ML20126G126
| ML20126G126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1992 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126G125 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301040072 | |
| Download: ML20126G126 (14) | |
Text
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pameeg jo UNITED STATES
'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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I W ASHING T ON, D. C. 20655 k.....
SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGVLAIJ93 BLLATED TO AMENDMENT N05.303 AND % TO
[LCILITY OPERATING LICENSE N05. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY NL&lRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT. UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DQCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 59-125
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 20, 1992, as revised July 23 and November 6, 1992, Northern States Power Company (NSP or the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-42 and DPR-60 for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2.
The application requests changes to reflect plant modifications being performed as part of the licensee's Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade (SB0/ESU) Project presently in progress.
The July 23 and November 6, 1992 letters contained clarifying information to the amendment application.
This information did not change the scope of the amendment request or the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration.
The SB0/ESU Project modifications consist of four major activities described below plus the necessary plant interfaces.
The plant changes are described in greater detail in the SB0/ESU Project " Design Report" submitted to NRC on November 27, 1990 and updated on December 23, 1991, lhe Design Report is the subject of separate staff reviews and is discussed in separate safety evaluations. This evaluation is intended to address only the associated TS changes.
-D5/06 Diesel Generator Addition Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, are presently served by redundant auxiliary electr'. cal systems employing two emergency diesel generators (EDGs) (D1 and D2) which are shared between the two units. The licensee is installing two new EDGs (DS and 06) and associated equipment.
(Note: Diesels 03 and D4 are non-safety-related power s0urces for which the licensee takes no credit in the facility analyses and licensing basis.) The D1 and D2 EDGs will be dedicated to Unit I and certain common equipment while the two new EDGs will be dedicated to Unit 2 and certain common equipment.
The two new diesel generators will each be provided with new cooling water-(radiator cooled), lube oil, fuel storage and transfer, ventilation,'and-starting air systems.
The new generators and associated auxiliary systems are
$ [ 0$005 N ob 202 p
located in a new 05/06 Building.
The Unit 2 diesel fuel oil storage tanks will be installed in underground vaults adjacent to the new building.
DS/D6 Diesel Generator Buildina Addition A new Seismic Category I DS/D6 Diesel Generator Building has been constructed to house the two new diesel generators and auxiliary systems, including the Unit 2 safeguards buses.
The building is located adjacent to the west end of the Auxiliary Building and the south side of the Turbine Building.
Electrical Safeauards Voorada The upgraded safeguards auxiliary power system includes new 4kV and 480V buses for each Unit 2 safeguards train. One new 4kV bus per train (two total) and two new 480V buses per train (four total) will be located in the new D5/06 Building.
The undervoltage protection scheme for the new 4kV buses will be designed to meet Branch Technical Position PSB-1 of the Standard Review Plan.
Two new qualified solid state programmable logic controller-based load sequencer systems will be installed for each unit.
The Unit 1 4kV buses will be extended for additional capacity.
The existing Unit 1 480V buses will be replaced by two new 480V buses per safeguards train (four total).
Replacement of the Unit 1 480V safeguards buses is scheduled for a later Unit 1 outage and will be the subject of a separate License Amendment Request.
The undervoltage protection scheme for the extended 4kV buses will meet Branch Technical Position PSB-1.
The 4kV safeguards buses in both units will be provided with two immediate access independent offsite sources (i.e., a preferred and an alternate offsite source) to each 4kV safeguards bus. Manual bus ties will be provided between the 4kV buses of the same train for the two units (e.g., between Unit 1 Train A and Unit 2 Train A) to provide an alternate AC power source during a station blackout event.
Vyarade of #121 Coolina Water Pumo The Prairie Island Cooling Water System provides cooling water from the Mississippi River to auxiliary feedwater pumps, diesel generators, air compressors, component cooling water heat exchangers, containment fan-coil units, and Auxiliary Building fan-coil units. The system has a ring-header served by five supply pumps. Of the five pumps, two (#11 and #21) are normal-use horizontal, motor-driven pumps, two (#12 and #22) are safeguards grade vertical diesel-driven pumps, and one (#121) is a vertical, motor-driven standby _ pump.
Each pump has a capacity of 17,500 gpm which exceeds the 15,200 gpm accident load (i.e., one unit in hot shutdown and one in long-term-post-accident cooling).
Isolation valves provide means to split the system so as to provide redundant supplies to safeguards trains.
-3 The #121 pump will be upgraded to safeguards classificatinn.
Power connection capability will be provided from both trains of Unit 2 4kV buses through a new 4kV " swing" bus 27 which will be capable of manual alignment to either one or the other train. The cables to #121 cooling water pump will be routed separately from either of the existing separation trains. The pump will receive an automatic start signal upon initiation of safety injection logic in either train of either unit.
If both diesel-driven safeguards cooling water pumps como up to speed, #121 cooling water pump will tript otherwise it will continue to run.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 2.1 Emeraency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storace Discussion:
Proposed changes to TS Section 3.7.A.5 and to Basis 3.7 reflect the new Unit 2 minimum diesel fuel oil supply. The proposed change specifies a minimum fuel oil volume of 75,000 gallons to be maintained for EDGs D5 and D6 in the Unit 2 interconnected diesel fuel oil storage tanks. The current total requirement of 70,000 gallons for D1 and D2 diesel generators and the diesel-driven cooling water pumps remains unchanged. Fifty-one thousand gallons of the 70,000 gallon total requirement for Unit 1 is available for 01 and D2 diesel generators.
The 51,000 gallon requirement is sufficient to meet the 14-day requirement of diesel fuel oil for the D1 and D2 diesel generators as stated above.
A fuel supply of 19,000 gallons remains allocated for the diesel-driven cooling water pumps in the interconnected Unit I diesel fuel oil storage tanks.
Evaluation:
The minimum diesel fuel supply of 75,000 gallons in'TS Section 3.7.A.5 for Unit 2 is based on using t1e time-dependent method of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N195-1976 to calculate the minimum diesel fuel supply necessary to supply one Unit 2 EDG set for 14 days to assure a fuel supply in the event of a probable maximum flood.
The conservative method of ANSI N195-1976 was used to calculate the minimum diesel fuel supply necessary to supply one Unit 2 EDG set for 7; days at rated load of 5400kW, which.is significantly above the maximum predicted load for a Unit 2 EDG, The calculated minimum volume for 7-day operation of one Unit 2 EDG set using the conservative method of calculation was less than the minimum volume _necessary for 14-day operation calculated using the time dependent method.- A conservative volume is proposed in TS Section 3.7 A 5 as the required minimum fuel supply for Unit 2 EDG. This minimum volume envelopes the 7-day and the 14-day requirements.
-The proposed fuel oil storage requirements are consistent with the staff I
criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.137 and is, therefore,: acceptable.
2.2 Emeraency Diesel Generator Allowable Outaae Time Discussion:
The licensee has chosen not to request changes to TS Section 3.7.B.1 regarding the allowed out-of-service time for EDG. The currently specified allowable outage time (A0T) is seven days, which differs from the current staff criterion of three days cited in Standard Technical Specification (STS).
Evaluation:
The licensee's application states that the new configuration will provide several features which are significant enhancements to the existing configuration:
(a) The arrangement of the offsite AC sources to the safeguards buses will be improved to reduce the risk of losing offsite AC power to the safeguards buses.
(b) The onsite AC power system will be enhanced considerably in that a loss-of-offsite-power event coupled with the loss of a diesel generator will be mitigated by the availability of another diesel generator which can be cross-tied to the affected 4160 volt safeguards bus.
(c) The D5 and D6 diesel generators will provide a diverse means of providing power to the 4160 volt safeguards buses, in addition to simply adding redundancy.
With respect to the existing D1 and D2 diesels, D5 and 06 were made by a different manufacturer, have different cooling systems, different size ratings, and will be housed in a separate building located on the opposite side of the plant. These factors reduce many of the common failure mechanisms that could otherwise affect all the diesel generators.
Most significantly, the D5 and D6 diesel engines will be cooled using radiators instead of being reliant on a separate support system.
(d) The reliability of the existing D1 and D2 diesel generators, which require a separate cooling water system, will also be enhanced.
Currently, two diesel-driven cooling water pumps are-available following a loss-of-offsite-power event. After completion of the SB0/ESU Project modifications, an additional motor-driven cooling water pump will be l-available, powered from the Unit 2 safeguards buses.
The staff acknowledges the enhancements listed in-(a) through (d) above will increase the reliability of the onsite power supply. The seven-day A0T of the i
current licensing basis, therefore, continues to be acceptable.
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- i 5-J 2.3 Diesel Fuel Oil Ouality Limits Discussion
Technical Specification Section 4.6.A.I.c would be revised to reference American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) D975-77,= " Standard Specification for Diesel-Fuel Oils,' (1977) rather than the 1968. version, for specificationf of acceptable diesel fuel oil limits.
Evaluation:
The use of the 1977 revision is acceptable based on. consistency.with Position-8.2.a of Regulatory Guide 1.137.
2.4 Diesel Generator D5 and 06 Monthly Surveillance Tests Discussion:
(1) Technical Specification Section 4.6.A.I.e would be. revised to add monthly-surveillance tests for the new DS and D6 diesel generators and correct' spelling errors. This specification:and also.TS Section-4;6.A.2.a would-be revised to remove the specific EDG speed and use the wording of-
" synchronous speed" for these surveillances.
(2) Technical Specification Section 4.6.A.2.c.would be revised to add--semi--
annual surveillance tests for the new Unit 2-EDG D5 and D6.1 (3) Technical Specification Section 4.6.A 3.b.2 would be revised to correct a spelling error.
(4) Technical. Specification Section 4.6. A.3eb.3 would be revised to ad'd month surveillances to verify _that auto-connected Lloads do not exceed'the-tested capacity of the new Unit 2 EDG.
(5) Technical Specification 4.6.A.3.b.4 would be revised to' add that thel ground-fault trip for Unit 2.is automatically. bypassed _when a-safety.
injection signal-exists.
(6)_ Technical Specification Section.4.6.A.3.c would:be. revised'tol add 18-month'
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surveillance tests for the new Unit 2 EDG.
(7) Technical Specification Section 4.6.A.3.d would 'be revised to add 18-month.
surveillances to verify the capability-of each of the new Unit 2 EDG to-reject the single largest emergency load without tripping.
(8) Basis'4.6 would be revised to specifically statefthat;th6 load rejection test will demonstrate the capability of each EDG to-reject th.e single largest emergency load withoutitripping.
It;would.als_o be revised to-reflect the new EDG configuration of two EDG per unit.
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Evaluation:
Proposed changes to TS Sections 4.6.A.I.e, 4.6.A.2.c and 4.6.A.3.c (Items 1, 2, and 6 above) will invoke new requirements for monthly, semi-annual, and 18-month surveillance testing for Unit 2 EDG to assure-that the EDG have the capability to start, accelerate to synchronous speed, and accept load. They involve loading each Unit 2 EDG to between a minimum of 5100kW and a maximum of 5300kW. The minimum 5100kW test load has been chosen to assure that either Unit i EDG has the capacity and the capability to assume the maximum auto-connected load for Unit 2.
The maximum 5300kW test load has been chosen to provide a load test range for operational test flexibility during the surveillance test. The minimum 5100kW test load in TS Sections 4.6.A.I.e, 4.6.A.2.c and 4.6.A 3.c also corresponds to the load proposed for the TS surveillance Section 4.6.A.3.b.3.
It is noted that, although 5100kW is iot the continuous rating of the Unit 2 EDG, it is significantly above the maximum auto-connected load. The current maximum auto-connected load is more than 1000 kW under the 5100kW minimum test load for the Unit 2 EDG. Therefore, the proposed TS Section 4.6.A.3.b.3 requirement to verify that the auto-connected loads do not exceed 5100kW for each Unit 2 EDG is conservative.
Specification 4.6.A.3.c is revised to add 18-month full load carrying capacity test. of each EDG for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of which 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> are at a load equal to 105 - 110 percent of the continuous rating of an EDG and 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> are at a load equal to 90 - 100 percent of the continuous rating.
During this test, the voltage and frequency are to be verified to be 4160 420 volts and 60 1.2 Hertz. This revision is acceptable.
The load rejection test specified in the proposed TS Section 4.6.A.3.d will demonstrate the capability of each Unit 2 EDG to reject the single largest emergency load (i.e., the vertical motor-driven safeguards cooling water pump) without tripping. A test load of at least 860kW will demonstrate this capability.
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'The licensee's proposed TS operability and surveillance requirements for the
- new 05 and D6 diesel generators have been evaluated for conformance with the staff criteria of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS). They have been found to conform to this guidance with the exception noted above relating to testing at less than the rated continuous load.
This exception is acceptable t
l to the staff based on the large margin between the emergency load requirement and the test load.
2.5 Bus Ties Discussion:
The licensee has not included TS for the alternate AC power bus ties for the proposed amendment.
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7 Evaluation:
In an letter from Dominic C. Dilanni, Project Manager, Nuclear Reactor Regulation to T. M. Parker, NSP dated September 18, 1990 (the staff's Safety Evaluation addressing conformance with the Blackout Rule) the NRC staff stated:
The Technical Specifications (TSs) for SB0 should be consistent with the Interim Commission Policy Statement. The staff has taken the position that TSs are required for SB0 equipment.
However the question of how specification for the SB0 equipment will be applied, is currently being considered generically under the TS improvement program and remains an-open item at this time.
In the interim you are expected to prepare and maintain adequate procedures to reflect the appropriate testing and surveillance requirements to ensure the operability of the SB0 equipment.
Based on the staff guidance given to the licensee, the omission of TS for SB0 bus ties is acceptable.
2.6 Safeauards Power Distribution System 2.6.1 Bus Arranaements Discussion:
Section 1.0 above summarizes the design changes. The proposed amendment would revise TS Sections 3.7. A.1 and 3.7.B.1, 3.7.B.2, 3.7.B.3, 3.7.8.4, and 3.7.B.5 to clarify that two separate paths from the transmission grid are provided to the unit safeguards distribution systems. Technical Specification Sections 3.7. A.3 and 3.7.B.6 would L revised to reflect the new configuration for the Unit 2 480V safeguards bus arrangenent. Additional TS changes will be requested in the future to coincide with completion of 480V bus replacement for Unit 1.
Evaluation:
This is an administrative change and does not affect the operation of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant and as such it will not affect the probabflity or consequences of an accident previously evaluated and is acceptable.
2.6.2 Instrumentation Set Points and Operatina Conditions for Auxiliary Electrical System Discussion:
Technical Specification Tables TS.3.5-1 and TS.3.5-6 would be revised to-reflect engineered safety features instrumentation limiting set points and instrument operating conditions for modified 4kV safeguards electrical buses.
New set points are proposed to reflect replacement of degraded voltage and undervoltage relays. New voltage analyses reveal that degraded voltage set -
points must be increased from the existing settings until the new voltage regulators are placed in service.. Technical Specification Table 3.5-6 would be revised to reflect the instrument operating conditions for the degraded -
voltage and undervoltage relays on eac14kV safeguards bus.
Basis 3.5 would-be revised to describe upgrades to undervoltage and degraded voltage protection for the 4kV safeguards buses and to provide the basis for set points and time delays selected.
The degraded voltage scheme provides two separate time delays.
Per Branch Technical Position PSB-1, these time delays are selected Las follows:
(1) The first time delay was selected to establish the existence of _a sus-tained degraded voltage condition, i.e., a duration greater than the l
longest expected voltage dip resulting from Class IE motor starting.
This time delay prevents actuation during normal transients (such as-motor starting) and allows protective relaying operation during faults and enables logic which will ensure that voltage and timing a e ad uate for safety injection loads by automatically performing the followi;, upon receipt of a safety injection signal:
(1)
Auto start the diesel generator; (2)
Separate the bus from the grid; (3)
Load the bus onto the diesel generator; and (4)
Start the load sequencer (including safety injection loads).
(2) The second time delay was' established in a. range limited so that permanently connected Class IE loads would not be damaged and. is used to allow the degraded voltage condition to be corrected by' external actions within a time period that will not cause damage to operating equipment.
If voltage is not restored within~ that time period, the logic automatically performs the following:
(1)
Auto start the diesel generator; (2)
Separate the. bus from the grid; (3)
Load the bus onto:the diesel generator; and
.(4)
Start the load sequencer.
In determining the revised 4kV safeguards bus undervoltage.and degraded voltage protection set points for TS Table 3.5-1, criteria and equipment voltage requirement assumptions used in the calculation of the new set-points were essentially the same as'those used to calculate the existing set points.
The. degraded voltage protection set. point has been changed to the range greater than or equal to 94.8% and less than or equal to 196.2%.
Testing and analysis have shown that all safeguards loads will operate properly at or
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above the minimum degraded voltage set point. The maximum degraded voltage set point is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme at the minimum expected grid voltage. The first degraded voltage time delay of 8 1 0.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients (i.e., motor starting and fault clearing).
It is also longer than the time delay required to start the safety injection pump at minimum voltage.
The second degraded voltage time delay is provided to allow the degraded voltage condition to be corrected within a time frame which will not cause damage to permanently connected equipment.
The undervoltage set point is 75 f 2.5% of nominal bus voltage.
The minimum set point ensures equipment operates above the limiting value of 75% (of 4000V) for one minute operation. The 75% set point is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme during voltage dips which occur during motor starting.
The undervoltage time delay of 4 1 1.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients and short enough to operate prior to the degraded voltage logic, providing a rapid transfer to an alternate source.
The existing margin of safety has been maintained by the proposed set points and time delays for 4kV_ safeguards bus undervoltage and degraded voltage protection.
Set point values provided in the proposed TS Table 3.5-1 will be confirmed upon completion of the electrical distribution systems voltage analyses.
Ey_aluation:
Proposed changes to TS Tables 3.5-1 and 3.5-6 reflect upgrades of the -
undervoltage protection which conform to NRC Branch Technical Position PSB-1 and are acceptable based on that conformance. A separate TS change will be requested to revise TS Table 3.5-1 to coincide with completion of 480V safeguards bus replacement for Unit 1.
2.7 Coolina Water System 2.7.1 Coolina Water Component Operability Qiscussion:
The proposed changes to TS Section 3.3.0 and Basis 3.3 would reflect the availability of the upgraded vertical motor-driven #121 cooling water pump as a safeguards cooling water pump. The cooling water pump #121 can be used as an equivalent replacement for either of the diesel-driven safeguards cooling water pumps.
Technical Specification Sections 3.3.D.I.a and b would be replaced with a new TS Section 3.3.D.I.a requiring four of the five cooling water pumps to be OPERABLE.
The proposed TS Section 3.3.D.l.a requires changes that certain conditions be met if. the inoperable cooling water pump is one of the diesel-driven safeguards cooling water pumps.
If the inoperable cooling water. pump is one of the diesel-driven cooling water pumps, then #121 cooling water pump
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shall be aligned as shown in the table below. All changes in valve positions will be under diract administrative controls implemented by approved plant procedures..
Inoperable Valve Alignment Power Supply to Pump Bus 27 (#121 Cooling Water Pump)
- 12 MV-32037 or MV-32036 closed; and Cooling associated Bkr Locked Off, or Water Pump MV-32034 and MV-32035 open; and Bus 25 both Bkrs Locked Off
- 22 MV-32034 or MV-32035 closed; and Cooling the associated Bkr Locked Off, or Water Pump MV-32037 and MV-32036 open; and Bus 26 both Bkrs Locked Off Technical Specification Section 3.3.D.1.c would be renumbered as 3.3.D 1.b.
A new TS Section 3.3.D.I.c would be added to clearly reflect the existing requirement for two cooling water headers to be OPERABLE.
A new TS Section 3.3.D.l.d would be added to require a 19,000 gallon minimum fuel supply in the interconnected storage tanks for the diesel-driven cooling water pumps. Also, the new TS Section 3.3.D.I.d would state that the 19,000 Gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total ~ diesel fuel oil requirement of TS Section 3.7.A.5 for Unit 1.
Technical Specification Sections 3.3.D.2.a and b would be replaced by revised TS Section 3.3.D.2.a to reflect a limiting condition for operation applicable-when two of the five cooling water pumps are inoperable.
Technical Specifi-cation Section 3.3.D.2.a, as proposed, requires that certain conditions-be met if the two inoperable pumps are safeguards pumps (i.e., #12 cooling water pump, #22 cooling water pump, #121 cooling water pump). The conditions _to be met are:
(1) the engineered safety features associated with the OPERABLE safe-guards cooling water pump are OPERABLE; (2) both paths from the transmission grid to the unit 4KV safeguards-buses are OPERABLE (applicable to Unit 1 operation only); and (3) the A0T for two safeguards pumps inoperable simultaneously may not exceed 7 days in any consecutive _30 day period.
Technical Specification Sections 3.3.D.2.c, d, e, and f would be renumbered as 3.3.D.2.b, c, d, and e.
Basis 3.3 would be revised to reflect the above changes and would state that:
(A) TS Section 3.3.D.I.a assures that an automatic safety injection signal to the cooling water header isolation valves will not align both OPERABLE.
safeguards pumps to the same safeguards train, (B) TS Section 3.3.D.I.a also assures that the vertical motor-driven (#121) cooling water pump is aligned to provide cooling water to the same train as that from which it is powered, and (C) that cooling water can be supplied by either of the two horizontal motor-driven cooling water pumps, by a safeguards motor-driven pump or by either of two safeguards diesel-driven pumps.
Basis 3.3 would also be revised to include the 19,000 gallon minimum fuel supply and to clarify that the 19,000 gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total onsite requirement of TS Section 3.7.A.5 for Unit 1.
Evaluation:
The new TS Section 3.3.D.l.c would reflect the existing TS requirement for two cooling water headers to be OPERABLE. This is not a new requirement since TS Section 3.3.0.2.c currently provides the limiting condition for operation (LCO) with one of the two required cooling water headers inoperable.
Technical Specification Section 3.3.D.l.d would reflect the requirement for a minimum fuel supply of 19,000 gallons for diesel-driven cooling water pumps.
Existing TS include this minimum fuel supply as part of the 70,000 gallon total required by TS Section 3.7. A.5 for Unit 1.
Based on the other TS changes proposed in this amendment application, it is necessary to clarify TS Section 3.3.D.
This is not a new requirement but is a clarification of the existing TS requirement.
Revised TS Section 3.3.D.2.a reflects a LC0 when two of the five cooling water pumps are inoperable.
Tne revised TS allows two of the five cooling water pumps to be inoperable for 7 days, whether the pump is a safeguards pump or a non-safeguards pump.
Technical Specification Section 3.3.D.2.a is being revised in TS Section 3.3.D.2.a.(2) to specifically apply to Unit I since diesel generators 01 and-D2, which require cooling water system flow, are being dedicated to Unit 1.
Unit 2 diesel generators D5 and D6 do not require cooling water system support and, therefore, loss of redundancy in the cooling water system does not degrade the Unit 2 onsite emergency AC power system.
The proposed amendment would also revise TS Section 3.3.D.2.a.(2) to clarify-that both paths from_the transmission grid are to the unit rather than plant 4kV safeguards buses.
Revised TS Section 3.3.D.2.a (3) acknowledges the more restrictive condition of inoperability (i.e., two safeguards pumps inoperable simultaneously) and restricts this condition of.inoperability so that it may'not exceed 7 days in any consecutive 30-day period.
This revised specification retains this restriction from the current TS Section 3.3.D.2.a.
Technical Specification Sections 3.3.D.2.d, e, f, and 'g would be renumbered as TS Sections 3.3.D.2.c, d, e, and f for editorial reasons.
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-The proposed changes to TS Section 3.3 and the associated bases have been evaluated by the staff. The staff has concluded that the proposed changes provide appropriate LC0 and A0T reflecting the modified cooling water system.
These changes will be available to mitigate a design basis event and are acceptable.
2.7.2 Surveillance Test for Autom_Alic_ Start Capability Discussion:
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The proposed TS change to TS Section 4.5.A.S.a would add a surveillance test requiring a demonstration of automatic start capability of the vertical motor-driven cooling water pump at each refueling outage.
A new TS Section 4.5.B.I.c would require that the vertical motor-driven cooling water pump be operated-at quarterly intervals. The specification is written to reflect that an acceptable level of performance shall be that the pump starts and reaches its required developed head and the control board indications and' visual observations indicate that the pump is operating.
properly for at least 15 minutes.
Evaluation:
Upgrading of the vertical motor-driven cooling water pump as a safeguards pump requires that it be subjected to periodic surveillance testing as required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). The proposed surveillance. testing is equivalent to that performed for the other safety-related portions of the cooling water system and provides the required level of assurance necessary to ensure equipment operability.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Minnesota State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State Official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a-facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and a change to the surveillance requirements'. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative
- 3 occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a-proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment-on such finding-(57 FR 13134). Accordingly, the amendments meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement er environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will =not be endangered by operation in 'the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
-l Principal Contributors:
W. Long S. Saba A. Singh Date: December 17, 1992
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