ML20126G120

Amends 103 & 96 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively, Adding & Revising LCOs & Surveillance Requirements to Reflect Station Blackout Project Mods That Will Be Complete Upon Startup from Fall 1992 Outages

ML20126G120
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	12/17/1992
From:	Marsh L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20126G125	List: ML20126G120 ML20126G126
References
NUDOCS 9301040071
Download: ML20126G120 (50)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:* r [pattop jo, UNITED STATES y 3,, 'j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -g p WASHINGTON. D. C. 20$$$ k.....,/ NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-282 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PL ANT. UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.103 License No. DPR-42 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the-licensee) dated March 20, 1992, as revised July 23 and November 6, 1992 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Encrgy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health-and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted ~ in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and para-graph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. OPR-42 is hereby amended-to read as follows: -9301040071 921217 PDR ADOCK 05000282 P PDR

t 2-Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment NoJ03, are hereby incorporated in the license The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' Ledyard B. Marsh, Director Project Directorate 111-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 17, 1992

i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.103 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-42 DOCKET NO. 50-282 Revise Appendix A Technical = Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. REMOVE INSERT TS-v TS-v TS.3.3-7 TS.3.3-7 TS.3.3-8 TS.3.3-8 Table TS.3.5-1 Page 2 of.2 Table TS.3.5-1 Page 2 of 2 Table TS.3.5-6 Table TS.3.5-6 TS.3.7-1 TS.3.7-1 TS.3.7-2 TS.3.7-2 TS.3.7-3 TS.3.7-3 TS.4.5-2 TS.4.5-2 TS.4.5-3 TS.4.5-3 TS.4.5-4 TS.4.5-4 TS.4.6-1 TS.4.6-1 TS.4.6-2 TS.4.6-2 B.3.3-3 B.3.3-3 i B.3.3-4 B.3.3-4 B.3.5-2 B.3.5-2 B.3.5-3 B.3.5-3 B.3.5-4 B.3.5-4 B.3.5-5 B.3.7-1 B.3.7 B.3.7-2 B.3.7-2 B.4.6-1 B.4.6-1 I i

s' TS v TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) TS SECTION TITLE PAGE 4.0 SURVEIL

• ANCE REQUIRDENTS TS.4.1 1 4.1 Operational Safety Review TS.4.1 1 4.2 Inservice Inspection and Testing of Pumps and Valves Requirements TS.4.2 1 A. Inspection Requirements TS.4.2-1 B. Corrective Measures TS.4.2 2 C. Records TS.4.2 3 4.3 Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves TS.4.3-1 4.4 Containment System Tests TS.4.4 1 A. Containment Leakage Tests TS.4.4 1 B. Emergency Charcoal Filter Systems TS.4.4 3 C. Containment Vacuum Breakers TS.4.4 4 D. Residual Heat Removal System TS.4.4 4 E. Containment Isolation Valves TS.4.4 5 F. Post Accident Containment Ventilation System TS.4.4-5

^ C. Containment and Shield Building Air Temperature TS.4.4 5 H. Containment Shell Temperature TS.4.4-5 I. Electric Hydrogen Recombiners TS.4.4 5-4.5 Engineered Safety Features TS.4.5 1 A. System Tests TS.4.5-1

1. Safety Injection System TS.4.5 1

2. Containment Spray System TS.4.5-1

3. Containment Fan Coolers TS.4.5 2

4. Component Cooling Water System TS.4.5 2

5. Cooling Water System

-TS.4.5-2 B. Component Tests TS.4.5 3

1. Pumps TS.4.5 3

2. Containment Fan Motors TS.4.5 3

3. Valves TS.4.5-3 4.6 Periodic Testing of Emergency Power System TS.4.6 1.

A. Diesel Generators TS.4.6 1 B. Station Batteries TS.4.6-3 C. Pressurizer Heater Emer5ency Power Supply TS.4.6-3 4.7 Main Steam Isolation Valves TS.4.7-1 4.8 Steam and Power Conversion Systems TS.4.8 A. Auxiliary-Feedwater System TS.4.8-1 B. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves .TS.4.8-2 C. Steam Exclusion System .TS.4.8-2 4.9 Reactivity Anomalies TS.4.9-1 4.10 Radiation Environmental Monitoring Program TS.4.10-1 A. Sample Collection and Analysis TS.4.10 1 B. Land Use Census TS.4.10-2 C. Interlaboratory Comrarison Program TS.4.10 2 4.11 Radioactive Source Leakage Test TS.4.11-1 Prairie Island Unit 1 - Amendment No. 69, 73, 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit 2 - Amendment No. 63, 66, 84, 96

.~. '? TS.3.3 7 3.3.D. Cooline Water System

1. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200'F unless the following conditions are satisfied (except as specified in 3.3.D.2 below),

s. Four of the five cooling water pumps are OPERABLE, and if one diesel-driven cooling water pump is inoperable, then 121 cooling water' pump shall be aligned as shown in the table below.

A1. changes in the valve positions shall be under direct administrative control. Inoperable Valve Alignment Power Supply to Pump Bus 27 (#121 Cooling Water Pump) w12 MV 32037 or MV 32036 closed; and Cooling associated Bkr Locked Off MV-32034 and MV 32035 open; and both Bkrs Locked Off

1. 22 MV 32034 or MV 32035 closed; and Cooling the associated Bkr Locked Off MV 32037 and MV 32036 open; and both Bkrs Locked Off

b. Two safeguards traveling screens are OPERABLE.

c. Two cooling water headers are OPERABLE.

d. A fuel oil supply of 19,000 gallons is available for the diesel-driven cooling water pumps in the interconnected Unit I diesel fuel oil storage tanks. Note that the 19,000 gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total diesel fuel oil requirement of Specification 3.7 A.5 for Unit 1.

i Prairie Island Unit 1 - Amendment No. 25, 97, 103 Prairie Island Unit 2 - Amendment NO. 19, 84, 96 9

t TS.3.3 8 3.3.D.2. During STARTUP OPERATION or PO' ER OPERATION, the following c J inoperability may exist provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, be in at least HOT SHUTDOVN within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

a. Two of the five cooling water pumps may be inoperable for 7 days with the following stipulation.

If the inoperable pumps are any two of these:

1. 22 Cooling Water Pump, and #121 Cooling Vater Pump #12 Cooling Water P conditions shall apply:

, the following (1) the engineered safety features associated with the OPERABLE safeguards cooling water pump are OPERABLE; and (2) both paths from transmission grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards buses are OPERABLE (applicable to Unit 1 operation only); and (3) this condition of inoperablility (i.e., two safeguards pumps inoperable simultaneously) may not exceed 7 days in any consecutive 30 day period,

b. One of the two required cooling water headers may be inoperable for 72 hours provided:

1 (1) the diesel-driven pump and.the diesel generator associated with safety features on the OPERABLE header are OPERABLE. (2) the horizontal' motor-driven pump associated with the OPERABLE header and the vertical motor-driven pump are OPERABLI,

c. One of the Safeguards Traveling Screens may be inoperable for 90 days provided a sluice gate connecting the Emergency Bay and the Cire l

Water Ba hours) y is open (except during periods of testing not to exceed 24

d. Both Safeguards Traveling Screens may be inoperable for 7 days provided a sluice gate connecting the Emergency Bay and the Cire Water Bay is open,

e. The Emergency Cooling Water line from the Mississippi River may be inoperable for 7 days provided that a sluice gate connecting the-Emergency Bay and the Circ Water Bay is open.

l Prairie Island Unit 1 - Amendment No. 91,103 Prairie Island Unit 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

T" A:

-77 IEE. na. ee YY py TABLE TS.3.5-1 (centinued) ~55 ENGINEERED SAFETY INITIATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING SET POINTS ee EE FIJNCTIONAL ~ UNIT CHANNEL LIMITING SET POINTS E F 10. 4KV Safeguards Busses a. Degraded Voltage .@ a . Volta'ge' Restoration I$ Voltage (1 nominal) 194.8% and 596.2% a a~ Time. Delay 1 8 i 0.5 see- . E E. Time, Delay 2 8 0.5 to.60 i 3 sec

-D%

b. Undervoltage -j E> -Voltage (t-nominal) 75.i 2.5% .w 1-Time' Delay 4 1.5 sec Y

5..

. d . y. T 9 r M m: ? 4 r-' y y-N- 4

-;~

z. TABLE TS.3.5-6 INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM i 2 3 4. MINIMUM MINIMUM PERMISSIBLE OFERATOR ACTION IF OPERABLE DECREE OF BYPASS CONDITIONS OF COLUMN FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS REDUNDANCY CONDITIONS 1 OR 2 CANNOT BE MET Place inoperable channel in the 1. Degraded Voltage 4KV Safeguards Busses 3/ Bus 2/ Bus tripped condition within one hour or be in hot-shutdown.*** Place inoperable channel in the 2. Undervoltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 4KV Safeguards Busses tripped condition within one hour or be in hot shutdown.*** Yg U OM If ninimum conditions are not met within 24 hours steps shall be taken to place the unit in cold shutdown conditions. y e. Prairie Island Unit'1 - Amendment No.-49,'50, 103' Praii-ie Island Unit 2 -- Amendment No. 43, 44,.96~ ..... =., - ~, - - -. - -

E q TS.3.7 1 3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS Avellesbility Applies to the availability of electrical power for the operation of plant auxiliaries. Obieetives To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to assure safe reactor operation and continuing availability of enginected safeguards. Specification A. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200*F unless all of the following i requirements are satisfied for the applicable unit (except as specified in 3.7.B below):

1. At least two separate paths from the transmission grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards distribution system each capable-of providing adequate power to minimum safety related equipment, shall be OPERABLE.

2. The 4 kV safeguards buses 15 and 16 (Unit 2 buses: 25 and 26) shall be energized.

3. The 480 V safeguards buses 110 and 120 (Unit 2 buses: 211, 212, 221 and 222), and their safeguards motor control centers shall be energized.

4. Reactor protection ~ instrument AC buses shall'be energized:' 111, 112, 113 and 114 (Unit 2 buses: 211, 212, 213 and 214).

5. The following unit specific conditions apply:

(a) Unit 1: D1 and D2 diesel generators are 0PERABLE, and a fuel supply of 51,000 gallons is available for the D1 and D2 diesel generators in the Unit 1 interconnected diesel-fuel otA storage-tanks. A total fuel supply of 70,000 gallons is available:for the D1 and D2 diesel generators and the diesel-driven cooling water pumps in the Unit 1 interconnected diesel fuel oil storage tanks. (b) Unit 2: DS and D6 diesel generators are OPERABLE and a; fuel l supply of 75,000 gallons is available for D5 and D6 diesel; generators in the Unit 2 interconnected diesel fuel oil storage tanks.

6. Both ' batteries with their associated chargers and both d.c safeguard systems shall be OPERABLE.

7. No more than one of the Instrument AC Panels 111, 112, 113 and 114-(Unit 2 panels:- 211, 212, 213 and 214) shall be. powered from Panel 117-(Unit 2 panel: 217) or its associated instrument inverter bypass source.

2 Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91, 103 Prairie. Island Unit No. 2 Amendment No. 84, 96 .i' 1.

TS.3.7 2 3.7/B. During STARTUP OPERATION or POVER OPERATION, any of the following conditions of inoperability may exist for the times specified, provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, place the affected unit (s) in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. 1. Onedieselgeneratormaybeinoperablefor7daysprovided(a)thel OPERABILITY of the other diesel generator is demonstrated

• by performance of surveillance requirement 4.6.A.1.e within 24 hours **, (b) all engineered safety features equipment associated with the operable diesel generator is OPERABLE, (c) the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards l

distribution system are OPERABLE and (d) the OPERABILITY of the two required paths from the grid shall be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour and at least once per 8 ho.urs thereafter. 2. One of the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV l safeguards distribution system may be inoperable for 7 days provided (a) D1 and D2 (Unit 2: D5 and D6) diesel generators are l already operating or are demonstrated to be OPERABLE by sequentially performing surveillance requirement 4.6.A.1.e on each diesel generator within 24 hours and (b) the OPERABLE path from the grid shall be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. 3. One of the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV l_ safeguards distribution system and one d'.esel generator may be inoperable for 12 hours provided, (s) the OPERABILITY of the other diesel generator is demonstrated

• by performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.A.1.e within 8 hours **, (b) all engineered safety features equipment associated with the OPERABLE diesel generator is OPERABLE, and (c) the OPERABLE path from the grid shall be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter.

4 Both of the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV l safeguards distribution system may be inoperable for 12 hours provided the D1 and D2'(Unit 2: D5 and D6) diesel generators are l already operating or are demonstrated to be OPERABLE by sequentially performing Surveillance requirement 4.6.A.1.e on each diesel generator within 8 hours. The OPERABILITY of the other diesel generator need not be demonstrated if the diesel generator inoperability was due to preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY. Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 9, 91, 103 -Prairie Island Unit NO. 2 - Amendment No. 4, 84, 96

TS.3.7 3 3.7.B.5, D1 and D2 (Unit 2: D5 and D6) diesel generators may be inoperable l for 2 hours provided the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards distribution system are OPERABLI and the -l. OPERABILITY of the -two required paths from the grid are verified OPERABLE within 1 hour.

6. One 4 kV safeguards bus (and its associated 480 V bus (Unit 2:

buses) including associated safeguards motor control centers) or one 480 V safeguards bus including associated safeguards motor control. centers may be inoperable or not fully energized for 8 hours provided the redundant 4 kV safeguards bua and its associated 480 V safeguards bus (Unit 2: buses) are verified OPERABLE and the diesel generator ar.d safeguards equipment associated with the redundant train are OPERAB1R.

7. One battery charger may be inoperable for 8 hours provided (a)-its associated battery is OPERABLE, (b) its redundant counterpart-is verified OPERABLE, and (c) the diesel generator and safeguards equipment associated with its counterpart are OPERABLE.

I

8. One battery may be inoperable for 8 hours provided that the other battery and both battery chargers remain OPERABLE.

9. In addition to the requirements of Specification TS.3.7.A.7 a second inverter supplying Instrument AC Parels 111, 112, 113, and 114 may (Unit 2 panels 211, 212, 213 and 214) be powered from an inverter bypass source for 8 hours.

5 l l Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 9J, 103 } Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96 2 p 4:

TS.4.5 2

3. Containment Fan Coolers Each fan cooler unit shall be tested durin6 each reactor refueling shutdown to verify proper operation of all essential features including I

low motor speed, cooling water valves, and normal ventilation system dampers. Individual unit performance will be monitored by observing the i terminal temperatures of the fan coil unit and by verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 900 gpm to each fan coil unit.

4. Component Cooline Water System System tests shall be performed during each reactor refueling a.

shutdown. Operation of the system will be initiated by tripping the actuation instrusentation.

b. The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations indicate that all cocponents have operated satisfactorily.

5. Coolinr Vater system System tests shall be performed at each refueling shutdown. Tests a.

shall consist of an automatic start of each diesel engine, automatic start of the vertical motor driven cooling water pump and-automatic operation of valves required to mitigate accidents including those valves that isolate non essential equipment from the system. Operation of the system will be initiated by a simulated accident signal to the actuation instrumentation. The tests will be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations indicate that all components have operated satisfactorily and if cooling water flow paths required for accident mitigation have been established.

b. At least once each 18 months, subject each diesel engine to a thorough inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the' manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.

Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 49, 6I, 63, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 43, 55, 57, 96

~ TS.4.5 3 4.5.B. Conmonent Tuta

1. Pumps

a. The safety injection pumps, residual heat removal 9 umps and containment spray pumps shall be started and operated at intervals of one month.

Acceptable levels of performance sh 11 be that the pumps start and reach their required developed h id on minimum recirculation flow and the control board indic and visual observations indicate that the pumps are operar4 properly for at least 15 minutes. m

b. A test consisting of a manually initiated start of each diesel engine, and assumption of load within one minute, shell be conducted monthly,

c. The vertical motor-driven cooling water pump shall be operated at quarterly intervals.

An acceptable level of performance shall be that the pump starts and reaches its required developed head and the control board indictions and visual observations indicate that the pump is operating properly for at least 15 minutes. 2. Containment Fan Motors The Containment Fan Cell tJnits shall be run on-law motor speed for at least 15 minutes at intervals of one montn. Motor current shall be measured and compared to the nominal current expected for the test conditions. 3. Valves

a. The refueling water storage tank outlet valves shall be tested in accordance with'Section 4.2.

b. The accumulator check valves will be checked for O during each refueling shutdown,

c. The boric acid tank valves to the-Safety Injection System shall be tested at. intervals of one month,

d. The spray chemical additive tank valves shall be cycled by operator action at intervals of one month.

e. Actuation circuits _for Coolin5 Water System valves that isolate non essential equipment from the system shall be-tested monthly.

f. All motor-operated valves in the SIS, RHR, Containment Spray, Cooling Water, and Component Cooling Vater System that are designed for operation during the safety injection or recirculation phase of emergency core cooling, shall be tested for OPERABILITY at each refueling shutdown, rai ie Island n 0 2

EL-l.: TS.4.5 4 4.5.B.3.g. The correct position of the throttle valves below shall be-verified as follows: 1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation. 2. Within 4 hours following maintenance on the valve when the Safety Injection System is required to be OPERABLE, and 3. Periodically at least once per 18 months to the extent not verified in accordance with 1 and 2 above within this time period. Unit 1 Valves Unit 2 Valves SI-15-6 251-15 6 SI 15-7 251 15 7 SI-15-8 2SI-15 8 SI 15 9 2SI-15-9 h. Following completion of high head Safety Injection System or RHR system modifications that alter system flow characteristics a flow balance test shall be performed during shutdown to confirm the following injection flow rates are achieved:

1. Hirh Head Safety Injection System:

(a) Flow through all four injection lines plus miniflow chall not exceed 835 gpm with one pump in operation. (b) The minimum flow through-loop A 6 B cold legsishall be 670 gpm with one pump in-operation. The' flow rates in each lee ahall be within-20 gpm of each other with one pump in operation. (c) Flow orifices and throttling valves will be used to limit and balance flow through the reactor vessel injection lines to a maximum of.the total flow limit in' Specification 4.5.B.3'.h.1 (a),above, with one pump in operation. During this flow test the flow rates-in each leg shall be within 50 gpm of each other.

2. RHR System:

The minimum flow through each RHR Reactor Vessel Injection line shall be at least 1800 gpm. Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 30, 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment Nc. 24, Sf, 96 i

e L.. .a TS.4.6 1 4.6 PERIODIC TESTING OF DiERCENCY POWER SYSTEM Arnlicability Applies to periodic testing and surveillance requireset_cs of the emergency power system. Obiective To verify that the emergency power sources and equipment are OPERATLE. Seecification The following tests and surveillance shall be performed: A. Diesel Generators

1. At least once each month, for each diesel-generator:

a. Verify the fuel level in the day tank.

b. Verify the fuel level in the fuel storage tank.

c. Verify that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank is-within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975 77 when checked for viscosity, water and sediment,

d. Verify the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from R

the storage system to the day tank,

e. Verify the diesel generator can start and-gradually accelerate'to-synchronous speed with generator voltage and frequency at 4160 t 420 volts and 60 i 1.2 H:. Subsequently, manually synchronize the j

generator, gradually load to at least 1650 kW (Unit 2: 5100 kW to-i 5300 KW), and operate for at least 60 minutes. This test should be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube, warm-up,-loading and shutdown procedu+t where.possible. i + JPrairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendt.ent No, 25,.49/ 9I, 103 -Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 19, 43, 84, 96

1 .g, TS.4.6 2 4.6.A.2. At least once each 6 months, for each diesel generator: Verify the diesel generator starts and accelerates to at least a. synchronous speed in less than or equal to 10 seconds. l b. Verify the generator voltage and frequency to be 4160 1 420 volts and 60 i 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal. c. Henut11y synchronize the generator, load to at least 1650 kW (Unit 2: 5100 kW to 5300 kW) in less than or equal to 60 seconds and ',perate for at least one hour. d. This test should be conducted in accordance with i manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube and shutdown procedures where possible. 3. At least once each 16 months a. Subject each diesel generator to a thorough inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the - manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service. b. For each unit, simulate a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety injection signal, and: 1. Verify de energization of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses. 2. VerlF7 the diesels start on the auto. start signal and energize the emergency buses in one minutt. This test should be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations l regarding engine prelube and shutdown procedures where possible. 3. Verify that the auto connected loads do not exceed 3000-hv (Unit 2: 5100 kW). l 4 Verify that the diesel generator system trips, except-those for engine overspeed, ground fault, and generator differential current (Unit 2: except those for engine overspeed and genecator differential current), are automatically bypassed. c. For each unit, demonstrate full-load carryin.g-capability for an-l interval of not less than 24 hours, of which 2 hours are at a loau equal to 105 to 110 percent of the continuous tating of the -emergency diesel generator, and 22 hours art. at a load equal to 90 to 100 percent of its continuous rating, Verify the generator voltage and frequency to be 4160 1 420 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz. d. Verify the capability of each generator to reject a load of at least 650 kW (Unit 2: 860 kW) without tripping. [ e. During this test, operation of the emergency lighting system shall be ascertained. Prairie-1sland Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 25.-91, 200, 103 . Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 19. $4, 93,.96

B.3.3 3 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Bases continued The containment cooling function is provided by two independent systems: containment fan cooler units and containment sprays. During normal operation, four containment fan cooler units are utilized to remove heat lost from equipment and piping within the containment. In the event of the Design Basis Accident, any one of the following combinations will provide sufficient cooling to reduce containment pressure: four containment fan-cooler units, two containment spray pumps or two containment fan cooler units plus one containment spray pump (Reference 4). Two of the four containment fan cooler units are permitted to be inoperable during POWER OPERATION. This is an abnormal operating situation, in that plant operating procedures require that inoperable containment fan cooler units be repaired as soon as practical. However, because of the difficulty of access to make repairs, it is important on occasion to be able to operate temporarily with only two containment fan cooler units. Two containment fan cooler units can provide adequate cooling for normal operation when the containment fan cooler units are cooled by the chilled water system (Reference 3). Comperwation for this mode of operation is provided by the hi h degree of redundancy of containment cooling systems during a Design 6 Basis Accident. One component cooling water puzp together with one component cooling heat exchanger can accommedste the heat removal load en one unit, either following a loss of-coolant accident or during normal plant shutdown. The four pumps of the two. unit facility can be cross connected as necessary. to-accommodate temporary outage of the pump. If, during the post accident phase, the component cooling water supply were lost, core and containment cooling could be maintained until repairs were effected (Reference 5). Cooling water can be supplied by either of the two horizontal motor-driven pumps, by a safeguards motor driven pump or by either of two safeguards diesel-driven pumps. (Reference 6). Operation of a single cooling water pump provides sufficient cooling in one unit during the injection and recirculation phases of a postulated loss of-coolant accident plus sufficie,.t cooling to maintain the second unit in a hot standby condition. TS.3.3.D.1.a assures that an automatic Safety _ Injection signal to the ensling_ water header isolation valves will not align both OPERABLE saiequards pumps to the same' safeguards ?*ain. TS.3.3.D.1.a tiso assures that 121 cooling water pump is aligned to provide-cooling water to the same train as the train from which it is being powered (e.g., if 121 cooling water pump is aligned to Train B cooling water header, it needs to be powered from Bus 26 and, ultimately, Diesel Generator D6 in the event of a loss of offsite power). Otherwise, the-single failure of a diesel generator could leave one train of engineered - - safety features without power and the other train without cooling water. The minimum fuel supply of 19,000 gallons will supply one diesel-driven cooling water pump for 14 days. Note that the 19,000 gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total diesel fuel oil requirement of Specificati0n 3.7.A.5 for Unit 1. Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment ho. 91,103 Prairie island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

+ B.3.3 4 3.3 ENcfNEERED SAFETY FEATURES Bases continued The Safeguards Traveling Screens and Emergency Cooling Vater Supply line are designed to provide a supply of screened cooling water in the event that an earthquake 1) destroyt Dam No. 3 (droppinb che water level in the normal canal to the screenhouse) and 2) causes the banks bordering the normal canal to the screenhouse to collapse eliminating the river as a source of cooling water. The Safeguards Traveling Screens and Emergency cooling Vater Supply line provide an alternate supply of water to the Safeguards Bay, which contains the two diesel driven and the one vertical motor driven cooling water pumps. Their normal supply is from the Cire Water Bay thru one of two sluice gates. Either one of the two sluice gates or one of the two Safeguards Traveling Screens will adequately supply any of the three cooling water pumps. The Safeguards Travelins Screens are not considered part of the " engineered safety features associated with the operable diesel driven cooling water pump" for determination of operability of diesel-driven cooling water pumps. The component cooling water system and the cooling water system provide water for cooling components used in normal operation, such as turbine generator components, and reactor auxiliary components in addition to supplying water for accident functions. These systems are designed to .utomatically provide two separate redundant paths in each system following an accident. Each redundant path is capable of cooling required components in the unit having the accident and in the oper-ating unit. There are several manual valves and manually-controlled motor-operated valves in the engineered safety feature systems that could, if one valve is improperly positioned, prevent the required injection of emergency coolant (Reference 7). These valves are used only when the reactor is suberitical and there is adequate time for actuation by the reactor To ensure that the manual valve alignment is appro priate operator. for safety injection during power operation, these valves are tagged and the valve position vill be changed only under direct _ administrative control. For the motor operated valves, the motor control center supply breaker is physically locked in the open position to ensure that a-single failure in the actuation circuit or power supply would not move the valve-. References 1. USAR, Section 3.3.2 2. USAR, Section 14.6.1 3. USAR, Section 6.3.2 4 USAR, Section 6.3 5. USAR, Section 10.4.2 6. USAR, Section 10.4.1 7. USAR, Figure 6.2 1 USAR, Figure 6.2-2 USAR, Figure 6.2-5 USAR, Figure 10.2-11 -Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amet.dment No. 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. S4, 96

3 B.3.5 2 3.5 INSTRtHENTATION SYSTEM Bases continued Steam Line Isolation (continued) line flow in coincidence with low T and safety injection or high steam flow (Hi-Hi) in coincidence with saIEty injection. Adequate protection is. afforded for breaks inside or outside the containment even when it is assumed that the steam line check valves do not function properly. Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves in the containment purge and inservice purge systems automatically close on receipt of a Safety Injection signal or a high radiation signal. Gaseous and particulate monitors in the exhaust stream or a gaseous monitor in the exhaust stack provide the high radiation signal. Ventilation System Isolation In the event of a high energy line rupture outside of containment, redundant isolation dampers in certain ventilation ducts are closed (Reference 4). Safeguards Bus Voltage Relays are provided on buses 15, 16, 25, and 26 to detect undervoltage and degraded voltage (the voltage level at which. safety related equipment may not operate properly). Relays are not provided on 4 kV safeguards bus.27 to detect undervoltage and degraded voltage since. voltage is-monitored on the 4 kV source safeguards bus (i.e., bus 25 or bus 26) to which it-is connected. Upon receipt of an undervoltage signal the automatic _ voltage restoring scheme is actuated after a short time delay which prevents actuation during normal-transients (such as motor-starting) and which-allows protective relaying _ operation during faults. When degraded volta 5* is sensed,-two time delays are actuated. The first time delay-is'long enough to allow for normal transients. The first time delay annunciates that a_ sustained degraded voltage condition exists and enables logic which. vill ensure;that voltage and timing are adequate for-safety injection loads-by automatically performing the following upon receipt of a safety injection signal:

1. Auto start the diesel generator;

~2. Separate the bus from the grid;

3. Load the bus onto the diesel generator; and

4. Start the load sequencer (including safety injection loads).

LPrairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 9I, 103 ^ Prairie Island Unit No. 2'- Amendment No. 84, 96

~ O B.3.5 3 3.5 INSTPfMENTATION SYSTEM fases continued The second longer time delay is used to allow the degraded voltage condition to be corrected by external actions within a time period that will not cause damage to operating. equipment. If voltage is not restored within that time period, the logic automatically performs the following:

1. Auto start the diesel generator;

2. Separate the bus from the grid;

3. Load the bus onto the diesel generator; and

4. Start the load sequencer.

{ Auxiliary Teedwater_ System Actuation The following signals automatically start the pumps and open the steam admission control valve to the turbine driven pump of the affected unit:

1. Low low water level in either steam generator

2. Trip of both main feedvater pumps

3. Safety Injection signal Undervoltage on both 4.16 kV normal buses (turbine driven pump only) 4 Manual control from both the control room and the Hot Shutdown Panel are also available.

The design provides assurance that water can be supplied to the steam generators for decay heat removal when the normal feedwater system is not available. Limiting Instrument Setpoints

1. The high containment pressure limit is set at about 10% of the maximum internal pressure.

Initiation of Safety Injection protects-against loss of coolant (Reference 2) or steam line break accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.

2. The Hi Hi containment pressure limit is set at about_50% of the maximum internal pressure _ for initiation of containment spray and at about 304 for initiation of steam line isolation.

Initiation of Containment Spray and Steam Line Isolation protects against large loss of coolant (Reference 2) or steam line break accidents (Reference 3) as discussed 'in the safety analysis.

3. The pressurizer low pressure limit is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently high to protect against a loss of coolant accident as shown in the safety analysis (Reference 2).

Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 9I, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. $4, 96

m B.3.5 4 3.5' INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM Bases continued Limiting Instrument Setpoints (continued) 4. The steam line low pressure signal is lead / lag compensated and its set point is set well above the pressure expected in the event of a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis (Reference 3). 5. The high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 20% of nominal full-load flow at the no load pressure and the high high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 120% of nominal full-load flow at the full load pressure in order to protect against large steam break accidents. The coincident low T, setting limit for steam line isolation initiation is set below,its hot shutdown value. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide protection in the event of a large steam break (Reference 3). 6. Steam generator low low water level and 4.16 kV Bus 11 and 12 (21 ~and 22 in Unit 2) low bus volta'ge provide initiation signals for the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Selection of these setpoints is discussed in the Bases of Section 2.3 of the Technical Specification. 7. High radiation signals providing input to the Containment. Ventilation Isolation circuitry are set in accordance with the Radioactive Effluent Technical Specifications. The setpoints are established to prevent exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 at the_ SITE BOUNDARY. 8. The degraded voltage protection setpoint is 294.8% and s96.2% of -nominal 4160 V bus voltage. Testing and analysis have shown that all safeguards loads will operate properly at or above the minimum degraded voltage setpoint. The maximum degraded voltage setpoint is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme at the minimum expected grid voltage. The first degraded voltage time delay of 810.5 seconds has been shown by testing _ and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients.(i.e., motor starting and fault clearing). It-is'also longer than the time required to start the safety injection _ pump at minimum voltage. The second degraded voltage time delay is provided to allow the degraded voltage condition to be corrected within a time frame which will not cause damage to permanently connected Class.1E loads. -Prairie Island Unit tha.1 - Amendment No; 91,- 103 Prairie. Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84,'96

B.3.5 5 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM Bases continued Limiting Instrument Serpoints (continued) The undervoltage setpoint is 7512.5% of nominal bus voltage. The minimum setpoint ensures equipment operates above the limiting value of 75% (of 4000 V) for one minute operation. The 75% maximum setpoint is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme during voltage dips which occur during motor starting. The undervoltage time delay of 4 1 1.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients and short enough to ~ operate prior to the degraded voltage logic, providing a rapid transfer to an alternate source. Instrument Operating Conditions During plant operations, the complete instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection System, which automatically initiates appropriate action to prevent exceeding established limits. Safety is not compromised, however, by continuing operation with certain instrumentation channels out of service since provisions were made for this in the plant design. This specification outlines limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the Reactor Control and Protection System when any one or more of the channels is out of service. Almost all reactor protection channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for CRANNEL CALIBRATION and test at power. Exceptions are backup channels such as reactor coolant pump. breakers. The removal of one trip channel on process control equipment is accomplished by placing that channel bistable in a tripped mode;.e.g., a two out-of-three circuit becomes a one out-of-two circuit. The source-and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation system channels are not intentionally placed in a tripped mode since these are one-out of two trips, and the trips are therefore bypassed during testing. Testing does not trip the system unless a trip condition exists in a concurrent channel. Refer _nees

1. USAR, Section 7.4.2

2. USAR, Section 14.6.1

3. USAR, Section 14.5.5

4. pSAR, Appendix I Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 103 Prairie Island Unit No Amendment No. 96 l

I N+ B.3.7 1 3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM fases The intent of this specification is to provide assurance that at least one external source and one standby source of electrical power is always available to accomplish safe shutdown and containment isolation and to operate required engineered safeguards equipment following an accident, Plant auxiliary power can be supplied from four separate external power sources which have multiple off site network connections: the reserve transformer from the 161 kV portion of the plant substation; the second reserve transformer from the 345 kV portion of the plant substation and the two cooling tower transformers, one of which is supplied from a tertiary winding on the substation auto transformer, and the other directly from the 345 kV switchyard. Any one vf the four sources is sufficient, under analyzed conditions, to supply all the necessary accident and post accident load requirements for one reactor, along with the shutdown of the second reactor. Each source separately supplies the safeguards buses in such manner that items of equipment which are redundant to each other are supplied by separate sources and buses. Each diesel generator, D1 or D2 (Unit 2: D5 or D6), is connected to its associated 4160 volt safeguards bus in Unit 1 (Unit 2) and each diesel generator has sufficient capacity to start sequentially and operate the safeguards equipment supplied by its associated bus. The-set of safeguards equipment items supplied by each bus is, alone, sufficient to maintain adequate cooling of the fuel and to maintain contain=ent pressure within the design value in the event of a loss of coolant accident. If no offsite source is available to the associated bus, each diesel starts autountically upon reccipt of an undervoltage signal on its associated bus. Both diesel generators start in the event of a safety injection signal for the reactor. The minimum fuel supply of $1',000 gallons will supply one, Unit 1 diesel generator for 14 days.- Note that the 51,000 gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total requirement for Unit 1. Tha total fuel supply of 70,000 gallons will supply one diesel-driven cooling water pump and one Unit 11 diesel generator (loaded per USAR Table 8.4-1)'for greater than 14 days (Unit 2: A fuel supply of 61,300 gallons will supply one Unit 2 diesel-generator for 7 days at rated load' calculated per the conservative method of ANSI-N195 1976. A minimum fuel supply of 75,000 gallons was conservatively chosen to supply one Unit 2 diesel generator for 14 days-calculated per the time dependent method of ANSI-N195 1976.) Additional diesel fuel can normally be obtained within a few hours. This assures. an adequate supply even in the event of the probable maximum flood. Prairie Island Unit No I'- Amendment No. 91, 103 Prairie-Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96 I i

I B.3.7 2 3.7 AUX 1LIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM Bases continued Following the inoperability of a Diesel Generator, the redundant diesel-generator is tested to prove that the cause of the inoperability does not affect both diesel generators. However, if the diesel generator is inoperable due to preplanned preventative maintenance, operability of the redundant l._ diesel generator does not need to be proven. The plant 125 volt d c power is normally supplied by rwo batteries for each plant, each of which will have a battery charger in service to maintain full charge and to assure adequate power for starting the diesel generators and supplying other emergency loads. The arrangement of the auxiliary power sources and equipment and this specification assure that no single fault condition will deactivate more than one redundant set of safeguard equipment items in one reactor and will therefore not result in failure of the plant protection system to respond adequately to a loss of coolant accident. Reference USAR, Section 8 USAR, Figure 8.2-2 Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment N5. 97, 103 -Prairie. Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

.( B.4.6-1 4.6 PERIODIC TESTINC OF EMERCENCY POWER SYSTEMS Bases The monthly tests specified for the diesel generators will demonstrate their continued capability to start and to carry load. The fuel supplies and starting circuits and controls are continuously monitored, and abnormal conditions in these syrtems would be alarm indicated without need for test startup. ~ The less frequent overall system test will demonstrate that the emergency power system and the control systems for the engineered safeguards (.aipment will function automatically in the event of loss of all other sources of a-c power, and that the diesel generators will start automatically in the event of a loss of coolant accident. This test will demonstrate proper tripping of motor feeder breakers, main supply and tie breakers on the affected bus, and sequential starting of essential equipment, as well as the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators. The load rejection test will demonstrate the capability to reject the single largest emergency load without tripping. The specified test frequencies provide reasonable assurance that any mechanical or electrical deficiency will be detected and corrected before it can result in failure of one emergency power supply to respond when called upon to function. It's possible failure to respond is, of course, anticipated by providing two diesel generators per unit, each l supplying, through an independent bus, a complete and adequate set of engineered safeguards equipment. Further, both diesel generators are provided as backup to multiple sources of external power, and this multiplicity of sources should be considered with regard to adequacy of test frequency. Each diesel generator can start and be ready to accept full load within 10 seconds, and will sequentially start and supply the power requirements for one ccaplete set of safeguards equipment in approximately one minute (Reference 1). An internal fault in the generator could damage the generator severely. Moreover, this change complies with BTP EICSB 17. ' Auto-connected loads-should not exceed the overload rating of_the diesel generator for the 2000 hour maintenance interval, as prescribed in Regulatory Guide 1.9. Station batteries will deteriorate with time, but precipitous failure is extremely unlikely. The surveillance specified is that which has been demonstrated over the years to provide indication of a cell becoming unserviceable long before it fails. If a battery cell has deteriorated, or if a connection is loose, the voltage under load will drop excessively, indicating need for replacement or maintenance. Prairie Island Jnit No. 1 - Amendment NO. 91, 103 Prairie Islana L' nit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

+#pa t8 tg'o, UNITED STATES 8' c/(',c NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E s#. ' c WASHINGT ON. D. C. 70%S s ~ l NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-301 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 96 License No, DPR-60 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated March 20, 1992, as revised July 23 and November 6, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR' Chapter _ I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. Thereisreasonableassurance-(1)thattheactivitiesauthorizedby. this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the connission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will n + ba inimical to the common defense and security or to the health nd safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's reguietions and all-applicable requireinents have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical-Specifica-tions as indicated in the tttachment to this license amendment, and para-graph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating t.icense No. DPR-60 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2-Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.96, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ledyard B. Marsh, Director Project Directorate 111-1 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 17, 1992 4 1 f .-.--l-a w -= n. s--,

. AIJfCHMENT T0 tlCENSE AMENDMENT NO. 96 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-60 DOCKET NO. 50-306 Revise Appendix A Technical S>ecifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attacled pages.. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. INSERT EEt1QVI TS-v TS-v TS.3.3-7 TS.3.3-7 TS.3.3-8 TS.3.3-8 Table TS.3.5-1 Page 2 of 2 Table TS.3.5-1 Page 2 of 2 Table 15.3.5-6 Table TS.3.5-6 TS.3.7-1 15.3.7-1 TS.3.7-2 TS.3.7-2 TS.3.7-3 TS.3.7-3 TS.4.5-2 TS.4.5-2 TS.4.5-3 -TS.4.5-3 TS.4.5 TS.4.5-4 TS.4.6-1 .TS.4.6-1 TS.4.6-2 TS.4.6-2 B.3.3-3 B.3.3-3 B.3.3-4 B.3.3-4 B.3.5-2 B,3.5-2 B.3.5-3 B.3.5-3 B.3.5-4 B.3.5-4 B.3.5-5 B.3.7-1 B.3.7-1 B.3.7-2 B.3.7 B.4.6-1 B.4.6-1

- -._..~ -. - - 1 TS v TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continue 2 TS SECTION TITLE PACE 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 75.4.1 1 4.1 Operational Safety Review 75.4.1 1 4.2 Inservice Inspection and Testing of Pumps and Valves Requirements T5.4.2+1 A. Inspection Requirements TS.4.2 1 B. Corrective Hessures 75.4.2 2

c. Records TS.4.2 3 4.3 Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves TS.4.3 1 4.4 Containment System Tests 75.4.4 1 A. Containment Leakage Tests 75.4.4 1 B. Emergency Charcoal Tilter Systems TS.4.4 3 C. Containment Vacuum Breakers TS.4.4 4 D. Residual Heat Removal System TS.4.4 4 E. Containment Isolation Valves 75.4.4 5 F. Post Accident Containment Ventilation System TS.4.4 5 G. Containment and Shield Building Air Temperature 75.4.4 5 H. Containment $ bell Temperature TS.4.4 5

1. Electric Hydrogen Recombiners TS.4.4 5 4.5 Engineered Safety Features TS.4.5 1 A. System Tests TS.4.5 1

1. Safety Injection System TS.4.5 1

2. Containment Spray System TS.4.5 1

3. Containment Fan Coolers TS.4.5 2

4. Component Cooling Water System TS.4.5 2

5. Cooling Vater System TS.4.5 2 B Component Tests TS.4.5 3

1. Pumps TS.4.5 3

2. Containment Fan Motors TS.4.5 3

3. Valves TS.4.5 3 4.6 Periodic Testing of Emergency Power System TS.4.6 1 A. Diesel Generators TS.4.6 1 B. Station Batteries TS.4.6 3 C. Pressurizer Heater Emergency Power Supply TS.4.6 3 4.7 Main Steam Isolation Valves TS.4.7 1 4.8 Steam and Power Conversion Systems TS.4.8 1 A. Auxiliary Feedwater System TS.4.8 1 B. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves TS.4.8 2

c. Steam Exclusion System

.TS.4.8 2 4.9 Reactivity Anomalies TS.4.9 1 4.10 Radiation Environmental Monitoring Program TS.4.10 1-A. Sample Collection and Analysis TS.4-10 1 B. Land Use Census TS.4.10 2 C. Interlaboratory Comparison Program TS.4.10 2 4.11 Radioactive Source Leakage Test TS.4.11 1 Prairie Island Unit 1 - Amendment No. 69, 73, 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit 2 - Amendment No. 63, 66, 84, 96

O tr 75.3.3 7 3.3.D. cooline Vater system

1. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200'T, unless the following conditions are satisfied (except as specified in 3.3.D.2 below).

L

a. Four of.the five cooling water pumps are OPERABLZ, and if one diesel-i driven cooling water pump is inoperable, then 121 cooling water. pump shall be aligned as shown in the table below. All changes in the valve positions shall be under direct administrative control.

I Inoperable Valve Alignment Power Supply to Pump Bus 27 (#121 Cooling Water Pump) w12 NV.32037 or NV.32036 closed; and Cooling associated Bkr Locked Off "*E NV 32034 and MV.32035 open; and both Skrs Locked off w22 NV.32034 or NV 32035 closed; and Cooling the associated Bkr Locked off Water Pump Bus 26 KV.32037 and MV.32036 open; and both Bkra Locked off

b. Two safeguards traveling screens are OPERABLI.

c. Two cooling water headers are OPERABLE.

d. A fuel oil supply of 19,000 gallons is available for the diesel.

driven cooling water pumps in the interconnected Unit 1 diesel fuel oil storage tanks.- Note that the 19,000 gallon requirement is -included in the 70,000 gallon total diesel fuel oil requirement of Specification 3.7.A.5 for Unit 1. 1 Prairie Island Unit 1 - Amendment No. 25, 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit 2 - Amendment NO.- 19.- 84, 96 G e 9

t 75.3.3 8 i 3.3.D.2. During STAR 7VP OPERATION or POVER OPERATION, the followin inoperability may exist provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, be in at least HOT SKUTDOVH within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOVN within the following 30 hours,

a. Two of the five cooling water pumps may be inoperable for 7 days with the following stipulation.

If the inoperable pumps are any evo of these: w22 Cooling Vater Pump, and #121 Cooling Vater Pump, the follow conditions shall apply: (1) the engineered safety features associated with the OPERABLE safeguards cooling water pump are OPERABLE; and (2) both paths from transmission grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards buses are OPERABLE (applicable to Unit 1 operation only); and (3) this condition of inoperablility (i.e., two safeguards pumps inoperable simulteneously) may not exceed 7 days in any consecutive 30 day period,

b. One of the evo required cooling water headers may be inoperable for 72 houra provided:

(1) the diesel. driven pump and the diesel generator associated with safety features on the OPERABLE header are OPERABLE. (2) the horizontal motor driven pump associated with the OPERABLE header and the vertical motor driven pump are OPERABLI.

c. One of the Safeguards Traveling Screens may be inoperable for 30 days provided a sluice gate connecting the Emergency Bay and the Cire l

Water Ba hours), y is open (except during periods of testing not to exceed 24

d. Both Safeguards Traveling Screens scy be inoperable for 7 days prcvided a sluice Water Bay is open, gate connecting the Emergency Bay and the Cire

e. The Emergency Cooling Vater liue from the Mississippi River say be inoperable for 7 days providad that a sluice Emergency Bay and the Cire Water Bay is open. gate connecting the Prairie Island Unit 1 - Amendment No. 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96 l

NN g g:

1:1 ea to yy TABLE TS.3.5-1 (continued)

EE ENGINEERED SAFETY INITIATION INSTRLMENTATIC6 LIMITING SET FOINTS ce EE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL LIMITING SET POINTS u-8.t E y 10. 4KV Safeguards Busses-a. Degraded Voltage Voltage Restoration Voltage (t nominal) 294.84 and s96.2% Time Delay 1 8 0.5 see EF Time Delay 2 8 i 0.5 to 60 i 3 see -{% b. Undervoltage 85 Voltage (4 nominal) 75 t 2.5% Time Delay 4. 1.5 sec Y E. tn V ~ y c-a

I TABLE TS.3.5-6 INSTRUfENT OP3ATING CONDITIONS FOR AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM i 2 3 4 MINIMUM MININUM PERMISSIBLE OPERATOR ACTION IF OPERABLE DECREE OF BYPASS CONDITIONS OF C012 Net MMICTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS REDUNDANCY CONDITIONS 1 OR 2 CANNOT BE MET -1. Degraded Voltage Place inoperable channel in the ~ 4KV Safeguards ' Busses 3/ Bus 2/ Bus tripped condition within one hour or be in het shutdown.***

2. -Undervoltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus Place inoperable channel in the 4KV Safeguards Busses tripped condition within one hour or be in het shutdown.***

5' = U

• • If minimus' conditions are not met within 24 hours, steps shall be taken to piece the unit in cold s,

shutdown conditions. E Prairie Island Unit I'- Amendment No. 49, 30, 103 1 Prairie Island Unit. 2 -L Amendment. No. 43, 44, % i .~. .~.

e TS.3.7 1 3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTDiS Adelicability Applies to the availability of electrical power for the operation of plant auxiliaries. Objectives To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to assure safe reactor operation and continuing availability of engineered i safeguards. Seecification A. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200'T unless all of the following requirements are satisfied for the applicable unit (except as specified in 3.7.B belov):

1. At least two separate paths from the transmission grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards distribution system each capable of providing adequate power to minimum safety related equipment, shall be OPERABLE.

2. The 4 kV safeguards buses 15 and 16 (Unit 2 buses: 25 and 26) shall be energized.

3. The 480 V safeguards buses 110 and 120 (Unit 2 buses: 211, 212, 221 and 222), and their safeguards motor control centers shall be energized.

4. Reactor protection instrument AC buses shall be energized:

111, 112, 113 and 114 (Unit 2 buses: 211, 212, 213 and 214).

5. The following unit specific conditions apply:

(a) Unit 1: D1 and D2 diesel generators are OPERABLE, and a fuel supply of 51,000 gallons is available for the D1 and D2 diesel generators in the Unit 1 interconnected diesel fuel oil storage tanks. A total fuel supply of 70,000 gallons is available for the D1 and D2 diesel generators and the diesel-driven cooling water pumps in the Unit 1 interconnected-diesel fuel oil storage tanks. (b) Unit 2: D5 and D6 diesel generators are OPERAELI and a fuel supply of 75,000 gallons is available for D5 and D6 diesel generators in the Unit 2 interconnected. diesel fuel oil storage tanks.

6. Both batteries with their associated chargers and both d c safeguard systems'shall be OPERABLE.

7. No more than one of the Instrument AC Panels 111, 112, 113 and 114 (Unit 2 panels: 211, 212, 213 and 214) shall be powered from Panel 117 (Unit 2 panel: 217) or its associated instrument inverter bypass source.

Prairie Island Unit =No. 1 - Amendment No. 97, 103 Prairie Island Unit-No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

75.3.7 2 3. 7.'B. During STARTUP OPERATION or POVER OPERATION, any of the following conditions of inoperability may exist for the times specified, provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued untti OPERABILITY is restored. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, place the affected unit (s) in at least HOT SHUTDOVN within the next 6 hours and be in COLD SHUTDOVN within the following 30 hours. 1. Onedieselgeneratormaybeinoperablefor7daysprovided(a)thel OPERABILITY of the other diesel generator is demonstrated

• by performance of surveillance requirement 4.6.A.1.e within 24 hours **, (b) all engineered safety features equipment associated with the operable diesel generator is OPERABLE, (c) the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards l

distribution system are OPERABLE and (d) the OPERABILITY of the two required paths from the grid shall be verified OPERABLE vithin 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. 2. One of the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV l safeguards distribution system may be inoperable for 7 days provided (a) D1 and D2 (Unit 2: DS and D6) diesel generators are l already operating or are demonstrated to be OPERABLE by sequentially performing surveillance requirement 4.6. A.1.e on each diesel generator within 24 hours and (b) the OPERABLE path from the grid shall be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. 3. One of the two required paths from the grid to the unit 6 kV l safeguards distribution system and one diesel generator may be inoperable for 12 hours provided (a) the OPERABILITY of the other diesel generator is demonstrated

• by performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.A.1.e within 8 hours **, (b) all engineered safety features equipment associated with the OPERABLE diesel generator is OPERABLE, and (c) the OPERABLE path from the grid shall be verified OPERABLE within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter.

4. Both of the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV l-safeguards distribution system may be inoperable for 12 hours provided the D1 and D2 (Unit 2: D5 and D6) diesel generators are l already operating or are demonstrated to be OPERABLE by sequentially performing Surveillance requirement 4.6.A.1.e on each diesel generator-within 8 hours. The OPERABILITY of the other diesel generator need not be demonstrated if the diesel generator in',perability was due to preplanned preventative maintenance or testing. This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY. ' Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 9, 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit NO. 2 - Amendment No. 4, 84, 96

TS.3.7 3 3.7.B.5. D1 and D2 (Unit 2: D5 and D6) diesel generators may be it. operable l for 2 hours provided the two required paths from the grid to the unit 4 kV safeguards distribution system are OPERABLE and the l OPERABILITY of the two required paths from the grid are verified OPERABLE within 1 hour.

6. One 4 kV safeguards bus (and its associated 480 V bus (Unit 2:

buses) including associated safeguards motor control centers) or one 480 V safeguards bus including associated safeguards motor control centers may be inoperable or not fully energised for 8 hours provided the redundant 4 kV safeguards bus and its associated 480 V safeguards bus (Unit 2: buses) are verified OPERABLE and the diesel generator and safeguards equipment associated with the redundan', train are OPERABLE.

7. One battery charger may be inoperable for 8 hours provided, (a) its associated battery is OPERABLE, (b) its redundant counterpart is verified OPERABLE, and (c) the diesel generator and safeguards equipment associated with its counterpart are OPERABLE.

8. One battery may be inoperable for 8 hours provided that the other battery and both battery chargers remain OPERA 3LE.

9. In addition to the requirements of Specification TS.3.7.A.7 a second inverter supplying Instrument AC Panels ill, 112, 113, and 114 may (Unit 2 panels 211, 212, 213 and 214) be powered from an inverter bypass source for 8 hours.

Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96 e

l TS.4.5 2

3. Containnent ran coolers Each fan cooler unit shall be tested during each reactor refueling shutdown to verify proper operation of all essential features including low motor speed, cooling water valves, and normal ventilation system dampers.

Individual unit performance will be monitored by observing the terminal temperatures of the fan coil unit and by verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 900 gpm to each fan coil unit.

4. Comoonent Cooline Water $vstem

a. System tests shall be performed during each reactor refueling shutdown.

Operation of the system will be initiated by tripping the actuation instrumentation,

b. The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations indicate that all components have operated satisfactorily.

5. Cooline Vater System System tests shall be performed at each refueling shutdown. Tests a.

shall consist of an automatic start of each diesel engine, automatic start of the vertical motor driven cooling water pump and automatic operation of valves rsquired to mitigate accidents including those valves that isolate non essential equipment from the system. Operation of the system will be initiated by a simulated accident signal to the actuation instrumentation. The tests will be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations indicate that all components have operated satisfactorily and if cooling water flow paths required for accident mitigation have been established.

b. At least once each 18 months, subject each diesel engine to a thorough inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.

Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 49, 61, 63, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 43, 55, 57, 96

o 'O TS.4.5 3 4.$.B. conoonent Tests

1. Pumps

a. The safety injection pumps, residual heat removal pumps and containment spray pumps shall be started and operated at intervals of one sonth.

be that the pumps start and reach their required dev on minimum recirculation flow and the control boar and visual obsarvations indicate that the pumps are opera properly for at least 1$ ainutes.

b. A test consisting of a manually initiated start of each diese 1

conducted monthly. engine, and assumption of load within one

c. The vertical motor. driven cooling water pump shall be operat at quarterly intervals.

shall be that the pump starts and reaches its requiredA developed head and the control board indictions and visual observations indicate that the pump is operating properly f at least 15 minutes. 2. Containment ran Motors The Containment ran Coil Units shall be run on low motor s for at least 15 minutes at intervals of one-month. expected for the test conditions. current shall be measured Motor 3. Valves a, ne refueling water storage tank outlet valves shall be tested in accordance with Section 4.2.

b. ihe accumulator check valves will be checked during each refueling shutdown,

c. The boric acid tank valves to the safety Injection Systaa shall be tested at intervals of one month,

d. The spray chemical additive tank valves shall be cycled b operator action at intervals of one month, y

a. Actuation circuits for cooling Water' System tested monthly.

f. All motor operated valves in the SIS, RHR, Containment Spray, Cooling Vater, and Component Cooling Vater System that are designed for operation during the safety injecti or recirculation phase of amargency core cooling, shall be on tested for OPERABIt.ITY at each refueling shutdown Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment ~No, I,

I, 3 Prairie: Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment O.

F O T5.4.5 4 4.5.B.3.g. The correct position of the throttle valves below shall be verified as follows: 1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation. 2. Within 4 hours following maintenance on the valve when the Safety Injection System is required to be OPERA 3LI, and 3. Periodically at least once per 18 months to the extetit not verified in accordance with 1 and 2 above within this tLae period. Unit 1 Valves Unit 2 Valves SI 15 6 251 15 6 51 15 7 251 15 7 SI 15 8 2S1 15 8 $1 15 9 251 15 9 h. Following completion of high head Safety Injection System or RRR system modifications that alter system flow characteristics a flow balance test shall be performed during shutdown to confirm the following injection flow rates are achieved:

1. Hirh Head Safety Iniection System:

(a) Flow through all four injection lines plus miniflow shall not exceed 835 gpm with one pump in operation. (b) The minimum flow through loop A & B cold legs shall be 670 gpm with one pump in operation. The flow rates in each leg shall be within-20 gpm of each other with one pump in operation. (c) Flov orifices and throttling valves will be used to limit and balance flow through the reactor vessel injection lines to a maximum of the total flow limit in Specification 4.5.B.3.h.1 (a) above, with one pump in operation. During this flow test the flow rates in each leg shall be within 50 rpm of each other.

2. RHR System:

The minimum flow through each RHR Reactor Vessel Injection line shall be at least 1800 gpa. Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 30, 91, 103 Prairie-Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 24, 84, 96 4

'e 75.4.6 1 4.6 PERIODIC TESTING OF EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM Aeolicability Applies to periodic testing and surveillance requirements of the emergency power system. Objeetlyg To vertfy that the emergency power sources and equipment are OPERABLE. 4 Seecification The following tests and surveillance shall be performed:- A. Diesel Cenerat2Il

1. At least once each month,~ for each diesel generator:

a. Verify the fuel level in the day tank'.

b. Verify the fuel level in the fuel storage tank.

c. Verify that a sample of diesel fuel from the-fuel storage tank is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975 77 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment,

d. Verify the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers' fuel from the storage system to the day tank.

e. Verify the diesel generator can-start and gradually accelerate to synchronous speed with generator voltage and frequency at 4160 i 420 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz. Subsequently, manually synchronize.the' generator, gradually load to at least 1650 kW (Unit 2:. 5100 kW to-5300 KV), and operate for at least 60 minutes. -This test should be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations rogarding engine prelube, warm up,-loading and shutdown procedures where possible.

1 Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment Noi,25.,49/.9f;L103 . Prairie Island Unit No.:2 - Amendment No. 19, #3, 84, 96 ~_

7s.4.6 2 4.6.A.2. At least once each 6 months, for each diesel generator: a. Verify the diesel generator starts and accelerates to at least synchronous speed in less than or equal to 10 seconds. l b. Verify the generator voltage and frequency to be 4160 i 420 volta and 60 1 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal, c. Manually synchronize the generator, load to at least 1650 kV (Unit 2: 5100 kW to 5300 kW) in less than or equal to 60 seconds and operate for at least one hour, d. This test should be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube and shutdown procedures where possible. 3. At least once each 18 months: a. Subject each diesel generator to a thorough inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service, b. For each unit, simulate a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety injection signal, and: 1. Verify de.energitation of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses. 2. Verify the diesels start on the auto start signal and energize the emergency buses in one minute. This test should be conductedinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationsl regarding engine prelube and shutdown procedures where possible. 3. Verify that the auto. connected loads do not exceed 3000 kw (Unit 2: 5100 kW). l 4. Verify that the diesel generator system trips, except those for engine overspeed, ground fault, and generator differential current (Unit 2: except those for engine overspeed and generator differential current), are automatically bypassed, c. For each unit, demonstrate full. load carrying capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, of which 2 hours are at a load equal to 105 to 110 percent of the continuous rating of the emergency diesel generator, and 22 hours are at a load equal to 90 to 100 percent of its continuous rating. Verify the generator voltage and frequency to be 4160 1 420 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz. d. Verify the capability of each generator to reject a load of at least 650 kW (Unit 2: 860 kW) without tripping. l During this test, operation of the emergency lighting system shall e. be ascertained. ( Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 25, 91, 200, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 19. B, 93, 96

d B.3.3 3 3.3 somEERED f QETY TEATlTES htti continued The containment cooling function is provided by two independent systems: containment fan cooler units and containment sprays. During normal operation, four containment fan cooler units are utilized to remove heat lost from equipment and piping within the containment. In the event of the Design Basis Accident, any one of the following combinations vill provide sufficient cooling to taduce containment pressures four containment fan cooler units, tvo containment spray pumps or two containment fan cooler units plus one containment spray pump (Reference 4). Two of the four containment fan cooler units are permitted to be inoperable during POVER OPERATION. This is an abnormal operating situation, in that plant operating procedures require that inoperable containment fan cooler units be repaired as soon as practical. However, because of the difficulty of access to make repairs, it is important on ocession to be able to operate temporarily with only two containment fan cooler units. Two containment fan cooler units can provide adequate cooling for normal operation when the containment fan cooler units are cooled by the chilled water _ system (Reference 3). Compensation for this mode of operation is provided by the high degree of redundancy of containment cooling systems during a Design Basis Accident. One component cooling water pump together with one component cooling heat exchanger can accommodate the heat removal load on one unit, either following a loss of coolant accident or during normal plant shutdown. The four pumps of the two unit facility can be cross connected as necessary to acconnodate temporary outage of the pump. If, during the post accident phase, the corponent cooling water supply were lost, core and containment cooling could be maintained until repairs were effected (Reference 1). Cooling water can be supplied by either of the two horizontal motor driven pumps, by a safeguards motor driven pump or by either of two safeguards diesel driven pumps. (Reference 6). Operation of a single cooling water pump provides sufficient cooling in one unit during the injection and recirculation phases of a postulated loss of coolant accident plus sufficient cooling to maintain the second unit in a hot standby condition. TS.3.3.D.1.a assures that an automatic Safety Injection signal to the cooling water header isolation valves vill not align both OPERABl.E safeguards pumps to the same' safeguards train. TS.3.3.D.1.a also assures that 121 cooling water pump is aligned to provide cooling water to the same train as the train from which it is being powered (e.g., if 121 cooling water punirp is aligned to Train B cooling water header, it needs to be powered from Bus 26 and, ultimately, Diesel Generator D6 in the event of a loss of offsite pover). Othervise, the single failure of a diesel generator could leave one train of engineered safety features without power and the other train without cooling water. The minimum fuel supply of 19,000 gallons vill supply one diesel driven cooling water pump for 14 days. Note that the 19,000 gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total diesel fuel oil requirement of Specification 3.7.A.5 for Unit 1. l Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91, 103 L Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

B.3.3 4 3.3 ENCINEERED SATETY TEATt'RES Enta continued The Safeguards Travnling Screens and faergency Cooling Water Supply line i are designed to provide a supply of screened cooling water in the event that an earthquake 1) destroys Dam No. 3 (dropping the water level in the normal canal to the screenhouse) and 2) causes the banks bordering the normal canal to the screenhouse to co11spee eliminating the river as a source of cooling water. The Safeguards Traveling Screens and Emergency cooling Water Supply line provide an alternate supply of water to the Safeguards Bay, which contains the two diesel driven and the one vertical motor driven cooling water purps. Their normal supply is from the cire Vater Bay thru one of two sluice gates. Either one of the two slutce gates or one of the tvo Safeguards Traveling Screens will adequately supply any of the three cooling vater pumps. The Safeguards Traveling Screens are not considered part of the ' engineered safety features associated with the operable diesel. driven cooling water pump" for determination of operability of diesel. driven cooling water pumps. The component cooling water system and the cooling water system provide water for cooling components used in normal operation, such as turbine generator components, and reactor auxiliary components in addition to supplying water for accident functions. These systems are designed to automatically provide two separate redundant paths in each system following an accident. Each redundant path is capable of cooling required components in the unit having the accident and in the oper. ating unit. There are several manual valves and manually controlled motor operated valves in the engineered safety feature systems that could, if one valve is improperly positioned, prevent the required injection of emergency coolant (Reference 7). These valves are used c,nly when the reactor is suberitical and there is adequate time for actuation by the reactor To ensure that the manual valve alignment is appro. priate operator. for safety injection during power operation, these valves are tagged and the valve position vill be changed only under direct administrative control. For the motor operated valves, the motor control center supply breaker is physically locked in the open position to ensure that a single failure in the actuation circuit or power supply would not move the valve. Re fe rens.,t2 1. USAR, Section 3.3.2 2. USAR, Section 14.6.1 3. USAR, Section 6.3.2 4 USAR, Section 6.3 5. USAR. Section 10.4.2 6. USAR, Section 10.4,1 7. USAR, Figure 6.2 1 USAR, figure 6.2 2 USAR. Figure 6.2 5 USAR, Tigure 10.2 11 Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91. 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. BA, 96.

e r 8.3.5 2 3.5 INSTRtHENTATION SYSTEM 11111 continued Steam Line Isolation (continued) line flow in coincidence with 1cw T and safety injection or high steam flow (H14H1) in coincidence with saI ty injection. Adequate protection is afforded for breaks inside or outside the containment even when it is assumed that the steam line check valves do not function properly. Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves in the containment purge and inservice purge systems automatically close on receipt of a Safety Injection signal or a high radiation signal. Cassous and particulate monitors in the exhaust stream or a gaseous monitor in the exhaust stack provide the high radiation signal. Ventilation System Isolation' In the event of a high energy line rupture outside of containment, redundant isolation dampers in certain ventilation ducts are closed (Reference 4).. Safeguards Bus Voltage. Relays are provided on buses 15,16 - 25, and 26 to detect undervoltage and degraded voltage (the voltage level at which safety related equipment may. not operate properly). Relays-are not provided on 4 kV safeguards bus 27 to detect undervoltage and degraded voltage 1since voltage is monitored on the 4 kV source safeguards bus (i.e., bus 25 or bus 26) to which it is. connected. Upon receipt of an undervoltage signal the automatic voltage. restoring scheme is actuated after a short time delay which prevents actuation during normal transients (such as motor starting) and which allows protective relaying operation during faults, When degraded voltage is sensed, two time delays tre actuated. The first time delay is long: enough to allow for normal transients. The first time _ delay annunciates that a sustained degraded voltage-condition exists and enables logic which, will ensure that voltage and timing are adequate for safety injection loads, by automatically-performing the following upon receipt of a safety injection signal:

1. Auto start the diesel generator;

2. Separate the bus from the grid;.

3. Load the bus onto.the diesel generator;-and

4. Start the load sequencer (including safety injection loads).

Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91,-1'03 ' -Prairie Island Unit No.:2 - Amendment No. 84, 96.

i B.3.5 3 3.5 INST /tHttrrATIONJYSTL4 Agata continued Tn. tocc'nd longer time delay is used to allow the degraded voltage rendition :o be corrected by external setions within a time period that will not verse (smage to Operating equipment. If v ltage is not restored within that tive parted, the logic automatically performs the following:

1. Auto start the diesel genetator;

2. Separate the bus from the grid;

3. Load the tus onto the diesel generator; and

4. 5 tart the load sequsacer, Auxiliary Teodwater System Actuation The foltowing signals automatically start the pumps and open the steam admission control valve to the turbine driven pump of the affected unit:

1. Lov. low watsr level in either steam generator

2. Trip of both main feedwater pumps

3. Safety Injection signal

4. Undervoltage on both 4.16 kV normal buses (turbine driven pump only)

Hanual control from both the control room and the Hot Shutdown Panel are also available. The design provides assurance that water can be supplied to the steam generatore for decay heat removal when the normal feedwater system is not availaolo. Limiting Instrument Setpoints

1. The high containment pressure limit is set at about-lon of the maximum internal pressure.

Initiation of Safety Injection protects assinst loss of coolant (Reference 2) or steam line break accidents-as discussed in the safety analysis.

2. The Hi.Hi containment pressure limit is set at about 50% of the maximum internal pr-ssure for initiation of containment spray and at about 304 for initiation of steam line isolation.

Initiation of Containment Spray and Steam Line isolation protects against large less of coolant (Reference 2) or steam line break accidents (Reference 3) as discussed in the safety analysis.

3. The pressurizer low pressure limit is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently high to protect against a loss of coolant accident as shown in the safety analysis (Reference 2).

Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91. 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. BK, 96 w

i B.3.5 4 3.5' INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM Bases continued Limiting Instrument Setpoints (continued) 4 The steam line low pressure signal is lead / lag compensated and its set point is set well above the pressure expected in the event of a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis (Reference 3). S. The high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 20% of nominal full load flow at the no load pressure and the high high steam line 1 flow limit is set at approximately 120% of nominal full. load flow at the full load pressure in order to protect against large steam break accidents. The coincident low T setting limit for steam line j isolation initiation is set below,,its hot shutdown value. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide protection in the event of a large steam break (Reference 3). 6. Steam generator low. low water level and 4.16 kV Bus 11 and 12 (21 and 22 in Unit 2) low bus volta'ge provide initiation signals for the Auxiliary Feedvater System. Selection of these setpoints is discussed in the Bases of Section 2.3 of the Technical Specification. 7. High radiation signals providing input to the Containment Ventilation Isolation circuitry are set in accordance with the Radioactive Effluent Technical Specifications. The setpoints are established to prevent exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 23 at the SITE BOUNDARY. 8. The degraded voltage protection setpoint is a94.8% and s96.2% of nominal 4160 V bus voltage. Testing and analysis have shown that all safeguards loads will operate properly at or above the minimum degraded voltage setpoint. The maximum degraded voltage setpoint is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme at the minimum expected grid voltage. The first degraded voltage time delay of 8 i 0.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients (i.e., motor starting and fault clearing). It is also longer than the time required to start the safety injection pump at minimum voltage. The second degraded voltage time delay is provided to allow the degraded voltage condition to be corrected within a time frame which will not cause damage to permanently connected Class 1E loads. l Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96

_. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _. _. _ _ __ _ __ _ _- _ 3.3.5 5 t 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM Bases continued Limiting Instrument setpoints (continued) The undervoltage setpoint is 7512.5% of nominal bus voltage. The minimum setpoint ensures equipment operates above the limiting value of 756 (of 4000 V) for one minute operation. The 754 maximum setpoint is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme during voltage dips which occur during motor starting. The undervoltage time delay of 411.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients and short enough to operate prior to the degraded voltage logic, providing a rapid transfer to an alternate source. Instrument Operating Conditions During plant operations, the complete instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection System, which automatically initiates appropriate action to prevent exceeding established limits. Safety is not compromised, however, by continuing operation with certain instrumentation channels out of service since provisions were made for this in the plant design. This specification outlines limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the Reactor Control and Protection System when any one or more of the channels is out of service. Almost all reactor protection channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for CHANNEL CALIBRATION and test at power. Exceptions are backup channels such as reactor coolant pump breakers. The removal of one trip channel on process control equipment is accomplished by placing that channel bistable in a tripped mode; e.g., a two out of three circuit becomes a one.out of two circuit. The source and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation system channels are not intentionally placed in a tripped mode since these are one.out of two trips, and the trips are therefore bypassed during testing. Testing does not trip the system unless a trip condition exists in a concurrent channel. Erfarences 1.-USAR, Section 7.4.2

2. USAR, Section 14.6.1

3. USAR, Section 14.5.5

4. FSAR, Appendix I Prairie Island Unit No. 1 -~ Amendment No.-103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment-No. 96

..J

B.3.7 1 3.7 AtTILIARY ELECTRICS SYSTEM Bases The intent of this specification is to provide assurance that at least one external source and one standby source of electrical power is always available to accomplish safe shutdown and containment isolation and to operate required engineered safeguards equipment following an accident. Plant auxiliary power can be supplied from four separate external power sources which have multiple off site network connections: the reserve transformer from the 161 kV portion of the plant substation; the second reserve transformer from the 345 kV portion of the plant substation and the two cooling tower transformers, one of which is supplied from a tertiary winding on the substation auto transformer, and the other directly from the 345 kV switchyard. Any one of the four sources is sufficient, under analyzed conditions, to supply all the necessary accident and post accident load requirements for one reactor, along with the shutdown of the second reactor. Each source separately supplies the safeguards buses in such manner that items of equipment which are redundant to each other are supplied by separate sources and buses. Each diesel generator, D1 or D2 (Unit 2: D5 or D6), is connected to its associated 4160 volt safeguards bus in Unit 1 (Unit 2) and each diesel generator has sufficient capacity to start sequentially and operate the safeguards equipment supplied by its associated bus. The set of safeguards equipment items supplied by each bus is, alone, sufficient to maintain adequate cooling of the fuel and to maintain containment pressure within the design value in the event of a loss of coolant accident. If no offsite source is available to the associated bus, each diesel starts automatically upon receipt of an undervoltage signal on its associated bus. Both diesel generators start in the event of a safety injection signal for the reactor. The minimum fuel supply of 51,000 gallons vill supply one Unit 1 diesel generator for 14 days. Note that the $1,000 gallon requirement is included in the 70,000 gallon total requirement for Unit 1. The total fuel supply of 70,000 gallons will supply one diesel driven cooling water pump and one Unit 1 diesel generator (loaded per USAR Table 8.41) for greater than 14 days (Unit 2: A fuel supply of 61,300 gallons will supply one Unit 2 diesel generator for 7 days at rated load calculated per the conservative method of ANSI.N195 1976. A minimum fuel supply of 75,000 gallons was conservatively chosen to supply one Unit 2 diesel generator for 14 days calculated per the time dependent method of ANSI.N1951976.) Additional diesel fuel can normally be obtained within a few hours. This assures an adequate supply even in the event of the probable maximum flood. Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment No. 91, 103 Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96 = m

B.3.7+2 3.7 AUXILDJtY ELECIP,1 CAL SYSTEM AAAAA continued Following the inoperability of a Diesel Cenerator, the redundant diesel generator is tested to prove that the cause of the inoperability does not affect both diesel generators. However, if the diesel generator is inoperable due to preplanned preventative maintenance, operability of the redundant l diesel generator does not need to be proven. The plant 125 vole d.c power is normally supplied by two batteries for each plant, each of which will have a battery charger in service to maintain full charge and to assure adequate power for starting the-diesel generators and supplying other emergency loads. The arrangement of the auxiliary power sources and equipment and this specification assure that no single fault condition will deactivate note than one redundant set of safeguard equipment items in one reactor and will therefore not result in failure of the plant protection system to respond adequately to a loss of. coolant accident. .Peference USAR, Section 8 USAR, Figure 8.2 2 -Prairie: Island; Unit No. 1 - Amendment N5.-91, 103. Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. $4, 96 .,.. ~ ~

4 i B.4.6 1 4.6 PERIODIC TESTING OF NERCENCY POWER SYSTI,ti! Inta The monthly tests specified for the diesel generators will demonstrate their continued capability to start and to carry load. The fuel supplies and starting circuits and controls are continuously monitored, and abnormal conditions in these systems would be alarm. indicated without need for test startup. The less frequent overall system test will demonstrate that the emergency power system and the control systems for the engineered safeguards equipment will function automatically in the event of loss of all other sources of a.c power, and that the diesel generators will start automatically in the event of a loss.of coolant accident. This test will demonstrate proper tripping of motor feeder breakers, main supply and tie breakers on the affected bus, and sequential starting of essential equipment, as well as the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators. The load rejection test will demonstrate the capability to reject the single largest emergency load without tripping. The specified test frequencies provide reasonable assurance that any mechanical or electrical deficiency will be detected and corrected before it can result in failure of one emergency power supply to respond when called upon to function. It's possible failure to respond is, of course, anticipated by providing evo diesel generators per unit, each l supplying, through an independent bus, a complete and adequate set of engineered safeguards equipment. Further, both diesel generators are provided as backup to multiple sources of external power, and this multiplicity of sources should be considered with regard to adequacy of test frequency. Each diesel generator can start and be ready to accept full load within 10 seconds, and will sequentially start and supply the power requirements for one complete set of safeguards equipment in approximately one minute (Reference 1). An internal fault in the generator could damage the generator severely. Moreover, this change complies with BTP EICSB 17. Auto. connected loads should not exceed the overload rating of the diesel generator for the 2000 hour maintenance interval, as prescribed in Regulatory Guide 1.9. Station batteries will deteriorate with time, but precipitous failure is extremely unlikely. The surveillance specified is that which has been demonstrated over the years to provide indication of a cell becoming unserviceable long before it fails. If a battery cell has deteriorated, or if a connection is loose, the voltage under load will drop excessively, indicating need for replacencnt or maintenance. Prairie Island Unit No. 1 - Amendment NO. 91, 103 ' Prairie Island Unit No. 2 - Amendment No. 84, 96}}