ML20102A375

Reply to Board Notification 85-009 Exemption from GDC 17 Re Low Power Operation.Initial Decision Wrong in Finding Original Configuration of Alternate Ac Power Sys Complies W/Single Failure Criterion

ML20102A375
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	02/07/1985
From:	Lanpher L KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
To:	Asselstine J, Bernthal F, Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#185-452 OL-4, NUDOCS 8502080332
Download: ML20102A375 (6)

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KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART

, 1900 M SHEET N.W.

WASHINoToN, D.C. 20036 ONE 80STON PLACE TEtsrHdsiaob +5SEco 1428 BRICIELL AVENUE TELICOPEA m 4WO52 ugAut, pt 33 33 g

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(BY HAND)

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Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman ,

Commissioner James K. Asselstine gygt Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal p t@

Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts

' Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555 7

Ret Reply to " Board Notification 85-009 Exemption from General Design Criterion 17 Regarding Low Power Operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station"

Dear Members of the Commission:

a Suffolk County is in receipt of Board Notification.85-009.

That Notification discloses that the Shoreham alternate AC power

. configuration does not meet the single failure criterion. This constitutes an important revelation, particularly because com-pliance with the single failure criterion was a critical issue in the GDC 17 exemption litigation. Indeed, in reliance on Staff testimony, the Miller Board in its October 29 Initial Decision found that LILCO complied with the single failure criterion and therefore with the "as safe as" standard. The. facts disclosed in the Notification make clear that the Initial Decision is wrong.

O This new development must be addressed by the parties in the context of the appropriate adjudicatory procedures of the NRC rules, not;by the informal procedure of a routine Board Notifi-cation. Suffolk County strongly objects to the Staff's apparent-

' attempt to bypass those procedures and to minimize the importance of the new development. We have been authorized by the Special M*88M"48'7 CORRESPONDENCE PDR c

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[ KRKPQ11tlCK &, LOCKHART e

y !U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission iFebruary 7, 1985

.Page-2 Counselito Governor'Cuomo to state that the State of New York agrees.with the content of this letter.1/

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LThe' County and-State emphasize that the new revelations are

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notlsome, minor matter appropriate.for casual, behind the scenes,

, accommodation between'the: Staff and LILCO. Rather, these revela-

-tions; demonstrate.that the alternate AC power. system approved in

the' October 29

Initial Decision is a deficient system, one that jdoes not-even meet the single' failure criterion.

The single 1 failure criterion.is one of the " minimum requirements" for design iof nuclear power plant systems. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A',

1, . Introduction. If the alternate AC power system does not even 4

<  ? satisfy such a " minimum requirement," there is no possible basis to make ther"as safe as" finding ~ required by the NRC's May 16,

'1984 Order.

Further, the Commission must be aware of the importance of this revelation in the context of its review of the Miller

Board's' Initial-Decision. - In_the= exemption litigation, LILCO

proposed ~a.particular alternate _AC-power configuration forJuse

'during' low power operation. That configuration was reviewed by

the_ Staff, litigated during the August. hearing, and approved by

the-Board'inTthe October 29-Decision.- It is that configuration ith'at"the Commission is:now reviewing and that. configuration is

. clearly inadequate. . Absent a full ~ evidentiary hearing, the NRC'

-has no1 authority to consider a"new configuration such as the

" proposed solution" (thel racking down-of Breaker 460) which is discussed in-;the Notification. .That " solution": represents a

.'significantly'different,Lless safe'AC power configuration, which was not' proposed or~ litigated before'the' Licensing Board and.is

.thus not'before'the Commission.

.Therefore, the'CommissionLis. confronted with the; undisputed

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- , Jfact1that.the Initial Decision'is wrong-in finding that ? the Loriginal configuration.of the alternate.AC power system complies-with the-single' failure criterion. The Initial Decision is thus

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(also' clearly, wrong in-its finding that'the "as safe'as" standard

'y i s . '~ satis fied . The.NRC'must accept these facts and refuse to authorize any Phase.III/IVilicense to-LILCO.

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if e This: letter'injbeing. filed with the Commission to-be

responsive to-the fact that.the NRC Staff brought ~this. matter-directly!to the Commission's-attention via the Notification.

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J e: 10 i- KRKPATIUCK &. LOCKHART '

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<U.S..NuclearLRegulatory Commission 4 l F e b r u a r y ...-7 , 1 9 8 5 .

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DISCUSSION ,

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'Underithe NRC's May 16 Order,'the Miller BoardIwas required Lto assess whether~ operation with the alternate AC powere system

~would be:"as' safe as ... . operation would have been with a fully qualified onsite A/C. power source." 19 NRC at.1156. In the litigation which followed-the:May.16 Order, a critical. issue on which1the' parties introduced evidence was whether the^ alternate EAC'powerJsystem met the single failure criterion. This was Limportant,'.in particular,.because if the alternate AC power

' system were subject-to.being defeated by_a single failure, LILCO clearly:could not meet the "as safe as" criterion.

The' Staff was? insistent in. urging that LILCO'.s alternate configuration complied with the single failure criterion. E . g . ',

SSER.6, fat pp. 8-5--thru 8-9 and Staff-prefiled testimony of- R

' Messrs.' Knox-and'.Tomlinson at pp. 6 and 14. 'Indeed, the Staff testified:.

The desiynLhas~ sufficient redundancy,

+g independencecand testability so.that it i '

ican perform its safety fitnction,Jgiven a

' sin'gle failure. lie have concluded thatLa

, fully qualified'onsite AC powero system would not provide a' degree ofLsafety.

greater than that.which would be provided by a1[ sic] proposed alternate:AC power

' system.;

ETr. 1859-60;(Knox). Suffol'k County. submitted 1 testimony arguing that_the alternate AC power' system wasJsubject to single' failures'

-and thus was less' safe than a-fully 1qualifiedesystem. E.g.,

LEley,;et al'., Tr., 2452, 2459-60. ,

In~its October.29 Initial Decision, the' Miller Boahd2 accepted 1the Staff position that'the alternate'AC. power system metithe.singleLfailure criterion. The. Board stated'incits c .section entitled " Single' Failure' Criterion" 1 f i t

w .

N Suffolk County's' testimony was dayoted almost exclusively;to showing that each..

unit 11n'the enhanced system (the gas x, turbine =and'the EMDs).was either11nferior e6

,to the qualified' system or,Jin"the case of the EMDs,Ethat;the potential existed .

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0 KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART '

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U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 7, 1985

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NI .i of d for a single failure which would disable

~] . all four of them.- The Board finds this y~ line of evidence to be irrelevant. The two units (the-gas turbine and the EMDs)

? were planned as a system, and it is the

( system that the Staff has reviewed and has determined that theLalternate power source was adequate. The only potential common fault is that the output of both units-gains entry to the nonemergency switchgear room through a concrete block wall, but even here they are separated by approximately forty feet. .The EMDs also will have an independent line which allows their output.to be delivered to

.the emergency :switchgear room. The Board xtherefore finds that the EMDs and the gas turbine are' adequately independent of each other.

Decision?at 50-51 (emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted).

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h> r[ 1 Based.upon the revelations (in Board Notification 85-009, it it clear that the-foregoing-Board finding-was wrong. A single

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failureLin. Breaker 460 could prevent. power from' reaching the emergencycbusses-from both'the 20 MW gas turbine and the 4 EMD diesels.: .Thus,.the configuration which was-proposed by LILCO and~

. litigated in:the.. exemption hearing did'not comply with:the-single

failure criterion:and thus was not as safe'as a fully. qualified AC power system. .lThe_only possISTe conclu'sion, therefore, is thatithe Initial-. Decision must be~ vacated and the issue remanded to determine what action (s)'to take as a result of these

~ developments.

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-The.NRC Staff,'apparently at LILCO's urging (see LILCO's

letter:of' January 29,'1985'to the Staff), has attempted by the.

Board Notification.to circumventLfair procedures and to permit

_licen' sing ac*. ion despite the clear error in the Initial Decision.-

P y ItLis; pertinent to review'the-Staff and LILCO actions: ,

~ 1. The Staff discovered.(on some unrevealed date) that its '

cprior testimony, upon which the Board relied, was wrong.

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i i KRKPATRICK Go LOCKHART U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

~ February 7, 1985 ,4 Page 5 /

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2. . The Staff, w'ithout any disclosure to Suffolk County, the_ State o'f New York, the Miller Board', the Appeal

' Board, or'the Commission, informed LILCO of its error.

'3.~ L1LCO' reviewed the situation and had to agree that. the

= single. failure criterion is not met.2f

4. Still without any disclosure of the problem to any party,cBoard, or the Commission, LILCO and the Staff w orked out-~a proposed " solution" to the problem, i.e.,

the proposal to rack down Breaker 460.

51 -On January 29, LILCO proposed its solution; thip was

.followed immediately by ths Staff's acceptance thereof in the Boarc} Notification.3/ <

This; proceeding ~w'a~s convened pursuant to the May 16 Order

' and was to-be conducted ="in accordance-with the Commission's s jrules." 19,NRC-.at 1156. It hardly needs to-be pointed out that t  ; when'materialifacts? relied upon by a Board turn'out to be faise,

'theE" solution" canr.ot beione of informal' accommodation between

, ':two. allied: parties <- 'the. Staff'and LILCO. . Rather, all partiesL 1

must be. properly informed and - the matter ::eturned to the Licens -

gLing Board for proper resolution. Until.then, there.is no

,possible: basis-fordthe Commission to consider;' authorizing a Phase III/IV license.4f

, , .2/:.!Injits1 January;29 letter, LILCO-urges that a. fault in -

Ireaker 460~isinot a"" credible", event.: Suffolk. County disagrees tand; notes -that. LILCO presents no;-analysis' to ' support that ,

assertion. ,

M l3/- LILCOi s January --29 letter, onnthis $ natter :was' received by '"o L  : We11mmediately! consulted with? ' '

e% ',, counsel.on_-Monday, February 34.. experts /who discoveredgin'; conversations wit WJ -Board Notification had been. issued on-Friday',5 February;1._ We: 4 Lobtained.theiNotificati,on;from the'Staffoyesterday, February 3 ,r A PC s Landionly because-we,specifically; asked that~itibe telecopied;to:

d us.i _We.st ~ ill-have not;rece ived;a1. servi ce copy of Lthr

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/4/l.lFurther,Athe. Staff /LILCO proposed " solution" highlights thste

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P . lthelalternate.1AC power, system is not as; safe as a fully qualified-

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_. ?sys. tem.f.:In'ordergtoLattemptito rectify:the single failure w

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KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART

+U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' February 7,-1985' Page 6 Sincerely yours, KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART

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f By*

Lawrence Coe Lanpher Attorneys for Suffolk County V .LCL/dk

,, .cc: Judge Marshall E. Miller

~ Judge Glenn O. Bright Judge Elizabeth'.B. Johnson Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.

Howard Wilber Gary J. Edles, Esq. <

Remainder of Shoreham Service List L

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. (fo'otnote continued from previous page)-

problem,.LILCO has reduced the capability of.the alternate AC power system to supply power.to=the'4 KV busses.- As originally

-proposed, the. alternate system was.not in' compliance withtthe single failure criterion but allegedly, absent a-Breaker 460 failure, the -l210_MW gas turbine could supply power to any of the 4 KV busses,~i.e.,-to busses. 101, 102, 103, 11.and 12. .Under the "new solution,"-the; alternate system now allegedly satisfies the single failure criterion but the 20 MW-gas turbine'can now supply.

. power to bus'll only if the operator uses alternate paths from

,those normally used. This reduces'the operator's options in how to-power the essential busses. This new " solution"'thus further ,

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reduces the capability of supplying power to the safety loads,

, making it all the more clearcthat operation'with the alternate' configuration is<not as safe as operation with fully qualified

diesels.-

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