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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211D3981999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requested Actions to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20207B5931999-05-26026 May 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam (PT) of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20202J1731999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Surface Exam Requirements of ASME BPV Code for CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20237A8171998-08-0505 August 1998 SER Related to USI A-46 Program GL 87-02 Implementation for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20217M6901998-04-29029 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology for Relocation of Reactor Coolant Sys P/T Limit Curves & LTOP Sys Limits Proposed by NSP for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20203H8331998-02-20020 February 1998 SE Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Nonstructural Seal Welds for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Unit 2 ML20148D5441997-05-16016 May 1997 Safety Evaluation of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Individual Plant Exam ML20138J9961997-05-0606 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds ML20058N8021993-12-0808 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Approving Third 10-yr IST Program Requests for Pumps & Valves,Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) & 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20127C0071993-01-0404 January 1993 Supplemental SE Accepting Changes & Additions Described in Rev 1 to Design Rept for Station Blackout/Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project ML20127C0291993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting pressure-retaining Components of safety-related Auxiliary Fluid Sys Associated W/Edgs ML20127C0241993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Audit of Load Sequencer Implementation. Four of Five Items Reviewed Acceptable & Closed.One Open Item Remained Re Electromagnetic Environ Qualification for Lower Frequency Range of 30 Hz to 10 Khz ML20127C0151993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Instrumentation & Control Sys Aspects of Unit 2 Load Sequencer Sys in Station Blackout/ Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project ML20128A7301992-11-30030 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 920921 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to GL 87-02 Re in-structure Response Spectra ML20128A7171992-11-30030 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 920921 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to GL 87-02 as Commitment to Entire GIP-2, Including Both SQUG Commitments & Implementation Guidance. In-structure Response Spectra Addressed in Separate SE ML20151U1181988-08-17017 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Compliance W/Atws Rule (10CFR50.62). Design Acceptable Contingent Upon Successful Completion of Human Factors Engineering Studies & Qualification of Isolation Devices ML20235Y4791987-07-13013 July 1987 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 870120 Requests for Relief from ASME Code Requirements Re Inservice Insp & Testing Program for Second 10-yr Interval ML20205Q8071987-03-30030 March 1987 SER Accepting Util 861104 & 840706 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re ATWS Requirements for on-line Testing of Reactor Trip Sys ML20205M5261987-03-27027 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Denying Util 860819 Proposal to Reproduce Radiographs on Microfilm ML20211Q2971987-02-18018 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability (Generic Issue 124) for Prairie Island Units 1 & 2 ML20209C2151987-01-21021 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability (Generic Issue 124) at Prairie Island Units 1 & 2.Util Actively Pursuing Improvements in Sys Reliability & Reducing Sys Challenges ML20214S4131986-11-26026 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Finding Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Adequately Designed,Maintained & Operated.Licensee Actively Pursuing Improvements in Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability & in Reducing Challenges to Sys ML20214C9231986-11-14014 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 80 & 73 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20212K8801986-08-15015 August 1986 Corrected Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 860110 Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events ML20203B1551986-07-11011 July 1986 SER Re Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1), Equipment Classification. Program Acceptable. Exemption of Turbine Trip Component from Listing Also Acceptable ML20202A7531986-06-23023 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events ML20199L4491986-06-23023 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 860110 Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.Response Acceptable ML20211A3791986-05-30030 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Use of VIPRE-01 Subchannel Thermal Hydraulic Code & WRB-1 Critical Heat Flux Correlation W/Min DNBR Limit of 1.17.Code & Correlation Acceptable ML20211A2111986-05-27027 May 1986 SER Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review (Data & Info Capability) ML20141N0961986-02-25025 February 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting K(Z) Curve & Current Tech Spec Fq Value of 2.32 ML20138H1951985-10-18018 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Re Util 850422 & 0830 Ltrs Concerning Removal of Rod Cluster Control Guide Tube Thimble Plugs. Plan Acceptable ML20133N2021985-10-18018 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 830415,0915,850118 & 0606 Responses to Generic Ltr 82-33 Re Conformance of post- Accident Monitoring Instrumentation W/Rev 2 to Reg Guide 1.97 ML20138P6301985-10-17017 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Re Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Concerning Reactor Trip Breaker Automatic Shunt Trip.Licensee Position on Items Acceptable ML20138E1661985-10-11011 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Re 850809 Inservice Insp of Components Relief Requests 29 & 66.Alternative Acceptable & Relief Should Be Granted ML20133P0521985-08-0505 August 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util post-trip Review Program & Procedures.Nrc Action on Item 1.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28 Completed ML20128M9091985-05-13013 May 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2,4.1 & 4.5.1 ML20062B6451982-07-0909 July 1982 Safety Evaluation Supporting Thermal Hydraulic Margins for Exxon Toprod for Cycle 7 ML20062B6361981-10-20020 October 1981 Safety Evaluation Supporting Thermal Hydraulic Margins for Exxon Toprod for Cycle 7 1999-08-24
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G4461999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pingp.With ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20216E7151999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211D3981999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requested Actions to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211C2531999-08-0404 August 1999 Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-990526 Cycle 19 971212-990526 ML20210Q4891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211B5971999-07-31031 July 1999 Cycle 20 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20209J1131999-07-15015 July 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept NSPNAD-8102,rev 7 Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units. Rept Acceptable for Referencing in Prairie Island Licensing Actions ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20209F9811999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196F4081999-06-23023 June 1999 Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 to Rev 7 of NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units ML20195G5181999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With . Page 3 in Final Rept of Incoming Submittal Was Not Included ML20207B5931999-05-26026 May 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam (PT) of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20196L2501999-05-13013 May 1999 Rev 0 to PINGP Unit 1 COLR Cycle 20 ML20206L6191999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205N1081999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205Q5101999-03-15015 March 1999 Inservice Insp Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 1 & 2 Refueling Outage Dates 981109-1229 Cycle 19,970327-981229 ML20207J6951999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20202J7711999-02-0404 February 1999 Simulator Certification Rept for Prairie Island Plant Simulation Facility,1998 Annual Rept ML20202G3761999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102-NP, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload SE Methods for Application to PI Units ML20207L2811999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20202J1731999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Surface Exam Requirements of ASME BPV Code for CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20206P7861998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20205H0561998-12-31031 December 1998 Northern States Power Co 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20198J6441998-12-17017 December 1998 Rev 0 to PINGP COLR Unit 2-Cycle 19 ML20206N2731998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196D7341998-11-20020 November 1998 Third Quarter 1998 & Oct 1998 Data Rept for Prairie Island Isfsi ML20155K6301998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154H4061998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20202J7991998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 3 to CEN-629-NP, Repair of W Series 44 & 51 SG Tubes Using Leaktight Sleeves,Final Rept ML20198P0571998-09-0303 September 1998 Rev 1 to 95T047, Back-up Compressed Air Supply for Cooling Water Strainer Backwash Valve Actuator ML20153B0761998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20237A3961998-08-11011 August 1998 Safety Evaluation on Westinghouse Owners Group Proposed Insp Program for part-length CRDM Housing Issue.Insp Program for Type 309 Welds Inadequate from Statistical Point of View ML20237A8171998-08-0505 August 1998 SER Related to USI A-46 Program GL 87-02 Implementation for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236X8531998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20236R6481998-07-15015 July 1998 Metallurgical Investigation & Root Cause Assessment of Part Length CRDM Housing Motor Tube Cracking at PINGP Unit 2 - Preliminary Summary Rept ML20236R0771998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20249A5751998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20247G7011998-05-31031 May 1998 Metallurgical Investigation & Root Cause Assessment of Part Length CRDM Housing Motor Tube Cracking at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Unit 2 ML20248M0561998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 5 to CEN-620-NP, Series 44 & 51 Design SG Tube Repair Using Tube Rerolling Technique ML20247E2671998-05-0505 May 1998 Rev 0 to Pingp,Units 1 & 2,Pressure & Temp Limits Rept (Effective Until 35 Efpy) ML20247G2921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20217M6901998-04-29029 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology for Relocation of Reactor Coolant Sys P/T Limit Curves & LTOP Sys Limits Proposed by NSP for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20216C6361998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Prairie Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 & 2 ML20216H0341998-03-31031 March 1998 Cycle-19 Voltage Based TSP Alternate Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20217D2041998-03-13013 March 1998 Rev 1 to 28723-A, Intake Canal Liquefaction Analysis Rept for Pingp,Welch,Mn ML20236P9801998-03-12012 March 1998 Rev 0 to 97FP02-DOC-01, Compliance Review of 10CFR50,App R, Section Iii.O RCP Lube Oil Collection Sys ML20248L3931998-03-10010 March 1998 ISI Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 1 & 2 Refueling Outage Dates 971018-971212 Cycle 18,960303-971212 ML20216D0911998-03-0606 March 1998 Rev 0 to Prairie Island Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2, Pressure & Temp Limits Rept 1999-09-30
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o WASHINGTON, D.C. 2066H001
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO LICENSEE RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 95-07. " PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY-RELATED POWER-OPERATED GATE VALVES" 1
NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 l DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306 I i
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Pressure locking and thermal binding represent potential common-cause failure mechanisms that can render redundant safety systems incapable of performing their safety functions. The identification of susceptible valves and the determination of when the phenomena might occur require a thorough knowledge of components, systems, and plant operations. Pressure locking occurs in flexible wsdge and double-disk gate valves when fluid becomes pressurized inside the valve bonnet and the actuator is not capable of overcoming the additional thrust i requirements resulting from the differential pressure created across both valve disks by the pressurized fluid in the valve bonnet. Thermal binding is generally associated with a wedge gate valve that is closed while the system is hot and then is allowed to cool before an attempt is made to open the valve.
Pressure locking or thermal binding occurs as a result of the valve design characteristics (wedge and valve body configuration, flexibility, and material thermal coefficients) when the valve is subjected to specific pressures and temperatures during various modes of plant operation. Operating experience indicates that these situations were not always considered in many plants as part of the design basis for valves.
2.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix A, General Design Criteria 1 and 4) and plant licensing safety analyses require or commit (or both) that licensees design and test safety-related components and systems to provide adequate assurance that those systems can perform their safety functions. Other individual criteria in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to specific systems.
In accordance with those regulations and licu.1 sing commitments, and un, der the additional provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix B, Criterion XVI), licensees are expected to act to ensure that safety-related power-operated gate valves susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their required safety functions.
On August 17,1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees 9908270019 990824 PDR ADOCK 05000282 p PDR
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take certain actions to ensure that safety-related power-operated gate valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of pedorming their safety functions within the current licensing bases of the facility. GL 95-07 requested that each licensee, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter (1) evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves in its plant to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding; and (2) perform further analyses and take needed corrective actions (or justify longer schedules) to ensure that the susceptible valves, identified in (1) above, are capable of performing their intended safety functions under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration. In addition, GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter, provide to the NRC a summary description of (1) the susceptibility evaluation used to determine that valves are or are not susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding; (2) the results of the susceptibility evaluation, including a listing of the susceptible valves identified; and (3) the corrective actions, or other dispositioning, for the valves identified as susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The NRC issued GL 9L-07 as a " compliance backfit" pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i) because modification may be necessary to bring facilities into
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compliance with the rules of the Commission referenced above.
In a letter of February 12,1996, Northern States Power Company (NSP, or licensee) submitted its 180-day response to GL 95-07 for Prairie Island Nucicar Generating Plant. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submittal and requested additional information in a letter dated July 8, 1996. In a letter of August 6,1996, the licensee provided the additionalinformation. In a letter of July 1,1999, the licensee supplemented its 180-day response to GL 95-07.
3.0 STAFF EVALUATION 3.1 Scope of Licensee's Review GL 95-07 requested that licensees evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related )
power-operated gate va!ves in their plants to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure !
locking or thermal binding. The Northern States Power Company letters of February 12 and August 6,1996, and July 1,1999, described the scope of valves evaluated in response to GL 95-07. The NRC staff has reviewed the scope of the licensee's susceptibility evaluation ;
pedormed in response to GL 95-07 and found it complete and acceptable.
The licensing basis for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant is Hot Shutdown; therefore, i valves that are operated during conditions below Hot Shutdown are not in the scope of GL 95-07. Normally open, safety-related power-operated gate valves which are closed for test or surveillance but must retum to the open position were evaluated within the scope of GL 95-07 except in the instances when the system / train is declared inoperable in accordance with technical specifications. The staff finds the criteria for determining the scope of power-operated valves for GL 95-07 are consistent with the staff's acceptance of the scope of motor-operated l
valves associated with GL 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and l Surveillance."
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3 3.2 Corrective Actions GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days, perform further analyses as appropriate, and take appropriate corrective actions (or justify longer schedules), to ensure that the susceptible valves identified are capable of pc.fsrming the.#ir intended safety function under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration. The licensee's submittals discussed proposed corrective actions to address potential pressure-locking and thermal-binding
- problems. The staffs evaluation of the licensee's actions is discussed in the following 1
- paragraphs:-
- a. The licensee stated that it used a thrust-prediction methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) to demonstrate that the pre.surizer power operated relief valve block valves, (1)MV-32195, (1)MV-32196, (2)MV-32197, and (2)MV-32198, are capable of opening during pressure-locking conditions.
The licensee stated that the containment sump to residual heat removal (RHR) pump i suction valves (sump side), (1)MV-32075, (1)MV-32076, (2)MV-32178(and
" l (2)MV-3217g, were susceptible to pressure locking. Procedures were revised to cycle the valves prior to leaving cold shutdown to ensure that the water is drained from the bonnet of each valve. The licensee stated that the Comed pressure-locking thrust
. prediction methodology was used to demonstrate that the valves are capable of opening during pressure-locking conditions. The licensee's evaluation concluded that there is a mixture of. air and water in the bonnet of each valve when pressure-locking conditions exist and that the presence of air minimizes the increase of pressure in the bonnets. The NRC staff finds that the licensee's evaluation of the effects of entrapped air in the bonnet
. of each valve'is consistent with the findings contained in NUREG/CR-6611, *Results of
= Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Tests of Gate Valves," and is therefore acceptable.
On April 9,1997, the NRC staff held a public meeting to discuss the technical adequacy of the Comed pressure-locking thrust prediction methodology and its generic use by licensees in their submittals responding to GL 95-07. The minutes of the public meeting were issued on April 25,1997. At the public meeting, Comed recommended that, when ;
using its methodology, minimum margins should be applied between calculated pressure-locking thrust and actuator capability. These margins along with diagnostic equipment accuracy and methodology limitations are defined in a letter from Comed to the NRC dated May 29,1998 (Accession Number 9806040184). The NRC considers !
the use of the Comed pressure locking methodology acceptable provided these margins, !
- diagnostic equipment accuracy requirements 'and methodology limitations are incorporated into the pressure-locking calculations. Comed indicated that its methodology may be revised. The staff considers that calculations that are used to
' demonstrate that valves can overcome pressure locking are required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,' Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, and therefore, controls are required to be in place to ensure that any ;
industry pressure-locking thrust prediction methodology requirements and revisions are i properly implemanted. - Under this condition, the staff finds that the Comed methodology i
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provides a technically sound basis for assuring that /alves susceptible to pressure locking are capable of performing their intended safety-related function.
- b. The licensee stated that the RHR system to vessel injection valves, (1)MV-32064, (1)MV-32065, (2)MV-32167, and (2)MV-32168, were susceptible to pressure locking and that, as corrective action, procedures were revised to require that these valves be maintained in the open position. The staff finds that changing the normal position of valves susceptible to pressure locking from normally shut to normally open is an appropriate corrective action to ensure operability of the valves and is thus acceptable.
- c. The licensee stated that a bonnet vent with manual valve was installed on the RHR system to safety injection pumr suction valves, (1)MV-32206, (1)MV-32207, (2)MV-32208, and (2)MV-3?200, and the containment sump to RHR pump suction valves (pump side), (1)MV-32077, (1)MV-32078, (2)MV-32167, and (2)MV-32168.
Procedures were revised to cycle the bonnet vent valve prior to opening (1)MV-32206, (1)MV-32207, (2)MV-32208, or (2)MV-32209 during pressure-locking conditions. The staff finds that the licensee's modification that installed a bonnet ventin' conjunction with a procedural change to cycle the bonnet vent valve following conditi.ons that result in pressure locking provides assurance that pressure-locking conditions are eliminated, and is an acceptable corrective action.
- d. The licensee stated that the containment spray pump discharge isolation valves, (1)MV-32103, (1)MV-32105, (2)MV-32114, and (2)MV-32116, were susceptible to pressure locking. As corrective action, procedures were revised to cycle the valves following evolutions that could potentially create a pressure-locking condition. The licensee stated that in the future it may implement a plant design change to ensure these valves are not susceptible to pressure locking.
The NRC staff finds that the licensee's corrective action provides assurance that pressure locking conditions are adequately identified and eliminated, and is thus j acceptable. 1
- e. Ne licensee stated that all flexible and solid wedge gate valves in the scope of GL 95-07 were evaluated for thermal binding. When evaluating whether valves were susceptible to thermal binding, the licensee assumed that thermal binding would not occur below i specific temperature thresholds. The screaning criteria used by the licensee appear to provide a reasonable approach to identify those valves that might be susceptible to thermal binding. Until more definitive industry criteria are developed, the staff concludes :
that the licensee's actions to address thermal binding of gate valves are acceptable. l
4.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of this evaluation, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has performed appropriate evaluations of the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves to identify valves at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. In addition, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has taken l
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-5 appropriate corrective actions to ensure that these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee has adequately addressed the requested actions discussed in GL 95-07.
Principal Contributor: S. Tingen, NRR Date: August 24. 1999.
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