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- g UNITED STATES i
8Y-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
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WASMNGTON, D. C. 20555 4
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June 1,1984 l
Docket No. 50-416 MEMORANDUM FOR: Elinor G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing FROM:
L. L. Kintner, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing l
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SUBJECT:
STATUS REPORT ON REVIEW 0F GRAND GULF TECHNICAL
~
SPECIFICATIONS (TS) CHANGES The enclosed table gives status of the review of letters from MP&L requesting ifcense amendments to change the Technical Specifications. Safety Evaluation Input for all such TS change requests are planned to be completed i
i for the full power license amendment. Requests for additional information have been requested by letter.
j Dov l
L. L. Kintner, Project Nanager l
Licensing Branch No.1 l
Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated 1
(
cc:
D. Hoffman T. Novak D. Houston i
i M. Duncan i
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DN ay N, f j
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Sheet 1
ef 8
TABLE 1 GRAND GULF REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (a)
Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transagal Compiegn Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Sub.iect No.
Date Date CHEB Stang 54313 073 Fire Protection Instruments 1
09/09/83 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 54334 131 Fire Pose Stations 23 09/09/84 11/07/83C TS Complete MEB Li 54316 123 Peactor Vessel Temperature 4
09/09/83 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 KB Hammer 54320 028 RCS Isolation Valves 8
09/09/83 04/16/84C SE Complete MEB Shaw 52523 139 Snubber Identification 1
10/07/83 04/16/84C Ordered 54603 021 Snubber Addition 1
03/29/84 04/16/84C Ordered l
SGEB Jagannath 54315 133 Embankment Slope Stability 3
09/09/83 06/30/84 RAT 05/08/84 l
Sheet 2
cf 8
l TABLE 1 I
GRAND GULF RE00ESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES *I
~
l Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner Extension:
49-27038 Date:
7 30/54 Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transegl Complegn Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Subject No.
Date Date METE Lee 54314 120 Off as Monitoring 2
09/09/83 06/30/84 9
54331 122 Ventilation Flow Monitors 19 09/09/84 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 54667 038 Radiation Monitor Instr.
1.A 04/07/84 04/12/84C Ordered II) 54667 262 SGTS Radiation Monitor 1.B 04/07/84 04/17/84C TS Denied 546E5 329 Accident Monitoring Instr.
3 04/10/84 04/13/84C Ordered METB Markee 54670 015 Containment Pressure Setpoint 4
04/07/84 04/14/84C Ordered 016 033 i
RAB Meinke 54340 105 Define " Unrestricted Area" 29 09/09/83 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84
!.r t
Sheet 3
cf 8
TABLE 1 GRAND GULF REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (a) l Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transm{gjal Comple}{9n Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Subject No.
Date Date ICSB Virgilio-54317 119 Rad Monitor Instruments 5
09/09/83 05/30/84 54328 111 Ventilation Rad. Monitors 16 09/09/83 05/11/84C SE Complete 54319 115 ECCS Actuation Instruments 7
09/09/83 03/30/84C TS Complete 54330 112 RPS & ESFAS Instruments
-18 09/09/83 03/30/84C TS Complete 54339 116 ECCS Instruments 28 09/09/83 03/30/84C TS Complete 1
(h) 54325 118 Control Rod Block Interlock 13 09/09/83 05/30/84 54332 114 ECCS actuation 21 09/09/83 05/11/84 SE Complete 1
52524 078 RCIC Initiation 1
10/11/83 03/30/84C Ordered 53395 037 Instr. Calibration Frequency 1
12/14/83 04/20/84C Ordered 54479 005 RWCU Isolation 2.1 03/20/84 03/30/84C Ordered 54602 198 Radiation Monitor Instr.
2 03/29/84 04/16/84C Ordered 54604 054 Containment Spray Instr.
3 03/29/84 04/16/84C Ordered 54605 213 ADS Instrumentation 4
03/29/84 04/16/84C Ordered
Sheet 4
cf 8
TABLE 1 GRAND GULF REOUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (a)
Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transmlgjal Comple{fjn Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Subject No.
Date Date ICSB - Virgilio 54606 285 Chlorine Detector Instr.
5 03/29/84 04/16/84C Ordered 54667 038 Rad Monitoring Instr.
1 04/17/84 04/12/84C Ordered
.l 54668 103 MS Flow Instr.
6 04/07/84 04/12/84C Ordered 54670 015, 016 Containment Pressure Setpoint 4
04/07/84 04/12/84C Ordered 033 54683 308 Room Temperature Setpoints 1
04/10/84 04/13/84C Ordered i
54685 329 Accident Monitoring Instr.
3 04/10/84 04/13/84C Ordered CSB - Notafrancesco 54324 128 Containment H Control 12 09/09/83 03/21/84C TS Complete 2
54326 107 Initial Containment Pressure 14 09/09/83 03/21/84C TS Complete 54333 127 Drywell Pressure 22 09/09/83 03/21/84C TS Complete 52139 140 Secondary Containment Isolation 2
08/09/83 03/21/84C TS Complete i
i
+
Sh:st 5
of 8
TABLE 1 GRAND GULF REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (a)
~
.I Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transmgal Complegn Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Subject No.
Date Date CSB - Notafrancesco 54327 126 Suppression Pool Level 14 09/09/83 03/21/84C (CSB) TS Com-plete. See also RSB.
54669 292, 293 Containment & Drywell Airlocks 3
04/07/84 04/12/84C Ordered f
54684 306 Containment Isolation Valves 2
04/10/84 04/13/84C Ordered 54685 329 Accident Monitoring Instr.
3 04/10/84 04/13/84C Ordered RSB - Collins 54318 076 ECCS Response Times 6
09/09/83 04/04/84C Ordered i
54322 110 Isolation Valve Response Time 10 09/09/83 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 54327 126 Suppression Pool Level 15 09/09/84 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 54329 Reporting of SRV operation 17 09/09/83 04/02/84C SE Complete 54335 075 LPCI Pump actuation 24 09/09/83 04/02/84C SE Complete 54478 001 ADS Valve Operability 1
03/20/84 04/04/84C Ordered l
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.a, Sheet 6
cf 8
'i TABLE 1 GRAND GULF REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (a)
~;
n i
i Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner j-Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transm{gjal Complegn Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Subject No.
Date Date RSB - Collins 54685 329 Accident Monitoring Instr.
3 04/10/84 04/13/84C Ordered I
54683 233 *)
ECCS Surveillance 1
04/11/84 04/13/84C Ordered PSB Rhow 4
54336 136 Containment Valve List 25 09/09/83 06/30/84 54323 060 AC Power Operability 11 09/09/83 06/30/84 54337 134 AC Power Survillance 26 09/09/83 06/30/84 I
i ASB Ridgeley i
51640 035 Refueling Platform 17 06/09/83 06/30/84 Prenoticed - RAI f
54321 129 Service Water for ESF.
9 09/09/83 03/21/84C SE Complete 54479 005 SLCS Pump Operability P.3 03/20/84 04/20/84C Ordered i
4
Sheet 7
of 8
TABLE 1
~
GRAND GULF REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (a)
Project Manager:
L. L. Kintner i
Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 i
Problem Licensee Staff Sheet Branch - Reviewer Item Transmlgjal Comple{f9n Status (d)
TAC No.(b)
Number Subject No.
Date Date CPB - Brooks 54338 109 RPS Instrumentation 27 09/09/83 03/27/84C TS Complete 54342 108 Control Rod Insertion 32 09/09/83 03/27/84C TS Complete j
54345 049 APRM Scram Setpoint 1
02/27/84 03/27/84C TS Complete i
HFEB Eckenrode 54343 132 Control Room Temperature 33 09/09/83 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 LQB - Benedict 54344 101 Operating Organization 1
01/18/84 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 I9) 53491 Audits of Plant Activities 04/07/83 03/27/84C SE Complete 53491 Quorum for Plant SRC 06/14/83 06/30/84 RAI 05/08/84 SSPB Hoffman 54341 027 Records Requirements 30 09/09/83 06/30/84 54479 005 RWCU Operability 2.2 03/20/84 04/04/84 Ordered
1 Sheet 8
cf 8
TABLE 1
)
NOTES GRAND GULF RE0 VESTS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES Praject Manager:
L. L. Kintner Extension:
49-27038 Date:
04/30/84 a
(a)
Requests for technical specification changes submitted by letter on dates indicated under " Licensee Transmittal Date."
5 (b)
P.A. #1111 for all TAC Numbers.
(c)
Date indicates branch memorandum target date; "C" indicates completed and is the date branch memorandum is issued.
(d)
"SE Complete" means evaluation found change acceptable.
"RAl" means staff requested additional information by letter i
on date indicated. " Ordered" means TS change was issued in 04/18/84 Order. SE Complete means staff's safety evalua-tion memo is issued. TS Complete means the change to the TS have been made and proofed and are ready to print.
(e)
The part of Problem Sheet No. 233 concerning ECCS was ordered. This part was transferred to No. 344.
III Safety evaluation accompanying order denied the request for this technical specification change.
(9)
Safety evaluation recommends denial of requested TS change.
(h)
Region II will advise on need for T.S. change.
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4 10 CFR 30.39 34fr.cy Evcuatica SSW VA!II 3ASIN !?ANSIII CA?A3I".!TY EVAL."ATION
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CALCULATIONS
_X JTHER SAND CCLF NUCLER STATION l' NIT 1 37 stem P/.1 Equipment Na=a
. Standby Se.rv5ce W:or-Srstes L.
As scated in FSAR Chapter 3.2. the classi#icacion of the affected componest is:
" The Standbr. Sarvice Water (55W) system.is classified 3afety class 3.
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Quality Crosp C, 5etsnic Category !.
2.
the safety function (s} of the affected cotponent Isi
( ist applicable references).
F5AR 9.2 states de SSW systes is designed to provide a reliable source of cooling for JLane ausildaries that. are essential to a safe.reaceae shutdova followin.g a. design-basis, loss-of-coolant accident (t.0.*.A). Either of two main supply headers in conjunction with the HFCS service vacer supply header or both.lin supply headers provide adequate cooling vater to het safe shu;;down. requirements.
3.
The affected system is governed by the foIlowing CCY5 !achnical
,, Specification:
3/t. 7.1.1 Standby Service Water System 3 r' '. 7.1. 2 HPCS Service Water Systen 3/4.7.1.3 Citimate Heat 51=ir.
4.
Description sf Sangel.
The 557 systa= vas ' designed to :aeet to.e cost li=iting :: ode of systex operation based on.he following assu:qcions-
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Nac sal shutde.ra of the scher unit, rai: 2.
c.
Total oss of offsite power for both units.
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Worst single active failure ocrues in the unit experiencing a LOCA.
The worst active failure for :his analysis is t.he loss of one af :he I'
two standby diesel generators which remves one of :he standby service b
vareg loops from operation.
'he Uni: 1A standby diesel generator (Division I) is assuced to fa1..
y e.
No makeup water is available es :he S5% cacling tower basins for 30 days.
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Worst 30-day site usteorology for hea: rejection.
-These assua:ptions vill result la che greatest heat rejec:1ca rate for the ultimate heat sink during che :sose severe" =c:ecrolo5y for cacling taver heat rejection.
f*
I*ne tse 55~4 basins, which are coacun fee **nies 1 and 2, are sized to have sufficien.t cochined water 1rc.entory to provide cooling :hrcugh the SSJ systes to plant auxiliaries for '30 days with no external nak.au7 vater sourca. The basin depth is from 130'-3*' elevation (mini un required by Tech Specs) to 82'-~3** elevatica (ac the Inttom of the basin). A line a
connecting the discharge of each 554 pu=p to the opposite basin Fernits l
transfer of 5574 va:4r from one basin to the other.
The FSAE analysis considered the ability co use the Uni: 2 55*.* pus:ps (Q2P41C001 A & 8) for transfer capabilities. The installed rait 1 punpa are divisionally separated i:r accordance with Reg. Cuide 1.75.
- E7vever, the Unit 2 SSW pumps are not operational ac this ti=e; aed, when consider-ing a LOCA coincident with a single ac:ive failure (loss of a division) aaf loss. of offsite power, the ability to trac.sfer water between the basins i
is lose during Unic 1 only operation.
Addicionally. in order to overcoce higher than anticipa:e pressure drops
~caou3h some of the couponent loops vi:5 the existing 55*J P2:Ps the re-qui:ed :tinf =w usable water level was increased to 107'-C" in order :e deve-Inp sufficient puscp discharge head :s previde design flow r2.:es t: sli neces-sary coeponents.
Consequently, during accident conditions, ths :tansfer af va:ar between the two basins ce maintain level greater : nan 107'-f' =r2s: se accomp!ished l
by other means due to the ur. availability of the '.*nic 2 pumps and the pos 2-l laced loss of T.SF power :c one of :he Unit 1 pu:sps.
The volume of water in one basin be:veen levels 130'-3" and *.07'4" is 3.37x106 gallons. Considering the eunulative cover losses due to drif:
i and evaporation. this inventory would last through the *:':5 day and parti-alir into the 13th day following :he 'Inic 1 LOCA.
~he saxt:uo icss rate from Unit 1 between days 13 ard 30 af:er :he 1.3CA is 131 gym,.hi.:h securs on day 13. The cotal inventory which =ust be :ransferred :: ;onpensa:e for i
losses between days 13 and 30 is 3.59x106 g 11,ng, or 2, m os pnees day, or 139 gpx averaged over the 18-day period.
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cundan:. 9 "p g a vili he :::asferrad my one of :ve oeple:ely re-
-ph ab;e syste:s sized ta pu=p a: '.eas: 300 rpm.
- he available pu= ping :apaci:y ir, 4: -ease rc; 3r e se rez.,1:.,g.3 g eup for evaporative and crif t losses :hus.pe:viding fer it. creased recovery Such increased recovery tire alceg.-i:h :ctal :cdua.iancy will tica.
provide added conservatism against esui:::ent failure.
In addition, the ia.iciatice. af :na ::ansfer vi1*. Se co::=eaced at the '
seventh (7th) day followins :he centinued. :oss of o ffsite gewer.:cinci-dent with failure to resecre the affac:ad F.5F power secree or the ' ailed SSW pc=7 Since adequate invencery withour transfer er 2.n.eup is avatl-able for ivelve ;*12) days sack :icely iniciatica wi;l provide additi' anal' ccuservatism agai::s: equipment failure etc.
Each portable sys:ez censis:s of a schnersible pucp. a por:able electrical generator, and hoses. The equip:nanc is sized s pump :vice the required flow considering the maxi: mum possible static elevatien and dynacic fric-ticaal head losses.
Plant precedures vili ensure that :ha equipmen: dedt-cs ed for this func:icn is properly identified, score:1. invencaried, in-spected for deterioration. and chece,ea fer aperahili:y.
The procedures pr: vide for an adequa:4 supp!y of fuel for the' generators and training for perscernel. In the event tha: both per:able transfer systema are nat operable, the piar. for cakeup af:et 30 days --ill be sc-celerated and impleencad.
Regdlatory Guide *. 27 provides sufficient latitude ice this proposed change.
5.
Y.ay the probability of an accurrence er the conseque=ce of an accideet, ce c:alfun:cica of equipcent important :s safety previous;y evaluated in the yimal Sa!ocy Analysis Empor:' 3e increased?
Yes X
No.
Because:
TP.:a 30-d'ay supply di vacer as* required av Regula:Try 1 side ;. I in ese SSR basins is assured by the design :f :he 55*.; syste= as describad i:
Sectica 9.2 of the FSA1. Sach design &ismic Categcry D pr:vides issur-ance agaic,s: varer inventery loss f=11ovi..:; a seisci event :r :thar
- r. ural phenomena.
Although one basin 31cne' cannot provide :he en: ire 30-day water supply tne redundanc por:able rsasfer syscans provide reasonable sssurance : hat varer can he transferred berveen bastas :o :he availele 55'.i,uco. 1his onclustaa is based oo the following analysis:
The. t ransfer pucair.g systes vi* 1 5e sized to cransfer va:er ac a ratt of at a.
least 2007 of :hs: required :s :over evaperative.md drif: losaes :hus :3.11.1 storing availasie inventory ceyond :aa: :equired for con:inacus 21:1' gatica of the accident.
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The transfer systass will be :acally. redundant. thus providing procectice againsc active failures in the ::ansfer sys:e=.
Other casite accious requiring access to the planc area vili c.
cecur before the need :o ac:iva:a :he 55'J transfer systen.
An. exanple of :his is the seed ca vnplenish the s:aadby diesel generator fuel oil at the sevench Geh} day follesing he ac '
cident. Thus other actions requiring. "f reade g cf ::ovecent" at the plant site bound the need for planc access.
d.
A11ousace foe : man::al n.akeup or in this case,cre conserva-r.ively manual transfer are allowed y/ Regulatory cuide I.27.
~ '
4 It is highly unlikely tha: restara:Lon of offsite or casice powe6r or other damage cont:oi actions could not be ecc: pie:ed withia, tha twelve (12) day period.
Therefore, with :he abow suppor:ive analysis the probability of an occurrence or tha :onsequences of an accident or =alfunction of equip-mese fatportant to safety is considered n: greacar than that previously avaluated in the yi_ul safety Analysis Report.
9.
May the possibility for an accident or zalfunc: ion of a.different type than j
any previously evaluagad in the Final Safety Analysis 7 apers, be created?
Yes X
No. because:
i Specific analysis sf =alfunctions differenc :han : hat previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis hpor: are discussed below. This analysis shows thoc equivalancy to. protection against single fsi*ure, sacural phe-scaena, and func:1caal capability can be pr=vided to ressenably perfor:n those functf.oas previously discussed in :he yinal Safety Analysis Reper:.
t-l 4.
Natural, phenomeha such as earthiuake have been 'assteiedt: =ccur it
(-
the time of accident initiation.
'"ae twel.u f*M day :i=e ;eriod prior to the seed for cransfer z!iavs suf ficient :ios fer resolu-cion of af tershock, ecc.
'hus the :cquirements fer a 'sais=1c cuali-fied cra=sfer system Ls fel:" c: ha extremely li:i:ri in :his case.
l h.
A totally redundanc pac; ping systas provides protecti:n agwinst s ingle failures in the :nanual transfer system.
c.
The manual ::ansfer system is 's relatively a=all, non-cceplex sys:4=.
. The potential for sissie generation tha: migh: effec uis:ing safety related equipment is remoce.
J.
Fire protec:ica ice added sour:es of :ce'oustibies aili i* pr:vided.
rne portable transfer equipeene wil; be, st: red inside the necuri:7 e.
area of the existing *.*!:ir.a:e :iest 51 i. :o=ple:-
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Suffiele te fuel capacity vill be assured for the pse:able electrical genera: ors used :s pc W: :he :ransfer pw:ps. Tuel is s : red onsite ami. is addi:1c2 fuel is available frcs locsi suppliers within eini=al distance fror :he plant.
- he eqttipcent requires abov: 330 gal. at r.2ri-una pun: Ping pcver over a 10-:iay period. A nic1=ue supply of 500 gal-loss will be sected foe use with :he transfer sysees.
S.
Alternate zakeup ;ethcds :c the 55*.* basins are discussed in :he Final Safety Analysis Report as well as the Safe:y Evaluatice Report. Al -
though, ths time period for Initia:ica of an alteruce m= bug is less than previously evaInated. the manual transfer xched is zcre conser-vativa.
. The changes being impleu.ncac assure :na capability to =eet the arial-nally postula:ed accident cocdiciens described in :he ESAR.
?.
.ls the.:.argin of safe:y, is defined in the basis for ane Technical Specift-I cation, reduced?
Yes X
No. 5ecause:
8 I
Impementation of this.:hange assures : hat the originally establisited design basis as described in the FSAR and sc arized in ites a above are mat. there-fore, ths =argin of safety is no: reduced.
1.
TSAR Ravision required? l Yes No FSAR See:isa 9.2.1 and Appendix 2A shoald address basis :ransfer capabil'ity v
censidering the.znavailability of :he *.*ni: 2 SS'.: pumps.
{
- l., CCNS Technical Specification revisicn'.' equi:ed?'
' Tes I _ No,
because:
i plan; procedures require period:: descastration of basin transfer capa-5ilicy.
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UNITED STATES E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
wasmwaTou. o. c.zosss k..... /
MAY I O 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chariman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts
},
Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
.{
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF RESTART DECISION 36.
4 In a memorandum dated May 3,1984, Comissioner Gilinsky requested copies of certain staff documents related to Grand Gulf. Comissioner Gilinsky's first request was for " sign-off by the licensing staff" that the Technical Specifi-cations in Grand Gulf license are currently correct and completely confom to the as-built plant. The staff has not yet reached a decision concerning the correctness or confomance of the technical specifications for operation beyord the current licensed power level of 5%.
The support for the decision to pemit operation within the current license at Grand Gulf was provided with the Order Restricting Condition for Operation that was issued April 18, 1984. A con-currence copy of the Order is provided for your infomation.
In addition, Region II perfomed two inspections which relate to the confomance of the j
Technical Specifications to the as-built plant.
A copy of the concurrence pages for these inspection reports will be provided in the next few days.
Comissioner Gilinsky's second request was for the staff sign-offs that the plant Final Safety Analysis Report has been revalidated as confaming to the 1
as-built plant.
In general, the Region's inspection program, which is based on a sampling methodology, serves as a basis for establishing sufficient assurance that the as-built plant confoms to the FSAR.
Eight inspection reports in addition to those previously raentioned relate to FSAR confomance.
Concurrence copies of these reports are attached. Additionally, we have attached two internal NRR documents that speak to the staf.f's conclusions regarding the consistency of the FSAR with the as-built plant for operation within the restrictions of the current 5% license,'a memorandum from R.
n.1 Mattson to D. Eisenhut dated April 18, 1984, and a note to T. Novak from R.
d Vollmer dated April 18, 1984..The staff reviewed those inconsistencies i
identified by the licensee and concluded that none were of a nature to preclude issuing the Order Restricting Conditions for Operation.
Documents which respond to the third request regarding licensed operators and plant advisors are on file in the Region II office. They will be provided in c
the next few days.
4
Contact:
DHouston, NRR' l
X28358
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Comissioners '
The fourth item requests staff sign-offs that outstanding investigations have been adequately resolved for starting up the plant.
Neither the Region nor NRR were or are aware of any infonnation on outstanding investigations that should preclude authorization of plant start up. Although staff sign-offs are not used for this purpose, this issue was considered by both the Region and NRR management in their decision to permit plant startup.
In response to item 5, the most complete and comprehensive NRC documentation of the causes for the technical specification errors and the surveillance procedure errors are the responses from Mr. Dircks to Comissioner Gilinsky's previous inquiries on these subjects. Memos of January 13, February 28, and February 29, 1984, respond to the questions of December 13, 1983, from Comissioner Gilinsky regarding the nature and causes of the Technical Specification errors.
Mr. Dircks' memoranda of March 8 and March 15, 1984, responded to the nature and cause of surveillance procedure errors, as requested by Comissioner Gilinsky's memo of March 2,1984.
The NRC staff is currently working with MP&L to review all required changes and corrections to the Technical S'pecifications for full power operation. The next license amendment will include all of these required changes to the.
Technical Specifications. The NRC staff approval when issued with a supporting safety evaluation will provide documentation that all necessary Technical Specifications have oeen corrected.
Regerding surveillance procedure errors, in response to the NRC Region II Confirmation of Action letter of October 20, 1982, MP&L performed a complete review, rewrite, and reapproval of the Grand Gulf surveillance procedures.
Revised procedures were designated as Revision 20 to distinguish them from I
older versions.
NRC Region II conducted an operational readiness inspection on August 15 through September 1, 1983, prior to recriticality. One facet of that inspection was evaluation of the adequacy of the Revision 20 surveillance l
procedures.
That inspection is documented as Region II inspection report 50/416/83-38. A copy will be provided in the next few days.
Comissioner Gilinsky's sixth request related to the staff sign-off that the emergency diesel power supplies are fully qualified for plant operation. At this time, the staff has not concluded that the emergency diesels are sufficiently qualified to support operation above 5 percent power. However,
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Commissioners the staff did find that total failure of the Delaval diesels at Grand Gulf would not significantly increase the risk of low-power operation and that the risk of low-power operation is acceptably small. We have attached a copy of that evaluation for )vour information (memo from R. Mattson to D. Eise April 12, 1984..
" (Signes William J.Direks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
4/18/84 Order 2.
InspectionReports(8) 3.
R. Mattson Memo, 4/18/84 4.
R. Vollmer Note, 4/18/84 5.
R. Mattson Memo, 4/12/84 cc w/ enclosures:
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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MAR 2 8 m84 l
n MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM:
William J. Direks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
LER DATA ON PERSONNEL ERRORS In response to the memorandum, S. J. Chilk to 'W. J. Dircks, dated March 2,1984,
Subject:
" Staff Requirement Briefing on Status of Grand Gulf," I am providing the folloying report dealing with operating
[
experience at Grand Gulf.
This report addresses the following two subjects which were available in preliminary for,m at the meeting:
1.
A count by plant of all LERs for events that. occurred in 1983,4
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2.
A count by plant of all LERs reported in 1983 that included at least one personnel error.
[ Errors that were not attribut3ble to the plant operating staff (i.e., construction errors, design errors, fabrication errors) were not included].
Two previous reports addressing similar aspects of operating experience at Grand Gulf are also enclosed.
l The requested data, including comparable counts for 1981 and 1982, are provided in Enclosure 1.
AE00 obtained the data by searching the Sequence Coding and Search System (SCSS) for LERs submitted in 1983 and for LERs that stated or implied that a personnel error was involved in the event.
Because of the extensive amount of information from each LER that is coded in the SCSS, it was not necessary to rely on text searches for particular words (e.g., " personnel error") or to rely on the data coded by the licensee on the LER fom.
Thus, if the LER text expressly stated that a " personnel error" ccurred, or if the LER implied that a personnel error occurred (e.g.,
Inadvertently he operated an incorrect valve"), the information was coded g
into SCSS and was captured by the subsequent search.
Contact:
/7/
F. J. Hebdon, AEOD
The Commissioners,
This data is provided in response to the specific request.
is concerned that the data could be easily misinterpreted.
However, the staff in Enclosure 1 vary considerably; for example, with respect to the num The plants included years that they have been in operation.
Many of these plants have been in when many equipment prob ems occur and procedur phase when large numbers of problems and erro To place the startup experience at Grand Gulf in better perspective that contain at least one personnel error for plants in
, AEOD plant operation.
Specifically, AE00 obtained counts of LERs (Table 1) for several plants for the twelve months immediately following issuance of the Power Operating License.
TABLE 1 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE DURING THE TWELVE MONTHS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ISSUANCE OF A LOW POWER Low Power Total Personnel
% Personnel Docket Fa cility License LERs Error LERs*
Error LERs 416 Grand Gulf 6/16/82. '
{
256 86 387 Susquehanna 7/17/82' 34 179 74 361 San Onofre 2 2/16/82 186 67
+,
41 373 La Salle 4/17/82 28 369 McGuire 6/12/81 187 67 28 149 64 43 395 Summer 8/6/82 153 57 37 362 San Onofre 3 11/15/82 93 27 29 328 Sequoyah 2 6/25/81 65 26 40 The information presented here is based on information available to the staff and has not been verified with the individual licensees.
and reported more personnel errors than the other units.As i is the first BWR 6 in the country.
As such Howev er Grand Gulf experienced in preparing procedures or opera, ting this specific mod Even vendor personnel had minimum or no experience with this type reactor a result, Grand Gulf may have been more susceptible to personnel errors than As for example, San Onofre 2 and 3 and Sequoyah 2 which are more standard in design.
In addition, Sequoyah 2 was the second unit started at that site in a short period.
more directly applicable experience.Both San Onofre 3 and Sequoyah 2 had ope This may have contributed to fewer LERs.
In addition, care should be taken in reaching firm conclusions from this data.
number of difficulties are associated with any collective a Jata.
For example, when events are reduced to counts they lose their individual identity.
This homogenization means all events are treated as if they were t
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3-all reported on the same basis and had the same individual significance --
which often is not the case.
Many of the errors reported by Grand Gulf, for example, were nissed surveillance requirements that did not directly affect s
plant operation.
Finally, any variation which is due to factors other than differences in actual safety perfomance will give a spurious indication of a problem.
For exanple, Region II has indicated that it has a low threshold for requiring licensees to report, and that this was particularly true for Grand Gulf.
Such variations are discussed in detail in Appendix E or huREG-0572, " Review of Licensee Event Reports," which was prepared by the ACRS in 1979.
A copy of Appendix E to tiUREG-0572 was forwarded to the Connission with my memorandum dated February 24, 1984.
Because of the many factors involved, an apparent trend or pattern in the data does not necessarily inply a real safety problem.
Such an apparent trend or pattern requires study to determine the underlying factors and to properly assess the implications and significance of the variations.
This in-depth analysis has not been done for the data provided in Table 1 and Enclosu.-
1.
Region II has perfomed a review of-the LERs issued during the period September 1,1982 through September 30, 1983, for which personnel error was designated by the 11censee as the root cause.
Region II found that none of the events had an affect on the health and safety of the public, and the
(
lnajority did not have the potential Sor.resulting in an event which could v have an affect on public health and safety.
In conclusion, while we have provided t$e requested LER count data, we believe that it is not appropriate and may in fact be misleading to use raw LER counts in isolation as a relative or absolute measure nf safety perfomance.
In addition, this practice has the undesired side effect of cotivating licensees to minimize the number and content of LERs instead of sharing infomation for the benefit of all.
(Signed William J. Dirckt William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
LER Count Data For 1981-1983 2.
Grand Gulf Operating Experience 3.
Personnel Errors At Selected Operating Plants
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Distribution: w/ enclosure NRC PDR PTB CF PTB SF AE00 SF F. Hebdon, PTB T. Ippolito, AE00 j
C. J. Heltemes, AEOD R. Dennig, PTB K. Seyfrit, ROA8 K. Black, NAS H. Denton, NRR E. Case, NRR F. Miraglia, NRR
- 0. Eisenhut, NRR R. DeYoung, IE J. Taylor, IE E. Rossi, IE G. Lanik, IE E. Jordan, IE M. Sinkule, RII
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o LER Count Data For 1981-1983 Docket LERs Personnel Error LERs Number Facility 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 29 Yankee Rowe 33 42 17 5
6 4
133' Humboldt Bay 5
8 1
1 1
1 155 Big Rock Point 27 35 14 3
6 3
206 San Onofre 1 29 26 5
13 11 3
213 Connecticut Yankee 19 10 18 4
3 1
219 Oyster Creek 72 61 19 22 23 9
220 Nine Mile Point 1 43 18-22 8
3 7
237 Dresden 2 75 53 61 22 12 12 244 Ginna 22 28 28 8
8 9
245 Millstone 1 39
,32 28 5
6 4
247 Indian Point 2 33 49 37 4
4 3
249 Oresden 3 33 44 36 4
6 8
250 Turkey Point 3 17 18 17 6
7 8
251 Turkey Point 4 17 14 15 2
6 6
254 Quad Cities 1 24 37 36 4
7 8
255 Palisades 53 49 69 13 11 10 259 Browns Ferry 1
.83 91 56 16 21 13 260 Browns Ferry 2 65 35 58 19 7
9 261 Robinson 2 33 18 27 15 6
4' 263 Monticello 24 -
15 8
6 4
3
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f.265 Ouad Cities 2 21 20 4
2
5 t
/266 Point Beach 1 2J
' 27 19 7
7 11
's 4
~ 269 Oconee 1 25 20 18 9
9*
9 270 Oconee 2 20 11 7
5 3
2 271 Vermont Yankee 36 26 24 5
4 7
272 Salem 1 118 88 45 24 21 17 275 Diablo Canyon 1 9
12 23 5
6 8
277 Peach Bottor.12 44 42 22 11 l'1 5
278 Peacn Bottom 3 21 26 15 3
4 3
280 Surry 1 83 116 42 22 31 10 281 Surry 2 81 70 37 24 18 5
282-Prairie Island 1 18 13 5
8 6
3 285 Ft. Calhoun 1 11 20 8
1 4
2 286 Indian Point 3 10 4
5 2
0 1
287 Oconee 3 16 14 11 6
5 7
289 Three Mile Island 1 13 16 40 5
5 15 293 Pilgrim 1 58 54 52 13 20 10 295 Zion 1 51 50 45 17 10 12 296 Browns Ferry 3 71 51 50 8
11 6
298 Cooper 25 25 15 12 8
6 301 Point Beach 2 8
11 10 2
5 2
302 Crystal River 3 80 76 45 12 21 16 304 Zion 2 38 29 40 8
7 11 305 Kewaunee 38 35 25 12 5
7 106 Prairie Island 2 11 11 8
3 3
2
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Docket LERs Number Facility Personnel Error LERs 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 309 Maine Yankee 23 39 30 11 11 12 311 Salem 2 123 153 55 25 31 26 312 Rancho Seco 55 31 31 9
12 13 313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 14 30 24 5
9 5
315 Cook 1 64 107 101 18 43 26 316 Cook 2 70 109 104 13 33 29 317 Calvert Cliffs 1 84 82 54 17 24 14 318 Calvert Cliffs 2 57 54 58 9
14 15 320 Three Mile Island 2 32 34 46 13 8
15 321 Hatch 1 140 96 94 33 37 20 324 Brunswick 2 145 136 87 24 38 23 325 Brunswick 1 94 143 46 22 35 20 327 Sequoyah 1 133 77 85 37 16 17 328 Sequoyah 2 27 65 64 14 17 9
331 Arnold 49 81 39 14 18 7
333 Fitzpatrick 78 53 45 21 20 7
334 Beaver Valley 1 102 55 26 21 9
6 335 St. Lucie 1 60 70 26 11 13 7
336 Millstone 2
.45 51 25 13 13 4
338 North Anna 1 87 88 70 20 19 13 339 North Anna 2 89 84 67 30 30 21 344 Trojan 31 22 15 13 11 9
k s346 Davis Besse 1 7) 68 55 33 29
16
- 348 Farley 1
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73 62 70 23 11
11
' 361 San Onofre 2 169 124 64
- 41 362 San Onofre 3 10 84 6
22 364 Fa rley 2 57 52 37 16 12 10 366 Hatch 2 133 135 117 31 50 29 368 Arkansas Nuclear 2 44 49 45 11 13 15 369 McGuire 1 187 82 100 78 37 32 370 McGuire 2 64 373 La Salle 1 28 151 116 387 Susquehanna 1 52 36 389 St. Lucie 2 80 141 38 51 63 395 Summer 18 65 123 409 Lacrosse 28 38 15 20 7
5 6
4 416 Grand Gulf 1 181 162 57 60 t
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