ML20132C036

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Forwards List of Discrepancies Between FSAR (Application) & as-built Plant for Followup on Need for Possible Enforcement Action.Nrr Will Be Requesting Licensee to Amend FSAR to Correct Discrepancies
ML20132C036
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1984
From: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19276B572 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-84-459 NUDOCS 8405020409
Download: ML20132C036 (3)


Text

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April 19* 1984 I e '-

DISTRIBUTION:

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'EA~de'6s W p MDuncan TNovak MEMORANDUM FOR: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator DEisenhut Region II FROM:

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR

SUBJECT:

POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT ACTION REGARDING GRAND GULF In our review of the licensee's implementation of their Technical Specification Review Program, we find that the licensee identified about ten discrepancies between the FSAR (the applicatior.) and the as-built plant (See enclosure 1).

This results from a rather narrow review with regard to the plant itself.

How-ever, I wanted to advise you of these identified discrepancies as you may wish to follow up on the need for possible enforcement action. NRR will be requesting the licensee to amend their FSAR promptly to correct existing discrepancies.

Should you need any further assistance from my staff, please feel free to call.

/S/

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Inconsistencies: FSAR vs. As-Built Plant 1

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INCONSISTENCIES: FSAR vs. AS-BUILT PLANT Page 1 of 2 NOTE TSPS #

PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS 52 073 2B Purely editorial.

Renaming of zones does not FSAR Figure 9A-22 does not correctly 102 2B alter fire protection requirements or measures identify fire detection zones. The 304 20 provided. Overall SER conclusions are not design documentation does identify the impacted.

zones correctly.

(Ap generator buildings.) plies to diesel 1

74 234 3A The FSAR discussion should be expanded to clarify The FSAR 6.2.7.5 does not clearly reflect I

j 112 reference to narrow range instrument.

The the suppression pool level clarification of the high and low water level instrumentation, i.e., which instrument alarm input should not alter overall conclusions provides high and low level alarms.

in the SER (7.5.2).

Harrow range instrumentation not described. Arrangement of sensors requires clarification.

85 131 2G Second column line is an editorial error.

There FSAR Figure 9.5-4 incorrectly lists a can be only one location for a single hose second column line for a single hose e

station. Area is provided necessary fire station.

protection measures. No impact on SER overall conclusions.

94 809 3B Methods employed in GGNS design meet FSAR 7.1.2.c.22 does not fully describe requirements of Reg. Guide 1.106, i.e., the methods used for providing thermal acceptance criteria in SER 8.4.3.

Therefore, overload protection to safety-related SER conclusions are not impacted.

M0V's.

155 818 3B Barriers such as these are considered acceptable FSAR does not indicate that blind flanges based on MP&L/Bechtel evaluation of BTP CSB 6-3.

and rupture discs are used in secondary The omission of the discussion of the use of containment boundary (FSAR 6.2.3.2).

blind flanges and rupture discs does not impact the overall SER conclusions (SER 6.2.2).

W3sdl Rev. 4, 4/13/84

e m.,. M a.

INCONSISTENCIES: FSAR us. AS-BUILT PLANT Page 2 [f 2

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NOTE TSPS #

PRIOP.ITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS 158 306 IB Categories "a" through "e" include discrepancies Numerous corrections and clarifications j

which are purely editorial, dealing with proposed to FSAR Table 6.2-44, information or changes to information which do

" Containment Isolation Valves." The not bear significantly on the overall acceptance items fall into the following categories:

of the plant's containment isolation provisions.

a) Penetration sizes incorrect or not j

indicated in Table.

b) Divisional power supply incorrectly labeled.

c) Valves incorrectly labeled as inbcard or outboard, d) Direction of flow in line incorrect.

e) Valve position under certain j

circumstances not expressed consistently throughout Table (e.g.,

" Closed" vs. " fail closed").

Category "f" - none of the affected valves have f) Valve closure times in the Tables were stroke times used in GGNS safety analysis.

revised to be consistent with GGNS Therefore, these changes do not affect the Tech Specs. This included roundoff of containment isolation system and do not impact values, elimination of stroke times the SER's overall conclusions.

for valves with no automatic closure, and increases / decreases in stroke time, consistent with the GGNS Tech Spec values.

Category "g" - In all cases changes are g) Isolation signals of some valkes proposed to correct or clarify the application listed incorrectly or in a confusing of signals which are system specific, e.g.,

manner.

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deleting references to signals which open LPCI injection valves (not isolation signals). No signals are deleted which cause valve closure for the automatic containment isolation l

function. The proposed changes correct the table but do not alter the acceptability of containment isolation system or the overall SER conclusions.

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W3sd2 Rev. 4, 4/13/84

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