ML20093F460
| ML20093F460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1984 |
| From: | Elgasseir M, George Minor, Weatherwax R SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20093F417 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-4, NUDOCS 8407190242 | |
| Download: ML20093F460 (75) | |
Text
r TED CORRESPONDEngg UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CDC RTy
_Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing kh[rd
'84 JL 18 P1 :33
)
In the Matter of ) lhg$]j'g 6
) BRANCH LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-4
) (Low Power)
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
)
TFSTIMONY OF ROBERT WEATHERWAX, L MOHAMED EL-GASSEIR AND GREGOPY MINOR ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY 0 Please state your names and professional affiliations.
A. My name is Robert M. Weatherwax, Jr. I am the president of Sierra Energy and Risk Asse,sment, Inc. , of Sacramento, California. I have had 15 years experience in matters relating to nuclear safety analysis of commercial _ power generation, including work related to developing elements of fault tree, sequence tree, and event tree analyses. A f ,
statement of my qualifications and educational background is set forth in Attachment A.
My.name is Mohamed M.-El-Gasselr. I am a senior
. staff scientist - with Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc. I hold a n.S. degree in chemical engineering from the University of California, Berkeley and a M.S. degree
in the same field from the University of Rochester. I am a doctoral candidate of Berkeley in the field of energy and resources. My recent work at Sierra has focused on probabilistic assessments. A statement of my qualifica-tions is set forth in Attachment B.
My name is Gregory Minor. I am founder and vice president of MHB Technical Associates. I have 24 years of experience in the nuclear industry, including 16 years with the General Electric Nuclear Energy Division and 8 years as a consultant with MHB. A copy of my qualifica-tions has been submitted with other testimony.
My educational background is in electrical engineer-ing in which I received a B.S. degree at the University of California , Berkeley and a M.S. degree from Stanford.
My work with General Electric included the design, testing, qualification and pre-operational testing of safety eauipment and control rooms for use in nuclear power plants.
As a consultant for MHB Technical Associates I have participated in numerous technical reviews and analyses of nuclear plant safety for government, public interest, and mw- _._ d
s private organizations. My work has included project coordination for a PRA study on the Barseback Muclear Plant in Sweden, and involvement in the performance or analysis of several probabilistic consecuence models re-lated to emergency planning for nuclear plants in the United States. In addition, I have participated through review, analyses, and testifying in many licensing hear-ings for nuclear power plants in the United states and abroad.
O. What is the purpose of this testimony?
A. The purpose of this testimony is to address the question whether operation of the Shoreham plant at up to 5 percent power, under the AC power system proposed by LILCO in its Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating License (the
" alternate" system), would be as safe as operation at up to 5 percent power with three fully qualified on-site
- energency diesel generators, as described in t.he shoreham PSAR (a " normal" system). In our opinion, operation with LILCO's alternate proposed system would not be as safe as operation with a normal system.
Q. Generally, on what do you base your opinion?
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A.- 'We-have assembled and reviewed documentation that enabled us to compare the proposed LILCO alternate AC power system and its components, with the qualified on-site AC power system described in.the Shoreham FSAF and its components, in particular, those systems which affect their capability to deliver, and. sustain the delivery of, AC power to essential-emergency loads. A description of the two systems is. contained in Attachment C hereto. We then performed a quantitative comparison of the probability of Shoreham reaching a state of core vulnerability (as defined by LILCO's contractor Science Applications, Inc.
in Probabilistic Fisk Assessments for the Shoreham plant) due to loss of offsite power, during operation at five percent power, assuming operation with the alternate system and assuming operation with the originally proposed qualified on-site power system.
O. 'dow does the quantitative comparison you just described relate to the relative safety of the two systems?
A. The comparison of calculated f requencies of the Shoreham plant reaching a state of core vulnerability due to a loss of offsite power, given each of the two AC power systems, provides a cuantitative measure of the two systems'
relative safety in terms of the overall operation of the plant at up to five percent power. The fact that the cal-culated probability of core vulnerability given operation with the alternate system is substantially greater than the corresponding probability given the normal system dem-
'onstrates that operation with the alternate system is quantifiably less safe than operation with the normal system.
O. Please describe briefly the two AC power systems you com-pared.
A.. Die proposed alternate system's major components include four General Motors EMD, mobile outdoor-type diesel repowered generators ("EMDs"), and a 20-MW refurbished Pratt and Whitney gas turbine. The EMDs as well as the cas turbine were used (prior to their relocation to Shoreham) as peaking units for several years. Technical details of this generation equipment and of the supporting electric devices can be found in Table Cl of Attachment C.
The proposed configuration is depicted by the line diagram in Figure C2 of Attachment C. The geographical layout of the major equipment is shown in Figure C1. The procedures for restoring power via the cas turbine and the EMDs are described in Section 2.1.1.2. of Attachment C.
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The normal system consists of a set of three
' self-contained and operationally independent diesel gener-ators manufactured by Transamerica DeLaval Inc. ("TDIs").
Technical details of the TDIs can be found in Section 2.1.2.1 of-Attachment C and in Testimony of G. Dennis Eley et al. on behalf of Su f folk County regarding EMD diesel generators and the 20 MW gas turbine. Specifications for other components related to operation of the TDIs are also listed in Table C1. The configuration of the normal system is shown in Figure C4 of Attachment C. The operation of'the TDIs is automatic.
O. D1 ease describe the process you used in analyzing the probability of Shoreham reaching a state of core vulnera-
! bility during operation at five percent power under each system.
-A. 'Recently,, at LILCO's request, Science Applications, In-corporated ("SAI") and Delian Corporation performed a Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Shoreham operation at 5 percent powe r . "Probabilistic Pisk. Assessment, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Low Power Operation un to 5% of Full Power," by Delian. Corporation and Science Applica-tions, Incorporated, Draft, May 1084 (hereinafter, "SAI
(
Low Power PRA"). Our basic approach in performing our
- quantitative analysis of core vulnerability probabilities was to use the structure and methodology used by SAI in performing its assessment for LILCO. We used that method-ology to produce two estimates of the probability of reaching core vulnerability due to a loss of of fsite power transient at Shoreham for operation at 5 percent power.
One estimate assumed that the TDIs, as described in the FSAR, were fully operational; and the other assumed that the EMDs . and the gas turbine were operational in place of the TDIs. We decided to produce these two estimates for purposes of comparison, because the potential for reaching a state of core vulnerability is a key measure of whether operation of the Shoreham plant at 5 percent power with the alternate AC power configuration proposed by LILCO would be as safe as 5 percent power operation with fully qualified onsite diesel generators.
Our principal data sources in deriving these two estinates of core vulnerable probability were the SAI Low Power PRA and information from the Probabilistic Risk As-sessment dated June 24, 1983, also performed by SAI for LILCO. " Final Report, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," Science Application
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Incorporated, June 24, 1984 (hereinafter, "SAI 1983 PRA").
The-latter source was used primarily to derive reliability figures relating to the operation of the TDIs.
We.used the SAI data in performing our analysis for several reasons. First, we did not have sufficient time to derive all'the necessary data independently. Second, the approach and methodology used by SAI in its PRAs seemed generally reasonable, and in our professional judq-ment, the SAI analyses were competently performed and its results, in general .were reasonable and accurate. Third, we believe that since SAI acquired much of the data it used in its analysis from LILCO, it is reasonable to as-sume that the underlying factual data are likely accept-able to LILCO, thus reducing the chance of controversy regarding such underlying data. We used the SAI data, however, recognizing that in our opinion, not all the as-sumptions incorporated into the SAI analyses were as con-servative or as appropriate as they should have been. At-tachment E sets forth certain adjustments that we believe would make SAI's estimates of core vulnerability probabilities at Eboreham more realistic.
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Core vulnerability can be produced by a nunber of initiating events. We limited our analysis to core vul-nerability following loss of offsite power because, in the SAI analysis, that was the only source of core vulnerabil-ity affected by the differing AC power configurations now at issue.
In its Low Power PRA, SAI assumed that the EMDs and the gas turbine comprised the onsite emergency AC power system, and then investigated five types of accident se-quences, each involving a unique time within which core vulnerability was reached after a loss of offsite power.
The probabilities of core vulnerability derived by SAI are contained in Table 1.1.3 of the SAI Low Power PRA. We performed a comparable analysis, using the same methodolo-gy as SAI, but assuming that the emergency onsite AC power system was comprised solely of operational TDIs. We ob-tained the necessary data to perform the TDI event tree analysis from the SAI 1983 9PA. The result of SAI's cal-cu.ations assumina the EMDs and the gas turbine provid ed emergency power, and of our calculations assuming the TDIs provided emergency power, are set forth in Table 1.1/ The 1/
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We believe, based on our review of the SAI Low Power PRA, that 94I did not consider the possibility of repairing the (Footnote cont'd next page)
TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF CORE VULNERABILITY FREQUENCY FOR' LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TRANSIENT FOR NORMAL AND ALTERNATE,AC POWER SOURCES Frequency (per Rx Yr); Frequency Loss of Off- Time to using EMD (per RX Yr. ) :
site Power diesels and using iDI Sequence Core Type vulnerable gas turbine diesels 2 days 1.0E-7 5.1E-9 Type 1 3.2E-7 2.BE-8 Type 2 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> 8.lE-7 1.3E-7 Type 3 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 5.9E-7 7.0E-8 Type 4 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 2.lE-7 l 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1.5E-6 Type 5 TOTAL 3.3E-6 0.44E-6
!! ate : Colu~a totals may not exactly equal the sum of the figures in each column due to rounding.
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event trees which form the bases for the frequencies in Table 1 are Attachment D.
O. What were your conclusions?
A. As shown on Table 1, the calculated probability of core vulnerability due to loss of offsite power, assuming LILCO's alternate AC power configuration is in place (EMDs and gas turbine) is 3.3 E-6; assuming the normal configu-ration (TDIs) is in place, it is O.44 E-6. This means that assuming there is a loss of offsite power during operation of the Shoreham plant at 5 percent power, it is more than seven times as likely that such an event would lead to core vulnerability under the alternate system than under the normal system. It also means that the likeli-hood of the Shoreham plant reaching a core vulnerable condition due to loss of offsite power is over seven times greater under the alternate configuration than under the (Footnote cont'd from previous page)
EMOs or gas turbine if they failed. Accordingly, in deriving the frequencies in Table 1, we used values for i the TDIs that also assumed no repairs if they failed. Be-cause there is a possibility, however, that either the TDIs or the EMDs and gas turbine could be repaired follow-ing a failure, we also performed a sensitivity study and compared calculated core vulnerable frequencies assuminq such repairs. See Attachment E.
F normal. configuration. Furthermore, assuming the accuracy of SAI's estimate of 1.6 E-6 for the annual frequency of core vulnerability from all other initiating events during 5 percent operation (SAI Low Power PRA at Table 4-4-1 ),
the likelihood that the Shoreham plant would experience an event leading to core vulnerability during 5 percent operation is approximately 2-1/2 times greater under the alternate configuration than it is under the normal con-figuration.
r We . recognize that uncertainties exist in each of the core vulnerability estimates set forth in Table 1. How-ever, we believe that the . uncertainties are comparable in the two estimates and that the existence of the uncertainties does not invalidate either the comparison or our conclusions. In our opinion the comparison set forth in Table 1 demonstrates that operation of the Shoreham
' plant with the alternate AC power configuration is not as safe as operation with a fully qualified source of emer-gency power.
'O. Did you perform any additional analyses or sensitivity studies?
L
A. Yes. . We performed a sensitivity study to assess the re-
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duction in core vulnerability attributable to the possi-
. bility.of repairing-the TDI diesels and the EMDs and gas turbine following their failure.- We also analyzed the effect of certain adjustments to the SAI probabilities of L
of fsite power -restoration and the frequency of loss of offsite power events at Shoreham, which we believe make those probabilities more realistic. .These analyses are described in Attachment E.
O. Do the results of.your sensitivity studies cause you to
- p. . modify your conclusions regarding the relative probability
~
of core vulnerability due to loss of offsite power given the alternate-_as compared to the normal Shoreham emergency
_ power system?
A. No. Our sensitivity studies confirm our conclusion that the probability of' core ~ vulnerability due to loss of
.. of fsite power transient, assuming use of'the alternate system,Eis. higher than with the use of the normal configu-ration. -The, precise difference in probability, though uncertain, is'sufficiently large to conclude that low power operat' ion' with the . alternate configuration would not be as safe as with' the normal configuration.
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ATTACHMENT A Sierro Energy and Risk Assessment.inc.
ROIERT K, WEADERWAX, 3, EXPERIENCE:
Jan.1981 - Present President, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc.
Sacramento, California July 1980 - June 1981 Visiting Scientist, Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley July 1977 - December 1980 Chief Energy Forecaster, California Energy Commission, Sacamento, California Jan.1977 - June 1977 Staff Scientist, Science Applications, Inc.
Palo Alto, California May 1974 - Jan.1977 Staff Scientist, School of Engineering Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey Jan.1969 - April 1974 System Safety Supervisor, McDonnell Douglas Aeronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California As the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Sierra Energy & Risk Assessment, Inc. (SERA), Mr. Weatherwax is presently involved in the twin topics of (1) risk assessment and comparison, and associated cost benefit analysis, and (2) energy demand and supply assessment, and policy evaluation.
He has had fif teen years of experience in nuclear safety analysis of commercial power generation and isotope power systems for space application. He has worked broadly in the area of nuclear fuel cycle risk assessment, and in reliability and failure mode assessment of complex systems. He has contributed to the original development of elements of fault tree, sequence tree (i.e., FAST), and event tree analyses, and has applied these methods to light-water nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel cycles, radiciosotope thermal generators, strategic weapons systems and launch vehicles, in an American Physical Society meeting, Mr.
Weatherwax debated Dr. Norman Rassmussin on the merits of the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (to which he was the major contributor). He is an engineer by formal education with a minor in economics and has applied these disciplines in numerous systems engineering and evaluation efforts, particularly related to energy demand forecasting and policy assessment during the last several years.
As a McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) employee, Mr. Weatherwax was principal author of a PSAR for the NASA SO kWe space station power system. He later was manager for Environmental Impact and Risk Assessment on the MDAC team selected by the Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL) to perform safety analyses of LES 8/9 and Viking missions. Af ter leaving MDAC he continued as a consultant to MDAC, and subsequently became a consultant to Teledyne Energy Systems in their support of the AFWL's space nuclear safety responsibilities.
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ROBERT K. WEATHERWAX BIBLIOGRAPHY _
Selected reports and analyses authored or coauthored by Mr. Weatherwax in the field of risk assessment include:
(With E. William Colglazier) Review of Shuttle / Centaur Failure Probability Estimates for Space Nuclear Mission Apolications_, Sierra Energy and Risk Assess-ment, Inc. , Draf t Report for Teleayne Energy Systems, SERA No. 83-57, June 1983.
l (With E. W. Colglazier) "The 236092 Penalty for Recycled Uranium", under publi-cation review, Annals of Nuclear Energy.
probabilistic Investment Decision Analysis Model, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report for the MCR Geotherrnal Corporation, SERA No. 82-13, April 1982.
"Coninents on Assessment of Accidental Pathways, Subtask D Report (Draft), A. O. Little Inc. dated February 1978", for Office of Radiation Programs, EPA, July 12, 1978.
Nuclear Safety Analysis Methodology for RTG Equipped Satellite Launches, MDC G6751, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California, May 1976.
Nuclear Fusion Systems Analysis Research, AMS Report No.1250, Princeton University, October 1975.
"Probabilistic Fission Power Plant Risk Analysis: Its Virtues and Limitations",
presented as an invited paper at the American Physical Society General Meeting, April 1975, and published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1975.
Probabilistic Risk Analysis of Nuclear Systems, Princeton University Seminar, May 1975.
(With C.' Wildon, et al.) Launch Vehicle Reliability Considerations for Nuclear _
Safety Assessment, MDC G5983, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beac i
California, April 1975.
(With R. Luna, et al.) Site Defense Safety Analysis and Hazard Evaluation Report, MDC G4885, McDonnel Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California, l October 1973.
" Applications of Multi-Phase Fault Tree Analysis", presented as part of industry course entitled RISK ANALYSIS given at Flow Research, Inc. , Kent, Washington, Februa 1973.
"A Comparison of Fault Tree Quantification Techniques", presented to System Safety Society Symposium, University of Southern California, April 1972.
' (With R. L. Gervais, et al.) Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Volumes 1, 3, and
) 5 (NASA Space Station 50 KW isotope and reactor power supplies), MDC G0744, Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California, January 1971, 175S e Street, Sul.te 19A, Sacramento, California 95814, 916/447 5421
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EXPERIENCE Jan 1983 - Present Senior Staff Scientist / Engineer, Sierra Energy & Risk Assessment. Inc., Sacramento, California Oct 1980 - Oct 1981 Research Associate,, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory's Energy Analysis Program, Berkeley, California Oct 1978 - 1980 Research Assistant, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory's Energy Analysis Program, Berkeley, California July 1977 - Oct 1977 Research Assistant on Project funded by the United States Council on Environmental Quality July 1976 - Oct 1976 Consultant, National Research Council Comittee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems Dec 1974 - July 1975 Assistant Lecturer, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Tripoli, Libya Oct 1972 - July 1975 Consultant to Libyan Government on the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity Oct 1572 - Nov 1972 Comittee member investigating the feasibility of joint Egyptian-Libyan power projects June 1972 - July 1973 Teaching Assistant, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Tripoli, Libya Additional Experience: Design of hybrid cooli q cycle for power plants capable l
of conserving both energy and water (Ph.D dissertation project, current)
Constructed computer programs for the layout of heliostat fields of a solar central-receiver power plant Modeling of the inter- and intragenerational transfer of resources with the objective of evaluating the effects of the discount rates on equity I
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ummmmmme IOWED M. EL-GEEIR Resume (continued)
At Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc. (SERA), Mr. El-Gasseir is currently engaged in an analysis of probabilistic failure studies conducted for NASA's Galileo and International Solar Polar missions. He is specifically evaluating the validity of the approach and methodologies pursued in these studies and in the accuracy of the data and computations perfon11ed. Mr. El-Gasseir is the principal author of a recent SERA report critiquing probabilistic simulation techniques presently used by the utility inudstry in system planning.
Mr. El-Gasseir is a chemical / engineer power generation specialist by education.
His background and experience encompass areas as diverse as the dynamics of multi-phase flow systems, simulation of complex systems, numerical and analytic quantita-tive techniques and institutional analysis of utility related issues. Mr. El-Gasseir's current research interests in the field of probabilistic simulation and risk assessment include the development of efficient Monte Carlo techniques for power generation applications and of effective representation of interdependent time series 'and the search for a universal (non-monetary) yardstick for evaluating costs and comparing risks.
Mr. El-Gasseir has recently completed the design of a novel cooling cycle for a nuclear turbine / generator. The device combines two natural-draf t dry towers with a spray pond. The design offers operating flexibility so that both energy and water can be conserved, it is particularly suitable for water-scarce regions.
At the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) Mohamed M. El-Gasseir was in charge of investigating the water quantity and quality issues of energy development in the Southwest. He developed the algorithms for computing the cooling water requirements associated with the various fuel cycles for generating electric power in California and Nevada. He was a member of a team designated by the Department of Energy (DOE) for its Regional Issues Identification and Analysis Program. Mr. El-Gasseir represented LBL on a 00E National Laboratories committee which was responsible for planning and funding water related energy research. He also conducted a study of the prospects for industrial water conservation.
As a consultant to the National Academy of Sciences Mr. El-Gasseir was a resource group member of the National Research Council Cormiittee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems. He carried out the study of the availability of water' for synthetic fuel development in the U.S. and the impacts of this future industry on the nation's water resources. The results published in Science magazine heightened government and industry interest in the environmental problems of intensive development of sp-thetic f uels.
EDUCATION:
- 8. Sc., Chemical Engineering, University of California, Berkeley M. Sc., Chemical Engineering, University of Rochester, New York Ph. D. candidate. Energy and Resources, University of California, Berkeley, expected June 84.
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numummmme t0 HAT.D M. EL-GASSEIR BIBLIOGRAPHY El-Gasseir, M., et al., Analysis in Support of Assessment of BPA's Short Term Rates and Load Balances, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No.84-126, March 1984 El-Gasseir, M. (with J. Kaiser), Documentation and Users Guide to EUGAP the SERA Electric Utility Generation and Pricing Model, SERA No.84-110, February 1984.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Huscroft and R.K. Weatherwax), Electric Utility Demand Forecasting and Resource Planning in Nevada: A Review of State-of-the-Art Methods and Recommendations for Regulatory Oversight, SERA No.83-103, December 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Valentine Huscrof t and R.K. Weatherwax), The Legislative and Contractual Framework for Power Transactions in the Pacific Northwest, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison I Company, SERA No. 83-91, September 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Valentine Huscroft and R.K. Weatherwax), An Analysis of WPPSS Delay Decision by the Bonneville Power Administration, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-85, August 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Valentine Huscrof t and R.K. Weatherwax), A Review of the Northwest Power Plannino Council Recional Plan, Sierra Energy ano Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-82, August 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with R. K. Weatherwax), On The Bonneville Power Administration 1983 Proposed Wholesale Power Rates, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc.,
Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-67, July 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with R. K. Weathewax), Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning: :
Limitations & Opportunities, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Draf t Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-51, May 1983.
El-Gasseir, M., in Energy and the Fate of Ecosystems, the Report of the Ecosystem Impacts Resource Group of the Risk / Impact Panel of the Comittee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, National Research Council (National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1980).
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mummmmme IOWED M. EL-GSSEIR Bibliography (continued)
El-Gasseir, M., Energy Water Issues, in Energy Analysis Program FY-1979, LBL 10320, April 1980.
College of Engineering Interdisciplinary Studies, California Power Plant Siting with Emphasis on Alternatives for Cooling, 9177-1978 (University of California, Berkeley College of Engineering Report 78-2, 1978.
El-Gasseir, M., Solar vs. Non-Solar Energy: A case of Intergenerational Equity (to be published).
Harte, J. and M. El-Gasseir, Eneroy and Water, Science 199: 623-634, February 10, 1978.
Harte, J., et al., Environmental Consecuences of Energy Technolooy: Bring 1no the losses of Environmental Services into the Balance Sheets, Part 11- Services, Disruptions, Con _secuences (Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley, ERG-WP-77-2, October 1977).
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ATTACHMENT C 1
Attachment C DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATE EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM PROPOSED FOR LOW POWER OPERATION AND THE NORMAL QUALIFIED ONSITE EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM
- 1. Introduction As requested on behalf of Suffolk County, New York, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment (SERA), Inc. of Sacramento, California has conducted an analysis of whether operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) at up to a power level of 5 percent, would be as safe, under conditions proposed by LILCO in its Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating License, as a fully qualified onsite AC power source. The alternate AC power s/ stem proposed by LILCO, and the normal system as set forth in the Shoreham FSAR, are described in this Attachment.
- 2. System Descriotions Section 2.1 provides a description of the systems to be compared. The LILCO proposed alternate system is specified first, emphasizing its unique elements. The description of the normal system builds upon the information developed in the specification of the alternate system. A system is viewed as consisting of:
- the hardware necessary for the generation and trans-mission of AC power to meet safety-related loads dur-ing emergency conditions accompanied by loss of offsite power,
t-
- the particular configuration in which the hardware
. - components are -integ rated , and
- the' operating procedures which must be implemented for the purpose of securing power supplies for safety-related. loads during emergency conditions.
2.1 AC= POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The AC power systems of concern consist of a particular configuration of hardware to be used during emergency operation accompanied by loss of offsite power and the operating proce-Edures to be implemented under such conditions. ' Detailed speci-fications and data for. the LILCO-proposed system configuration can beifound in Tables Cl, C2 and C3, and Figures Cl, C2 and C3.~ The normal system configuration is depicted by the line diagram of1 Figure C4. The proposed alternate system is
- discussed first. The normal - system-'is then. described.
- 2. . l .1 The LILCO-Proposed Alternate' System InDits. Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating
~
License, LILCO proposed to. augment offsite power sources to support emergency loads by_a combination of a gas turbine and a set of four mobile diesel generator units, in place of a: fully
. qualified NRC approved onsite source of AC power as described
. in ;the FSAR. - lThus, ' the proposed configuration consists of newly introduced elements and pre-existing components.
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The geographical layout of some of the key elements in the proposed configuration is depicted in Figure Cl. Figure C2 provides a line diagram of the Shoreham plant, showing how the new components, the mobile diesels and the gas turbine, fit within :the pre-existing configuration. Technical and function
. specifications of the elements relevant to the operation of the proposed configuration are listed in Table C1. In Table C1, components.which did not exist in the SNPS FSAR line diagrams but which became associated with LILCO's alternate AC power system are classified as " proposed." This is to distinguish such components from the circuit and generation elements
' installed prior to LILCO's proposal of the alternate AC power configuration.
' Procedures for restoring AC power after the onset of a LOCA condition and loss of offsite power are presents after the discussion characterizing the alternate configuration. The procedures apply to the 20 MW gas turbine (GT or GT-002) and the 4 General Motors EMD mobile diesel generators (EMDs) procured by LILCO.. The comparison is based on the latest information made available by the utility in response to dis-covery requests.
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l The designations of the components in Figure C2 and the information compiled in Table C1 are used to characterize the hardware and circuitry of the proposed configuration. There-fore, the discussion to follow has been confined to the major elements of the alternate arrangement. Additional technical details can be found in Table C1.
2.1.1.1.1 The Mobile Diesel Generators LILCO has installed a set of four General Motors EMD die-sel generator (DG)~ units (see Tables C1 and C2 for technical details). Prior to being purchased by LILCO, the EMDs were in service for 15 years as Units 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Lynnway Die-sel Plant of New England Power (NEP). While owned by NEP, the
.4 units underwent an unusually high number of major repairs.
-(See Table C3 for specifics).
LILCO staff estimates that the output of a single unit
-(approximately,-2.5 MW) is capable of meeting the minimum emer-gency load required'during low-power operation. The apparent redundancy is counteracted by the following features of the EMDs:
-- The output of all four diesels is conveyed to the load center (Bus 11) by way of a single power con-duit.
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-- The EMD diesel system is of the master unit type.
Accordingly, all four units share:
one starting battery and battery charger (housed with the master unit),
-- a common fuel system, including one long-term fuel source, one main supply pipe, and a single fuel transfer system (housed within the master unit).
The EMDs have a deadline start capability. Units start sequentially. Each generator is allowed 3 starting attempts.
The battery can support 12 starting attempts. In the absence of AC power, the charger cannot power the battery. Thus, if the diesels fail to start after 12 attempts, another source of AC power would have to be found.
Units are synchronized automatically but connection to the safety load on Bus 11 is achieved manually. A single circuit breaker-(No. 11.1B) can disconnect all four EMDs from Bus 11 loads. Power generated by the EMDs has to be routed through two more circuit breakers before it can reach emergency bus 101, 102 or 103. The EMDs are located outside the reactor building within the fenced security area. The enclosures and the foundation they rest on are not seismically designed. The switchgear for the four EMDs is housed within a single outdoor-type control cubicle located adjacent.to the EMDs.
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2.1.1.1.2 The Gas Turbine The unit, or GT-002, is a 20 MW Pratt & Whitney gas tur-bine (GT) with deadline black start capability. GT-002 has served as LILCO's West Babylon Unit 1, providing peaking service for 15 years before relocation to Shoreham early in 1984. Even though the unit is located within the 69 KV switch-
-yard of Shoreham and is connected with the SNPS 69 KV circuit,
.it is controlled by the System Operator in Hicksville, New York, rather than by the Control Room Operator at Shoreham.
The gas turbine shares a common bus and a 13.8 KV/69 KV step-up transformer with a 55 MW gas turbine (Unit GT-001; a Shoreham peaking power facility) which does not have black start capability and cannot operate in an isolated mode. To prevent load hunting if and when off-site AC power is restored, GT-001 must be securely disconnected from the grid. LILCO plans call for the 20 MW gas turbine to be a source of AC power to serve safety-related loads in the event that off-site power and_other on-site power become unavailable. However, LILCO officials have indicated that GT-002 could be used as a peaking unit. .(See Testimony of William G. Schiffmacher, filed April 2 0 ,- 1984). In addition to providing safety power and peaking
-service the black-start 20 MW gas turbine could be the primary source of start-up power for the Shoreham nuclear facility.
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2.1.1.2 Proposed Operating Procedures Final procedures for operating the alternate AC power system proposed by LILCO for the Shoreham facility have not been issued as of the end of the writing of this report. The interim procedures described herein are for restoring AC power with the proposed alternate configuration, first, using the 20 MW gas turbine (GT-002) and then using the EMDs, assuming fail-ure of Unit GT-002. In both cases, the following conditions apply:
- 1. Reactor operations at 5% power level, i
- 2. Loss of off-site power (leading to loss of both Normal and Reserve Station power),
- 3. System operator informs plant personnel that the loss of off-site power will be for an extended time period, and
2.1.1.2.1 Restoration of AC power with the 20-MW Gas Turbinel /
The gas turbine can be started qr one of the following methods:
- 1. Local switchroom - Automatic or Manual.
1/ Extracted from Attachment 8 of the Testimony of W. G.
Schiffmacher, Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 (Low Power) and from
" Additional Responses to Staff Questions", (ibid),
SNRC-1036, April 11, 1984.
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- 2. EFB main Control Room - Automatic or Manual.
- 3. EFB dead-line start - mant?al only - local or remote.
- 4. Hicksville supervisory - Automatic only.
- Manual operation requires initiation and manual closing of
- Field Breaker,: Voltage and speed adjustment, manual synchroni-zation.by closure of the main breaker, and manual loading by the'operato'r. Automatic operation' requires only initiation by the operator,' local or remote. Sequential control causes the unit to be brought up to speed, phased in and loaded to a pre-determined value.
.(i) Pre-Start Checks
- 1. Local. Operation:
- a. Check all personnel clear of enclosures and all doors shut.
b.- Check all switches in proper position as
- follows:
L 1. 43-1 (Engine lockout - local - . remote)
- 2. 43-2 (Engine idle - manual - automat-ic)
L3. 43-2A (Base - minimum) 4;.43-3 (Parallel - isolated)-
- 5. GSS (Peak - Emerg. Peak)
- 6. 43-GL.(Gas - Liquid) s
'7.-FRS-(Normal - Loss of Aux. Power) p.
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- 8. lL51 (Start - Stop)
Operation of Switch lL51 will initiate the starting sequence. The following will occur.
- 2. Electric generator lube oil pump will start.
- 3. At 6 PSIG lube oil pressure (electric generator) air starter valve will open to accelerate N2 rotor. Failure to attain 1500 N2 within 30 seconds will initiate " incomplete sequence".
- 4. At approximately 1500 N2 ignition will be actuated and combustion should start.
- 5. At 3400 N2 starter valve will close.
N2 will accelerate .to high idle.
- 6. At above 5400 Nw, N3 should be above 900 RPM at which time Field Breaker switch may be closed.
- 7. N2 will accelerate to high idel of ap-proximately 6200 RPM.
- 8. Operate Speed Control (Manual Governor) to incresse N2 speed, until N3 attains approximately 3600 RPM.
- 9. Activate Synchroscope and adjust volt-age as necessary.
- 10. Close main ACB to " phase in" when scope is proper. Increase load imme-diately.
- 2. Automatic Operation - Local Set switch 43-2 in automatic. Other switches will be set as above. Operate start switch to
" Start" position. Unit will start as above.
However at 900 N3, Field Breaker will close au-tomatically. Following " crossover" (from N2 to C-9 I
N3 control, observed as a slight hesitation in N2 and N3 speeds) automatic sequencing will energize speed matching and synchronizing relays to permit automatic synchronization and automat-ic loading to predetermined setting.
- 3. Remote Operation - Automatic Set switch 43-1 (Engine lockout - local -
remote) to remote position. Set switch 43 z (Engine idle - manual - automatic) to automatic position.
All sequencing will be performed automatically, including breaker closure and loading to prede-termined setting. Remote base or peak '
operations will cause unit to increase load as required.
(ii) Automatic pick-up of Shoreham of RSS Bank 4 by GT-002: As the 69-KV PT8 de-energizes, a 30-second timer is initiated, picking up auxil-iary MG-6 relays 62X and 62X1, and resulting in:
- 1. Tripping of oil Circuit Breaker (OCB) 640, Air Circuit Breakers (ACB) 8Z-110 and 3Z-120, and opening of motor operated dis-connect switches MABS (Mechanical Air Break Switch) 616 and MABS 617.
- 2. The GT-002 " Mode Selector" Switch 43-3 will change to " Isolate" mode and prevent closing of ACB 8Z-110.
- 3. The GT-002 receives a start signal.
- 4. The GT-002 shifts to isolated precise mode and starts through its DC fuel pump.
- 5. When GT-002 reaches 3550 RPM ACB 8Z-120 (its main breaker) will close to allow picking up of RSS Bank 4 load. When the unit reaches 3600 RPM, it begins powering the RSST through ABS 623.
I automatically as the pressure builds up on the discharge. side of the AC fuel pumps.
(iii) Normal positions of the GT-002 controls:
- 1. Voltage Regulator Transfer Switch Auto
- 2. Engine Mode Selector 43-2 Auto
- 3. Engine Mode Selector 43-2A Base / Peak
- 4. Mode Selector 43-3 Parallel
- 5. Governor Selectcr Base 6.. Synch Scope Switch off
- 7. 86 CX Breaker Failure lockout Reset
- 8. Field Ground Relay Test Switch Normal
- 9. Lockout Relay 86 G 1 Reset
- 10. Lockout Relay 86 G 2 Reset
- 11. Control Switches A/W:
- a. Gen Oil Cooler Fan Auto
- b. Gen Oil Exhaust Fan Auto
- d. FT Lube Oil Cooler Fan Auto
- e. AC Fuel Delivery-Pump Auto
- f. DC Lube Pump Auto
- g. Inverter Auto
- h. DC Fuel Forward Pump Auto
- 12. ACB 9 a/w Air - PAC Closed 2.1.1.2.2 Restoration of. AC Power With the Four 2.5 MW Mobile Diesel Unitsi/
2/ Extracted from " Restoration of AC Power With On-Site Mo-bile Generators, Interim Emergency Procedure", SP No.
TP29.015.03.
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In addition to the five conditions listed earlier, it is assumed that the 20-MW gas turbine has failed to auto-start and power the RSST.
(i) Automatic actions upon loss of all AC power:
- 1. EMDs' supply breaker No. 1R22-ACB-ll-1.B to Bus 11 trips.
- 2. EMDs undergo automatic start.
- 3. EMDs' local Generator Breakers ACB-1, 2, 3 and 4 close.
(ii) Immediate actions:
- 1. The 4-KV Normal Bus supply breakers No.
1R23ACB-1A-3, 11-11, lb-2 and 12-1 are placed to pull-to-lock (PTL).
- 2. Verify the 3 NSST supply breakers 1R22ACB-101-1, 102-1 and 103-1 are open and that Bus Program 27/86 devices are tripped
- 3. Verify that main generator breakers OCB 1310 and 1330 are open.
- 4. Check with System Operator to determine status of off-site power restoration.
(iii) Subsequent actions:
(Note, the RSST may be restored at any time.)
- 1. Change the 4-KV Emergency Bus supply breakers No. 1R22*ACB-101-1, 101-2, 101-8, 102-2, 102-8, 103-1 and 103-8 to PTL. (Caution, no auto sequencing of 4-KV loads f rom the bus sequencing program will occur. Note, Control Room personnel can monitor power res-toration to the NSST or RSST by system operations by closing Breakers lA-3 or 1B-2 (NSST) or Breakars lA-4 or 1B-1 (RSST) and monitoring bus indicating lights on MCB-0. )
1 l
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2.. An operator is dispatched to perform the following:
': a. Removal of undervoltage bus pro-gram (UBP) fuses FU-71A located in Reactor Building Service Water Pump B,. Cubicle 3 1R22ACB- 102.
- b. Removal of UPB fuses FU-101A lo-cated in Reactor Building Service Water Pump C, Cubicle #3 1R22ACB-103.
- c. Removal of UBP fuses (FU-42) lo-cated in Reactor Building Service Water Pump A, Cubicle #3 1R22ACB-101.
- d. Verifying that EMDs' feeder breaker 1R22-ACB-ll-1B is open (located in 1R23-SWG-ll).
e.- Opening the GT-002 feeder breaker 1R23-ACB- ll-1A with the Local Control Switch (located in normal switchgear-1R22-SWG-ll).
- f. Opening Screen Wash pumps feeder breaker 1R22-ACB-ll-2 with the local Control Switch (in normal switchgear 1R22-SWG-ll).-
9 Opening the 480-V Substation feeder breaker 1R23-ACB-ll-10
- with the local Control Switch (in normal switchgear 1R22-SWG-ll).
- h. Checking the number of closed EMD breakers by returning to the normal switchgear room and observing (indicated by red-light cubicle) (lR22-ACB-11-1B).
- i. Notifying Control Room of the status of the DGs from normal switchgear room.
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- j. Notifying Control Room of the re-moval of the UBP fuses from the emergency switchgear cubicles.
- 4. Inform System Operator of intention to line up the DGs to meet emergency loads.
- 5. Request from System Operator to open OCB 1350 and 1360.
- 6. If Actions 4 and 5 not accomplished proceed to Step 8.
- 7. If there is a fault-in the NSST, as experi-enced by annunciators 0218 "NSS X XFMR PRI PROT TRIP" or 0219 "NSS XFRM BACKUP PROT TRIP" on panels 209H, A-1 and A-2, proceed to Step 8.
- 9. Directed by the Control Room, the operator in the Normal Switchgear Room puts the control switch in the closed position at 11-1B until the breakers closes (as indi-cated by illumination of white light on Main Control Board of Bus 11).
- 10 . Close the NSST Supply Breaker 11-11.
(After re-energizing the Emergency Buses refer to SP 29.015.01 " Loss of Offsite Power" for more instructions on equipment restoration.)
- 11. Reset bus program lockout Emergency Bus 101.
- 12. Close Emergency Bus /NSST Supply Breaker 101-1.
- 13. Verify that the 4-KV Emergency Bus 101 is energized.
- 14. Verify enat the 480-V Emergency Bus 111 is energized.
- 15. . Reset bus program lockout Emergency Bus l -- 103.
- 16. Close Emergency Bus /NSST Supply Breaker 103-1.
- 17. Verify that the 4-KV Emergency Bus 103 is energized.
- 18. Verify that the 480-V. Emergency Bus 113 is
' ene rg ized .
11 9 . Reset bus program lockout Emergency Bus 102.
- 20. .Close Emergency Bus /NSST Supply Breaker 102-1.
- 21. Verify that the 4-KV Emergency Bus 102 is energized.
- 22. Verify-that the 480-V Emergency Bus 112 is energized.
-(Ensure that maximum current rating does not exceed 434 amps per DG unit and 1200 amps at Breaker 11-1B.)
24.. Power the ECCS pumps to recover to required level, using only the emergency buses.
2.1.2 The Normal System Figure C4 contains a line diagram of the Shoreham station, showing the onsite (auxiliary) AC power system configuration.
With the exception of the three diesel generators marked G-101, C-15
[
1 l
l 102, and 103, all components which bear upon the comparative assessment of the safety the two AC power systems are described in Table C1. The following discussion will, therefore, focus on the three emergency diesel generators, which are the most important element in the auxiliary power system for providing AC power to safety functions.
Before we proceed further, two observations must be made.
First, the description to be given and (for that matter) Figure 4 have been extracted from the SNPS FSAR, dated 1979. Second, in spite of the technical difficulties LILCO has encountered with the diesels identified in the FSAR, we have assumed that the requirements of GDC 17 and of other pertinent regulations will have to be. eventually satisfied if the plant is to oper-ate. Hence, we have considered the FSAR information to be ge-nerically applicable where safety requirements are concerned.
-2.l.2.1 Onsite Emergency Diesel Generators The onsite emergency diesel generators are described in the Shoreham FSAR as follows:
The Shoreham plant is provided with three independent
. standby diesel generators with buses arranged so that any tuo
. generators, operating independently, can provide power to all C-16 4
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II the loads that are deemed essential for the design basis accident . The emergency diesel generators are not used for the
. purpose of supplying additional power to the utility power
. system (peaking). It is assumed that the onsite power system satisfies GDC 17 and 18, IEEE 308-1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.9. The rating of each diesel generator set is as follows:
Continuous (8,760 hr) 3,500 KW 2 hr per 24 hr period 3,900 KW The criteria used to size the emergency diesel generators are:
- 1. The capacity of any two diesels is adequate to meet the safety features demand caused by a loss of coolant accident. The established demand is shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1.
.2. The maximum continuous load imposed on the diesel is less than the continuous rating of the machine, i
defined as the output the unit is expected to maintain for a minimum of 8,700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />. The maximum intermittent load in the first 60 seconds (approxi-mately) during the operation of the motor-operated C-17
valves is less than the 2-hour rating of the machine.
These' loads are given in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1.
- 3. Each generator is capable of starting and accelerating to rated speed, and then in the required sequence, meeting all of its emergency shutdown loads, as shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-2.
' Sizing of the emergency diesel generators is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9.
The emergency diesel generators are automatically started on:
.l. Loss of voltage to the respective 4,160 V bus to
~
which each generator is connected.
2.. High drywell pressure.
- 3. Low reactor coolant level signal.
.If the preferred (offsite) power source is not available, the emergency diesel generators are automatically connected to the 4,'160 V emergency buses and sequentially loaded. The capacity of any two emergency diesel generators is- suf ficient to meet the- safety related load required by a loss of coolant accident
.during a loss of offsite AC power. The required loads and C-18
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- Only fc9 ~ 'maxidum~v coincident. demand is shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1.
- ta;;, .
- one emecgency-diesel' generator s is needed for low power y , o
/ .operption. -The emergency diesel generator loading sequence for the above shutdown conditions is shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-2..
.The loading sequence prevents system instability during motor starting. A' fast responding exciter and a voltage-regulator
. ~ .
x' ensure quick voltage buildup during-the starting sequence.
Each diesel generator has independent start control circuits.
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(The emerdency diesel generator units are housed in separate T rooms deeigned to Seismic Category I.-
u s, t ,
i Each diesels generator is equipped with protective relays N ,
1 which shuc the, unit,down automatically in the event of unit
, g idults. Curing 5peration under emergency conditions, trip 1
conditions; ors limited to those, which if allowed to continue,
.. c . .,3 ,S 5.,
S.
would'rgpidly result in the loss of.the emergency diesel gener-2 w s
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- ator. H Surveillance instrumentation is .provided to monitor the v, .
C status.of the di 7sel-generator. Conditions which can adversely I e N affect performance of the emergency diesel generators are
,c s,
?"annunciaNed.locallyandinthemaincontrolroom.
The follow-x-
7
'ing list shows the important functio'ns that are annunciated: ,
l s ,
Alarm
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+ %. -
w \ Control Function',, Local Room a;_ . s. 3; ,,
av 'g - -s._
s
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1;~ X X s
LowM'ressureLubeGil s
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- 2. Overspeed Shutdown X X
, 3. -Main Board Control Disabled X X Except[for,the control rod drive pumps, all t
- nonsafety-related-loads are connected to the diesel generator bus-through two-series connected breakers (for those 480 V loads that are dis-onnected on LOCA, one of these breakers is the molded case shunt-trip or switchgear breaker). The magnet-ic breakers have been' installed to limit detrimental effects on the emergency-buses due to faults and overloads on nonsafety related. equipment. The power and control circuits for the control rod. drive pumps are treated as Class IE circuits, and
~
the' power circuits to 480 V nonsafety loads fed through two
- series connected breakers are treated as Class-IE circuits up.
s
~
to'the second breaker.
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The three dieselEengines operate on No. 2 fuel oil. Each
- engine is supplied tur a separate. diesel' generator fuel oil storage 1and transfer system design.to~ allow for 7 days-continuous operation of' the diesel engine at rated load. 'All
- ~ safety-related portions-of the diesel-generator-fuel oil stor-Lage~andI-t'ransfer systems are designed-to ASME III, Code Class-
- '3,.and: Seismic' Category I requirements.. The system design in-corporates sufficient' redundancy to prevent a malfunction or C-20
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s failure of'any single active or passive component from impairing the capability of the system to supply fuel oil to at least two of the diesel engines. The diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer systems are designed so that makeup fuel oil may'be transferred from the auxiliary boiler fuel oil stor-
. age , tanks to the. fill piping for the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. Auxiliary boiler fuel will be e upatible with diesel generator fuel' requirements. Missile protection is pro-vided for the fuel oil storage and transfer systems in accor-dance with General Design Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
The diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system located in the area adjacent to the diesel generator rooms consists of:
.1. Three buried diesel fuel oil storage tanks - one for each diesel engine. Each storage tank has a capacity of 42,000 gallons, providing suf ficient fuel oil for continuous operation of the associated diesel at
[ rated load for 7 days. Each tank is vented to the s
atmosphere.
-2. Six 10 gpm full-capacity, electric motor driven rota-ry positive oisplacement fuel oil transfer pumps ( two 9
C-21 0
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pumps for each diesel generator fuel oil storage tank) are provided. Each pump is provided with a re-lief valve discharging back to its associated suction line. Each diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump is mounted directly above its associated fuel oil storage tank.
-3. A diesel generator fuel oil day tank for each diesel engine . is situated in the associated diesel generator room. Each diesel generator fuel oil day tank is sized to store 550 gallons of fuel oil. Each diesel generator fuel oil day tank is supplied with a flame arrestor on the vent.
4.. Two 13 gpm, full capacity, positive displacement fuel oil booster pumps per diesel engine. The shaft driven and d-c motor' driven booster pumps are piped in parallel and mounted on the diesel engine skid.
Each pump discharge is. equipped with a relief valve back to the pump suction. A large mesh Y type fuel oil strainer is located upstream of each booster
- pump.
As a result of. the ' redundancy incorporated in the system design,fthe diesel generator fuel oil system provides its C-22 t
- - , , n sv, -- - . ,. , e -~ -- y-
r minimum required safety function under any of the following conditions:
- 1. Loss of offsite power coincident with failure of one diesel generator.
- 2. Loss of offsite power coincident with maintenance outage or failure of one diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump or one diesel generator fuel oil boost-er pump associated with each diesel generator.
The fuel oil storage tanks are buried 2 1/2 feet below grade, with a 4 foot separation between the sides of each tank.
The tanks rest on, and are covered by compacted sand. Six inches above the top of the tanks, supported by the compacted soil, is a 2 foot thick concrete slab, designed to Seismic Cat-egory I requirement,s. The fuel oil transfer pumps are mounted above this slab, and take suction through the top of the tanks.
A Seismic Category I concrete block house is provided above each tank to enclose the two fuel oil transfer pumps, associ-ated discharge piping, instrumentation, and manhole into the tank. The blockhouse and slab together provide the fuel oil storage and transfer system with adequate protection against potential missiles due to tornadoes or hurricanes. This ar-rangement meets the intent of General Design Criterion 4.
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l Each of the diesel generator fuel oil day tanks is sized to store a maximum 550 gallons of diesel fuel oil, as allowed by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards, Vol.
1, 1971-1972. This storage capacity provides for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of continuous operation of the diesel generator at rated load.
Each of the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks is provided with a connection for manual determination of the die-sel fuel oil level. A level transmitter is also provided to give a continuous computer monitored reading of the tank level in the' main control room. On low fuel level, a low level alarm, initiated by a level switch independent from the level transmitter, is annunciated in the diesel generator room, and a diesel trouble alarm is annunciated in the main control room.
Each diesel generator fuel oil day tank is provided with local indication of the< day tank level. A level switch is provided to alarm high and low diesel generator fuel oil day tank level on the standby diesel generator panel, and to indicate diesel trouble-in the main control room. The level of the fuel oil day; tanks is controlled by the automatic starting and stopping of the corresponding preferred diesel generator-fuel oil transfer pump. Should the preferred ~ pump fail to start, a re-dundant level s< itch will automatically start the second fuel
-oil transfer pump. Manual pump control is also provided on the C-24
n standby diesel generator panel for starting or stopping either the preferred or secondary fuel oil transfer pumps. In the event'that the pumps fail to stop, a gravity drain overflow is provided from the day tank back to the diesel fuel oil storage tank._ An interlock is provided to automatically shut off the fuel oil transfer pumps when the carbon dioxide fire protection system is actuated in the associated diesel generator room. A high 'dif ferential pressure alarm across each of the booster pump Y strainers is provided on the diesel generator panel and annunciated as a diesel trouble alarm in the main control room.
Each diesel generator set has a separate air starting system designed to be capable of starting the diesel engine without external power and also to meet the single failure cri-terion. The air storage tanks and piping between tanks and the air' start distributors are designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Class 3. All other portions of this system are designed to manuf acturer's standards and Seismic Category I requirements. Each diesel generator is provided with two independent, redundant starting systems (Figure 9.5.6-1). Each independent starting system .ncludes the fol-lowing:
C-25
- 1. One ac motor driven air compressor with intake filter
- 2. One air compressor after cooler
- 3. One refrigerant air drier with moisture trap
- 4. Two check valves
- 5. Two air storage tanks with relief valves and drain valves
- 6. One manual shutoff valve
- 7. One strainer
- 8. Instrumentation and control systems
- 9. Air stater distributor system Each independent redundant air starting system is of suf-ficient volume to be capable of cranking the engine for a mini-mum of five starts, without recharging the tanks. Each motor driven air compressor has the capacity to recharge the air storage system in 30 minutes to provide for a minimum of five starts. Its motor is furnished with automatic start and stop control'on pressure signals from the air storage tanks.
C-26
Because of the independence and redundancy incorporated in the system design, the diesel generator starting system provides its minimum required safety function under the follow-ing conditions:
- 1. Design basis accident with loss of offsite power, by putting into operation the standby diesel generator.
- 2. Maintenance outage or failure of one of the two air starting systems associated with the diesel engine.
Procurement of components is governed by the requirements of 10 CPR 50 Appendix B.
Each diesel generator has its own lubrication system.
Each lubrication system includes the following equipment:
- 1. One direct engine driven lubricating oil pump.
- 2. One a-c motor- driven lubricating oil circulating pump i to supply warm lubricating oil to the engine sump and other necessary components when the engine is not running, as well as supply pressurized oil to the engine block until the shaft driven pump reaches ef-fective speed.
\
C-27
The lubricating oil cooler is designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessels Code,Section III, Class 3. The lubricating oil cooler itself is serviced with the engine jacket water.
All the other equipment is designed to manufacturer's standards, and Seismic Category I requirements. Each diesel generator lubrication- system is an independent system, thereby satisfying the single failure criterion by assuring operation of at least two of the three diesel generators.
Each of the three diesel generators has its own jacket cooling water system. The engine jacket cooling water heat ex-changer is designed to ASME Section III code Class 3. The engine jacket cooling water pumps and piping are designed
^
according to manufacturer's standards. All components of the diesel generator cooling water system are designed and quali-fled to Seismic Category I requirements. The diesel cooling water system is furnished as a part of the diesel generator ,
package, pre-piped by the manufacturer. Procurement of compo-nents is governed. by the requirements of 10 CFR 30, Appendix B.
Each of the emergency diesel generator units is located in its own separate room within the control building. The control building is a Seismic Category I structure and is capable of withstanding tornado missil'es.
C-28 mmmummmmm mummmm m um
\:
Each emergency diesel generator room is provided with fixed CO2 total flooding system. These systems are provided with temperature detection for automatic actuation. A smoke detection system is provided in these areas for actuation of alarms. Manual operation is provided at a local station near the protected area. There is a time delay between system actuation and system CO2 release, with signals provided to warn personnel. The fuel transfer area consists of a concrete pit with individual cubicles to house the fuel tanks and transfer pumps. Due to their remote location and segregation from each other, only yard fire hydrant protection is provided with fire detection devices from the fire detection and plant security system. Fire detection systems using smoke detectors of the ionization combustion products type are monitored on an annun-ciator panel in the main control room to alert personnel of a possible fire situation in the DG rooms. The plant design iso-lates each emergency generator room from the adjacent diesel generator room by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire wall. The day tank is located
'in the room with the engine it supplies. Fuel oil storage tanks are buried. Provisions are made to confine the spread of oil to the immediate fire area. Fire detecti.on systems are provided for early warning. A detection and fire protection l
system as described previously is provided. Fuel oil tanks for i
C-29 l
l l
the auxiliary boilers and the emergency diesel generators are buried. In addition, the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tanks are covered with a two-foot concrete slab with their as-sociated fuel oil pumps located in individual concrete cu-bicles.. Adequate fire protection is supplied from yard fire hose houses in close proximity of all oil tanks. The gas tur-bine oil tank is an above ground tank, located approximately 450 feet from the nearest safety related structure, surrounded by.a steel dyke sized to hold 110 percent of the volume of the gas turbine oil tank. Therefore, the tank presents no fire hazard to safety related structures. On flash oil fires around diesel generators, the time between detection and the opening of the CO2 valve could be almost simultaneous.
2.1.3 Common Elements There are several components common to both the alterna-
'tive and the normal systems which have not been described in detail' here. They include the 480 volt systems fed from the safety buses (e.g., from Bus 11) and the loads used for specific safety functions. Because they are common to both systems, these components do not impact a comparative evalua-tion of the alternative and normal systems.
C-30
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM Af.3 RELATED ELEMENTS No. Proposed Specification Item ,
Standby Diesel Generators:
Mobile Diesel Generator EMD- Yes 4 General Motors EMD units, previously Units 5, 6, 7 and 8 DG- at Lynnway Diesel Plant of New England Power; each 2.5 MW, 4 01 4.16 kV, 20 cyl~inder EMD series 645 turbo-charged engine, thru deadline start capability (automatic start on loss of 4 04 offsite power on the 4.16 kV bus from the NSS transformer),
independent weather-resistant enclosure, two 125-V dc motors for starting,15 seconds per starting cycle, 3 attempts at starter motor engagement before lockout; units start sequentially, share one single battery, automatically synchronize after reaching rated speed and voltage, connected
- to load as one unit in parallel operation, conner. tion done manually; EMDs are mounted outdoors near the reactor building within fence-protected area, not in a seismic structure nor on a foundation designed to withstand a DBE; have no defined quality specifications for design, fabrication, and installation; are not classified as safety-related; are not seismically qualified, nor is their installation and foundation seismic Category 1; no fire protection or design basis fire has been defined; are not independent and will not meet the single failure criterion due to common reliance on one starting battery, one lore term feel supply, and a single bus feeding power. to the 'i.16 kV uwitchgear rooia; are not classified as a vital area but are inside the main security area of the plant, thus are assured of only nominal protaction per Part 73 requirementsi associated components (such as the cable carrying power to safety loads) also are not qualified, thus do not meet GDC 2 or 4 or Part 100 of Appendix A; power from EMDs is directed to the 4.16 kV switchgear room via a single nonsafety-related above-ground conduit; cable from EMDs is in exposed cable tray, minimal Part 73 Protection.
1 l
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION _OF MPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC P0KER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (C Proposed Specification Item 'io . __
Starting Motors XSMD Yes Dual independent, battery-powered starting rectors for cranking an engine; when starting circuit is energized a stepping switch moves from one DG to another at 1/4 second intervals in search of a ready-to-start unit; if such unit is found a relay energizes its starting motors for a 15-seconds attempt (maximum) and if it fails it locks out; if starter pinions do not engage the ring gear in 2 seconds, stepping switch moves to the next ready-to-start unit; switch bypasses running units until all units have started; a unit failing to start after 3 attempts will be locked out; after an i engine has started a speed-sensing device deenergizes its starting circuit; starting motors are not to operate
- more than 20 seconds at a time; allow a 2-minute cooling l period before repeating starting procedure.
Starting Battery XS8D Yes 420-amp hour,125-volt dc, lead acid battery, provides start-ing power sequentially to all 4 mobile DGs; housed with DG #2; charged by charger powered from auxiliary transformer that is powered from the 4-KV system during standby, and from the DGs otherwise; battery rated for 12 starting attempts, poten-tial source of single failure that could prevent operation of DGs.
Battery Charger' XBCD Yes Located in the master unit (DG #2), within the generator compartment; automatic, solid state, constant voltage device, capable of AC-voltage compensation. DC-voltage regulation and current limiting; has relay device for disconnecting automatic charging control from the battery (to prevent drainage) in case of AC power loss; automatic resumption of charging with return of AC power; fused AC input-line; fused DE outpat-line.
2
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
- 3. Proposed Specification It_em fuel Oil System XF00 Yes Consists of a DG's fuel oil system, the fuel oil transfer sys-tem for all four units, and a piping network.
DG's fuel Oil System XDFSD Yes For each DG, it' consists of a day tank, pump, suction straine filter, sight glasses, pressure gauge, intake manifolds, injectors, and associated plumbing (Figure 3-A).
Day Tank XDTD Yes 130 gallon capacity; supplies fuel and reservoir for unused fuel returned from the engine injectors.
Sight Glasses XSGD Yes A fuel return sight glass (FRSG) and a fuel bypass sight l glass (FBSG); provide visual indication of fuel status; FRSG l contains a 10-lb relief valve which opens if fuel pressure exceeds 10 lbs to return excess fuel to day tank; FBSG (mounted between pump and fuel filter) houses a 60-lb relief valve which opens (at pressure higher than 60 lbs) if filter
~
becomes clogged, so that oil is diverted from engine mani-folds towards day tank.
Pump XPD Yes Engine-driven pump draws fuel from day tank through suction strainer,10-lb check valve, and filter (there is a pressure gauge between the valve and filter).
Fuel Transfer System XFTSD Yes System housed within master unit; consists of 2 transfer pumps, suction strainer for each pump, check valves, waste type filter (c), and float level gauges and switches; system transfers fuel from main storage source to the day tanks of the units; fuel level is controlled by float switches in the day tank of the master unit (Unit 2);
fuel levels in day tanks are equalized by equalizer lines; Fuel Transfer Switch Normal activates first pump ,
to maintain normal fuel level; fuel Transfer Switch Low activates second pump for fuel levels below normal; Fuel Transfer Switch High de-activates the circuit to both pumps for levels above normal; deviations from normal fuel level trigger the Fuel Transfer light on the unit's annunciator (but fault indication would not cduse a shut-down) (Figure 3-B).
3
. TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PEOPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEM j No. Proposed Specification Item _
Consists of a main supply pipe extending from an existing Fuel Piping System XFPSD Ye s diesel-oil fill station to the master unit (EMD-DG-402),
a number of joints on the pipe, equalizer pipe-network, ard valves.
Yes Consists of 8 sections of 2" Schedule 40 carbon steel ending Main Supply Pipe XMSPD with a section of flexible pipe (Fleyonics #PCS-200-MMT, 2" Screwed ends), three valves, and at least 10 joints.
Yes A 2" steel line made up of 3 main sections and an end Equalizer Pipe Network XEPD (held together by 4 joints), and four flexible pipes (Flexonics) each ending with a valve at each enoine.
XLV1 Yes Manually operated lever-type valve, located at the diesel Valves oil fill station; normally open.
- XLV2 Yes As above but located just ahead of the fuel transfer system in the master unit.
XLV3 Yes Manually operated lever-type valve located before the mouth of the emergency truck-fill connect next to the master unit; normally closed.
XGV1 Yes 4 gate (screwed)-type valves, each at the entry point of a thru generating unit fuel oil system; normally open.
XGV4 XFTD Yes 2 tanker trucks; each, 9,000 gallons of fuel oil capacity Fuel Tanker Trucks capable of sustaining all 4 diesels for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> or one diesel for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> at full load; will be stationed in the vicinity of the Auxiliary Boiler fueling station, which is outside the Reactor Building near the EMDs; one tanker can feed the diesels by gravity feed into the lines while the other is being replenished from off-site sources or from the onsite 972.L31-gallons gas turbine storage tank by pump or gravity feed if fuel is appropriate; no fire protection or design basis fire ins been defined.
Yes Includes coolant sources, any intake or discharge fac-Cooling System XCSD ilities, and pumping equipment and power sources.
Circuit Breakers EMD- Yes Air circuit breaker between each DG and the bus shared SWG-by the DGs,1200A; all housed in the diesels' control 400-1 cubicle (EMD-SWG-400). 4
+ hen
n TABLE-C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Contin Item fio . Propo sed Speci fica tion DG's Switchgear. EMD- Yes Located in the control cubicle. adjacent to the diesels.
SWG- includes the DGs' circuit breakers; to load DGs to emer-400 gency buses requires manual operations which is exper.tec '
to take 30 minutes.
Circuit Breaker 11.18 Yes Mobile diesel supply breaker between DGs' bus and Bus #11 ~ l in the normal switchgear room, air break type,1200A.
Power Line XPLD Yes Single power line from tne DGs enters via nonsafety-related switchgear roor , routed in an above ground covered raceway, except where near RSST where it is to be burried.
e l
5
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
' tem t:3 Propo sed Stecification Normal Station Service Transformer:
1 operating and I spare; spare stored in 138- KV Mormal Station Service NSST- No switchyard requires several days to be installed Tran sfors..er 003 and could be source of spare parts; each 24/32/40 (44.8) 1:VA 0A/FA/F0A, 55/65C,131.73 (A)-4.16 (Y)-4.16 (Y) KV; provided with split secondary vindings [one winding powers normal station ser-vice (NSS) Buses lA and 18 and the other NSS Buses 11 and 12 and the emerge.cy Buses 101, 102 and 103]. During normal operation reactor and turbine-generator systems' loads are shared be-tween NSST-003 and Reserve Station Service Transforn.cr (RSST-004 ).
Switch 1R21- Yes Disconnecting switch between NSST-003 and Bus #11; 7.2 KV DISC- 4000 A; stk. oper.
400A 1R21- Yes Disconnecting grounding switch between Switch 1R21-DISC-400A DISC- and NSST-003; 15 KV. 600A, H&S Code 185095; normally open; 4008 stk. oper.
4-KV System:
Circuit Breakers (CBs) All CBs No Three-pole air break type,125 V-DC powered, 250 MVA listed nominal 3-phase interrupting class, 78,000 Ft.p closing with and latching capability, stored energy operating n.ech-t he 4 -KV anism, systet.
6
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
Item No. Pro po sed Speci fication -
CBs between NSST/RSST 400, No In addition to the above, can automatically and immediately and Buses IA, IB, 410, transfer auxiliaries from NSST to RSST and vice versa 11, and 12 420 - through auto tripping, if fast transfer is completed 430, within 10 cycles from time protective relays initiate 440, the trip, or for system faults not cleared by high 450, speed relays; also identified as No.18-1, lA-3, IA-4,1B-2, 460, 12-11,11-11,11-1 and 12-1, respectively; No. 400, 410, 440 470 and 450 are normally closed, rer.aining CBs are normally
.open.
i CBs between Buses 11 and 415, No in addition to properties common to all 4KV breakers, these
, 12, and Buses 101, 424, CBs possess dual trip coils; one coil is connected to the i 102 and 103 435, safety related circuit while the other is connected to non-444, safety related circuits; coils are separated by metal barri er 455, and enring is separated within the switchgear design limit-
! 464, ations; breakers must be tripped by safety related signals or special to the bus and from common nonsafety related trans-101-1, former signals; CBs allow fast trensfer of auxiliaries from 101-2, NSST to RSST only, for auto and manual tripping of NSS CBs;
, 103-1, with an accident CBs trip if under voltage is sensed on the
- 103-2, emergency buses; linking of a DG to an emergency bus will not 1 02-1 , be interferred with by a nonsignificant trip on the nonsafety-
, 102-2 related trip coil; if open circuits in nonsafety related circuits prevent tripping of CB in response to a fault undervoltage will eventually be sensed on the bus; No. 415,
- 435 and 455 are normally closed, t .e rest are normally open.
l Switch Breakers 411 No Between the 4 KV-480 V transformers and the 4-KV emer-i thru gency buses (101,102 & 103); al so identified as No.102-3, 417 102-3,103-3,103-5,101-3, and 101-4, respectively; 411, 413, and 416 are normally closed, the rest are normally open.
i Others 11- 10 No Two circuit breakers, one betwecn Bus 11 and one end of l
i 12-3 the 480V switchgear and the other between Bus 12 and the other end of the same switchgear;.both normally closed.
- 3 i 7 l
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
No. Proposed Specification Item Normal Large Motor IA & No Two metal-clad indoor type bust s; supply power to the con-Buses 1B densate booster pump motors, the driver motors for the vari-able frequency motor generator sets for the reactor coolant recirculation pump motors, and 2 of the 4 circulating water pump motors; auxiliaries can be transferred automatically and immediately from NSST to RSST and vice versa.
Normal Small Motor 11 & No Two metal-clad indoor type buses; power all 4-KV NSS motor Buses 12 loads not covered by Buses IA& 18 and, through step-down transformers and voltage regulators; the 4POV Bus 11 & 12 loads can be transferred quickly as in the case of 1A & IB bus loads.
Emergency Station 101, No Three metal-clad indoor type buses; power the 4-KV emer-Service Buses 1 02, gency core cooling system (ECCS) loads, control rod drive
& 103 water pumps and, through step-down transformers, provide power to 480V . emergency buses 111, 112 & 113.
Double-Ended 480-V Load Centers:
General System ' XGS480 No Four double-ended load centers for normal 480-V station auxiliaries; each consists of a 4-KV current-limiting fused disconnect switch, a 4 KV-480 V step-down transformer and a metal-enclosed switchgear section with incoming main bus tie circuit breakers.
NSST-Side Buses 11A No Normal load buses fed by NSST or the mobile diesek s.
thru 110 RSST-Side Buses 12A No Normal load centers' buses fed by RSST.
thru 12D 8
. . . . . . . .. - . ..,s .y ,,..,........y....
, ,. . . . . ..;... .e.. , . g . j, 7 , , ; . . .; .- ,. .y.. .
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. . TABLE'C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
Item No. ProposeJ __
Specification Interrupter Switches XS11A f;o Four on each side of the double-ended load centers; each thru with current limiting fuse; 5 KV, 600 amp continuous, XS11D & 61,000 amp momentary, 96,000 amp fault closing.
X512A thru XS12D Transformers T-001A No For stepping down voltage; 4 KV-480 V,1000/1333 KVa.
thru T-011D and T-012A thru T-012D Voltage Regulators IND-11A fo Four inductrols on each side of the double-ended load centers
. thru regulate voltage to the 480-V normal load centers; 150C IND-llD & KVa. 480 VI 20%.
IND-12A thru II:D-12D Circuit Breakers XCBTA No Bus ties between Buses 11A and 12A through llD and 12D; t hru 1600 amp continuous, 50,000 amp syn. metrical interruptir.g KCBTD capacity; air-magnetic drawout type; normally open.
XCB11A ho Incoming main CBs between buses 11A through 110 and incuctral thru IND-IIA through IND-llD, and between buses 12A through 120 XCBilD & and inductrol s IND-12A through IND-12D; rated as above; air-XCB12A magnetic drawout type; normally closed.
thru
)CB12D X0CB No Other feeder breakers; 600 amp continuous, interrupting capacity of 30,000 amp symmetrical (with instantaneocs trips) and 22,000 amp symmetrical (without instantaneous trips); air-magnetic drawout type.
9
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIflCATI0ra 0F SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Co No.- Pro posed Specification Item l
Single-Ended 480-V (Emergency) Load Centers:
T-101, No Between each of the 4-KV emergency buses and each of the Transformers 480 V emergency buses; 1000/1333 KVa, 4160-480 V (step-102, 103 down); grounded.
Emergency Buses 111, No 480-V physically isolated and electrically independent 112 buses; metal-enclocsed switch9 ear; power safety-related and loads; feed motor control centers supporting 100 hp and 113 smaller power requirements; support essential nonsafety related 480-V loads; some nonsafety loads are tripped off of these buses during a LOCA.
Circuit Breakers XCB111, No Between each of the 4 KV-480 V transformers (T-101.102 XCB112, & 103) and each of the 480 V emergency buses (111,112
~
XCB113 & 113); 1500 A continuous, 50,000 A symmetrical inter-rupting capacity, air-magnetic draw +0ut type; all norr. ally closed.
Reserve Station Service Transformer:
Reserve Station Service RSST- No 1 operating and I spare; spare stored in 138-KV switchyard, Transformer . OG4 requires several days to be installed and could be source of spare parts; each 24/32/40 (44.8) MVA 0A/FA/f0A,55-65C, 65.86 (Y)-4.16 (Y)-4.16 KV provided with split secondary windings (one winding powers normal station service. (NSS)
Cuses IA and 18 and the other supplies NSS Buses 11 and 12 and emergency Buses 101,102 and 103). During normal operation reactor and turbine-generator systens'. loads are shared between RSST-004 and NSST-003.
69-KV/4-KV System 1
640 Oil circuit breaker; 69 KV 600A, Westingbouse GO-48; can Lircuit Breakers No disconnect the Shoreham gas turbines from the RSST-004 (and safety - and nonsafety-related 4-KV and 480-V plant loads) and from the Wildwood substation (of fsite loads) i f Switch 623 is open.
10
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continu fio . Proposed Specification Item 44F No Fused switches for' disconnecting various nonsafety loads thru (including construction) from 4-KV bus fed by transfonrer 47F Banks No. 6 and 7.
63F, No Fused switches capable of isolating the 69-KV system from 66F,
- miscellaneous nonsafety loads (in addition to switctes 616
& 617, 67F 4 04 , yes Manually operated switches for disconnecting various 4-KV 4 07 , loads from transformer banks No. 6 and 7.
455 613 No Motor operated air-break switch; 69KV, 600A, Joslyn, by ITE; can isolate gas turbines GT-001 and GT-002 from the 69-nV system.
616, No Motor operated air-break switches 69KV 600A, Joslyn; func-617 tion similar to switches 63F, 66F and 67F.
623 No Motor operated air-break switch; 69KV, 600A; can isolate RSST-004 from the 69-KV system; manually operated; sr.c.id ta open when 69-KV by-p: ss bus is used to dispatch gas turbir:
power.
633 No 69KV 600A, Joslyn switch isolates gas turbine start-ing transformer (66.4-4.33 KV) and cc.nstruction power and gas turbine auxiliary power from 69-KV system; manually i
operated.
643 No Motor operated 69KV, 600A, Joslyn RF-2 switch for isolating the 69-KV system from outside AC power sources (backs up CB 640) (provided the 69-KV by-pass is not in UsE or switch 623 is open).
Ye s Branches of f 69-KV line betw2en CB 640 and Wildwood; lead Potential Transformers XPT1 to XPT1 is to be disconnected when 69-rV by-pass is used.
XPT2 -- Three potential transformers (pts) off 69-KV bus.
Bank 3 No Gas turbine starting transfor.aer; supplies 2.4 KV power fo r Transformers construction and starting ga.s turbine; 66.4-4.33 KV .
i 11
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC P0,lER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued) ho. Proposed Specification Item Bank 5 No for stepping up gas turbines (GT-001 & GT-002) output vol tage; 33/44/55 MVA 0A/FA/F0A, 66-13 KV; G.E., N.P. #525.
Banks 6 No Two 66-4 KV transformers provide 4-KV voltage power to
&7 miscellaneous nonsafety loads; #6 is 516.25 FMVA, Westing-house N.P. 272; #7 is 515.6 FMVA, G.E. N.P. 414.
Lightning Arresters; XLA1 New Three lightning arresters (LAs) off line between 69-KV switchyard and RSST-004; each with arrester and 60-MV l G.E. Allugard II.
XLA2 New Three LAs off line between CB 640 and Wildwood; each with
[- arrester.
. XLA3 -- Three LAs off line linking Shoreham gas turt'ines with 69-KV system; each with arrester.
Yes Buried 69-KV line between RSST-004 and Switch 623; con-Cable Lines XL1 I
stitutes normal route to RSST-034.
XL2 Yes Buried 69-KV line between RSST ')04 (prior to the normally l
l open contact) and CB 640 (after PTI).
XL3 Yes Buried 69-LV line between RSST-004 and the normally open contact on the line to CB 640.
XL4 Yes Portable cable taps (stored on-site) for linking CB 640 with an alternate route to RSST-003 when the normal route is faulted.
l XL5 Yes Cable leads to be disconnected when the 69-KV b.y-pass is used.
XL6 Yes 69-KV by-pa ss bus.
12 y
z q 2 . :. . y. q:3.g4 g_ gy:,p.S y 7;g ;, . z. ;.y 3 .y j;;;;
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- q ..y . . ygg; 9,
TARLF C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED -ELEMENTS (Continued)
Item f'o . Proposed . Specification XL7 Yes Same as for XL4; note that XL7 can link CB 640 with RSST-004 through either XL4 or through XL6.
XL7A Yes Portable taps (' stored on-site) for connecting the by-pass XL6 with the normal route to RSST-004.
Contacts XNOC1 Yes Normally open contact on the alternate 69-KV line to RSST-004 13.8-KV System:
The 55-MW Gas Turbine GT-001 No 55-MW,13.8-KV. 0.8 PF, 0.5 SCR; shares a common bus with the 20-MW unit (GT-002); houses the 125 V-DC battery supplyin the control power for the 69-KV oil CB; G.E.
Switches -
11F No 3 fused switches between potential transformer XPT4 and GT-001 circuit.
13F No Fused switch between potential transformer XPT3 and GT-001 i circuit.
! XF1, Yes Fused switches between GT-002 circuit and potential trans-XF2, formers XPTS, XPT6, and XPT7, respectively.
XF3 112 Yes 13-KV 1200A manually operated switch for isolating the 20-MW i
gas turbine (GT-002).
Circuit Prcakers 8Z-110 No CC bet 6;cen GT-001 and bus shared with GT-002; AM 13.8.1000 MVA, 300A; formerly CB 520.
8Z-120 Yes CB MVA.bebween 000 AGT 002 aSy CB 52.d bus shared with GT-001; AM 13.8.1000 lormer Potential Transformers XPT3 -- Sevsral pts'of f GT-001 line. .
l XPT4 -- Three pts; each G.E., JVM-5,14400-120 V; off bus linked
! with GT-001 line.
l XPT5 New PT off GT-002 line after CB 8Z-120; 112.5 KVA,13.8 KV-230V.
XPT6 New Three pts off GT-002 line before CB 8Z-120.
l I
13
. , TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS' (Continue Item i;o . Propo sed __
Speci fica tion XPT7 New- PT off GT-002 line before CB 8Z-120.
XPT8 -- PT off GT-001 line; G.E.-HT,112.5 KVA,13.8 LV-240/480 V .
Transforn.ers .XTl No Grounded transformer for GT-001; 10 KVA,12KV-240 V.
XT2 Yes Grounded transforaer for GT-002; 25 KVA,13.8 KV-120/240 V.
Lightning Arresters XLA4 New Three LAs off-line linking GT-002 with transformer Bank e5 (after CB 8Z-120); with arrester.
XLA5 -- Three LAs off-line linking GT-001 with transformer Bank PS (before CB 8Z-110); with arrester.
Capacitor XC1 Yes Grounded capacitor off GT-002 after CB 8Z-120.
Cable Lines XL8 Yes Buried 13.8-KV line between CB 8Z-120 and Switch 112.
. XL9 Yes Buried 13.8-KV line between CB 8Z-120 and Switch 112 (by-pass portion).
Bus -- Yes 13-KV bus serving both gas turbines (GT-001 and GT-002).
14
i TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (C:ntinued),
, Item Sc . Propo sed Speci fi ca tion -
The 20-MW Gas Turbine Gas. Turbine GT-002 Yes A single Pratt & Whitney Model #FT 4A-8 Power Pack 20-MW gas turbine with deadline start capability; generator, gas turbine, and all electrical and mechanical controls contained in a weather-resistant enclosure which is outside security fence; GT-002 is mounted on a pad in the 69 KV switchyard, separate from the main plant without protection against missiles by a structure nor is it designed to withstand earthquakes, thus does not meet GDC 2 or 4 Part 100 of AppendixA; the unit feeds the same 69 KV line that supplies power through the RSS transformer to the' 4.16 KV buses 18 and 12 but does not normally feed the ener-gency buses; manual operation is required to load the gas turbine to emergency buses, loading is expected to take 10 minutes; gas turbine has no defined quality specifications for design, fabrication and installation, is not seismically qualified and is not classified safety-related; no fire pro-tection or design basis fire has been defined for the gas tur bine; has not been designed to meet the single failure criterion.
Starting Systea XSS2 --
Consists of an air starter, pressure regulators, air cylinder and a compressor; capable of 3 starting attempts, represents a point of single failure.
Air Starter XA52 -- Newly installed ACE-507 Series Air Starting System; drives the high pressure compressor rotor from standstill; driven by compressed air; below a certain minimum system pressure a starting lockout prevents starting the unit.
Air Cylinder XACY2 -- Store air at 400-500 psig; capacity allows 3 starting attempt without recharging (275 cu. ft.).
Pressure Pegulators XPR2 -- Located downstream from high pressur e air cylinder; reduce pressure of air supply to the air starter over two stages.
15
TABLE C-1 COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSE 0 LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS '(Continued)
Item No. Propc sed Specification Air Compressor XAC2 -- 1000 PSI 3-stage Ingersoll-Rand compressor, driven by 20-HP -
230 V motor; maintains compressed air supply; automatically controlled; cycled on/off; housed within the gas turbine enclosure; powered by auxiliary transformer.
Ba t tery XB2 -- Provides control power for the sequencer, breakers. .and
, the DC fuel-pump; 150 amp / hour,125-V DC.
Chargar XC2 -- New 50-amp charger; maintains distribution system. battery
. charge; powered from same auxiliary transformer supplying compressor.
Power Line XPL2 -- 69 KV line from the gas turbine connects to the RSS transformer via a buried cable and then enters the non-safety-related switchgear room which is not protected in accordance with Appendix R.
Auxiliary Transformer XA?2 -- Supplies power to battery charger, air compressor and AC-
- powered fuel pump; powered fr.om the 69-KV system during standby and from the gas turbine (GT-002) during latter's operation.
fuel System XFSG -- Consists of a main fuel oil tank, fuel booster pumps, gen-erator-driven fuel pump, fuel-pressurizing and dump valve, throttle valve and actuator, solenoid-generated bypass, fuel manifold and nozzles.
fuel Tank XFTG2 -- Above ground storage tank located outside the main security fence and near the 69 KV switchyard; 972,931 gallon capa-city; can sustain the gas turbine at full load for 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />; no fire protection or design basis fire has been defined for the fuel tank.
fuel Booster Pamps XFPG2 -- Two fuel pumps; take fuel from the fuel tank; suRply fuel under pressure to GT-002 generator-driven pump suction through filters; one pump is powered by same 125-V DC bat-tery supplying power to distribution system; other pump is AC powered and takes over from DC-pump af ter GT-002 starts; /,C pump receives power from above-mentioned auxiliary transforn.e a bypass and check valve is provided around the AC pump; dur-ing dead-bus starting the bypass supplies fuel under tank-lead pressure to the DC-driven pump suction until the AC pump is energized.
16
pv . .i
~ .
r o
1, TABLE C-1 j,' *
. .. . - m.
j ,
COMP 0NENT ' PECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL, AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ILEMENTS (C:n ky
/% ; /,
,- . a
' b -
1 - -
.,~ Specification Item ,
No .. , Proposed .
/ '* ,
J y _. ,, ' ; 9;,
Generator-Drive ; Fuel XGF2 Receives ~ feel . oil from:the .oper_ating booster pump at 35-50 PSI; delivers fuel to the7 throttle valve and astuator; a (.
Pump relief 4alve limits; pressure rise to 835-845 PSI.'
/~~ '
,. A constant-pressure, metering-type shutoff valve, controlled Throttle-Valve and XTVA2 --
by the SPC2 fuel control; discharges to the fuel-pressurizing Actuator 'and dsp valve through the' fuel bypass valve.
p- ,
p , ~
'SPC-2 Fuel Cgntrol XSPC7 / -- /
A newly installed Hamilton Standard SPC-2A electronic sta-
.) ,
tionary servo-system fuel controller; monitors operation cf
' ' ~ - e, the tnrottle valve. a j
Fuel Bypass Valve , ' XBV2 -- - A solenoid-operated 3-way valve; permits fuel flow in 'the energized position and bypasses fuel back to the main. fuel
. pump inlet when de-energized.
.5 9
- g
/
/ o l
l
TABLE C-2 DATA SPECIFIC TO THE MOBILE EMD DIESEL GENERATOR UNITS Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit # 0 NEP ** 5 6 7 8 Year Installed 1%8 1%8 1%8 1906 Serial - #, Engine 67-F101031 67-F1-1051 67-F101071 67 -F1-1058 Serial #, Generator 67 -F1-1004 67-F1-1003 67-F1-1106 67 -F1-1005 Model # or Type 20-645-E4 2 0-645-E4 20-645-E4 20-645-E4 Rated KW 2750 2750 2750 2750 RPM 900 900 900 900 volts 2400/4160 2400/4160 2400/4160 2400/4160 Amps / Terminal 826/477 826/477 826/477 826/477 Rated P.F. 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 Rated KVA 3440 3440 3440 3440 Rated HP 3600 3600 3600 3600 No. of Cylinders 20 20 20 20
- Bore & Stroke 91/16x10 91/16x10 9 1/16x10 91/16x10 Cycle 2 2 2 2 EMD # 63610 63609 63612 63611 UTEX 0 Hour 6,030 6,552 6,163 8 , 07 0 Repower 0 Hour 12,932 - 13,153 -
Oper. Hours After UTEX or Repower + 345 6,281 120 4, %5 Lube Oil Consumption (gal /hr. ) + 0.95 0.92 1.14 1.02 i
- ' Source:' Discovery Request #3.
- New England Power.
+ Over a time period between 1968 and 1983.
/ This figure is based upon 1968-1983 data. However, the lube oil consumption rate of Unit 4 just before relocation to Shoreham amounted
~"
to 1.7 Gal /hr.
m
n gs-
- f &D *~ Y f3
..+
, . , .i 7 << , . TABLE C-3
.x ,
- t - l _y -
- ,j 4 ENGINE'HAINTENANCE
SUMMARY
F,OR THE FOUR MOBILE c- -/ DIESEL GENERATOR UNITS WHILE IN.5ERVICE AT NEW
- u
- -
. ^f ENGLAND POWER LYNNWAY STATION PL41T NO.1: 1974-1983*
, , , .,Y* ,
-- .; a
^
l Engi na l. . Operatingi ^; Average Lube T ., y Number Hours e Item 011 Consumption
- 5
" , 6,030 , ' - 3/72 UTEX En31ne Installed .95 gal /hr e '
'~ '
11,601~
New Radiator (Rear)-
? .11,618 New Cylinder Head (9)
"12,242 New Cylir. der Head (0, 7 8) f "( , p ., ,
12,274 New Cyli& der Head (2)
~,- 12,498 New Clock
- - - .? 12,932 Repower.
~
f "'
12,938- New Starters m , 23.019 New Cyljnder (#11)-
P , 6 ,, 6.552' UTEX Engine Installed- . 92 gal / hr 2 b I t 10,834 New Rear Radiator Core
~
N/
~
' 11,279 New Batteries 7./ #
,, 11,727 New Cylinder Head (6)
-12,471 New Clock ~
s ',
a ,12,667y New Stack
, .. 12,697 New Stack N 6,163 3/72 UTEX Engine Installed 1.14 gal /hr 11,062 New Cylinder Head (2)
/
11.306 New Cylinder Head (9) d , [^" 11,632 New Cylinder Head (14) s 11.695 New Cylinder Head(14 )
11,868 New Cylinder Head (4)
New Cylinder Head (12)
- 11,91 0 12,170 New Cylinder Head (6, 3)
%?, . a. - 12,551 New Cylinder Head (20) 4: s ,a. '/ -
12,694 New Starting Motors-
' , s"'< T _ ,_ 12,952 New Starting Motorss
, 13,153 Repower
,'-^ 13',177 New Stack w . , ,
W ~ HB 8,07 0 1/73 UTEX Engine Installed New Generator 1.02 gal /hr
.. Si407 o
' '4
~
10,962 .New Turbo-Charger New Starting Motors
~
- 11,617
, : f 11,617 V New Cylinder (11,13)
F , _
" " 11,696 New Cylinder (10, 9), New Turbo-Charger 7,y /, 12,667 ' New Rear Radiator
~' 12,781 i New Governor y, .
- Source: Discovery Request No. 3.
, -M [
9 -
Ni n x. ..;,
LEGEND
. T. . -
- LONG ISL AND LIGHTING CO. - - - -
PROPERTY BOUNDARY 138 KV OVERHEADLINES t SHOREHAg7 69 KV OVERHEAD LINES NUCLEAR
' ++++=* esse 69 KV UNDER3ROUND CABLE L 8IA TlO N ITTfl TR ANSFORMER ~
D CIRCulT OREAKER ,,
I !
j y l Ma> 13 KV CIRCulT BREAKER I
) NSS i
-/- 69 KV - 138 KV SWITCHES TR ANSFORVER l
[ _
TWO RSS _ , 7 % g i
MAIN TRANSFORMER J g:
& r TRANSFORMERS b
4-25 MW G.M. DIESELS - , [)' '
4 p i 138 KV OVERHEAD SS WW GAS TURBINE =Y
- 1 I F-20MW GAS TURBINE g '
. /N
- 's, - _ _ _ - _ ,
l Higher VoJio9e Circuit f ) ,
i s Alweys Crosses Over Lower %,
V ltage Circuit s 's
% p 138 KV e
i N SUBSTATION N.- -
138 KV OVERHEAD .
OVERHEAD c l
[I z
)
69 KV OVERHEAD R T ET Four Circuits f Shore Common R.O.W. For Appros. l.6 Miles WILDWOOO l Riverhead 69 KV Circuits Shore 69 KV TD NO. SHORE BEACH C POnT JEFFERSON SUBSTATI _
, (( . Common ROW I Approg, g g y, igg 69 KV TO i RIVERMEA F/ gh- f
[ j L~
138 KV TO _
HOLBROOK /- 69 KV TO 138 KV TC
' -[ ..
RIDGE RIVE RHEA
> ! l 138 KV FIGURE C-l BROOKHAVEN NAT'L LAB.
OVERALL LILCO-PROPOSED SYSTEM GE0 GRAPHICAL LAYOUT
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FIGURE C-3 FUEL SYSTEM OF THE EMD DIESEL GENERATORS (Source: EMD Operating Manual, GM April 1958)
FIGURE C-3A Press.re G w e n
- r.el 5.csson .
\ "
- Lates Gange r.ei .*wmp '
2WE4 Engine "
30 ID Checs Valee I*'I O'F To Ingriors { SL,9 - k ~/
Tenn l
rrom insertors , - .,_,,, Ces Ors.t es.e _
. r.e r.iier a e ,,, y ,,,,
Signe Classes Ee.al.ser Lane bes een un.s.
CENER AT!gC L* NIT FL'EL OIL SCHE 4 ATIC FIGURE C-3B Man.at Vag,e r P. I
_; C4,.4 e
,,; Rei.ra rrom Engine
- te-
- 1 -
r , s.,
I t I r' F
f , , ,0 C_, _ .. e . 7,. !__ ="
rm $. o. ,
./ ,,,,,,,e, v.3., , r s. uni , l rTsL Q q,T = ,
Lee cas..er s ,
y I l ,..
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l
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,__ / q g w w Ee.eaiser L.ne See een uneen
(
y p.3 rVEL TRAN$rER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (Apptses To MPA bees Cailpi
-N
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'n e - . . , <m -l ,. -l 3- l.i . g .-
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tr. =
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.= .
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f~ FIGURE C-4
~**^*
=: =.-- .=-.
SNPS NORMAL SYSTEM CONPIGURATION (Source: SNPS FSAR, Figure 8.2.1-1)
(.
}-
1 f.
)
)
k' i.
f-l r
I.
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ATTACHMENT D
') ?
I, l
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j --
s t
F M A. L. .s,. ~ . . _ . . _ , , . _ _ .. . . _ . . . - - - - . _ _ . . . - . - . . _ _ _ , -
ou.sar uosite omas ' ,, .arte scue.er seapewescy reco ea, una sacasa' POwt2 *** 4a lets suscrease
, ,, c.,,e, uen or (pgr. musistmalue numeCaetases . siiv ear-weTWutf8 t CA3 avamaILp o p.g s . awmetactt TWegeset useeI ava.a.48be avsee mett avatt aet t 88A CTE31s $f f f POsus se arast aet t Os & > 0 8 y a eso se 7
.9999
.99
.04
. 1.0 .llE-7 0.6 l 1.0
.01 0.03 1.0
.lE-3 2 0.1 .33E-10 0.7 -
.15E-3 l
.04 i 0.7 .25 ' I f
' l.0 1.0 .27E-ll!
. 062 i
. 0.3 i 0.03 ' l.0
' l 0.1 .23E-8 ! ,
i ,
.999- !
.99 .04
- . 1.0 .74E-7 O.4 l 1.0 i .01 0.03 '
1.0 --
' l 0.1 .22E-9
.lE-2 0.7 .15E-3
.04 i
.25 ,
1.0 i 0.7 i
! 1.0 i .18E-10 i
0.3 0.03 l {
1.0 , o1 i .16E-7
!. t l
Total Cumulative Value = 1.0E-7 LOSP; Isolation: Reactor Scrammed:
Entry Conditions Sequence Type 1: Primary System Intact; Coolant
- Injection Available through 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> via HPCI/RCIC; reactor may be depressurized to 150 psia. ,
1-EVENT TREE D-1 (Table 1, Column 3) l L
o .un uuu st e o.esam
- seen. cv
.w,,
, uen ux:= m. eec rw m., ==en c.s x:s l ncma.= .o m. wn
.sg . .. co n a um.co.- en an u nte en o . == nun =e c. e v ..as co..n u ava u ci
.n cse sne on.in avacas avan nets an.tante
.. int.et r aust .tt u a "* ** * * ** " '
2 i
I '
I r
I
/
i l- ,
- s .
i l
l
.995 0.96
.99 "
0.04 1.0 1.0 .22E-6
.15E-l l
.lE-1 0.97 0.03 ' O.8 1 1* .14E-8
.5E-2 l 0.2
.99935 0.7
.15E-3 0.96 r
0.75 0.04 0.25 ' 4 0.7 i 1*o .55E-10j l 1.0 l 0.3 -
3 47 !
0.03 0.8 l 1.0 .NE-7 l 0.2 !
f Total Cumulative Value = 3.2E-7 Entry-Conditions Sequence Type 2: LOSP; Isolation; Reactor Scrammed; Reactor Integrity Intact; Coolant l~
Makeup Available 0-4 Hours: Reactor may be decressurized to 150 psia.
! EVENT TREE D-2 (Table 1, Column 3)
I t
i I
1
..tr o.m -
.,. o ., s,ri su. . a:v
.c .- t,.
.. .,,,,,,, .o.n,-S ie c an.t.u.ite eus.
. e.on.a . swic.u.o.w =>
meia itseae rusas ro.ot u.n a ci vais.u w.
, .w ,n o. ciano.in < ei e avt et .e m.a.Lagt( AWA.L A$t a u a *** ** ou o' o o '
i3 i
l
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- i. t a-I
, i
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I I I i~ l 1 l
3 i i
l I '
0.75 O 96
.99 0.75 -
0.04 .
1.0 0.25 0.3 '
I .52E-3 1.0 .39E-6 0.97 i .lE-1 0.03 ' 05 0.25 ' 1.0 '
O.5 .59E-9
.99985 0.7
, '.15E-3 0.96
- 0.04 0.75 t
0.25 , i 0.7 i 1.0 -
l 1.0 .96E-10 l 0.97 0.03 10 0.5 1
0.5 .41E-6 Total Cumulative Value = 8.lE-7 Entry Conditions Sequence Type 3: 'LOSP ; Isolation; Reactor Scrammed; SORV, LOCA or ADS; no Coolant Makeup Available; Reactor Decressurized to.
Less than 65 psia.
7 l- EVEN IREE D-3 (Table 1, Column 3) l-
I l
tauult IT O msts wetta sage sce 64te Al>rt trv estees teaCIs as' OW.v l t use = taTL POwta ava'TIEL4 gantE
- e Gctioso Amansmar.v gg. CalIsthesutu gwisuevast MuutoCasviso senw s1rustl8 cA5 seipe nG S. fW ( M
- EWiebASLI Ktfatt &&& t IWeast U88tl awagats t.
igeAm 3B1% MU4Will awa40 a9f f avast sat t
' swast aat t Da D 8 as, es Os O.
4 y se I i
I ,
1 i i I
l i i
I , ,
.99 ,
0.04 O.3 . S 1.0 .36E-6 h .20E-2 ' 1. 0 l
.01
.03 i 1.0 .32E-8 0.06 l 0.3 0.7
.15E-3 0.04 ,
.25 ,
0.7 i 1. 0 l 1_ n .88E-10 0.3
'g
.03 1*
-.0 'O.3 .23E-6 Total Cumulative Value = 5.9E-7 i
l' ' Entry Conditions S equence Type 4: LOSP; Isolation; SORV, Coolant Injection Available initially.
EVENT TREE D-4 (Table 1, Column 3) i ,
r I
l l
l
-- - , , . . , _ . , , , , . . . ..m - . , -.,.....____,~.m-.- - . . _ . . . . - . . . ~ - . . _ . . . , . . . . _ _ . . . . . _ . - . . . . - . . _ .
wasa ras.<ix' <w-e s t use-use uvuit e m sw. - .m3 wwy
.; t,,,3
,,,, ca.,v, ueo r.ecovnei fltWICMT&8 Eu 80stv ilsest as Ca3 POwtm avae6mied Mcrapes ese pe g . Of OFF. M 90evas11 Usse t avnes ass e Sitt mnela atace ase s avtH AGtt awastatt t tWesst easA m ma.tnote avaitartt m es Os O. I > 0 8
, se
- i. I 1
.l l 6-
. i. t I
I I
e i i I
l l
.. i
.99 0.04 0.3 n 10 -
l1.0 . 91E A
. 21E-2
.01 l .03 i i 1.0 ;g,3 9gg_g I Ll 0 .1,3 0.7 . 6
.15E-3
, 0,0L
'~
.25 i ;
0.7 t 1.0 20E--
l1.0 .
t l .03 l 1.0 i
_; , ggg_g 1
Total Cumulative Value = 1.5E-6 j
l
. Entry Conditions for Sequence Type 5: LG P; Isolation; no initial l
Coolant Makeup; Procedural ,
Depressurization c.
\
l EVENT TREE D-5 (Table 1, Column 3) i I -
T' *? Tw w w-r--=--*e w - w- eweera+, w-sm--seaw w-e-r.-e-wree--wm-us--y--mw-e
=
euen snu W SuMCavano seb GC ces aune6ae6g som con 6 e geg agesgo aegag63 ause6Aega muu6asse .
vthJeGamatt
- =9 = e 0 e e W e ten Se On sees
.9942 4.8 8 i ee
.1M 2 8.1 .423-10 in.1 .99999 g , .9943
.113 1 e.e 943 _sen-2 a* e.1 . Leg.L2 i r
}-
.eed2 83 e.9
.SeE-2 0.1 . .348 9
_eee
.9962 e.a ee A..
. 380-3 0.1 .208 8
.in.2 .99999 8i 4.E .
.tsu-s ..,
.383 3 a.' e.1 .4 93.L2
.9942 l
e.3 e.e l .30s-t l
8.1 .30s.4 l Total Cunulative Value = 5.lE-9
' Entry Conditions Sequence Type 1: II)SP, Isolation; Reactor Sw.cuad; Primary System Intact; Coolant Injection Available through 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> via HPCI/PCIC; reactor may be depressurized to 150 psia.
l
- Does not reflect repair.
EVENT TREE D-6 (Table 1, Cblumn 4)
-- , ---w-- - , - ,aw-e--- ,y e-------,,-w--- + . u,s, -w , - -ee.-~ w , -w w #4 =~9-" v c+-' r '-- -' n~c'--=m-' -'"v^
McGM PRES. og or g . Switch rARD SWtiCH Y A RD 60KV POWE R AVAIL A BLE IN IE C T ION F RE QUE NL Y lesJEC T 40N S11E POWER AVAIL ABL E AVAIL ABLE Avall ABL E AVAIL ABLE f0R COHf "4 h' VULNERABit 2u R tes Os Os D F
.995
.9962
,155-1
.30E-2
.2 .17E-/
.5E-2
.99985 0.7 .9962
.15E-3
.8
.30E-2 0.7 .2 .42E-11 9962 0.3
.8
- .3hE-2 2 .11E-7 l
Total Cumulative Value = 2.8E-8 Entry Conditions Sequence Type 2: LOSP; Isolation; Reactor Scrammed; Reactor Integrity Intact; Coolant Makeup Available 0-4 Hours; Reactor may be depressurized to 150 psia.
O Does not reflect repair l
l EVENT TREE D-7 l (Table 1, Column 4) l
gagP)sg) atCovt RY W AIN SACKUP Os s -511( Def SttS
- rIRE waitR StOUfNCE gg gg OF Ot t - SwitCHvaRD SWrt1CMVARD tenvPOWER AVAIL A BLE ledJE C110N ffEOUENCY
- 'I T I" " ' ^I ' * "#"' '* "'" " I '
ptAC7 EON Vu E Bt 3U m hos Os Os O p 0.75
.9962 4 .52E-3 0.3 .
0.5
.30E-2 0.5 .74E-7 0.25 .99905 0.7 .9962
.15E-3 O.5
.30E-2 0.7 . 0.5 .1EE-10
.9962 0.3 0.5
.30E-2
- 0.5 .52E-7 Total Cumulative Value = 1.3E-7
. Entry Conditions Sequence Type 3: LOSP; Isolation; Reactor Scrammed; S0RV, LOCA or ADS; no coolant Makeup Available; Reactor Depressurized to -
Less than 65 psia.
.* Does not reflect repair i
L L
EVENT TREE D-8 l (Table 1, Column 4) l l
f , , _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . , , _ _ , _ , __. , _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ _ . _ _ , , .
~-
- SIRL WAllR SL Out NCE W AIN SACMUP of f-Seit INJE CT ION ffEOLENCY LOSPS stLCOvt9tv SWliCHYARD SOMVPOWER AVAIL A BLE peGH PpE S.- p gy. SWi1CHvstD AVAIL AS LE FOR CORf AvAILASLE AVAIL ASLE AWAtL ABL E VUL N E RABL E IM ACl e0N gait powtR e le fA 4 8W se m 0 F du R W 0.94
.9962
- l 0.9
.20E-2 .38E-2
.3 .41E-7 0.06
.99985
- 0. 7
.9962 7
.15E-3
.30E-2
.3 .10E-10
.9962 0.3
.30E-2
,3 .29E-7 Total Cumulative Value = 7.0E-8 Entry Conditions Sequence Type 4: LOSP; Isolation; SORV; Coolant Injection Available Initially.
- Does not reflect repair l- EVENT TREE D-9 (Table 1, Column 4) l
DtESELS FIRE WATER SECMilNCE M AIN SACMUP OF F-SIT E FRE wihCr L0se s NO RfCOVERY e0KV POWER AV AIL A BLE INJECieON OF OF F - SwlTCMYARD Switch vAhD AVAIL AGL E MOH PRES. AVAILASLE AVAILABLE AVAIL ASL E pe g gg gy $41E PQW%R D F go R Ms Ss Os O.87
.9962
.21E-2
.6
.0038
.4 .12E-6 0.13
.99985 0.7 .9962
.15E-3
.6
.0038
.4 .31E-10 n.1
.9962 0.3
.6
.0038
.4 .87E-7 Total Cumulative Value = 2.lE-7 Entry Conditions for Sequence Type 5: LOSP; Isolation; no initial Coolant Makeup; Procedural l
l Depressurization.
l
\
l
-
- Does not reflect repair t.
EVENT TREE D-10
-- v 7
o.
1 5
i'.
i~l L
[
r r-I'
! ATTACHMENT E L
i i
N rru r 1 - r.. .-. . . _,, ., _. _ _ _ , _ , , . _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ , , . _ , _ _ _ , , __ , , , _ . , , _ ._ ,_ _
Attachment E
-SENSITIVITY STUDIES AND ADJUSTMENTS TO SAI METHODOLOGY AND DATA Some of_the data and assumptions used by SAI in per-forming its Low Power PFA for LILCO could be improved or
~
-made more accurate. The two most significant items are (1) the frequency of occurrence of the loss of offsite power transient at the Shoreham facility, and (2) the as-sumed means of restoring offsite power via the 69 KV switchyard.- It also appears that slight changes are nec-essary-in the probability of restoring power following a loss of offsite power and in the conditional availability of the 138 KV switchyard following the occurrence of a loss of offsite-power. We have recalculated the
~
frequencies of core' vulnerable conditions due to loss of offsite power,-as set forth in Table 1 of our testimony, using corrected data as described below.
'First, we~used a loss of offsite power frequency of.
O.25 events per year..instead of .082 events per year as was used by SAI in both the Low Power PRA and its 1983 E-1 g
I
PRA. 'SAI's loss of offsite power frequency value is based on data-concerning only the LILCO grid. (SAI 1983 PRA, page-3-102). Thus,'its value of .082/ year does not take into account the probability of failures within the E
Shoreham~ switchyard resulting in loss of offsite power.
In our opinion, the failure to account for such failures makes the SAI value unrealistically low.
The. 25/ year frequency of loss of offsite power,
.which we believe-is more realistic, is from a Brookhaven i . National Laboratory assessment of the frequency of loss of offsite power for the nuclear reactors found in the Reliability Council region to which LILCO belongs. See Table E-1. We consider this figure to be conservative, but more realistic than SAI's, because it takes into account _the contribution to losses of offsite power from failures in the switchyards of nuclear power plants. Such failures are a major contributor to loss of offsite power events. 'Although we believe that a value even higher than the .25 figure ~might be appropriate for a plant such as Shoreham which will be operated at low power by relatively inexperienced operating sta f f using equipment subject to break-in type failures, we did not increase the Brookhaven frequency in performing our calculation.
E-2
- e -
=w
Y Second, our recalculation also corrected what we r
= believe'to be an error in the SAI model for offsite power
-availability. The SAI low power event tree for the loss
-: of offsite power transient takes into account the possi-bility._that'offsite power will be restored at different
' times after the transient, with varying probabilities.
SAI.also" assumes, however, availability of offsite 69 KV
' power-with a probability of 0.99985, after the occurrence of the l'oss of offsite power transient. We believe this second assumption is improper,-and amounts to double
~
counting, because the probability of restoring offsite 69 KV power s is already included in the event tree in the time
~
varying probabilities for restoring of fsite power. We have eliminated this double counting in our recalculation.
-The final major change we made was to consider the possibility of repairing the gas turbine and the EMDs fol-lowing.a failure. ~Mue SAI Low Power PRA did not discuss o
, . the'. possibility of. repairing the EMDs and gas turbine.
Thus, to the best of our. knowledge,-the values in Table 1 of ourotestimony. reflect comparable assumptions of no ,
1 ~ repairs forlboth the EMDs and gas turbine, .and the TDIs.
and. gas turbine, then.the difference between the core y E-3 J
g ba _ .. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _.._ ,_ .._ _ _ _ . . .
7 4
vulnerable frequencies for the TDIs and the EMDs and gas turbine-is understated in-Table 1 to our testimony, be-
'cause adding.the repairability assumption to the TDI values would- further reduce the probability of reaching a -
core vulnerable condition.
-We took values from the SAI 1983 PRA to determine the core: vulnerable frequencies assuming the TDIs could be
' repaired .: To be conservative, we used the same TDI repair values used by SAI in our EMD and gas turbine event trees ,
- to determine core vulnerable frequencies for the alternate
' system.
a.
. The-results of our recalculations are summarized in Table E-2. Increasing the frequency of loss of offsite power -increases the ~ estimated frequency of core vulnera-
~
t.
bility due to' loss of offsite power-by an equal factor of about 3 for.both the-alternate and the normal AC power systems. LThus,.the impact of this adjustment is only in the-overaIl core vulnerable frequency, and the adjustment-does not 'af fect' the frequency . for one system relative to m
l U
the other.- The elimination of redundant consideration of
' offsite -power restoration results in a greater increase in the' probability of core vulnerability for the alternate configuration.than for-the normal configuration. This E-4 l
would reflect the greater dependency of the alternative system on the 69 }G7 ' switchyard availability.
' Explicitly considering repair of the gas turbine and EMDs reduces the estimated probability of core vulnerabil-
'ity due'to loss of offsite power for the alternate system.
The TDI analysis showed a comparable reduction in core vulnerable frequency when repairability was included.
Thistis' expected because the system components might be
. returned to operation even though they may have initially failedLto.. operate.
1; Combining"the corrections in' data and methodology de-scribed above, and assuming the possibility of repair for both the alternate and normal systems, the probability of
. core vulnerability due to loss of offsite power, is.still about .a factor of 4 higher for the alternate system. Fur-thermore, . assuming the accuracy of SAI's estimate of 1.6
-E-6 for the annual frequency of core vulnerability from all'other initiating events'during-5 percent operation (SNI'1983 PRA at Table 4-4-1), the likelihood that the Shoreham plant would experience'an event leading to core vul'nerability during 5 percent operation is approximately 2.8 ' times. greater. under the alternate configuration than
'it is-under the. normal-. configuration.
E -
t
TABLE E-1 PLANT-SPECIFIC POSTERIOR PROBABILITY FOR THE FREQUENCY OF THE LOOP-(Events Per Year)
RELIABILITY COUNCIL = NPCC PLANTS IN SITE N T MEAN 5 PERC 55 PERC 95 PERC
- 1. Fitzpatrick 2 5.55 2.0E;01 9.6E-02 2*. 4 EE 01 5.4E-01
- 2. cinna 3 10.57 2.6Ea01. 1.0E-01 2*.2E-Oi 4.6EE01
- 3. tiaddam Neck 5 13.72 3.0E 01 1 3E-01 2".7EE01 5.0E- 01
- 4. Indian Point 2 & 3' 4 7.94 3.5E-01 i.4E-01 j 3*.5E-Oi 6.2E-0')
- 5. Main Yankee 1 7.62 2.0E-01 5.3E-02 1*.7E-Oi 3.8E-01
- 6. Millstone 1&2 1 10.47 1.7E-01 4.5E-02 l'.5E-01 3.2EE01
- 7. Nine Mile Point 1 11.32 1.6E-01 4.3E-02 l'.4E-01 3.1EE01
- 8. Pilgrim 4 7.96 3.5E-01 1.4E-01 3'.0EE01 6.2E-01
- 9. Vermont Yankee 1 8.19 1.9E-0'1 5.1E-02 1".6E-Oi 3.7EIO1
- 10. Yankee l< owe 1 20.70 1.2EE01 2.9E-02 l'.0E-01 2.2E-01 AGGREGATE 23 104.04 2.5E-01 4.4E-02 l'.9E-01 5.8E-01 Source: I. A. Papazoglou et al, Bayes Analysis Under Population Variability With An Application to the Frequency of Loss of Offsite Power in Nuclear Plants, BNL Report, Feb., 1983.
e TABLE E-2 REQUANTIFICATION OF SAI EVENT TREE FOR CORE VULNERABILITY DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TRANSIENT (Frequency Per Reactor Year) s Gas Turbine /zrau Dieselm TDI Diesels '
Type Non-Repairable Repairable Non-Repairable Repairable l
1 -2.3E-5 1.0E-6 1.4E-6 6.4E-8 2 1.9E-5 1.7E-6 1.2E-5 1.lE-6 3 4.0E-6 2.0E-6 7.0E-7 3.5E-7 4 5.6E-6 1.3E-6 5.8E-7 1.6E-7 5 8.7E-6 2.6E-6 1.2E-6 3.6E-7 Sum 6.0E-5 .87E-5 1.6E-5 .21E-5, Note: Column totals may not exactly equal the sum of the figures in each column due to rounding.
f l
- _ . . , . . - . - . . . - . - _ . _ _ - - . . _ . - , . . . _ . . - _ . . . _ - . . . . - , _ . . . . . - - . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . , _ . . - - . . _ . - _ . _ . - . . , , _ - _ .