ML20046B635
| ML20046B635 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046B633 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-91-08, GL-91-8, NUDOCS 9308050289 | |
| Download: ML20046B635 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES I
f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1(*vh.
g WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 i
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS.107 AND 1mTO l
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 i
l NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306' l.0 INTRODUCTION 1
By letter dated May 7, 1992, as revised June 24, 1993, Northern States Power Company (NSP or the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2.
The supplemental letter dated June 24, 1993, provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards determination published in the Federal Reaister (57 FR 24674). The proposed' amendments-would (1) relocate the Containment Penetration List from Section 4.4 of the Technical Specifications into plant procedures in accordance with the guidance of Generic letter 91-08, (2) change Section 3.6.C of the Technical Specifications to clarify when non-automatic containment isolation valves are required to be operable and what actions are to be taken in response to inoperability of a non-automatic containment isolation valve, and (3) deletes l
condensate cross-connect valve C-41-1 from Section 3.4.B.1.g of the Technical l
Specifications.
2.0 EVALUATION l
2.1 RELOCATION OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION LIST i
The proposed changes to the Prairie Island Technical Specifications being proposed in response to Generic Letter 91-08 are described below.
A.
The reference to Table TS.4.4-1, " Unit I and Unit 2 Penetration Designation for Leakage Tests," in the Tab.le of Contents " List of Tables" would be deleted consistent with deletion of Table 4.4-1 from Section 4.of the Technical Specifications.
B.
Item 2 of the definition of " Containment Integrity" in Section 1.0 would be deleted.
This statement references usage of blind flanges as required by Table 4.4-1.
Table 4.4-1 is proposed to be _ deleted as indicated below.
A separate statement in Section 1.0 for the installation of blind flanges, is unnecessary as it is redundant to another existing requirement in Item i
1.b of the Containment Integrity definition which states that all
. penetrations are either closed by manual valves, blind flanges or deactivated automatic valves.
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C.
References to Table TS.4.4-1 would be deleted from Sections 3.6.C.2 and 3.6.C.3 for consistency with the deletion of the table from Section 4.
D.
References to Table TS.4.4-1 would be deleted from Sections 4.4. A.2, 4.4. A.4.a and 4.4. A.4.b reflecting the deletion of the table from Section 4.
The term " containment system integrity" would be changed to
" CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY" in Section 4.4.A.2 to be consistent with the current terminology in Section 1.0 and the policy for capitalizing all defined terms. The acronym "ABSVZ" (Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone) would be spelled out in Sections 4.4. A.4.a and 4.4. A.4.b for clarity and consistency with Sections 4.4.A.5 and 4.4.A.6.
E.
In Section 4 of the Technical Specifications Table TS.4.4-1, " Unit I and i
Unit 2 Penetration Designation for Leakage Tests," would be relocated into plant procedures that are subject to the change control provisions for plant procedures in the Administrative Controls Section of the Prairie Island Technical Specifications. Notes that are part of Table 4.4-1 would be affected as follows:
1.
License Amendment No. 62, dated February 23, 1983 revised the Prairie Island Technical Specifications to conform to the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. Notes 1, 2 and 5 of Table TS.4.4-1 were incorporated into the Prairie Island Technical Specifications by
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l License Amendment No. 62 to provide clarifications and exemptions to i
the Type B and C testing requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
Discussion of notes 1, 2 and 5 of Table TS.4.4-1 would be incorporated into Bases Section 4.4 so that the applicability of the related Appendix J testing requirements remains clearly defined. While the reference of these notes to specific containment penetrations would be-relocated out of the Technical Specifications with Table TS.4.4-1, the specific clarifications and exemptions incorporated into Table TS.4.4-I by License Amendment 62 would remain in effect.
l 2.
Note 3 of Table TS.4.4-1, which defines terms utilized in. Table TS.4.4-1, would not be retained because it is an integral part of the l
Table and serves no useful purpose in the Technical Specifications once the table is relocated.
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3.
Note 4 of Table TS.4.4-1, which describes which penetrations have..
l blank flanges, would not be retained in the Technical Specifications because of its reference to specific penetration numbers.
The information provided by Note 4 will be relocated with Table TS.4.4-1 to the plant procedures and the Prairie Island Updated Safety Analysis Report.
4.
Note 6 of Table TS.4.4-1 would be deleted, on the basis that it duplicates information which is also'provided by Section 3.6.D.2.b of the Technical Specifications.
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The staff has reviewed the proposed changes and verified that the changes are consistent with Generic Letter 91-08 and do not unintentionally delete or modify any Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements using the guidance of the Generic Letter. As stated in the Generic Letter, plant administrative procedures provide adequate change control provisions and the operability requirements of_ the Technical Specifications will remain effective and enforceable. The proposed changes relating to relocation of the List of Penetrations are, therefore, acceptable.
2.2 NON-AUTOMATIC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES This license amendment application requests changes to Prairie Island Technical Specification Section 3.6.C which will clarify when the non-automatic containment isolation valves are required to be operable and what actions are to be taken in response to the inoperability of a non-automatic containment isolation valve.
The existing wording in Technical Specification Section 3.6.C.1 does not l
specify when non-automatic containment isolation valves are required to be operable and does not specifically refer to the containment isolation valve action statements in Section 3.6.C.3.
It is not clear from reading the existing wording in Sections 3.6.C.1 and 3.6.C.3 that the action statements in Section 3.6.C.3 are applicable to the non-automatic containment isolation valves.
To correct this, Section 3.6.C.1 would be revised to (a) specify that non-automatic containment isolation valves be operable whenever containment integrity is required and (b) refer to the action statements in Section 3.6.C.3.
The proposed changes would make it clear that the specified action statements apply to all containment isolation valves, both automatic and non-automatic.
With the exception of automatic instrumentation operability.and testing requirements, non-automatic containment isolation valves are subject to operability and surveillance testing requirements similar to those for automatic isolation valves. Accordingly, the proposed changes are acceptable.
2.3 DELETION OF CONDENSATE SUPPLY CROSS-CONNECT VALVE The two Prairie Island units share three condensate storage tanks which are I
cross-connected with a suction header serving the four Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps. Technical Specification 3.4.B.I.g currently specifies that condensate cross connect valves C-41-1 and C-41-2 be blocked and tagged open. A reliability study of the Prairie Island auxiliary feedwater system was completed in April 1986 (Ref: NSPNAD-8606P).
That reliability study concluded that the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system could be improved if valve C-41-1 was rr.oved from the condensate supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and replaced with a spool piece. Valve C-41-1 was subsequently removed and replaced with a spool piece. However, due to an oversight, the valve was-removed and replaced with a spool piece before it was removed from the Technical Specifications. Valve C-41-1 was originally included in the Technical Specifications to protect against inadvertent closure of the valve which would adversely affect the condensate supply to the auxiliary
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.4 feedwater pumps. When the licensee identified that the valve had been removed without modifying the Technical Specifications, it was concluded that the spool piece performed the same function as a blocked and tagged open valve and that the use of the spool piece met the intent of Technical Specification 3.4.B.I.g.
The replacement of valve C-41-1 with a spool piece reduces th?
possibility of a human or administrative error that could adversely affect the reliability of the Auxiliary Feed Water System condensate supply.
Remaining valves provide capability to isolate the condensate storage tanks when necessary. The proposed amendment is, therefore, acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Minnesota State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State Official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation er use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 24674, June 10, 1992). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
W. Long Date: July 29,1993 I
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