, at 14." Dr. Stelson suggested waiting :
P until January 1988 when a new Associate Director was expected to join the staff, and they agreed to speak to Dr. Kahn, Chairman of the NSC, about the situation. Dr. Kahn suggested that an assessment be obtained from an industrial psychologist prior to taking - l the contemplated personnel actions, to which they agreed. Drs. Karam and Stelson then contacted Dr. R. Michael O' Bannon, an industrial psychologist, and asked him to perform this assessment. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 36; GT Exh.10, at 1,4.
ss Dr. Karam also stated that the two HP technicians were adversely affecting Mr. Boyd's decisiveness and effectiveness; and he believed that removing the two HP technicians would help to eliminate the strife at the facility. Tr. 2773,2774. In contrast, Mr. Boyd believed that the university's reason for replacing the HP staff was vindictiveness on the part of Dr. Stelson, due to Mr. Boyd's having closed down a (State-licensed) hot cell operation in early 1987, causing the loss of a $4,000 contract.
Tr. 2181, 2474-77.
" This recommendation to replace the two HP technicians was made one week j
before the commencement of Mr. Kuzo's inspection on December 16,1987, thus supporting the Licensee's assenion that their termination was based upon the i HP-operations conflict and the HP technicians' conduct, rather than on a belief that they had reported problems to the NRC during Mr. Kuzo's inspection. Tr. 3490,3491. See ,
, Staff Exh. 25, at 14-15.
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-M-l 2.2.9.6. TM NRC inspection which commenced on December 16,1987, led to the identification of nuineous violations in the areas of operations and health physics l
l related to the Cadmium spid ud resulted in the NRC's issuance of the January 20,1988, -
l Order suspending reactor experiments. These events further degraded Dr. Karam's confidence in the HP staff -- whom he also believed had provided damaging (and arguably inaccurate) information to the NRC. Following the NRC's inspection " exit l interview" on January 22, 1988, Dr. Karam concluded that removal of the HP staff should be expedited. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 42-43,44; Staff Exh. 25 at 24-27.
2.2.9.7. At about the same time, Dr. O' Bannon performed the requested psychological assessment of the GTRR organization; and he reported his conclusions to Dr. Karam, orally on February 5-6, and in writing on February 18,1988. GT Exh.10; l
Staff Exh. 25 at 17. Dr. O' Bannon concluded that Mr. Boyd's management of the HP ;
unit was weak and that he was not exercising normal managerial control or setting guidelines for appropriate behavior on the part of the two HP technicians. Dr. O' Bannon i l
told Dr. Karam that the level of hostility between the HP and operations units was too -
great and too entrenched to be repaired, that the HP staff showed a defiant attitude with ;
no desire to correct the situation, and that he surmised that one of the HP technicians l (Mr. Millspaugh) was likely to have been involved in the " dirty tricks" referred to above.
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Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 37-38; Tr. 3197. Dr. O' Bannon recommended that the entire l
HP staff should be removed from the NNRC and assigned elsewhere, and that a new
! manager of the HP staff should be appointed to replace Mr. Boyd -- finding there to be 4
- a lack of effective first-line management of the health physics group, which constituted
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a major factor contributing to the conflict between the operations and health physics groups. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 37; GT Exh.10 at [ unnumbered] 4."
2.2.9.8. On February 11,1988, Dr. Karam handed letters of termination to the two health physics technicians, Paul Sharpe and Steven Millspaugh, effective February 25, 1988.6 Three days later, however, following discussions with counsel, Dr. Stelson rescinded the termination notices, pending a hearing; and the HP technicians were thereafter reassigned to other duties outside the NNRC, Staff Exh. 25, at 20-21; l Tr.3198.
i l 2.2.9.9. Also in February 1988, Mr. Boyd learned that the university wanted to reassign him to other duties. GANE Exh. 51, at 2; Tr. 2178-79." In May 1988, Mr.
Boyd left the NNRC, under an arrangement worked out between Georgia Tech and Georgia State University, to which Mr. Boyd consented. According to Dr. Karam, this ,
- Staff witness Kuzo confirmed that the Licensee's health physics staff had problems (as demonstrated by the number of violations issued for poor performance by that group), !
l and that some sort of action had to be taken to address that situation. Tr.1898.
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! Mr. Boyd said he was working out of town when he received word that his two I health physics technicians had been fired, and this news came as a shock to him. I Tr. 2178-79. Nonetheless, Mr. Boyd stated that he, himself, had previously l recommended to Dr. Karam that one of these HP technicians be removed from the l GTRR, due to the conflict with the operations staff. Tr. 2180.
l
" Dr. Karam testified that as early as 1986, he had discussed with Dr. Stelson the desirability of replacing Mr. Boyd with someone who possessed doctoral level training in Health Physics, and to replace others on the staff as well. He stated that a decision was made to first hire a new Ph.D. level manager, and to make any further changes to
- the HP staff after obtaining that individual's input. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 28-29.
, Nonetheless, Dr. Karam stated that he had tried to protect Mr. Boyd's employment at the
- university, in the face of opposition by others, Tr. 2774-75; and Mr. Boyd agreed that Dr. Karam had tried to protect him from being fired, prior to about December 1987, but
- that Dr. Karam's attitude changed later, Tr. 2363-64.
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reassignment was based upon a determination that Mr. Boyd was not cooperating with l GTRR management. GANE Exh. 70; Tr. 2185-87, 2354, 2358-61, 3275-77.63 l 2.2.9.10. The removal of the two HP technicians from the NNRC would result l
l in the filing of a civil action by Messrs. Sharpe and Millspaugh, against Drs. Stelson and Karam, in which they asserted, inter alia, that their termination was in retaliation for their having provided information to the NRC about regulatory violations at the GTRR, l
and that this constituted harassment and intimidation in violation of Section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851, and a violation of their " free speech" l
rights. Staff Exh. 25. Ultimately, that action would result in a judicial finding in 1991 that one factor in the termination of Messrs. Sharpe and Millspaugh was the fact that during the NRC inspection which commenced in December 1987, they informed the NRC of the August 1987 Cadmium spill, leading to the issuance of the NRC's January 1988 1
Order suspending experiments at the facility. Millspaugh v. Karam, Civil Action No.1:88-cv-312-ODE (N.D. Ga., 10/31/91)(slip op. at 24-25, 27-28), a,[f'dper curiam 1
63 Dr. Karam cited one example of this lack of cooperation, in which he said Mr. Boyd resisted developing a tracking system to account for all radioactise materials I on campus. Tr. 2776. In contrast, Mr. Boyd stated that he had put together a list of all locations on campus having radioactive materials, but refused to comply with a request by Dr. Karam that he lower the reported levels of contamination at the GTRR -- telling
! Dr. Karam that if he wanted to change the report he should do so and sign it himself, Tr. 2244-45; Dr. Karam denied Mr. Boyd's statement that he had asked Mr. Boyd to change the numbers, Tr. 3509. Ilowever, regardless of whether Dr. Karam requested that the numbers be changed or whether they were correctly reported in the first place, it is apparent that Mr. Boyd was not cooperating well with Dr. Karam.
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l sub nom. Sharpe v. Karam, 976 F.2d 744 (11th Cir.1992) (Staff Exhs. 25 and 26)-
I Tr. 3457-58." l l
2.2.9.11. The NRC also received allegations concerning the termination of the j i
two HP technicians, and an investigation was commenced by the NRC's Office of I Investigations (OI) at the request of the Regional Administrator of NRC Region II, to !
1 determine, inter alia, whether their dismissal constituted unlawful harassment and i
intimidation. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 29-30; Tr.1842. '
1 2.2.9.12. On August 11,1988, OI issued an extensive report summarizing the findings and conclusions of its investigation. Id. at 30. The OI Report reached the l
folicwing conclusions:
[T]he investigation revealed evidence to indicate that i a severe state of disharmony and conflict exists between the Operations and HP staffs at the GTRR facility. This condition appears to have escalated and intensified since July 1, 1987, when all staff personnel, including HP employees, were placed under the same management structure. The involuntary dismissal of two HP employees in February 1988, was explained by management as a necessary action to " upgrade the HP program" but was viewed by the HP staff as retaliation for reporting and discussing safety concerns with the NRC. There appears to be sufficient indications to suonort the
" Dr. Karam testified that he and Dr. Stelson " prevailed" in the litigation -- in the sense that they were not required to pay monetary damages to the Messrs. Sharpe and Millspaugh and were not required to reinstate them to their former health physics l positions at the NNRC as the two former HP technicians had requested. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 39; Tr. 3451-52,3485. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that the litigation resulted in a judicial determination that retaliation had occurred, and the Court enjoined Dr. Stelson (and all persons acting in concert with him) from taking any future retaliatory action against the plaintiffs. Staff Exh. 25 at 27-28; Tr. 3462-63.
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I perception of these individuals and to oronerly conclude that one of the reasons for the involuntary separation of the two HP technicians is soecifically related to discussine or reportine potential health and safety concerns with NRC inspection officials.
Although the investigation failed to disclose 1 intentional, contrived violations of regulations and license requirements, there was overwhelming l evidence to support severe mismanagement, l negligence, and carelessness by an Operations l employee and a haphazard and unorganized approach i concerning the performance and completion of some
, GTRR activities.
l Report of Investigation, OI Case No. 2-88-003 (GANE Exh. 33), Enclosure at 6; 1
i emphasis added."
2.2.9.13. On September 19, 1988, an enforcement conference was held with L
Georgia Tech's management to discuss the OI report. At this conference, the NRC
! representatives expressed concern that the dismissal of the health physics staff could be construed as reprisal, and seemed to show that Georgia Tech had not adequately evaluated the performance of NNRC management in this and other matters. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 31.
I l 2.2.9.14. The Licensee's President denied having knowledge that the HP l
technicians were dismissed for reporting concerns to the NRC. He stated that the l
primary reasons for their dismissal was a desire to upgrade the quality of the HP group, and to defuse the hostility that had developed over the 1987 reorganization. Id. at 31.
I
" The findings and conclusions of the OI investigation were subsequently factored
! into the NRC Staff's determination as to whether to authorize restart of the GTRR.
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 29.
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l The President also cited a consultant's study, which led the university to conclude that i replacement of the HP staff was required. He further stated that the decision to replace l the health physics personnel was made in December 1987, before the August 1987 event became an issue with the NRC; that a decision was made to wait until after the January f l 1988 inspection to make the change; and that the decision was then expedited following l i
the implication of a degraded health physics staff." He stated that he believed the organization present at that time was working well, with a close working relationship l 1
l among the Radiation Safety Officer, the Acting Vice President of Research, and the NNRC management and staff. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 31; Tr.1900, j
)
(10) Allegations That GTRR Personnel Were Instructed By Management Not to Document Perceived Safety Problems.
2.2.10.1. Mr. Boyd testified in this proceeding that Dr. Karam instituted a policy following the reorganization, in which he ordered the HP staff not to write things down in personal logbooks, but "to tell him or to write him memoranda" so he could
" control" everything. Tr.2254.67 Mr. Boyd stated that the " natural" effect of this directive was that the HP staff ceased writing anything down and instead just told I
l
" As Administrative Judge Lam pointed out, Mr. Boyd and his health physics staff were sharply criticized for radiation safety problems at the GTRR in 1987-88, by Georgia j Tech's upper management, by Dr. O' Bannon, and by the NRC; Mr. Boyd dismissed this
! fact, stating that "they made a mistake." Tr. 2525.
67 At the same time, however, Mr. Boyd stated that it was entirely proper for l Dr. Karam to want to be informed as much as possible on anything occurring at the NNRC. Tr. 2419. He further agreed that undermost circumstances, it is best for an t employee who has a safety concern to first tell his supervisor. Tr. 2420.
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l Dr. Karam of any problems they identified "and let him work from there because he's 3
)
in charge of radiation safety." Tr. 2255."
i 2.2.10.2. In fact, the evidence does not support the assertion that Dr. Karam l
instructed the HP staff to stop writing down the problems they identified. First, Mr.
! Boyd's own testimony, cited above, indicates that Dr. Karam told GTRR employees that they should either tell him of problems orally or write memoranda describing the problem. This interpretation is supported by other evidence. In a memorandum dated f
July 29,1987 from Dr. Karam to all NNRC personnel-- having learned that some of the HP technicians were keeping personal logs in which they were recording problems, and had reported those matters to the NRC without bringing the matter to the attention of Dr.
Karam or other management officials at Georgia Tech -- Dr. Karam instructed his staff ,
how to handle such matters in the future (Staff Exh. 29). Therein, Dr. Karam informed his staff that if they wished to keep personal logs or diaries, they could do so, separate from reactor records; however, he instructed them that any safety issues should be brought to his attention, either verbally or in writine, so that the problem could be addressed. Tr. 3514-15, 3531; Staff Exh. 29.
2.2.10.3. In February 1988, the university President addressed this matter as i
i well. On February 19, the President issued a memorandum to the NNRC staff in which i l
i I
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" Mr. Boyd's statements in this regard show that after the reorganization, bitter
- feelings existed among Mr. Boyd and his HP staff, causing them to hand over to Dr. Karam some of their own responsibility for radiation safety -- tending to corroborate '
Dr. Karam's view that Mr. Boyd and his HP staff had become uncooperative to the point i
of insubordination. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 34-35; Tr. 2789-90.
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i he clarified the reporting relationships under the reorganization. Therein, he clearly stated that any safety problems are to be brought to the attention of the line inanager and the NSC, and that the NSC Chairman is to forward to the Office of the President a
" monthly summary of safety related incidents." Id. The university President discussed this memorandum at the September 1988 enforcement conference. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 31.
2.2.10.4. In light of this evidence, there does not appear to be any basis upon which to conclude that Dr. Karam or other members of Georgia Tech's management instructed the GTRR staff in 1988 not to document perceived safety problems.
(11) The Licensee's Resolution ofIdentfled Problems.
2.2.11.1. Further meetings were held between NRC and Licensee management on March 21 and May 16, 1988. At the May 16 meeting, Dr. Stelson continued to express the view that the Licensee's primary problem was not necessarily an NNRC management problem, but rather, a long-term health physics management problem which had since been remedied." The NRC representatives disagreed with this position and
- Dr. Karam testified tnat the two HP technicians had been replaced, first on a temporary basis by qualified health physicists from Georgia Power Company, and later by permanent health physicists with formal education in the area. In addition, Mr. Boyd was transferred to a radiation safety position not associated with the GTRR, and was replaced by Dr. Betty Revsin (the former NRC inspector who had identified numerous HP violations described in IR 87-03). Dr. Karam believed that Dr. Revsin's familiarity
- with NRC procedures and requirements would provide a significant benefit to the GTRR; and he believed this was demonstrated during her employment at the GTRR, in her l
- professionalism and in her accomplishing a major revision of the facility's procedures.
Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 46-47; Tr. 3226-28, 3230.
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reiterated their views that the root cause was a lack of upper management attention to I NNRC operations. Id. at 27-28."
2.2.11.2. On May 20,1988, a separate enforcement conference was held with William Downs, the NRC-licensed reactor operator who was involved in the August 1987 contamination event. Id. at 28; Tr.1817. This enforcement conference was conducted l
due to the Staff's concerns over his apparent lack of adherence to procedures, lack of diligence in recording information in operating logs and experiment forms, and the casual i
j attitude he displayed during and after the August 1987 contamination incident. Panel A, l Post Tr.1740, at 28.72 No enforcement action was taken against Mr. Downs as a result l-of this conference. Rather, the Staff concluded that the principal cause of his marginal performance was ineffective Licensee management, including a lack of adequate procedures, standards, and performance expectations (such as counseling and training feedback). Id.; Tr.1822.
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- While the Staff had identified various matters as " management" problems, it l considers the Licensee to be ultimately responsible for compliance with NRC regulations, l
i and no one individual in the management chain (including the facility director) bears sole responsibility for ensuring that such compliance is attained. For this reason, the Staff's l
i inspection reports are directed to the President of the university or his delegee, a Vice President, as the person with overall responsibility for the facility. Tr. 1810-13.
78 For instance, Mr. Downs exceeded the maximum irradiation time specified in the L experiment approval form, failed to follow health physics procedures for monitoring himself for contamination, and could not remember whether he had surveyed his home l_
i for contamination following the incident (although the Licensee had asked him to do so).
j Tr.1814-15. Mr. Downs' performance, the Licensee's review and handling of the issues presented by that performance, and the ultimate termination of Mr. Downs' employment at the GTRR, are discussed infra, at 90-91.
e . t l
2.2.11.3. Further communications between the Licensee and NRC Staff I
occurred in the period of May - July,1988. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 28; Tr.1825.
During that period, it appeared to the Staff that NNRC management was inappropriately !
focusing its attention on the specific issues and individuals involved with the August 1987 i contamination event, rather than evaluating its program and its management controls over its program and identifying the " root cause" of weaknesses in its programs and j 1
management controls;72 and that the Licensee had still not conducted adequate ;
investigations into the contamination incident, had failed to fully discuss the incident with l
l facility staff, and had performed an inadequate assessment of the consequences of this i !
l incident. Id. at 28-29."
2.2.11.4. On August 19,198S, the Licensee's President sent the NRC a letter l
l stating that progress had been made on the NNRC Action Plan to the extent that he i
concluded the Licensee had resolved the issues raised in the Order Modifying License. <
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Staff witness Collins explained that while it was important for the Licensee to j remedy the specific shortcomings identified (st;ch as revising procedures and training its I l
personnel, which the Licensee committed to do), the Licensee also needed to conduct a full evaluation of the event and its root causes, including the need to provide management controls, management performance expectations, and systems to ensure that procedures are followed. Tr. 1826-27.
" In addition, in March - April,1988, the Staff conducted an inspection to review the corrective action program at the facility and the mechanisms for addressing and correcting personnel errors. This inspection resulted in certain adverse findings, but no violations were identified. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 32-33; Tr.1845. In September
- 1988, a further inspection was conducted of the Licensee's emergency preparedness (EP) program. This inspection also resulted in certain adverse findings; and it identified one j l
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violation (Severity Level V) for failure to train a member of the emergency organization j in accordance with the facility Emergency Plan. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 34-35.
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t He theref:re requested that the NRC approve a resumption of reactor operation and l irradiation experiments. Id. at 33. NRC Region II then sent an inspection team to )
Georgia Tech to determine whether the Licensee had adequately addressed and resolved the previously identified deficiencies, and to assess the Licensee's technical readiness to resume reactor operation and irradiation experiments (the " Phase 1" inspection). This inspection found that the Licensee had added experienced staff at the GTRR, had j upgraded operating procedures, and had retrained facility operators, but that not all of the actions directed by the two Orders had been completed; and the inspection identified certain additional issues which needed to be addressed prior to restart. Id. Accordingly, by letter dated September 13, 1988, the Staff outlined eight issues that remained to be resolved before restart authorization could be given. Id. at 33-34.
l l 2.2.11.5. The Licensee had committed to taking numerous corrective actions, which were identified in the course of its various communications to NRC Region II.
NRC Staff personnel reviewed the Licensee's proposed corrective actions (including a l considerable amount of procedural revisions, as well as proper training and implementation of procedures) to assure that appropriate actions were identified and taken
! to resolve the identified concerns. In addition, the Licensee's progress in taking these ;
i actions was tracked on an item-by-item basis by NRC Region II inspection personnel, to assure that the corrective actions were in fact taken. Id.; Tr. 1856-57.7d 74
! For example, the procedures for the conduct of experiments were changed, such
! that experiments involving the irradiation of any container (like the one which led to the Cadmium spill in 1987) must now be conducted under a hood and in the presence of i more than one person. Tr. 3238.
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l 2.2.11.6. By letter dated November 2,1988, the President of Georgia Tech j informed the NRC that the eight items remaining for restart had been completed. The l
NRC team inspection (the " Phase 2 inspection") then continued on November 7-10,1988. !
! l l The inspection addressed all of the many restart evaluation areas resulting from the two enforcement Orders and the NRC letter of September 13, 1988. The inspection found l
l that appropriate actions had been taken to correct the major deficiencies that led to the 1
l issuance of the two NRC orders. The Staff al o concluded that the Licensee had i
appropriately focused on the need for long-lasting corre aive actions and management l
controls to prevent reoccurrence of the type of problems that had occurred in the past.
Although three additional violations were identified during the inspection, the Licensee l
l corrected these matters before the end of the inspection. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 37-38; Tr.1754-55,1828.
i 2.2.11.7. With respect to management issues, the Staff concluded that the organizational changes incorporated in License Amendment No. 7, discussed supra l at 43-45, would serve to eliminate the discord which had existed previously and would improve the Licensee's management of the facility. In addition, the Staff concluded that ,
the added responsibility of the NSC provided sufficient depth and breadth of reviews of l
NNRC activities to assure adequate third party oversight. Interviews with NSC members l
l showed their awareness of the additional functional responsibilities set out in the revised Technical Specifications. Finally, the monitoring of operations and management of the l facility was improved by the appointments of the new Vice President for Interdisciplinary l
Programs with direct responsibility for the GTRR, the hiring of the new Manager of the i
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i Office of Radiation Safety who was to report safety problems to the NSC, and the addition of an Associate Director to the Office of the NNRC Director. Panel A, Post l
Tr.1740, at 38-39. In sum, all of the issues which had been identified in the Staff's Orders of January and March 1988 and in the Staff's letter of September 13,1988, were ;
l addressed and resolved satisfactorily. Id. at 34, 36. 1 i
l (12) The NRC's Issuance of a Notice of Violation, Imposition of a Civil Penalty, and Authorization to Restart Reactor Operations (November 1988).
2.2.12.1. As result of the adverse inspection findings described above, on November 15, 1988, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty to the Licensee. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 35; Staff Exh.15 (GT Exh.16). Four violations were evaluated collectively as Severity Ievel III. The violations were issued i
for failure of the Licensee to implement adequate management controls and programs l
necessary to assure that licensed activities were conducted in a safe manner in accordance 1
with NRC and facility requirements. Based on this determination, a $5,000 civil penalty was imposed. In accordance with NRC enforcement policy, The civil penalty was escalated 100 percent (i.e., doubled) because of the Licensee's prior poor performance in adherence to procedures and radiological controls, and because of the Licensee's failure to take prompt corrective action to deal with management control problems.
Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 35-36; Tr.1852-53,1855.
i 2.2.12.2. As the NRC Staff witnesses explained, the two enforcement Orders
! issued to Georgia Tech in January and March 1988, and the NRC's subsequent issuance i
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i of an escalated penalty against Georgia Tech, constituted very significant enforcement t actions for a research reactor. The two Orders required extensive self-examination and i
corrective actions by the Licensee, and prevented operation of the reactor for a lengthy period of time, approximately ten months. In alldition, the amount of the civil penalty '
)
is among the highest ever imposed against a research reactor licensee by the NRC. !
i Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 36. j 2.2.12.3. At the same time, based upon the Licensee's satisfactory ccmpliance :
with the requirements which the Staff had identified as necessary in its inspection of these f
matters, the Staff concluded that the '.icensee could and should be allowed to restart the ;
operation of the GTRR. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 36,39. This decision was based on 4
l the findings of the mspection team that the training of reactor operators and health i
physics personnel as well as the augmentation of the staff in these areas appeared ,
i satisfactory for the restart of the facility. In addition, the improvements in procedures i
in both operations and health physics appeared adequate to control the conduct of .
experiments and radiological assessment of operations. Id. at 39; Tr.1902; Staff Exh.16 (GT Exh.17). Also, training provided to the GTRR staff indicated that Licensee personnel would improve their adherence to procedures with a result of significant j improvement in attention to safety at the GTRR. The Staff concluded, based on the progress made by GTRR and the organizational changes which had been made, that the management team at the GTRR was adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the i
! future operation of the GTRR would not adversely affect the public health and safety,
- Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 39. Further, the Staff concluded that the Licensee had i
I i
I satisfactorily resolved the required corrective actions set out in the January and March -
1988 enforcement Orders.75 As a result, by letter dated November 15, 1988, the NRC !
Staff notified the Licensee of its decision to authorize the resumption of reactor l operations and experiments at the GTRR. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 39-40; Tr.1859; Staff Exh.17.
! (13) Zhe Efect of the 1987-1988 Events on License Renewal.
2.2.13.1. Based upon their knowledge of the events which led to the NRC Staff's determination to take enforcement actions against Georgia Tech in 1988, the j l
Licensee's corrective actions, and other events which led to the Staff's subsequent ;
determination to allow a restart of the reactor, the Staff's witnesses disagreed with ;
i GANE's assertion that those events demonstrate that Georgia Tech's management of the :
GTRR facility presently fails to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of l the public health and safety. Rather, in their view, the 1987-1988 events were l
appropriately dispositioned by the Licensee, and the management problems which had been identified prior to restart were satisfactorily resolved. Further, they indicated that l
l at the time the Staff determined to allow restart of the GTRR in November 1988, the it j
was satisfied that the Licensee's management of the facility provided reasonable assurance i that the public health and safety would be adequately protected in the future. Panel A, Post Tr.1740, at 8.
75
- This was documented by letter dated September 18, 1990, in which NRC l Region Il notified the Licensee that the Licensee's actions required by the Orders had i been reviewed and found to be adequate, as indicated in the attachment to the letter.
' Panel A Post Tr.1740, at 39-40; Tr.1859; Staff Exh.17. !
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i 2.2.13.2. The Staff's conclusions regarding these matters appear to be well informed and reflect careful consideration of the pertinent issues. The evidence of record in this proceeding concerning the 1987-1988 events does not provide any reason to ,
i' believe that those events were not adequately resolved by the time the NRC authorized i
the Licensec to resume reactor operations in November 1988. Nonetheless, as the parties l recognize, a later recurrence of those or similar problems would cast doubt upon the soundness of this conclusion, and the significance of the 1987-1988 events therefore must !
be evaluated in light of the Licensee's performance in the period following November l 1988. Accordingly, we now turn to an evaluation of the Licensee's performance in the period following the November 1988 restart authorization.
i i
C. The Licensee's Performance Followine Restart in November 1988. !
i :
(1) Background '
2.3.1.1. In challenging Georgia Tech's performance in the period following the i
authorization to restart in November 1988, GANE identified numerous NRC inspection reports as supportive of its view that the GTRR license renewal application should be i denied. These inspection reports were introduced into the record of this proceeding and/or were addressed in the parties' testimony. The findings of these inspection reports, and the adequacy of the Licensee's management of the facility in the post-restart period, is examined below.
- 2.3.1.2. The NRC Staff's Panel B" summarized the Licensee's NRC inspection j and enforcement history in the period since operations were authorized to restart in i
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November 1988 until the present, and provided the Staff's perspective on the adequacy l
of Georgia Tech's management of the facility during this period. Panel B, Post l Tr. 2813, at 1,4. This panel of witnesses was well qualified to present this testimony, I
being comprised of (a) the Staff's principal inspector for the GTRR facility since 1989 l
(Craig H. Bassett, a Senior Radiation Specialist in NRC Region II), who conducted many l
inspections of the GTRR and coordinated the NRC's inspection and enforcement efforts l
concerning the facility; (b) Mr. Bassett's supervisor (Edward J. McAlpine, currently Chief of the Fuel Facilities Branch, NRC Region II), who has managed or supervised implementation of the NRC's inspection program for research reactors in NRC Region II l since August 1989; and (c) the Staff's project manager for the GTRR facility j (Marvin M. Mendonca, a Senior Project Manager in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)), who has served as back-up or lead project manager for the facility since June 1990 and December 1991, respectively, as well as approximately 18 other research reactors throughout the nation. Id. at 1-4. All three witnesses were well qualified by reason of their education and experience to testify concerning the matters at j issue in this proceeding. See Qualifications, Post Tr. 2813; Tr. 2815-18.
2.3.1.3. The Panel B witnesses were familiar with the events which led to the NRC's issuance of the two enforcement Orders in January and March 1988 and to the issuance of the November 1988 authorization for restart. Id.76 Accordingly, they were 76 The Panel B witnesses, whose GTRR-related responsibilities post-dated the involvement of the Staff's Panel A witnesses, confirmed that the Licensee satisfactorily completed the actions it was required to take prior to restart. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, j at 33; see Staff Exh.17.
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I able to present a well-considered opinion concerning the improvements which have been made and the adequacy of the Licensee's performance in the period following restan.
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l We find their testimony in this regard to be well-informed, highly credible, and entitled
- to significant weight.
l (2) The NRC's inspection Program for Research Reactors. l l
l 2.3.2.1. In order to properly evaluate the Licensee's mspection history, it is I !
l important to understand the NRC inspection program for non-power reactors, pursuant i
> 1 I I l to which NRC inspections of the GTRR were conducted. The NRC inspection program for non-power reactors is conducted in accordance with guidance contained in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2545, Research and Test Reactor Inspection Program -
Operations Phase, and the inspection yocedures outlined therein. The inspection l frequency is based upon the non-power reactor's authorized power level and its l
operational status. Class I reactors are those licensed to operate at a power level of 2 megawatts (MW) or greater; Class II reactors are those licensed to operate at a power l level less than 2 MW. The GTRR is authorized to operate at a power level up to 5 MW, and is therefore a Class I facility. Id. at 7-8.
2.3.2.2. In NRC Region II, typically four routine inspections are performed i
each year at Class I non-power reactors. The number of inspections at a particular facility might increase due to unplanned events occurring at the facility or upon a j determination by the Staff that an event or a series of events demands immediate or i
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1 l increased attention, and additional inspections (e.g. , a reactive inspection) would then be l
performed. Id. at 8.
2.3.2.3. The routine inspections conducted at Class I facilities are usually l performed by different inspectors, based upon their expertise in particular areas. The
! subjects or areas of emphasis reviewed during a routine inspection at a facility, include, inter alia, reactor operations, safeguards and security, emergency preparedness, and health physics. Specific inspection procedures for each of these areas are enumerated in Manual Chapter 2545. Id. at 8-9."
2.3.2.4. NRC inspection and enforcement practice has been to describe the significance of any particular violation identified in an NRC inspection in terms of its l
l severity level. Until June 30,1995, NRC Enforcement Policy categorized violations in l
I Severity levels I through V; after June 30,1995, NRC Enforcement Policy categorized l
i violations in Severity levels I through IV (i.e. , Severity level V violations are no longer routinely issued by the NRC). The January 1995 revision of 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"Section IV describes " Severity of Violations" as follows: l
- " In NRC Region II, inspections at Class I research reactors typically last from 2-3 days to one week each, or a total of about 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> per year; at Georgia Tech, the inspections have generally been longer, totalling about 120-160 hours per year (i.e.,
- 30-40 hours each). In unusual cases, inspections could last significantly longer, i- Tr. 2829-30, 3131-32; and considerable inspection resources may also be devoted to
! investigating allegations at a facility. Tr. 3154.
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t Severity level I and II violations are of very significant regulatory concern. In general, violations that are included in these severity categories involve actual or high potential impact on the public.
Severity level III violations are cause for significant regulatory concern. Severity level IV violations are less serious but are of more than minor concern; i.e.,
j if left uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious
- concern. Severity Level V violations are of minor
! safety or environmental concern.
l Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 11.
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l 2.3.2.6. In addition, NRC inspection reports may describe a violation as a "non-cited violation" ("NCV"). The NRC's Enforcement Policy affords discretion for the NRC to treat as an NCV a violation that has not been formalized as such in a Notice l of Violation. Id. For inmnce, the Enforcement Policy authorizes issuance of an NCV l
for Licensee-identified Severity I2 vel IV violations, under certain specified conditions.
See NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," 60 Fed. Reg. 34380, 34393 (June 30,1995); Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 11-13.78 Prior to June 30,1995, NCVs could include Severity level V Violations; this is not the case under the current Enforcement Policy. Id. at 13.
78 The NRC enforcement policy establishes the category of non-cited violations in order to encourage licensees to find, identify and correct problems on their own; and a licensee's self-identification of its problems is viewed with favor by the NRC. Tr. 2856, 2986. A matter treated as a non-cited violation is, nonetheless, a violation, even though i a Notice of Violation is not issued. Thus, if a second occurrence is identified in a
! subsequent inspection report, the NCV is treated as if it had been a cited violation -- i.e. ,
- it will support a finding of a " repeat violation." Tr. 2858. Non-cited violations are t
therefore treated as seriously as cited violations. Tr. 2856.
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! l I (3) The Licensee's NRC Inspection and Enforcement ;
History in the Period Following November 1988.
l 2.3.3.1. During the period from January 1989 through April 1996, NRC l
inspections at the GTRR reviewed numerous aspects of the Licensee's operation and l t
, management of the facility, in accordance with established NRC inspection procedures.
l The areas inspected included the Licensee's organization and its review and audit l I l functions (including the Nuclear Safeguards Committee), as well as such other functional ;
1 areas' as operational and maintenance activities, design change functions, operator j licenses, requalification and medical activities, procedures, fuel movement, surveillance, l experiments, effluent and environmental monitoring, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, and safeguards and security. The specific inspection findings for the GTRR l
facility are documented in the NRC inspection reports and related enforcement actions j
during this period. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 10.
i l 2.3.3.2. From January 1989 through April 1996, the Staff performed a total of 31 inspections at the GTRR facility. Since January 1, 1989, 18 inspections found no violations; in 13 inspections, however, a total of 17 cited violations (Severity Levels IV i
and V) and seven non-cited violations (NCVs) were found and documented. Id.79 The Inspection Reports which documented violations were discussed in Staff Panel B's l
i l
7' Other observations were noted in various Staff inspection reports, which did not l constitute a violation; and certain matters were identified as " Unresolved Items" (URIs)
- which required further inspection or evaluation before a determination could be reached l
as to whether they demonstrated a violation. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 27. Those matters do not present significant concerns and do not affect the outcome of this analysis.
j l
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I l l l l testimony (as summarized in the following discussion), along with the Staff's view of the
~
significance of these matters.
2.3.3.3. Inspection Report 89-02. An operations inspection was conducted in July and August,1989, and was documented in Inspection Report (IR) 89-02 (GANE Exh. 61). Two violations (both Severity Level IV) were identified:
- a. failure to perform leak-rate testing in accordance with
- commitments, and
- b. inadequate procedure to assure tilat any shim blade not fully l inserted was withdrawn sufficiently to cause a negative trip l when released in.to the core (a previous Unresolved Issue was i
upgraded to a violation).
l Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 14." Appropriate corrective actions concerning this i
I violation were taken by the 1,ientsee, and this matter was then closed by the Staff. Id.
l at 14-15.
l 2.3.3.4. Inspection Report 89-05. A security inspection was conducted during September 1989,.as documented in IR 89-05 (GANE Exh. 64). The following six ;
i violations (all Severity I2 vel IV) were identified:
" The shim safety blades arc intended to ensure that the reactor can be safely shut down, and are the primary means by which shutdown is accomplished. Tr. 2935-36.
The Staff had previously identified, as an unre>olved item (URI), the lack of a procedure to assure that any shim blade not fully inserted was withdrawn sufficiently to cause a t negative rate trip when released into the core, as required by T.S. 3.1.d; in IR 89-02, I the previously identified URI was determined to be a violation. See GANE Exh. 61 (Report Details at 6-7); Tr. 2930-31. The Staff's references to shim safety blades in '
other inspection reports did not involve safety problems and were not of great sigr ficance. See Tr. 2932-33, 2935-36.
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- a. failure to maintain assessment equipment in operable condition and failure to properly position assessment equipment (two examples),
- b. failure to secure a controlled access barrier,
- c. failure to maintain the alarm system in operable condition, l l
l d. failure to change keys as committed, i
- e. failure to control keys as committed, and
- f. failure to establish and maintain a safeguards event log.
Id. at 15. This constituted an excessively large number of violations, and caused the Staff to be concerned about weaknesses in the Licensee's procedures used to implement 1
! its physical security program - to the point that escalated enforcement action was i
j considered. GANE Exh. 64, at 1; Tr. 3046-47,3162-63. Corrective actions concerning these violations were then taken by the Licensee, and those corrective actions were found to be acceptable by the Staff. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 15-17.
2.3.3.5. Insoection Report 90-02. A health physics inspection was performed during June 1990, and was documented in IR 90-02 (GANE Exh. 55). One violation (Severity Level IV) and one non-cited violation were identified:
l
- a. failure to maintain a high radiation area locked as required in 10 C.F.R. 20.203(c)(2), and
- b. failure to perform a personal survey at the exit to a controlled area. (This was the non-cited violation.)
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! Id. at 17.8 Appropriate corrective actions were subsequently taken by the Licensee to j address these matters, including procedural revisions, counselling and/or training the individuals involved. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 17-18; Tr. 2822, 2825, 2827-28,
]
2995-97.s2 i i f
! 2.3.3.6. Inspection Report 91-04. An emergency planning (EP) inspection was l conducted during September 1991, and was documented in IR 91-04 (GANE Exh. 58).
I While various EP exercise strengths were observed, GANE Exh. 58 (Summary, at 1-2), l Tr. 3143-44, two non-cited violations were noted:
l
- a. Inadequate procedure for implementing the Emergency Plan notification requirements, and l l
- b. Failure to perform a biennial review of the Emergency Plan as !
required.
l i i
Id. at 18. Appropriate corrective actions concerning these violations were subsequently ;
l taken by the Licensee. Id. at 19.
l 8' The NRC inspector was familiar with the organizational problems identified in the l
1987-88 period; he did not find similar problems during this inspection. He believed the l health physics staffing appeared adequate; the NSC wa's meeting more frequently than required, indicating good commitment to performing its job; and the Licensee was moving in the right direction. GANE Exh. 55 (Report Details, at 1-2); Tr. 3133-35.
a:
Inspection Report 90-02 also discusses radiological effluents from the facility, principally consisting of tritium and Cobalt-60 from the Cobalt Pool, which were
! commingled in the Licensee's waste decay tank and measured before being released to
- the environment. GANE Exh. 55 (Report Details at 8-9); Tr. 3013. All such releases j have been within NRC regulatory limits. Tr. 3018, 3020.
- e 2.3.3.7. Inspection Report 92-04. An EP inspection was conducted during November 1992, and was documented in IR 92-04 (GANE Exh. 57). One violation (Severity Level V) was noted during this inspection:
failure to have an adequate procedure for implementing certain EP notification requirements (a repeat of the non-cited violation noted in IR 91-04).
l Id.83 Appropriate corrective actions concerning this yiolation were subsequently taken by the Licensee. Id. at 19-20.
2.3.3.8. Insoection Report 93-02. A combined operations and HP inspection was performed in September 1993, and was documented in IR 93-02 (GANE Exh. 60).
Three violations (all Severity level IV) were cited as a result of this inspection:
- a. failure of the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) to conduct the biennial audit of the licensed operator requalification program as required by Technical Specifications (the Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety (MORS) performed the audit; he was not a member of the NSC),
- b. failure to follow procedures for conducting neutron surveys, for completing certain twice weekly contamination control surveys, and for completing survey forms required for shipping radioactive material, and
- c. failure to comply with 49 C.F.R. Part 172 requirements concerning the description of radioactive material being 83 The lack of an adequate notification procedure had been treated as a non-cited violation in Inspection Report 91-04 (GANE Exh. 58). This violation was not remedied
- i. promptly by the Licensee, and it was therefore identified in Inspection Report 92-04 as a recurring violation. Id.; Tr. 2851-52. Under the NRC enforcement policy in effect
- at the time, even if the NCV had been cited as a Severity Level V violation, the Severity 4 level V violation identified in IR 92-04 would not have been a candidate for escalation to a higher severity level (i.e., Severity I2 vel IV). Tr. 2857.
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! t shipped and indicating a 24-hour emergency response telephone number on shipping documents. l i
l Id. at 20." Appropriate corrective actions were subsequently taken by the Licensee l concerning these matters, including a conunitment that the NSC would thereafter perform I
l the required audits," procedural revisions, and revision of the shipping forms. Id. l l
l at 20-21; Tr. 3024."
2.3.3.9. Inspection Report 93-03. An EP inspection was conducted during November 1993, and was documented in IR 93-03. One non-cited violation was noted:
l i failure to perform periodic testing of the criticality alarm l
system in accordance with procedure. (The required monthly i tests of the system were not performed during May, June, and July,1993.)
l l Appropriate corrective actions were subsequently taken by the Licensee concerning this l
l matter. Id. at 21-22.
i i
" Various other matters were identified in Inspection Report 93-02 as inspector followup items. None of those matters identified a regulatory violation. GANE Exh. 60 (Summary at 2); Id. (Report Details at 2,4,5); Tr. 2880-87.
i
" The Staff indicated that the NSC may delegate performance of the audit function i to an independent third party, but it contested the Licensee's delegation of that function to the MORS, since he was associated with the facility being audited. Tr. 2873.
" The Licensee committed to include the telephone number of the Georgia Tech Police on the shipping papers, and to specify the chemical form of the radioactive material being shipped. Previously, the Licensee had identified the radioactive isotope and the physical form of the material (i.e., liquid, gas or solid), but had not identified the chemical form of the material (e.g., uranium metal, uranium oxide, or uranium j nitrate); this information could affect the manner in which the material was stored and shipped. Tr. 2877-78, Tr. 3157. The shipping forms have since been modified to
- provide a space for entry of the chemical form of the material being shipped, and the i
- Licensee now provides that information. Tr. 2878.
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2.3.3.10. Inspection Reoort 94-01. A reactive inspection (i.e., an unscheduled inspection, conducted in response to events or issues) was conducted during March 1994, {
t ,
t i to follow up on an incident involving the failure of a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO),
l William Downs, to follow procedures that resulted in two disabled reactor scram i
functions. Id. at 22; Tr. 2860-61, 2865. This inspection was documented in IR 94-01 i (GANE Exh. 59). One NCV with two examples was identified:
I j a. failure to complete the actions required by the checklist for startup of the reactor on February 15,1994 (a fuse was not j replaced after it had been removed during a training session, !
as the checklist required), and l
- b. failure to complete the actions required by the checklist during l l '
l shutdown of the reactor on February 11,1994 (three electrical jumpers had not been removed).
Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 22; Tr. 2862. These incidents were classified as NCVs because the disabled scram functions (although listed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)), were not required under the Technical Specifications (TS) for safe operation of the reactor, since they generally provide equipment protective functions, and credit is not taken for them in accident mitigation in the FSAR. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 22; Tr. 2863-64, 3155; see Tr. 2057, 2.3.3.11. Following the incident, the Licensee took corrective actions which included ' reviewing the incident, temporarily suspending the SRO's reactor operating duties, and establishing a panel to further investigate the incident and the SRO's operating i
history to recommend what further actions should be taken, if any. The Licensee's panel 1
i l evaluated the technical performance of the SRO with respect to the incident of '
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February 15, 1994, as well as the SRO's historical performance," and determined that, because of the SRO's lack of diligence to safety and poor past performance, the 1
suspension of the SRO should remain in effect until there was an obvious change in 1
l attitude and a commitment to follow procedures.88 The SRO subsequently terminated i l employment at the facility in June 1994. Id. at 22-23; Tr. 2865, 2800-02, 2804.
l 2.3.3.12. Insoection Report 94-02. An HP inspection was conducted during l
l August 1994, and was documented in IR 94-02 (GANE Exh. 56). One violation (Severity Level IV) was cited:
L failure of the licensee to make a proper evaluation of the extent :
of the radiation present following the annual neutron radiation survey performed' August 11, 1994, which was required by l procedure.
i
" Mr. Downs commenced employment at the GTRR in 1976. Prior to the Staff's t l May 1987 enforcement conference with him, he was involved in various inappropriate actions, including striking a hot cell window with a wrench (thereby chipping the window slightly); throwing contaminated protective booties against a wall; improper conduct of operations and health physics surveys related to the 1987 Cadmium spill; and failing to promptly notice a reactor power transient. Staff Exhs. 21, 22; Tr.1814-15, 2766, 2797-98, 2166-68, 3234. Dr. Karam indicated that following the Cadmium incident he -
sought to fire Mr. Downs but was prevented from doing so by Dr. Stelson; and that the l Licensee then retrained Mr. Downs and counseled him extensively on the need to follow
! procedures. Tr. 2799-2800, 3233-34. Neither Dr. Karam nor the NRC Staff detected a problem in Mr. Downs' performance between the time of the Cadmium spill and the March 1994 inspection described in IR 94-01. Tr. 2800, 2866, 2869.-
88 t The 1994 incident raised concern in NRC Region II over Mr. Downs' lack of i diligence and caused the Staff to consider whether Mr. Downs' SRO license should be
! suspended or revoked. Tr. 2869, 2872.- The Staff, however, considered the Licensee's
} suspension of Mr. Downs to be responsible and appropriate. Accordingly, the Staff took
- no action on its own, pending the outcome of the Licensee's evaluation. Tr. 2872.
,- .~.,.- - - . . - - . .
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l Id. at 23. The Licensee subsequently took appropriate corrective actions concerning this
)
matter. Id. at 23-24.s9 2.3.3.13. Inspection Reoort 94-04. An EP inspection was performed during October 1994, and was documented in IR 94-04. One non-cited violation was noted:
failure to submit emergency procedure changes to the NRC in :
. accordance with Section 10.4 of the Emergency Plan.
Id. at 24. Appropriate corrective actions were subsequently taken by the Licensee with I
respect to this matter. Id.
2.3.3.14. Insoection Report 94-05. An operations inspection was conducted during December 1994, and was documented in IR 94-05 (GANE Exh. 63). One l non-cited violation was noted during this inspection:
failure to replace the charcoal cartridges every two weeks as required by Technical Specification 6.4.b(6).
8' Inspection Report 94-02 identified important areas of strength in the Licensee's radiation safety program. GANE Exh. 56 (Summary, at 1); Tr. 3137. In addition, the Licensee's efforts to control access to a high radiation area (i.e., radiation levels greater than 100 mrem /hr), which existed on the second floor of the reactor building when the reactor was operating at 3-4 MW, were found to be satisfactory and in compliance with regulatory requirements. GANE Exh. 56 (Report Details, at 8); Tr. 284042, 2844.
, IR 94-02 also noted that "the staffing and current organizational structure appears to be
! adequate to meet Technical Specification requirements and to implement the licensee's l radiation protection program," and that the NSC was " functioning as required." No violations in the area of organization and management control were identified. GANE Exh. 56 (Summary, at 1); Tr. 3137-38.
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Id. at 24-25." Appropriate corrective actions were subsequently taken by the Licensee with respect to this matter. Id. at 25.
2.3.3.15. Inspection Repert 95-01. An HP inspection was performed during Febmary and March,1995, and the inspection results were documented in IR 95-01 1 (GANE Exh. 66). Two violations (one Severity level IV and one Severity Level V) were identified:
- a. reporting failures, by: (1) omission of some of the required data and providing inaccurate data in annual reports concerning l
l liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents to the NRC for the years 1983,1986, and 1988 through 1993, and (2) providing inaccurate information to the NRC in the 1994 Safety Analysis Report concerning continuous, automatic measurement and recording of meteorological data, and
- b. failure to have a Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) approved procedure to calibrate and operate the alpha / beta proportional counter.
Id. Appropriate corrective actions were taken by the Licensee with respect to the inaccurate reporting of data,' including the creation of a computer data base for gaseous and liquid discharges, and the correction of the inaccurate portions of the annual repons l
- Inspection Report 94-05 also referred to various deficiencies which had been identified by the inspector. These matters reflected a need for greater sensitivity on the part of the Licensee, but did not involve a serious safety concern or a violation of any regulatory requirement, GANE Exh. 63 (Report Details, at 1-2); Tr. 3035-36,3039-41.
Although a large number of arithmetic errors or inaccuracies were identified, the number of errors identified constituted a relatively small fraction of the data reviewed by
- the NRC. The errors did not indicate a programmatic problem. Tr. 3085-86. GANE
- pointed to various statements in the FSAR, which it contended were indications of inadequate management. No showing was made that those statements, even if inaccurate, j
were relevant to the management issue. See, e.g., Tr. 3104, 3109-10, 3111-12.
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and FSAR. Id. at 25-26. Appropriate corrective actions also appeared to have been l taken with respect to the failure to have an NSC approved procedure, although
, verification of these corrective actions had not yet been completed and documented by the NRC Staff prior to the commencement of hearings in this proceeding. Id. at 26."
2.3.3.16. Inspection Report 95-02. A security inspection was conducted during l
May 1995, and was documented in IR 95-02. One violation (Severity level V) was identified: l l failure to submit material status reports within 30 days of
- March 31 and September 30 of each year as required by l 10 C.F.R. 74.13(a)(1). ;
l l Id. at 26. See GANE Exh. 69; Tr. 3097-99. Appropriate corrective actions were l subsequently taken by the Licensee with respect to this matter. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, l
! at 26-27.
l l
l (4) The Sigmjicance of the Violations Identified in the Period Following Restart Authorization in November 1988.
l 2.3.4.1. As indicated in the preceding discussion, none of the violations which l
were identified at the GTRR facility in the period following restart have been more l
serious than Severity Level IV. While this fact is important, it is important as well to
" GANE questioned a statement in the FSAR that the main pump associated with the secondary H2 O system will circulate water at 1200 gallons per minute, believing that this statement was inconsistent with a statement in the NSC minutes related to a reduction in water " flow" in the secondary system. There was no inconsistency, however: The NSC minutes related to a reduction of the low flow set point, not a reduction in the actual flow rate. Tr. 3118-19, 3120, 3122-23; see Tr. 3326, 3329.
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consider whether the violations and inspection findings, as a whole, present a picture of I
serious management problems at the facility. l 2.3.4.2. The Staff's Panel B witnesses provided their view of the adequacy of the Licensee's management, based upon a collective analysis of the violations and NCVs described above. The witnesses reviewed the number and nature of the violations and l
NCVs which were observed at the GTRR in the course of the Staff's inspections. From l- 1989 to April 1996, the inspection and enforcement history shows: 1989 (8 violations),
! 1990 (1 violation,1 NCV),1991 (no violations, 2 NCVs),1992 (1 violation), .1993 (3 violations,1 NCV),1994 (1 violation,3 NCVs), and 1995 (3 violations). While the number of violations and non-cited violations appears large, they have generally not l involved significant health and safety issues; and the Staff's review did not demonstrate a breakdown of management controls and programs. Id. at 28." The witnesses further indicated that the number of violations identified has shown a trend of decreasing over l ,
\
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l l " Dr. Karam stated his opinion that most of the violations which have occurred over I' the years at the NNRC appeared to be Severity 12 vel IV violations related to paperwork (i.e., record keeping) activities alone; and that occasional, minor errors of this nature are l to be expected. Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 18-19. GANE witness Dr. Copeutt agreed that
! it would be very difficult for a research reactor to operate for a long period of time without occasional minor violations. Tr.1162. Nonetheless, Dr. Karam recognized that such violations may sometimes be significant to safety, depending on the circumstances.
Tr. 2759-60. As Staff witness Collins further noted, violations for recordkeeping are j nonetheless important. Proper recordkeeping and tracking of corrective actions assists i in evaluating problems that have occurred and in developing the necessary corrective i
actions, and could affect the manner in which a facility is operated and possibly serve to
{' avert future accidents. Tr. 1782-84.
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the period of 1989 to the present. Tr.3151." Accordingly, the Staff's witnesses
- concluded that the violations and NCVs discussed above do not support a conclusion that the Licensee's management of the facility is inadequate. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 28.
l 2.3.4.3. Staff witness Mendonca contrasted the GTRR inspection results with l inspections of similar Class I research reactors in the United States during the period of l
June 1990 to Aptil 1996." These facilities are located at the University of Virginia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Michigan, and the University of Missouri at Columbia. Tr. 2984-85.* During this period, inspections at these reactor facilities showed the following results:
Facility Number and Category of Violations l
l U. of Virginia Severity Ixvel II - 2 l Severity I2 vel IV - 1 l Severity level V - 2 NCVs - 6 TOTAL: 11 i
l l
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" Unlike the practice with respect to power reactors, the NRC does not have a
" Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance" (SALP) program for research reactors; l and the Staff witnesses were unable to assign a number equivalent to a SALP finding by ,
which to measure the Licensee's performance. Tr. 1896-97, 3151-52. I
" Until approximately 1989, the NRC performed unannounced inspections of research reactor facilities. This practice was found to interfere with class schedules, and i
the NRC then began to announce its inspections a short time in advance, in order to
! minimize their impact on the educational process. Tr. 2987-88, i
i
" An additional Class I reactor is operated by the National Institute of Standards and Testing (NIST); Mr. Mendonca did not tabulate the inspection results for this facility
! since it is a test reactor rather than a research reactor. Tr. 2985.
s a 1
Facility Number and Category of Violations MIT Severity Level IV - 4 NCVs - _1 TOTAL: 5 h
U. of Michigan Severity level III - 2 Severity LevelIV - 2 NCVs -
6 l TOTAL: 10 U. of Missouri-l Columbia Severity 12 vel II - 2 Severity I2 vel III - 3 Severity Level IV - J TOTAL: 8 l
Georgia Tech Severity I2 vel IV - 6 Severity Ixvel V - 2 NCVs - 1 TOTAL: 15 Tr. 2985-86. These inspection results demonstrate that the GTRR's inspection and enforcement history is not substantially worse than that of several other Class I research reactors - and in fact compares favorably to some of those facilities, which had I
l violations of a higher severity level than the violations identified at the GTRR."
2.3.4.4. In addition, the Staff's Panel B witnesses found an overall reduction in the frequency and severity of violations since restart of the GTRR was authorized, as i,
- " The' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviews all violations identified in j research reactor inspections throughout the United States -- assuring that NRC regulations i affecting research reactors are properly interpreted, safety significance is properly l understood, the appropriate Severity Ixvel is assigned to the violation, and violations are i categorized and treated consistently throughout the nation. Tr. 3159-61.
e a .
i compared to the situation which existed previously. They testified that the GTRR's previous enforcement history shows that, during the period from 1987 - 1988, the Staff identified approximately 20 violations of NRC regulations and TS requirements; the Staff found it necessary to hold three management and enforcement conferences with GTRR management; and the NRC issued two Orders restricting reactor operation, and issued a $5000 civil penalty to Georgia Tech. In contrast, in the seven-plus years since January f
1989, the Staff identified a total of 17 violations (about the same number of violations as were previously found in 1987 - 1988); and the violations identified since restart have involved a lower Severity Level as defined in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Id.
at 28-29.
2.3.4.5. On the basis of their review, the Staff's witnesses concluded that the violations observed after November 1988 do not indicate a consistent failure of Licensee management to identify and correct problems (as had occurred previously). On the contrary, they believed the Licensee's inspection and enforcement history shows an l
iuprovement as compared to the period before 1989, and that the Licensee has operated and managed its facility in a manner that acceptably ensures that the public health and safety is protected. Id. at 29. The Licensee has demonstrated a steady, concerted effort to improve its performance, and a continuing improvement has occurred. Procedures have become more detailed and specific; efforts were made to bring in a better qualified staff; and while there is still room for improvement, the Licensee's management has been diligent in trying to solve its problems and correct them. Tr. 3149-50.
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2.3.4.6. The Staff's conclusions regarding the violations which have been ,
identified in the period following the November 1988 authorization of restan are well i
. informed, balanced and persuasive. The violations identified during this period do not demonstrate a pattern of inadequate management or a disregard for safety, and do not warrant a cause for concern in connection with the license renewal application.
l D. Hardware and Reportine Issues. ,
l :
(1) Background 2.4.1.1. GANE has asserted that the Licensee's management is inadequate based on certain circumstances involving a bismuth block leak, a fuel element failure, and the use of film badges for environmental radiological monitoring. These matters were explored during the evidentiary hearings and are addressed below.
(2) The Bismuth Block.
2.4.2.1. The bismuth block is part of a shield located adjacent to the biomedical facility. It is designed to attenuate gamma radiation from the core while allowing neutrons to pass through to the biomedical facility. The bismuth block cooling system is primarily designed to remove heat to cool the bismuth shield block for equipment l l
protection purposes and is not a SAR accident mitigation system. Panel B, Post l
Tr. 2813, at 36-37. In other words, it is not safety-related, per se. Tr. 2944.
' 2.4.2.2. In Inspection Report 83-01, dated September 29,1983, a description i j is provided concering the discovery of a leak in the bismuth block. This report indicates I
that on August 4,1983, GTRR staff noted that a one gallon per hour leak had developed
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in the coolant system of the innermost bismuth shield block of the bio-medical beam port.
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At the time, the bismuth block coolant system contained heavy water (D2 0) in a closed system which is entirely separate from the reactor's D2 0 coolant system. Some of the l
D20 leak flowed by gravity to the next lower level (the basement) and was entirely l
contained within the Reactor Containment Building. Tl'e reactor was shutdown when the leak was discovered and much of the D2 0 was collected and stored. An area of about 12 feet by 12 feet in the basement was posted and restricted as a potentially contaminated area. No personnel contamination occurred and no significant increases in air or liquid effluents to unrestricted areas resulted. After examining the source of the leak, plans
- were made to correct the problem. A commercial radiator "stop-leak" product was used I
to seal the leak and, after flushing the system, the coolant was changed to from D2 0 to H2 O (light water). Id. at 37; Tr. 2891."
2.4.2.3. In 1989, several years after the previous leak had been repaired, the bismuth block began to leak once again. Tr. 3294. An extensive memo was transmitted by Dr. Karam to the NSC, describing the nature and significance of the leak, the failure l
of an epoxy and stop-leak treatment to stop the leak, and certain recommended temporary steps to deal with the situation (GANE Exh. 71). Significantly, the bismuth block l
l cooling function was not affected by the leak, and radioactivity levels in the liquids collected from the leak have been below regulatory limits -- although, at the surface f
l l
" GANE questioned whether the use of a commercial "stop-leak" product was appropriate for a nuclear facility. However, commercial products are often used in various applications at nuclear reactor facilities, and the use of such a product in this situation was not prohibited. Tr. 2942-43.
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where the leak occurs (inside a steel cavity, some distance away from any human i l
l activity), radiation dose rates have approximated 5 Rem /hr. GANE Exh. 71, at
[ unnumbered] 1, 2, 3-4; Tr. 3295, 3296-97.
2.4.2.4. To remedy the situation, the NSC authorized the GTRR staff to install a collection system in the area under the leak to catch the leaking water, channel it to a l condensate pump, circulate the water through a 5 micron filter and return the water to 1
i a storage tank. Inspections in the area of the basement where the collection system is i
located have indicated that the area is roped off and controlled as a potentially contaminated area. Review of the contamination surveys of the area have indicated no contamination spread outside the controlled area. Only small amounts of water have ever l
been observed in the area and the collection system appears to be functioning. Although l
the area is sometimes damp, no running water has been observed. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 37-38; Tr. 28%." As a result, the bismuth block leak does not have any health and safety implications. Tr. 3295.
2.4.2.5. Since the bismuth block does not perform a safety function, the Licensee can continue to use it in its current condition. Tr. 2944. Further repairs are unlikely to resolve the t iroblem, and the Licensee must either use it as is, or replace it.
The Licensee plans to replace the bismuth block in the future. GANE Exh. 71, at j " Roping off an area does not effectively contain tritium. The Licensee therefore has in place a program to collect and recycle the water that leaks from the Bismuth block, a bioassay program that can measure the uptake of airborne tritium, and other monitors to detect the presence of tritium. Worker exposures have been within the limits imposed
! by NRC regulation. Tr. 28 % -2900.
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[ unnumbered] 8; Tr. 2048, 2943, 3300, 3306. In sum, the bismuth block leak has no i safety implications, and the Licensee has implemented appropriate measures to protect ,
against radiation exposures which may be associated svith the leak. This matter does not present a concern with respect to the license renewal application.
(3) The Fuel Element Failure.
i 2.4.3.1. A fuel element weld failure was noted in the NSC minutes dated October 29,1992. The Licensee informed the NRC of the problem by a phone call on September 22, and in a letter dated September 23,1992, which explained the problem.
During an inspection of the facility in January 1996, NRC Inspector Bassett noted that the fuel element had been removed from the floor storage area in the reactor building and had been transferred to the storage pool for further processing. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 38-39.
2.4.3.2. GANE asserted that GTRR management failed to notify the NRC of
! the fuel element failure. As noted above, however, the Licensee informed tie NRC of i
j the problem by telephone and in writing, on September 22 and 23,1992. The foel element weld failure was also mentioned in the Licensee's Annual Report dated ;
February 22,1993. Id. at 38. The fuel element weld failure problem did not result in a violation of NRC regulations or the GTRR license. Id. at 39. Further, the Licensee l
appears to have handled this problem in an appropriate manner. Like the bismuth block leak discussed above, this matter does not present a concern with respect to the license renewal application.
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2.4.4.1. In Inspection Repon 93-02 (GANE Exh. 60), discussed supra at 88-89, )
the Staff made the following observation: l l The Licensee's environmental monitoring program
! consisted of measuring direct radiation from the
! facility and from gaseous elements by means of a system of 30 film badges positioned around the l, perimeter fence and at other locations on campus,
- typically downwind from the facility. The film badges used for this purpose have a lower limit of detection of approximately 10 mrem.
l GANE Exh. 60 (Report Details at 13). The inspection repon further indicated that several badges showed radiation levels above background, one of which the Licensee attributed to environmental damage (e.g., rain or excess heat), and certain others as l
l having been caused by exposure to Radium-226 stored in a location in close proximity l to the badges. Id.2" The Staff's witnesses indicated that film badges are sensitive to !
heat and moisture, and other facilities have experienced similar problems. The Staff l
concurred in the Licensee's explanation that rain or excessive heat probably affected the 1
accuracy of a film badge. Tr. 2905-06, 2908, 2911, 2913.
2.4.4.2. In January 1994, the Licensee converted from the use of film badges to thermal luminescent devices (TLDs), which are not susceptible to such problems and are more sensitive to radiation -- i.e., they go to a lower sensitivity than film badges.
l l '" GANE questioned whether Georgia Tech's program for handling radioactive waste was adequate, given the storage of radioactive waste in this storage shed. See, l e.g., GANE Exh. 66; Tr. 3079-80. No problems concerning these matters were noted by the Staff, Tr. 3080, 3082; or by GANE witness Dr. Copeutt who had served as MORS during a portion of this period. Tr. 1066-67.
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Tr. 2908, 2913, 3158-59. This was reported in the Licensee's Annual Report dated February 20,1995. Tr. 3158. GANE's witness Mr. Boyd agreed that film badges are 5 much more susceptible to heat and moisture than are TLDs, and he approved of the Licensee's replacement of the badges with TLDs. Tr. 2238-39, 2240-41.
2.4.4.3. The TLDs (and formerly the film badges) placed around the facility are not required by the GTRR license or technical specifications, but are the subject of a l
commitment in the Licensee's FSAR. Tr.2913. This commitment has been in the Licensee's FSAR since 1966. Tr. 2915, 2919. 2 The Licensee has in place other radiation monitors aside from the film badges or TLDs in use outside the building - e.g.,
there is a radiation monitoring device in the stack of the facility (which is exposed to all effluents ping out the stack), as well as other monitors required by the TS. Tr. 2910, l 2914. The Staff is not concerned about the reliability of the environmental monitoring devices in use at the GTRR. Tr. 2925, 2.4.4.4. The Licensee has upgraded the environmental monitoring devices used outside the facility, having converted from the use of film badges to the use of TLDs.
The Licensee's use of these devices does not present a cause for concern in connection with the license renewal application.
I l
- When the Licensee transmitted its license application to the NRC in April 1994, l it included a copy of its FSAR, which used the term "TLDs" instead of " film badges" I
( in describing the environmental monitoring program. See Tr. 2917. GANE pointed to
! this as an example of inaccurate statements by the Licensee. The difference is j insignificant, however, for regulatory purposes: The Staff had previously approved the Licensee's use of film badges in its environmental monitoring program, and would
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j approve the use of TLDs for this purpose as well. Tr. 2924-25.
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_ E. Intrusion by the Film Crew of "A Current Affair."
2.5.1.1. In October 1995, a film crew from the television series, "A Current )
Affair," visited the Georgia Tech site and, with its camera rolling, made its way into the administration building which adjoins the reactor containment building. A filmed record l
1 of their " intrusion" (i.e., entry) into the reactor complex was broadcast by Fox Television j
on November 15, 1995, and was videotaped by Glenn Carroll, GANE's representative
)
l in this proceeding. Tr. 2620-22, 2653. The video portion of that tape was admitted into l evidence in this proceeding (GANE Exh. 54), along with limited portions of a transcript I of the broadcast (GANE Exh. 53). See Tr. 2677-98.
I 2.5.1.2. GANE contends that the film crew's ability to intrude, unimpeded, into )
I the reactor complex demonstrates inadequate management on the part of the Licensee.
See, e.g., Tr. 2669-70. Although Ms. Carroll was not present during the film crew's j intrusion into the reactor complex, she had been informed that members of the film crew
- were dressed like students; and a small, concealed hand-held camera was used in the l - filming. Tr. 2651, 2654-56. Ms. Carroll stated that the film crew tried to open certain doors but found them to be locked; and that they did not get into the room where the radioactive Cobalt is stored or into the reactor containment. Tr. 2656-57, 2658. She l pointed out a sign they had filmed, indicating the presence of radioactive materials --
l l however, she did not know if entry had been made into areas containing radioactive l
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materials, or if the facility's security plan was breached;" and she could not point to any violation of a regulatory requirement. Tr. 2649-50, 2657-59, 2660-61.53 2.5.1.3. Upon receiving a report of this event, an NRC Region II safeguards inspector conducted an inspection of the facility on October 31 - November 3,1995; the results of that inspection are summarized in Inspection Report 95-04. No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection. GANE Exh. 65 (Summary at 2; Report Details at 1, 3). The inspector determined that the film crew toured interior and exterior areas of the NNRC that are open to the public - i.e., areas that are not subject to Licensee control under its security plan -- including hallways in the administration building, a stairwell leading to the visitors' observation window, the roof of the administration building, and a fenced storage yard. GANE Exh. 65 (Summary at 2; Report Details at 1). The film crew was videotaped challenging two security doors, i
which remained locked. No breach of security or the security plan occurred; and there 1
was no indication that the television crew had unauthorized access to protected or 1
1 2" In contrast, Dr. Karam stated that the signs which appear in the videotape are l located outside secured areas in which radioactive materials were present, and that the film crew only entered a public building which was open to students who come and go to classes there. Tr. 3511-12.
S3 Ms. Carroll offered a " common sense" opinion that the facility security plan should utilize fences and barbed wire. Tr. 2661, 2665. Ms. Carroll's education and !
experience (consisting solely of a Bachelor of Arts degree in visual arts, and experience j as an artist, typesetter and graphics designer, Tr. 2665-67) do not qualify her to render I an expert opinion on this subject. Moreover, Ms. Carroll has never seen or devised a j
- security plan for any nuclear reactor, and she did not know what security measures are j m place at any other research reactor. Tr. 2667-68.
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radiation-controlled areas. GANE Exh. 65 (Summary at 1-2; Report Details at 1-2);
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l Tr. 3058; see Tr. 3511-12.
l l 2.5.1.4. The safeguards inspector spoke with Licensee personnel concerning this ,
event, and verified that access controls, barriers, alarms, assessment capabilities and response to alarms was in accordance with the Licensee's security plan. The inspector )
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subsequently viewed the television broadcast of the event on November 15,1995, and determined that it contained no indication that the television crew had unauthorized access to protected or radiation-controlled areas. GANE Exh. 65 (Report Details at 2-3);
! Tr. 3061-62. The videotape did not lead to the identification of any weaknesses in the l Licensee's security program. Tr. 3%8. "
i
[ 2.5.1.5. After the event occurred, the facility director discussed it with all i
l NNRC staff and students. Notwithstanding the fact that no violations or deviations were i
identified as a result of this event, the Licensee subsequently revised its security l measures, by restricting public access to the NNRC to require use of an existing coded key card reader or the presence of an authorized individual to open the front entrance to l the facility;'" also, additional patrols by the campus police, whose office is located l
across the street from the reactor facility, were put into effect. GANE Exh. 65 (Report l
l 8"
The videotape showed that one individual (whom GANE identified as a reactor operator) allowed the film crew to continue in its intrusion into the administration building, unimpeded. This individual was not remiss in this regard, since there is no j requirement for him to have done anything to limit their access to that area. Tr. 3068.
! 3" The key card reader at the front door was in place previously, but was only used j
when the door was locked (i.e., from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.). Tr. 3522, 3530.
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Details at 3); Tr. 3263-64, 3513.
- The Licensee's voluntary institution of these l
l additional security measures was over and above NRC requirements. The Staff would t
not have required the Licensee to take these actions. Tr. 3054-56, 3069-70.
l 2.5.1.6. Upon careful consideration of the evidence, it is apparent that the' Fox Television film crew's intrusion into the reactor complex does not demonstrate inadequate management by the Licensee. To the contrary, the security plan appears to have worked as intended, in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. Further, the Licensee's subsequent decision to improve its security measures beyond the requirements of its security plan may be viewed as demonstrating good managerial judgment.
Accordingly, this matter does not present a cause for concern in connection with the license renewal application.
l-F. Adeauacy of the Licensee's Management Organizational Structure.
(1) Background.
i 2.6.1.1. Central to GANE's litigation of this contention is its challenge to the Licensee's management organizational structure. This challenge includes assertions that the Manager of the OfGce of Radiation Safety (MORS) lacks sufficient independence to conduct his duties; that the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) has had inadequate responsibilities and concern for safety; and that too much authority has been concentrated
'" .In addition, a new fence has been installed at the facility, with an alarm that i activates at the NNRC and the campus police station if the fence is cut, climbed or l shaken. Tr. 3513. This fence was installed in connection with the advent of the 1996 i Olympic Games, but Dr. Karam indicated that Georgia Tech intends to keep it in place
- after the Games have concluded. Tr. 3522-23, 3525.
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in the hands of the facility Director following the 1987-1988 reorganization. These issues are addressed in the following discussion.
(2) Applicable Regulatory Standards.
2.6.2.1. In order to properly evaluate the adequacy of the Licensee's management organization structure, it is important to identify the applicable regulatory requirements and standards. These requirements and standards were identified in the testimony of the Staff's Panel C, comprised of Alexander A. Adams and Marvin M.
l Mendonca.2" Messrs. Adams and Mendonca were quite familiar with the applicable j standards, as well as the manner in which these standards have been satisfied by research reactors throughout the United States, including the GTRR. "
i 2.6.2.2. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. { 50.36(c)(5), reactor licensees are '
i required to establish administrative controls relating to organization and management, l i
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2" Messrs. Adams and Mendonca are employed as Senior Project Managers in the l l Non-Power Reactors and Decommissioning Project Directorate, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Mr. Adams was the Staff's Project Manager for the GTRR from June 1987 to December 1991, at which j time Mr. Mendonca assumed those duties. Panel C. Post Tr. 3171, at 1,5, 6,12. ;
8" In addition to his other duties, Mr. Adams serves as the NRC's alternate representative to American Nuclear Society (ANS) Consensus Committee N-17, "Research Reactors, Reactor Physics and Radiation Shielding"; is the NRC's representative to ANS subcommittee ANS-15, " Operation of Research Reactors"; and represents the NRC on the working group for several individual American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ANS standards pertaining to research reactors, including the working group for ANSI /ANS-15.1, "The Development of Technical Specifications for Research Reactors," which includes guidance on organizational issues. Id. at 2-3.
I Likewise, in addition to his other duties, Mr. Mendonca has conducted training courses l on research reactor inspection and regulation issues related, inter alia, to organizational, l review, and audit functions, and serves as the NRC's representative on various standards committees associated with research reactors. Id. at 4.
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f procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to assure operation
! of the facility in a safe manner. The Commission's regulations do not require that any particular organization or management structure be adopted at power or non-power t
i reactors. However, the "American National Standard for the Development of Technical Specifications for Research Reactors," ANSI /ANS-15.1, contains a section on administrative controls and has been used by many research reactor licensees to achieve l compliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.36(c)(5) -- and it has regularly been accepted for this purpose by the NRC Staff in its review of numerous research reactor organizations.
Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 9.
2.6.2.3. ANSI /ANS-15.1 is a voluntary consensus standard which was developed by a broad-based working group under the direction of Subcommittee ANS-15, and is intended to provide guidance to the research reactor community and other persons.
l j Id. at 9-10; Tr. 3186. Any standard proposed by the ANS working group must be 1
approved by the full ANS-15 subcommittee and ANS Consensus Committee N-17, "Research Reactors, Reactor Physics and Radiation Shielding." The NRC Staff has been actively involved in the work of these committees, represented, in part, by Staff witness Adams and by the Director of the Non-Power Reactors and Decommissioning Project Directorate in NRR. See n.108, supra. NRC representatiies on the committees ensure that the standards produced are consistent with NRC regulations and guidance, to the maximum extent possible. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 10. l 1 2.6.2.4. The Staff has accepted the organizational guidance and structure i described in ANSI /ANS-15.1 as an adequate format for research reactors, and has i 1 l
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! approved licensee Technical Specifications (TS) that generally follow the guidance in the standard. The ANSI standard provides regulatory guidance, but does not establish a
]
regulatory requirement. The Staff has informed research reactor licensees that proposed i
technical specifications which meet the standard will be approved by the Staff; other TS l
proposals may also be approved, but if they are significantly different from the guidance contained in ANSI /ANS-15.1, the Staff generally asks the licensee to justify its proposal, so that a determination can be made as to whether the proposal is acceptable. Tr. 3186.
2.6.2.5, Recommended organizational charts for research reactor facilities are l
contained in the 1982 and 1990 revisions of ANSI /ANS-15.1 - ANSI /ANS-15.1-1982 l
l and ANSI /ANS-15.1-1990. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 11.
l 2.6.2.6. The recommaded organizational chart in ANSI /ANS-15.1-1982 indicates a level 1 unit or organizational head; a 1: vel 2 reactor facility director or I l administrator, reporting to level 1; a level 3 reactor or shift supervisor (this level is conditional and is intended for facilities with routine multi-shift operations), reponing to l
level 2; and a level 4 operating staff, reporting to level 3. The chart also indicates that review and audit functions should report to a level above the facility director -- i.e., to t
level 1 management. In addition, the chart shows that radiation safety personnel should
! l l report either to level 2 (the director or administrator of the reactor facility) pr to level 1 I
(the unit or organizational head). Id.
2.6.2.7. While the 1982 standard showed only reporting lines, the 1990 version of the standard shows both reporting and communication lines. In particular, the 1990 standard shows communication lines between the review and audit functions and the l
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level 2 facility director, and between the radiation safety function and the !cvel 3 reactor [
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or shift supervisor. Further, in the 1990 standard, a narrative section was added on l radiation safety which emphasized that the individual or group assigned responsibility for
[
implementing the radiation protection program at the reactor is to report either to level 1 gr Level 2. Id. at 11-12.
L 2.6.2.8. It is equally acceptable under the 1990 version of the ANSI standard for a radiation safety officer to repon either to the facility director or to a person above the facility director in the facility's organization. Tr. 3174-75. Various facilities have l operated effectively under both systems. About 35 percent of the licensed operating l
l research reactors have adopted organizational structures in which the radiation safety i function repons to the facility director, while the other 65 percent have organizational structures in which the radiation safety function report to a higher or different chain of command. Tr. 3175. The principal concern in either case is that the person to whom
! the radiation safety function reports is technically qualified to oversee that function.
Tr. 3175, 3183.
2.6.2.9. The ANSI guidance provides an appropriate standard by which to l
l measure the acceptability of a licensee's management organization structure. While conformance with the ANSI standard does not, in itself, assure that a licensee will adequately protect public health and safety, it provides an appropriate framework by l
which to assess the adequacy of a licensee's management organizational structure.
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l (3) The Licensee's Current Management Organization.
2.6.3.1. In general, under the current GTRR organizational structure, the NNRC Director has administrative responsibility for safe operation of the facility, .
including reactor operation, experiments, and radiation safety activities. This ;
! responsibility for safety is shared with the NSC and MORS, which provide inherent -
checks and balances to ensure that safety matters are properly considered. The NSC -
provides these checks and balances through its responsibility for oversight of the facility, ;
I and through the NSC members' appointment by, and responsibility to, the President of Georgia Tech. The MORS similarly provides these checks and balances in that it is his l or her responsibility to report safety concerns both to the Director of the NNRC and to l
the NSC, and the MORS also possesses independent authority to suspend any activity he l
or she considers to be unsafe. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 22, 23; GT Exh. 28, at 5. l l
I 2.6.3.2. The current GTRR organizational chart contained in the technical l i
specifications shows the Office of the President at the top of the organization. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 22. The President has overriding responsibility for the Licensee's l conduct of activities under the license; it is his responsibility to appoint the NSC, and to l
assure that a management structure is in place which can properly conduct licensed activities. Tr. 2769-70, 2771, 3129. The NSC and the Office of the Dean of Engineering report to the Office of the President. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 22; Staff !
i Exhs. 5,6; Tr. 3129. The Dean of Engineering is assigned responsibility to supervise the j i
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facility director and to assure proper communication, in both directions, between the facility director and the President. Tr. 2771, 3129-30.
- i 2.6.3.3. In research reactor organizations, the quality assurance (QA) function l
is generally performed through the review and audit functions -- i.e., QA is provided by l 1
a unit higher than or independent from the facility director. That is tnie also for the GTRR, where the review and audit function is performed by the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (which reports to the President of the university). Tr. 3175-76.
1 2.6.3.4. With respect to the NSC, the technical specifications provide- 1 l ,
l The Nuclear Safeguards Committee shall be !
established by the President of the Institute and shall '
! be responsible for maintaining health and safety l standards associated with operation of the reactor and l l
its associated facilities . . . . The Committee shall be i composed of five or more senior technical personnel l who collectively provide experience in reactor j engineering, reactor operations, . chemistry and j j radiochemistry, instrumentation and control systems, l radiological safety, radiation protection, and mechanical and electrical systems.
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- The functions which are currently performed by the Dean of Engineering were previously performed by a university Vice President. Thus, the Vice President for Research performed these functions prior to the issuance of License Amendment No. 8 .
on December 22,1988, at which time these duties were assigned to the Vice President l for Interdisciplinary Programs. The Vice President for Interdisciplinary Programs, in ;
turn, was replaced by the Dean of Engineering in License Amendment No.11, dated
' September 20, 1995. The Staff approved both amendments, having found that the changes were consistent with the standards in ANSI /ANS-15.1-1990, the newly designated official would have the same access to the university President as his ,
predecessor, and there was no adverse effect on the GTRR organizational structure and j function. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 19, 21. 1
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Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 22-23."
2.6.3.5. The TS also state that the NSC reviews and approves changes in equipment, systems, tests, experiments, or procedures; reviews reportable occurrences; reviews and approves proposed procedures and experiments; and reviews and approves proposed changes to the TS and license (excluding organizational structure, which is the >
l responsibility of the President). Thus, consistent with the ANS standard, the NSC ,
I reviews reportable occurrences, operating abnormalities, and violations of the TS, i
license, or internal procedures or instnictions having safety significance. The NSC also audits reactor operations and associated records, the retraining and requalification program, and corrective actions for deficiencies that affect reactor safety. Id. at 23; see Tr. 2729-30, 3314-15, 3335."
2.6.3.6. The organizational independence of the NSC from the facility Director, and the fact that the NSC is appointed by and reports to the President of Georgia Tech, ensures that it has sufficient organizational independence consistent with the guidance of ANSI /ANS-15.1. Similarly, the fact that the NSC is responsible to exercise the review l
" The Staff considers the expertise and variety of' experience of the NSC members l
l to be adequate in areas important to safety. Tr. 3177-78, 3183.
"I As described by Dr. Karam, the NSC operates more or less as a Board of Directors. It inquires into, reviews and approves all safety-related issues. Tr.2771.
The twelve NSC members are generally required to have significant expertise in science or engineering as a condition of membership, Tr. 2771, 3177; no more than a minority )
of NSC members may come from the GTRR staff, and members from the GTRR may
! not constitute a majority of those present at NSC meetings, Tr. 1980-82.
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and audit function, and the fact that it reports to level 1 management, is consistent with i the ANS standard. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 23.n2 2.6.3.7. The GTRR technical specifications indicate that the NNRC Director )1 is to have overall responsibility for direction and operation of the reactor facility, including safeguarding the general public and facility personnel from radiation exposure, and adhering to all requirements of the operating license and TS. The organizational chart shows that the Director is to repon to the Dean of Engineering. In turn, the chart i shows that the Manager of Reactor Operations, the Manager of Gamma Radiation i
Operations, and the Coordinator of Experimental Research are to report to the NNRC j l 1 l
Director in all respects. It further shows that the MORS is to report to the NNRC l t ;
Director in matters relating to supervision and administration -- but is to report to the I
NSC with regard to matters related to safety and safety policy. Id. at 23-24.
l 2.6.3.8. With respect to the MORS, TS 6.1.b. states as follows:
The Manager, Office of Radiation Safety, shall advise the Director, Nuclear Research Center in matters pertaining to radiological safety. She/he has access to -
the Dean of Engineering and/or the President of the Institute as needed.
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n2 The Chairman of the NSC was designated as the campus Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) in License Amendment No. 7, dated July 12,1988. Staff Exh. 23. See discussion supra, at 41, 45. This designation was subsequently deleted in License Amendment No.10, dated June 11, 1991; this amendment also transferred other TS-defined responsibilities of the RSO to the MORS. The Licensee's justification for this change
! noted that the NSC Chairman did not function as the RSO in a traditional sense, radiation
- safety matters were now managed by the MORS, and confusion had resulted from the designation of both an RSO and an MORS. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 20-21; Staff i Exh. 7, at 1; Tr.1232-33.
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This technical specification is consistent with the ANS standard discussed above, and is not unusual. Id. at 24; Tr. 3184. Indeed, the fact that the MORS reports to the NSC for matters of safety and safety policy, exceeds the ANSI standard, and provides further checks and balances beyond that which is provided by some other licensees. Tr. 3176,
-3184-85.
2.6.3.9. In addition, the MORS has the authority, independently from the l
facility director, to shut down any activity he considers to be unsafe. In this regard, the Licensee's " Radiation Safety Manual" provides as follows:
The MORS has the authority and responsibility to f
interrupt or suspend any activity which involves the use of radiation if the methods and/or procedures used l in such experiments, in his/her professional opinion, are deemed to be unsafe and/or contrary to l regulations. Such interruption / suspension shall remain in effect until resolved by the Nuclear Safeguards Committee.
GT Exh. 28, at 5."2 As noted above, this function contributes to the independence of the MORS, and provides further checks and balances in the GTRR organization.
2.6.3.10. Based on their review of the Licensee's current organizational structure, Messrs. Adams and Mendonca concluded that it is consistent with the guidance of ANSI /ANS 15.1-1990, and is generally (although not uniformly) comparable to the organizational structures in pl, ace at a number of other research reactors. The GTRR's l l
organizational structure and comparable organizational structures at other facilities have j 1
l "3 This statement of the MORS' authority to suspend unsafe operations is virtually !
I identical to the statement of authority specified in the Manual for the facility director.
See GT Exh. 28, at 3. ,
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l been effectively used for a considerable time, as determined by NRC licensing and inspection activities. " Finally, they concluded that the GTRR organizational structure r
l satisfies NRC regulatory requirements and applicable generic standards; and it provides acceptable checks and balances and sufficient independent oversight to assure the protection of the health and safety of the public and of GTRR employees. Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 24-25.
2.6.3.11. The Staff's views concerning these' matters are well informed and are entitled to considerable weight. None of the witnesses presented by GANE or the Licensee indicated any familiarity with the ANSI /ANS standard utilized by the Staff to l
evaluate the adequacy of research reactor organizations, nor were they familiar with more than a very limited number of other research reactor organizations. See, e.g.,
l l Tr.1192-94,1212-14,1966. Nonetheless, several of those witnesses expressed their opinions concerning the adequacy of the Licensee's organizational structure, based upon other considerations. Their views are considered in the following discussion.
(4) GANE's Concerns Regarding the Potentialfor Abuse l Inherent in the Director's Au:hority Over the MORS.
2.6.4.1. GANE Contention 9 asserts, in part, that the director of the GTRR facility has too much authority over the MORS, and that the threat of reprisal would
" This conclusion was supported by Staff witnesses Gibson and Collins (testifying
, as members of Staff Panel A) who stated that NRC experience has found that either system -- where the health physics staff reports to the facility director, or where it reports i to a higher level - has worked effectively in various organizations; and how well the l_ system works is a function of the personalities involved and the degree of cooperation that exists between individuals in the organization. Tr. 1894-95.
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inhibit the MORS from challenging the director. GANE produced two witnesses who had ,
i previously served as RSO or MORS under Dr. Karam, who testified concerning their l
perception of these matters. These were (1) Robert Boyd, who served as RSO at the j GTRR from 1973 to July 1987, and as MORS from July 1987 to 1988; and (2) Dr. Brian l Copeutt, who served as MORS from July to November,1990. GANE Exh.1; Tr. 2121; Boyd Qualifications, Post Tr. 2122, at 1-2. Testimony concerning these matters was also t
presented by the Licensee and Staff, and is discussed infra at 138-49 and 149-51, !
1 l respectively. -
2.6.4.2. Mr. Boyd's testunony concernmg these matters is generally discussed supra, at 42-44. In addition to the matters stated above, Mr. Boyd expressed concern j l '
l .
that the facility director's supervisory relationship with the MORS would cause the MORS to fear retaliation (by firing, layoffs, reassignment, or salary cuts) for disagreeing with Dr. Karam; and he believed that this had happened to him. Tr. 2245.us i .
Nonetheless, Mr. Boyd stated that he does not consider the management structure to be so inadequate that the safety of the public cannot be assured, and he does not consider the present organizational structure to constitute an immediate health hazard. Tr. 23%.
ns Mr. Boyd also offered his opinion that the GTRR has not received sufficient funding since it opened over thirty years ago. He believed that this resulted in the facility being operated at a level of safety that would be equivalent to a SALP rating of
" adequate" or slightly less than adequate during the years he was employed at the GTRR.
Tr. 2148-51. Mr. Boyd's opinions concerning the current budgetary situation were not well supported, however. He had not reviewed university financial records or made a
- focused inquiry into the reactor's funding levels after he left, and he did not know the
' current level of State funding. Tr. 2153-54. Similarly, he believed there had been a high l turnover of radiation safety officials at the facility, but he could only speculate as to why the various individuals left their positions. Tr. 2215-19.
. s j - 120 -
Rather, it is his view that this situation might cause a safety concern in the future.
l i
l Tr. 23%.
2.6.4.3. While Mr. Boyd expressed considerable discontent with the 1987 ,
i reorganization and the requirement that he report to Dr. Karam, he was not familiar with l the changes made after he left the GTRR in May 1988. This is significant. As discussed l l
1 supra at 43-45, many of the related organizational changes which Mr. Boyd had opposed l
were subsequently eliminated after he left the facility, such as the designation of the NSC l
Chairman as the RSO, the lack of a reporting line from the MORS to the NSC, and the j l
l proposed limitation of the NSC's oversight authority and independence."6 Moreover, he was not familiar with the manner in which the GTRR has been operated or how it has l l :
functioned since he left the facility, including any changes in the health physics program, i l
procedures and methodology. See, e.g., Tr. 2170, 2210-11, 2354."7 The force of )
l Mr. Boyd's opinions is also somewhat diminished due to his feelings concerning the )
manner in which he was treated by Georgia Tech, discussed above.
l "6 The potential for retaliation has been greatly alleviated since the time Mr. Boyd served as MORS, in that under the original 1987 reorganization, the MORS was to reooa safety problems to the facility director, and the independence and authority of the NSC was limited -- in contrast to the organizational structure which was implemented upon the issuance of License Amendment No. 7 on July 12,1988 (Staff Exh. 23)-- approximately two months after Mr. Boyd ceased to be employed at the GTRR facility.
"7 Mr. Boyd did not know if the current MORS (Dr. Ice) has felt a similar fear of retaliation; he did not know how Drs. Ice and Karam interact; and he agreed that his own ,
- fears are based on his personal experience. Tr. 2388, 2394, 2417. Dr. Ice directly i l
- addressed this matter in his testimony, indicating that he feels he is able to report safety
! matters freely to the NSC, university officials and the NRC, without inhibition. See discussion infra, at 143-45.
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2.6.4.4. GANE's witness Dr. Brian Copeutt was able to provide a more recent and better informed view of the Licensee's management, having been employed as the MORS during a four-month period in 1990 -- although it must be noted that, like Mr. Boyd, Dr. Copeutt had no knowledge of either the management situation or how the radiation safety program was run at Georgia Tech after he left the facility in 1990.
Tr.1095,11%,1208.
2.6.4.5. Dr. Copeutt received a Ph.D. in biomedical engineering, with a specialty in medical and health physics, from Texas A & M University in 1983. He is certified in the field of health physics by the American Board of Health Physics. From 1983 to 1989, he served as Radiation Safety Officer at the University of Virginia, with campus-wide radiation protection responsibilities, including the university's 2 MW research reactor. While working at the University of Virginia, Dr. Copcutt was recruited by Georgia Tech to serve as its MORS. He received an offer of employment at Georgia Tech in 1989; and he received a second offer in March 1990, which he accepted."8 He then commenced work at Georgia Tech on July 2,1990, but resigned from that position on October 8, effective November 2,1990. From January 1991 to the present, "8
Dr. Copeutt had met the Associate Director of the NNRC, Dr. Betty Revsin, while he was at the University of Virginia and she was an NRC inspector assigned to inspect that facility. Dr. Revsin subsequently commenced employment at Georgia Tech as the MORS; after she became the NNRC Associate Director, she recruited Dr. Copeutt to take her place as the MORS. Dr. Copeutt believed that she was favorably impressed
- by his performance at the University of Virginia, even though the NRC had identified j violations in the U. Va. health physics program while he was there. Tr. 1025-26, 1070,
! 1176-77. At the same time, Dr. Copeutt formed a positive impression of Dr. Revsin
} while he worked at U. Va., believing her to be a tough inspector and very thorough in j her work. Tr. 1070, 1176-77.
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he has served as Director of Medical Physics and Radiation Safety Officer at a Los Angeles hospital, where he provides health physics support for the Gamma Knife Radiosurgery Unit and the Radiation Oncology Department. GANE Exhs.1, 2,3,4,5, 13; Tr.1005,1007,1012,1100.
2.6.4.6. Dr. Copeutt stated his opinion that the MORS should be independent from the facility director, and should report to a university official outside the facility.
Tr. 1226, 1228."' He contrasted the GTRR organization to the organizations which he observed at the University of Virginia and Texas A & M University (where he had l
worked as a graduate student), in which the health physics group reported to a chain of l command separate from the reacter facility. Tr. 1017-18, 1277.32 In Dr. Copeutt's l
l view, the reporting relationship at Georgia Tech had the potential to adversely impact !
l I
safety, since the director was in a position to subordinate radiation safety to budgetary l 1
l Dr. Copeutt agreed with the Staff's view, Tr. 3175, 3183, that whoever the j MORS reports to, that person must be able to provide adequate oversight and supervision of the MORS. He doubted that the Vice President would be able to do so, given the other time demands he faced; and he believed that such a situation would result in the MORS receiving too little supervision. Tr.1271. Dr. Copeutt further believed the NSC Chairman's oversight role required that he be independent from both the facility director and the radiation safety function, Tr.1235 -- as is currently the case at Georgia Tech.
i:
Dr. Copeutt's views, although soundly based upon his own experience, do not l constitute " expert opinion." He had no knowledge of the organizational structure in place at any research reactor facility other than the few at which he had worked -- and he did not consider himself to be an expert in the organizational structure of such facilities or in the management of research reactors. Tr. 1018-19, 1192-94, 1283, 1287-88. Further, he was not familiar with any standards or guidelines for research reactor organizational structures, including any that may have been issued by the American Nuclear Society (ANS) er American National Standards Institute (ANSI); and he had never seen ANSI /ANS-15.1-1990 prior to his deposition in this proceeding. Tr. 1212-14.
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and operational concerns, Tr.1230; and he believed that strict control of the MORS by the facility director was not conducive to safety. Tr.1234. Dr. Copeutt also related a series of events which occurred at the GTRR while he was MORS, relating to statements ,
I l made by the facility director about Dr. Copcutt's practice of documenting problems which I
he identified, as follows.
l 2.6.4.7. On July 26,1990 (a few weeks after arriving at Georgia Tech), .
l Dr. Copcutt sent a memorandum to Dr. Karam reporting on his identification of four high radiation areas (levels in excess of 100 mrem /hr) in the containment building and i
recommending that certain actions be taken to provide the required access control.
GANE Exh. 7; Tr.1012-13. Dr. Karam responded by memorandum dated July 30, 1990, in which he accepted Dr. Copcutt's report and recommended that Dr. Copeutt take effective actions to remedy the situation. GANE Exh. 8; Tr.1013. Dr. Copcutt thought this was an appropriate response, and took appropriate corrective actions as requested.
Tr.1013, 1147. On August 3,1990, Dr. Copcutt sent a further memorandum to Dr. Karam, reporting on the discovery of Phosphorous-32 contamination in the Cherry Emerson Building (a laboratory building in which State-licensed radioactive material was used), and the efforts he had undertaken to decontaminate the area and pcevent future recurrence. GANE Exh. 9; Tr.1014.
2.6.4.8. Dr. Copcott stated that his July 26 memo caught Dr. Karam by surprise. Tr.1209. Shortly afterwards, he had a brief, impromptu discussion with 4
i Dr. Karam in the reactor building hallway (at which no one else was present), in which i
i Dr. Karam allegedly told him that he should not document such findings in the future.
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Tr.1015,1041,1197. According to Dr. Copeutt, Dr. Karam indicated that creating a l l
documentary record of such matters would make it easy for NRC inspectors to cite those -
matters as violations for failing to meet regulatory requirements for controlling access to high radiation areas. Tr.1016,1088-89,1200. 2 He stated that, as a result of this conversation, he was reluctant to prepare further memos, and there was therefore a drop-off in his written communications. Tr.1034.
2.6.4.9. On September 28, 1990, Dr. Revsin transmitted a memorandum to Dr. Karam, expressing numerous specific concerns over Dr. Copcutt's performance as a manager of the Georgia Tech HP program. GANE Exh.10; Tr.1025-26. Dr. Revsin concluded her memo by expressing disappointment that "we are not getting the help and assistance from him that we had counted on," and that efforts should be made to get Dr. Copeutt "to assume his appropriate position as MORS and claim ownership of the radiation protection program." GANE Exh.10, at 2. Dr. Revsin further indicated she was worried about the potential for neglect and how the situation would be perceived by NRC and State regulators, noting that Georgia Tech could not " afford to backslide." Id.
2.6.4.10. Dr. Copcutt recalled that Drs. Karam and Revsin discussed with him l many of the issues described in Dr. Revsin's memorandum, in a meeting held on October 2,1990. That meeting is summarized in a lengthy memorandum prepared by l Dr. Karam on October 5,1990. GANE Exh.12 (GT Exh. 21); Tr.10 , 1027.
f 12' i Dr. Copcutt also speculated that in documenting non-compliances, he would be l creating an adverse reflection on Dr. Revsin, who had served as MORS before him.
i Tr.1089. No evidentiary basis was offered to support this opinion. See Tr. 1214-15.
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Dr. Karam's memorandum addressed the issues raised in Dr. Revsin's memorandum along with other issues that were discussed at the meeting, including a need for I-l Dr. Copeutt to increase his productivity in completing written procedures, and to develop l
( and provide educational programs in health physics to others. GANE Exh.12 (GT l
l Exh. 21), at 2; Tr.1033. i l
i I- 2.6.4.11. Dr. Copeutt agreed that the items discussed in Dr. Karam's October 5 memorandum had been discussed "in great detail" at the meeting of October 2,1990.
Tr.1113-14. Nonetheless, he dismissed this memo, and the meeting which preceded it, )
l as an attempt to control his actions and to punish him for acting in a manner contrary to expectations. Tr. 1030-31. He further viewed this as a signal that he would continue to receive negative personnel evaluations unless he performed his job in a certain way.
Tr.1030-32,1035-36.
l 2.6.4.12. Dr. Copeutt further stated that during the October 2 meeting, another :
1 matter had been mentioned which was not described in' Dr. Karam's memorandum.
)
I Dr. Copeutt reported that Dr. Karam had remarked, as "a sideline," that he should not
" document" problems at the facility. Tr.1034.u2 222 Dr. Copeutt stated that Dr. Revsin was not involved in the initial hallway discussion he had with Dr. Karam, shortly after issuance of Dr. Copeutt's July 26,1990 memorandum. Tr. 1016, 1025-26, 1041. He stated that Dr. Revsin was present at the October meeting, but he did not recall if she said anything there concerning Dr. Karam's
- statement. Tr. 1033-34. Nonetheless, Dr. Revsin's presence at the October meeting led l Dr. Copeutt to conclude that she joined in Dr. Karam's statement -- although he conceded
- . that he, himself, "mainly just listened" when Dr. Karam made that statement. Tr.1199.
{
Dr. Copcutt had no documentation concerning either meeting. Tr. 1040 41.
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l 2.6.4.13. Dr. Karam's memorandum was issued on Friday, October 5,1990.
On the following Monday, October 8, Dr. Copeutt turned in a letter of resignation, effective November 2,1990. GANE Exh.13; Tr.1037,1113. Therein, Dr. Copcutt l stated that he could not work effectively within the structure of the radiation safety program; that the MORS " lacks sufficient operational freedom to adequately conduct the radiation safety program"; that the health physics staff appeared to be under the dual control of the MORS and the Associate Director (Dr. Revsin); that he had been i
discouraged from makmg even mmor decisions without first consulting Dr. Karam or Dr. !
l l Revsin; that he objected "to suggestions from [Dr. Karam] and Dr. Revsin that I should I not, in the future, document observed regulatory violations or proposed program improvements"; and that he could not, "in good conscience, take responsibility for a program whose priorities I cannot set and in which I must compromise my professional judgments." Id. Dr. Copcutt forwarded a copy of his resignation letter to Dr. Gary j i
l Poehlein (the Vice President for Interdisciplinary Programs, to whom Dr. Karam then ).
reported), and to each of the NSC members. Id.; Tr.1189. i 2.6.4.14. Dr. Copeutt's resignation came as a surprise to Dr. Karam. On i October 10,1990, Dr. Karam sent a confidential memo to the NSC in which he informed l
the committee of Dr. Copeutt's resignation, indicated that he had attempted to use the October meeting as a means to improve Dr. Copeutt's performance, and stated that he had attempted unsuccessfully to dissuade Dr. Copeutt from going through with his l
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i resignation;i23 and he set this matter as an agenda item for discussion at the next NSC l meeting. GANE Exh.14. !
l 2.6.4.15. On October 18,1990, Dr. Revsin documented her views concerning Dr. Copeutt's resignation (GANE Exh.15). She indicated that she regretted both his decision to resign and his mas:er of doing so, but she disputed Dr. Copeutt's assertion l that he had been told not to document regulatory non-compliances. Accordir"; to Dr. Revsin, Dr. Copeust had been told to use the correct format for documenting non-routine occurrences rather than using the personal memo format. GANE Exh.15, at 1-2. She further stated that Dr. Copeutt had not performed his supervisory or corrective action functions effectively (as she had indicated in her prior memo), and that any " lack of freedom" experienced by Dr. Copeutt merely reflected the accountability that is normal in an employer / employee relationship. Id."'
l 2.6.4.16. On October 18, 1990, NRC Region II received a . ellegation concerning Dr. Copcutt's resignation from Georgia Tech, which it then proceeded to investigate. Oscar DeMiranda (the Regional Allegation Coordinator (RAC)) obtained a copy of Dr. Copeutt's resignation letter, contacted Dr. Copeutt, and spoke with him by
Dr. Copeutt confirmed that Dr. Karam had expressed regret that he was leaving i and tried to persuade him not to resign. Tr.1117; see Staff Exh.1.
l Not surprisingly, Dr. Copeutt disputed Dr. Revsin's description of these events.
See Tr.1052-53, Tr.1093; nonetheless, he acknowledged it was possible for two l individuals to have different perceptions of the same conversation. Tr.1167.
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l telephone on October 25, 1990. " Mr. DeMiranda then reported the results of this j conversation in an internal NRC memorandum (Staff Exh.1).
l 2.ti.4.17. In their conversation, Mr. DeMiranda discussed with Dr. Copeutt his l
letter of resignation and, in particular, the statement that he had been told not to document observed regulatory violations or proposed program improvements.
26 Mr. DeMiranda recorded their conversation as follows:
RAC asked the RSO to explain what the meaning was
! of that sentence and in particular were there any l safety issues which were unresolved. The RSO said l that during his employment at Georgia Tech hs
! identified safety issues but that all of them have been resolved. The RSO said that he was accustomed to documenting safety issues and suggestions for improvement so that there would be a record of the
! issue that would account for his responsibilities. The RSO said that he not the imoression from KAREM l Isic1 and REVSIN that it was not necessary to document issues of this nature. RAC asked the RSO if KAREM and REVSIN discussed his letter of resignation with him. The RSO said that they were both sorry to see him leave and that they both stated that he. the RSO. must have misunderstood him.
l They both stated that they never had a oroblem with him documentir.e safety issues, l- RAC asked the RSO if he had any safety issues that ,
he thought should have been documented and were j not[,] and the RSO responded noI.1 that he always documented safety issues and program improvement !
l !
l
" Dr. Copeutt did not send his resignation letter to the NRC, and was surprised to l receive Mr. DeMiranda's call. Tr.1175.
i 26 In Mr. DeMiranda's memorandum, Dr. Copeutt is referred to as the "RSO" rather than as the MORS.
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l RAC asked the RSO why he resigned and the RSO responded that he felt that he didn't have the organizational freedom to manage and impl[e] ment the radiation safety program at Georgia Tech. RAC l l asked the RSO to explain and the RSO said that everv !
l time he would document a potential safety issue or l
program improvement. he was told by REVSIN or i KAREM that it was not necessary to document the issue and that all he had to do was imolIelment la solution 1. The RSO said that when he did though, l
it had to be [their] way. The RSO said that they were :
involved in every single daily impl[e] mentation of the l
! program. He was not even allowed to determine what l his program priorities were.
. . . The RSO said that basically, he was beine l
l l micro-managed and elected to oursue other i employment.
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RAC asked the RSO' if he had any additional l information he wished to discuss and he responded l no. . . . The RSO agreed that no NRC action was reauired in this matter and in fact stated that KAREM and REVSIN were sorry to see him leave.
RAC informed the RSO that our conversation would constitute closure of this matter an:t that if any additional issues or questions come to mind, to feel l free to contact me. The RSO agreed with the resolution of this case.
Staff Exh.1, at 1-2; emphasis added.
l 2.6.4.18. During the evidentiary hearings in this proceeding, Dr. Copeutt l confirmed the accuracy of this memorandum in every material respect. Tr.1165-66, f
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l 1168-69, 1172-75, 1254. He further indicated that he did not call Mr. DeMiranda with any additional concerns at any time following this conversation. Tr.1175.
2.6.4.19. Significantly, as stated in M r. DeMiranda's memorandum, 1
Dr. Copeutt confirmed that he had documented any safety concerns he had while at Georgia Tech; he was not aware of any outstanding regulatory violations or non-compliances when he wrote his letter of resignation; he was not aware of any observed non-compliances that were required to be reponed to the NRC but were not; 1
and any regulatory violations that may have existed had been rectified. Tr.1039-40, 1160, 1162, 1164, 1259. He funher stated that he was not aware of any safety problem that wasn't handled properly, or any instance in which Dr. Karam's solution to a problem was improper, inadequate, or had compromised radiation safety, Tr. 1110,1164; and he i
was confident that if a reportable radiation safety problem or exposure had occurred, Drs. Karam and Revsin (and he) would have reported it to the NRC as required.
Tr.1263-64,1265-66. I 2.6.4.20. Dr. Copeutt stated that the only instances in which suggestions had been made that he should not document observed regulatory violations were the two verbal statements described above. Tr. 1040, 1138. He further stated that he was not told not to document the results of radiological surveys -- even if they showed contamination. Rather, the statements referred to his practice of issuing narrative memoranda. Tr. 1138-39. Dr. Copeutt also confirmed that Dr. Karam did not tell him 1
to cease reporting regulatory non-compliances to Dr. Karam. Rather, Dr. Karam wanted l
l to be informed of such matters, and to be involved in their resolution. Tr. 1139-40.
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l 2.6.4.21. Dr. Copeutt believed he had understood Dr. Karam's statements correctly. Nonetheless, he recognized that Dr. Karam may have had a different perception, such as telling Dr. Copeutt to discuss matters before documenting them.
Tr.1167-68,1269-70. Trdeed, during his testimony, Dr. Copeutt indicated that a much l different instruction had Aen given to him than he described above -- Dr. Copeutt stated i that he was supposed to " clear and discuss" memoranda with Dr. Karam before they were written up in final form and released, and that he believed he would have been allowed to write a memo in " draft" form and discuss it with Dr. Karam, prior to issuing it.
Tr.1110,1140. 27 This latter description of Dr. Karam's remarks is considerably less l- objectionable than Dr. Copeutt's initial characterization of those remarks.iza Moreover, l
Dr. Copeutt told Mr. DeMiranda shortly after his meeting with Dr. Karam of October 2, i 1 l 1990, that he had been told it was not "necessary" to document the issue; he did not tell :
Mr. DeMiranda triat he was prohibited from documenting such matters. See Staff i
Exh.1, at 2.
iz7 I Dr. Copeutt was not satisfied with this approach, because of a concern that his views might not be reDected in whatever resolution and documentation that would follow.
Tr.1240-41. Dr. Copeutt acknowledged, however, that Dr. Karam may have had vtlid reasons for requesting such action, such as the fact that two individuals could have differing views as to whether a matter was or was not of regulatory importance, which might be resolved through discussions. Tr. 1143, 1274-75. Further, he acknowledged that under the GTRR organization chart, Dr. Karam's request for prior clearance of j memos was within his supervisory authority over the MORS. Tr.1226 12s Dr. Copeutt's clarification of Dr. Karam's remarks is somewhat similar to the l description provided by the current MORS (Dr. Ice) of Dr. Karam's instruction to him, i to first report problems verbally, and to then provide draft written reports, prior to l issuing final written reports. See discussion infra, at 145-46.
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2.6.4.22. Dr. Copeutt acknowledged that neither Dr. Karam nor Dr. Revsin had ever told him that he should not report violations or safety concerns to the NRC.
t Further, he knew he could report any such matters to the NRC on a confidential basis, i
without fear of retaliation. Tr. 1160-61, 1209, 1243, 1281, 1282. "' He was not hesitant to report matters to the NRC when he thought it was professionally appropriate i l to do so; and he had reported very serious matters to the NRC while employed at the University of Virginia. Tr.1212. Prior to being contacted by Mr. DeMiranda, Dr. Copeutt never informed the NRC of Dr. Karam's statements about documentation, l
or about any concerns he may have had concerning the GTRR organizational structure; l
nor did he send the NRC a copy of his resignation letter. Tr. 1161, 1162.
( 2.6.4.23. Dr. Copeutt understood it was his responsibility to keep the Nuclear Safeguards Committee informed on issues related to radiation safety; indeed, this had been pointed out to him at the first NSC meeting he attended, in July 1990. Staff Exh. 2, at 1: Tr.1158,1178-79. Dr. Copeutt also understood that he could report to the NSC either in a meeting or confidentially, Tr. 1179,1186,1209; and that he could bring any concerns he had to the university Vice President or President. Tr.1243. Significantly, Dr. Copeutt routinely sent the NSC copies of all hts memoranda (including his July 26 memo to Dr. Karam), in accordance with his responsibilities. He stated that Dr. Karam i
"' Dr. Karam testified that he recognizes that NNRC employees have the right to speak to the NRC, and he indicated that notices of their right to do so are posted in the facility. While he prefers that safety issues be brought to his attention first, he stated that I he has never told employees they cannot report anything to the NRC and he has not
( questioned their right to report matters to the NRC. Tr. 3515-17.
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never told him there was anything he should not report to the NSC, and Dr. Karam never indicated any displeasure for his bringing matters to the NSC's attention. Tr. 1157, 1158, 1179-80.8" I 2.6.4.24. Dr. Copcutt never told any of the NSC members that he was having problems in his relationship with Dr. Karam, either while he was at Georgia Tech or P
afterwards; and he never told any of the NSC members about Dr. Karam's " don't i
document" statements. Tr. 11 % , 1197. He similarly acknowledged that he could have l gone to the NSC if he was dissatisfied with the results of his discussions with DL Karam l
l
- but he stated that he would have been reluctant to do so since that might impair his
- relationship with his supervisor (Dr. Karam). Tr. 1227, 1230, 1241.
- l l
2" l Indeed, the minutes of the NSC's imtings reflect that Dr. Copeutt brought various other matters to the attention of the FSC, W,'.uding (a) the contamination in the l Cherry Emerson Building, (b) his July 26 inemo and the facility modifications he proposed to control access to the high radiation areas he had detected, (c) contaminated
- ants in the Cherry Emerson Building and (d) the results of an emergency drill at the NNRC. No one ever told him he no tid not have brought those matters to the NSC's attention, and no one from the NSC eve, expressed displeasure with him for having done so. Staff Exhs, 3, 4; Tr.1152,1157,1180-83,1184-87.
l Dr. Copcutt's reasons for resigning from Georgia Tech appear to have been l largely centered upon (a) his dissatisfaction with the degree to which Drs. Karam and Revsin " micro-managed" his work and interfered with his professional freedom (Tr.1049,1079-80,1107-11,126a7); and (b) his discovery in September 1990 -- one month before his meeting with Drs. Karam and Revsin -- that another position was l
available to him at a hospital in Los Angeles, which offered him a substantially higher l salary and greater career satisfaction than was available to him at Georgia Tech (GANE j Exh.1: Tr.1043-45,1100-06,1117,1159,1203-%,1260-61). Thus, Dr. Copeutt I
, conceded that while still working at Georgia Tech, he considered that "if I could get a i
position somewhere doing something in medical physics and it paid more[,] that it would
, be a good change." Tr.1107.
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l 2.6.4.25. Dr. Copcutt's perception that he was told by Dr. Karam not to document safety problems and violations was denied by the other two participants in the October 1990 meeting, who both stated that Dr. Copeutt must have misunderstood Dr.
Karam's statements. - Moreover, Dr. Karam did not attempt to restrain Dr. Copeutt fiom continuing his normal practice of reporting contamination on survey forms or reporting matters to the NSC; and he did not indicate that Dr. Copeutt should not report matters to the NRC. In addition, Dr. Copeutt's recitation of Dr. Karam's remarks indicates that he may well have been told to dgfer documentation until after he had discussed the issue with Dr. Karam. In light of these considerations, Dr. Copeutt's letter of resignation does not appear to provide a cause for concern in connection with Georgia Tech's license i renewal application.
2.6.4.26. Dr. Copeutt's concern that by reporting matters to the NSC, he might l ' damage his relationship with his supervisor (see discussion supra, at 133), should not be lightly disregarded. To be sure, the possibility that such retaliation might occur can not-I be ruled out with certainty. Nonetheless, the GTRR technical specifications and l Radiation Safety Manual, discussed supra, at 116-17, clearly establish that the MORS is l
l reauired to report safety problems to the NSC, and to interrupt or suspend any activity l that he deems to be unsafe or contrary to regulations; any retaliation for doing so would be contrary to the university's fundamental TS requirements and governing policy.u2 I
n2 Even if a revised organization was adopted in which the MORS administratively
{
- reports to some person other than the facility director, his position could arguably still i be adversely affected if that supervisor did not agree with or like his findings.
a .
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2.6.4.27. In addition, during their assigned duties relating to the GTRR, the Staff's Panel B witnesses had the opportunity to interact with various members of the Licensee's staff. None of the persons interviewed by the Staff indicated that they had 1
been or are currently harassed or intimidated by management or fellow workers, or that
- they had been restricted in any way from performing their job functions. None of the i ;
HP technicians or operations personnel raised any concerns about unsafe conditions at the l l
f facility or management problems during the Staff's interviews. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, ,
at 30-31. In particular, private interviews were conducted by the Staff's principal
! inspector, Mr. Bassett, in the course of his inspections at the facility. During those interviews, conducted with HP technicians, reactor operators, and office personnel l
! . outside the presence of Licensee management, no reluctance was noted or expressed by l
anyone to discuss safety issues with the Director of the NNRC, the NSC, other Georgia Tech officials, or NRC personnel. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 31."'
l 2.6.4.28. The Staff's inspections of the GTRR up to the time of the hearing indicated that proper training has been received'by Licensee personnel concerning employees' right to bring safety and regulatory concerns to the attention of Licensee management or the NRC, and that appropriate notices are in place at the facility in this j regard. In addition, the Staff's review of the NSC minutes indicates that potential problems have been reported to the NSC, and the minutes provide a record of these The Staff would consider seriously any allegations it receives concerning i harassment and intimidation by licensee management, or management directions to i . conceal or not report safety problems or regulatory violations to licensee management or j oversight' committees or to the NRC. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 31-32.
l 1
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communications. In the period following the restart decision through March 1996, the NRC did not receive any allegations of potential harassment and intimidation; any allegations or additional information were received following that period would be 1
evaluated by the Staff and dispositioned appropriately. Accordingly, the Staff is not l l
aware of any reason to believe that the Licensee's management has failed to encourage )
a safety-conscious attitude among its employees, or to provide an environment in which l
employees feel they can freely voice safety concerns. Id. at 32.
l 2.6.4.29. For all of the reasons stated above, Mr. Boyd's fear of retaliation and i
Dr. Copcutt's stated reluctance to discuss matters with the NSC due to a concern that this l might damage his relationship with his supervisor, do not present a serious cause for concern in connection with the license renewal application.
(5) GANE's Concerns Regarding the Nuclear Safeguards Committee. l l
7.6.5.1. GANE's contention asserts, in part, that safety concerns at the GTRR are the " sole responsibility" of Dr. Karam, that the Nuclear Safeguards Committee "has theoretical oversight of the GTRR operations" but has "no concern with health issues" and looks to the MORS for "its knowledge of law" rather than of health physics."*
1
- No evidence was presented to support GANE's assertion that the MORS "is sought for its knowledge of law more than its knowledge of health physics." Itis possible that this assertion is related to Mr. Boyd's views concerning a former MORS l
who is no longer employed at the facility. See Tr. 2426. The qualifications of a former MORS, even if shown to be deficient, would have little relevance here; moreover, even Mr. Boyd considers the current MORS to be excellent. Tr. 2216, 2355.
e .
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l The only substant_ive evidence offered by GANE in support of these assertions was l
presented by Dr. Copeutt.n5 2.6.5.2. Dr. Copeutt's criticism of the NSC was rather limited. He stated that i
he considered the NSC members to be technically qualified to function on the committee, ,
but he had an impression that the NSC was not as actively involved in radiation safety matters as the committee with which he had worked at the University of Virginia.
l Tr.1054-55. However, Dr. Copcutt was employed by Georgia Tech only for four l
months, during which time he attended a total of three NSC meetings. Tr. 1054, 1156.
l In contrast, he was employed at the University of Virginia for approximately six years, during which time he attended four or more committee meetings per year (or a total of 25 or more meetings). He therefore had a much smaller data base concerning the GTRR committee upon which to base this judgment. Tr. 1156-57, 1286-87.8"
\
2.6.5.3. The Staff's witnesses disagreed with GANE's assertions that safety is the sole responsibility of Dr. Karam, and that the NSC has no concern for health issues and is otherwise inadequate. Although the Director of the facility has overall "5 Indeed, GANE's witness Mr. Boyd disagreed with GANE's assertion that the NSC has no concern over health issues. Tr. 2418.
" Dr. Copeutt was also critical of the Vice President to whom Dr. Karam reported in 1990, when Dr. Copeutt served as MORS. Dr. Copeutt' stated that he did not sense that individual was interested in getting involved in resolving the documentation conflict !
between himself and Dr. Karam. Tr. 1259-60, 1284. However, Dr. Copeutt had very j little contact with that individual, and had very little basis upon which to form such an !
impression. See Tr. 1195-96 1284-86. In any event, Dr. Karam no longer reports to that individual; and Dr. Ice's testimony concerning the interest in radiation safety shown ,
by Georgia Tech's current President provides more current and reliable information !
! _ concerning this matter.
l l
r ,
__ . __ _ _ _ ._ .. _ ._ _ - _.. _ _ _ _ _ . _._ _ ~ _ _ _-....._._ _._
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l sesponsibility for safety at the GTRR, responsibility for safety at the facility is shared by the MORS. the NSC, other Georgia Tech officials (including the President and the Dean l
l of Engineermg), and all employees involved with GTRR. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 34.
l The Staff's witnesse.c further disagreed with GANE's assertions concerning the role
\
l performed by the NSC, based upon their in-depth knowledge of the NSC's function and l
l safety responsibilities, their attendance at NSC meetings, their conversations with NSC h
j members, and their review of NSC minutes and other documents. This information demonstrated that the NSC has generally performed its safety, review and audit functions in a satisfactory manner. Id. at 7, 30, 32, 34-35; Tr. 2873; Panel C, Post Tr. 3171, at 8 9.15-18, 22-24. See discussion supra, at 135-36.
2.6.5.4. Based upon the evidence of record concerning the assignment of safety l
responsibilities at the GTRR, the NSC's authority and responsibilities, and the manner ,
1 in which the NSC has performed those responsibilities, these matters do not present any cause for concern in connection with the license renewal application. l (6) The Licensee's Testimony Concerning the GTRR Management Organizational Structure. l 2.6.6.1. Dr. Karam expressed his opinion that one person should have supervision over the facility and health physics, regardless of who that person is.
Tr. 2780-81. He believes the current organizational structure in which the radiation 4 l
safety function reports to the facility director, is far better than a structure in which i
radiation safety reports to some authority outside the reactor facility, based on his i
experience at the GTRR. Tr. 3480. In his view, the alternative structure would work l .
e s L
l - 139 -
l l
only if the person to whom radiation safety reports is knowledgeable about reactor l operations, health physics and nuclear safety -- since that person would have to be able l
to make decisions resolving different points of view and would be responsible for decisions affecting health and safety of workers and the public.2" Dr. Karam also pointed out that he is accountable to persons above him in the management chain, and he l encourages all persons to elevate safety concerns to levels higher than him in the l management chain if they do not wish to bring their concerns to him. Tr. 3481.
1 2.6.6.2. A different view was expressed by two other witnesses proffered by Georgia Tech -- Dr. Tsoulfanidis (a consultant hired by Georgia Tech to evaluate its l organizational structure), and Dr. Ice (the current MORS). Both Dr. Ice and l Dr. Tsoulfanidis recommended modifying the GTRR organizational structure to place the MORS under the authority of an official outside the facility director's chain of command. ;
l 2.6.6.3. Dr. Tsoulfanidis is a Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the l - University of Missouri-Rolla, and is also Assistant Dean for Research in the School of Mines and Metallurgy, and the Radiation Safety Officer for the Rolla campus (which includes responsibilities for the university's 200 kilowatt research reactor). Tsoulfanidis, I Post Tr.1939, at 2,4; GT Exh.1. In late 1995, he was asked by the Georgia Attorney "7
Over the years, Dr. Karam believes that this has not been possible at Georgia Tech, regardless of whether the official was the President, the Vice President or the Dean
, of Engineering. Tr. 3480-81. In addition, Dr. Karam stated that the person should have i sufficient time to devote to such supervision and the resolution of disputes between health physics and operations; and that both the university President and the Dean of i Engineering (to whom Dr. Karam now reports) have other assigned duties which would not allow them to devote much time to this task. Tr. 2782, 2783-84.
r p ,g%,-. - -y..e-- --
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General's Office to evaluate the GTRR's management structure and organization, in the L context of GANE Contention 9, and to make any recommendations he may have as to how innagement of the facility might be improved. Tsoulfanidis, Post Tr.1939, at 7-8.
On January 3,1996, he issued a written report which summarized his findings and 1
! recommendations (GT Exh. 2); that report was admitted, in all relevant respects, into l
evidence in this proceeding. Tsoulfanidis, Post Tr.1939, at 13; Tr.1929,1935-39.
)
i l 2.6.6.4. Based on his investigation, Dr. Tsoulfanidis found no reason to be !
1 l
concerned that management problems at the facility are so great that public safety cannot be assured. Dr. Tsoulfanidis concluded that the director (Dr. Karam) is very safety conscious; that the NSC was operating effectively and had excellent membership, sufficiently frequent meetings, and annual audits of the program; and that the structure of the radiation safety program provides no evidence which would warrant concern about the safety of the NNRC's operation. Tsoulfanidis, Post Tr.1939, at 10-11; GT Exh. 2 at 3; Tr.1976-77. Dr. Tsoulfanidis funher concluded, with specific reference to health physics and radiation protection, that the present managerial organization and operation -(
of the NNRC, under its current director, is not inimical to the reactor's safe operation or to public safety generally. Id. at 12. In sum, he did not find any safety issues related to operation of the GTRR. GT Exh. 2 at 1; Tr.1968.
2.6.6.5. In the course of his interviews at the GTRR, each person with whom Dr. Tsoulfanidis spoke (including Dr. Ice, Dr. Karam, and the reactor supervisor) confirmed that all incidents at the facility are reported to the NSC and are reported in the NSC's minutes. Tr. 1964-65; GT Exh. 2, at 2. Dr. Tsoulfanidis recognized that either
l
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l l
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I the facility director or the MORS may bring a matter to the NSC's attention and request j a meeting to address the matter. Tr. 1982, 1983. Further, the MORS has the authority to shut down the reactor pending resolution of a problem by the NSC. Tr. 1983-84.
2.6.6.6. Dr. Tsoulfanidis made one suggestion for improving the GTRR l
organizational structure."8 In his view, the facility director and MORS should report l t
l l to two different administrators, and two separate budgets should be established for the ,
i !
i L
director and the MORS. GT Exh. 2, at 1, 7. He believed that the present reporting l relationship has the potential for " errors, omissions and abuse, particularly if the current Director is replaced and the new one is not so safety conscious." Id. at 6. However, he l found no evidence that the current director either made mistakes or abused the system, l
l and his concern only applied in the event that the current facility director is replaced.
Accordingly, he recommended that the facility director should report to the Dean of l Engineering or equivalent, and that the MORS should report to the Vice Provost for l Research or equivalent; major differences of opinion between the MORS and the facility I
director would be resolved by the NSC. Id. at 6-7; Tr.1949-50,1979."' An "8
Dr. Tsoulfanidis also made some recommendations concerning the expansion and circulation of the minutes of NSC meetings. GT Exh. 2, at 1, 3, 5-6; see Tr.1973-75.
Dr. Tsoulfanidis' recommendation that the NSC resolve major differences of opinion between the MORS and the facility director, is consistent with the Licensee's current practice; he is not recommending any changes in this regard. Tr. 1 % 7, 1979.
Dr. Tsoulfanidis approved of the fact that the current NSC membership includes persons l
who are not affiliated with the GTRR, GT Exh. 2, at 3; in fact, the facility's technical l specifications provide that no more than a minority of NSC members may come from the
- GTRR staff, and NSC members from the GTRR may not constitute a majority of those i present at NSC meetings, Tr. 1980-82.
1
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l adequate, appropriate, equivalent and safe alternative would be for the MORS and facility j director to report to the same individual. Tr. 1963, 1965, 1972-73.
2.6.6.7. Dr. Tsoulfanidis recommended that the MORS should report to someone other than the facility director, not because the current organizational structure l was a matter of concern or presented an unsafe situation, but because he thought the alternative he suggested would work better. Tr. 1947-49, 1968. Dr. Tsoulfanidis stated l
l that management stmetures in place at various research reactors around the country utilize l
either the structure in place at Georgia Tech or the stmeture he recommended, or some variation of the two (although he had never seen the ANSI /ANS organizational charts, Tr.1966); but he favored the stmeture in place at his own university, where the RSO and l
facility director report to different individuals. Tr.1949.2*
2.6.6.8. Dr. Rodney D. Ice, the current MORS at Georgia Tech (appointed in 1992), also testified on the Licensee's behalf. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 1-2. Dr. Ice holds l
a Ph.D. in Health Physics; is certified as a Health Physicist by the American Board of l
l Health Physics; has had nearly 30 years of experience in the fields of health physics, i
l nuclear research, nuclear pharmacy and nuclear medicine. He is, without dispute, l
eminently qualified to serve Georgia Tech in this capacity. Id. at 6-8; see Qualifications, i
- At the University of Missouri-Rolla, the RSO reports to a Vice Chancellor, while
! the reactor director reports to the Office of the School of Mines; both of those Offices i
report to the Chancellor. Tr.1959. However, at the University of Missouri-Columbia (which has a significantly larger, 5 megawatt reactor), both the reactor HP staff and reactor operations report to the reactor director. Tr. 1941, 1960-61. Dr. Tsoulfanidis did not believe that this organizational structure adversely affected the safety of the i University of Missouri-Columbia reactor. Tr.1966.
l
. 4
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1 l
l Post Tr.1940; Tr. 2216,2355." Dr. Ice has a staff of two full-time Health Physicists l 1.
and three student assistants who work on a part-time basis. On routine matters, the Health Physicists report to him; on more significant matters, they report both to him and to Dr. Karam. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 10-11. . In turn, Dr. Ice reports to Dr. Karam. Id.
l at 11-12.
2.6.6.9. Dr. Ice stated that he has the authority to suspend activities involving raLiation, both at the GTRR and elsewhere on campus, if, in his professional judgment, he believes it is unsafe to proceed. Dr. Ice has this authority on his own; he does not l
have to get permission to do so from Dr. Karam, nor does he have to get approval or permission from Dr. Karam to investigate a potentially improper activity. Id. at 12; Tr.1996.u2 Dr. Karam lacks the authority to overrule his suspension, which will remain in effect until the matter has been resolved by the NSC. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 13.
" Dr. Ice devotes approximately 45% of his time to administrative and related safety issues at the NNRC. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 4-5. Dr. Ice has a strong background in teaching health physics, and considers himself and his staff to be highly qualified in health physics methodologies - far beyond the capabilities of the HP staff which was present at the time of the 1987 Cadmium spill. Tr. 2031-33. He described the current i relationship between the health physics and operations staffs as mutually cooperative, in which safe radiological practices are encouraged. Tr. 2060-61.
n2 Dr. Ice provided insight into this process, in response to GANE's inquiries concerning in instance in which he had requested approval to " review" a problem involving a malfunctioning X-ray device. Dr. Ice explained that he had shut the device down (without seeking Dr. Karam's approval), and he then needed NSC approval in order to bring the device back up -- which was required in order to pursue the investigation into why the device had malfunctioned. Tr. 1996-97. In addition, Dr. Ice cited another instance in which he unilaterally shut down a laboratory in which radioactive materials were used, elsewhere on campus, due to his concern over radiation safety. Tr. 2009. No event has occurred at the NNRC to date in which he has had to l, shut down operations, or in which he has wanted to do so. Tr. 2009-10.
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2.6.6.10. Dr. Ice is an ex officio member of the NSC, attends all meetings of the NSC, and regularly makes reports to that committee as part of his duties as MORS.
Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 13; Tr. 2010, 2012. His reports to the NSC would generally i
! involve unusual incidents, violations, safety problems, or requests for approval of i
research projects (for which prior NSC approval is required), and would report to the i
NSC anything of significance that might affect radiation safety at the NNRC. Ice, Post )
Tr.1940, at 13; Tr. 2012-13. Significantly, Dr. Ice stated that Dr. Karam has never told i
! him that he may not express his own professional judgment when making reports to the l
NSC, and Dr. Karam does not prevent him from providing his views to the NSC -- even l
l when Dr. Karam disagrees with him. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 14. Similarly, Dr. Karam has never told Dr. Ice that he should not report violations or safety problems to the NSC.
l l Id. at 16. Dr. Ice feels he always has an opportunity to present any comments he may have to the NSC, without inhibitions, even on matters as to which he has not presented I
a formal report. Tr. 2013, 2035-36."3 In addition, Dr. Ice feels no inhibition on his "3
l Dr. Ice indicated that both he and Dr. Karam are non-voting, ex officio members of the NSC. He believed the MORS should be a voting member of the NSC -- and he would not object if the facility director were also a voting member. Dr. Ice further stated that this is a matter of personal preference; the current status does not present a safety issue; and he could not identify any instance in which the outcome of an NSC decision would have been different if he had been allowed to vote. Tr. 2010-12. Dr. Copeutt j also believed the MORS should become a voting member of the NSC, and stated that he i had been a voting member of the reactor safety committee when he was the RSO at the
! University of Virginia. Tr.1022,1197-98. Neither witness could explain, however, how their becoming a voting member of the NSC would improve safety at the facility, l and their suggestion seems to be a matter of professional pride more than a matter of i regulatory or, safety significance.
- ~ ~ - . - - - - - - . - - . - - . - . - . . . - . - - . - - .
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ability to report matters to other university officials, such as the university's President, Dr. Clough. Tr. 2026.
2.6.6.11. Dr. Ice indicated that Dr. Karam generally wants to know about everything that is going on at the NNRC or elsewhere on campus, that is of any significance; Dr. Ice described this as " micro-management" or being a detail-oriented-manager who is involved with all operational decisions. Id. at 14; Tr.1997-98."'
Accordingly, a procedure has been established whereby Dr. Ice's " Step One" is to take appropriate corrective actions within the exercise of his own responsibilities. His " Step I Two" is to report the matter and discuss it orally with Dr. Karam. " Step Three" would be for him to prepare a draft report and give it to Dr. K.aram for review, comments and suggestions. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 14-15. Dr. Ice stated, however, that there never was an occasion in which he would have liked to prepare a written report but was prevented from doing so by Dr. Karam. Tr. 2015-16. Although Dr. Ice does not favor this system l
personally, he has never found it to be inadequate from a safety standpoint.
l l Tr. 2015.u5 l
"4 This perception of Dr. Karam as a manager who seeks to know what is happening at the reactor in great detail, and to be involved in everything occurring at the reactor of any significance, was shared by Mr. Boyd (Tr. 2370,2461), Dr. Copeutt (Tr. 1109-11),
and Dr. Karam, himself (Tr. 3507).
- us Dr. Ice further stated that there has never been a safety issue which Dr. Karam failed to resolve satisfactorily, nor any occasion in which Dr. Ice believed that the safety L of v,orkers and the public was not adequately assured. Tr. 2018-20. Further, whenever l Dr. Ice has reported safety issues or emergencies to Dr. Karam, Dr. Karam acted in a j
manner to Dr. Ice's satisfaction. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 14; Tr. 2013-14.
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2.6.6.12. Dr. Ice stated that Dr. Karam established this procedure because he l
views any repon that is to go outside the NNRC as a report of the NNRC, and he wants to review and personally approve of the final version to be released. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 15. Dr. Ice did not view this as an attempt to " cover up" or suppress an issue, but as l
part of this practice of " micro-management," in which he wants to know everything going on that is of consequence and to have his personal imprint and approval on any report going out of the NNRC as a report of the NNRC. Id. Dr. Karam concurred in this
, assessment of his intentions concerning the preparation of reports. Tr. 3510.
2.6.6.13. Written reports to the NRC would constitute reports of the NNRC to
! persons outside the university, and would generally have to be approved by Dr. Karam.
l Tr. 2034-35.'" Significantly, however, Dr. Ice stated that Dr. Karam has never l
indicated or suggested that he is not to inform the NRC of a violation or a safety problem; and Dr. Ice feels he is not restricted from making a report to the NRC, as an i individual. Id. at 16; Tr. 2034. Dr. Ice further indicated that he feels he has the i opportunity to discuss any matter he wants with the NRC at any time, formally or !
informally. Tr. 1998, 2009."7 In addition, if he felt a major hazard existed on which 2" Dr. Ice clarified that he would not need to get Dr. Karam's approval for some types of reports, such as telephonic " reports" of spills involving radiation releases in i
! excess of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 limits. Tr. 2.035.
"7 Dr. Ice indicated that his written reports to the Nuclear Safeguards Committee would constitute " internal" (intra-university) documents, for which approval by Dr. Karam is not required. Tr.2036. This is significant. Under Georgia Tech's
- technical specifications, the MORS is responsible to report matters of safety and safety policy to the NSC. ' Any interference by the facility director with this responsibility might
( well constitute a TS violation.
I
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l Dr. Karam had failed to act, Dr. Ice would_immediately report the matter to the NRC and would also call the Chairman of the NSC. Tr.1999.
l 2.6.6.14. Dr. Ice indicated that Dr. Karam insists on strict compliance with the
! written technical specifications, rules and policies of the NNRC. Further, Dr. Karam is 1
very safety conscious, and has sometimes been overly conservative in his interpretation and application of radiation safety-related procedures. Id. at 18-20; Tr. 2018-19. On one such occasion cited by Dr. Ice, Dr. Karam's view was stricter than that of Dr. Ice.
I Tr. 2038."8 While Dr. Ice and Dr. Karam have sometimes argued about the proper 1
handling of health physics matters, Dr. Karam listens to his views and has sometimes changed his mind based on Dr. Ice's statements or arguments,Id. at 16-17; Tr. 2017-18; l
these arguments have not discouraged Dr. Ice from expressing his views on subsequent occasions. Tr. 2016-17.
2.6.6.15. Dr. Ice does not share Dr. Karam's preference for the current GTRR ,
organizational structure. He believes it would be preferable if the MORS and his health physicists were not subject to the supervisory authority of the Director. Id. at 17.
Dr. Ice explained that while he currently has the independent authority to shut down operations, he has no other decision-making authority short of that action. Tr. 2020, 2061,2064. In addition, Dr. Ice believes the MORS' budget should be independent from the operations budget, Tr. 2020-22; and the MORS should have independent authority l
l l
"8 l Mr. Boyd likewise stated that Dr. Karam is very safety conscious and is
! concerned'with radiation safety. Tr. 2232.
_ . . _ _ _. _ _ ~ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ - _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _
- 148 - l in personnel matters, Tr. 2054-55. " In addition, he believes that executive management should be involved in oversight of the radiation safety function, and that the MORS should have a clear reporting line to executive management. Tr. 2000-01.'" l However, notwithstanding these recommendations, Dr. Ice stated that he does not believe the current organizational stmeture or lack of independence of the MORS renders the l
operation of the facility unsafe. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 17-18; Tr. 2022-24, 2057. I 2.6.6.16. In sum, Dr. Ice stated that he has complete authority to shut down any l
l operation he deems unsafe; he has the opportunity to meet with the university President j and to raise safety concerns with him; he has an open communication channel to the Nuclear Safeguards Committee; and he can speak with the NRC at any time. Tr. 2030.
In light of these considerations, Dr. Ice belie.ves tha' the has adequate and sufficient l
independence to ensure safety, in the performance of his official duties. Tr. 2030-31, l 2045. Finally, Dr. Ice believes that the managerial organization and operation of the 1
l I 2"
Although Dr. Ice, as MORS, exercises many of the same functions that are exercised by an RSO, he does not have administrative authority over his program, or the authority to define the scope of his program; he therefore feels his role as MORS is not equivalent to an RSO. Tr. 2054-57. However, he did not perceive any difference between the roles of MORS and RSO, from a safety standpoint. Tr.2057.
l_
Dr. Ice stated that Dr. Clough, the new President of the university, established l a practice one year ago, of meeting with Dr. Ice privately on a quarterly basis to discuss
- radiation safety matters. Dr. Ice perceives this to be active and effective involvement by
! upper management in the reactor safety program; and he would like this practice to be l formalized through a revision to the organizational reporting lines, whereby the MORS 4
would report either to the President or to one of the President's subordinates.
Tr. 2001-02, 2025-26.
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NNRC as presently constituted and under its current director, are not inimical to the i reactor's safe operation or to public safety generally. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 20.
(7) The Staff's View of GANE's Concerns Over the GTRR Management Organizational Structure.
2.6.7.1. The Staff's Panel B witnesses, who were involved in the Staff's, inspection, enforcement and licensing actions related to the GTRR for much of the period since restart in November 1988, disagreed with GANE's view that the GTRR's organizational structure, whereby the MORS reports to the facility director, is inadequate.
Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 33. They noted that the director was given increased authority over the radiation safety function with the creation of the new MORS position, upon the 1
l issuance of Amendment No. 7 in 1988; however, based on their knowledge of the facility and its inspection history, they stated their belief that the current organizational structure has improved the organizational relationships and resulted in acceptable performance.
1 They further stated that the MORS' performance of his safety responsibilities is regularly i l
considered in NRC inspection activities to ensure that the ability to raise issues to higher j l
levels of management or the NSC on safety matters is clearly understood and implemented. Accordingly, the witnesses concluded that there is no effective disincentive to raising safety issues and assuring that they are properly addressed. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 33-34.
- 2.6.7.2. The Staff's Panel B witnesses further disagreed with GANE's assertion
. that the MORS lacks sufficient authority or independence to perform his functions effectively. Based on their knowledge of the current organizational structure and
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functioning of the GTRR, they were satisfied that the MORS has the backing and support of the Director to perform his duties in both the health physics and safety areas. This conclusion was also based on discussions the witnesses have had with the NNRC Director, the MORS, and other GTRR personnel, and on their observations and review of safety-related activities and programs in connection with their assigned duties i
concerning the GTRR. Id. at 35-36."
2.6.7.3. The witnesses noted that the qualifications and experience of the present MORS were outlined in a letter from the Licensee to the NRC dated December 4,
! 1992; these qualifications demonstrate that the MORS has indepth knowledge and practical experience in the area of health physics and radiation safety. Further, NRC Inspector Bassett has met with the current MORS on many occasions at the facility, has inspected the implementation of his program and his overall performance, and is satisfied that the current MORS is capable of performing his functions effectively and that he has done so. Id. at 35.
2.6.7.4. Staff witness Mendonca further disagreed with the view expressed by Drs. Copcutt and Ice, that it would be preferable for the Licensee to utilize an j organizational structure in which the MORS reports to a separate chain of command s
"8 The Staff's Panel B testimony also addressed the present status of the Licensee's ,
HP procedures, equipment and personnel competency to deal with a contamination event at the GTRR. In this regard, Inspector Bassett stated that, at present, the HP procedures and ' equipment are acceptable, and the HP and operations personnel are competent, to
- implement the radiation protection program at the GTRR. He further indicated that since i 1989, he has noted improvements in the Licensee's HP procedures, including more j, information, specific guidance, and direction for the HP staff; also, procedure changes
- have been reviewed and approved by the NSC. Staff Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 36.
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independent from the facility director. According to Mr. Mendonca, both types of l l
l organizations have performed satisfactorily, and neither has been found to be more i
advantageous from a health and safety standpoint. Mr. Mendonca pointed out that many i
- different parts of an organization (including operations, radiation safety, experimenters, and the NSC), have a role to play in the health and safety function. Tr. 3181-82.
i Accordingly, the Staff did not find any reason to require, as a condition of license renewal, that the health physics function (headed by the MORS) report above the facility l director or to a chain of command separate from the facility. Tr. 3182-83.u2 l l
l (8) Conclusions Regarding the Adequacy l of the Licensee's Management of the GTRR. ,
I j 2.6.8.1. During three assessments of the Licensee's performance, conducted in 1991,1992, February 1994, the Staff determined that its performance was acceptable and i
the problems from the 1987 to 1988 time penod had been corrected. Since early 1989, i
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! the personnel at GTRR have significantly improved the facility's procedures, and the ,
i Licensee's compliance with NRC regulations and procedures has generally improved.
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- In sum, the Staff's witnesses concluded that the Licensee's present organization performs l
its various functions in a manner which assures proper attention to the protection of the public health and safety. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 29.
u2 Indeed, Mr. Mendonca pointed out that another Class I research reactor facility (the University of Virginia) utilizes an organizational structure in which the radiation safety function reports outside of the facility. Nonetheless, that licensee was found to l - have more significant violations than the GTRR during the period reviewed by Mr.
Mendonca; and some of the violations involved that university's radiation safety program
-- at a time when Dr. Copeutt served as its RSO. Tr. 1177, 2985, 3182.
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2.6.8.2. In general, NRC inspections at the Licensee's facility have verified that !
l the Licensee complies with the TS requirements associated with organization and management. -Inspector Bassett personally attended various meetings of the NSC. This attendance at NSC meetings and the NRC Staff's review of the minutes of the majority of the other meetings showed the Committee performed its duties (including, among other matters, the review of procedures) as stated in the Technical Specifications. Id. at 30.
2.6.8.3. During the past seven years, the Staff interviewed the majority of the NNRC personnel, including management, HP technicians, reactor operators, and office personnel, concerning working conditions, surveys, procedures, and their opinions of interoffice relationships and cooperation at GTRR. None of those interviewed indicated that there was a continuation of the past problems between the HP and operations personnel. Those individuals who had been at the facility during the previous personnel problems stated there was a significant improvement in the working relationships. Id.
I 2.6.8.4. The Staff has concluded that the GTRR management and organizational structure fulfills the NRC requirements for the performance of required duties with j sufficient oversight to assure independent review. The organizational structure provides l
an integrated approach to operations, experiments, radiation safety and use of radioactive materials. The organizational structure also provides a satisfactory means to raise safety issues to University officials by both the NSC and MORS. The Licensee's inspection history following restart, and the Staff's conversations with Licensee personnel to the
{ time of the hearing, support a conclusion that safety problems and regulatory violations j
would likely be reported to appropriate Licensee management or to the NRC. Id. at 39.
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2.6.8.5. The Staff's Panel B witnesses found no evidence that the Licensee was not making a diligent and acceptable effort to comply with Federal regulatory requirements. On the contrary, they indicated that the Licensee is meeting the regulatory l
requirements, and they believed the Licensee is concerned with and is tryirg to comply l with safety regulations. Tr. 3148.
l l 2.6.8.6. The Staff's Panel B witnesses clearly disagreed with GANE's view that the Licensee's management of the GTRR facility is inadequate to provide reasonable l assurance of the continued protection of the public health and safety, based upon their l knowledge of (a) the NRC Staff's inspection and enforcement efforts in the period I
following the NRC's November 1988 authorization to restart, (b) their knowledge of the actions taken by the Licensee to comply with the requirements imposed in connection 1 with the NRC's January and March 1988 enforcement Orders and the November 1988 ,
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authorization to restart, and (c) their knowledge of pertinent regulatory actions and other i matters related to the Licensee's management of its facility in the period following i
restart. Panel B, Post Tr. 2813, at 5, 6. l l
L 2.6.8.7. The Panel B witnesses testified that in the period following the l November 1988 authorization of restart, the cooperation between and functioning of the l radiation safety and operations groups improved considerably from the manner in which they were described by other NRC personnel in 1988. In the post-restart period, the ,
1 Staff has found the functioning of the radiation safety and operations organizations in this
( regard to be acceptable. Further, based upon their inspection and review of the Licensee's management and organizational structure, the Panel B witnesses concluded that l
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the Licensee's management of the GTRR since November 1988 has generally complied with NRC regulatory requirements (i.e., regulations, license requirements and technical specifications), and accepted standards for research reactor licensees. Based on their inspections of the GTRR facility and their reviews of these matters, these witnesses !
concluded that the corrective actions taken and other improvements made by the Licensee acceptably resolved the Licensee's previous management and organizational problems.
l Accordingly, the witnesses concluded that the present organization and management of ,
I the GTRR provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety, as well as the ;
health and safety of GTRR employees, will be protected in the event that license renewal is authorized. Id. at 6-7.
2.6.8.8. The Staff's conclusions regarding the adequacy of the Licensee's management organizational structure were based upon their knowledge of the GTRR organizational and management structure, the checks and balances incorporated in that structure, and the way in which the GTRR organizational and management structure compares with the structures in place at other research reactors and with applicable generic standards for research reactors. On this basis, the witnesses concluded that the Licensee's management of the GTRR complies with NRC regulatory requirements and accepted standards for research reactor licensees. Id. at 8.
2.6,8.9. Further, in the Staff witnesses' view, the organizational and management stmeture for the GTRR provides appropriate, redundant checks and i
- balances, in that the facility Director has overall safety responsibility, while the NSC and
! the Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety (MORS) have the responsibility and w '
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i appropriate independence to ensure that safety issues are properly addressed or raised to higher authorities in the Licensee's organization. Id. For these reasons, as amplified in ,
their testimony, they concluded that the present organization and management stmeture of the GTRR provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public, as well as of GTRR employees, will be protected if renewal of the GTRR license is authorized. Id..at 8-9."'
2.6.8.10. The conclusions reached by the Staff's witnesses concerning the adequacy of the Licensee's management and organizational structure are well considered and persuasive. Further, the evidence introduced in this proceeding amply supports the Staff's conclusions concerning these matters.
2.6.8.11. In sum, the evidence does not support GANE's accertions that the Licensee's management of the GTRR is inadequate. Th.s conclusion is based upon the evidence of record, which demonstrates, in part, that (a) the facility director did not impreperly withhold information from the NRC in 1987 concerning the Cadmium-115 incident; (b) the Licensee's dismissal of the two health physics technicians in 1988 does not provide cause for concern at this time, in light of the Licensee's conduct since then and its institution of safeguards to prevent a recurrence in the future; (c) excessive "3
L For his part, Dr. Karam provided his " professional opinion" that the managerial organization and operation of the NNRC, coupled with its cuo ent highly qualified HP staff and operators, results in "the highest level of safety." Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 53.
All of the individuals who served as MORS under Dr. Karam at the GTRR and testified l in this proceeding (including Mr. Boyd, Dr. Copeutt, and Dr. Ice) agreed that Dr. Karam l is very safety conscious. Further, as discussed above, none of these individuals were
! aware of or could point to any instance in which Dr. Karam failed to resolve a safety problem satisfactorily.
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authority has not been centralized in the hands of the facility director but, rather, is appropriately shared by the MORS, the Nuclear Safeguards Committee and other university officials; (d) the MORS has direct reporting responsibility to the NSC on ;
matters of safety and safety policy, and is able to bring to the NSC's attention (as well ,
as the university President and others), any concerns he may have concerning radiation safety or other matters; (e) the NSC is appropriately concerned over health and safety issues and has performed its functions in a satisfactory manner; and (f) the Licensee's performance in the period following the November 1988 authorization to restart demonstrates an appropriate regard for safety and regulatory compliance on the part of Licensee management.
I G. Beneficial Uses of the GTRR Facility. I l 2.7.1.1. While not directly related to the management contention, GANE l attempted to show that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is under-utilized, l
under-funded, and unnecessary. See, e.g., Tr. 2262-63. In contrast, Dr. Karam l
I provided a brief description of the beneficial uses of the GTRR, including research and l
the training of graduate students for work in industry, government, and research.
Tr. 2733-35, 3535.
2.7.1.2. This issue need not be long considered: Congress has explicitly recognized and facilitated the realization of the benefits afforded by research reactor facilities, in 5% 31 and 104(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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I 2.7.1.3. In addition to the benefits which have accrued from research reactor !
l l l facilities to date and which may be expected to continue in the future, testimony was )
l l - introduced in this proceeding concerning the potential significant benefit which might be offered by utilizing the GTRR facility for research into boron neutron capture therapy -
(BNCT), and the treatment of cancer patients for whom surgery is not a viable option, using this medical therapy. Ese, e.g., Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at 54; Ice, Post Tr.1940,
]
at 21; Tr. 2005-07, 2058-59, 3257-61, 3536. The potential benefit of such a program was recognized by GANE's witnesses,.Dr. Copeutt and Mr. Boyd, Tr. 1099,2209; and l
by Drs. Ice, Karam and Tsouifanidis. Ice, Post Tr.1940, at 21; Karam, Post Tr. 2723, at $4; Tsoulfanidis, Post Tr.1939, at 12); Tr. 2058-59.
2.7.1.4. The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is believed to be particularly well suited for use in this therapy. According to GANE witness Dr. Copcutt, it is one of the few reactors in this country powerful enough for this purpose. Tr. 1044,1045. Drs. Ice and Karam similarly believe the GTRR may be " uniquely" or best qualified to provide BNCT therapy, as compared to any other facility; in this regard, Dr. Ice mentioned its power level, as well as its ability to produce an ideal neutron spectrum; and he cited a j l
Department of Energy report which ranked the GTRR as the most appropriate device for l l
this purpose. Tr. 2005-06, 2026, 2050, 3536. Substantial modifications of the l
biomedical research facility adjoining the reactor would be required, however, before it could be used for this purpose; the appropriate drugs and dose levels have to be i
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identified; elaborate procedures have to be developed; and the university may have to become affiliated with a medical school or hospital. Tr. 1044, 2006-07, 3258-63.* '
I l l III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ;
1 l 3.1. The Board has considered all of the evidence presented by the parties on i 4
L the admitted contention concerning the adequacy of the Licensee's management of the l Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Based upon a review of the entire record in this l proceeding and the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the l
panies, and based upon the findings of fact set fonh herein, which are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record, the Board has decided all l
matters in controversy and reaches the following conclusions.
l l ' 3.2. The Board finds that the Licensee's performance in the post-restart period, although not entirely satisfactory, has substantially improved since the shutdown of the reactor in 1988. Funher, the Board concludes that the Licensee's performance in the post-restart period does not support GANE's assenion that management of the GTRR is inadequate and that the license renewal application should therefore be denied; and, funher, that GANE has not met its burden of demonstrating that " substantial management deficiencies persist." Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor),
LBP-95-6,41 NRC 281,299 (1995).
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- Funding to conduct the required research and to make the required facility
- modifications has not been provided, as yet. Tr.1044. However, some work is being j done by Drs. Karam and Ice in the areas of neutron filter design, pharmaceuticals, and
] pharmaceutical delivery mechanisms. Tr. 2027-29.
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l l 3.3. The Board has further examined the evidence in light of the guidance l
provided by the Commission at the start of this proceeding. We conclude that GANE has I not demonstrated " management improprieties or poor ' integrity' . . . [that] relate directly to the proposed licensing action," or that "the GTRR as presently organized and staffed l [ fails to] provide reasonable assurance of candor and willingness to follow NRC l regulations." Moreover, the evidence supports a finding that "the facility's current management encourages a safety-conscious attitude, and provides an environment in which employees feel they can freely voice safety concerns," and there is " reasonable l
l assurance that the GTRR facility can be safely operated" in that "the GTRR's current management [n]either is unfit [n]or structured unacceptably." Georgia Institute of ;
I Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12,42 NRC 111,120-21 (1995).
3.4. The Licensee's management of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 1
l j complies with all applicable regulatory requirements, and provides reasonable assurance i
that its management of the GTRR facility, upon the renewal of License No. R-97, will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
3.5. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. il 2.760 and 50.57, as applicable, the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation should be, and hereby is, authorized to issue to the Georgia Institute of Technology, upon making requisite findings with respect to l
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t l matters not embraced within this Initial Decision, a renewal of Operating License l No. R-97, in accordance with the Licensee's application for such license renewal.
! Respectfully submitted, I
Jo i
! Sherwin E. Turk
! Counsel for NRC Staff i
1 Dated at Rockville, Maryland l this 25th day of October,1996 l
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DOCKETED USHRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 96 0CT 28 PS :22 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BgRD .
DOCKElMG i ;EiNICE In the Matter of ) gpA n
)
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ) Docket No. 50-160-Ren
)
l (Georgia Tech Research Reactor) ) ASLBP No. 95-704-01-Ren
)
(Renewal of License No. R-97) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i
I hereby certify that copies of the "NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served l on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicated by a single asterisk through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system on this 25th day of October 1996.
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l Administrative Judge Panel
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Boa d Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Mail Stop: T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Adjudicatory File * (2)
Dr. Jerry R. Kline* Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Administrative Judge Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Office of the Secretary * (2)
Attn: Docketing and Service Dr. Peter S. Lam
- Mail Stop: OWFN-16 GIS Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C. 20555
- Mail Stop: T-3 F23 i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 4
v Office of Commission Appellate Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Esq.
Adjudication
- Senior Assistant Attorney General Mail Stop: OWFN-16 GIS Georgia Department of 12w l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 40 Capitol Square S.W.
! Washington, D. C. 20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300 Alvin Lenoir, Esq. Georgians Against Nuclear Energy c/o Greenpeace P. O. Box 8574 Twenty 13th Street, N. E. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 l Ms. Glenn Carroll l
Randy A. Nordin, Esq. GANE Manager, Legal Division 139 Kings Highway
Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0420
)hsO h_
Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff I
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