ML20148T019
| ML20148T019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1988 |
| From: | Crocker D, Kelly R, Lindell M, Mileti D COLORADO STATE UNIV., FORT COLLINS, CO, EECWESTO, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO., MICHIGAN STATE UNIV., EAST LANSING, MI, ROY F. WESTON, INC. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6096 OL-3, NUDOCS 8804200147 | |
| Download: ML20148T019 (173) | |
Text
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ex*.c ra "NC 88 APR 15 P1 :04 D
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^t Y0CKrit,ANf!"VICI i^'
2 lf UNITED STATES OF AMERICA en NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
?)
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board S
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
) (School Bus Driver Issue)
O Unit 1)
)
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, O
ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON TIIE REMANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCIIOOL BUS DRIVERS O
O Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 O
April 13,1988 0
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-O 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
- O In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
) (School Bus Driver Issue)
- O Unit 1)
)
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, O
ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON THE REMANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS O
O Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 O
April 13,1988 O
O-
O LILCO, April 13,1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA mV NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensinz Board
'O In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISI.AND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
) (School Bus Driver Issue)
O Unit 1)
)
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL X. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON THE REMANDED ISSUE O
OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS CONTENTS O
Paze I.
Identity and Qualifications of Witnesses............................ 2 II.
"Role Conflict" of Regular School Bus Drivers....................... 9 O
A.
Li t e ra t u re a nd T heo ry.......................... 9 B.
Empirical D a t a..............................
25 C.
Polls
.....................................40 D.
C o n clusio n.................................
4 8 III.
LILCO's Auxiliary School Bus Driver Procedure.....................49 O
Attachments A-Resume of Douglas M. Crocker B-Resume of Robert B. Kelly C-Resume of Michael K. Lindell D-Resume of Dennis S. Milet!
E "Role Abandonment by Bus Drivers During Emergency Evacua-O tions" by Robert B. Kelly F-Interview Schedule for Bus Driver Study for Organizational Re-spondents G-Results of the Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respondents H-Bus Driver Interview Schedule I-Results of the Bus Driver Interview Study
<O J-LILCO's 1984 testimony, Cordaro e_t_al.. If. Tr. 832, at 88-93.
K "School Transportation Requirements For a One-Wave Evacua-tion" Chart O
O.
L "Regular Bus Drivers Employed By or On Contract to School mV Districts in the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ" Chart M-Pages 11-19 through 11-21 of App. A of the LILCO Plan (Draf t)
N-OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14, "LERO School Bus Driver Proce-dure" (Draf t)
O I. IDENTITY AND QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESSES 1.
Q.
Will the witnesses please identify themselves and provide a brief descrip-tion of their professional qualifications and background?
A.
(Crocker] My name is Douglas M. Crocker. As Manager of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division for LILCO, I oversee all aspects of the Shoreham onsite and offsite (LERO) emergency preparedness program. I am responsible for the development and maintenance of facilities, plans, procedures, training, and drill programs to satisfy NRC and FEMA require-ments. My professional qualifications, and those of the other witnesses, are Attachments A-D to this testimony.
O (Kelly] My name is Robert B. Kelly. I am a Senior Project Manager for Roy F. Weston, Inc., an environmental engineering consulting firm. I have O
been retained as a consultant by LILCO to collect data on how bus drivers have responded in actual emergencies. I have developed and implemented emergency preparedness programs for federal, state, and local government O
agencies, chemical plants, pharmaceutical firms, nuclear power plants, and others.
I have done a study of 50 major U.S. evacuations that have occurred since 1980. The purpose of this research was to identify those
.O f actors which made for a successful evacuation.
(Lindell) My name is Michael K. Lindell. I am an Associate Professor of Psychology at Michigan State University. I am a consultant to LILCO on
- O human behavior in emergencies. My area of research and writing can be
- O
D dafined broadly as individual and organizational response to emergencies.
In this area I have conducted three types of research dealing with (1) "risk pe:ception," (2) "warning response," and (3) "emergency planning."
O (Miletil My name is Dennis S. Mileti. I am Professor of Sociology and Di-rector of the Hazard Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
I am a consultant to LILCO on human behavior in emergencies.
O 2.
Q.
What emergencies have you actually been to and for which have you per-sonally collected data?
A.
( Lindell] My own research has included primary data collection on four O
communities struck by floods (Sumner, Washington on December 2,1977; Valley, Nebraska on March 19, 1978; Fillmore, California on March 14, 1978; and Snoqualmie, Washington on December 2,1977) and four communi-O ties (Cougar Woodland, Longview, and Toutle/Silverlake, Washington) af-fected by the eruption of Mount St. Helens on May 18,1980.
(Mileti] I studied the following disasters shortly af ter they occurred: the O
Wray, Colorado tornado in 1971; the Rapid City flood in June 1972; and the l
1986 eruption of the Nevada del Ruiz volcano in Columbia.
l I have also studied actual warnings of earthquakes for which the O
l threat did not materialize:
the Wilmington, North Carolina earthquake prediction in 1976; the Kawasaki and Tokyo earthquake predictions in 1975; the Parkfield earthquake prediction in 1985; and the San Diego earthquake lO l
i prediction in 1985.
I also studied the 1982 Livingston, Louisiana train derailment; the 1983 Coalinga earthquake; and the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, though O
I was not at these during the immediate impact.
O
. _. e 3.
Q.
What experience have the rest of you had with real emergencies?
A.
(Crocker] I was living on Long Island when Hurricane Gloria hit in 1985.
While I did not participate in any emergency response during the hurricane, I volunteered to serve in LILCO's restoration efforts and performed survey work for damage in the community and later served as a messenger and coordinator of line crew activities for 7-9 days.
In 1978 I was living in Massachusetts when the state was hit by its worst blizzard in decades. My town was hit hard with snow and coastal flooding. Many beach houses were washed away and parts of the area had to be evacuated. The National Guard was called out to assist the communi-ty with traf fic and access control.
[ Kelly) I have been involved in emergency responses to several natural and technological emergencies: the Lynn, Massachusetts fire in 1982; the i
l l
1984 spring floods in western Massachusetts; a 1984 winter storm in eastern Massachusetts; a Massachusetts state employees' strike in 1982; the Salem, f
Massachusetts fire in 1984; the Cuban refugee program in 1980; the 1980 Hurricane Allen recovery program; and many smaller emergencies.
4.
Q.
What experience do you have in emergency planning?
)
A.
(Crocker] At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, I was working in Stone & Webster's environmental engineering department. Af ter TMI the area of emergency planning grew extensively, and I was recruited by man-
)
agement to be trained and to participate in an emergency planning project that was just beginning at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station.
l l
From May 1980 to Jahuary 1984 I worked on and ended up managing all of
)
l Stone & Webster's offsite emergency preparedness activities for the five l
l
)
O unties and tw states surr unding Zimmer in njun ti n with those O
counties and states.
From September 1982 to January 1984, I developed the emergency response plans for the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Kentucky EPZ counties for the Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station. During this time I was the Project Engineer responsible for all emergency planning work in the New York office of Stone & Webster. This included work for the Salem, Shoreham, Indian Point, and Oyster Creek nuclear power plants.
Since 1984 I have been working for LILCO, first as a Stone &
Webster employee and later as a LILCO employee. Initially I worked onsite as the Onsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor. In 1986 I moved to the equivalent position responsible for offsite emergency preparedness activi-ties offsite. Now I oversee both the onsite and offsite emergency prepared-ness efforts for Shoreham.
(Mileti] My experience regarding emergency planning is or several types.
O First, I have conducted academic studies that are related to the topic, and I have written publications based on these studies. Second, I have been in-volved in non-academic practical applications of emergency planning i O knowledge: I have shared knowledge applicable to emergency planning with varied user groups, for example, through speeches and guest lectures as well as through long-term working relationships.
O The academic studies I have performed that are related to emergen-cy planning are varied. These include synthesizing literature reviews as i
well as collecting primary field data. The former is illustrated by the docu-
,O ment entitled Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation M 'he United States, which appeared in 1975 through the Institute of Behavioral Science at the O
D 6-University of Colorado and was written as part of work for the National Science Foundation. Another example is the recent report Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Research by J. Sorensen, B. Vogt, and me, which appeared in 1987 for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
In the decade between the appearance of these works, I also participated in well over a dozen other efforts to appraise knowledge that was in one way or another related to emergency planning issues, and I wrote several dozen papers and reports related to the topic.
My experience with the collection of primary field data on topics re-lated to emergency planning is illustrated by my most recent trip to a di-l saster site in January 1986 to study preparedness and response issues relat-ed to the eruption of a volcano in Colombia, South America,in which some 4
l 24,000 people died. That research was sponsored by the National Academy O
of Sciences. I have also conducted primary field data collection efforts in other studies that amount to probably several thousand interviews; these were mostly research efforts funded by the National Science Foundation.
,O In 1984 I and others completed the report Interf ace in Reactor Emergency Planning and Response for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in which we sought to determine empirically if current regulations for nuclear O
power plant preparedness result in integrated emergency plans.
I have also been involved in non-academic practical applications of j
emergency planning knowledge. For example, I have consulte(1 with about
.O i
a half-dozen utilities on the topic, as well as a variety of governments and organizations, including the State of California, the City of Los Angeles, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, the Paris fire brigade, the Interna-O tional and American Red Cross, IBM, the Governor's Office in the State of Colorado, and others.
O
t*--
2-
- O
_7 In 1981 I helped begin the Southern Ca11fornia
'thq
'e Prepared-ness Project, which is a California-federal cooperat3 effort to prepare for a major earthquake. I am also a member of the Committee on Natural Disasters in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), as well as a member of the Subcommittee on Earthquake Research of the Board on Ea-th Sci-ences to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) also within the N AS. I recently helped the USGS develop its emergency plan for an impending earthquake
- O prediction.
l Finally, from time to time I am called upon to make preparedness-related presentations to seminars on emergency planning and hazard miti-gation hosted by, for example, the Federal Emergency Management Agen-cy, General Public Utilities (GPU-Nuclear), and others.
O (Kelly)
I have worked for FEMA and the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. I worked both as an emergency planner and in a emergency op-l erations role.
'O
! have reviewed and developed state-level emergency plans for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including the State Emergency Broadcast System Plan, the State In-Place Shelter Plan, the State Comprehensive i
O Emergency Management Plan, and the State Disaster Recovery Plan. I also d!rected the development of 165 local community emergency plans, i
I have also aeveloped and conducted emergency training programs O
and conducted capability assessments and hazard analyses studies. As a j
private consultant, I have developed industrial and community emergency preparedness plans.
O I have been involved with radiological emergency planning for the Pilgrim, Seabrook. Yankee Rowe, and Vermont Yankee nuclear power
[
O
.O 4 plants.
My duties included reviewing local, area, and state emergency plans and implementing those plans during emergency drills and exercises.
During these drills and exercises I was in charge of the Emergency Broad-cast System and as a member of the operations staff was responsible for intelligence gathering and resource management.
( Lindell] I would cite my AIF study and the workshop for emergency per-O sonnel in the Three Mile Island area. These are mentioned elsewhere in this testimony.
5.
Q.
What have you done specifically on role conflict?
A.
( Lindell)
Role conflict is addressed in my study (with Patricia Bolton, Ronald Perry, and others) for the Atomic Industrial Forum entitled Planning Concepts and Decision Criteria for Sheltering and Evacuation in a
~ O i
Nuclear Power Plant Emergency, AIF/NESP-031 (June 1985). I also made i
an oral presentation on role conflict at the 1986 Three Mile Island area ex-i ecutive seminar on emergency preparedness.
- O (Mileti)
I discussed role conflict in Mileti, Drabek, and Haas, Human s
Systems in Extreme Environments (1975S Sorensen, Vogt, and Mileti, O
Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Ryearch (1987); "Emergency i
Role Performance in Disaster Response Organizations," Environmental So-ciology (1985); and "Role Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency
- O Workers," Emergency Management Review (1984). Additionally, as I stated in testimony in this proceeding in 1983, I gathered information with the as-sistance of a student from organizational respondents concerning role i
O abandonment during the Three Mile Island emergency. I have also gathered i
information while in Japan about role abandonment from some victims and other informants in reference to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
!O
.O
- U. NME CONCP OF_ REGRAR SCHOOL BUS DRNERS "O
A.
Literature and Theory 6.
Q.
What does the scholarly literature on disaster behavior tell us about "role conflict"?
O A.
(Miletil Russell Dynes, John Sorensen, and I reviewed the literature in our testimony in this proceeding in 1983. Testimony of Matthew C. Cordaro, Russell R. Dynes, William G. Johnson, Dennis S. Mileti, John H. Sorensen,
. O and John A. Weismantle on Behalf of The Long Island Lighting Company on Phase II Emergency Planning Contention 25 (Role Conflict) (Nov. 18, 1983),
ff. Tr. 832, at 51-71.
- O 7.
Q.
Have there been new publications since you last testified on this issue?
A.
(Mileti] Several publications about role conflict and/or role abandonment have appeared since testimony was originally submitted in these hearings in
- O 1983.
Since then I myself have published two articles on this issue, "Role Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency Workers," Emergency Manage-inent Review 2(1):20-22 (1984) and "Emergency Role Performance in Disas-ter Response Organizations," Environmental Sociology, 42:6-10 (1985).
These are little different from each other and little different from my 1983
.O testimony and its conclusions.
The essential point is that emergency workers who have a clear perception of their emergency roles do their jobs in emergencies. The reason is that they use many ways to resolve role con-fl!ct other than abandoning their emergency roles.
A recent attempt to summarize findings in the field of disaster re-search has been provided by Thomas E. Drabek, Human System Responses
- O to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings (New York:
I J
i O
~ Springer-Verlag,1986). At page 145 he makes the following overview con-O f
clusion and citations regarding "role conflict" in emergencies:
A few early researchers, especially Killian (1952), proposed that helping behavior might be curbed at times by forms of "role conflict." That is, persons LO might experience conflicting obligations (51oore et al.,
I 1963).
Killian, in particular, argued that disasters would leave many with conflicts between family and organizational responsibilities.
But subsequent re-search has recast the matter significantly (5111eti, Drabek, and Haas.1975: 67-68).
The conclusions of lO Dynes and Quarantelli appear to be on target (see also, the Proceedings from an N151H-FEh!A sponsored con-ference, Role Stressnrs and Supports For Emergency Workers,1985).
ID2.5 "In our experience over the years,
!O in over 100 disasters and in the course of interviewing over 2,500 different organi-zational officials, we found that role con-flict was no_t a serious problem which creates a significant loss of manpower.
In fact, we have had difficulty in O
finding any illustrations of the phenome-na, let alone documanting the perva-siveness of it" (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976:237).
ID22.Sa(H) (Three propositions as to why O
role abandonment is not found empiri-cally:] "(1.) The total role structure, thus, becomes more coherently organized around a set of value priorities and, at the same time, irrelevant roles which could produce strain are eliminated until
- 0 the emergency is over. (p. 239)...
(2.] Because of the assurar.ce that these organizational members on duty will re-main, other organizational members not on duty have the reassurance that they have time to check personal and familial
,0 damage and also to engage in limited 1
amounts of nnn-occupational role behav-for before reporting. ( p. 24 0 ) [ 3. ]...
family units can make internal allocative decisions which facilitate the assumption of various emergency roles on U
the part of various f amily members (e.g.,
wife may go to EOC with husband and serve as secretary) (p. 240]" (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976:239-240).
(See also O
______ _ _ O
c Nj Dynes,1970a:154-155; Instituut Voor So-O claal Onderzoek Van Het Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam,1955: Form and Nosow, 1958:102.)
Drabek (at p. 30) also refers to Quarantelli as follows:
O~
IIIA1.2 Role conflict experienced by orga-nizational personnel does not precipitate role abandonment; the tendency is to re-main on the job, of ten for too long.
(Based on Quarantelli,1982b:10.)
O Reviewing a variety of studies of the type that I will summarize in the next ahapter, Quarantelli con-c!uded that organizational planners should recognize that what many fear rarely occurs. That is, upon learning of a disaster, personnel do not flock to their homes. If they reside in the impact area, however, O
efforts may be made to ascertain family member safety. Instead of role abandonment, "... there is a strong tendency for staff members to remain on the job too long, or to overuse all personnel concurrently" (Quarantelli,1982b:10). Analytic qualities that might define "outlying" events wherein role abandonment O
may occur remain undefined and controversial.
A 1987 book chapter, "The Concept of Role in Disaster Research,"
by Russell Dynes also addresses "role conflict." Russell R. Dynes, Bruna de O
Marchi, and Carlo Penanda, Eds., Socio. logy of Disasters (Milan: Franco An-gell,1987),71-102. In that chapter (see pp. 80-85) Dynes reports on the findings of field experience by the Disaster Research Center regarding role O
abandonment by emergency workers. He reports the following:
The results... show that among those persons at work.., none abandoned his/her emergency role responsibilities. About 15 percent engaged in search behavior at some time, most of that was done in con-O nection with their job responsibilities (see pp. 82-84).
... For those who were at home..., sixty-two per-cent were involved in what we called an active re-sponse, meaning that they quickly entered the emer-gency social system, either in their work role or in terms of some reaction to an emergency-created O
need. The rest were involved in what we called a passive response in that they did not take any imme-diate action to assume their organizational responsi-bilities. Such a stance, however, is not necessarily O
O-O inappropriate since most worked for organizations which followed a pattern of notifying them if they were needed for work. For those who were neither at work nor at home... eighty-two percent were in-volved in an active response, some went directly to work while others went home before they reported to work or stayed home to await notification (p. 84)....
n
-U In sum, in examining a sample of 443 persons who held positions in emergency-relevant organizations, not one abandoned his/her emergency role obligations to opt for familial-role obligations. For those who were at home, or away from home, or at the work site at the onset of the emergency, the most common v
response was to report to work, or to react in some fashion to needs created by the emergency. Of those persons who were not at work at the time of the emergency, some 28, or less than one percent of the sample, indicated some delay in reporting to work (p. 84).
Role conflict / abandonment was also considered as part of a compre-hensive effort to assess issues and criticisms of evacuation planning for all hazards. This *vork was performed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. See John H. Sorensen, Barbara M. Vogt, and Dennis S. Mileti, Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Research (Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory,1987).
The conclusion reached (at page 147) is as follows:
Role abandonment has been a controversial issue for some hazards. Research suggests that total role aban-donment has not been prevalent in disasters and cer-lO tainly has not been dysfunctional in organizational be-havior.
Some people have hypothesized that role abandonment would be greater and likely problematic in a nuclear power plant accident or during a nuclear war threat. This remains somewhat speculative. Re-search suggests that in the former case there may be
- O an increased potential for conflict and role strain, but emergency functions would not be threatened. In the latter case, the issue is highly uncertain. Additional research on role conflict would be confirmatory but is not of high priority.
O A paper,"Role Conflict and Role Abandonment in Disasters: A Need for Empirical Reorientation." by Barbara J. Friedman was prefented at the O
O
- lg Annual Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society in April 1986. This paper is now part of the Preliminary Paper Series at the Disaster Research j
Center at the University of Delaware. This paper made several observa-tions. Interestingly, at page 17 the author states the following: "In many respects Mileti's argument is very similiar and agreeable with the work done by Barton some twenty years earlier." The reference to my work is to my 1985 article in the Emergency Management Review (which is in essence l
the same as my 1983 testimony in these hearings); the reference to Barton's work is to his book Communities in Disaster, (A. Barton, Communities in l
Disaster (New York: Doubleday,1969)), and to his original 1963 report,
.O l
Social Organization Under Stress:
A Sociological Review of Disaster Studies, for the National Academy of Sciences on which his Doubleday book is based.
10 l
The conclusions made by Friedman (see pages 22-26) can be para-phrased as follows.
First, role conflict does exist during disasters and i
l0 emergencies just as it does during normal times. Second, role conflict may l
increase or decrease during disaster, depending on how the researcher de-fines the term. Third, role conflict and role abandonment are not the same nor indicative of each other. Fourth, it is more than plausible that individ-uals use other methods of resolving role conflict in disasters besides role abandonment. Finally, future research should be directed at how individu-als resolve role conflict in disaster, since many alternatives exist.
Barbara Vogt, a graduate student at the University of Tennessee, is doing a very comprehensive study of evacuations of special facilities. As an adjunct professor at the Univerity of Tennessee,I am on her dissertation iO committee. I asked her what she has found so far. She said that in general
.O l
O' about twice as many people show up to evacuate special f aciltles (nursing homes and hospitals) as there are people who need to be evacuated from them.
Finally, James H. Johnson, Jr., a witness for Suffolk County earlier in these proceedings, has published a 1985 article, "Role Conflict in a Ra-diological Emergency: The Case of Public School Teachers," in the Journal of Environmental Systems 15(1) (1985). This article is based on a survey during normal times of the behavioral intentions of teachers in California with respect to a future, as yet unexperienced emergency. The following conclusion is made on page 83 of this article:
Almost one-third of the teachers surveyed indi-cated that, under the conditions outlined in the nuclear reactor accident scenario, other loyalties or responsi-bilities would take precedence over assisting in a full scale evacuation of schools (Table 1).
.O Similarly, on page 87 of this article the author makes the following state-ment:
flearly one-third of the teachers surveyed stated
.O unequivocally that they would nql assist in an emer-gency evacuation of schools. A strong sense of obliga-tion to family in crisis situations and concern for per-sonal safety appear to be the most important factors in distinguishing these teachers (group 2)....
O These additional publications and research, except for Professor Johnson's, confirm the conclusions ceached in our testimony in this pro-l ceeding in 1983 regarding the actual behavior of emergency workers and in
.O no way suggest that those conclusions would be inapplicable to school bus l
drivers. In general, these conclusions are that emergency workers who i
have clearly defined emergency roles do not abandon their jobs. In other O
words, role clarity f acilitates role performance.
lO
I r
- l
)
We also concluded in 1983 that training is one means by which role l
clarity can be achieved. Nothing in the literature since 1983 changes this view; it is consistent with the empirical evidence and prevailing contempo-rary theory in disaster research.
Professor Johnson, on the other hand, represents a view that is in-correct for the reasons I gave in 1983 and in this testimony,
)
8.
Q.
What does this mean for regular school bus drivers in an emergency at Shoreham?
A.
(Mileti] Although it is likely that regular bus drivers would understand their emergency job in an actual emergency, they have not yet been trained in the specifies of a radiological emergency, and consequently they have not been exposed to all the factors known to enhance role clarity and emergency. ole performance.
As a practical matter, however, this would not likely result in their abandoning school children evacuees. In a real emergency, most untrained bus drivers would undoubtedly realize what their role in a school evacuation would be because of the normative overlap between their routine daily job (driving school children to and from school in buses) and their emergency function (driving school children in buses in the evacuation), and then per-l form that role.
9.
Q.
Professor Cole has suggested (Deposition of Stephen Cole, Jan. 28,1988 at 61-80) that bus drivers have low commitment to their jobs. I think the im-p plication is that blue-collar workers or part-time employees or women are more likely to abandon their jobs than, say, police or firemen. Wh t is your opinion of this?
A.
( Lindell) Work motivation - people's willingness to expend effort to ac-D complish their assigned tasks -is commonly considered to be of two types.
The first of these is "Intrinsic" motivation, which refers to rewards O
L
., inheront in the work itself. Intrinsic motivation comes from factors such
,J as the challenge provided by the job or from its significance -- the degree f
to which it "makes a dif ference." In "extrinsic" motivation, on the other hand, the rewards comes from external inducements such as money and the v
social approval of others.
I The Intervenors' witnesses appear to be saying that in normal cir-cumstances school bus drivers are not likely to be highly committed to
_J their jobs because these jobs provide little intrinsic (job significance) or ex-trinsic (money or social recognition) reward for performance. But this would not be so in an emergency. The opportunity to play an instrumental role in removing school children f rom potential danger would have high sig-nificance and would be likely to earn these drivers an unusual amount of so-cial approval. So whatever the levels of commitment to their duties these O
bus drivers may have in normal situations, they are likely to have a high level of motivation to accomplish their tasks under emergency conditions.
O
[ Mileti} There are many different classifications or ways to categorize people (male vs. female, blue-collar workers vs. white-collar, part-time vs.
full-time employees, and so on). It is no surprise that sociologists have O
thought of an elaborate list of such distinctions and then shown that such distinctions correlate with behavior.
This approach to the study of human behavior is labeled "role theo-
'O ry" and is based on the premise that a person's position in a complex stratified modern society influences his behavior. A social psychological explanation or interpretation of the same premise would be, for example, O
that women are socialized into ditferent roles and adhere to ditferent val-ues and norms f rom men, perceive the world dif ferently from men, and consequently behave dif ferently trom men.
O
) There is an empirical basis for "role theory" regardless of whether
)
one adheres to a sociological or a social psychologicalinterpretation. Typi-cally social categories such as sex and occupational status do correlate with observed variation in human behavior. These statistical correlations are of ten somewhat weak; they rarely exceed.30 or.35 at best, which suggests that the social category can explain perhaps as much as 9% to 12% of the variance in the human behavior being observed. Also, statistical correla-tions, particularly weak ones, do not constitute evidence of cause and ef-fect.
Factors such as sex (male vs. female), occupational prestige (blue collar vs. white collar), and employment (full-time vs. part-time), as well as other social categories, might well be found in any psrticular emergency to correlate with observec variation in behavior in a general public. For h
example, these categories would likely correlate weakly with the rate at I
which people in the general public volunteered for emergency response work.
For example, Professor Barton has showed that males volunteer more frequently than females. See Barton, Communities in Disaster, at 82-83.
The correlation of social categories with behavior does not necessar-ily hold, however, for specialized benavlor of specialized populations such as emergency workers. Occupaticnal prestige (blue collar vs. white collar) weakly correlates with volunteering from the general public for emergency
)
work, but it does not correlate with variation in performing emergency work by emergency workers. Sex (male vs. female) does correlate with vol-unteering from the general public.for emergency work, but it does not cor-
)
relate with variation in performing emergency work by emergency
)
3 workers. The same is true for employment status (full-or part-time). The reason is that role clarity or specification, not social category, determines the behavior of emergency workers.
In simple terms, less educated, part-time blue-collar females do their emergency work for the same reason that better educated, full-time white-collar males do: role clarity exists.
The notion that being a part-time bus driver (a blue collar worker)is Just a job (particularly to women who are more inclined to be interested in other things) is not a surprising opinion. It might be expected to be found among fud-time employed, well-educated males in nonemergency times.
But it is not likely to characterize the viewpoint of emergency bus drivers t
during an emergency, be they male or female.
The reason is that l
emergencies re-prioritize the elements of social life and place emphasis on those that are central to health and safety. In such a context, the social i
a system would elevate to prime status the task of evacuating school chil-dren. What may now to some appear to be "just a job" would take prece-Q dence in an actual emergency over most other routine aspects of social life.
.O 10.
Q.
Dr. Lindell, does the literature of social psychology tell us anything about the issue of bus driver role abandonment?
A.
( Lindell) Yes it does. The literature suggests that those who are trained as bus drivers and who normally drive school children, quite aside f rom
'O feeling obligated to help in an emergency, are likely to want to help. This conclusion is based on the results of studies on "bystander intervention" that are cited in most introductory social psychology texts, as well as more O
advanced sources such as a book by Pillavin, Dovido. Gaertner, and Clark, O
D !
Emergency Intervention (New York: Academic Press,1981). Deaux's and Wrightsman's Social Psychology in the 80's, for example, contains a chapter that reviews a number of studies of bystander intervention, which can be defined as actions taken by an onlooker to help the victim of an emergen-cy.
Deaux and Wrightsman, Social Psychology in the 80's, 4th ed.
(Monterey, Calif.: Brooks-Cole Publishing Co.,1984). Bystander interven-tion involves behavior that is voluntary and which benefits the victim more than the helper.
11.
Q.
What precisely does the research tell us?
O A.
( Undell] Research on bystander intervention has shown that people are motivated to become involved when they see that others have a need that arises from a personal emergency. This research has identified a number of O
ci.aracteristics of the victim, the helper, and the situation that influence whether and how the hciper becomes involved.
In general, the factors identified by this body of research are consis-
.O tent with the idea that bus drivers are likely to be motivated to involve themselves in evacuating school children. The attributes of the victim that l
tend to invoke the helping response are the following:
l 1.
The need is temporary and basic (i.e., the vic-tim's safety is at risk).
2.
The victims are blameless and unable to help themselves.
,0 3.
The victims are attractive (especially children) rather than stigmatized (e.g., convicts).
t j
The attributes of the helper that promote the helping response are r
(Q the following:
f 1.
The helper has the ability to act (for example, the helper is not ill), especially a special i
competence to act.
O l
Ot 2.
The helper has a perceived obligation to act.
0 These are all factors that facilitate a response by the helper. The need to evacuate is temporary; the need is basic (safety): the school children are blameless and unable to evacuate by themselves; they are attractive; and most hus drivers would be able to act and would perceive themselves as naving somial competence to do so.
i Tina (Mt relevant factor is diffusion of responsibility. If a person feels that he has no more responsibility for a victim than any of a number of oths would-be hTipers, then his feeling of obligation to help is dimin-ished. Conversely, if a bu3 drtver feels that alternative sources of assis-tance are not readuy available and that there are not others who are as I
)
quallfim or more qualified as he is, then he is more likely to be motivated to involve hirnself in contributing to a resolution of the emergency. It is
.O hkely that bus drivers whose ordinary job is to drive children would feel es-pe9Lally qualified.
i a
!O 12.
Q.
Is iere anything else?
5 A.
[1.tndell) Yeq In addition, as noted above, there is "extrinsic" motivation ta help.
- O 13.
Q.
Wiiat do ycu ;nean by extrinsic motivation?
A.
( Lindall) As contrasted to the "Intrinsic" desire to help others, explained I
abcyo, extrinsic motivat%n comes from the expectation of the bus driver's
!O employer and community.
i 1
The e :transic motivatocs ve cowards and punishments admirastered j'y ekternai Jource'/. In 'hc lass of the bec cLmpardes nanagement, an ex-O tr!nsic motivation to perform arises trom manage s* abi'ity to monitor bus f
r O
m.
O,
drivers' performance of their tasks and willingness to administer rewards a
for compliance or sanctions for noncompliance with expectations.
Another source of extrinsic motivation would come from the mem-bers of the community at large, and specifically the parents of the school children. To the extent that they perceive the bus drivers as falling to act, even though the drivers have especial competence to do so, these parents are likely to be vocal in their disapproval of the bus drivers' failure to act.
Conversely, bus drivers who do help evacuate school children are likely to receive social approval, especially by the parents.
- O (Crocker, Lindell, Mileti) In a real emergency, it would not be just LILCO wanting school bus drivers to drive. Suffolk County and New York State would also be making a "best efforts" response, and they would want the O
school bus drivers to drive. The school districts would want them to drive.
The bus companies would want them to drive. And the community would j
want them to drive.
l
'O 14.
Q.
But Professor Turner says that the community will eventually approve those who protect '. heir own f amilies, even if that means abandoning school children (Deposition of Ralph H. Turner, Feb. 26,1988 at 27-29).
A.
( Lindell) The community may well tolerate bus drivers going to the aid of O
their own f amilies. But it is hard to believe they will actually approve their failing to act in ' heir area of special competence, where the bus driv-ers have a special skill.
O Also, Professor Turner's analysis applies in the long run. In the short run (that is, during an accident) what will be obvious is that the bus drivers have the ability to move the children from a place of danger to a place of O
safety. That is what would be salient at the time of the emergency.
O
O g (Mileti) The community's reaction would depend on the pilght of the driv-l er's family. The community would indeed be tolerant of a bus driver who lef t his job to protect a f amily that was threatened in a direct, drastic way.
The community would be much less tolerant of a bus driver Who lef t to be g
with his relatively unthreatened family and in doing so lef t threatened school children to shif t for themselves.
O 15.
Q.
Are you saying that LILCO can rely on nothing more than this tendency of l
bystanders to intervene in personal emergencies?
A.
( Lindell] No, the motivation of bystanders to help is an important factor, but there are other factors that should be considered as well.
O The studies of bystander intervention have focused largely on indi-i vidual, rather than communitywide, emergencies. A communitywide emer-gency requires an effective organizational mechanism by which to trans-late high levels of individual motivation into effective communitywide action. This means there should be an effective organizational design that includes planning and training.
16.
Q.
Have you read Allen Barton's book Communities in Disaster (1969)?
A.
(Milet1] Yes, and I do not think Professor Barton and I differ on the essen-O tial points. Consider this passage from his book:
The results of (Medal White's study need careful checking in additional disaster situations, both to over-come the prob!er of eight year retrospection and to cover systematically cases of other types, including the
.O Texas City type, where the distribution of certainties is different. It must be emphasized that the finding of White's study is not that "the great majority of people l
choose their organizational role over their f amily role" l
but that they will do so under certain conditions, which prevailed in the three tornado disasters she studied. In lO other types of disaster -- exemplified by the Texas City explosion - the distribution of knowledge about the
' eeds of the f amily may be quite different. In the case
.i of an atomic attack, the visible extent of fires or the rO
O detectable extent of radiation might create a certainty nv of family danger over a wide area, similar to the Texas City situation.
A. Barton, Communities in Disaster (New York: Doubleday, 1969),120 (em-phasis in original).
O The "conditions" that prevailed in the Texas City explosion are also described in Professor Barton's book:
This finding [Meda White's] contradicts the conclusion O
that has frequently been drawn from the Killian study.
White finds an explanation in the unusual ecology of the Texas City disaster studied by Killian: the workers' homes were next to the dock area where the ship ex-ploded.
These homes caught fire, and the workers could see that they had caught fire. The distribution of O
members in the typology of role conflicts was thus heavy in the direct, drastic conflict that is totally inissing in White's interviews from the three tornado cities, with their long, narrow strips of destruction sur-rounded by safe areas.
lO id. at 119-20.
(Lindell, M11eti)
We believe that the difference between Professor Barton's and Turner's conclusion that a significant level of role abandon-j ment would occur and our conclusion that role abandonment would not be a problem can be accounted for by the difference in the nature of the ra-diological emergency that is being assumed. We agree with them that bus drivers might not drive buses if a radiological plume threatened their fami-lies in a "direct, drastic" way similar to that of a person seeing his own house on fire.
O
( Crocker, Lindell]
However, to assume that such a threat would inevitably occur during a radiological emergency is quite inconsistent with O
the results of reactor accident consequence analyses.
O
. (M11eti) The difference between the Texas City type of situation and a ra-diological emergency is this. If a worker sees his house on fire and thinks I
i his f amily is inside, he is likely to think that there is something he could do l
to help, if La were there, that his family could not do by itself. In a ra-diological emergency, if the worker's house were immersed in a radioactive plume, the appropriate protective action would be to shelter or to evacu-I ate. Most workers' families can take those actions with or without the
)
workces being present.
17.
Q.
How do you think the Licensing Board should resolve this issue?
?--
A.
(Lindell, Milet1] Suffolk County has drawn a conclusion, based on the fact that people care about their families and fear radiation and on their reading of early disaster research and role theory literature. We have a
)
contrary conclusion, based on more recent and more pertinent literature on role abandonment and upon a more accurate understanding of the nature of the radiological emergency - as portrayed by reactor accident conse-
)
quence analyses.
The best way to resolve the dispute is to look at empirical data in light of the current literature. The history of science is replete with exam-3 pies of f alse theories that were thought to be true for a long time, until they fell in the face of empirical data. If one finds that many bus drivers have abandoned their jobs in real-life emerget cles, it tends to support Suffolk County. If one finds no such thing,it supports LILCO.
3 J
l I B.
Empirical Data
.O I
18.
Q.
Have ar:y of you witnessed, or heard of, role abandonment in real emergencies in which you were involved?
A.
(Crocker) No. As Hurricane Gloria approached Long Island in September O
1985 LILCO activated two of its emergency response organizations. The l
SNPS Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the Emergency Resto-i ration Organization were called out in advance of the hurricane's arrival to i
,0 wait out the storm at their duty posts. This represented approximately 120 i
l people in the SNPS ERO and 2200 people from the Restoration Organiza-tion. Hurricane Gloria made landiall on Long Island at approximately 10:30 lO a.m.
By 8:00 a.m.,1115 people were stationed at 102 substations across Long Island to ride out the storm and then perform the prompt initial dam-age survey immediately af ter the storm. An 1100 additional personnel as-O signed to Une crews waited at their normal dispatch centers for the storm to pass. All these personnel lef t their f amilies to cope with the hurricane while they performed their emergency functions. As far as we know, there O
were no cases in which LILCO personnel did not report due to f amily con-cerns.
Also, none of the approximately 46 emergency planning profession-O als in LERIO, who have a total of approximately 176 person years' experi-ence, knows of any actual case of role abandonment in an emergency.
( Kelly) No. As mentioned earlier in my testimony, I have been involved O
in many natural and technological emergencies. At the state level, I never observed or heard of any instances of role abandonment. I also never heard of instances of role abandonment at the local response level.
O O
h t l
(Lindell) No.
i (Miletil No, except as follows. When I was inquiring about role conflict in Japan for my testimony earlier in this proceeding, I did hear anecdotes 3
describing medical personnel who at first attempted to treat victims but then gave up the attempt. These stories, if true, are explalned by the un-usual nature of the Hiroshima disaster. It was unusual because it resulted in 3
almost total physical destruction. The bomb destroyed all emergency re-sponse organizations in the community. What this means is that the only emergency response available was from volunteers. The small percentage O
of persons with skills relevant to the post-impact situation (for example, doctors and nurses) did volunteer to perform emergency duties, but some of them were overwhelmed and gave up the effort.
O 19.
Q.
Have you looked for actual cases of role abandonment?
( Kelly, Lindell, Mlleti) Yes.
O
[ Kelly) At LILCO's request, I reviewed iniormation on fitty U.S. evacua-tions. I had previously collected the information for a project for another client which was unrelated to this project. For that project I narrowed the O
set of evacuations to 50 based on the following factors: size, type, geo-graphic location, proximity to a nuclear power plant, special problems, and location type (population density). The goal of this narrowing process was to select 50 incidents that tended to entall large, quickly developing, O
problem-laden evacuations in densely populated areas, particularly if they occurred near a nuclear power plant.
l0 l
f O
O Af ter reviewing the documentation on these 50 cases,Iidentified 16 large-scale evacuations in which buses had been used to evacuate people. !
reviewed secondary sources such as the following:
articles from major media sources (AP, UPI) 0 local newspaper clippings af ter-action reports communications logs police / emergency services reports sociology reports O
A review of these secondary sources revealed no evidence that any bus driver had failed to drive. This study is documented in Attachment E to this testimony.
O Since that study was completed, I have identified three additional evacuations in which buses were used, making a total of 19.
20.
Q.
Isn't it possible that there might have been cases of role abandonment that O
the secondary sources didn't pick up?
A.
(Lindell, Miletil It is unlikely. Newspapers are quick to publish reports of looting and panic even when they don't occur. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
,O 832, at 79. Defections of emergency workers would be "news"; if there were even unsubstantiated rumors of such a thing happening, the newspa-pers would likely mention it.
!O l
21.
Q.
Did you gather any other information?
l A.
(Kelly, Lindell, M11eti) Yes. To gather additional information, Bob Kelly l
l and people under his supervision phoned knowledgeable people who had
- O I
emergency responsibility at each of the 19 disasters. Two separate studies were done. The first surveyed organizational respondents and the second surveyed bus drivers who actually responded to these emergencies. The O
survey instrument used in the first study is Attachment F to this testimony O
D,
and the results of that study is Attachment G.
The survey instrument for J
the bus driver study is Attachment H and its results are found at Attach-ment I to this testimony.
Of the 19 evacuations investigated,17 involved technological haz-ards and two involved natural hazards. The evacuations involved from 1000 to 300,000 people. Siost of the evacuations involved the use of buses to evacuate non-sch@l populations; although, four involved the evacuation of two to seven schools, t
22.
Q.
What did the organizational respondents study find?
O A.
(Kelly, Lindell,5111eti) The completed surveys of the 19 cases showed that all people who needed to be evacusted were in fact evacuated in time.
There were no instances of role abandonment by bus drivers. Pertinent O
findings include the following:
There were no refusals to drive the buses by any notified bus drivers.
- O All bus drivers reported for duty af ter being contacted. In the Nanticoke incident, one woman was determined to drive an evacuation bus because she thought it was har civic duty -
- O despite her husband's protests, in 51arysville, two "mechan-1 l
les" could nct physically make it to the bus yard but pro-ceeded to a nearby rest home to assist in its evacuation.
10 With the exception of o_n_g case, no bus driver arrived late for duty.
In the one exception, orL: bus company in the i
51arysville incident reported that 1 or 2% of the drivers were O
delayed due to traf fic congestion.
JO
)
- i l
3 Atter receiving the duty call, no bus drivers helped evacuate their families before showing up for duty, despite the fact that in nine evacuations,5% to 100% of the drivers had f ami-iles in the area at risk during the emergency.
I There were no reports of bus drivers not doing their job as well as they could have.
In seven of the 19 evacuations, bus drivers did not know be-L forehand that they had an emergency role.
In all of the evacuations, there were enough driver:, to drive evacuation buses. In Denver, rosters of evacuation bus driv-l ers have been prepared as a standard emergency preparedness procedure. Bus drivers wanted to participate in evacuations and volunteered to do it.
In all cases everyone who needed to be evacuated was evacu-l ated.
There were a few isolated instances of problems such as traffic congestion, O
l and difficulties in contacting drivers due to busy telephone circuits, but in i
no case did these problems have a negative impact on the outcome of the evacuation.
O 23.
Q.
What did you find out from the Bus Driver Interview Study?
i A.
(Kelly] By the time we wrote this testimony we were able to reach 27 bus O
drivers who had participated in ten of the 19 evacuation cases we studied.
( Kelly, :.indell, Mileti] We found that the data collected from the bus t
drivers are in line with the data we collected in the organizational respon-e dents study. No bus drivers refused to drive buses during the evacuation t
i O
i
?
A s ;
i and only two drivers reported doing something else before beginning their bus driver functions. As to these two drhers, the first driver reported a e
few minutes later and the other 20 minutes later. We have summarized some of our findings below.
Eighteen of the 27 respondents had other family members at home t
when they received the activation message (Question 11). Nino of the 18 answered Question 7 about whether they thought their household would be threatened by the hazard agent. Seven of the respondents in this group said that the danger to their homes was either extremely or very likely or even odds. Even with this perceived danger to their households, six of the
,O l
seven proceeded immediately with their bus driver dutles (ie, reported to drive or called other drivers). The one exception in this group took an extra 20 minutes to evacuate her children before reporting to drive an
,O l
evacuation bus.
With respect to the nine respondents who did not answer the ques-i i
tion about the perceived degree of danger to their household, we found the i
O following:
I Two respondents said their families were closer to the impact area than they were (Question 10). Nonetheless, both went directly to the
!O l
reporting location af ter being called.
Two bus drivers said they were with their f amilies in the impact area at the time they received the activation message (Question 10).
O One driver made arrangements for his f amily to evacuate and then t
reported to work a "few minutes" later. The other respondent said he felt a great
.ise of personal reponsiblity to help h's f amily by 0
staying at home but instead "gave instruction to (his] son to I
i s
O
evacuate the f amily." This driver said he "felt (his) obligation (was) to drive the bus and felt (his) son could evacuate the fami-ly."
The remaining five reported that they were with their f amilies out-Os side the impact area or were closer to the impact area than their families were (Question 10). All respondents felt their f amilies could protect themselves and felt either no sense or some sense of respon-sibility tr stay home with their f amilies (Questions 13 and 12).
We also discovered that 12 of the 27 respondents felt that to a "great extent""those in the risk area would be protected even if ( the bus drivers) did not go to help" them (Question 15). Notwithstanding this fact, all bus drivers directly reported to drive or helped call out other drivers. Eight of those drivers reported even though they had f amilies at home (Question 11).
I Of these eight, four reported even though there was a perceived threat to l
their household (a threat perceived as extremely or very likely or even odds)(Question 7).
.O l
Seven of the 27 drivers rcported that, according to the activation l
message, the people who needed to be evacuated were in only slight danger or that the message indicated no clear sense of threat (Question 3).
i O
Nonetheless, six of the bus drivers responded immediately and one driver reported af ter a "few minutes" (during which he prepared his f amily to evacuate). Of this group, four of the seven had family at home and two of O
the four lived in the impact area (Question 10) and one felt that it was very likely that her home would be threatened (Question 7).
O i
t
- O
lO - 24.
Q.
Did you found out anything about the level of training these bus drivers O
had?
A.
. (Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) Yes, we did. Seven of the 27 drivers said that they had :eceived no emergency training about their evacuation bus driver role O
before the emergency began (Question 23), (One said he had received mini-mal training then later said he hadn't received any.) All reported to drive directly, or, in one case, in a few minutes. This was true even for four of O
the respondents who had families at home.
Ten of the drivers said they had received a minimal amount of emer--
gency training beforehand (Question 23). The training included first aid or O'
CPR training (three respondents), "flood evacuation training" (one respon-dent), how to operate a wheel chair lif t (one respondent), and disaster and evacuation training by the fire department (one respondent). One respon-O dent said she received training at the bus garage during the emergency and another said she was "just told (she) might have to drive." Only one re-spondent in this category had "in-service training with film strips."
'O The remaining ten drivers said that they had received a moderate or a great amount of training beforehand. This training included school evac-uation and fire drills (three respondents), use of special equipment (oxygen
.O masks and jump suits) (two respondents), and regular school bus driver training (one respondent). Others reported that they train once, twice, or three times a year.
O 25.
Q.
Did you look anywhere else for cases of role abandonment?
A.
( Kelly) 'tes. Since November 1986 FEMA has en ouraged local jurisdic-tions involved in major emergencies to evaluate the strengths and weak-O nesses of their emergency response operations by completing a Disaster O
P O
O Response Questionnaire (DRQ). Among other things, these DRQ's are used to report problems encountered during emergencies, i
i I phoned FEMA headquarters to find out whether the DRQ's show l
l g
role abandonment to be a significant problem in past emergencies. The person I talked to at FEMA made a quick review of the "problems" section of the DRQ's FEMA has on file and told me that he found nothing to suggest that r le aband nment has been a Problem.
O 26.
Q.
But the Intervenors will claim that radiological emergencies are different, j
A.
(Mileti) Yes, but we addressed their theory of the uniqueness of radiation i
O fully in 1983, Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832, at 93-98: Cordaro et al., it. Tr.
i 1470, at 112-15, and again last summer in the Reception Centers remand i
proceeding, LILCO E:c.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony) at 20-23, 25-29.
iO If one is inclined to take their theory seriously, he should look at the
+
empirical data from radiological emergencies. Three Mile Island and Ginna
[
being the principal candidates.
(In 1983 we addressed Hiroshima and l
O Nagasaki as well. Cordaro et al., f f. Tr. 837, at 46-51.)
l 1
Three Mile Island was perhaps the "worst case" for producing role conflict. Risk information was terrible; offsite emergency plans were poor O
or nonexistent; the Catholic Church granted general absolution of sins, pre-sumably on the theory that many people would die; and the expert agency (the NRC) predicted that the reactor would explode, which probably meant l
I
- O a nuclear bomb-type explosion to many people. Yet, as we testified in
[
I -
1983, there is no evidence of role abandonment by emergency workers at l
TMI. Cordaro et al., f f. Tr. 832, at 73-76.
lO 4
i l
i lO l
O 27.
Q.
Professors Cole, Zeigler, and Johnson, in their testimony in the Seabr%K O
proceeding, cited a number of papers about shortages of medical personnel during the Three Mile Island accident. Do these demonstrate role t.bandon-ment?
A.
(Mileti) Earlier in these hearings LILCO (Cordaro et al., f f. Tr. 832, at 72 O
83-85) and Sulfolk County witnesses discussed several publications that, on the surf ace, appeared to reveal role abandonment by hospital workers dur-ing the Three Mlle Island accident. See, for example, Christopher Maxwell, O
"Hospital Organizational Response to the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island: Implications for Future-Orientated Disaster Planning," American Mrnal of Public Health 72(3): 275-79 (1982): J. Stanley Smith, Jr., and O
James H. Fisher, "Three Mile Island: The Silent Disaster," Journal of the American Medical Association 245(16): 165fi-59 (1981); Gordon H. Macleod, "Some Public Health Lessons from Three Mile Islandt A Case Study in O
Chaos," AMBIO 10(1): 18-23 (1981).
Other publications apparently reach the same general conclusion.
See, for example, Dennis L. Breo, "Nuclear Scare Tests Hospital's Disaster O
Plan," Hospitals. J. A.H. A. (1 May): 33-36 (1979): K. Haglund, "At Hershey:
Medical Systems Near Failure During Three Mlle Island," New Physician 28(6): 24-25 (1979); E. Kuntz, "Hospitals Prepare Radiation Plans in Wake O
of Nuclear Plant Accident," Modern Healthcare (9 July):
16 (1979); E.
Kuntz, "Ready to Evacuate Area 7 Nuclear and Chemical Accidents Test Hospital Disaster Plans," Modern Healthcare (May): 14-16 (1979): Stanislav Q
V. Kasl, Rupert F. Chisholm, and Brenda Eskenazi, "The Impact of the Ac-cident at the Three Mile Island On the Behavior and Well-Being of Nuclear Workers. Part I: Perceptions and Evaluations, Behavioral Responses and O
Work-Related Attitudes and Feelings." American Journal of Public Health 71(5):
472-83 (1981); Stanislav V. Kast, Rupert F. Chisholm and Brenda O
O Eskenazi,"Tho Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island on the Be-O havior and Well-Being of Nuclear Workers Part II:
Job Tension.
Psychophysiological Symptoms, and indices of Distress," American Journal of Public Health 71(5): 484-95 (1981): William A. Weidner, Kenneth L. Mill-er, Robert F. Latshaw, and G. Victor Rohrer. "The Impact of a Nuclear Crl-sis on a Radiology Department," Radioloey 135 (June):
717-23 (1980);
William E. DeMuth, Jr., and Joseph J. Trautlein, "Thc Luck of Three Mile Island " The Journal of Trauma 19: 792-94 (1979); and others.
These publications do not, however, reveal role abandonment by emergency workers during the Three Mile Island accident. They document the need for energency planning at hospitals for emergency response in which the hospital is a "victim." At no time during Three Mile Island was there a medical emergency. Hospital workers who were off for the week-end or in San Francisco at a convention did not abandon emergency roles by not inventing one during the accident.
Suffolk County witnesses have also pointed to a publication by the Pennsylvania National Guard (Af ter Action Report: Three Mile Island fiuclear incident (Pennsylvania: Department of Military Affairs,1979)) as evidence of role abandonment by national guardsmen during the accident.
O In f act, this report states the fo!!owing at page 12:
- a. Personnel. A review of personnel problems of PNG personnel revealed that an evacuation could have resulted in significant conflicts between personal
.O responsibility to the members f amily and the individual I
responsibility to the PNG when mobilized to deal with the emergency. This was evidenced when many Guard personnel residing in the immediate vicinity of TMI could not be contacted during the condition white of the operation, it was later learned that many person-O nel evacuated their f amilies from the area before being notifled of possible NG participation. These problems were compounded when the radius of the area to be evacuated increased from five to ten and eventually 20 0
O t miles.
Additional complications could have resulted O
from the emfusion and frustration of a direct mass evacuation.
It is difficult to understand how guardsmen who evacuated with their faml-lies can be cast as persons who abandoned their emergency roles, since those roles were not activated when the!r evacuation occurred.
28.
Q.
Does the experience at Chernobyl tell us anything'l O
A.
(Miletil We must make the usual caveats that (1) the Soviets do not freely make information available, (2) their culture is fdf ferent from ours, ?nd (3) no one of whom we are aware has done systematic research on human be-O havior at Chernobyl. We can ray, however, that many people were evacu-ated from the Chernobyl accident. Reportedly city buses from Kley were used:
O soviet officials began to macuate the local population in the town of Pripyat ab,)t.t 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> af ter the explo-sion.
The evacuation was carried out by 1,100 city buses brought in from Kiev,130 kilometers to the south. The town of Chernobyl was evacuated beginning May 2.
O C. Hohenemser, M. Deicher, A. Ernst, H. Hofsass, G. Linder, ano E.
Recknagel, "Chernobyl: An Early Report " Environment 28(5): 6-13, 30-43 (1986), at 13. We have been able to find no evidence that any Soviet bus O
driver f ailed to perform. In f act, all we have been able to find on the point is the following:
The revelation (by Pravda) that 1,100 buses i
O were marshaied for the evacuation was coupled with the assertion that no Kiev driver refused to volunteer, and the f act that 92.000 people were evacuated was couched in an account of the care taken of the refu-gees.
1 t
lQ Serge Schmemann. "Reporter's Notebook: Bit by Bit. Soviet Gets News."
New York Times,14 May 1986. Section A, p.10. col. 3.
There were also
- O
0- reports of some officials shirking their duties, of firemen displaying ex-traordina:'y heroism, and of discontent and strikes by Estonians conscripted to decontaminate the area. But nothing that we can find suggests role abandonment by bus drivers.
29.
Q.
But if the bus drivers came from Kiev, their f amilies wouldn't have been in danger.
A.
(Lindell, Miletil Yes. But, as we testified last summer, people in Kiev were advised to keep their windows closed and wash their fruits and vege-tables. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony) at 22 in the Recep-tion Centers remand proceeding (June-July 1987). We were responding to a County witness's claim in her deposition (which she did not offer in her written testimony) that there had been a "near riot" at the Kiev train sta-tion.
Id. at 26. Apparently people did perceive that there was a ra-O diological risk in Kiev.
30.
Q.
Newspaper articles don't count as scientifically reliable data, do they?
O A.
(Lindell, Miletil No. But there are no scientifically sound, reliable reports of role abandonment in iadiological emergencies.
We have therefore looked for a_n_y reports of role abandonment at Chernobyl -- even if they are O
,t uncertain reliability -- and still we find few or none.
[Milotil In the same spirit, we have looked for anecdotal accounts of role abandonment in other radiological emergencies, and again we find few re-O ports at all and none that is reliable. There have been several radiological accidents; some of them may not have required an offsite emergency re-sponse but did require an emergency response of some sort. Examples are O
the NRX reactor accident at Chalk River, Canada in 1952; the Windscale O
~
. 0 Um in England in 1957; the SL-1 accids in Maho in 1961; the Fermi Unit 1 accident in Detroit in 1966; the Browns Ferty fire in 1975; the rupture of a cylinder of UF6 at the Sequoyah Fuels Facility in Gore, Oklahoma in 1986; and contamination by cesium-137 in Goiania, Brazil in 1987.
The only thing we have found suggesting "role conflict" in these events is a popular account that a reporter interviewed a scientist who had packed his wife and children off when the fire broke out at the Windscale plant. See John G. Fuller, We Almost Lost Detroit (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1975),85. For obvious reasons, we have reason to doubt even this report.
31.
Q.
Professor Cole mentioned a case of a policeman who had abandoned his role.
A.
(Mileti] I am aware of that case. It was so remarkable it was featured on O
the Phil Donahue Show.
As I recollect the television program, the policeman in question was assigned to man a desk and take phone calls during the emergency, which was a flood in Illnois. While performing his duties, the policeman phoned home to check on his wife and two young daughters. His wife told him that the floodwaters had covered the first story of their house and were rising;
- O she had no one to help her evacuate. The policeman called several friends and relatives to help but reached none of them.
At this point the policeman asked his superior if he could leave to
,O l
help his wife. The superior (who allegedly was looking for an excuse to fire i
this particular police officer) said no. The policeman lef t anyway to help i
O.
his f amily. Reportedly, he intended to return to work af ter helping his family, but when he called the station, he was told he had been suspended.
l O
l
0- a4 This anecdote illustrates the process people typically go through in a "role conflict" situation. This police officer went through the usual steps:
1.
He. called his wife. Of ten the threatened spouse is able to evacuate without help, but in this un-usual case she could not.
2.
He called friends and relatives. Of ten there are others who can help the threatened spouse, but in this unusual case there were not.
1 3.
He asked his boss if the organization could cover O
for him while he lef t temporarily. Usually the organization can.
In short, this case illustrates a hignty improbable case in which all of the usual role conflict resolution mechanisms did not work. Moreover, the po-liceman's job (taking phone calls) may or may not have been essential to the emergency response, but it seems te have been of the type that others could cover.
O Of course, an interview of this policeman on the Donahue Show, with his lawyer present, does not constitute good sociological data. If the facts are as stated, all the case of the policeman shows is that role aban-donment can occur, which we have never denied.
-32.
Q.
Will you summarize?
O A.
[ Kelly, Lindell, Mileti] If you look at the empirical facts, Suffolk County's theory of role conflict simply does not hold up.
In 19 cases of nonradiological emergencies in which real bus drivers O
were used to evacuate real people, no reports of role abandonment were found.
In the peacetime radiological emergencies that have been addressed
- O in this proceeding (particularly Three Mlle Island, Ginna, and Chernobyl) there is likewise no evidence of role abandonment such as Suffolk County predicts.
O
O C.
Polls O
33.
Q.
Why do you say that measures of behavioral intentions (polls, for example) do not predict actual behavior?
A.
(Miletil I have repeatedly stated in testimony in these hearings that be-C havioral intentions poli data gathered in non-emergency times should not be taken as in ?!cative of behavior in future, unexperienced actual emergencies. I will not repeat all the reasons I have already stated in prior O
testimony for why I hold this opinion. I would, however, like to give an em-pirical example of how pre-event behavior intentions did n_ot match actual behavior when an event actually did occur.
O I and several others conducted one of the largest, most elaborate, and perhaps best-funded surveys of behavioral intentions in relation to di-sasters or emergencies ever performed. This study sought to explore the O
impacts and response of people to a scientifically credible prediction or warning of an earthquake. We interviewed well over one hundred organiza-tions and several hundred f amilies to ask what people would do if scientists O
were to predict an earthquake. Our interview techniques were detailed and complex; they went to great lengths to present people with detailed sce-
- narios and questions about behavioralir.tentions.
- O The interviews with families are illustrative. We interviewed fami-lies as a group. Prediction scenarios were tape recorded and even visually illustrated on flip-charts. We interviewed respondents in a f ace-to-f ace O
situation. We played the audio tapes that described the prediction at the same time that flip-charts illustrated the scenarios.
At pre-designated points the audio and visual presentations were stopped, questions were O
asked, and behavioral intentions were measured.
.O
- - - - - ~
O Our study concluded that a scientifically credible earthquake predic-tion would result in large social and economic costs for society resulting from the response to the prediction. Subsequently, a "near prediction" was actually issued. It was empirically studied by Professor Ralph Turner and colleagues to determine actual public response to this actual event. Their study did not document any behavior that supported the conclusion we had reached based on our behavioral intentions study. Professor Turner con-cluded, for example, that "the people of Los Angeles County showed few of the perverse effects that are of ten given as reasons for withholding soundly based but uncertain earthquake forecasts"; that there was an "absence of negative effects" (see Ralph H. Turner, "Waiting for Disaster: Changing Reactions to Earthquake Forecasts in Southern California," International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 1(2): 335, 334 (1983)); that "the 0
earthquake threat was not salient in relation to other everyday concerns" (see Ralph H. Turner, "Individual and Group Response to Earthquake Pre-diction," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake
,O Prediction, Unesco Headquarters, Paris, p. 7 (26 Feb.1987)); and that
"[e]xcept for a great deal of informal discussion and attention to media reports and occasional massive
.mor waves, life went on as usual" (see 10 Ralph H. Turner, Joanne M. Nigg, and Denise Heller Paz, Waiting for Disas-ter: Earthouake Watch in California (Los Angeles: University of California Press,1986), 416).
O There are many reasons why these two studies may have documented a wide g3p between behavioral intentions and actual behavior. For exam-plc, behavioral intentions and behavior are different, particularly in regard
- O to emergency behavior. Also, the prediction scenarios used in the study of O
.O intentions differed from the prediction situation that actually occurred.
Consequently, what people took into account or were thinking when they offered intentions was not an accurate estimate of what was operating in the actual situation when it was experienced. But that is precisely the point.
34.
Q.
What is your assessment of the practical significance of Stephen Cole's be-havioralintention polls?
A.
(Lindell, Mileti] Suffolk County appears to have concluded that the re-ported intentions of respondents can be taken at f ace value -- that is, that the bus drivers do not presently intend to, nor will they in the future, drive buses to evacuate school children in a radiological emergency. We, and others, are mindful of the limitations of behavioral intentions data. As Gordon Wood has written:
O Some people who claim that they would intervene in fact would do so. However, in other cases, the self-report procedure (relative measure) would yield a dif-ferent set of results from the nonreactive measure ob-tained by actually staging a crisis. If you were to ask a O
number of people whether they would come to the aid of an elderly person being mugged, it is likely that a number of the respondents would indicate a willingness to help. We have no idea, however, whether they actu-ally would help a victim in a real mugging. Imagine that a close relative (brother, sister) needs a kidney O
transplant. Would you be willing to donate one of your kidneys? Most of us are likely to say yes when the need is far distant (in a hypothetical situation). How many of us would actually give up a kidney? We simply do not know unless f aced with the situation.
O Gordon Wood, Fundamentals of Psychological Research. 3d ed. ( Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1981), 35.
We believe, moreover, that there are other, more plausible interpretations of these data and their relevance to O
the LERO emergency plan.
O
O 35.
Q.
What are these alternative interpretations?
A.
(Lindell, Mileti]
One alternative explanation for these data is that the questions that were asked are assessing only the bus drivers' attitudes to-ward protecting their families. The fact that they have clear concerns about famliy safety does not mean that they would refuse to help in an ac-tual emergency in the future.
Another alternative is that the survey questions are assessing the bus drivers' attitudes toward the utility company. The fact that the re-spondents have negative attitudes toward LILCO in normal circumstances does not imply that they would refuse to help children in an emergency.
Both the social entity (LILCO vs. school children) and the situational re-ferent (normal circumstances vs. an emergency) differ between the cir-cumstances of questionnaire administration and the circumstances under O
which the action would be performed.
36.
Q.
Suppose that one were to accept the interpretation that the polls do in fact mean that bus drivers do not intend to cooperate. Doesn't this present a O
problem to LERO?
A.
[ Lindell, Mileti } Not necessarily, even if the bus drivers' current intention is to refuse to cooperate. In fact, Professor Cole's questionnaire itself has O
helped to communicate to bus drivers what behavior is expected of them in an emergency, and thus may help, however slightly, to clearly communi-cate the expectation that they drive an evacuation bus in a radiological O
emergency.
Moreover, a bus driver's present decision not to drive is not irrevers-ible. Respondents may drive (and we believe that they are likely to drive)
O in an emergency even if they currently are not inclined to do so. The rea-son they would be inclined to carticipate in an emergency is the high O
i
- 0~ degree of helpin7 behavior that has been demonstrated in emergencies, O
ranging in scope fr minor individual emergencies to communitywide di-sasters involving threats to life and health.
In light of the evidence we have cited regarding the strong motivations that people have for helping in a broad range of emergencies, we are extremely skeptical that the role rejection that may have been ex-pressed in order to prevent LILCO from obtaining an operating license would be extended into an emergency situation when the health and safety of school children would be at stake.
lO 37.
Q.
What do you think of the methodology of the County's polls?
A.
[Mileti) As I testified in 1983, I believe there are several methodological flaws in the way the questions are worded and the order in which they were
!O asked. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832, at 89-93. The 1983 testimony is Attach-ment J to this testimony.
( Lindell, Mileti) However, we think that focusing on such flaws in behav-lO ioral intention polls diverts attention from the main point, which is that such polls, no matter how well constructed, cannot predict actual behavior l
in future, unexperienced emergencies.
O i
38.
Q.
Suffolk County witness Stephen Cole has conducted another firemen survey in March 1988. Do you have any comments on the new survey?
A.
(Mileti) I was provided a copy of one of the survey answer forms only a
- o few days ago, and thus I have not had time for an in-depth review. I do have a few comments though, based upon a necessarily brief review.
<O O
O O My first impression of Dr. Cole's new fireman survey is that it ap-pears that the sorts of f actors that scientific, empirical data have shown to be the determinants or causes of behavior in emergencies could not be op-erating in this survey of intentions. As a matter of f act, it appears that no attempt was made to have them operate in this poll at all. I do believe, however, that Dr. Cole agrees that these f actors are important, because he did try to include some of these factors in the survey he presented last summer during the OL-5 exercise hearing.
39.
Q.
Could you give us some examples of what you mean by this?
O A.
(Mileti] Yes, I can. For example, Question 26 reads as follows:
If there was an accident at Shoreham requiring the evacuation of people within a ten mile zone of the plant, do you think that it would be dangerous for you to spend a day working within the evacuation zone?
As this question shows, no attempt was made to simulate what would be going on during an evacuation. The respondent here doesn't have the bene-l fit of the vast array of information that would be available to him during an emergency, such as EBS messages or what his supervisors would tell him, also, in answering this question, the respondent has no idea what he would be doing, where he would be located in the 10-mile EPZ, or whether he O
would have special protective clothing or dosimetry, all of which would in-fluence his opinion about how safe it was to be in the EPZ. To more accu-rately measure the fireman's behavioral intentions, the respondent should
- O have been given more situation-specific factors before being asked to make l
any judgment about what he thought he might do in the situation.
I lo l
l l
l O
O Questi n 8 als has methodological flaws in it. First, this question O
presumes that people who have children in school will want to check on them. (Of course, we all believe that they would in absence of information about school children, but from a methodological standpoint it is incorrect to automatically assume this is so.) Second, this question also did not per-mit the respondents to take any other situational f actors into consideration before stating their behavorial intentions. For example, the respondents weren't told that there are protective measures in place for school chil-dren.
Another flaw in Dr. Cole's most recent survey is evident in Question
- 6. This question asks the respondents what they would do first. The notion in this question of what they would do "first" precludes all other behavior (especially since the survey didn't inquire how long the "first" action would take or what the respondents would do next). The respondent is given no opportunity to respond that he would do more than one thing. In reality, though, if a person says he would make sure his family was safe first, that does not mean that he wouldn't report to work a few minutes later. The re-suits from our bus driver interview study bear out this fact.
Also, Question 6 in Professor Cole's latest poll and its answers are O
confusing because the question has the respondent assuming at the start that he is already at work. But the first answer to this question has the re-spondent reporting to work. Why would the respondent pick this answer if O
he were already at work?
40.
Q.
Suffolk County's witnesses argue that emergency planners should use opin-lon polls in planning. What is your opinion?
O A.
(Lindell, Mileti)
If we accept their thesis, we conclude that planners O
O should provide more personnel than are necessary to carry out an emergen-cy response because a large percentage of personnel will not be available because of role conflict. But the empirical fact, demonstrated in many past emergencies, is that there is of ten an oversupply of personnel. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832, at 17.
(Mileti] That is why I have advised against using opinion polls, at least in O
the way Suffolk County urges, for emergency planning. It is not just that they are unreliable; they are harmful. If believed, they focus the planner on the wrong problem -- indeed on a hypothetical problem that is the oppo-O site of what actually happens in emergencies.
[Crocker] Even in the unlikely event that regular school bus drivers were not available, LILCO has alternate provisions for evacuating school chil-O l
dren. We have provided many additional bus drivers so that, even if we as-sume many defections by regular bus drivers, we can still get the job done, as I discuss in Part III of this testimony below.
O 41.
Q.
Apparently a number of school bus drivers on Long Island have signed state-ments saying that they "cannot and will not agree to drive a school bus in the event of an accident at Shoreham." Does this mean that the signers would in f act not help evacuate school children in a radiological emergen-O cy?
l A.
( Lindell, Mileti) No.
It is likely that these statements, like Professor Cole's polls, reflect opposition to the utility or the nuclear plant rather O
than real future behavior.
(Mileti] I testified in 1983 that I had no doubt that school teachers could be found to come forward, in advance of an emergency, and say they would O
not help in an emergency. Cordaro et al., f f. Tr. 832, at 36. The same is O
.O <
l true of bus drivers. That does not mean these pCopie would not driva in an emergency, no matter what they niay say now.
[ Lindell) It is possible that the bus drivers who ?igned the statements are O
slightly less likely than cthers to arive, because in a sense they have nade a public "commitment" not to drive. To this small extent the soliciting of such statements may lessen the public safety. But this has little or nothing O
to do with "role conflict." More important. I would not expect this com-mitment to override the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation to drive that I discussed above.
.O D.
Conclusion 42.
Q.
So what is your conclusion?
A.
[Lindell) Whenever I have raised the hypothetical problem of role conflict O
with people associated with offsite preparedness for emergencies at nucle-ar power plants (for example, at a workshop for emergency planning per-sonnel sponsored by General Public Utilities in the Three Mile Island area in 0
1985), reaction has ranged from surprise to indignation that anyone would think it would happen. Emergency planning professionals simpl) do not re-gard "role conflict" as a real problem in emergencies.
O (Mileti) It is inconceivable to me that third graders (for example) would be lef t on the curb with no transportation during a radiological emergency
- O because their drivers had "role conflict" or for any other reason. I know of no scrap of empirical evidence that any such thing has ever happened in any emergency of any kind.
O l
l I
O t
l 0 III. LILCO'S AUXILIARY SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE I
O 43.
Q.
Mr. Crocker, would you please give us a brief overview of LERO's auxiliary school bus driver procedure?
A.
(Crocker] Yes. First of all, LILCO believes that the regular school bus O
drivers will do their job in an emergency. LERO provides enough LERO school bus drivers, however, to evacuate all public and private schools in the 10-mile EPZ around Shoreham in a single wave. With LERO's auxiliary O
school bus driver procedure, there will be a "backup" LERO school bus driv-er for every regular school bus driver. The LERO "backup" driver would drive a school bus only if a regular driver was unable to drive, or decided O
not to drive, during a Shoreham emergency. Also, there will be enough ad-ditional LERO auxiliary school bus drivers to drive the extra number of buses needed to evacuate all EPZ schools in a single wave. These extra
- O drivers are referred to as "primary" LERO school bus drivers.
Briefly stated, LERO's procedure requires that all LERO auxiliary school bus drivers, that is both backup and primary drivers, will be called l
!O out to help evacuate schools during an emergency at Shoreham. They will l
report directly to pre-designated bus yards and (1), if they are "primary" bus drivers, they will pick up a bus and go directly to one of the schools or O
(2), if they are "backup" drivers, they will inform the bus company dis-patcher that they are ready to drive an evacuation bus in place of a regular bus driver if they are needed. Once at the school, the LERO bus drivers lO will let the school officials in charge know that they are ready to help evacuate the school children. At the direction of school personnel, the LERO bus drivers will evacuate the children to safety.
O O
h
, i 44.
Q.
What do you mean by a "single-wave" evacuation?
A.
(Crocker] A single-wave evacuation means that enough buses and drivers are allocated to each school to ensure that no driver makes more than one trip. As a result, all schools are evacuated as quickly as possible. This practice is consistent with the school evacuation plans for counties around other nuclear power plants in New York State.
O 45.
Q.
If LILCO believes that the regular school bus drivers will drive during a Shoreham emergency, why did LILCO develop this procedure?
A.
[Crocker] LILCO developed its auxiliary school bus driver procedure to remove any lingering doubt that there won't be enough bus drivers to trans-port school children safely out of the EPZ. LILCO also developed this plan so that all EPZ schools could be evacuated as quickly as possible in a single wave.
- O 46.
Q.
How many school bus drivers are needed to evacuate all schools in the EPZ in a single wave?
A.
[Crocker] In all, 488 school bus drivers are need9d to evacuate all public and private schools in the EPZ: 449 are needed for public schools,15 for parochial schools, and 24 for nursery schools.
O 47.
Q.
How did LILCO arrive at these numbers?
A.
(Crocker] For the public and parochial schools we first determined the population of each school, reduced that number by 5% for daily absences, t
O and then further reduced the number for high schools by an additional 20%
to account for students who would evacuate in their own cars or with I
i someone else. Since the Longwood Junior High School is on sollt session, O
we also reduced its student population by half. The final number for each school is the number of students who might need to be evacuated by bus for i
l
i O that school. For nursery schools we used the student population numbers g
given to us oy the nursery schools themselves.
Next we calculated the number of buses needed to evacuate each O
s hool based on 40 students per bus for high school and 60 students per bus for lower grades. These bus capacities are standardly applied in the indus-try. The results of these calculations are Attachment K to this testimony.
O 48.
Q.
Why did you reduce the school populations by 5% for daily absences and by 20% for those students using other transportation?
A.
[Crocker] These assumptions are the same assumptions litigated during the 1984 emergency planning hearings. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, Vol. II, at 55. LILCO believes they are still valid today. In 1984 all school popula-tions were also reduced by 3% for split sessions. Since only one school is on split sessions, however, we reduced only that school's population number by half in our current calculations to more accurately reflect its population at any given time.
O 49.
Q.
How many regular school bus drivers are used by the school districts to transport students who go to schoolinside the 10-mile EPZ?
A.
(Crocker) According to information LERO has been collecting over the past several months, there are approximately 301 regular school bus drivers contracted to or employed by the school districts to drive school buses for public and parochial schools in the EPZ. Parochial schools are figured into this number because public school districts regularly transport parochial school children. Attachment L to this testimony shows the breakdown of regular school bus drivers per school district.
Since nursery schools normally do not provide transportation for O
their students, LERO will provide all of their transporation needs unless O
O they decide to provide their own. This practice is consistent with earlier O
revisions of the LERO Plan. Recently one nursery school told us that it would provide its own transporation during a Shoreham emergency. Thus, LERO will not provide this school any additional transportation.
50.
Q.
How many LERO emergency workers will be auxiliary school bus drivers?
A.
(Crocker)
Presently LERO is training LERO emergency workers to be O
auxiliary school bus drivers. Once the training is completed, LERO expects to have 582 auxiliary school bus drivers to implement its school bus driver procedure. The number of drivers will be adjusted yearly according to cur-O rent school-student populations to ensure that there are always enough bus drivers to do the job.
51.
Q.
How many of the LERO auxiliary school bus drivers live in the 10-mile O
EPZ?
A.
(Crocker] I don't have an exact count of the number of LERO school bus drivers who live in the EPZ. In response to an interrogatory from Suffolk
'O County, I asked my staff to figure a best estimation of the number based on the street addresses of all LERO school bus drivers. Based on that count, about 46 of 562 bus drivers recruited at that time live in the EPZ.
"O This number is conservatively high, because a LERO worker was considered to live in the EPZ if we were unsure from his address whether he lived just inside or just outside the boundary. Of course, some bus driv-
- O ers who do not live in the EPZ may have relatives who do live in it. Con-versely some drivers who live in the EPZ may have no f amily living in the EPZ. Consequently 46 of 562 is likely to be a slightly conservative estimate
!O of the LERO drivers who might have family in the EPZ.
O
O 52.
Q.
If only 488 bus drivers are needed, why are there so many more when you O
add the number of LERO and regular bus drivers together?
A.
( Crocker)
In the interest of conservatism LERO customarily recruits more emergency workers than are needed, providing a 150% call-out for all O
of its LERO emergency worker positions. LERO's auxiliary school bus driv-er procedure has enough auxiliary school bus drivers to back up all 30 t reg-ular school bus drivers on a one-to-one basis. That covers 301 of the 488 0
bus driver positions needed for a one-wave evacuation, which, when counting both regular and LERO school bus drivers, provides 200% coverage for the 301 regular bus driver positions. The remaining 187 bus driver post-O tions will be covered by the rest of the LERO school bus drivers; that is, 281 LERO drivers will fill the 187 positions. This provides 150% coverage for these positions.
O 53.
Q.
When and how would LERO mobilize the auxiliary school bus drivers?
A.
(Crocker) According to page II-20a of the LERO Plan, which is Attach-ment M to this testimony, LERO will mobilize its school bus drivers it one of the following events occurs during an emergency at Shoreham:
1)
LERO makes a recommendation to evacuate or shelter schools; or O
2)
A public school district decides not to dismiss early or cancel classes when recommended by LERO.
To mobilize the LERO school bus drivers, pagers would be set off to a se-O lected group of bus drivers, who in turn would call the rest of the bus driv-ers. The callers would instruct the bus drivers to report to their pre-assigned bus company yard. This procedure is similar to how the rest of
!O LERO's emergency workers are mobilized.
- O
O 54.
Q.
H w wH1 the LERO school bus drivem know where to go?
O A.
(Crocker] LERO school bus drivers will be trained to report directly to a pre-designated bus yard.
O 55.
Q.
what will they do once they get to the bus yard?
A.
(Crocker] LERO auxiliary school bus drivers will serve either as "backup" or "primary" drivers. A LERO "backup" driver will go to a pre-designated
.O bus yard that normally services an EPZ school. Once there, he will tell the bus company dispatcher that he is available to drive a bus if any of the reg-ular school bus drivers elect not to drive. A LERO "backup" driver will O
drive only if the bus company dispatcher directs him to. If the bus dis-patcher asks the LERO driver to drive, the driver will select an Assignment Packet from the LERO box, put on dosimetry, and fill out the emergency O
worker dose record form. Then he will obtain a bus from the dispatcher and head to the schoolindicated in the Assignment Packet.
A "primary" LERO school bus driver will go directly to a pre-O designated bus yard that does not normally service an EPZ school and select an Assignment Packet from the LERO box. Af ter putting on dosimetry and completing the necessary forms in the packet, the LERO primary bus driv-O er will request that a bus be provided to him according to existing con-tracts between LILCO and the bus company. He will then drive directly to the school indicated in the packet.
O 56.
Q.
Explain what the "LERO boxes" are and tell us where they will be kept.
A.
(Crocker] LERO boxes contain the Assignment Packets that will be used by the bus drivers who will drive school evacuation buses during an emer-O gency at Shoreham. The contents of the Assignment Packet is listed in the O
O "LERO School Bus Driver Procedure" which is Attachment N to this testi-mony. There will be a separate LERO box for each bus yard that normally serves an EPZ school and for each addillonal bus yard that LERO will use to supp:ement the number of buses needed for a single-wave evacuation.
,_Q LERO boxes will be stored at each bus yard or will be brought to the bus
' yard at the beginning of the emergency if LERO has not received permis-sion to keep it there. Almost all boxes will be kept at the bus yards howev-er.
57.
Q.
How will the bus company dispatchers know what to do?
O A.
(Crocker) Each LERO box will contain Instructions for the bus company dispatcher explaining what he should do. Also, LERO's procedures provide that the LERO bus coordinator in the EOC will explain the process to him
- O over the phone on the day of the emergency. We also intend to explain LERO's procedure to the bus company dispatchers beforehand.
58.
Q.
How will the drivers know when to go to the schools?
A.
(Crocker] LERO primary school bus drivers will go directly to the schools indicated in the Assignment Packets once they pick up their buses. A back-up LERO school bus driver will go to the school indicated in the Assignment iO l
Packet only af ter the bus company dispatcher asks for his help and assigns a bus to him.
O 59.
Q.
How do the auxiliary school bus drivers know how to get to the schools?
A.
[Crocker] All LERO auxiliary school bus drivers will be trained, like all other LERO bus drivers, on which routes they must take. For example, O
road rallies and/or drills may be used. In addition, each Assignment Packet will contain a map to the evacuating school.
O
O~ 60.
Q.
What will they do at the schools?
O A.
(Crocker] Once at the schools, each LERO school bus driver will report to the school personnel coordinating the evacuation and tell them that he is a LERO bus driver ready to drive the school children out of the EPZ. At the ga direction of school personnel, the LERO bus driver will help load children onto the bus. Before leaving the school the LERO bus driver will request that a school staff member accompany the children. The regular school bus drivers will also help evacuate the schools in the same manner.
61.
Q.
Who will supervise the school children before and af ter getting on the bus?
O A.
[Crocker } Teachers and other school personnel will supervise the school children before getting on the bus in the same manner they do every day or during early dismissal. We expect that at least one teacher will accompany O
the children and provide supervision on each bus.
62.
Q.
Then what?
A.
(Crocker] Af ter the bus is loaded, the school bus drivers will drive to the school relocation center designated for that schoolin the Assignment Pack-et (or proceed to another facility, if directed to do so by the school person-nel on the bus).
O 63.
Q.
How will the school personnel know what to do?
A.
(Crocker] We continually offer training to the school districts and have O
repeatedly expressed our interest in discussing school evacuation plans with them. Furthermore, we intend to provide each school in the 10-mile EPZ with guidelines on what to do in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
O Also, LERO's Public and Private School Coordinators in the EOC will talk with each public school district and private school during the emergency O
i} g about what is happening. In addition, each bus driver will be able to explain the evacuation procedures to school personnel.
e4.
Q.
Why do you believe LERO school bus drivers are qualified to drive school buses during a Shoreham emergency?
A.
(Crocker]
LERO auxiliary school bus drivers are qualified to transport i
school children during a Shoreham emergency because they will have the O
ne essary New York State Class 2 operator's licse and will M trained in their job-specific and other emergency procedures. We do not believe that LERO's auxiliary scitool bus drivers would need any other training to trans-port children, since the evacuation would be a one-time occurrence and g
since at least one teacher would be on the bus to supervise the children.
66.
Q.
Are regular school bus drivers approved of by the school districts in the PZt rive s hool buses?
O A.
(Crocker] According to my staff, bus drivers must be approved before they can drive a bus for a particular school district, either as a regular school bus driver or as a substitute for a regular school bus driver. Various Suffolk County witnesses who are school officials have testified to this fact in their dep%itions.
O 66.
Q.
will LERO school bus drivers recebe the same type of approval? If not, why not?
A.
(Crocker] No. LERO does not intend to obtain the school districts' ap-proval for its auxiliary school bus drivers. LILCO does not believe that emergency workers who are used to evacuate schools in a radiological l
emergency need the approval of the school districts, since they are not l
being employed as regular or substitute school bus drivers and will drive
- O school buses only in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. We do not l
O
O g believe that the approval process was intended to apply to such an excep-tional situation. Furtherm;re, if the concern raised here is about supervi-sion, each bus will have at least one teacher on it to provide the necessary
"d 8"P*'"l81 "'
0 67.
Q.
Do you know anything about how schools are evacuated in the counties around the other nuclear power plants in New York?
A.
(Crocker] Yes. I asked one of EO's consultants, Mr. Richard Watts, to O
call all of the counties within the 10-mile EPZ's of the other nuclear power plants in New York State to find out how they evacuate schools in their E PZ's.
The planners he talked with are from Monroe, Oswego, Orange, g
Putnam, Rockland, Wayne, and Westchester counties. Mr. Watts discovered that all counties evacuate schools in a single wave using both the school districts' regular school bus drivers and other available bus drivers from
.O other bus companies that do not normally serve those schools. Mr. Watts also asked the counties if the additional "non-school" bus drivers were ap-proved by the school districts. Basically, they responded that they had
.O never heard of any requirement that the extra drivers needed the school l
l districts' approval before driving during a radiological emergency.
lO 68.
Q.
Why do you believe that the school districts in the EPZ will let LERO school bus drivers transport their children out of the EPZ during an emer-gency at Shoreham?
A.
(Crocker, Kelly, Lindell. Mileti) We believe that school authorities will
,C use whatever resources are available to them to evacuate their schools.
This means that the school districts would use LERO's buses and drivers as well as their own. To take any other course of action would go against the O
best interest of the chil""en and might endanger their health and safety. If the school districts aie concerned about adequate supervision of the O
D l g
children on the buses, having teachers accompany the children resolves this concern.
69.
Q.
Will LILCO, train regular school bus drivers to implement its school bus driver procedure?
g A.
(Crocker] LILCO has offered through the school districts to train all reg-ular school bus drivers. This training would address emergency procedures, the drivers' emergency role as a bus driver, radiological information, provi-sions for families, information about Shoreham, and the use of dosimetry.
Recently we offered the same training to the school bus drivers at two of the bus companies that service EPZ schools. That training will be coordi-nated through the bus companies. We intend to offer training through the other bus companies in the future.
Any regular bus driver who participates in I.lLCO's school bus driver program will be compensated for his time in training and will receive an annual bonus. In an emergency these drivers would also participate in LERO's family tracking System, and those with families living in the EPZ
,O l
would be eligible to have their families stay at LERO family congregate l
care centers, l
O 70.
Q.
What if a regular school bus driver wants to help with the evacuation but hasn't been trained in LILCO's procedures. How will she know what to do?
i A.
( Crocker] The bus company dispatcher will know in advance thut regular 1
school bus drivers should also use the Assignment Packets to determine lC what they need to do. So if the regular school bus drivers haven't been trained by LERO and want to help evacuate schools, the bus company dis-patcher will tell them to take an Assignment Packet and help evacuate the
.O school described in it. Also, the LERO auxiliary school bus drivers will help i
O
- O - O the regular drivers understand what they need to do. If there are a suff t-cient number of drivers LERO drivers may accompany regular school bus drivers on their assignments.
. O 71.
Q.
LERO drivers will have dosimetry. What will the regular bus drivers use?
A.
(Crocker] Dosimetry will be available in the LERO boxes for all school bus drivers.
Each Assignment Packet will contain two direct reading O
dosimeters (DRD's) and two thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLD's). LERO drivers, who will be fully trained in the use of these devices, will use the two DRD's and one of the TLD's. The other TLD will be used by the regular iO school bus driver who hasn't been trained in dosimetry, so that her exposure may be recorded.
In addition, each Assignment Packet will contain two potassium O
iodide (KI) tablets, one each for the LERO driver and the regular driver who might together fulfill the bus driver assignment.
72.
Q.
If, as LILCO believes, the regular bus drivers will assist in the evacuation,
. O what will the extra "backup" drivers do?
A.
(Crocker]
When all the required buses have been dispatched, the re-maining LERO backup drivers will report to the Patchogue Staging Area for
- O possible reassignment.
73.
Q.
Does this conclude your testimony?
A.
(Crocker, Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) Yes.
lO t
I l
lO l
10 1
OCCKETED USNRC EELATED CORRESP0gg 88 APR 15 P1 :04 UNITED STATES OF AMERICM2c $$' "f l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h e,l_
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
) (School Bus Driver Issue) i Unit 1)
)
ATTACHMENTS FOR TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, l
ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON TIIE REMANDED ISSUE l
OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCIIOOL BUS DRIVERS I
I i
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 April 13,1988 s
- - - - - _Y
O iO-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- O Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
- O In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emettency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
) (School Bus Driver Issue)
.O Unit 1)
)
ATTACllMENTS FOR O
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON THE REMANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS O
O Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 O
i April 13,1988 O
O
O "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS O
DRIVERS TESTIMONY ATTACHMENTS INDEX A.
Resume of Douglas M. Crocker
()
B.
Resume of Robert B. Kelly C.
Resume of Michael K. Lindell D.
Resume of Dennis S. Mileti O
E.
"Role Abandonment by Bus Drivers During Major Emergency Evacuations" by Robert B.
Kelly F.
Interview Schedule for Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respondents
()
G.
Results of the Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respon-dents H.
Bus Driver Interview Schedule I.
Results of the Bus Driver Interview Study J.
LILCO's 1984 testimony, Cordaro et al.,
ff. Tr. 832 at 88-93.
K.
"School Transportation Requirements For a One-Wave Evacua-tion" Chart i10 l
L.
"Regular Bus Drivers Employed By or On Contrect to School Districts in the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ" Chart M.
Pages II-19 through II-21 of App. A of the LILCO Plan (Draft)
!g N.
OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14, "LERO School Bus Driver Proce-dure" (Draft) i O
O O
O DOUGLAS M. CROCKER g
MANAGER, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DIVISION NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SUPPORT DEPARTMENT LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
'O EDUCATION Stevens Institute of Technology - B.E. with Honor in Mechanical Engineering,1972
- O State University of New York at Stony Brook - M.S. in Marine Environmental Science,1978 Stone & Webster Radiological Safety Course Medical Aspects of Radiological Emergencies Course, New York Academy of Medicine,1983
- O Harvard School of Public Health, "Planning for Nuclear Emergencies," 1985 Harvard School of Public Health, "Advanced Planning for Nuclear Emergencies," 1986 FXPERIENCE SUMM ARY O
During the period May 1980 to the present, Mr. Crocker was generally responsible for preparing emergency plans, procedures, training programs, exercise scenarios, and other emergency planning activities.
He was actively involved in ASLB licensing hearings on emergency planning. He has participated in many practice exercises and has observed many emergency plan exercises.
_O Mr. Crocker is presently Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager responsible for the SNPS Onsite and Offsite (LERO) Emergency Preparedness Programs. This consists of developing and maintaining facilities, plans, procedures, training, and drill programs to satisfy NRC and FEMA requirements in support of the SNPS licensing effort. He directs a staff of 45 LILCO and consultant personnel.
From May 1986 to Deceinber 1987, Mr. Crocker served as Supervisor - Offsite Emergency Preparedness in addition to his duties as Manager of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
During the period March 1985 to June 1986, Mr. Crocker was Gnsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor responsible for all onsite planning activities including the onsite portion of the C
1986 NRC observed exercise.
From September 1982 to February 1985 Mr. Crocker was Project Engineer responsible for all Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. - N.Y. emergency planning projects. In this capacity, he directed a staff of forty-five engineers and planners in the execution of up to five simulta-neous pro.lects for utility clients.
cg Mr. Crocker joined Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)in May 1976 as an Engi-neer in the Environmental Engineering Division. Working in the EnvironmentalImpact Anal-ysis Group, his activities included the mathematical modeling of cooling tower visible O
'O plumes, coastal storm surge, and wave effects on shoreline intake structures. He has also had experience with the modeling of thermal discharges from power plants and with the col-g lection and analysis of hydrotnermal data. His past assignments include circulating water system performance tests at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and the preparation of indus-trial energy survey reports for the petroleum refining and olefins industry. At Shoreham, Mr. Crocker was responsible for the collection and analysis of hydraulle transient data.
O Prior to joining SWEC, Mr. Crocker worked as a Research Assistant at the Marine Science Research Center at the State Universr; nf Nec Ynrk at Stony Brook, collecting and analyz-ing oceanographic data during his graduaR sittdy from 1974 to 1976.
From 1972 to 1973, Mr. Crocker worked as an Estimator for L. K. Comstock and Co., Inc.,
preparing bids for electrical construction projects.
O PUBLICATIONS "Radiological Protection Issues Associated with the Establishment and Operation of Public Evacuee Reception Centers on Long Island," D. M. Crocker, D. P. Dreikorn, and R. J. Watts, O
to be presented at the Health Physics Society Annual Meeting, Boston, Mass., July,1988.
"Development and Verification of a Synthetic Northeaster Model in Application to Coastal Flooding," Y. J. Tsai, D. M. Crocker, T. J. Burda, and F. K. Chou, Proceedings of National Symposium on Urban Storm Water Management in Coastal Areas,1980.
.O "Intake Screenwall Surging Caused by Wave Dynamics," Y. J. Tsal Y. C. Chang, and D. M.
Crocker, Hydraulics in the Coastal Zone,1979.
"EN-129: Cooling Tower Visible Plume Modal-User's Manual," Y. J. Tsal and D. M. Crocker, Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., April 1977.
O "EM-128 - Intake Surge Model - User's Manual," D. M. Crocker and Y. C. Chang, Stone &
Webster Engineering Corp., August 1977.
AWARDS
'O Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation's "Ten Best Papers Award," 1980.
- O
!O O
O DETAILED EXPERIENCE RECORD DOUGLAS M. CROCKER g
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY. SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION (May 1984 to present)
O Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division (July 1986 to present)
Mr. Crocker is responsible for all Nuclear Emergency Preparedness activities for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. He oversees the onsite and offsite (LERO) emergency pre-paredness programs to ensure a satisfactory level of preparedness. He is responsible for plans, procedures, drills, training, exercises, and facilities for the 3600 member emergency O'
response organization. In this effort, he directs a staff of 45 LILCO and consultant person-nel. Additional duties include providing technical support and testimony in ASLB licensing hearings, coordinating with legal support organizations, and coordinating exercise activities with NRC and FEMA. During the period July 1986 to December 1987, Mr. Crocker also served as Acting Offsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor.
O Offsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor (May 1986 to July 1986)
Mr. Crocker was responsible for the development and maintenance of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO).
He was responsible for the LERO plan and procedures, training, drills, and f acility maintenance. He supervised a staff of twelve LILCO and consul-tant personnel. Additional duties included support of ASLB licensing hearings on emergency O
preparedness issues and the resolution of FEMA plan and exercise comments.
Onsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor (March 1985 to May 1986)
Mr. Crocker was responsible for the Onsite Emergency Preparedness Program. He directed the preparation and maintenance of:
(1) SNPS Emergency Plan and Procedures, O
(2) Emergency Response facilities, (3) Emergency Preparedness Training Program, and (4)
Emergency Preparedness Drill Program. He was responsible for preparations for the suc-cessful onsite portions of the first NRC observed exercise. He directed a staff of ten LILCO and consultant personnel in this etfort.
Onsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (acting)(May 1984 to February 1985)
Mr. Crocker came to SNPS as a Stone & Webster employee in May 1984 to serve as an interim replacement for the departing LILCO coordinator. He was responsible for the onsite emer-geray preparedness preparations for the first NRC observed exercise. Mr. Crocker lef t Stone 1 Webster to work for LILCO in the same capacity.
O STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION. NEW YORK, N.Y. (May 1976 to February 1985)
Argantments:
Fqbet Engineer - 1982 nV i c"tronmental Engineer - 1982 E.igineer - Environmental - May 1976 O
q Emergency Planning, SWEC-NY (September 1982 to February 1985)
O Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER, responsible for all emergency planning work in SWEC-NY, supervising a group of approximately forty-five planners.
Long Island Lighting Company (September 1982 to February 1985)
O Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER, coordinating planning support services by SWEC per-sonnel at LILCO headquarters and the Shoreham site.
Public Service Company of Indiana (September 1982 to January 1984)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER for emergency planning for the Kentucky portions of O
the Marble Hill NGS emergency planning zone. He was responsible for the preparation of state and county plans, procedures and training.
State of Delaware (September 1982 to November 1983)
Mr. Crocker was PROJEC.' ENGINEER, directing emergency plan, procedure, and training O
program development for the Delaware Department of Emergency Planning and Operations.
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (May 1980 to January 1984)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER for emergency planning for the Wm. H. Zimmer Nu-clear Power Station in Moscow, Ohio. He was responsible for all offsite emergency plans, O,
procedures, and training, and provided licensing support to CG&E during it! ASLB hearings.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (March 1980 to April 1980)
Mr. Crocker was assigned to a feasibility study of alternative fuel uses in industrial boilers
""d'"'"*
O Long Island Lighting Company (November 1979 to February 1980)
Mr. Crocker was assigned to the pressure and performance testing of the cooling water circulating system at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, where he was responsible for data collection and analvsis.
g U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Federal Flood Insurance Administration (FIA)(March 1978 to December 1978)
Mr. Crocker conducted Flood Innsurance Studies for nine coastal communities in Maine. He was PRINCIPAL COASTAL INVESTIGATOR, responsible for the development of a synthetic n
northeaster storm model and for the analysis of coastal flood elevations.
[S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Flood Insurance Administration (FirJ (June 1977 to March 1978)
Mr. Crocker was SUPPORT COASTAL ENGINEER for the Maine flood study. He was as-
,n signed to northeaster computer model development.
O
D 5
N_atforal Oil Company, Libya (May 1977 to June 1977)
D He was responsible for a wave and surge study for intake design. Mr. Crocker determined de-sign parameters of an intake structure located on the Mediterra.r.ean Sea.
Indiana Power & Light Company (March 1977 to July 1977) 9 Mr. Crocker analyzed the hydrothermal characteristics of a cooling tower blowdown dis-charge into the Ohio River.
Millstone Unit No. 3. Northeast Utilities (May 1977)
Mr. Crocker conducted a hurricane surge and wave study for the design of a cooling water D
intake structure.
Long Island Lighting Company (January 1977 to April 1977)
Mr. Crocker participated in hurricane surge and wave analysis. He developed a computer model of intake screenwell surging in response to storm waves. He also calculated storm D
surge elevations caused by a modified probable maximum hurricane.
Koshkonong Units 1 and 2, Wisconsin Electric Power (January 1977 to March 1977)
He analyzed hydrothermal characteristics of a cooling tower blowdown discharge into the Rock River.
O Mystic Station Unit No. 7. Boston Edison Company (August 1976 to January 1977)
Mr. Crocker conducted a hydrothermal field survey and data analysis. He was responsible for a temperature and dye field survey and subsequent analysis to determine the hydrothermal characteristics of a fossil power plant once through cooling system discharge and its effects O
on circulation in the Mystic River Estuary, Jamesport Units 1 and 2. Long Island Lighting Company (July 1976 to August 1986)
Mr. Crocker conducted an analysis of wave forces in the interior of the cooling water intake structure.
,J Montague Units 1 and 2. Northeast Utilities (May 1976 to July 1976)
Mr. Crocker was responsible for the modification and verification of a cooling tower visible plume model. He incorporated upper air sounding data into the analysis of plumes.
State University of New York at Stony Brook (1975 to 1976)
As a RESEARCH ASSISTANT, Mr. Crocker developed computer models of tidal circulation in New York Harbor and the Peconic Estuary.
I o
b RESUME OF ROBERT B. KELLY O
EDUCATION Lesley College, M.S., Management,1984 Tuf ts University, B.A., Political Science,1980 Federal Emergency Management Agency-Professional Development
.O Courses FEMA Courses and Seminars:
Nuclear Civil Protection Seminars
,O Emergency Management -Introduction Radiological Home Monitoring Course Radiological Defense Officers Course Shelter Seminar Population Protection Seminar O
EXPERIENCE Roy F. Weston, Inc.,1987 to Present NUS Corporation, 1985 - 1987 Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, 1981 - 1985 O
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980-1981 Roy F. Weston, Inc. - As a Senior Project Manager in the Expert Systems Department, is responsible for developing emergency management and community right-to-know programs for clients. Currently is managing a major evacuation database project; de-veloping functional specifications for an emergency response expert system; and work-O ing on other emergency management programs.
NUS Corporation - As Supervisor of the Emergency Preparedness Section, directed the development of emergency preparedness programs for nuclear utilities, chemical plants, hospitals, and other industrial facilities, and government agencies. Prepared emergency plans and implementing procedures and conducted capability assessments to O
ensure program effectiveness. Reviewed and integrated facility and local response agency preparedness programs to ensure compatability and compliance with govern-ment regulations. Developed and presented training programs for emergency planning and response. Developed emergency drill and exercise programs including scenario preparation, MSELs, exercise conduct, and evaluation reports.
O Examples of projects at NUS:
Reviewed the emergency plan for a community near a DOE f acility Reviewed a waste water treatment plant's emergency preparedness program O
Developed an emergency plan for a waste water treatment plant O
O:
-2 Reviewed the emerger.cy plan for a pharmaceutical plant, a chemical plant,
^"d "" 'I* "I"8 '* III*Y O
Developed an industrial park emergency plan Developed an industrial emergency annex cf a city emergency operations plan O
Designed exercise plans (MSEL, scenario development, etc.) for two community exercises Evaluated drills and exercises (community and plant level)
Developed an audit procedure for hospital emergency plans Developed an emergency public information booklet for a pharmaceutical plant Conducted a training needs analysis for a pharmaceutical plant Developed a video-based training program for a major industry association O
Developed and conducted a course for industrial emergency preparedness for the American Sc.ety of Safety Engineers Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency - As Assistant Planning Director, managed profes-sional planning of fice staff. Coordinated the Commonwealth's Disaster Assistance Pro-O gram. Responsible for the development and implementation of the State's Comprehen-sive Emergency Management Plan, Emergency Broadcast System plan, and nuclear civil protection plans. Developed programs for disaster recovery activities. Developed pub-lie information and educational programs.
Developed emergency management databases. Directed development of comprehensive emergency management plans and hazard analyses studies for 165 local communities.
In conjunction with local officials, developed training programs and exercises. Assisted in testing the State's radiological emergency plan. Coordinated the Agency's medical services advisory committee. Analyzed current and proposed legislation and prepared impact reports for the Director. Developed the State's Hazard Analysis Study.
O As a junior planner for the State, developed support plans covering medical care, hospi-tal relocation, and transportation routes. Educated local officials through seminars and meetings. Assisted in development of radiological plans for local communities. Partic-ipated in various emergency operations including but not limited to: Lynn fire,1984 i
spring floods, winter storms Salem fire and State employees strike.
r O
Federal Emergency Management Agency - As Emergency Management Specialist, worked on various disaster response and recovt y projects. Coordinated in-processing and out-processing at the Fort McCoy Cuban Refugee Relocation Camp. Served as Ver-ification Specialist during recovery operations in Texas following Hurricane Allen. Re-sponsible for review of damage survey reports and insurance settlements.
O Developed af ter action reports of Cuban Refugee project for the FEMA Regional Dirce-tor.
O
) Assisted in the recovery program for the "Blizzard of 1978" winter storm.
.g MEMBERSHIPS American Society of Safety Engineers Emergency Management Committee of the International Association of Fire Chiefs O-Association of International Disaster Experts National CoorCnating Council on Emergency Management American Society for Public Administration PUBLICATIONS AND TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS g
"Dealing with the Media During Emergencies," HAZMAT 86 Workshop, June 1986.
"Beyond Contingency Planning: Development Strong Emergency Preparedness Capabil-ity," Presented at HAZTECH, August 1986.
O "Choosing and Developing the Proper Emergency Plans for Your Facility," National Health and Safety News, November 1986.
Presentation to the Buffalo Chapter of the American Society of Safety Engineers - De-veloping Emergency Plans.
O Presentation to the Pittsburgh Chapter of the Association of Industrial Hygienists - De-veloping Effective Emergency Preparedness Programs.
Presentation to the Louisiana Loss Control Assocication - Developing Effective Emer-gency Preparedness Programs.
- O I
- O O
P O
l l
O
O i
MICHAEL K. LINDELL t
April 1988 O
EDUCATION Ph D Social / Quantitative Psychology, University of Colorado,1975
{
O.
BA Psychology, University of Colorado,1969 PROFESSION AL POSITIONS 1987 to Associate Professor of Psychology g'
present Michigan State University 1
1987 to Adjunct Faculty Federal Emergency Management Agency present National Emergency Training Center 1986 to Visiting Associate Professor of Psychology O
1987 Georgia Institute of Technology 1981 to Adjunct Assistant Professor of Psychology 1987 University of Washington O
1974 to Research Scientist present Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers 1981 Visiting Lecturer in Educational Psychology School of Education, University of Washington (O
1974 Research Psychologist, K.R. Hammond Associates l
1972 to Data Analyst / Computer Pr frammer i
1974 University of Colorado 1
1971 to Teaching Assistant O
1972 University of Colorado 1970 to Research Assistant 1971 University of Colorado O
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS American Statistical Association Human Factors Society Society for Risk Analysis Judgment /Decisionmaking Society O
American Society of Civil Engineers (Affiliate Member)
O
t O PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR / PROJECT DIRECTOR lO NationalInstitute of Mental Health. Consequences of natural hazards for mental health, 5/77-2/78, $10,000.
Office of Naval Research. Effects of social structure, technology and job design on job satisf action, 3/77-8/80, $77,000.
- O Energy Research and Development Administration. Public perception and evaluation of risk associated with nuclear waste, 10/77-9/78, $50,000.
Private Corporation. Analysis of position evaluation system,5/79-12/79,
$15,000.
- O Department of Energy. Consumer response to gasoline shortage,7/79-1/80,
$30,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Technical assistance in implementing emergency preparedness requirements, 9/79-9/82, $355,000.
- O Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of licensee emergency response iacility designs, C/81-10/81, $56,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Design assistance for NRC headquarters and regional operations centers, 9/81-3/84, $105,000.
O Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of emergency exercises at nuclear power plants, 10/81-9/82, $114,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Analysis of emergency staffing, 10/82-3/84,
$59.000.
O Atomic Industrial Forum. Planning concepts and decision criteria for sheltering and evacuation, 8/83-5/84, $110,000.
National Science Foundation. Contingent conditions for research-based local emergency planning, 6/83-5/85, $21,000.
- O National Science Foundation. Behavioral response to technological hazards, 8/84-11/85, $60,000.
Westinghouse Corporation. Human factors assistance for the Hanford Emergency Control Center, 1/85-9/85, $26,000.
'O Private Corporation. Toxic chemical emergency response plan, 1/86-7/86, i
I
$4 4,000.
Department of Energy. Human factors assistance for the DOE headquarters emergency operations center, 2/86-11/86, $66,000.
O Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of licensee emergency response facilities, 5/86-9/86, $19,000.
'O
D SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL AD HOC REVIEWS O
Academy of Management Review Risk Analysis Disasters International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters Nuclear Safety Journal of Applied Psychology
_U Professional Psychology SCIENTIFIC PEER REVIEW PANEL MEMBERSHIP National Science Foundation Community Water Management Program O
National Science Foundation, Applied Science and Research Applications Directorate National Science Foundation, Earthquake Hazards Mitigation Program National Science Foundation, Decision and Management Science Program Brookhaven National Laboratory, Department of Nuclear Energy University of Washington, Department of Family Medicine n
Pennsylvania State Univerisity College of Medicine, Department of Dehavioral Science University of Pittsburgh, University Center for Social and Urban Research Universitf of Southern California, Institute of Safety and Systems Management National Science Foundation, Geography and Regional Science Program Arg nn National Laboratory, Energy and Environmental Systems Division O
EXPERT TESTIMONY Pub' e Forum on the Operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant sponsored
'O by Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy Public Hearing on the Operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant sponsored by the Plymouth Board of Selectmen and Boston Edison Company Litigation of Long Island Lighting Company's Application for an operating O
license for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station conducted by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, Dockets 50-322-OL-3 (Emergency Planning) and -OL-5 (Emergency Exercise Performanca)
'O PROFESSION AL COMMITTEES Committee Member--American National Standards Institute /American Nuclear l
Society Committee on Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities Conference Chair--American Society of Civil Engineers Specialty Conference on lO Planning for Hazardous Facilities l
l lO 1
L
'O Committee Member--Academy of Management Program Committee O
BOOKS AND CHAPTERS Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management Lexington, MA: Health Lexington Books,1981.
O Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Human Adjustment to Volcano Hazards, Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press,in press.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Handbook cf Emergency Response Planning, New York: Hemisphere Publishing, in press.
O Stewart T.R., Joyce C.R.B. and Lindell, M.K. New analyses: application of judgment theory to physicians' judgments of drug effects. In K.R.
Hammond a.id C.R.B. Joyce (Eds.) Psychoactive Drugs and Social Judgment Theory and Research, New York: Wiley Interscience,1975.
Earle, T.C. and Lindell, M.K. Public perception of industrial risks: a free g
response approach. In R.A. Waller and V.T. Covello (Eds.) Low Probability High Consecuence Risk Analysis issues. Methods and Case Studies, New York: Plenum Press,1984.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Communicating threat information for volcano hazards. In L. Walters (Ed.) Communication in Disaster Disseminating Bad lO News, in press.
JOURNAL ARTICLES O
Lindell, M.K. and Stewart, T.R. The ef fects of redundancy in multiple cue probability learning. American Journal of Psychology 1974, 37, 393-398.
Lindell, M.K. Cognitive and outcome feedback in multiple cue probability learning tasks Journal of Experimental Psycholocy Human Learning and Memory 1976, 2, 739-745.
O 2
Lindell, M.K. Interpretation of the R index in regression models of judgment.
Educational and Psychological Measurement 1978, 31, 69-74.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Psychological consequences of natural disaster.
Mass Emergencies 1978, 3, 105-115.
Lindell, M.K. and Drexler, J.A., Jr., Issues in using survey methods for measuring organizational change. Academy of Management Review 1979, 4, 13-19.
Lindell, M.K. and Drexler, J.A., Jr., Equivocality of f actor incongruence as an O
indicator of type of change in OD interventions. Academy of Management Review 1980, 5, 105-107.
O
.O Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. Evaluation criteria for emergency response plans in radiological transportation Journal of Hazardous Materials 1980,3, O
335-345.
Lindell, M.K. and St. Clair, J.B. TUKKNIFE A jackknife supplement to canned statistical packages. Educational and Physchological Measurement 1980, 4_0, 71-74.
O Perry, R.W., Greene, M.R. and Lindell, M.K. Enhancing evacuation warning compliance suggestions for emergency planning. Disasters 1980, 4, 433-449.
Greene, M.R., Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. The March 1980 eruptions of Mt. St.
Helens: Citizen perceptions of volcano hazard. Disasters 1981, 5, 49-66.
Drexler, J.A., Jr. and Lindell, M.K. Training / job fit and worker satisf action.
Human Relations 1981, 34, 907-915.
Southwick, L., Steele, C., Marlatt, A. and Lindell, M. Alcohol-related expectancies defined by phase of intoxication and drinking experience.
.O Journal of Consultine and Clinical Psychology 1981, 4_9, 713-721.
Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Threat perception and public response to volcano hazard. Journal of Social Psychology, 1982, 116, 199-204.
O Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R. Individual reponse to emergency preparedness planning near Mt. St. Helens. Disaster Management,1983, 3,5-11.
Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Crisis communications, ethnic differentials in interpreting and responding to disaster warnings. Social O
Behavior and Personality, 1982, 1_0,97-104.
Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C. How close is close enough: public perceptions of the risks of industrial facilities. Risk Analysis, 1983, 3, 245-253.
Houts, P.S., Lindell, M.K., Hu, T.W., Cleary, P.D., Tokuhata, G. and Flynn, C.B.
9 The protective action decision model applied to evacuation during the Three Mile Island crisis, international Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 1984, 2, 27-39.
Lindell, M.K. and Barnes, V.D. Protective response to technological emergency
.O risk perception and behavioralintention. Nuclear Safety, 1986, 2_7, 457-467.
Southwick, L., Steele, C. and Lindell, M. The roles of historical experience and construct accessibility in judgments about alchoholism. Cognitive a
Therapy and Research, 1986, 10, 167-186.
O Kartez, J.D. and Lindell, M.K. Planning for uncertainty: the case of local disaster planning. Journal of the American Planning Association,in press.
!O
oo Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. Warning mechanisms in emergency response systems. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, in
- g press.
OTHER ARTICLES n
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R. Mount St. Helens: Washingtonians View Their Volcano. Hazard Monthly, 1980, 1(2), 1-3.
Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Flood Warning: How People React Atter the Warning. Hazard Monthly, 1981, 1(11), 1-6.
O Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. Nuclear power plant emergency warning: how would the public respond? Nuclear News,1983,2_Q,49-53.
Lindell, M.K. Review of "Warning and Response to the Mt. St. Helens Eruption" by Saarinen and Sell. Disasters, 1985, 9, 230-232.
O Perry, P..W. and Lindell, M.K. Source Credibility in Volcanic Hazard Information. Volcano News, 1986, 2_2(12), 7-10.
PRESENTATIONS O
Lindell, M.K.,1976. Assessment of social values in nuclear waste disposal.
Western Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K. and Maynard, W.S.,1976. Interchange of technicalinformation and public beliefs in energy decisionmaking. Western Psychological Association.
O Drexler, J.A. Jr. and Lindell, M.K.,1976. Training / iob fit and worker satisfaction. Western Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1978. Jackknife, ridge and ordinary least squares estimators of regression parameters: a monte carlo comparison. Psychometric Society.
Lindell, M.K. and Drexler, J.A., Jr.,1978. Issues in using survey methods for measuring organizational change. Western Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1978. Equal vs. differential predictor weights; testing hypotheses and estimates with restricted regression models. Psychometric Society.
g Perry, R.W. and Lindell, h!.K.,1979. Predisaster planning to promote compliance with ev)cuation warnings. National Conference on llurricanes and Coastal Storms.
Lindell, M.K., Earle, T.C., and Perry, R.W.,1979. Radioactive wastes; public g
attitudes toward disposal facilities. American Nuclear Society.
O
- o. Lindell, M.K.,1980. Ridge and ordinary least Squares estimators of relative weights in regression analysis. Psychometric Society.
O Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greer.a. M.R.,1980. Race and disaster warning response. Pacific Sociological Association.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R.,1980. Consistency of attitudes and
~,
behavior related to nuclear power. Western Psychological Association.
O.
Greene, M.R., Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K.,1981. Citizen perception of public action. Western Political Science Association.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R.,1981. Individual response to emergency preparedness planning. Western Social Science Association.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R.,1981. Social and psychological f actors affecting evacuation decisionmaking. American Psychological Association.
McGuire, M.V., Lindell, M.K. and Walsh, M.E.,1981. Law enforcement response i
O to an investigative innovation. American Psychology Law Society.
Perry, R.W., Greene, M.R. and Lindell, M.K.,1981. Evacuation behavior during the May 18th eruption of Mt. St. Helens. Pacific Sociological Association.
B lt n, P.A., Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R.,1981. Hazard O
experience and warning response of older persons. Gerontological Society of America.
Earle, T.C. and Lindel', M.K.,1982. Public perceptions of industrial risks.
Society for Risk Analysis Workshop on Low Probability-High Consequence
'O Risk Analysis.
Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C.,1982. How close is close enough: public perceptions of the risks of industrial f acilities. Society for Risk Analysis Workshop on Low Probability-High Consequence Risk Analysis.
O Lindell, M.K.,1982. Judgments, values and the management of conflict over nuclear waste. First International Conference on Social Impact Assessment.
Lindell, M.K.,1982. Development of a design for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's emergency operations center. Human Factors Society.
O Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W.,1982. Protective action recommendations: how I
would the public respond? American Nuclear Society.
l Lindell, M.K. and Southwick, L.L.,1982. An analysis of information integration us_ lng free response data. American Psychological Association.
i O
Southwick, L.L., Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C.,1982. Attitude polarization in public issues: the roles of cognitive complexity evaluative consistency and issue importance. Washington State Psychological Association.
O
O l Hansvick, C. Archea, J., Hanson, H., Keating, J., Lindell, M.K. and Wise, J.A.,
1983. Designing for personal control in hazards and disasters.
O Environmental Design Research Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Analysis of emergency staffing for nuclear power plants.
Human Factors Society.
Lindell, M.K., Moeller, P.A. and Renner, M.S.,1984. Of fsite response 0
considerations for appropriate protective actions. American Nuclear i
Society.
Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W.,1984. Social psychological processes and personal risk assessment. Society for Risk Analysis.
O Lindell, M.K.,1984. Communicating risk information to the public: a review of research on natural hazards. NSF/ EPA Workshop on Risk Communication.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Tukey's "lackknife"in theory and in practice. American Psychological Association.
O Lindell, M.K.,1985. Decision criteria for sheltering or evacuating medical f ac!11 ties in radiological and hazardous matierals incidents. Association for the Advancement of MedicalInstrumentation.
SHORT COURSES AND OTHER LECTURES
!O Lindell, M.K.,1, _J. Perception of risk at nuclear waste disposal sites and power l
Plants. Lecture for Pacific Lutheran University Center for the Study of Public Policy.
O Lindell, M.K.,1983. Emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. Lecture to University of Washington Department of Environmental Health and Nuclear Engineering.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Design of emergency response f acilities. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
O Lindell, M.K.,1983. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
l Lindell, M.K.,1984. Emergency staffing. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
O Lindell, M.K.,1984. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Protective action decisionmaking. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
O Lindell, M.K.,1985. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
O
O Lindell, M.K.,1985. Social and political aspects of nuclear power plant emergency planning. Health Physics Society Short Course on Emergency
.O Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Social response to the Mt. St. Helens eruptions. University of Washington Extension Course on Mt. St. Helens.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Emergency management planning principles for larre-scale 0
emergencies involving technological and natural hazards in developed and developing nations. Administrative Staff College of India Workshop in Risk Analysis in Developing Countries.
Lindell, M.K.,1986. Concerns about offsite response in a nuclear power plant emergen y.
PU Nuclear Annual Training Workshop for TMI Area O
Emergency Response Agencies.
Lindell, M.K.,1987. Public Response Considerations and Pubtle Information.
Federal Emergency Management Agency National Emergency Training Center Short Course on Evacuation Planning and Response Simulation.
Als given in January 1988 and May 1988.
O Lindell, M.K.,1988. Disaster Psychology. Federal Emergency Management Agency National Emergency Training Center Short Course on Multi Hazard Planning (given in February and May).
TECHNICAL REPORTS Over 40 technical reports to governmental and corporate sponsors of grants and contracts. Titles available on request, reports available through the Battelle Human Aff airs Research Centers Technical Library.
'O
'O lO 1
i j
'O i
O
3 ACADEMIC VITA OF DENNIS S. MILETl March, 1988 D
PERSONAL Office:
Department of Sociology Hazards Assessment Laboratory Colorado State University Clark Hall
()
Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 Colorado State University (303)491-5951 or 6045 Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 EDUCATION University of Colorado, Boulder: PhD, Sociology, 1974 California State University, Los Angeles: MA, Sociology, 1971
,sL)
University of California, Los Angeles: BA, Sociology, 1968 SPECIALIZATIONS Complex Organizations, Applied (Hazards and Policy), Methods APPOIN1MENTS 1974-date Faculty, Department of Sociology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins (1985-date, Professor; 1978-1985, Associate Professor; 1974-1978, Assistant Professor),
1984-date Director, Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins.
c) 1986-date Adjunct Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
1981-year Policy Analyst, Seismic Safety Commission, State of California, Sacramento (on leave from university).
1978-1979 Invited Instructor, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chautauqua Short Course Program.
7')
Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Southern 1975-year California, Graduate School of Public Administration, Intensive Seminar Program.
1971-1972 Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Boulder.
O AWARDS 1983-1984 Alumni Honor Faculty Award, Colorado State University Alumni Association for excellence in teaching, research and service 1981-year Cited in Outstanding Young Men of America
()
1978-1977 Cited for excellence in teaching, research and service by the Dean, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences l
KEMBERSHIPS American Sociological Association, International Sociological Association, Pacific Sociolocical Association, Midwest Sociological Society, Earthquake
()
Engineering Research Institute, National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management, Western Social Science Association l
l l
IQ l
O RESEARCH GRANTS AND CONTRACTS O
1987-1988 Associate Investigator, "Preparation of a Model Response Plan for the Three Mile Island Reactor," Public Education and Warnings Group, subcontract from Clark University for the Three Mile Island Public Hecith Fund.
1987-1988 Principal Investigator, "Research Applications for Emergency Preparedness," contract for Public Service nV Company of New Hampshire.
1987-year Associate Investigator, "Socioeconomic Impacts of the Proposed High-Level Radioactive Waste Site at Hanford, Washington," Risk Assessment Team, subcontrCct from Social Impact Assessment, Inc. for the State of Washington.
U-1987-year Principal Investigator, "Public Perception of Seismic Risk in Santa Clara County," grant from the Bay Area Regional Earthquake Preparedness Project and the California Seismic Safety Commission.
1986-1987 Coprinicpal Investigator, "Warning Systems: A State of the Art Review," subcontract from Oak Ridge National O
Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
1984-1985 Associate Investigator, "Evacuation Liability Issues,"
subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the U.
S. Department of Energy.
1984-1985 Principal Investigator, "Assessment of Human Stress Impacts fr m the Livingston Train Derailment and Chemical O
Emergency," contract for Illinois Central Gulf Railroad.
1984-1985 Associate Investigator, "State-of-the-Art Assessment:
Evacuation," subcontract form Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
1984-1985 Associate Investigator, "International Study of Disaster O
Impact on Domestic Assets," subcontract from the University of Georgia for the National Science Foundation.
1983-1984 Principal Investigator, "Research and Applications for Emergency Preparedness," contract for Long Island Lighting Company (reactivated for 1987-1988).
O 1983-1984 Principal Investigator, "Intended and Forgotten Audiences for Emergency Warnings," quick-response grant from the Natural Hazards Research Applications and Information Center.
1982-1983 Associate Investigator, "Organizational Interface for Nuclear Reactor Emergency Preparedness," subcontract from O
Oak Ridge National Laboratories for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1981-year Principal Investigator, "Nuclear Hazard Warnings and Emergency Evacuation Preparedness," contract for Pacific Cas and Electric Company.
1980-1983 Principal Investigator, "Local Land Use Policy O
Decisions," Colorado State University Experiment Station.
1979-1982 Principal Investigator, "Behavioral Aspects of the Three Mile Island Incident and Re-start," contract for General Public Utilities via Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.
O
") 1977-1980 Principal Investigator, "Higration Impacts of Non-metropolitan Areas in the West," Colorado State
()
University Experiment Station.
1977-1979 Principal Investigator, "Adoption and Organizational Implementation of Policy for Land Use Regulations," grant from the National Science Foundation.
1975-1977 Coprincipal Investigator, "Socioeconomic, Organizational and Political Consequences of Earthquake Prediction,"
()
grant from the National Science Foundation.
1972-1974 Research Sociologist, "Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards," grant from the National Science Foundation.
COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPS t/
1987-year Expert panel on Disaster Research and Planning at the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research at the State University of New York at Buffalo.
1984-1988 National Academy of Science, National Research Council, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems,
,s il Committee on Natural Disasters 1984-1988 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, Board on Earth Sciences, Subcommittee on Earthquake Research.
73 1984-1986 National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service, Center for Mental Health.ctudies of Emergencies, Advisory Panel.
1983-year National Science Foundation, U.S. Delegate on Earthquake Prediction Research to Japan, International Scientific Exchange Section.
1983-1986 Front Range Consortium on Natural Hazards Studies,
()
Colorado State University, University of Colorado, University of Denver.
1983-date International Sociological Association, Research Committee on Disasters.
1982-1983 Pacific Sociological Association, Nominations Committee
()
for the Standing Committees for 1983.
1982-date Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Chair, Committee on Social Science Research, Berkeley.
1981-1983 U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Advisory Panel on the Earthquake Studies Program.
1981-1982 Pacific SocioAogical Association, Program Committee for
()
the 1982 Annual Meetings in San Diego.
1981-1982 Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, Threat and Reconstruction Committees, State of California, Sacramento.
1980-1981 Governor's Science and Technology Advisory Council, Committee on the Relocation of Uranium Hill Tailings, C)
State of Colorado.
1979-year American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on Intergovernmental Research and Development on Fire Saf ety and Disaster Preparedness, Washington, D.C.
C)
/
1976-1978 Natioral Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, Committee on
()
Socioeconomic Ef f ects of Earthquake Prediction, Washington, D.C.
BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS AND CHAPTERS O
Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen.
1988.
"Planning and Implementing Warning Systems."
Pp. 204-218 in Mary Lystad (Ed.) Mental Health Response to Mass Emergencies.
Larchmont, N.Y.
Brunner-Mazel.
Tapay, Nenita E., Alan C. Early and Dennis S. Mileti.
1987.
"Irrigation Organization in the Philippines 3 Structure and Effectiveness of National Communal Types."
Po. 209-221 in Harry K. Schwarzweller (Ed.) Research in LJ Rural Sociology and Development. Volume 3.
Greenwich, Connecticut JAI Press Inc.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1987. "Stress from Risk Uncertainties."
Pp. 123-128 in Vincent T. Covello, Lester B. Lave, Alan Moghissi and V.R.R. Uppuluri (Eds.)
Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Decision Making. New York: Plenum Press.
k)
Mileti, Dennis S. 1987.
"Sociological Methods and Disaster Research."
Pp. 57-70 in Russell R. Dynes, B. do Marchi and C. Pelanda (Eds.) Sociology of Disasters: Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Research. Milan, Italyt Franco Angeli Libri.
Sorensen, John H., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1987.
"Programs that Encourage the Adoption of Precautions Against Natural Hazards: Review and Evaluatiorn" cs kJ Pp. 208-230 in Neil D. Weinstein (Ed.) Taking Caret Understanding and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior. New York:
Cambridge.
Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. 1987.
"Natural Hazards and Precautionary Behavior."
Pp. 189-207 in Neil D. Weinstein (Ed.) Taking Caret Understanding and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior. New Yorkt Cambridge.
q' Cochrane, Hall and Dennis S. Mileti.
1986.
"The Consequences of Nuclear War:
An Economic and Social Perspective." Pp. 381-409 in F. Solomn and R.Q.
Martson ( Eds. ) The Medical Implication of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Joanne Nigg.
1986.
"Social Science Earthquake Investigations."
Pp. 167-188 in Scholl (Ed.) Lessons Learned from Recent
()
Berkeleyt Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.
Williams, Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1986.
"Inclusion of Social Variables in Models of Risk Assessment."
Pp. 375-379 in Geotechnical and Geohydrological Aspects of Waste Management.
Bostont Rottendam.
Harwell, Christine C. (Ed.) 1985.
"Experiences and Extrapolations from Hiroshima
()
and Nagasaki." Pp. 427-467 in M.A. Rarwell and T.C. Hutchinson (Eds.)
Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War Volume II:
Ecological and Agricultural Effects.
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Hartsough, Donald M., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1985. "The Media in Disasters."
Pp. 282-294 in J. Laube and S. Murphy (Eds.) Perspectives in Disaster Recovery.
Norwalk, Connecticut Appleton-Century-Crofts.
()
Sorenson, John, Janice Hutton and Dennis S. Mileti.
1984. "Institutional Management of Risk Information Following Earthquake Predictions."
Pp. 913-924 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthquake Prediction. Tokyot Terra Scientific Publishers for UNEGCO. Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li
()
() Huaying (Ed.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology.
- Beijing, China Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 119-126.
()
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen.
1964.
"Social Factors Affecting the Response of Groups to Earthquake Prediction."
Pp. 649-658 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthquake Prediction.
Tokyo Terra Scientific Publishers for UNESCO. Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology.
Beijing, China Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological B:.reau, pp.17-22.
()
Hutton, Janice, Dennis S. Mileti and John Sorensen.
1984.
"Factors Affecting Earthquake Warning System Effectivenss."
Pp. 947-956 in K. Oshida (Ed.),
Earthquake Prediction. Tokyo Terra Scientific Publishers for UNESCO.
Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology.
Beijing, China:
Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 139-143.
()
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982 "A Bibliography for Graduate Research Methods."
Pp. 249-255 in Russel Schutt, Alan Orenstein and Theodore C. Wagenaar (Eds.).
Research Methods Courses:
Syllabi, Assignments and Projects.
Washington, D.C.:
American Sociological Association.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen.
1981. Earthquake Prediction Response and Options for Public Policy. Boulder:
Institute of Behavioral
()
Science.
Hutton, Janice, John Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti.
1981.
"Earthquake Prediction and Public Reaction."
Pp. 129-166 in T. Rikitake (Ed.).
Current Research in Earthquake Prediction.
Boston Reidel Publishing Company, Tokyo Center for Academic Publications.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1981.
"Planning Initiatives for Seismic Hazard Mitigation."
()
Pp. 44-53 in J. Isenberg (Ed.).
Social and Economic Impact of Earthquakes on Utility Lifelines. New York:
American Society of Civil Engineers.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1979. Technostructures and Interorganizational Relations. Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books.
Committee on Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction. 1978. A Program of Studies on the Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction. Washington,
()
D.C.:
National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council.
Gillespie, David F.,
Dennis S. Mileti and Ronald Perry. 1976.
Organizational Response to Changing Community Systems Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.
Mileti, Dennis S., Thocas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas.1975. Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective.
Boulder:
Institute of
()
Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1975. Natural Hazard Warning Systems in the United States.
Boulder Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph 12.
Portions reprinted in Joseph Perry and Heredith Pugh, Collective Behavior
Response
to Stress, 1978.
()
Erickson, Neil, John Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti.
1975.
Landslide Hazards in the United Statest A Research Assessment. Boulder Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1975. Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation in the United States.
Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Ayre, Robert, Dennis S. Mileti and Patricia Trainer.
1975. Earthquake and
()
Tsunami Hazards in the United States: A Research Assessment.
Boulder Institute of Behavioral Science.
O
O <
ARTICLES C)
Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen.
1987. "Determinants of Organizational Effectiveness in Rosponding to Low Probability Catastrophic Events,"
Columbia Journal of World Business.
X).I (1): 13-21.
Sorensen, John H., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1986. "Decision Making Uncertainty in Warning System Organizations," Mass Emergencies and Disasters (accepted and forthcoming).
()
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1785.
"The Ef f ects of Legitimacy on Goal Change and Formalization in Crganization4," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 22(1,2): 33-53.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1985.
"The Human Equation in Earthquake Prediction and Warning," Policy Studies Revied 4(4):725-733.
Sorensen, John H., and Dennis S, Mileti, and Emily Copenhaver.
1985.
"Inter and
()
Intraorganizational Cohesion in Emergencies," Mass Emergencies and Disaster 3(3):27-52.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1985.
"Emergency Role Performance in Disaster Response Organizations," Environmental Sociology (42):6-10.
Mileti, Dennis S., Donald Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick Hufnagel. 1984.
"The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study in Behavioral Indicators of Human C)
Stress, "Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2(1):89-114.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1984.
"Role Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency Workers,"
Emergency Management Review 2(1):20-22.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1984.
"Earthquakes and Human Behavior," Earthquake Spectra 1(1):89-106.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1983.
"Societal Comparisons of organizational Response to 1 ()
Earthquake Prediction: Japan vs the United States." Mass Emergencies and Disasters 1(3):399-414.
M11eti, Dennis S. 1983.
"Public Perceptions of Seismic Hazards and Critical Facilities," Bulletin of the seismological Society of America 72(6)13-18.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1982. "Differentiation in Organizations," Social Forces 60(4):1172-1175.
, ()
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"Structure and Process in the Implementation of Public Policy," Political Science Review 21(1):1-34.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982.
"A Review of Research on Public Policy Adoption," Public Administration Review (accepted and forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S., Doug Timmer and David F. Gillespie. 1982. "Intra and Interorganizational Determinants of Decentralization," Pacific Sociological
,()
Review 25(2):163-183.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen.
1981. "The Multidimensionality of Organizational Size," Sociology and Social Research 65(4):400-414.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1981. "Heterogeneous Samples in DC)
Organizational Research," Sociological Methods and Research 9(3):327-388.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1980.
"Human Adjustment to the Risk of Environmental Extremes," Sociology and Social Research 64(3):327-347.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1980.
"Determinants of Planning in Organizations," Administrative Science Review 10(3):21-32.
M11eti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1980.
"Organizational and
,0 Technological Interdependencies," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 17(3-4):132-158.
- O
]) Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry and Dennis S. Mileti.
1980. "Stress and Transformation," Journal of Social Research 21(2):139-147.
[)
Mileti, Dennis S.,
David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen.
1979. "Structure and Decision Making in Corporate Organizations," Sociology and Social Research 63(4):723-744.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1979. "Action and Contingency V2stulates in Organizations-Environment Relations," Human Relations
.ti!3):261-271.
)
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Patricia Harvey.
1978.
"Correcting for the Human Factor in Tornado Warnings," Disaster Preparedness 2(February):5-9.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Elizabeth Morrissey. 1978.
"Technology and Organizations: Methodological Deficiencies and Lucunae," Technology and Culture 19(1):83-92.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1978. "Organizational Technology and I
2)
Environment Adaption-Manipulation," Scottish Journal of Sociology 2(2):205-219.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1977.
"Socioeconomic and Political l
Consequences of Earthquake Prediction," Journal of the Physical Earth 25(4):283-293.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1977.
"Earthquake Prediction and its 2)
Consequences," California Geology 30(7):147-157, 1977.
Revised and reprinted in San Francisco 20(4):60-68, 1978.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and J. Eugene Haas.
1977. "Size and Structure in Complex Organizations," Social Forces 56(1):208-217.
l Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1977.
"Technology and the Study of l
Organizations: An Overview and Appraisal," Academy of Management Review
)
2(1):6-19. Reprinted in Readings on How Managers Manage.
Englewood l
Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1982.
l Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1976.
"An Integrated Formalization of Organization-Environment Interdependencies," Human Relations 29(1):80-100.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
"Organizational Adaptions to Changing Cultural Contingencies," Sociological Inquiry 46(2):135-141.
Gillespie, David F., Roy Lotz, Dennis S. Mileti and Ronald Perry.
1976.
"Historical and Paradigmatic Differences in the Use of the Goal Concept,"
International Review of History and Political Science 8(30):1-14.
Gfillespie, David F.,
and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
"A Refined Model of Differentiation in Organizations," Sociology and Social Research
{)
60(3):263-278.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
"Earthquake Prediction and Other Adjustments to Earthquakes," Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 9(4):183-194.
Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie, Roy Lotz and Dennis S, Mileti.
1976.
[]
"Attitudinal Variables as Estimates of Behavior," European Journal of Social Psychology 6(1):74-90.
Mileti, Dennis S., Ronald Perry and David F. Gillespie.
1975. "The Analytical Use of Case Study Materials in the Study of 0.ganizations," Sociological Inquiry 45(4):72-50.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Elwood M. Beck, 1975.
"Explaining Evacuation 3
Symbolically: Communication in Crisis," Communication Research 2(1):24-49.
Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry, Dennis S. Mileti and Roy Lotz.
1975.
"Organizational Tensions and Decentralization: The Interactive Effect on Member Commitment,"
International Journal of Group Tensions 5(2):26-37.
D
- )
-g-i Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie and Dennis S. Mileti.
1974. "Collective Stress and Consounity Transformation," Human Relations 27(8)t767-788.
[1 Mileti, Dennis S.
1974.
"Change Ratios in Age-Scientific Percent Contributions to Fertility: A New Method with Applications to the United States,"
Pacific Sociological Review 17(1):3-26.
First Prize, student paper competition, Pacific Sociological Association, 1974.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1974.
"An Integrative Approach to the Study of Organizational Technology, Structure and Behavior," Current Il Sociology 23(1):189-200.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1974.
"System Stress and the Persistence of Emergent Organizations," Sociological Inquiry 44(2):111-119.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Larry Barnett.
1972.
"Nine Demographic Factors and Their Relationship Toward Abortion Legalization," Social Biology 19(2):43-50.
O TECHNICAL REPORTS Sorenson, John H.,
Barbara M. Vogt, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1987. Evacuation:
An Assessment of Planning and Research. Report prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Knoxville Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
C)
Mileti, Dennis S., and Steven Helmericks.
1987.
Public Perception of Tarthquake l
Risk During 1976 In Santa Clara County. Report prepared for the Bay Area Regional Earthquake Preparedness Project and the California Seismic Safety i
Commission.
i l
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Janice R. Hutton, 1987. Initial Public Responso to the 5 i
April 1985 Parkfield Earthquake Prediction.
Boulder Natural Hazards Research Applications and Information Center, University of Colorado.
l M!.leti, Dennis S., Randal G. Updike, Patricia A. Bolton, and Gabriel Fernandey.
1986. Recommendations for Improving the Existing Warning System for Possible Nevado del Ruiz Volcanic Eruption, Colombia, South America.
Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Sciences.
()
Mileti, Dennis S.,
John H. Sorenson and William Bogard.
1985.
Dvsruation Decision Making Process and Uncertainty. Oak Ridge, Tennesseet Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Report TM-9692.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1985.
Stress Impacts of a Technological Emergency:
An Unobtrusive Indicators Study of Livingston Train Derailment. New Orleanst Lemle, Kelleher.
(3 Popkin, Roy, Dennis S. Mileti, Barbara Farhir-Pilgrin, and John Shefner.
1985.
Unmet Needs of Disaster Victims in the United States.
Fort Collins Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
Review Panel of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Plan.
1984.
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Programt Five Year Program Plan. Washington, D.C.:
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- ()
- Sorensen, J., E. Copenhaver, D. Mileti and M. Adler.
1984. Organizational Interf ace in Reactor Emergency Planning and Response. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Nuclear Regulat7ty Commission, NUREG No. CR-3524.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1983. Human Response Scenariost Law Enforcement Applications and Media Implications. Sacramentot California Division of Mines and t
Geology.
()
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982. Organizational Behavior and Interorganizational Relations:
Implications for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencices and Preparedness. Oak Ridge, Tennesseet Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
r O
g
_g.
u-Mileti, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough and Patti Hadson.
1982. The Three Mile Island Incident:
A Study of Eehavioral Indicators of Human Stress.
()
Washington, D.C.:
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Arthur Svenson.
1981.
Earthquake Prodtetion-Warning Response For Emergency Organizations to the Prediction Terminology. Van Nuys: Southern California Eartaquake Preparedness Project.
Santopolo, Frank, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1980.
Impacts of Population Growth in Agricultural Colorado Committees.
Fort Collins: Colorado State University 0
Experiment Station Bulletin.
Committee on Fire sa;ety and Disaster Preparedness.
1979. Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness. Washington, D.C.:
American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Hutton, Janice, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1979.
Analysis of Adoption and Implementation of Community Land Use Regulations for Floodplains. San
,s L>
Francisco:
Woodward-Clyde.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
Socioeccnomic Impact of Earthquake Prediction on Government, Business and Community.
Bouldert Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1976.
Interorganizational Relations and Community Service Delivery Systems.
Boulder: Center for Action e,
'J Research.
BOOK REVIEWS Mileti, Dennis S.
1984.
"A Review of Social and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes
()
by Barclay G. Jones and Miha Tomazevic (Eds.).
Ithaca:
Program in Urban and Regional Studies, 1983. Mass Emergencies and Disasters (forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"A Review of Unequal Care:
Interorganizational Relations in health Care by M. Milner, Jr., New York: Columbia University Press, 1980."
Social Foreas 60(3):943-944.
()
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"A Review of Whistle Blowing:
Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation by Alan Westin (Ed.).
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981."
Sociology:
A Review of New Books 7(2).
Mileti, Dennis S 1980.
"A Review of Aftermath: Communities After Natural Disasters 1< H "aul Friesena et al. Deverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979 and Af tne Clean-Up:
Long Range Effects of Natural Disasters by
- ()
James Wright and Peter Rossi et al. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979."
Journal of the American Planning Association (October):484-485.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1976.
"A Review of A Sociology of Organizations by J.
Eldridge and A. Crombie.
New York:
International Publications, 1975."
Contemporary Sociology 5(6):184.
' C)
PROCEEDINGS Sorensen, John H.
1987.
"Public Warning Needs."
Pp. 9-75 in Paula Gori and Walter Hays (Eds. )
Proceedings of Conf erer.ca on the U.S. Geological Survey's Role in Hazards Warnings.
Pe' tan:
U.S. Geological Survey.
Paper 13 presented at the February,1987 Conf erence on Hazard Warnings, Denver.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1980.
"Human Response to Earthquake Prediction."
Pp. 36-56 in Walter Hays (Ed.).
Proceedings of the Conf erences on Earthquake Predict on Information. Menlo Park:
U.S. Geological Survey.
Paper i
lo t
C) presented at the January,1980 Conf erence on Earthquake Prediction Information, Los Angeles.
C)
Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice Hutton.
1978.
"Social Aspects of Earthquakes."
Pp. 179-192 in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Microzonation.
San Francisco:
National Science Foundation.
Paper presented at tne November,1978 Conference on the State of the Art in Microzonation for Earthquake Hazards Reduction, San Francisco.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1978.
"Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction on C)
State Policy."
Pp. in Proceedings of the National Conf erence on Earthquake Related Hazards.
Lexington, Kentucky Council of State Governments.
Speech presented at the November, 1977 Conference on State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Boulder.
O OTHER PUBLISHED COMMENTS Mileti, Dennis S.
1987.
"The Fatal Flaw in Flight 51-L Events Leading to the Ill-Fated Challenger Launch," Spectrum 24(2):36-51.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1986.
"Disaster Survival," Alumnua Quarterly 62(1):6-7, 20.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1984.
"The Character of Traffic in an Emergency," Bulletin
)
6(1):4-5.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1983.
"Disasterous Warnings," Omni (March):24,44,152.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"Razards Reduction Work: The Next Era," National Hazards Observer 6(4):1-2. Reprinted in Earthquake Information Bulletin 14(2):60, 1982.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"Sociological Aspects of Earthquake Prediction,"
(#3
__arthquake Information Bulletin 11(3):102-105.
E Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1977.
"Earthquake Prediction Response,"
Time (January 24):83.
M11eti, Dennis S.
1977.
"Earthquake Prediction:
Is It Better Not To Know?"
Mosaic 8(1):8-14.
(3 Mileti, Dennis S.
1977.
"Social Hazards of Earthquake Prediction," science News 111(2):20-21.
Haas, J. Euyte, Thomas Drabek and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
"Individual and Organ' -tional Response to Threat," Mass Pmergencies 1(4):247.
Mileti, Denn.s S.
1976.
"Social Scientists and Applied Research," The American Sociologist 11(4):220-221.
()
Mileti, Dennis S.
1974.
"Response to Research and National Needs," Footnotes 2(October):6.
CONFERENCE PAPERS
()
Mileti, Dennis S.
1987.
"Disaster Prevention and Mitigation During Rehabilitation and Reconstruction," paper presented to the International Research and Training Seminar on Regional Development Planning for Disaster Prevention spsonsored by the United Nations Center for Regional Development, Tokyo October.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Joanne Nigg.
1987.
"Adjustment to Natural Hazards and
()
Disasters," paper presented to the Section on Environmental Sociology, Roundtable Discussion of the American Sociological Association, Chicago August.
i
O Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen.
1986. "Determinants of Organizational Effectiveness in Responding to Low Probability Catastrophic Events," paper O
presented to the Crisis Analysis Models Session, International Conference on Industrial Crisis Management, New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York City: September.
Mileti, Dennis S., and James Goltz.
1986.
"Social Response to the Parkfield Prediction," paper presented to the Parkfield Prediction Experiment Session of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia O
May.
Cochrane, Hall, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1985.
"Vulnerabilitics of Medical / Health Care Systems to the Effect of Nuclear War," paper presented at the Symposium on the Medical Implications of Nuclear War, National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Session on Medical Resource Needs and Availability. Washington, D.C.:
September.
O Mileti, Dennis S.,
and R. cary Williams.
1985.
"A Sociological Perspective on the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities," paper presented to the Social and Economic Effects of Public Perceptions Session of the Symposium on Waste Management, Tuscon March.
Mileti, Dennis S., Rick Hufnagel and David Gillespie.
1984.
"Rogulation of the Firm: Toward a Theory of Consequences," paper presented t6 the Complex O
Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, San Antonio: August.
Mileti, Dennis S.
"Stress from Risk Uncertainties," invited paper presented t7 the Social Aspects of Risk Uncertainties Session of the Society for Risk Analysis, Knoxville October.
O Mileti, Dennis S.
1984.
"Social and Political Obstacles to the Use of Honstructural Flood Loss Mitigation Measures," paper presented to the American Society of Civil Engineers, San Francisco: October.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1984.
"Why People Take Precautions Against Natural Hazards,"
paper presented to the Conference on Encouraging Self-Protection behavior, Rutgers University:
July.
O Mileti, Dennis S. 1984.
"Sociology in Litigation:
Applications of Disaster Research," paper presented to the Sociology of Disaster Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle: April.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1983.
"Social Impact and Use of Earthquake Prediction-Warnings," paper presented to the US-Japan Seminar on Practical Apprnaches to Earthquake Prediction and Warning, Tokyo November.
O Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, Dennis S. Mileti, and Debra Cornelius.
1983.
"Structural Determinants of Community Adoption of the National Flood Insurance Program," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Lexington: July.
Mileti, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick Hufnagel.
1983.
"The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study of Unobtrusive Indicators of O
Human Stress," paper presented to the Disasters and Hazards Research Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Kansas City: April.
Hufnagel, Rick and Dennis S. Mileti.
1983.
"Organizational and Environmental Catastrophe:
Facterb Affecting Organizational Response to a Predicted Earthquake," paper presented to the Disasters and Hazards Research Session of the Wrstern Social Science Associatio.,, Albuquerque April.
O Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"Earthquake Prediction Response Cultural Comparisons Between Japan and the United States," paper presented to the Disaster Research Session of the International Sociological Association, Mexico City: August.
O
O Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"Influencing Corporate Decisions on the Use of Microzonation Information," paper presented to the Third International
,V Conference on Microzonation, Seattle June.
Milett, Dennis S.
1982.
"Earthquake Prediction and Warnings:
The Human Equation," paper presented to the Conference on Hazards Researth, Policy J
Development, and Implementation Inventives:
Focus on Urban Earthqr.akes, Policy Research Center at the University of Ledlands, Redlands: June.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982.
"Public Perception of 56tsmic hazards," paper presented O
to the Seismological Society of Americe, Anaheim: April.
Williams, Gary, Frank Santopolo and Dennis S. Milet1.
1980.
"Perception of Growth Impacts in Energy Impacted Comunities," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Ithaca: August.
M13 eti, Dennis S.
1980.
"Planning Initiatives for Seismic Hazard Mitigation,"
paper presented to the Conference on Social and Economic Impacts of O
Earthquakes on Critical Lifelines of the American So'iety of Civil Engineers, San Francisco May.
Timer, Doug, and Dennis S, M11eti.
1980.
"Interorganizational and Structural Determinants of Decision Making," paper presented to the Session on Compley Organizations ot the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee.
William, Gary, Dennis S. Mileti.
1980.
"Comunity Growth and Impact s," paper O
presented to the Western Social Science Association, Albuquerqual April.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1980.
"Human Response to Earthquake Prediction," paper presented to the Status of Knowledge Session of the Conference on Earthquake Prediction Information, Los Angeles: January.
Williams, Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1979.
"Perceptions of Growth Impacts in N n-Hetr p litan Colorado," paper presented to the Impacts Session of trhe O
Conference on Regional Migration Trends, St. Louis October.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Gary Williams.
1979.
"Resident Perceptions in Growth Impacted Western Agricultural Comunities," paper presented te the Rural Sociological Society, Vermont August.
Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Stan Eitzen.
1979.
"The O
Epinenominality of rganizational Size," paper presented to the Session on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee April.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice R. Hutton and John Sorensen.
1979.
"Social Factors and Response to Earthquake Prediction," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris April.
O Hutton, Janice R.,
Dennis S. Mileti, and John Sorensen.
1979.
"Factors Affecting Earthquake Warning System Effectiveness," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris April.
Sorenson, John, Janice R. Hutton and Dennis S. Mileti.
1979. "Institutional Management of Risk Information Following Earthquake Predictions," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, O
Paris April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice Hutton.
1978.
"Social Aspects of Earthquakes,"
paper presented to the State of the Art Session of the Second International Conference on Micronzonation, San Francisco: November.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1978.
"Organizational Size, Cceplexity and Decision Making," paper presented to the Organizations
'O Session of the American Sociolcgical Association, San Franciscos j
September.
O
- C) Gillespie, David F.,
and Dennis S. Mileti.
1978.
"Corporate Size as Work,"
paper presented to the Organization of Work Session of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco:
September.
se Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespfe.
1978.
"Action Postulates in Organization-Environment Relations." paper presented to the Organizations-Environment Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha: April.
Gillespie, David F.,
and Dennis S, Mileti.
1978.
"Size and Organizational Dif ferentiation," paper presented to the Formal and Complex Organizations
. ()
Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Spokane: April.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and Patricia Harvey.
1977.
"Correcting for the Human Factor in Tornado Warnings," paper presented to the Conf arence on Severe Local Storms of the American Meteorological Society, Omaha: October.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1977. "Osganization and Environment Adaption. Manipulation,' paper presented to the Organizational Relations g)
Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago:
September.
Hutton, Janice R., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1977.
"The Uses and Abuses of Scenarios in Policy Research," paper presented to the Social Policy Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago:
September.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1977.
"Organizational Growth and Managerial Efficiency," paper presented to the Social
()
Organization / Formal / Complex Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento: April.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1977.
"Organizational Manipulation and Adaption to Complex Environments," paper presented to the Complex Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Minneapolis:
()
April.
Gillespie, David F.,
Dennis S. Mileti and J. Eugene Haas.
1976.
"Size and Structure in Complex Organizations," paper presented to the Organizational Change Session of the American Sociological Association, New York City:
August.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1976.
"Learning Theory and Disaster Warning Response," paper
()
presented to the Issues in Environmental Analysis Session to the American Sociological Association, New York City: August.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti.1976.
"Consequences of Earthquake Prediction on Other Adjustments to Earthquakes," paper presented to the Australian Academy of Science, Canberra: May.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and J. Eugene Haas. 1976.
"A Methodology for Future
()
Collective Events," paper presented to the Collective Behavior Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis: April.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
"Operations Technology and Organizational Structure," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis:
April.
Haas, J. Eugene and Dennis S. Mileti.
1976.
"Assessing the Consequences of C)
Earthquake Prediction," paper presented to the Social Risk Session of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston: February.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1975.
"Technologica'. Jncertainty in Organization-Environment Relations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, Esn Francisco: August.
C3 Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1975, "A Resolution of Inconsistencies Between Size, Complexity and the Administrative Component in Organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago: April.
O
{3 Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1975. "Technology and the Study of Organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the
_J Pacific Sociological Association, Victoria: April.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1975.
"An Interaction Model for Organization-Environment Relations," paper presented to the Interorganizqtional Relations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha: April.
Mileti, Dennis S.,
and David F. Gillespie.
1974.
"A Formalization of
_')
Organization-Environment Dependencies," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose:
March.
Farhar, Barbara, and Dennis S. Mileti.
1974.
"Value and Role Issues for the Involved Social Scientist," paper presented to the Applied Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose: March,
- h. )
Mileti, Dennis S. 1973.
"Drowning: A Communications Disease," paper presented to the Mass Communications and Public Opinion Session of the American Sociological Association, New York City: August.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Sigmund Krane.
1973.
"Response to Impending System Stress," paper preserted to the What Do We Know Session on Human Behavior in Disaster of the American Sociological Association, New York City:
)
August.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1973.
"A Paradigm and Sociology of Knowledge for Theories of Natural Law," paper presented to the Theory Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee: April.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1972.
"Response to Hazards Narnings," paper presented to the Organizational and Community Response to Disaster Seminar at tha Disaster c)
Research Center of the Ohio State University, Columbus: July.
SPEECHES AND GUEST LECTURES
()
"Factors to Consider in the Dissemination of Public Information Regarding Recent Scientific Evidence Concerning Earthquake Risk in California," Meeting of the National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council, Menlo Park, California:
February, 1988.
"Current Knowledge on Communicating Hazards and Risk Information," Workshop on
()
Continuing Actions to Reduce Potential Losses from Earthquakes Along the Wasatch Front, Utah, Salt Lake City: December, 1987.
"Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar by General Public Utilities, Forked River, New Jersey September, 1987.
()
"Human and Social Aspects of Hazards Mitigation," Colorado Society for Natural Hazards Research, Denver:
September, 1987.
"Have We Gotten Any Betier at Informing and Educating the Public About Risks?"
Hazards Research and Application Workshop, Boulder: July, 1987.
C)
"Overview of Current Knowledge Abo 9t Communicating Hazards and Risk Information,"
Workshop on the U.S. Geological Survey's Role in Hazard Warnings, Golden, Colorado: February, 1987.
O
E) "Industrial Crisis Response," Fluid Mechanics and Wind Engineering Program, College of Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins: November, 1986.
)
"Emergency Preparedess and Mitigation Measures: The November 1985 Colombia Nevada del Ruiz Volcano Eruption," Committee on Natural Disasters, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.:
October, 1986.
O "Social and Economic Imoacts of Earthquake Predictions," Los Angeles City Earthquake Prediction Workshop, Asilomar, California: October, 1986.
"Armero, Columbia: What are the Lessons for Hazards Management in the United States," Plenary Session, Hazards Research and Applications Workshop, Boulder, Colorado: July, 1986.
()
"Public Response Elements fot Flood Warning Emergency Preparedness," Plenary Session, Conference on What Have We Learned Since the Big Thompson Flood, Boulder, Colorado: July, 1986.
- ()
"Social Aspects of Risk Communication," Conference on Communications in Emergencies, Wyoming Disaster and Civil Def ense Division, Cheyenne: April, 1986.
"Earthquake Prediction: A General Overview," Emergency Preparedness Commission for the Cities and County of Los Angeles, Carson, California: April, 1986.
()
"What Do We Know About Human Behavior and Earthquakes," Annual Meeting of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, San Francisco: February, 1986.
"Social Aspects of tne Parkfield, California Earthquake Predic tan," Annual Meeting of the American Geophysical Union, Session on Parkfield Earthquake Studies, San Francisco: December, 1985.
()
"Social Impacts and Lessons from the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction," Earthquake Prediction Warning and Response System Workshop, Governor's Of fice of Emergency Services, Asilomar, California: July, 1985.
"How Well Do Traditional Warning System Strategies Deal With Today's Natural and Technological Hazards?" Plenary Session, Invitational Workshop on Hazards
- C)
Research and Application, Boulder, Colorado: July, 1985.
"Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation, Middletown, Pennsylvania: May, 1985.
' C)
"Social Aspects of Risk," Risk Analysis Seminar, Department of Industrial Engineering, Stanford University: February, 1985.
"Communicating Engineering Information to Public Officials," Social Applications Session, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Seattle:
February, 1985.
13 "Social and Political Obstacles to the Use of Nonstructural Flood Loss Mitigation Measures," American Society for Civil Engineers, San Francisco: October, 1984.
- O
[) "Warnings: Applying Research in the Private Sector," Plenary Session on Hazards Research and Management: Assessments of a Maturing Field, Natural Hazards b)
Research Applications Workshop, Doulder: July, 1984.
"Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar for County Commissioners of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, GPU Nuclear Corporation, Harrisburg:
March, 1984.
)
"The Uses of Earthquake Prediction-warnings," Collogium on Earthquake Prediction Research in the US, Earthquake Research Institute, University of Tokyo: November, 1983.
"Human Response in Disasters," American Red Cross, Mile High Chapter, Boulder Region, Boulder: July, 1983.
)
"Integrated Emergency Management: Challenges and Opportunities,"
Plenary Session of the Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1983.
)
"Public Response to Flood Disasters," Conference on the Need for Teamwork in Managing Flood Hazards, Association of State Floodplain Manager, Sacramento:
April, 1983.
"Natural Hazards, Disasters and Public Policy," Environmental Management Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles: April, 1982.
-)
"Myths of Disaster Response," Earthquake Planning Conference for Business and Industry, Los Angeles: May, 1982.
"Communicating Lessons Learned from Social Science Pesearch on Earthquakes,"
Workshop of Identifying and Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent
- )
Earthquakes," Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los Altos:
- December, 1982.
l "Social Causes of Earthquake Prediction-warning Response: Implications for the Design of California's Warning System and Information Dissemination," Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Van Nuys: October, 1981.
O "Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards: What Have We Learned and What Problems Demand Further Attention," Natural Razards Research Applications l
Workshop, Boulder: July, 1981.
"Disaster Reconstruction:
Patterns to Guide Planning," Governor's Task Force
.]
for Earthquake Emergency Preparedness, Committee on Long Range Reconstruction, Sacramento, July, 1981.
"Socio-cultural Dimensions of Earthquake Risk," Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, General Assembly, Sacramento:
May, 1981.
GB Interorganizational Relations and Service Delivery Systems," Health Sciences Center, University of Colorado, Denver: October, 1980.
O
) "Social Response to Earthquake Prediction:
Local Policy Issues,"
Southern California Emergency Services Association, Montebello:
February, 1980.
,,J "Human Response to Weather-borne Hazards Warnings," Department of Atmospheric Sciences, Colorado State University: October, 1979.
"Natural Hazards, Disasters and Social Research," Department of Sociology, University of Denver: December, 1980, 1979.
"Measuring Implementation of Public Policy for Floodplain Land Use Controls,"
Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: August, 1978.
"Socioeconomic Ef f ects of Earthquake Prediction and State Policy," Conf erence on State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Boulder:
November, 1977.
3 "Population, Resources and Policy for Social Change," College of Natural Resources, Colorado State University:
September, 1977; February, 1978; February, 1980.
"The Behavior of Government and Corporate Organizations in an Earthquake
^'3 Prediction," American Society for Public Administration, Colorado Chapter, Denver: April, 1976,.
"The Social and Economic Aspects of Scientifically Credible Earthquake Predictions," California State Seminar on Emergency Preparedness and Earthquake
]
Prediction, Palm Springs:
June, 1976.
"Preparing to Mak e Use of Earthquake Predictions," Emergency Preparednesq Commission for tne County and Cities of Los Angeles, Montebello:
February, 1976.
"The Social Organ 1Astion of Hazard Warning Systems," Engineering Foundation 2)
Conference on Decisian Making for Natural Hazards, Pacific Grove: March, 1976.
"Briefing on the Likely Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquake Prediction,"
Governor's Conf erence Room, Sacramento: May, 1975; Mayor's Conference Room, Los Angeles: October, 1975.
D "Social, Economic and Legal Aspects of Earthquake Prediction," General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, Granoble:
September, 1975.
"Earthquake Prediction and Its Implications for Emergency Preparedness," Center for Community Studies, Tokyo: September, 1975.
]
"Social Impacts of Earthquake Prediction:
Implications for Policy," California Water and Power Earthquake Engineering Forum, San Francisco: April, 1975.
OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Organizer and Presider Sessions on the Sociology of Disaster, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City: August, 1986; Session on Nuclear Pow'ar, Third International Congress on Emergencies, Washington, D.C.:
May, 1985; q
C) Session on Applied Sociology, Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle: April, 1984; Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San
,s'>
Diego: April, 1984; Session on Methodological Approaches in the Study of Health Care Delivery Systems, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Earthquake Hazard Reduction:
Is the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program Meeting its Congressional Mandate, Seventh Annual Workshop on Natural Razards Research Applications, Boulder: July, 1982; Session on Disasters and Cataclysms: Can Sociology Help, Pacific Sociological Association, San Diego:
C)
April, 1982; Session on Collective Behavior, American Sociological Association, New York: August, 1980; Session on Complex Organizations, Pacific Sociological Association, San Francisco: April, 1980; Session on Complex Organizations, Western Social Science Association, Tempe,1976.
Discussant 3
Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Societal Response to Hazards, American Sociological Association, San Antonio: August, 1984; Session on Public Response to Earth Science Information, Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1980; Session on Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural
()
Hazards, Boulder: June, 1976; Session on Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards, Boulder: July, 1975; Session on Disaster Relief and Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards, Estes Park: June, 1973.
Participant O
Workshop on Research Applications of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program in the Western United States, U.S. Geological Survey, Denver: September, 1987; Revier Panel on Disaster Research and Planning, National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University of New York at Buffalo:
August, 1987; Use of the Crisis Response Conclusion Retrival System, University
()
of Pittsburgh Center for Social and Urban Research, Pittsburgh:
December, 1985; Panel on Disaster Research, Its Funding and Future, American Sociological Association, San Antonio: August, 1984; Review Panel, Corresponding Member, Task Group on Social and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, Washi.ngton, D.C.:
1982; Workshop on Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent
()
Earthquakes, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los Altos:
December 1982; Tennessee Valley Authority Flood Plain Evaluation Panel, Boulder:
November, 1982; Earthquake Prediction Warning Task Force Workshop, Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Asilomar:
December, 1981; Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, Preparedness and Human Response, San Fernando:
- June, 1976; Seminar on Disaster Research, Colorado State University, Fort Collins:
C)
February, 1975; Symposium on Complex Organizations: Research and Applications, Western Social Science Association, El Paso: April, 1974.
Editorships Member of the Editorial Advisory Board for Industrial Crisis Quarterly,
()
1986-date; Associate Editor for social science, Earthquake Spectra, Journal of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 1984-date; Corresponding Editor, Organizations and Occupations, Newsletter of the American Sociological Association, Western Region 1984-d5; Corresponding Editor on Hazards and O
()
_ 19 -
Disaster, Environmental Sociology, Newsletter of the Secticn on Environmental
()
Sociology of the American Sociological Association, 1981-1985; Guest editor, special issue on Environmental Stress, Threat and Social System Response, Mass Emergencies 1(4): 247-346, 1976.
Testimony
()
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Seabrook nuclear plant, Concord: November, 1987 through March, 1988; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suffolk: May through July, 1987; December 1983 through June 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Comaission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shearon-Harris nuclear Power plant, Raleigh: June and November, 1985; Nuclear Regulatory
()
Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suffolk: December, 1983 through June, 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Wolf Creek generating station, Burlington, Kansas: January, 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of pre-emergency public education and information for emergency planning at the Waterford Three nuclear reactor, New Orleans:
February, 1983; Suffolk County
()
Legislature, State of New York, in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suffolk: January, 1983; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Diablo Canyon nuclear reactor, San Luis Obisbo: January, 1982; Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space in the matter of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act, Washington, D.C. :
April, 1980; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of the impact of
()
floating nuclear plants on tourist behavior, Bethesda: May, 1977 and July, 1978.
Legislative and Program Reviews Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, U.S. Congressional Panel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983-82; Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of the U.S.
.)
Geological Survey, 1988, 1982; Final Regulations for Floodplain Management and
(
Protection o,f Wetlands, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Register 176(45):59520-59538, 1980; Applied Research Program Evaluation, National Science Foundation, 1979-78.
O O
O O
9 3
Role Abandonment by Bus Drivers During Major Emergency Evacuations o
O r
ConfidentialWork Product Prepared in Contemplation of Utigation O
w a
O O
O Prepared by:
O Robert B. Kelly Senior Project Manager Roy F. Weston, Inc.
O O
- O 1
O Contents O
I' O
II.
Methodology III.
Findings IV.
Conclusions V.
Appendices A. List of Fifty Major Evacuations B. Refemnces O
O O
O O
O
V O
i Purpose ne purpose of this report is to summarize research findings concerning role abandonment by bus drivers during emergencies. Additionally, documentation of fifty major U.S. evacuations was O
reviewed in rder to identify incidents in which buses were used as a means of transporting evacuees out of the the endangered area, and to identify cases where bus drivers refused to participate in the evacuation.
Methodology o.
A wide range of documents on the general topic of evacuation as well as incident specific evacuation experiences were reviewed.
In order to accomplish the objective of dentifying and summanzing research findings concerning role abandonment of bus drivers, the following sources were consulted:
o Federal agency publicadon centers and libraries, including:
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- FEMA's Emergency Management Institute Library
- Department of Transportation
- National Technical Information Service O
ne Natural Disaster Resource Referral Service (PO Box 2208, Arlington, VA)
- Re Natural Hazards Research Information and Application Center of the University of Colorado ne Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware O
+ Penn State University WESTON staff also reviewed case histories and documentation of fifty major U.S. evacuations which have occurred since 1980.1 nese case histories contain one or more of the following:
O
. articles from major media sources (AP, UPI);
- local newspaper clippings;
- after action reports;
. communications logs;
- Police / Emergency Services reports;
- sociology reports; and O
. others ne primary question asked during the review of these evacuation case histories was: were buses used to transport people out of the endangered area, and if so, did bus drivers refuse to assist in the evacuation? The results of this secondary source analysis are also presented in the f 11 wing section.
O I Note: Data on these cases were collected for an ongoing, in depth study of evacuations for another client. In th:u study, secondary sources along with some interviews will form the basis of a comprehensive database of rnajor Q
ev3cu3tions.
1 0
I O
Mndings Several studies have addressed the issue of role abandonment by emergency workers. Some of this research is summanzed in a document entitled, "Planning Concepts and Decision Criteriafor O
Sheltering e 'Evacuanon in a Nuclear Power Plant Emergency."2 A relevent excerpt from this study states:
"A corresponding concern sometimes expressed by the public is that emergency response personnel will abandon their jobs in order to O
ar tect themselves, their families r their property. However, Dynes las stated that in disasters "abandonment of organizational roles simply does not occur" (Dynes,1974, p.153). In his analysis of the reasons for the absence of role abandonment, he emphasizes the operation of two groups of mechanisms suggested by Barton (1969). De first group, pnority mechanisms, are established by training members of O
emergency organizations to give first priority to their jobs and by making organizational membership visible (especially through uniforms) and by the strength of primary group loyalties among organization members that would make the individual feel personally responsible to his or her colleagues, as well as to the community at large. The second set consists of avoidance mechanisms. Dese O
Perate when members of the emergency organization come from outside the affected area (and, thus, families are unaffected) and when they have. few or no family ties within the area Avoidance mechanisms also operate when members of emergency organizations nave unequivocal information about the extent of the affected area that indicates that their families are not threatened, have made prior o
arrangements for their families to take protective action without their assistance or have established communication with their families to verify that they are safe."
De study goes on to say:3
' O "Section 4.2.4 noted that designated emergency workers (e.g., police, fire and emergency services personnel) do not abandon their roles during disasters. It is important to recognize, however, that this conclusion does not automatically extend to a group that might be referred to as emergency auxiliary personnel. Dese can be defined as those members of "emergency relevant" organizations (those O
possessing resources that may be needed in an emergency) or "community relevant organizations" (those with an orientation toward community service, see Dynes,1974, p.18) who may be needed to perform specific emergency tasks. Bus drivers, for example, could be classified within this group. Although they may be needed to assist in O
evacuating residents of affected areas during a nuclear power plant emergency, bus drivers could not be assumed to have developed priority and avoidance mechanisms to the same degree as designated 2 Lindell, M., Bolton, P., and Perry, R. (1985), Plannine Conceots and Decision Criteris for Shelterine and Evacustion in a Nuclear Power Ptsnt Ernercencv. AIF/NESP-031, National Environmental Studies Program of the O
Al rnic Industrial Forum, Washington D.C., July 1985, pp. 419 to 4 20.
3 lbid, p. 816 2
O
~
l
'O emergency workers. As a result, special provisions may need to be rnade in order to assure their availability in a nuclear power plant emergency. This can be acheived by special training that explains their role in the emergency response effort. In addition, this training should O
describe the nature of the radiation hazards to which the emergency auxiliary personnel might be exposed, emphasize the measures that will be taken to avoid exposure, and explain the procedures and equipment that would be used to monitor the magnitude of the exposures if they do occur. Finally, ernergency auxiliaries should be informed of actions that will be taken to assist their families in taking O
protective action, if their homes are located in an affected area.
Procedures planned in advance of an emergency would be expected to be particularly effective in avoiding the types of role conflict that could potentially result in role abandonment."
Sorenson, Vogt, and Mileti,in their 1987 study entitled, "Evacuation: An Assessment of O
Planning andResearch,"4 wrote:
"Mileti (1985) has recently examined the concept as first conceptualized by Killian (1952) and later discussed by Moore (1958), Fritz (1961),
Bates et al. (1963), Dynes (1970), Barton (1969), and Quarentelli (no O
date). The prevailing line of thought on role conflict is that, while people likely will experience conflict between family and organizational responsibilities, roles are rarely abandoned, and perfonning multiple roles does not jeopardize emergency duties.
Mileti (1985) concludes that when emergency work roles are "certain" O
Perhaps through training, emergency workers do not abandon work roles to attend to roles involving intimate relationships. When ernergency work roles are not "certain", than role conflict can occur, and would-be workers could attend to personal or family duties before attending to emergency duties."
O They went on to say:5 "Role abandonment has been a controversialissue for some hazards.
Research suggests that total role abandonment has not been prevalent in disasters and certainly has not been dysfunctional in organizational behavior. Some people have hypothesized that role abandonment O
would be greater and likely problematic in a nuclear power plant accident or during a nuclear war threat. This remains somewhat speculatise. Research suggests that in the former case, there may be an increased potential for conflict and role strain, but emergency functions would not be threatened. In the latter case, the issue is highly uncertain."
O 4 Sorenson. J., Vogt, B., and Mileti, D. (1987), Evacuation: An assessment of Pbnninc and Research. Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington D.C., July,1987. p. 90.
5 Ibid p.147 3
0
3:
Case Histories-In a review of reports, articles, and other documents concerning fifty major U.S. evacuations, it was reported that m 16 cases, buses were used to transport people from endangered areas. The 3
other cases did not report the use of buses in the evacuation, however this does not mean that they were not used. There were no documented cases of bus drivers not cooperating or refusing to drive the buses.
The sixteen evacuation incidents that reportedly used buses during the evacuation were:
Dag Location Sam Cause Number of Evacuees 3 March 87 Nanticoke PA Metal Plant Fire 14000 12 June 85 Pine Bluff AK Train Deradment 12000 20 Febmary 86 Marysville CA Flood 20000 g
29 August 85 Pinellas County FL Hurncane Elena 300000 12 April 87 Pittsburgh PA Train Derailment 17000 4 September 85 Canton OH Chemical Plant Explosion 2000 29 May 86 Springfield MA Chemical Spill 10000 4 August 85 Checotah OK BombTransponation Accident 6000 14 November 85 Malden WV Chemical Plant Explosion 6000 g
6 May 82 Superior WI Chemical Plant Explosion 10000 4 April 83 Denwr CO Train Deradment 9000 29 March 85 Greenfield MA Train Deradment 2000 11 December 82 Taft LA Chemical Plant Explosion 17000 28 May 87 Woodbum IN Wharehouse Accident 5000 14 April 87 Gary IN ChemicalTank Leak 2000 3
3 April 80 Somerville MA Train Yard Accident 17000 Conclusions In conclusion, existing research and an examination of recent major U.S. evacuations suggest 3
that bus drivers would probably not aband6n their role during an evacuation and that through training and planning, this possiblity can be minimized.
D e
S 4
9
- O
.g Appendix A FIFTY MAJOR EVACUATIONS Date Location St Cause Evace iO 870325 maticote
,A netat Piant, ire 54000 850716 Cedar Recies IA Fire sewage Treatment Plant 20000 860804 St Petersburg FL Chemical Plant Accioent 6800 860708 Missisburg ON Train Derailment 26 821211 Taft LA Chemical Plant Explosion 17000 850624 Anaheim CA Warehouse Fire 7500 850708 son Luis Ct>lspo CA Forest Fire 10000
- O 870414 Cary lu storage Tank Leet 2000 30,0A centon o, ene i et,i.nt Accioent 2000 870822 Pittsburgh PA Train Derailment 5100 870528 Wooeurn tu Irdest. Accioent 5000 870412 Pittsburgh PA Train Derailment 17000 860529 Springfield MA Chemical spill 10000 851029 tow Orleans LA Myrricane Juan 6000 850926 Ocean City e Murricane Gloria 50000 0
85652' 'ia'lt** cauntr
"ur'*a' 'L'a' 3
850321 Pteinfletd NJ Transportation Accident 8250 800403 somerville MA Train Yard Accident 17000 860630 Seeunent TI Nurrieone Bomie 30000 851114 me1 den W Cheefcel Ptont Emplosion 6000 850925 bare comty uC Myrricane Glorie 37000 850804 Checotsh OC Ient> Eaptosion 6000 850612 Pine stuff At Train Deraltaent 12000 Q
850902 Lerioce LA Murricone Etone 15000 841231 Little toct At Train Car Leet 2500 870404 Minot NO Chemical Warehouse Explosion 15000 831118 Lym MA Fire 5600 830816 Mouston TX Norricane Alicia 42000 820928 Livingston LA Train Derailment 3300 800805 Corpuschristi TX Myrricane Allen 400000 861016 Coluseus ON Dynamite Threat 1500 0
860609 son Antonio Tx Trein Derailment 1700 860220 MerysvItte CA Ftood 20000 840909 JetytI Comty GA Mureieone oiena 14500 821131 Crange CA Chemical Ptont Exotosion 3000 821112 trvine CA Chemical Ptont Accident 2000 820506 Seerior WI Chemical PlantExplosion 10000 870725 Avon tu Rt Tenter Leet 2500
,0 870410 Lawrence MA FIoods 3600 861010 ring of Prussia PA casotine Pipe a.ture 3000 l
851kW Bay Comty FL Myrricane Cate 2000 850308 Peorie IL Ftooos 3000 l
830404 Denver CD Train Derailment 9000 f
870602 Coer toge 04 Transport. Accident 2500 860225 Satine at Chemical spill Totuene 2000 850810 springfield M0 froastrial Accicent 3000 0
850703 Downington PA chemical seit1 2500 850524 nott w Ft Cniorine tan = e.ture 5000 850329 Greenfletd WA train Derailment 2000 840902 cmena ts unknown 10000 O
l
- o
O Appendix B O
N Sorenson, J., Vogt, B., and Mileti, D. (1987), Evacuation: An Assessment of Plannine and Research. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington D.C., July,1987.
Lindell, M., Bolton, P., and Perry, R. (1985), Plannine Concents and Decision Criteria for O
Shelterine and Evacuation in a Nuclear Power Plant Emergency. AIF/NESP 031, National Environmental Studies Program of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Washington D.C., July 1985.
Barton, A. (1969), Communities in Disaster. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Bates, F.L., et al. (1963), The Social and Psychological Conteauences of a Natural Disaster.
O National Research Council Disaster Study 18. Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
Dynes, R. (1970), Oreanized Behavior in Disasters. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath.
Fritz, C. (1961), "Disasters," pp 651-694 in Merton and Nisbet (eds.), Contemocrary Social Problems. New York: Harcoun.
O Killian, L. (1952), "'Ihe Significance of Multi group Membership in Disasters," American Journal of Socioloey (January): 309-314.
Mileti, D., Sorenson, J., and Bogard, W. (1985), Evacuation Decision Makinct Process and Uncertaintv. ORNL TM 9692. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
O Moore, H. (1958), Tornadoes Over Texas. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
Quarentelli, E.L. (no date), "Structural Factors in the Minimization of Role Conflict: A Reexamination of the Significance of Multiple Group Membership in Disaster"(preliminary paper l
49). Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, Ohio State Umversay.
O O
P l
i l
O O
.m
^
lo 4
s 10
-j O
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
- O
-O BUS DRIVER STUDY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONDENTS
- O O
-O O
O O
O.
- O
.O Incident C) -
Location Interviewer Name Job Title
. Phone Number
()
READ:
Hello, my name is (insert name).- I'm calling from the research. firm of Weston, Inc. in West Chester, Pennsylvania.
We are doing a study of emergency evacuations, and the (insert name) emer-gency.that occurred in your community has been chosen for study.
I'd like to ask you some questions about the emergency and the
()
evacuation.
Is now a good time to talk; if not I can call back at a more convenient time.
There are several kinds of questions I will ask you.
If you don't know an answer, please feel free to say so; in cases where
-()
you don't know an answer to a question I'd very much appreciate it if you could give me the name and number of someone who might know.
O O
O
-)
A.
The first set of questions I will ask you are general ques-tions about the evacuation that took place as a result of
[)
the (hazard agent) on (date).
1.
What was the time of impact?
By this I mean what was the time at which the (hazard agent)
[)
actually became a direct threat to public safety?
[ Verify that for hazard release, this is time of release, not time of initiatino event, such as derailment, if these took place at different times).
AM/PM D
2.
Did the evacuation take place before, during or after im-pact?
Before After
)
During (Explain)
Mixed (Explain) 3a.
Did emergency response personnel and/or public officials have any advance warning prior to the impact?
,,J No (go to 4)
,_ Yes (go to 3b)
U 3b.
How much time was there between the first notification of emergency personnel and/or public officials and the time of impact?
(hours / minutes) iw 9
a
,0..
4.
When.did the evacuation begin and when-did it end?
O Becin End Time Day
.O-Month Year 5.
How large was the geographical area that was evacuated?
square miles 6.
How many people were there in the area that needed to be evacuated?
!O number of people B.
READ:
The next set of' questions are about the people who needed to be evacuated by evacuation buses.
7..
How many people in total needed to be evacuated by bus?
number of people O
8.
How many schools needed to be evacuated by bus?
number of schools M
9.
How many school children needed to be evacuated by bus?
number of school children 10 10
[jj '
10' Excluding school children, where were the people who needed to be evacuated by bus located?
(Record and define each O-type of location)
Q-i O
C.
READ:
The following questions concern the mobilization of bus drivers to drive evacuation buses during the emergency.
11.
How many buses were used to evacuate people?
number of buses 1
4 12.
How many bus drivers were thought to be needed to drive evacuation buses when bus driver mobilization began?
,O number of drivers 13.
How many bus drivers were attempted to be contacted?
.O number of drivers l
r 14.
Of these, how many were actually contacted?
number contacted
()
15.
Why couldn't all bus drivers be contacted?
(Explain)
I lo O
O
.=
% ;0 16.
Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage refused to drive evacuation-buses during the emergency?
10 percentage (if "O," go to 18) 17.
Why did these drivers refuse to drive evacuation buses dur-ing the~ emergency?
(Explain) t i
18.
Did any of these refusals occur because bus drivers were concerned about the safety of their family?
No O
Yes (What
%) (Expir.in)
O I
19.
Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage did not re-fuse to drive evacuation buses, but simply did not report
,0 for work?
percentage (if "0", go to 21) 20.
Why didn't these drivers show up?
(Explain) g) -
i O
t i
O 0-
~
. 9; 21.
Did any of these "no-shows" not report for driving because they were concerned about the safety.of their family?
O No Yes (what
%) (Explain)
O O
'22.
of those bus drivers contacted who did show up to drive evacuation buses, what percentage showed up late?
(That is, they took noticeably longer to arrive than would be expected-given the distance from their house to the bus yard.)
percentage'(if "O,"
go to 24) 23.
Why did those drivers show up late?
(Explain)
!OF i
24.
Did any of the bus drivers who showed up late do so.because
,O of concern about the safety of their family?
No L.
Yes (what
%) (Explain)
- O l'
O' O
0 vr -
~rw p-se
--vn,--w, - -,
,,,+----r~n-->g
-v,e v-
--w-w-w - n
-me---ew-ve--
.w.--
-n r,-,=~s.-rv,,,-
~~-,-wg
,e-
- ~ -, -
- _, - - O 25.
What was the length of delay in reporting for driving evacu-ation buses among drivers who were concerned about the safe-O ty of their family?
a.
Longest delay
(
hrs; minutes) b.
Shortest delay
(_,
hrs; minutes)
, Q c.
Average delay
(
-- hrs; minutes) 26.
Did any evacuation bus drivers help to evacuate their family _
before showing up for duty to drive evacuation buses?
- O No Yes (what
%)
27.
Did any person volunteer to drive evacuation buses (by vol-O unteer we mean people who did not have evacuation bus driv-ing as their job before the emergency began)?
No Yes (how many
) (Explain who they were) f
, O D.
READ:
The questions which now follow address the perfor-mance of the bus drivers who actually did drive evacuation buses during the emergency.
40 28.
What percentage of the drivers who actually did drive evacu-ation buses did not do their job as well as they could have?
percentage (if "O," go to 30)
- O
'I t
f
- ~.
_ _ _ _ _ _ g s
29.
What sort of problems did these drivers have?
(Explain)
O 0:
30.
Why did they have these problems?
(Explain)
.O 31.
Did any of the drivers who did drive evacuation buses have any problems because of concern about their family's safety?
'O No Yes (what
%) (Explain)
O 0
32.
Approximately how much time did evacuation bus drivers spend in the evacuation zone driving evacuation buses?
a.
Longest stay
(
hrs; minutes) b.
Average stay
(
hrs; minutes) c.
Shortest stay (
hrs; minutes)
M E.
READ:
The next set of questions address the kind of things that evacuation bus drivers might or could have thought as
.O they drove evacuation buses.
3A=. Did any b us cArive_es make_ rne re. -6 one. + rig into 4**'""C'"dionareA!
O-No Y e G.
__ Don'Yknow O
- N o answe_r
_ j l
33.
Do you know if.any evacuation bus drivers thought that they themselves were in danger during the time that they were
)
driving buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't think they were in danger.
Yes, they did think they were in danger.
(What
%)
(Explain why) 1 34.
Do you know if any evacuation bus driver thought that they
)
would receive adequate forewarning of any danger to them-selves were it to occur during the time that they were driv-ing buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't expect adequate forwarning (explain
)'
Yes, they did expect adequate warning (what
%)
(Explain why) i l
)
i 35.
Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought thet ' hey could personally detect any danger to themselves withou's relying on specialized equipment during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
)
No, they didn't think they could personally monitor (Explain why)
)
l Yes (what
%) (Explain why) h i
- O 36.
Do you know i f any evacuation bus drivers thought that they could easily reach safety if the hazard impacted where tney O
were during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't think they could easily reach safety.
(Explain why) i C1
~
Yes (what
%) (Explain why)
O f
O F.
READ:
The next few questions concern some background fac-tors about all the bus drivers who were contacted and asked (either successfully c unsuccessfully) to report for evacu-l ation bus driving duty during the emergency.
O 37.
What percentage of these potential bus drivers had families l
in the area at risk during the emergency?
percentage (if "O," go to 38)
P l
38.
What percentage of these families v.ere capable of acting without assistance from the family member who was needed to drive an evacuation bus?
i percentage
)
G.
READ:
The next two questions focus on the training, if any, of evacuation bus drivers that occurred before the emergency we have been discussing occurred.
O r
i r
I r
F F
i h
- O m_,__,._-,,,,,,..___.,,.m._..,,.
0:
39.
Did evacuation bus drivers receive any kind of emergency training about their evacuation bus driver role before the g
emergency began?
No Yes (what
% of drivers received the training)
(Explain the training)
O O
40.
Did evacuation bas drivers know before the emergency began that they had the role of evacuation bus driver in an emer-() -
gency like the one experienced?
No Yes (what
%) (Explain how known)
O O
H.
READ:
There are only two questions left.
41.
Were there enough bus drivers to drive evacuation buses in the emergency?
)
No (what
% were available) (Explain why)
O Yes (Explain why)
O O
- O 42.
Did everyone who needed to be evacuated by evacuation bus get out in time?
O 1.o (what
% did not) (Explain why) 0 Yes (Explain why)
O O
Thank you very much for your help.
I appreciate it very much.
O O
O O
O O
O Results of the Bus Driver Study O
for OrQanizational Respondents People familiar with the emergency operations during 19 major evacuations were surveyed for this study.
Respondents included emergency managers (i.e.,
fire chiefs, police, civil defense of-O, ficials, etc.) who were interviewed for basic information about the emergency (usually questions 1-10) and bus company officials (i.e., owners, managers, dispatchers, etc.) who were interviewed to answer the remaining questions.
The evacuation cases and the number of emergency managers and bus n
company officials interviewed are listed below:
- Emergency
- Bus Company Case Manaaers Officials _
n 1.
Canton 0
1 2.
Pittsburgh 1
1
~
3.
Superior 1
2 4.
Malden 1
1 5.
Checotah 1
1 6.
Pine Bluff 1
1
'0 7.
Springtield 1
2 8.
Greenfield 2
2 9.
Nanticoke.
1 1
10.
Taft 2
1 11.
Denver 1
1 12.
Somerville 1
1
.O 13.
Elkhert 1
1 14 Gary 1
2 15.
Marysville 1
4 16.
Pinellas 1
2 17.
Miamisburg 1
2 18.
Hicksville/Woodburn 1
1 O
19.
Minot 2
1 The Questions and Results:
1.
What wss the time of impact?
O Morning (6:00 am - 11:59 am) 5 Afternoon (12 pm - 5:59 pm) 6 Evening (6:00 pm - 11:59 pm) 3 Night (12:00 am - 5:59 am) 4 No answer 1
g O
O 2.
Did the impact take place before, during or after impact?
E)
Before 4
During 5
After 9
No answer 1
3.
Did emergency response personnel and/or public officials g'
have any advance warning prior to the impact?
No 13 Yes 5
No answer 1
0 3b.
How much time was there between the first notification of emergency personnel and/or public officials and the time of impact?
No advance warning Minimum 0
From 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to 4 days (Pinellas).
Maximum 4.
When did the evacuation begin and when did it end?
O The date and time of the evacuations varied.
5.
How large was the geographical area that was evacuated?
.5 mile radius Smallest area Average 2-20 sqcare miles 280 square miles
()
Largest area 6.
How many people were there in the area that needed to be evacuated?
Minimum 1,000 (Malden) 300,000 (Pinellas)
()
Maximum 7.
How many people in total needed to be evacuated by bus?
0 (At Pine Bluff people were loaded Minintum onto buses but not evacuated)
O Maximum 5,000 to 10,000 (Pinellas) j 8.
How many schools needed to be evacuated by bus?
Minimum 0
Maximum 7 (Springfield)
)
(O l
l
O 9.
How many school children needed to be evacuated by bus?
O Miniaum 0
6,000 Maximum 10.
Excluding school children, where were the people who needed to be evacuated by bus located?
O Nursing homes, shopping malls, hospitals, a barrier is-land, elderly housing, mobile home parks, old age homes, a beach area, residential areas, a college, a housing project, apartment complexes, a manufacturing plant, and business districts.
C) 11.
How many buses were ised to evacuate people?
Minimum 3
235 (Pinellas)
Maximum 12.
How many bus drivers were thought to be needet
. rive C) evacuation buses when bus driver mobilization
,an?
Answers varied from "I can't remember" or "Don't know" to between 2 and 240.
13.
How many bus drivers were attempted to be contacted?
()
Answers varied from "don't know" to "only those on duty were contacted" to between 3 and 80.
14.
Of these, how many were actually contacted?
O Answers varied.
Answers to question 14 are most rele-vant when taken together with answers to question 13.
In the 12 cases that had reported firm numbers for both questions, one case reported that more drivers were ac-q3 tualy contacted than the number of drivers attempted to i
be contacted primarily because a number of drivers vol-unteered after their normal routes were disrupted.
l In 3 cases, fewer actual contacts were made than at-tempted due tc the reasons stated in response to ques-O tion 15.
The remaining 8 cases reported actual contact with all attempts.
Respondents in other cases either could not recall or did not know.
O O
O
_4_
15.
Why couldn't all bus drivers be contacted?
O Reasons varied, but included:
not home, Easter, out of town, phone busy, radio system problems, vacation peri-od, and that some drivers were already out on the road.
16.
Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage ref: sed to drive evacuati n buses during the evacuation?
O No one in any of the cases studied refused to drive evacuation buses.
In the Taft case, a discrepancy exists because there was a report of testimony about the role abandonment of
()
two or three drivers.
The emergency coordinator, his assistant, and the transportation officer do not recall any instance of bus driver abandonment.
17.
Why did these drivers refuse to drive evacuation buses dur-O ing the emergency?
N/A 18.
Did any of these refusals occur because bus drivers were concerned about the safety of their family?
O N/A 19.
of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage did not re-fuse to drive evacuation buses, but simply did not report for work?
O All drivers reported for work in all cases, with two minor exceptions in the Marysville evacuation. Ac-cording to the information on the Marysville case two "mechanics could not physically reach the bus yard,"
presumably due to flood waters damaging access roads.
. C)
Since they were unable to reach the bus yard, the two mechanics proceeded to a nearby nursing home to help in its evacuation.
20.
Why didn't these bus drivers show up?
- (3 See answer to question 19 above.
21.
Did any of these "no-shows" not report for driving because they ware concerned about the safety of their family?
N/A
.O
- O
O
-s_
22.
Of those bus drivers contacted who did show up to drive evacuation buses, what percentage showed up late?
(That is, O
they took noticeably longer to arrive than would be expected given the distances from their house to the bus yard.)
None of the drivLrs "showed up late" in 16 of the 19 Cases.
O One bus company in Marysville reported that 1-2% showed up late due to traffic congestions.
This particular company utilized about twenty drivers so presumably the respondent meant 1 or 2 drivers, not 1 or 2% of the drivers showed up late.
)
During the Pinellas evacuation, about 10% of one bus company's drivers showed up late because they first helped "tan.e care of family."
One bus company in Miamisburg reported that 0% or an unknown numbec of drivers showed up late.
Ia response g
to question 24, the respondent stated that "1 or 2 peo-ple who had to get families situated first" showed up late.
23.
Why did those drivers show up late?
O See answer to question 22 above.
24.
Did any of the bus drivers who showed up late do so because of concern about the safety of their family?
O see answer to question 22 above.
25.
What was tne length of delay in reporting for driving evacu-ation buses among drivers who were concerned about the safe-ty of th( ir fami]y?
()
Ir. the Pinella.s case the delay caused by drivers re-porting to week late ranged from 20 minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> with an average delay of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
i O
l lo
'O
l 0 - b 26.
Did any evacuation bus drivers help to evacuate their family g =
before showing up for duty to drive evacuation buses?
No 15 cases 2 cases Don't Know 2 cases Yes Three to five drivers evacuated their families first 0
during the Miamisburg evacuation.
one driver in the Woodburn/Hicksville evaucation evacu-ated his family first.
However, this was before the evacuation order was given and before the report calls went out to the drivers.
()
Even.though Pinellas respondents said that 10% showed up late in answer to question 22, they responded no to this question.
()
27.
Did any person volunteer to drivit evacuation buses (by vol-unteer we mean people who did not have evacuation bus driv-ing as their job before the emergency began)?
10 Yes 9
No O
In the Checotah case, the respondent answered yes to this question but that was because the drivers were not
- paid, i
28.
What percentage of the drivers who actually did drive evacu-O ation buses did not do their job as well as they could have?
All cases - 0%
29.
Gnat sort of problems did these drivers have?
C)
While all cases reported 0% to question 28 above, some respondents reported problems such as traffic jams, confusion as to where to go or what to do, confusion of law enforcement about access to evacuation areas, peo-ple wanting to take possessions with them, and flood waters impeding the roadways.
O 30.
Why did they have these problems?
Most answers to this question were n/a.
l l5)
While all cases reported 0% to question 28 above, a few respondents provided the following:
l O
1
3 At the Superior evacuation, traffic jams were created because parents went to pick up their children, 3
During the Columbus evacuation, there was a lack of communication early on among the police, disaster ser-vices, and the bus company.
This was corrected later i
by placing a transit company supervisor in the EOC.
O 31.
Did any of the drivers who did drive evaucation buses have j
any problems because of concern about their family's safety?
j 17 No Yes 2
O During the Greenfield evacuation, half of the drivers heard rumors and were scared for families, apparently because the exact nature of the incident and the threat was not known.
[)
During the Pinellas evacuation, officials told drivers they could leave to go home and take care of their fam-ilies if they so desired. About 1". did so.
32.
Approximately how much time did evacuation bus drivers spend in the evacuation zone driving evacuation buses?
O 10 minutes Minimum 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> Maximum 32a. Did any bus drivers make more than one trip into the evacua-tion e.rea?
g l
N) 2 13 l
Yas l
Zon't Know 1
l n/a 1
No Answer 2
O l
33.
Do you tnow if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they themse.ves were in danger during the time that they were drivint btses in the evacuation zone?
No 13 O
Yes 5
Don't Know 1
9 0
C) 34.
Do you know if any evacuation bus driver thought that they would receive adequate forewarning of any danger to them-g selves were it to occur during the time that they were driv-ing buses in the evacuation zone?
1 No 18 Yes
'O 35.
Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they could personally detect any danger to themselves without relying on specialized equipment during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
7 No
()
10 Yes 2
Don't Know 36.
Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they
.<3 could easily reach safety if the hazard impacted where they were during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
11 No 15 Yes
' C)
Don't Know 3
37.
What percentage of these potential bus drivers had families in the area at risk during the emergency?
6 cases 0%
6 cases
!(3 1%-50%
2 cases 51%+
5 cases Unknown 38.
What percentage of these families were capable of acting without assistance from the family member who was needed to
()
drive an evacuation bus?
0 0%
0 1%-50%
6 51%+
8 Unknown 4,3 n/a 5
In two cases, Pine Bluff and Taft, the respondents said, in response to question 37, that none of the bus drivers lived in the area.
Here they said that most (greater than 51%) of the families could act without 13 assistance from the bus driver.
i i
lo l.
C3
_g_
39.
Did evacuation bus drivers receive any kind of emergency training about their evacuation bus driver role before the 33 emergency began?
10 No 9
Yes O
In Marysville, s me bus companies reported yes while others reported no.
This case was considered a yes in this summary.
40.
Did evacuation bus drivers know before the emergency began that they had the role of evacuation bus driver in an emer-()
gency like the one experienced?
7 No 12 Yes In Marysville, some bus companies reported yes while
'3 others reported no.
This case was considered a yes in
,(
this summary.
41.
Were there enough bus drivers to drive evacuation buses in the emergency?
- O All cases - yes 42.
Did everyone who needed to be evacuated by evacuation bus get out in time?
All cases - yes O
In Pittsburgh, there were some refusals but all who wanted to get out by bus were evacuated.
O C)
O O
1
,m
---~-,---~n,
,---,,-,,~ ~._. -,-.. -
i BUS DRIVER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE INCIDENT LOCATION INTERVIEWEE NAME O
JOB TITLE PHONE NUMBER
)
READ.
Hello, my name is (insert name).
I'm calling from the research firm of Weston, Inc. in West Chester, Pennsylvania.
We are doing a study of emergency evacua-tions and the (insert incident)
D emergency that occurred in your community during (insert date) has been chosen for study.
I'd like to ask you some questions about the emergency and the evacuation.
Is now a good time to talk?
If not, I can call back at a more con-venient time.
O Your name was provided to me as a person who drove L.
s during this emergency. Is that correct?
Yes No (if no, do not proceed, thank them for their time)
O O
o l
O A.
READ:
The first set of questions I will ask you are about your "activation message."
By "activation message" I mean O
the request you received in which you were specifically asked to drive an evacuation bus during the incident.
1.
Who did you receive this message from?
.O 2.
Where were you told to report?
- O 3.
Which of the following statements best describes the degree of threat to those in the risk area - that is, those who needed to be evacuated - as it was described in the activation message?
()
People in the risk area are in severe danger.
People in the risk area are in moderate danger.
O People in the risk area are in slicht danger.
There was no clear sense of threat in the message.
(Do not read)
I don't remember.
O 4.
Which of the following statements best describes the degree of urgency - the need for immediate - action as it was de-scribed in the activation message?
You are needed now.
'O You will be needed soon.
You will be needed later.
You may be needed later.
There was no clear sense of urgency in the message.
(Do not read)
I don't remember.
- O O
O
_3_
B.
READ:
The next set of questions I will ask you are about emergency information that you might have received orior to
.O the activation messace.
5.
Were you aware that there was an emergency prior to receiving your activation message?
E)
No (skip to 10)
Yes 6.
How did you find out about the emergency?
()
7.
As a result of the information that you received prior to the activation message, how likely did you think it was that
()
your home would be threatened by the (hazard event)?
Extremely likely
()
Very likely Even odds very unlikely O
Extremely unlikely (Do not read) I don't remember 8.
Did you or the members of your household take any protective C) action prior to receipt of your activation message?
Continued normal activities sought additional information O
Prepared to evacuate One or more household members evacuated Other (specify) _
O i
O
C')
_4_
9.
How much time was there between:
()
When you first found out about the emergency, and when you received your activation message?
hours / minutes O
C.
READ:
The next set of questions I will ask you are about your reactions to the activation messace.
10.
Where were you located at the time of the impact?
By this I mean where were at the time the (hazard agent)
()
actually became a direct threat to public safety?
With family in impact area.
With family in periphery.
O With family outside area.
Separated from family, family closer to impact.
Separated from family, respondent closer to impact.
O 11.
What members of your household were at home when you re-ceived the activation message?
Self
()
Spouse Number of children under 18 Number of other dependents (specify)
Number of others (specify)
O O
O I
() 12.
To what extent did you feel a sense of personal responsibil-ity to help those in your household by staying home to help n
them cope with the emergency?
Great extent Moderate extent Minimal extent Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
O 13.
To what extend did you feel that the members of your house-hold would be protected even if you did not stay to help them?
()
Great extent Moderate extent Minimal extent
()
Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
14.
To what extent did you feel a personal responsibility to l(3 help those in the risk area by reporting for duty to drive an evacuation bus?
Great extent Moderate extent lO Minimal extent i
Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
)
9 I
i
- O
r - - - - - -. - _ - - - - _
O
_s_
- 15.. To what extent did you feel that those in the risk area would be protected even if you did not go to help them?
()
Great extent Moderate extent Minimal extent
()
Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
O 16.
After you received your activation message, did you do any-thing other than proceed directly to the location where you were told to report.
(Do not read alternatives).
No, I went directly to the reporting location (go to O
17)-
Yes, I tried to get additional information.
Yes, I helped my household prepare to evacuate.
()
Yes, I took other actions (specify)
O 17.
If you did take any actions between receiving your activation message and arriving at your reporting location, about how much more time did you take than would have been required if you had proceeded directly?
O hours and minutes O
O O
O
-7_
l D.
READ:
The next set of questicas i will ask you are about your reactions during the time you were driving an evacua-q).
tion bus.
18.
How would you describe the sense of threat that you experi-enced during the time that you were in the risk area?
)
I was in severe danger.
I was in moderate danger.
I was in slicht danger.
O I had no sense of threat whatsoever.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
g 19.
To what extend did you feel that you would receive adequate forewarning of any danger to yourself during the time that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
Very great extent.
O Moderate extent.
Minimal extent.
Not at all.
O (Do not read) I don't remember.
t 20.
To what extent did you believe that you would be able to de-tect any danger to yourself by means of environmental cues such as sights, sounds or smells?
Very great extent.
Moderate extent.
i Minimal extent.
- O Not at all.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
4
- O 4
l O
f
- Ci
.g.
21.
To what extent did you believe that you could easily reach safety if the hazard impacted where you were during the time
.O that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
9 Very great extent.
Moderate extent.
Minimal extent Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
O 22.
Were you or any members of your family injured as a result of this emergency?
Family member injured.
State relationship to respon-dent.
O Respondent injured.
Family members uninjured.
- O E.
READ:
The next set of questions I will ask you are about any advance preparation that you might have received re-garding your role as an emergency evacuation bus driver.
4
!O 23.
To what extent did you receive any kind of emergency training about your evacuation bus driver role before the emergency began?
Very great extent.
i(3 Moderate extent.
Minimal extent.
Not at all (Go to 23).
33 (Do not read)
I don't remember.
lO
- O
,(3 t 24.
What type of training was this?
CY j
25.
Did anyone tell you before the emeraency becan that you might be asked to drive an evacuation bus during an emergen-cy?
es
.L/
No (Go to 25).
Yes.
- O 26.
Please explain who told you, when they told you, and what you were told.
(3 F.
READ:
The next question is about the "lessons learned" from your experience.
O 27.
Are there any lessons that you think would be valuable to pass on to planners so that they could prepare better plans, procedures and training for emergency evacuations?
- O
.O iO
[
r
]
O
. ~ _
i
~'
OL G.
READ:
I only have one more question that I would like to l
ask you.
g i
28.
How-old were you during the time of the emergency?
Under 20.
O 20-44.
45 plus.
DO NOT READ:
Below mark the sex of the respondent.
l g
Male
[
Female j
Thank you very much for your help.
I appreciate it very much.
l l
O f
t e
i I
O i
L 0
[
l O
l e
O L
E I
1 O
t l
t
l Results Of The Bus Driver Interview Study As a follow-up to the Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respondents, LILCO talked with individual bus drivers who re-sponded to ten of the 19 emergencies addressed in the previous study. Twenty-seven (27) bus drivers were surveyed who had par-ticipated in 10 of the 19 evacuation cases.
The evacuation cases
)
and the number of drivers surveyed are listed below:
- Bus Drivers Case Surveyed 1.
Marysville 10 3
2.
Greenfield 1
3.
Malden 2
3 4.
Taft 3
5.
Canton 1
6.
Miamisburg 1
]
7.
Springfield 4
8.
Pine Bluff 2
9.
National City 1
D 10.
Hicksville 2
The Questions and the Results:
l l
1.
Who did you receive this message from?
O Activation messages were received from co-workers, l
transportation supervisors, bus dispatchers, transpor-tation directors, emergency coordinators, sheriff's de-l partments, over the television, and by word of mouth.
]
2.
Where were you told to report?
Drivers were told to report to one of the following i
places:
bus garages, nursing homes, senior citizens' homes, downtown areas, central offices, command cen-ters, and police stations.
3 IJ
O,
3.
Which of the following statements best describes the degree of threat to those in the risk area - that is, those who O
needed to be evacuated - as it was described in the activation message?
12 People in the risk area are in severe danger.
5 People in the risk area are in moderate danger.
O
_1 People in the risk area are in slicht danger.
_1 There was no clear sense of threat in the message.
_1 I don't remember.
()
4.
Which of the following statements best describes the degree of urgency - the need for immediate - action as it was de-scribed in the activation message?
O 24 You are needed now.
_1 You vill be needed soon.
_0 You vill be needed later.
O
_Q You may be needed later.
_J.
There was no clear sense of urgency in the mes-sage.
_1 I don't remember.
O 5.
Were you aware that there was an emergency prior to receiving your activation message?
12 No O
11 Yes 6.
How did you find out about the emergency?
Answers included:
over the radio or scanner; on the television; by supervisor, word of mouth, or passerby; O
from friends; or by actually seeing the threat.
O O
O 3-7.
As a result of the information that you received prior to the activation message, how likely did you think it was that g
your home would.be threatened by the hazard event?
_]
Extremely likely
_1 Very likely O
_2 Even odds
_1 Very unlikely
_1 Extremely unlikely.
'O 8.
Did you or the members of your household take any protective action prior to receipt of your activation message?
_1 Continued normal activities 0
1 sought additional information
_5 Prepared to evacuate
_1 One or more household members evacuated O
_1 other 9.
How much time was there between:
When you first found out about the emergency, and when you received your activation message?
O Answers ranged from a few minutes (most answers) to about 1-3 hours and in one case 3 days.
10.
Where were you located at the time of the impact?
By this I l
mean where were (you) at the time the hazard agent actually l
became a direct threat to public safety?
!O
_1 With family in impact area.
_1 With family in periphery.
11 With family outside area.
)
_A Separated from family, family closer to impact.
_g Separated from family, respondent closer to im-pact.
O O
0 - _..;
-s-i 11.
What members of your household were at home when you re-
.g ceived the activation message?
_1 Self l_0 Spouse
- O lQ Number of children under 18
_.2 Number of other dependents
_.4_
Number of others O
1 N/A 12.
To what extent did you feel a sense of personal responsibil-ity to help those in your household by staying home to help them cope with the emergency?
10
_1 Great extent
_3_
Moderate extent 8_
Minimal extent O
l_1 Not at all 4
N/A one person who responded "not at all" said she took her family with her.
Another who responded "minimal ex-O tent" said "family (was) already out and safe.'
13.
To what extend did you feel that the members of your house-hold would be protected even if you did not stay to help i
them?
l "O
19 Great extent 2
Moderate extent l
_0_
Minimal extent f
'O
,3 got,e 311 3_
N/A
[
- O l
.! O
C) 5_
14.
To what extent did you feel a personal responsibility to 3
help those in the risk area by reporting for duty to drive an evacuatio.i bus?
21 Great extent
_2
. Moderate extent 0
Minimal extent
_0 Not at all
- 15. - To what extent did you feel that those in the risk area i
C) would be protected even if you did not go to help them?
12 Great extent
_1 Moderate extent
- ()
_1 Minimal extent
[
_1 Not at all Comments:
"duty to go and help;" "Felt he was needed to insure the safety of the residents.
Did not think i
- C) about the situation."
16.
After you received your activation message, did you do any-thing other than proceed directly to the location where you vere told to report.
I(3 21 No, I went directly to the reporting location.
_A Yes, I tried to get additional information.
_1 Yes, I helped my household prepare to evacuate.
(3
_1 Yes, I took other actions (specify).
The driver who helped his household prepare to evacuate said that only took a "few minutes."
The driver was with his family (spouse and one child) in the impact area at the time he received his activation message.
)
Those that took other actions did the following: two made phone calls to get out other drivers, and the other evacuated her children (which took 20 extra minutes) because she did not want to leave them alone.
- C3 l
!O rr---*
ew a-r
.----%---,v,--,
,-w
,v
.-e,,w
.,--r
- - + - - - - -
--r
O l 17.
If ou did take any actions between r.eceiving our act vation message and arriving at your report ng location, O
about how much more time did you take than would have been required if you had proceeded directly?
One respondent said 10 minutes, one said 15 minutes, and the respondent who helped her family evacuate said she took 20 extra minutes.
O 18.
How would you describe the sense of threat that you experi-enced during the time that you were in the risk area?
_1 I was in severs danger.
$)
_1 I was in moderate canger.
_f I was in slicht danger.
_9 I had rio sense of threat whatsoever.
_1 N/A One did not respond because was not in risk area but in "standby area."
.(3 19.
To what extend did you feel that you would receive adequate forewarning of any danger to yourself during the time that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
i l
11 Very great extent i()
_2 Moderate extent
_1 Minimal extent
_1 Not at all
()
Comments:
"Never thought about it - bus had communica-tions;" used radios; "3 times got wrong information -
Drivers were telling police what was going on."
20.
To what extent did you believe that you would be able to de-tect any danger to yourself by means of environmental cues
,O such as sights, sounds or smells?
13 Very great extent
_s Moderate extent O
_2 Minimal extent
_f Not at all O
O l 21.
To what extent did you be.ieve that you could easily reach safety if the hazard imprcted where you were during the time
.(3 that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
I 11 Very great ex'.ent
~
_1 Moderate extent
- O
_2 Minimal extent j
_2 Not at all
[
2 N/A
)
Comments:
"Never thought about this, had an obligation to evacuate the residents and was concerned about only this."
One person who responded "not at all" said that she "didn't think of ability to reach safety."
3 j<3 22.
Were you or any members of your family injured as a result of this emergency?
j
_0 Family member injured.
State relationship to re-I spondent.
O
_Q Respondent injured.
22 Family members uninjured.
23.
To what extent did you receive any kind of emergency training about your evacuation bus driver role before the
- (3 emergency began?
_2 Very great extent
_3 Moderate extent I
- (3 11 Minimal extent i
i
_1 Not at all i
24.
What type of training was this?
j K3 Seven drivers reported receiving no training before the evacuation.
Others received minimal training such as j
first aid, CPR, and how to operate a wheel chair lift.
others received more training, to include school evacu-ation and fire drills, use of special equipment, and regular school bus driver training.
Some reported C3 training occurred once, twice, or three times a year.
i I
a I
^
O i
O 25.
Did anyone tell you before the emeraency becan that you might be asked to drive an evacuation bus during an emergen-n cy?
v 11 No 11 Yes o'
26.
Please explain who told you, when they told you, and what you were told.
Respondents indicated that they were told by their su-pervisors, emergency planning councils, school boards, or at routine meetings concerning evacuation.
One re-g) spondent answered that she was told to be "always pre-pared" to transport school children during an emergen-cy.
Another indicated that he was told that his "primary role" during an emergency is to evacuate school children.
O 27.
Are there any lessons that you think would be valuable to pass on to planners so that they could prepare better plans, procedures and training for emergency evacuations?
Comments included that the evacuations vent well; ev-O erything was perfect; "that those in charge did an ex-cellent job;" that radios should be used to keep driv-ers posted; have drills once a week; let drivers know which routes are best to take; that it would help if drivers were told what the emergency was all about; communications is most important.
One said that it O
took too long to get out because there were only two main roads out of risk area.
28.
How old were you during the time of the emergency?
_0 Under 20 O,
16 20-44
_2 45 plus Breakdown of Respondents by Sex:
2 Male lE Fc.nale O
O
LILCO,'N'cVCmbar 18, 1983 O
i O
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION and Licensine soard O
sefore the Atomic Safety
)
In the Matter of
)
50-322-OL-3
)
Docket No.
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY )
(Emergency Planning O
)
Proceeding)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARC, DYNES, W!LLIAM G. JOHNSON, O
RUSSELL R.
MILETI, JOHN H. SORINSEN, DENNIS S.
AND JOHN A. WCISMANTLE ON BEHALT OF THE LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 25 (ROLE CON O
PURPOSE Contention 25 is entitled "Role Con-Th' 1"**#"*" #8' "Rele The contention alleges that O
flict of Emergency Workers."
significant numbers
. creates the possibility that conflict ilies of emergency personnel will look to the needs of their fam h
o or others for which they have respensibility (including t em-selves) before they report (if at all) to thei: designated quest emergency response positions or otherwise respond to a re O
by LILCO for assistance."
O O
-- ~---- _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
g In general, then, a poll is unnecessary (1) because it is not a valid and reliable instrument for pre-O dicting future behavior, (2) because it would not upgrade the list of factors a plan should address, (3) because a plan is mostly based on the actions of organizations, and (4) because past experience suggests that emergency workers perform their as-signments.
)
This is not to say that particular types of surveys might not make important contributions to emergency O
planning.
For exampl2, a survey could be used to identify people who are willing to perform volun-teer emergency work.
The people identified by the O
survey could then be given an emergoney role and trained.
Also, a survey could be useful to help identify fe. cts important to know about for plan-ning; for example, the identification of people with special evacuation needs.
O 68.
Q.
Mr. Johnson and Dr. Mileti, have you reviewed the County's survey of bus drivers and volunteer firemen in Suffolk County?
O A.
(Johnson, M11eti)
Yes.
O O
89-O 69.
Q.
What i s your opinion of that survey?
Doer it have any shortcomings?
O jo
/7 A.
(Johnson, Mileti)
Questions pf through >( on the p
survey instrument for volunteer firemen and Ques-
-f 13 tions
-$I on the survey for school bus drivers are the same as questions 11-16 and.18-19 of the Coun-
~v's survey of the public in general, and thus are O
subject to the rame criticisms as have been men-tiened for those questions in LILCO's written tes-timony on contention 23.
O f
Question of the survey of volunteer firemen is as follows:
O Js. Assuming that the Shoreham nucle-ar power plant is licensed and begins to operate, de are inter-ested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an ac-cident at the plant.
suppose O
that you were at work on a week-day morning and there was an ac-cident at Shoreham.
Everyone living within 10 miles of the plant was advised to evacuate.
O volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation.
What do you think you would do first?
1 = first, you would report to O
the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the avacua-tion zon
\\$4s iO
'O w
e
-w v--,.w--
m m
.4
---ym-
-s-
--w
,w,,.m,,-
w-
,w-eww-,,
s-w ww w- -,,
o----
,ww
O
-90 2 = first, you would make sure that your family was. safely out of the evacuation zone ont,
.o j
0 = first, you would leave the evacuation zone to make sure
)
- ddt, that you were in a safe placey O
4 = first, you would do something else (specify)
The response categories to this question are nei-C) ther mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.
Also, the qtistion itself tends to confuse respondents by asking what they think they would do "first."
A "O
volunteer fireman could both check to see that his 7
or her family was safely out of the evacuation zone and also help with firefighting and evacuation in
- O the evacuation zone.
It is conceivable that a vol-unteer fireman could be working outside of the so-called evacuation zone when an accident took
- O place.
No ef' fort was made to determine if the vol-
'unteer fireman does in fact normally wor.k outside the 10-mile evacuation zone.
U Questfon pd states as follows:
3,?. If there was a nuclear accident O
at Shoreham requiring the evacua-tion of people within a ten mile zone, how dangerous do you think it would be for you to epend a day working within the evacuation zone?
'O l
- O
. O It is impossible to determine what is meant by the term "spend a day working within the evacuation O
zone."
If this was meant to mean a 14-hour day, an 8-hour day, or somewhere in between, it should have D**" *
- d' Th* **Y *h* ""**** " ** * #d*d O
would be subject to different interpretations by different responders.
0 O
Question JE of the school bus driver questionnaire states as follows:
O Suppose that you had completed your morning run -
- _chn:. d:7 and there was an accident at Shoreham.
EverWne living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate.
Schoolbus drivers were expected to O
help evacuate school children.
What do you think you would do first?
6<st, L wed
- I.
- 1., report to duty so that yem could Fir s+ 3 I wed pick up school children in the e/ go evacuation zone and drive them to g
g a she1:er.
E rst, L "'* M MY 2.
gc = make sure that y 3 f.mily gk 4, A*
m-& :: utre - ~ !s. W f
L M4 we,
$<st 3 3.
61 eave the evacuation zona to make
- C sure that
--.e in a safe i
g_
place.
.a - WS6 1
firsh'1. Wod 4.
do something else (Please specify)
?
Once again, the suggested response categories are neither mutually c::clusive nor exhaustive.
- Also,
.O J
!O O
if everyone were advised to evacuate, why would school bus drivers be expected to help evacuate school children?
Th
- e :::::nt: 2pply ~~ 72ee-tien 12 ;f the C+""ty -"r"ey D
I 0
guestion y's asks "how dangerous" does the respon-dont think it would be to spend "several hours" driving school children out of the evacuation tone.
O The term "several" in this question leaves much to 1
i the imagination of the school bus drivers.
- O rinally, a serious problem with the survey is that it was self-administered; that is, respondents were given the survey instrument and asked to complete
.O it.
It is very possible that the respondents' an-swers to particular questions were influenced by information or questions that occurred later in the O
questionnaire.
~
l l
70.
Q.
The County polled the opinions of volunteer fi#'**"-
Wh'* fi"***^ **#*
P ll'd?
C)
A.
[Cordaro, Weismantle).
The poll was done by phone to 291 firemen at Miller Place, Ridge, Rocky Point, O
Sand Beach, and Riverhead.
O O
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ )
71.
Q.
What were the firemen told to assume?
J A.
(Cordaro, Weismantle]
Among other things, they were told (in Question 18) to suppose that volun-teer firemen were expected to help with the evacua-tion.
l 72.
Q.
Have these volunteer firemen been assigned a clear role in helping with an evacuation?
l A.
(Cordaro, Weismantle]
No.
73.
Q.
Did emergency workers abandon their emergency roles
)
during the Ginna steam generator tube rupture inci-dent on June 25, 1982?
D A.
(Weismantle]
No, not at all, as indicated in the NRC report on the Ginna accident, NUREG-0909 (At-l tachment 8).
3 F.
The "Unicueness" of Radiation 1
74.
Q.
What is your opinion of the County's theory that g
l radiological emergencies are "unique," so that ex-perience with, for example, hurricanes and floods 3
provides little guidance?
A.
(Dynes, Mileti, Sorensen].
The ability to transfer i
the principles of human behavior in emergencies is I
o
~~
~
O O
O O
O O
O O
'O 6:
0.
SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR A ONE-WAVE EVACUATION SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS 1
2 l
SCHOOLS POPULATION 5%
20%
NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE I
Shoreham-Wading River Central School District 162 3
Briarcliff 170 8
=
261 5
Miller Ave.
274 13
=
=
473 8
i S-W River Mid.
498 25
=
749 - 150 = 599 15 (40 per)
S-W River High 788 39
=
367 l
Wading River 386 19
=
Total 38
==
1 Rocky Point School District a
523 9
Jos. A. Edgar 550 27
=
855 15 Rocky Pt. El.
900 45
=
380 7
Rocky Pt.-Jun.
400 20
=
-Sen.
800 40 760 - 152 = 608
_16_ (40 per)
Total 47
==
Longwood Central School District i
1,212 21 j
Ridge El.
1,275 63
=
766 13 W. Mid. Isl. El.
806 40
=
942 16 Coram El.
991 49
=
990 17 Walters El.
1,0$2 52
=
3 2,546 t 2 = 1,273 22 Longwood Jun.
2,680 134
=
1,786 - 357 = 1,429 36 (40 per)
Longwood High 1,879 93
=
Total 125
=
O O.
O O
O O
O O
O O-O SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS 1
2 SCHOOLS POPULATION 5%
20%
NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE Miller Place School District 404 7
N. Country Rd.
425 21
=
747 13 Muller Prim.
786 39
=
570 10 Sound Beach 600 30
=
767 - 153 = 614
_16,(40 per)
Miller Pl. High 807 40
=
Total 46
==
Port Jefferson _ School District 275 5
Pt. Jeff Jun.
289 14
=
535 9
Pt. Jeff El.
^563 28
=
1,093 - 218 = 875 22 (40 per)
Vandermeulen High 1,150 57
=
Total 36
==
Comsewogue School District 468 8
Clinton Ave El.
492 24
=
1,288 - 257 = 1,031 26 (40 per)
Comsewogue Sen.
1,355 67
=
382 7
Terryville El.
402 20
=
560 l_0 J.F. Kennedy 589 29
=
Total 51
==
Patchogue-Medford School District 774 Total 13 Eagle El.
814 40
=
O O-O O
O-0 0
0 O.
O.
O.'
SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS 1
2 SCHOOLS POPULATION 5%
20%
NEEDED FOR ONC WAVE Riverhead Central School District 315 6
Riley Ave. El.
331 16
=
Pulaski Str. El.
54f 27
=
517 9
718 12 Riverhead Jun.
755 37
=
2_0 (40 per) 0 968 - 193 = 775 Riverhead High 1,019 51
=
Total 47
,I
==
4
{
South Manor School District I
475 8
South Street 500 25
=
404 7
Dayton Ave.
425 21
=
Total 15
==
Mt. Sinal School District 912 16 Mt. Sinai El.
960 48
=
812 14 Mt. Sinal Jun.
854 42
=
Total 30
==
2 i
BOCES Mid-Island Arena 5(a.m.) -
O 5
1 (a.m. & p.m.)
r 22(p.m.) -
22 Total 1
4 4
==
Final Total 449
=
l NOTE: Little Flower Union Free School District is not listed here because LILCO treats the one school in its dis-
{
trict' as a special facility since its students live there and the school does not have its own transportation.
l
- i i
k
+
SCHOOL BUSES.5 DRIVERS 1
2 SCHOOLS POPULATION 5%
20%
NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE Parochial Schools 222 5
St. Isidore 233 11
=
351 6
I Infant Jesus 369 18
=
197 4
N. Shore Christian 207 10
=
Total 15
==
i Nursery Schools 50 1
Alphabetland Child 50 0
=
Enrichment Center 45 1
Brookhaven Country 45 0
=
i Day School I
Central Brookhaven 75 0
75 2
=
Head Start 50 1
Coram Child Care 50 0
=
Center 16 1
Harbor View Nursery 16 0
=
School 120 3
Just Kids Early 120 0
=
Childhood Learning i
Center l
Middle Island Nursery 13 0
13 1
=
School 12 1
Neighborhood Nursery 12 0
=
School 14 1
Rainbow Cottage 14 0
=
12 1
Riverhead Cooperative 12 0
=
Nursery School 20 1
Sea Port Pre-School 20 0
=
38 1
St. Anselm's Nursery 38 0
=
School 17 1
St. John *s Pre-School 17 0
= 2
O O
O O
o o
O-
.O
~
O O
'O SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS 1
2 SCHOOLS POPULATION 5%
20%
NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE 19 1
Sound Beach Pre-19 0
=
School Co-op 30 1
Step-by-Step Early 30 0
=
Learning Center 35 1
Tots'n Toys Pre-35 0
=
School Learning Center 50 1
Trinity Lutheran 50 0
=
Nursery School 32 1
Wading River 32 0
=
Cooperative Play School 50 1
Whispering Wonders 50 0
=
Pre-School 60 2
World of Children 60 0
=
100 Pre-School 100 0
=
(summer (summer POP-)
POP-)
Total 24 1
1 Reduction for daily absences.
2 Reduction for those who drive to school or ride with someone who drives to school -- for high schools only.
3 Reduced by half for split session.
0-REGULAR BUS DRIVERS EMPLOYED O
BY OR ON CONTRACT TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE SHOREHAM 10-MILE EPZ Number of Pegular O
School Districts School Bus Drivers Shoreham-Wading River Central School District 30 0
Rocky Point School District 26 Longwood Central School District 94 Miller Place School District 21 O
Port Jefferson School District 14 Comsewogue School District
- 21 Patchogue-Medford School District
- 11 O
Riverhead Central School District
- 47 South Manor School District 10 Mt. Sinai School District 27 O
These school districts have schools located both inside and outside of the Shorehan 10-mile EPZ.
O O
- O O
O Draft For a complete summary of each organization, and its transportation and relocation plans, refer to the Evacuation
- O Procedures of this Appendix.
Schools This section covers public and private schools, including nursery schools, which are listed in Section IV of this Appendix.
O officials of Public and private schools located in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) as well as schools located outside the EPZ but with students who live in the EPZ have the responsibility in a radiological emergency of providing their
()
students with the best possible protection.
There are three general alternatives available to provide for the safety of the children during an emergency.
The first alternative is an early dismissal, whereby all students would be returned to their hotea.
The second alternative is evacuation, whereby all students would be relocated O
to reception centers outside the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The third alternative is sheltering students at their schools until conditions are safe for the children to either return home or be relocated.
The best alternative will depend on the O
nature of the emergency, plant conditions, weather conditions, and time of day.
The specific course of action recommended for each emergency classification is discussed below.
In the event of an emergency, schools in session will be O
notified of any Alert or higher emergency classification by the Emergency Broadcast System and by telephone.
Each public school district, parochial school, and nursery school in the EPZ will have a tene alert receiver which will automatically activate and transmit g
the EBS message.
The EBS message will advise the schools to implement specific protective actions and may contain general information about the condition of the plant, radiological conditions, etc.
In addition, each school district superintendent and individual in charge of the private schools in the EPZ will be i
O contacted by telephone by either the Public Schools Coordinator or Private Schools Coordinator to verify that the EBS message was received and to receive requests for additional assistance.
-O 11-19 Rev. 5 ll O
4
'O 11 13 EE:mjlrev10 14
-14 17 While LERO will advise the school officials on what protective actions should be
.O-18 taken, the final decision lies with the School District Superintendant and private school gd-20 ministrators. LERO will broadcast EBS messages announcing the protective actions taken 21 by each school district and private gehool.
23
~O 24 If an Alert or higher emergency classification is declared when schools are in the 25 process of opening, and no protective getion recommendation has been given to the public, 26 school gfficials will be advised to have arriving buses return their students to their homes,
'O and to have students who do not normally use buses return home in their usual manner. If 28 30 gehool is not in session and an Alert or higher emergency classification is declared, school 31 officials will be advised to cancel classes for all schools in the EPZ until the emergency is O
33 terminated.
34 35 If an Alert or Site Area Emergency is declared while gehools are in session, schools 36 will be advised to dismiss their students early. If any school district informs LERO that O
37 they are not implementing early dismissal, then LERO will mobilize the LERO school bus 39 drivers for all schools. If a parochial or nursery schoolinforms LERO that they are not im-40 plementing early slismissal, then LERO will mobilize the neede '"ces from the Patchogue O
42 Staging Area as a special dispatch.
43 44 If schools within the EPZ are still in session when a protective action is recom-45 mended for the general public in any grea of the EPZ, the schools will be advised to take O
46 the same protective action. That is, if some combination of sheltering gnd no action is rec-48 ommended for the general public, then the gehools would be advised to shelter and put their 49 buses on standby. If some combination of sheltering and evacuation is recommended for the g
51 general public, then the schools would be gdvised to evacuate to the School Relocation Cen-52 ters. If gehools are in the process of opening, then they will be gdvised to implement shel-54 tering or evacuation, as appropriate, yvhen their students arrive.
g 56 II-20 Draft
'O
6 (O
7 8
9 57 U_pon a decision by school officials to evacuate schools in the EPZ, school children 58 will be transported by bus directly to gne of two centers outside the EPZ that have been O
59 designated as J:elocation centers: the Nassau Coliseum or the Nassau Community College.
61 Facilities at the Coliseum and the Community College are adequate to accommodate all of 62 the apporixmately 28,000 children enrolled in public and private schools in the EPZ. Some 64 schools, however, have made arrangements to tee gther facilities as relocation centers.
66 67 School districts on Long Island provide bus transportation for approximately one half 68 I their students. School districts glso provide some transportation for parochial schools.
O 70 Private schools provide minimal transportation. Thus,in the gvent of an emergency 71 requiring evacuation, school districts in the Et>Z would be unable by themselves to evacuate 72 all students gt the same time. To provide for the capability of a "one-wave" evacuation, 74 LERO has arranged with various bus companies on Long Island to obtain "first-call" rights 75 to gnough additional buses so that when combined with buses already provided by the 77 schools, all school children could be gvacuated in one "wave" of buses. The number of buses 78 required is based upon 40 high school students per bus or 60 elementary school students per 80 bus.
81 0
82 LERO will provide additional trained auxiliary bus drivers to ensure that all neces-83 sary buses are manned. LERO bus drivers will be pre-assigned to designated bus yards and 84 will _be mobilized automatically if an evacuation is recommended or if any public school dis-O 86 trict does not implement early dismissal while schools are in session. Bus drivers will pick 88 up dosimetry and school assignments at the bus yards. This gquipment will be either stored 89 at the bus yard or brought by a LERO school bus driver to the bus yard LERO bus drivers 90 will be available to drive LERO-supplied buses and any regular school bus for which a regu-O 92 lar driver is not available. The plan provides enough LERO bus drivers to ensure 150 per-93 cent of total bus driver needs.
97 O
97 II-20a oraft 97 97 97 O
O Students will be transported by bus to a pre-assigned location either at the Nassau Coliseum or the Nassau Community College where they will wait to be picked up by their parents or g
guardians.
LEP.0 bus drivers will park their buses and assist teachers and parents at the school relocation centers.. Regular bus drivers will proceed to the EWDF for monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination.
v In those situations where school officials have pre-designated relocation facilities on their own, LERO will provide transportation assistance to these facilities as requested.
Those schools outside the EP7. which have students living in the EPZ will be requested to retain those students at the school when the school day ends, if any protective actions are recommended O
for the general public in any area of the EPZ.
Nursery Schools O
Nursery schools will be advised to implement the.same protective actions as the public and private sch3ols for each O
O O
O II-20b Rev. O O
l
= __
O emergency classification and recommended protective action.
If the nursery schools are advised to evacuate the children to re-O caption centers, LERO will provide the necessary transcortation.
- O O
O i
4 O
lO l
O
- O II-21 O
Rev. 3
,O
,--w,,p
,--m--
+.,,,--y-
,,m-,--,,
,,,__,,,,.w.
s.m.,m.,
_,.,w,-,_.r.--,__,,
n_, _ _,
-_,,-a,-,
-n,_
O-OPIP 3.6.5 Page 63 of 75 4 O
page 1 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE O
1 Upon callout LERO School Bus Drivers should rehort to bus yardListen to WP designated on callout sheet.
EBS radio station for emergency status.
The callout sheet also indicates if you are a primary ce backup driver.*
2.
At bus yard, proceed to the bus yard dispatcher's office.
O Inform the bus yard dispatcher that:
a)
There is a Shoreham emergency and that you are a LERO School Bus Dciver.
,0 b)
You have a current New York State Class 2 Driver's License.
c1)
(If you are a backup driver)
You are available if needed to drive a bus to support an evacuation of the school children or accompany a regular school bus driver.
O c2)
(If you are a primary driver)
Request that a bus be assigned to you.
3.
After a bus has been assigned to you, obtain an Assignment Packet from the LERO box.
(The LERO box will either be stored
.o in the bus yard dispatcher's office or brought by one of the LERO bus drivers).
If accompanying a regular bus driver, pick a packet for that bus drivers regular school assignment.
If all packets have already been taken, report to the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area.
o 4.
Ensure the Assignment Packet contains:
a)
One 0-200 mR Direct Reading Dosimeter (DRD) b)
One 0-5R DRD O
c)
One Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) d)
Two KI tablets e)
Emergency Worker Dose Record Form (OPIP 3.9.1, Att. 2)
O f)
Emergency Worker Bus Driver Badge g)
Bus Lease Receipt Form (OPIP 3.6.4, Act. 14) h)
Directions to School See definition on page }(of 3 O
Draft p
O OPIP 3.6.5 Page 64 of 75 4 O
Page 2 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (Continued) i)
Directions to School Relocation Center j)
Directions to the EWDF k)
Directions to Patchogue Staging Area 1)
School Relocation Center Area Diagram m)
Sch 1 Relocation Center Location Assignments O
n)
School Children Log Out Form o)
LERO School bus driver procedure P)
Directions to the EWDF O
q)
Pen or Pencil 5.
If you heard that a general emergency has been declared, swallow one KI tablet.
If you are riding a bus with a Regular O
Driver Provide her with a KI tablet if she has received dosimetry training.
6.
Fill out Part I of the Emergency Worker Dose Record Form.
~
Caeck both DRDs to ensure they are reading between zero and 207.
of full scale.
If necessary zero the dosimeter using a O
d simeter charg"er in the box.
Enter the readings in the column marked "Initial in Part II of the Emergency Worker Dose Record Form.
Keep all 3 parts of this form with you.
7.
Clip both DRDs and the TLD to your outer clothing on the upper part of your body.
Read DRD's every 15 minutes.
iO 8.
Primary Bus Drivers should examine the assigned bus and fill out Bus Lease Receipt Form.
Leave Pink Copy with the bus yard dispatcher.
9.
Proceed to the designated school.
Identify yourself to a
'O school staff member and inform them you are available to assist in evacuating the school if needed, 10.
When directed by school personnel assist in loading children.
l Request that a school staff member accompanies the children.
l lO Draft
O OPIP 3.6.5 Page 65 of 75 4 O
Page 3 of 3 LERO SCF00L BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (Continued) 11.
Take the children to the designated relocation center, unless told differently by the school staff member.
The school representative has final say on the bus destination.
)
12.
Provide the school representative with the School Relocation Center Location Assignments and the School Children Log Out Form.
13.
Upon arrival at the School Relocation Center drop off children O
the location designated on the School Relocation Center Area at Diagram.
14.
Park the bus and take the keys with you.
15.
Proceed to the School Relocation Center Assignment Station O
shown on the School Relocation Center Area Haps and pick up an assignment packet.
16.
Perform the assignment identified in the packet.
17.
When told that your job is completed by a School Relocation O
Center Staff member, proceed to the EWDF.
18.
At the EWDF, turn in your dosimetry, two copies of Emergency Worker Dose Record Form and the Yellow Copy of your Bus Lease Receipt Form.
0 19.
Return to the Bus Yard.
20.
Primary Bus Drivera fill out Part II of the Bus Lease Receipt Form.
Ensure that you sign the form.
Give the completed form to the bus company dispatcher before leaving the bus yard.
O NOTE:
If you have any problems contact the Special Facilities J
Evacuation Coordinator at the EOC at O
O Draft
I
.O OPIP 3.6.5 Page 65a of 75 4 o
Page 3a of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (Continued)
O De finitions Primary Driver -
LERO School Bus Driver who drives a bus from a O
bus yard that does not normally provide buses to schools within the EPZ.
Backup Driver -
LERO School Bus Driver who drives a bus from a bus yard that normally provides buses to schools within the EPZ.
The drivers will drive buses O
when directed by the bus yard dispatcher or accompany the regular driver.
Regular Driver -
A bus driver who regularly drives school buses on a daily basis.
An employee of the Bus Company or S hool District.
O O
O O
O Draft O
LILCO, April 13, 1988 e:te..
W C 88 APR 15 P1 :03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE f0 i'hG E BRANCW In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETi ON THE RE-MANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS were served this date upon the following by Federal Express as indicated by one asterisk, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
James P. Gleason, Chairman
- Adjudicatory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing 513 Gilmoore Drive Board Panel Docket Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
- Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North i
East-West Towers, Rm. 427 11555 Rockville Pike 4350 East-West Hwy.
Wkville, MD 20852 Bethesda, MD 20814 HcQ Jrt H. Brown, Esq.
- Mr. Frederick J. Shon *
' awrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
Board Kirkpatrick & Lockhart U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South Lobby - 9th Floor East-West Towers, Rm. 430 1800 M Street, N.W.
4350 East-West Hwy.
Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Bethesda, MD 20814 Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- Secretary of the Commission Richard J. Zahnicuter, Esq.
Attention Docketing and Service Special Counsel to the Governor Section Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 1717 11 Street, N.W.
State Capitol Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, New York 12224 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
~*
E
- Alfred L. Nardelli, Esq.
Jonathan D. Feinberf;, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General New York State Department of 120 Broadway Public Service, Staff Counsel Room 3-118 Three Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10271 Albany, New York 12223 George W. Watson, Esq.
- Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq.
Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room S40 Smithtown, Nev' York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Evan A. Davis, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq.
Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
- Suffolk County Attorney Twomey, Latham & Shea Building 158 North County Complex 33 West Second Street Veterans Memorial Highway P.O. Box 298 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Riverhead, New York 11901 Dr. Moorce Schneider Mr. Philip McIntire North Shore Committee Federal Emergency Management P.O. Box 231 Agency Wading River, NY 11792 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 i
5 ary o Leu Ilunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: A pril 13,1988
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