ML20154D475
| ML20154D475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1988 |
| From: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6394 OL-3, NUDOCS 8805190205 | |
| Download: ML20154D475 (421) | |
Text
._
r Ui NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of: )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No.
) 50-322-OL-3 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) (Emergency Planning)
Unit 1) ) (School Bus Driver
) Issue) l O
/
I l
l LOCATION: Hauppauge, New York PAGES: 19390 through 19611 DATE: May 16, 1988
===.......============================= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
s V,c\
O Y HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION W A8P8Ff8r8 1220 L Street, N.W., Sake 600 WanWeston, D.C. 200H 8805190205 880516 (III) 0 PflR ADOCK 05000322 T DCD
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~ . _ . _ _ - ~ . _ . . - . . _ _ . - . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ ..__ _ .
19390 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[]~'
\
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
, 2 In the Matter of: )
3 ) Docket No.
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) 50-322-OL-3 4 ) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power ) (School Bus Driver 5 Station, Unit 1) ) Issue) 6 7 Monday, May 16, 1988 8
State Office BuildinT 9 Hauppauge, New York 10 The above-entitled matter came on for hearing 11 at 9:30 a.m.
12 BEFORE: HON. JAMES GLEASON, Chairman of the Board 13 For the Board:
O- 14 JUDGE JERRY KLINE 15 JUDGE FRED SHON 16 APPEARANCES :
17 On behalf of Applicants:
18 JAMES M. CHRISTMAN, Esq.
19 MARY JO LEUGERS, ESQ.
Hunton & Williams 20 707 East liain Street, P.O. Box 2535 Richmond Virginia 23212 21 (Continued on next page.)
22 23 TANKOOS REPORTING CCMPANY, INC.
24 150 Nassau Street 223 Jericho Turnpike New York, N.Y. 10038 Mineola, N.Y. 11501 25 (212)349-9692 (516)?41-5235 O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19391 1 APPEAR!:NCES : (Continued)
/}
2 On behalf of the Intervenors:
l 3 RICHARD J. ZAHNLEUTER, Esq.
Deputy Special Counsel to the Governor 4 Executive Chamber, the Capital, Room 229 Albany, New York 12224 5
CHRISTOPHER McMURRAY, ESQ.
6 J. LYNN TAYLOR, ESQ.
MICHAEL S. MILLER, ESQ.
7 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 1800 M Street, N.W.
8 Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 9 on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
10 RICHARD BACHMANN, ESQ.
MITZI YOUNG 11 NRC Staff Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 12 13 O 14 ***
15 16 ,
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19392 1 INDEX 2 WITNESS DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS 3 Panel:
4 Douglas M. Crocker Dennis Mileti 5 Michael K. Lindell Robert B. Kel ly 19406 19433 6
EXHIBIT NO. FOR IDENT. IN EVIDENCE 7
No 3xhibits Marked This Session.
8 INSERTS: PAGE #
9 Testimony of Douglas M. Crocker, 10 Robert B. Kelly, Michael K. Lindell and Dennis S. Mileti on the Remanded 11 Issue of "Role Conflict" cf School Bus Drivers 19431 12 Attachments for above-mentioned 13 testimony. 19431
() 14 LILCO'S Supplemental Testimony on the Remanded Issue of "Role Conflict" of 15 School Bus Drivers 19431 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19393
/~'T 1 PROCEEDINGS V
2 JUDGE GLEASON: This is an 3 administrative hearing before the Atomic Safety and 4 Licensing Board appointed by the United States 5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The hearing has been 6 convened tc consider certain issues pertaining to 7 the Long Island Lighting Company's application for 8 an operating license to operate its nuclear power 9 generating facility at Shoreham, 10 The issues which will be heard concern 11 the applicant's emergency plan which is required to 12 be developed and to comply with the NRC's rules and 13 regulations. The emergency plan only becomes
() 14 operative in the unusual event of an accident 15 occurring at a nuclear facility that is required to 16 be developed before licensing. The parties in this 17 litigation, in addition to the applicant, are 18 Nuclear Regulatory staff, which provides technical 19 oversight and monitoring of license applications; 20 the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which 21 overseas the development of adequate machine plans; 22 and the governments of Suffolk County, State of New 23 York, Town of North Hampton, which oppose the
! 24 application for a license. Only those parties are i
25 entitled to participate in this proceeding.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 1
\
19394 3 1 My name is Judge James P. Gleason. I
~)
2 am the Chairman of the Board. On my left is Judge 3 Shon and on my right--Judge Shon, and Judge Jerry 4 Kline.
5 I would like to have the parties 6 identify themselves for the record, please, starting 7 with the applicant.
8 MR. CHRISTMAN: Thank you, Judge.
9 My name is James N. Christman of the 10 law firm of Hunton & Williams, P.O. Box 1535, 11 Richmond, Virginia, 23212. To my right is Mary Jo 12 Leugers. We represent the licensee and applicant, 13 Long Island Lighting Company.
() 14 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Bachmann?
15 MR. BACHMANN: Judge Gleason, my name 16 is Richard G. Bachman. I am with the Office of the 17 General Counsel of the United States Nuclear 16 Regulatory Commission. I reprenent the technical 19 staff of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 20 Commission. Joining me--I believe her plane may be 1
21 . held up by this fog-- Ms. Mitzi Young, also of the 22 Office of General Councol of the NRC.
23 MR. McMURRAY: My name is Christopher 24 McMurray. I represent Suffolk County. I am with 25 the law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart. To my left i
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 1
v 19395 1 are Lynn Taylor and Michael S. Miller, also 2 representing Suffolk County, also with the firm of 3 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart.
4 MR. ZAENLEUTER: My name is Richard J.
5 Zahnleuter, Deputy Special Counsel to the Governor.
6 I represent the Governor and the State of New York 7 in these proceedings.
8 JUDGE GLEASON: I want to state at the 9 outset of this proceeding that we are engaged in a 10 litigation to determine whether the proposed 11 resolution of four discrete issues by the Long 12 Island Lighting Company meet the regulatory 13 requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
() 14 The first three involve, first, the availability of 15 school bus drivers during an emergency. Second, the 16 time estimates for evacuating hospital patients 17 during an emergency. Third, the emergency 18 broadcasting system's capability to send messages 19 and operate tone-alert radios. The fourth issue, 20 which may or may not be litigated, depending on a 21 ruling by the board several weeks from now, involves 22 the adequacy of LILCO's emergency plan supplemented 23 by the best efforts of New York State and Suffolk 24 County to manage eight emergency activities if and 25 when it should ever develop.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19396
{} 2 1 Many aspects of these four issues have been litigated before a licensing hearing board on 3 previous occasions. These discrete issues here have 4 either been remanded or directed to the board for 5 further evaluation and consideration by the NRC's 6 appeal board, the Commission, or both. This 7 proceeding is no different than any other litigated 8 hearing conducted by a Nuclear Regulatory Hearing 9 Board during the past three or four years. It is 10 simply a process with very defined rules and 11 procedure to determine whether LILCO is entitled to 12 an NRC license to operate its nuclear power Shoreham 13 facility to produce electrical energy. This
() 14 proceeding is. however, being conducted in an 15 unusual environment, that being, of course, in the 16 midst of apparently a variety of discussions 17 concerning the possible abandonment of the Shoreham 18 facility and the cessation of efforts by LILCO to 19 obtain an operating license. These activities, of 20 which we take judicial notice, to state for 21 clarification purposes will have no effect on this 22 proceeding, however. These hearings will continue 23 as if they do not exist or until such time as LILCO, 24 if it chooses to do so, withdraws its application 25 for a license.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
- - - - _ _ _ _ -----J
19397 f- 1 I refer to this matter at the outset to V) ausist in keeping the two activities distinct in the 2
3 public's mind. In light of the substantial amount 4 of newspaper and media coverage presently existing, 5 it would be easy for citizens to be confused as to 6 why this proceeding is being conducted, why the 7 state and local governments are party to it when 8 there is apparently discussions for abandonment 9 being conducted at the same time by the State of New 10 York and applicant. This board has no alternative 11 but proceeding as if these negotiations do not 12 exist.
13 This board has on a previous occasion
() 14 indicated that there was no basis in the record of 15 this proceeding to make a conclusion that it would 16 be impossible to fashion and implement an effective 17 emergency plan for the Shoreham facility. We are 18 endeavoring now to ascertain whether the emergency 19 plan which has been developed by LILCO with the 20 resolution it proposes of the four issues, 21 resolutions which are contested in these proceedings 22 by the State, Suffolk County and the Town of North 23 Hampton, will meet NRC's regulatory standards.
24 These hearings are scheduled to run for the next 25 several weeks. They commence after today at 9:00 0 COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19398 a.m. and run approximately until 5:00 p.m. daily.
~
1 2 The hearings, the schedule of witnesses which have 3 ,
been agreed to in the main by the parties, will 4 cover, first, the school board issue, then the 5 hospital evacuation time issue, and the E P. S 6 issue, and finally the best-effort issue in that 7 order. We expected a one or two-week delay to occur 8 while a planned exercise is being conducted sometime 9 in the first part of June before considering the 10 final issue, if that comes to hearing.
11 The applicant, please present your 12 witnesses to be sworn.
13 MR. McMURRAY: Excuse me. Before we
(') 14 move forward, we would like to address a few brief 15 procedural matters if we may.
16 JUDGE GLEASON: Sorry. I should have 17 asked you.
18 MR. MILLER: Judge Gleason, I will keep 19 this very brief. I find interesting your comments 20 just now to open the hearings and I don't believe I
, 21 will comment in response to your comments, but I do 22 have a couple of questions.
23 You mentioned just now, in terms of the 24 schedule, the scheduling of the EBS issue as the 25 third item on the agenda--
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19399 1 JUDGE GLEASON: Excuse me--off the 2 record.
3 (Discussion held off the record.)
4 JUDGE GLEASON: Back on the record.
5 Will you please put the sign down or 6 you will be encorted from the room.
7 Officer, would you escort this 8 individual out of the room.
9 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I can't see why 10 I can't hold a sign. Judge Margulies, we were able 11 to carry signs in--
12 JUDGE GLEASON: They are not being 13 permitted.
() 14 AUDIENCE PARTICIPAN'.': Also Judge Fry, 15 we had signs all the time. Why are you different?
16 JUDGF, GLEASON: I said they are not 17 being permited in this room during the hearing.
18 Witnesses--
19 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: You don't want 20 to hear the truth. ;
21 JUDGE GLEASON: Witner.ses cannot 22 testify in light of those kind of signs being 23 exhibited. Please put them down or you will have to 24 leave the room.
25 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I think it is O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19400
/~') 1 because you are afraid of the truth.
-(/
2 I am not leaving. I think this is a 3 travesty and I am not leaving. I think the people 4 have a right to speak.
5 JUDGE GLEASON: You will have to pnt 6 the sign down or you will be asked to leave the 7 room.
8 2ND AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Excuse me.
9 Do you also specify photographs?
10 JUDGE GLEASON: Yes. Any kind of sign.
11 The witnesses are supposed to be here to testify 12 without any kind of materials being shown outside 13 the record, m
14 2ND AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Because we 15 thought that it would be a fair and accurate 16 contribution for a good look as to our Long Island--
17 JUDGE GLEASON: I'm sorry, sir. That 18 information cannot be put in the record. You either 19 have to put the sign down, the pictures down, or you 20 will have to leave the room.
21 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Can you tell us 22 why again?
23 JUDGE GLEASON: I am not telling you 24 any more than I have already told you.
- 25 3RD AUDIENCE PARTICIPAMT
- Since this COMPUTER AIDED TRAMSCRIPTION/ keyword index
19401 1 is part of what happened here--
[}
2 JUDGE GLEASON: Off the record at this 3 point.
4 (Discussion off the record.)
5 JUDGE GLEASON: We will have a brief 6 adjournment.
7 (Recess.)
8 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Miller, you had 9 some comments you wanted to make. We can proceed 10 with your comments. We may just have to 11 suspend- gat the sign put down later, before the 12 testimony starts. But that won't affect you, so--
13 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir. Judge Gleason,
() 14 very briefly, in your opening comments you mentioned 15 the order, the schedule of the issues to be heard 16 over the next few weeks. Included in your schedule 17 were the issues relating to the proposed LILCO EBS 18 network. I am assuming at tnis time the board has 19 not received LILCO's statement regarding the EBS 20 proposal.
21 JUDGE GLEASON: No. We were supposed 22 to have that today.
23 MR. CHRISTMAN: You will have that 24 today in hand.
25 JUDGE GLEASON: I didn't mean to have O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index an , e, , - - ,.
.e .- - - , - , -. . . , - - , . . -. _ . , ,
19402 1 those remarks construed that it was a foregone 2 conclusion that that issue would be heard. It was 3 just I referred to the possible issues.
4 MR. MILLER: Judge Gleason, with regard 5 to the EBS issues, we of course will also await 6 LILCO's filing before we make further comment. The 7 board, on Friday, May 13th, was telecopied a letter 8 by Ms. Leugers regarding the proposed schedule for 9 the upcoming few weeks. I am not sure the board 10 needs or wants to discuss that proposal. I t-11 essentially reflects an agreement between Suffolk 12 County, at least, and LILCO as to the order of the 13 issues that will be heard. It 's noteworthy that in
() 14 that letter to the board LILCO does bring to the 15 board's attention a problem with the FEMA EBS 16 witness. I guess we should postpone any discussion 17 of that matter until we decide whether we are going 18 .ta) be litigating the EBS issues.
19 With respect to the remainder of the e.
20 schedule, Judge Gleason, again, maybe there is no 21 need to addreca these issues now, there are a few 22 matters, though, that will need to be ironed out and 23 it may be hard for the board to do so because I 24 don't know if LILCO and the County will agree.
25 JUDGE GLEASON: I think it probably O
V COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19403 f' 1 will be well to wait until we resolve the EBS issue i {)T u
2 before we--
3 MR. MILLER: A few other brief matters, 4 some mundane but nonetheless important. We have i
j 5 with us for this proceeding a different court 6 reporting firm than we have over the past years.
7 We had the luxury over the past years of a reporter 8 who got to know everybody quite well. The reporting 9 firm is new. I bring it up for the board, counsel 10 and witnesses to keep in mind we may be using some 11 terms not necessarily familiar to the court 12 reporter.
13 With that in mind, Suffolk County took
() 14 the luxury of giving to the reporter this morning a 15 list of terms we believe may be used frequently 16 during the hearings. One of our legal assistants, 17 Robert Yourczek, prepared a list and we gave that to 18 the court reporter. Other parties may wish to do 19 the same thing. But I think people should be 20 conscious of the fact some terms may need to be 21 spelled out and spelled out more than in the past.
22 JUDGE GLEASON: Did you provide a list 23 to the other parties?
24 MR. MILLER: We did not. It is juut a 25 list with terms like "LERO" and "auxiliary bus O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19404
{} 1 2
drivers." We will give a copy to the other parties.
MR. GLEASON: That would be fine.
3 Mh. MILLER: One other matter. The 4 board of course last weak ruled on motions to strike 5 proposed testimony on all three of the remanded 6 issues. The only issue which is really important at 7 this time from our perspective is the board's ruling 8 concerning the school-related testimony. There are 9 some rulings that were made by the board which 10 Suffolk County would like to seek reconsideration of 11 the board's rulings. I believe it is not necessary 12 to do so in terms of protecting your rights of 13 appeal. But I believe because of the importance of
() 14 some of the issues we would like to seek briefly at 15 least some reconsideration of some of the rulings 16 made by the board relating to the County's testimony 17 regarding the school's issues. We are prepared to 18 do that at this time if the board would like to do 19 so.
20 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Miller, the board 21 spent a great deal of time going over a discrepancy 22 between the two orders that the board issued 23 regarding the rulings to strike, and that is why I 24 said the word "clarification" and/or 25 "reconsideration."
l
(
I COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19405 1 Have you received the board's errata
{~}
2 sheet with respect to that order?
3 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Yes, I have. That is 4 what causes me to ask--
5 JUDGE GLEASON: Bring that up at the 6 same time and notify the other parties if you will.
7 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Thank you.
8 JUDGE GLEASON: We are ready for 9 testimony so we will have to suspend the hearing for 10 a moment until we get the signs removed-11 (Recess.)
12 JUDGE GLEASON: Would you please 13 present your witnesses to be sworn in, please.
() 14 MR. CHRISTMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
15 MR. ZAMNLEUTER: Judge Gleason, I will 16 ask the County lawyers to return. Would you please 17 wait.
18 JUDGE GLEASON: Can I swear them in I 19 while you are getting them?
20 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Sure.
21 MR. CHRISTMAN: Let me ask the 22 witnesses each to identify yourself by name so the 23 Judge can swear you in. ;
24 MR. CROCKER: My name is Douglas 25 Crocker.
O COMIUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
19406
'- 1 MR. KELLY: My name is Robert Kelly.
(~}
V 2 MR. LINDELL: My name is Michael 3 Lindell.
4 MR. MILLER: I am Dennis Mileti.
5 Whereupon, 6 DOUGLAS M. CROCKER 7 DENNIS MILETI 8 MICHAEL K. LINDELL 9 ROBERT B. KELLY 10 having been first duly sworn, were examined and 11 testified as follows:
12 JUDGE GLEASON: The witnesses have been 13 sworn in. Will counsel please proceed. -
() 14 MR. CHRISTMAN: Thank you, Judge.
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION I 16 BY MR. CHRISTMAN:
17 Q. Mr. Crocker, starting with you, would 18 you state your name again quickly and tell the board 19 just a little, very brief word about what you do for 20 a living?
i 21 A (Crocker) My name is Douglas Crocker, 22 manager of the nuclear emergency preparedness for 23 Long Island Lighting Company.
24 Q. Mr. Kelly, the same?
t 25 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: What lies are
{
l
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19407 1 you going to tell us? This is a shara--
[
2 JUDGE GLEASON: Will somebody please 3 get him outside.
4 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: He is being 5 peaceful bringing in signs and you can't even face 6 the truth. That is really a sham. Are you so
- 7 scared of the truth you can't even see a sign? Just 8 sitting there, not disturbing the courtroom, that is 9 contempt of Court? I have contempt for this Court.
10 I don't believe this. The people of Long Island do 11 not want you here. You can come, come visit, you 12 can go out to Montauk and visit the park. We don't 13 need you here to judge over us.
() 14 Why don't you just go back to 15 Washington? We don't need you here. We don't want 16 LILCO's lies. We don't want your lies. You can go 17 now. We don't need you. You may be sent here, you 18 may be the hired gun, we don't want you here. We 19 prefer you leave. I don't want to hear anything 20 else from you. The people don't want to hear you.
21 Our governments say they don't want you. You can go 22 back.
23 You can't even face the truth, a few e 24 simple signs you can'u even face. I don't think 25 what he has done, bringing in signs to make some O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
i
, _ . _ . _ . . . _ , .~ . _ _ _ _
19408
(} 1 2
etatement to you, is bad.
the problem.
You are not listening to I don't think these hearings should 3 continue. We don't want to hear any more of LILCO's 4 lies and deceits. You think you can squash the 5 truth consistently?
6 MR. IRWIN: I went out in the hall, 7 Judge. There were no security officers in the hall.
8 I went to LILCO security and asked them to summon 9 officers.
, 10 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: LILCO security?
- 13 We have LILCO security police in hearings, in the 12 State building? That is interesting. Since when .
13 does LILCO become the law of the land here? I
() 14 realize they want to be. They want to be the 15 police. This is amazing, i 16 JUDGE GLEASON: Officer, would you j 17 please escort this gentleman out of the courtroom 18 and hold him in contempt of court, too, please. He f
19 is obstructing the proceedings here.
20 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I intend to 21 obstruct these proceedings. We don't recognize them 22 as valid. You can't silence us. We will be back.
23 (Whereupon, the gentleman was escorted 24 from the courtroom.)
1 25 JUDGE GLEASON: Let us proceed, please.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19409 1 Q. Mr. Kelly, we were up to you. Would 2 you state your name and tell the board what you do 3 for a living?
4 A. (Kelly) My name is Robert Kelly, 5 senior project manager with the environmental 6 engineering firm of Roy F. Weston, emergency 7 management consultant with the firm.
8 Q. Speak up a little so everybody can hear 9 you.
10 Doctor Lindell, would you do the same?
11 A. (Lindell) My name is Michael Lindell, 12 I am an associate professor of industrial 13 organizational psychology, Michigan State l
() 14 University.
15 Q. Dr. Mileti?
16 A. (Mileti) Dennis Mileti, professor of 17 sociology at Colorado State University and director 18 of Hazards Assessment Laboratory at the same i
19 university.
20 MR. CHRISTMAN: Judge Gleason, I am 21 going to describe now LILCO's pre-filed written 22 testimony, including attachments. There are three 23 documents I will describe. Doing what I think is 24 consistent with what the board wanted last summer, I l
l 25 will suggest these three documents be called i
l i (1)
! COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l l
l t
19410 1 exhibits rather than bound in the transcript, but 2 that is up to you.
3 JUDGE GLEASON: At this point we are 4 going to put all the testimony in the record, not as 5 exhibits.
6 MR. CHRISTMAN: Fine. Then we will 7 make seven extra copies, but we will do that.
8 Q. Mr. Crocker, I am going to show you a 9 document, 60 pages in length, called "Testimony of 10 Douglas M. Crocker, Robert B. Kelly, Michael K.
11 Lindell and Dennis S. Mileti on the Remanded Issue 12 of Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers." I will ask 13 the four of you gentlemen whether this document was
() 14 prepared by you or under your direction and 15 supervision.
16 A. (Crocker) Yes, it was.
17 A. (Kelly) Yes, it was.
18 A. (Lindell) Yes.
19 A. (Mileti) Yes.
20 Q. Mr. Crccker, are there penciled 21 corrections or additions you want in the pre-filed 22 testimony?
23 A. (Crocker) Yes.
24 Q. Would you read them so the board and 25 the other parties can get them down? Read slowly O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIFFION/ keyword index
i9411 1 and clearly, and if anyone has trouble following I (V~T 2 am sure they will speak up.
3 A. (Crocker) The first correction is to 4 page five, second full paragraph, fifth line of that 5 paragraph. You should delete tha ~c;f 'off-site " .
6 MR. McMURRAY: Only the word "off-site" 7 and not the word "and"? ,
8 A. (Crocker) The sentence should read, 9 "for off-site emergency preparedness activities,"
10 period. There was an extra "off-site" at the end 11 there.
12 The next correction is on page 28. On 13 the very top line on the page, the word "is" should
() 14 be changed to "are."
15 On the same page, near the bottom, the 16 third bullet item under question 22, immediately 17 after the bullet, where it now reads, "With the 18 exception of one case," the words "With the 19 exception of one case, no," those words should be 20 struck and it should be replaced by the words "in 21 three cases."
22 MR. McMURRAY: I didn' t catch that, Mr.
23 Crocker.
24 WITNESS CROCKER: Where it now says 25 "With the exception of one case, no," strike O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index r
p 19412 T 1 everything up to and including the word "no."
(V 2 Replace those words with "in three cases."
3 JUDGE GLEASON: It reads "with the 4 exception in three cases"?
5 WITNESS CROCKER: No. It should cow 6 read, "In three cases, bus drivers"- "bus driver" 7 has to be changed to plural--and after the word 8 "driver" insert the words "were reported to have."
9 So the sentence in its entirety as corrected would 10 read, "In three cases bus drivers were reported to 11 have arrived late for duty."
12 In the following sentence, the first 13 four words in that sentence should be stricken. In
() 14 other words, cross out the words "in the one 15 exception." The first word in that sentence now 16 becomes the word "one" and it should read, "One bus 17 company in the Maryville incident," et cetera.
18 If everyone has that, we would like to 19 add two sentences to the end of that paragraph.
20 JUDGE GLEASON: Page 28?
21 WITNESS CROCKER: Yes. Still on page 22 28. These would be the last two sentences on this 23 page. It would be a continuation of the last 24 paragraph. It begins, "In the Pinellas"--and I will 25 spell that- "incident"--Pinellas is O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
'19413
- t 1 P-i-n-e-1-1-a-a- "incident, about 10 percent of on9
.{ }
2 bus company's drivers (about 20 drivers), showed up 3 late because they first helped 'take care of ,
4 families'." '
5 That sentence should read in its 6 entirety, "In the Pinellas incident, about 10 ,
7 percent of one bus company's drivers (about 20 8 drivers), showed up late because they first helped 9 'take care of families'."
10 Following that sentence is this short 11 sentence, "In the Miamisburg--Miamisburg is spelled i
l 12 M-i-a-m-i-s-b-u-r-g- "incident, it appears that a 13 few drivers showed up late due to family concerns."
I
() 14 That entire sentence should read now, "In the 15 Miamisburg incident, it appears that a few drivers 16 showed up late due to family concerns."
l 17 On page 29, the very first line, the ;
I l 18 word "no" should be replaced with the words "only 19 three to five." And after the word "drivers," the -
l 20 words "in one event (Miamisburg)," should be 21 inserted. The sentence should therefore read, 22 "After receiving the duty call, only three to five l 23 bus drivers in one event (Miamisburg), helped i
24 evacuato their families," et cetera.
25 1Mving to page 30, beginning with the O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index ,
l
19414
(} 1 first full paragraph that begins with the word "18,"
2 change that word 18 to the word 19.
3 Moving down one line to the sentence 4 that begins with the word "nine," where it now says 5 "nine of the 18," that should be corrected to "ten 6 of the 19." So the first word, "nine," should be 7 replaced by the word "ten," and the numeral 18 8 should be replaced by the numeral 19.
9 On Page 31, in the first full paragraph 10 that begins with the sentence, "We also discovered 11 that 12," et cetera, the fourth line within that 12 paragraph, in the sentence that begins with the word 13 "eight", that word "eight" should be changed to the
() 14 word "nine."
15 Moving down two lines, where the 16 sentence begins, "Of these eight," that should be 17 corrected to read, "Of these nine." The word "four" 18 that follows that should be replaced by the word l 19 "five."
20 I see I have inadvertently skipped one l
l 21 on this page. We have to move up to the first full l
22 indented paragraph. That is the paragraph that 23 begins with the words "The remaining five." In the 24 second full sentence in that paragraph, the sentence 25 that begins, "All respondents felt," in the second O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19415 1 line of that sentence the words "and felt either no 2 sense or some sense," those should be stricken. I 3 will repeat that. The words "and felt either no 4 sense or some sense" should be stricken. Those 5 words should be replaced by the following words:
6 "to a great extent, (4), or felt some minimal sense, 7 (1) . " That is the end of the insertion.
8 The sentence--
9 MR. McMURRAY: Mr. Crocker, what was in 10 the paren, the last one?
11 WITNESS CROCKER: The numeral one.
12 The sentence should now correctly read, 13 "All respondents felt their families could protect
(} 14 themselves to a great extent (4), or felt some 15 minimal sense (1) of responsibility to stay home 16 with their families, questions 13 to 12."
17 Moving to page 32, the very first line, 18 top of the page, the third word in the question is 19 "found." It should be "find." Replace the word 20 "found" with the word "find."
21 Moving down to the seventh line on the 22 page, which is in the first paragraph of the answer, 23 the last sentence in that paragraph, the word "four" 24 should be replaced by the word "five." The sentence 25 would now correctly read, "This was true even for O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
n 19416
- - 1 , five of the respondents with families at home."
j 2 We now have to jump ahead to page 47.
3 At page 47, as well as on 48, the entirety of )
l 4 question 41 and its associated answer should be ;
5 withdrawn. All of 41 and its answer should be
- 6 withdrawn.
7 On page 50, question 46, the first line 8 of the answer, where it says, 488, that should be 9 replaced by 509. 488 should be replaced by 509.
10 Moving down to the next line, where it 11 says 449, that should be replaced by 470. 449 12 replaced by 470.
13 Moving down to question >47, the second 14 full sentence in the answer to that question, the
(])
15 sentence begins, "Since the Longwood Junior High 16 School is on split session," that entire sentence 17 should be removed. There is no replacement for 18 that.
19 On page 51, question 48, the third 20 sentence in thu answer, all the way to the end of 21 that answer, should be removed. The sentence--the i 22 first sentence that should be stricken begins, "In 23 1984, all school populations were also reduced by I 24 three percent." Everything after that in that j 25 answer should be stricken.
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
19417 1 JUDGE GLEASON: Including the O 2 3 subsequent sentence?
3 WITNESS CROCKER: Yes. The answer 4 should end now with the statement, "LILCO believes 5 they are still valid today."
6 On page 51, question 49, the beginning 7 of the second sentence in the answer, the sentence 8 now reads, "Parochial schools are figured into." In 9 front of the word "parochial" insert the words "bus 10 drivers of." So the sentence would now read, "Bus 11 drivers of parochial schools are figured into this 12 number."
13 On page 52, question 50, the third line 14 in the answer to question 50, where it says 582,
[}
15 that number should be replaced by the number 613.
16 582 should be replaced by 613.
17 Moving to page 53, question 52, the 18 question now reads, "If only 488 bus drivers."
19 Replace the number 488 with 509. 488 replaced by 20 509. Continuing that change, further down in the 21 answer, in the fifth line, in the sentence that
(
j 22 begins, "That covers 301 of the 488," that 488 i
23 should also be changed to 509.
t 24 Moving down the page three more lines, l 25 the sentence that begins, "The remaining 187 bus
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
i L
19418 l
1 driver positions," that number 187 should be
[}
2 replaced by the number 208. 187 becomes 208, 3 Moving down two more lines, that line 4 begins, "281 LERO drivers." That number 281 should 5 become 312. And moving a few words down that line, 6 the number 187 should become 208.
7 Moving to question 53 on the same page, 8 the second line of the answer, which refers to 9 Attachment M to this testimony, the letter "M" as in 10 Mary should change to "O" as in Oscar.
11 Moving to page 55, the first line at 12 the top of the page, where it refers to Attachment 13 N, as in Nancy, the letter "N" should be replaced by
() 14 the letter "P," as in Peter.
15 Moving down one line there is a 16 sentence that reads, "There will be a separate LERO 17 box for each bus yard." That should be amended by 18 removing the article "a" before the word "separate" 19 and making the word "box" plural, so that the 20 sentence will now read, "There will be separate LERO 21 boxes for each bus yard."
22 That is all I have in the testimony.
23 MR. CHRISTMAN: That is fine with 24 respect to this first document.
25 BY MR. CHRISTMAN:
O COMPUTER AIDT;D TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
19419
~
1 Q. Let me ask the witnesses, then, if as 2 corrected this testimony, the 60 page testimony, is 3 true and correct to the best of your knowledge and 4 belief.
5 A. (Crocker) Yes, it is.
6 A. (Kelly) Yes.
7 MR. CHRISTMAN: I will move all three 8 of these into evidence as soon as I get through with 9 all three, if that is all right.
10 JUDGE GLEASON: Yes.
11 Q. Mr. Crocker, let me show you a slightly 12 thicker document called "Attachments for Testimony 13 of Douglas M. Crocker, Robert B. Kelly, Michael K.
14 Lindell and Dennis S. Mileti on the Remanded Issue
['}
15 of Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers," consisting 16 of attachments tab A through N.
17 Do you see that document?
18 A. (Crocker) Yes.
- 19 Q. Does that constitute the attachments to 20 the testimony that we just described?
21 A. (Crocker) Yes.
22 Q. Are there any corrections you would 23 like to make of that document?
24 A. (Crocker) Yes, there are.
25 Q. Would you read those carefully for O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19420 1 people.
2 A. (Crocker) In Attachment G, as in 3 George, page two--
4 MR. McMURRAY: Wait, please.
5 A. (Crocker) Page two, question two, the 6 question now reads, "Did the impact take place 7 before?" That is a typo. It should read, "Did the 8 evacuation take place before?" The first word 9 "impact" should be replaced by the word 10 "evacuation."
, 11 Moving to page eight in the same 12 attachment, question 37, tabulated under the 13 question are four lines of data. In the line that
() 14 begins with zero percent--six cases, that numeral So, for zero 15 six should change to numeral five.
16 percent there are five cases.
17 Moving down two lines to the 51 18 percent-plus line, the "two cases" should be l 19 replaced by "three cases." The numeral two becomes 20 a numeral 38.
21 Moving to page nine, on question 40, 22 for question 40, opposite the word "no" where it now 23 says "seven," that should become an eight. The 24 numeral seven replaced by the numeral eight.
l 25 Opposite the word "yes," where it now reads numeral 4
I COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index u
l l
t
19421 7ss 1 12, that should become numeral 11.
U 2 The next correction is to Attachment K.
3 On the first page of Attachment K, which is a table, 4 4 in the left-hand column, the second line from the 5 bottom, where it says, "Longwood JUN," the period 6 should be replaced by a clash and followed by the 7 word "middle." So it should read, "Longwood 8 JUN/ Middle," meaning junior / middle.
9 Moving to the right, on the same line, 10 in the third--sorry--the third column of numbers.
11 You will see the number 2,546, which is followed by 12 a division sign, the number two and a few other 13 numbers. Strike the division sign, the numeral two,
{} 14 the equal sign, the number 1,273, and the numeral 15 three that indicates a footnote.
16 Moving one column to the right, where 17 it indicates 22, replace 22 with 43.
18 The last correction to this page is the 19 bottom right-hand corner in the last column, where 20 it indicates "Total, 125." That 125 should be 21 replaced by 146.
22 Moving to the third page of the same 23 attachment, because of the changes I just mentioned, 24 the final total in the bottom right-hand corner o '
25 this chart, which presently reads "449," that should O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19422
(} l 2
be corrected to read 470. That is 470.
On the following page, page four, the 3 very top line, under the heading of "Parochial 4 Schools," opposite "St. Izidor's School," we need to 5 change some of those numbers. The first number is 6 233. That should be replaced by 267. Moving to the 7 right one column, the number 11 should be replaced 8 by the number 14. Moving to the right one more ;
9 column, the number 222 should be replaced by the 10 number 253.
11 On the bottom of page five, there is a 12 footnote three at the bottom of the page. That 13 should be deleted.
() 14 Finally, Attachment M should be deleted 15 in its entirety because it has been replaced by 16 Attachment 0 in the supplemental testimony. i 17 Attachment N, as in Nancy, should also 18 be deleted in its entirety. It has been replaced by 19 Attachment P, as in Peter, in the supplemental 20 testimony.
21 That is the last of the corrections.
22 Q. Let me ask all the witnesses whether 23 this set of Attachments A through N, two of which 24 have been stricken, were compiled and prepared under 25 your direction c.r supervision or by you?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19423
('; 1 A. (Crocker) Yes, they were.
2 A. (Kelly) Yes.
3 A. (Lindell) Yes.
4 Q. As corrected, are these attachments 5 true and correct to the best of your knowledge and 4
6 belief?
7 A. (Crocker) Yes.
8 A. (Kelly) Yes.
9 A. (Lindell) Yes.
10 A. (Mileti) Yes.
11 Q. Mr. Crocker, let me show you a third 12 document. This is only three pages long and has 13 Attachments O and P, which you just mentioned. It
() 14 is called "LILCO's Supplemental Testimony on the 15 Romanded Issue of Role Conflict of School Bus
, 16 Drivers." All these questions and answers are 17 sponsored by you, Mr. Crocker, so let me ask you, 18 was this document prepared by you or under your 19 direction and supervision?
20 A. (Crocker) Yes.
21 Q. Do you have any corrections you want to 22 make to it?
. 23 A. (Crocker) No, I do not.
24 Q. Is this document true and correct to 4
25 the best of your knowledge and belief, including the O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19424 1 two attachments O and P?
2 A. (Crocker) Yes.
3 Q. Do you adopt it as part of your 4 testimony in this proceeding?
5 A. (Crocker) Yes.
6 Q. Mr. Crocker, in all the changes we just 7 went through, apart from minor typos and grammatical 8 corrections, there were two sets, let me call them, 9 of changes of numbers. The last ones you made had 10 to do with the number of bus drivers that would be 11 used in a Shoreham emergency or that are planned 12 for. An earlier set had to do with the number of 13 people who responded to phone questions about past 14 real emergencies such as at Miamisburg.
(])
15 Do you want to explain briefly how the 16 two sets of changes came about or why we had to make 17 those in the testimony today?
18 A. (Crocker) Well, in terms of the number 19 of bus drivers, we made an adjustment to reflect the 20 different treatment of the Longwood Junior / Middle 21 School which was on split session and we have added 22 sufficient drivers to the program to allow us to 23 evacuate the full school population--that is, when 24 both of the shifts, so to speak, are at the school.
25 The other information--I think I will O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index I
19425 w 1 confer with Mr. Kelly. This dealt with his data.
(O 2 A. (Kelly) The testimony just had some 3 inadvertent mistakes with that data. The correct 4 data was, of course, contained in the appendix to 5 the testimony. It just was inadvertently reported 6 in our testimony.
7 MR. CHRISTMAN: Thank you.
8 Judge Gleason, I would like to move 9 these three documents into evidence and ask that i
10 they be bound into the transcript as though read and 11 that they constitute LILCO's direct case on this 12 issue.
13 JUDGE GLEASON: Is there objection?
() 14 MR. McMURRAY: Judge Gleason, I would 15 like to conduct a brief voir dire on soms of these 16 changes before I determine whether or not I have an 17 objection.
18 JUDGE GLEASON: Go ahead.
19 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 20 BY MR. McMURRAY:
21 Q. Mr. Kelly, let's talk about the 22 adjustments made to the surveir data beginning on
- 23 page 29 and a few pages after that.
24 When did you first become aware that 25 the data in the testimony was not accurate?
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index I
19426 l
Just when I was preparing over
{} l 2
A. (Kelly) the last couple of days.
3 Q. And you had not read your testimony 4 prior to that time?
5 A. (Kelly) But I just picked up on that 6 in the last couple days.
7 Q. When was it you first picked up on it?
8 A. (Kelly) I believe, Saturday.
9 Q. Did you inform counsel of that?
10 A. (Kelly) Yes, I did.
11 Q. Do you know why we were not informed of 12 those changes prior to today?
13 A. (Kelly) No, I do not.
() 14 Q. Mr. Crocker, were you aware that there 15 were discrepancies between the actual data and the 16 data in the testimony?
17 A. (Crocker) You are referring to the 18 data you just--
19 Q. That's right.
20 A. (Crocker) I found out about it 21 yesterday when they gave me the list of corrections 22 to read.
23 Q. Let me ask Drs. Mileti and Lindell, 24 were you aware that the data reported in the 25 testimony was not accurate?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19427
{} 1 2 Sunday.
A. (Lindell) Not until either Saturday or 3 A. (Mileti) I had a hunch that that might-4 be the case on Friday. '
l 5 Q. Did you check the data to see whether 6 your hunch was correct? i 7 A. (Mileti) That is how I got the hunch.
8 I was reading the testimony and the attachments and 9 a few other things on the airplane right out here.
10 Q. Did you inform counsel on Friday that 11 it might be incorrect?
12 A. (Mileti) I got to the hotel very late 13 and I didn't see counsel until I encountered them in
() 14 the restaurant. I had coffee and desert and had 15 missed dinner and said I had a few questions I 16 wanted to talk to people about, and they said, 17 "Let's do that Saturday," and we talked about it on 18 Saturda,y.
19 Q. Mr. Kelly, are you now confident that 20 the data as represented in the testimony as 21 corrected is accurate? ;
22 A. (Kelly) Yes. And as I pointed out, l l
23 the attachments themselves to the testimony were (
24 accurate all along.
25 Q. They were accurate all along?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19428 i
1 A. (Kelly) Yes. .
2 Q. You are confident of that now?
3 A. (Kelly) Yes. ;
4 Q. Were you the one who compiled the data?
5 A. (Kelly) Yes. ,
6 Q. Were you the one who tabulated the 7 data? ,
- 8 A. (Kelly) Yes.
I 9 Q. Were you the one who added up the i 10 numbers? j 11 A. (Kelly) Yes.
12 Q. So you now feel-- :
! 13 A. (Kelly) I was responsible for that.
() 14 Q. You now feel confident that it is 15 correct?
16 A. (Kelly) Yes.
17 Q. With no qualifications?
l 18 A. (Kelly) No. I do want to look at the 1 l
19 wording he used in correcting one item on page 31, 4
20 3ust to make sure that the wording was properly 21 reflected. But the data itself is correct.
t i
j 22 Q. Let's look at that item, then. What is ;
23 the wording you are talking about? i i
24 A. (Kelly) "All respondents felt their f l 25 families could protect themselves- " I think the ,
1 i i
i COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
19429 1 word "and felt either" should have been left in and 2 I think Doug may have suggested it be deletad. The 3 sentence--I believe, without pulling out data, 4 should read "all respondents felt their families 5 could protect themselves and felt either to a great 6 extent, four, or minimal, one, sense of 7 responsibility to stay home with their families."
8 Q. This is joint testimony and I will 9 leave it to witnesses or counsel--
10 JUDGE GLEASON: Which version shall wo 11 put in or issve out? Mr. Christman?
12 MR. CHRISTMAN: Why don't the two of 13 you put your heads together there.
() 14 (Witnesses confer.)
15 WITNESS KELLY: May I just take a 16 moment?
17 JUDGE GLEASON: Sure.
18 MR. McMURRAY: While they do that, 19 Judge Gleason, may I run out?
20 JUDGE GLEASON: We are going to have a 21 recess as socn as this evidence is in so--
22 MR. McMURRAY: Okay.
23 JUDGE GLEASON: Why don't wo ta&.e a 24 five-minute recess and correct this when we come 25 back.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19430 ,
{} 2 1 (Brief recess.)
JUDGE GLEASON: 11 we can proceed, 3 then, please? Have you resolved your--
4 WITNESS KELLY: Yes. j 5 JUDGE GLEASON: You want to tell us how 6 you want it in the record?
7 WITNESS KELLY: Let me read the 1
8 corrected sentence as Doug Crocker read it to you.
9 He read it, "All respondents felt their families 10 could protect themse?v64 to a great extent, four, or 11 felt some minimal sense, one, of responsibility," ,
E 12 and so forth. What I would like to do is after the 13 words "to a great extent," insert the following five
() 14 words: "and felt either no sense (4)," so the new ,
15 sentence should read, "All respondents felt their 16 families could protect themselves to a great extent 1
17 and felt either no sense (4), or felt some minimal :
18 (1) sense of responsibility to stay home with their i 19 families."
20 JUDGE GLEASON: All right.
21 MR. McMURRAY: Judge Gleason, let me I 22 also note for the record that the testimony 23 withdrawn by LILCO referred to certain signud 24 statements by the bus drivers. That was one of the 25 issues that we wanted to re-argue later this I ,
j COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
-,mu
1 19431 i 1 afternoon. I just informed the board of that.
2 Also, we have objected to the !
3 supplemeatal testimony. As you know, the board has ,
4 ruled. Other than that, we have no objections to
, 5 the admission of this tastimony. -
J
} 6 JUDGE GLEASON: Then the testimony as ;
7 read and as submitted and modified will be received
, 8 into the record as if read.
9 10 3
4 11 12 I
! 13
() 14 15 i
16 !
, t 17
! 18 &
i I, 19 20
{ 21
- 22 23 i
j 24 i-25 i
i f COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
[
O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and L'.ensing Board in the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 5P3224L-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ) (School Bus Driver lasue)
Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, n ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. UNDELL, AND
- V DENNIS S. MILETI ON THE REMANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT
- OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS 1
'l l
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 l
Richmond, Virginia 23h2 I
AprU 13,1988
!o 4
LILCO, Apru 13,1988 O usirro st^tts or ^"taic^
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Lleensing Board d
in the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) (School Bus Driver 1ssue)
Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, ROBERT B. KELLY, M1CHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON THE REMANDED ISSUE QF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS
- CONTENTS O =
- 1. Identity and Qualifications of Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II. "Role Confuct" of Regular School Bus Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A. Lit era ture and Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 B. E m piri c al D a t a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 C. Pous .....................................40 D. C o n cl usio n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 III. LILCO's Auxiliary School Bus Driver Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Attachments A- Resume of Douglas M. Crocker i B- Resume of Robert B. Keuy l C- Resume of Michael K. Linden D- Resume of Denriis S. Mueti E "Role Abandonment by Bus Drivers During Emergency Evacua-tions" by Robert B. Keny F - Interview Schedule for Bus Driver Study for Organizational Re-i spondents G- Results of the Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respondents H - Bus Driver Interview Schedule
!- Results of the Bus Dnver Interview Study
- - LILCO's 1954 testimony, Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832, at 85-93.
"Senoot Tr>asportatioa aei"tre=*"t> ror oae-wave tvae">-
i O x tion" Chart 8
2-O t Reeular sus Drivers Empioved av or On Contract to Seneel Districts in the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ" Chart M- Pages U-19 through U-21 of App. A of the LILCO Plan (Draf t)
N- OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14, "LERO School Bus Driver Proce-dure" (Draf t)
L IDENTITY AND QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESSES
. Q. Will the witnesses please identify themselves and provide a brief descrip-tion of their professional qualifications and background?
A. [Crocker) My name is Douglas M. Crocker. As Manager of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division for LILCO, I oversee all aspects of the Shoreham onsite and offsite (LERO) emergency preparedness program. I am responsible for the development and maintenance of f acilities, plans, procedures, training, and dri!J programs to satisfy NRC and FEMA require-ments. My professional qualifications, and those of the other witnesses, are Attachments A-D to this testimony.
(Kelly) My name is Robert B. Kelly. I am a Senior Project Manager for Roy F. Weston, Inc., an environmental engineering consulting firm. I have been retained as a consultant by LILCO to collect data on how bus drivers have responded in actual emergencies. I have developed and implemented emergency preparedness programs for feder::1, state, and local government agencies, chemical plants, pharmaceutical firms, nuclear power plants, and others. I have done a study of 50 major U.S. evacuationi that have occurred since 1980. The purpose of this research was to identify those l
I i f actors which made for a successful evacuation.
l r
! [Lindell) My name is Michael K. Lindell. I am an Associate ?rofessor of l
l Psychology at Michigan State University. I am a consultant to LILCO on O nu m aa oenavior ta e m erceacies- av are or researen aae writiae cea de
O eeriaea broae2r s iae2viou>> aae ore aizatioa i reseoase to emereeocies-l In this area ! have conducted three types of research dealing with (1)"risk perception," (2) warning response," and (3) "emergency planning."
l
[Mileti] My name is Dennis S. Mileti. I am Professor of Sociology and Di-rector of the Hazard Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
I am a consultant to LILCO on human behavior in emergencies.
- 2. Q. What emergencies have you actually been to and for which have you per sonally collected data?
A. ( Lindell] My own research has included primary data collection on four communities struck by floods (Sumner, Washington on December 2,1977; Valley, Nebraska on March 19, 1978; Fillmore, California on March 14, 1978; and Snoqualmie, Washington on December 2,1977) and four communi- 3 1 ~
e' (c "<*r " e '"e ' "5"'e" ""o ' "e'St "' r*e "^'ar t ") ^'~
O fected by the eruption of Mount St. Helens on May 18,1980.
(Mileti] I studied the following disasters shortly af ter they occurred: the Wray, Colorado tornado in 1971; the Rapid City flood in June 1972; and the l 1986 eruption of the Nevada del Ruiz volcano in Columbia.
I have also studied actual warnings of earthquakes for which the threat did not materialize: the Wilmington, North Carolina earthquake ,
prediction in 1976; the Kawasaki and Tokyo earthquake predictions in 1975; the Parkfield earthquake prediction in 1985; and the San Diego earthquake prediction in 1985.
I also studied the 1982 Livingston, Louisiana train derailmen,t; the 1983 Coalinga earthquake: and the 1979 Three Mile :sland accident, though
! was not at these during the immediate impact.
Q l
- 3. Q. What experience have the rest of you had with real emergencies?
A. [Crocker) I was living on Long Island when Hurricane Gloria hit in 1985.
While I did not participate in any emergency response during the hurricane, I volunteered to serve in LILCO's restoration efforts and performed survey work for damage in the community and later served as a messenger and coordinator of line crew activities for 7-9 days.
In 1978 I was living in Massachusetts when the state was hit by its worst blizzard in decades. My town was hit hard with snow and coastal flooding. Many beach houses were washed awsy and parts of the area had to be evacuated. The National Guard was called out to assist the communi-ty with traffic and access control.
[ Kelly] I have been involved in emergency responses to several natural and technological emergencies: the Lynn, Massachusetts fire in 1982; the 1984 spring floods in western Massachusetts; a 1984 winter storm in eastern Massachusetts; a Massachusetts state employees' strike in 1982; the Salem, Massachusetts fire in 1984; the Cuban refugee program in 1980; the 1980 Hurricane Allen recovery program; and many smaller emergencies.
- 4. Q. What experience do you have in emergency planning?
A. (Crocker] At the time of the Three Mile Island accident,I was working in Stone & Webster's environmental engineering department. Af ter TMI the area of emergency planning grew extensively, and I was recruited by man-agement to be, trained and to participate in an emergency planning project that was just beginning at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station.
From May 1980 to January 1984 I worked on and ended up managing all of Stone & Web::ter's offsite emergency preparedness activities for the five i
3 (V counties and two states surrounding Zimmer in conjunction with those counties and states.
From September 1982 to January 1984, I developed the emergency response plans for the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Kentucky EPZ counties for the Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station. During this time I was the Project Engineer responsible for all emergency planning work in the New York office of Stone & Webster. This included work for the Salem, Shoreham, Indian Point, and Oyster Creek nuclear power plants.
Since 1984 I have been working for LILCO, first as a Stone &
Webster employee and later as a LILCO employee. Initiauy I worked onsite as the Onsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor. In 1986 I moved to the equivalent position responsible for offsite emergency preparedness activi-ties effdte. Now I oversee both the onsite and offsite emergency prepared-ness efforts for Shoreham.
(Mueti) My experience regarding emergency plarating is of several types.
First,I have conducted academic studies that are related to the topic, and I have written publications based on these studies. Second, I have been in-volved in non-academic practical applications of emergency planning knowledge; I have shared knowledge applicable to emergu.;cy planning with varied user groups, for example, through speeches and guest lectures as wen as through long-term working relationships.
The academic studies I have performed that are related to emergen-cy planning ate varied. These include synthesizing literature reviews as well as collacting primary field data. The ictmer is illustrated by the docu-ment entitled Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation in the United States, which appeared in 1975 through the Institute of Behavioral Science at the
(l University of Colorado and was written as part of work for the National v
Science Foundation. Another example is the recent report Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Research by J. Sorensen, B. Vogt, and me, which appeared in 1987 for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
In the decade between the appearance of these works, I also participated in well over a dozen other efforts to appraise knowledge that was in one way or another related to emergency planning issues, and I wrote several dozen papers and reports related to the topic.
My experience with the couection of primary field data on topics re-lated to emergency planning is illustrated by my most recent trip to a di-saster site in January 1986 to study preparedness and response issues relat-ed to the eruption of a volcano in Colombia, South America, in which some 24,000 people died. That research was sponsored by the National Academy p
V of Sciences. I have also conducted primary field data collection efforts in other studies that amount to probably several thousand interviews; these were mostly research efforts funded by the National Science Foundation.
In 1984 I and others completed the report Interf ace in Reactor Emercency Planning and Response for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in which I
we sought to determine empirically if current regulations for nuclear l power plant preparedness result in integrated emergency plans.
l l I have also been involved in non-academic practical applications of 1
l emergency planning knowledge. For example, I have consulted with about i
a half-dozen utilities on the topic, as well as a variety of governments and organizations, including the State of California, the City of Los Angeles, the Tokyo Mett:politan Government, the Paris fire brigade, the Interna-tional and American Red Cross, IBM, the Governor's Office in the State of Colorado, and others.
y .- _ _ _ _ . ,, - _
O ia 1981 i neiPee necia ine soutnera c tirorata tarinauake Preparee-ness Project, which is a California federal cooperative effort to prepare for a major earthquake. I am also a member of the Committee on Natural Disasters in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), as well as a member of the Subcommittee on Earthquake Research of the Board on Earth Sci-ences to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), also within the N AS. I recently helped the USGS develop its emergency plan for an impending earthquake prediction.
Finally, from time to time I am called upon to make preparedness-related prewntations to seminars on emergency planning and hazard miti-gation hosted by, for example, the Federal Emergency Management Agen-cy, General Public Utilities (GPU-Nuclear), and others.
( Kelly] I have worked for FEMA and the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. I worked both as an emergency planner and in a emergency op-erations role.
I have reviewed and developed state-level emergency plans for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including the State Emergency Broadcast System Plan, the State In-Place Shelter Plan, the State Comprehensive t
Emergency Management Plan, and the State Disaster Recovery Plan. I also directed the development of 165 local community emergency plans.
I have also developed and conducted emergency training programs and conducted capability assessments and hazard analyses studies. As a private consultant, I have developed industrial and community emergency preparedness plans.
1 have been involved with radiological emergency planning for the l
Pilgrim, Seabrook, Yankee Rowe, and Vermont Yankee nuclear power
l
(] plants. My duties included reviewing local, area, and state emergency plans and implementing those plans during emergency drills and exercises.
During these drills and exercises I was in charge of the Emergency Broad-cast System and as a member of the operations staff was responsible for intelligence gathering and resource management.
(Lindell) I would cite my AIF study and the workshop for emergency per-sonnel in the Three Mile Island area. These are mentioned elsewhere in this testimony.
- 5. Q. What have you done specifically on role conflict?
A. [Lindell) Role conflict is addressed in my study (with Patricia Bolton, Ronald Perry, and others) for the Atomic Industrial Forum entitled i Plannine Conceots and Decision Criteria for Shelterine and Evacuation in a O
O Nuclear Power Plant Emergenci', AIF/NESP-031 (June 1985). I also made
! an oral presentation on role conflict at the 1986 Three Mile Island area ex-ecutive seminar on emergency preparedness.
( Mileti) I discusM role conflict in M11eti, Drabek, and Haas, Human i
Systems in Extreme Environments (1975); Sorensen, Vogt, and Mileti,
! Evacuation: An Assessment of Plannini ;'d Rer.earch. (1987): "Emergency I Role Performance in Disaster Response Organizations," Environmental So-ciolorv (1985); and "Role Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency Workers," Emergency Manacement Review (1984). Additionally, as I stated in testimony irt this proceeding in 1983, I gathered information with the as-l sistance of a student from organizational respondents concerning role l
l abandonment during the Three Mile Island emergency. I have also gathered information while in Japan about role abandonment from some victims and other informants in reference to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, i
y -- -n
t~)
U II. "ROLE CONFLICT" OF REGULAR SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS A. Literature and Theorv
- 6. Q. What does the scholarly literature on disaster behavior tell us about "role conflict"?
A. [Mileti] Russell Dynes, John Sorensen, and I reviewed the literature in our testimony in this proceeding in 1983. Testimony of Matthew C. Cordaro, Russell R. Dynes, William G. Johnson, Dennis S. Mileti, John H. Sorensen, and John A. Weismantle on Behalf of The Long Island Lighting Company on Phase II Emergency Planning Contention 25 (Role Conflict)(Nov. 18, 1983).
ff. Tr. 832, at 51-71.
- 7. Q. Have there been new publications since you last testified on this issue?
l A. (Mileti] Several publications about role conflict and/or rale abandonment I
have appeared since testimony was originally submitted in these hearings in 1983.
Since then I myself have published two articles on this issue, "Role l
Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency Workers," Emergency Manare-ment Review 2(1):20-22 (1984) and "Emergency Role Performance in Disas-l ter Response Organizations," Environmental Sociolorv, 42:6-10 (1985).
These are little different from each other and little different from my 1983 testimony and its conclusions. The essential point is that eniergency workers who have a clear perception of their emergency roles do their jobs l
in emergencies. The reason is that they use many ways to resolve role con-flict other than abandoning their emergency roles.
A recent attempt to summarize findings in the field of disaster re-i search has been provided by Thc. .as E. Drabek Human System Responses O 1o oisaster: An inventorv of Socioiozicei rineines < sew vork:
l l
l
l
.] Springer-Verlag,1986). At page 145 he makes the following overview con-clusion and citations regarding "role conflict"in emergencies:
A few early researchers, especially Killian (1952), proposed that helping behavior might be curbed at times by forms of "role conflict." That is, persons might experience conflicting obligations (Moore et ala, 1963). Killian, in particular, argued that disasters would leave many with conflicts between family and organizational responsibilities. But subsequent re-search has recast the matter significantly (Mileti, Drabek, and Haas,1975: 67-68). The conclusions of Dynes and Quarantelli appear to be on target (see also, the Proceedings from an NIMH-FEMA sponsored con-ference, Role Stressors and Supports For Emergency Workers,1985).
ID2.5 "In our experience over the years, in over 100 disasters and in the course of interviewing over 2,500 different organi-zational officials, we found that role con-flict was not a serious problem which creates a significant loss of manpower.
... In fact, we have had difficulty in finding any illustrations of the phenome-Q na, let alone documenting the perva-siveness of it" (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976:237).
ID22.5a(H) { Three propositions as to why role abandonment is not found empiri-cally:] "[1.) The total role structure, thus, becomes more coherently organized around a set of value priorities and, at the same time, irrelevant roles which could produce strain are eliminated until the emergency is over. (p. 239) . . .
(2.] Because of the assurance that these organizational members on duty will re-
[ main, other organizational members not I on duty have the reassurance that they have time to check personal and familial damage and also to engage in limited amounts of non-occupational role behav-
- 16r before repo7 ting. (p. 240) (3.) . . .
l family units can make internal allocative decisions which f acilitate the assumption of various emergency roles on the part of various f amily members (e.g.,
O -ife may so to soc with hushame aad serve as secretary] (p. 240)" (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976:239-240). (See also l
l
G Dynes,1970a:154-155; Instituut Voor So-O claal Onderzoek Van Het Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam,1955; Form knd Nosow, 1958:102.)
Drabek (at p. 30) also refers to Quarante111 as follows:
IDA1.2 Role conflict experienced by orga-nizational personnel does not precipitate role abandonment; the tendency is to re-main on the job, of ten for too long.
(Based on Quarante111,1982b:10.)
Reviewing a variety of studjes of the type that I wiU summarize in the next chapter, Quarantelli con-cluded that organizational planners should recognize that what many fear rarely occurs. That is, upon learning of a disaster, personnel do not flock to their homes. If they reside in the 11apact area, however, efforts may be made to escertain family member safety. Instead of role abandonment, ". . . there is a strong tendency for staff members to remain on the job too long, or to overuse all personnel concurrently" (Quarantelli,1982b:10). Analytic qualities that might define "outlying" events wherein role abandonment may occur remain undefined and controversial.
A 1987 boc. chapter, "The Concept of Role in Disaster Research,"
by Russell Dynes also addresses "role conflict." RusseD R. Dynes, Bruna de Marchi, and Carlo Penanda, Eds., Socioloev of Disasters (Milan: Franco An-geli,1987),71-102. In that chapter (see pp. 80-85) Dynes reports on the
( findings of field experience by the Disaster Research Center regarding role abandonment by emergency workers. He reports the following:
The results . . . show that among those persons at work . . . none abandoned his/her emergency role responsibilities. About 15 percent engaged in search behavior at some time, most of that was done in con-nection with their joo responsibuities (see pp. 82-84).
l l
. . . For those who were at home . . . , sixty-two per-I cent were involved in what we called an active re-sponse, meaning that they quickly entered the emer-gency social system, either in their work role or in terms of some reaction to an emergency-created need. The rest were involved in what we called a O 9 ssive response in that tney die not taxe ear imme-diate action to assume their organizational responsi-bilities. Such a stance, however, is not necessarily l
inappropriate since most worked for organizations f]
which followed a pattern of notifying them if they were needed for work. For those who were neither at work nor at horne . . . eighty-two percent were in-volved in an active response, some went directly to work while others went nome before they reported to work or stayed horne to await notification (p. 84). . . .
In sum, in examining a sample of 443 persons who held positions in emergency-relevant organizations, not one abandoned his/her emergency role obligations to opt for familial-role obligations. For those who were at home, or away from home, or at the work site at the onset of the emergency, the most common response was to report to work, or to react in some fashion to needs created by the emergency. Of those persons who were not at work at the time of the emergency, some 28, or loss than one percent of the sample, indicated some delay in reporting to work (p. 84).
Role conflict / abandonment was also considered as part of a compre-hensive effort to assess issues and criticisms of evacuation planning for all hazards. This work was performed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. See John H. Sorensen, Barbara M. Vogt, and Dennis S. Mileti, Fvacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Research (Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory,1987),
The conclusion reached (at page 147) is as follows:
Role abandonment has been a controversial issue for some hazards. Pescarch suggests that total role aban-donment has not been prevalent in disasters and cer-tainly has not been dysfunctional in organizational be-havior. Some people have hypothesized that role abandonment would be greater and likely problematic in a nuclear power plant accident or during a nuclear war threat. This remains somewhat speculative. Re-search suggests that in the former case there may be an increased potential for conflict and role strain, but emergency functions would not le threatened. In the latter cise, the issue is highly uncertain. Additional i
research on role conflict would be confirmatory but is not of high priority. I i A paper,"Role Conflict and Role Abandonment in Disasters: A Need for Empirical Reorientation," by Barbara J. Friedman was presented at the l
l
i
'G Annual Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society in April 1986. This V
paper is now part of the Preliminary Paper Series at the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware. This paper made several obse.va-tions. Interestingly, at page 17 the author states the following: "In many respects Mileti's argument is very similiar and agreeable with the work done by Barton some twenty years earlier." The reference to my work is to my 1985 Erticle in the Emergency Management Review-(which is in essence the same as my 1983 testimony in these hearings); the reference to Barton's work is to his book Communities in Disaster, (A. Barton, Comm6?jties in Disaster (New York: Doubleday,1969)), and to his original 1963 report, S_ocial Organization Under Stress: A Sociological Review of Disaster Studies, for the National Academy of Sciences on which his Doubleday book is based.
The conclusions made by Friedman (see pages 22-26) can be para-l phrased as follows. First, role conflict does exist during disasters and emergencies just as it does during normal times. Second, role conflict may increase or decrease during disaster, depending on how the researcher de-fines t.5e term. Third, role conflict and role abandonment are not the same nor indicative of each other. Fourth, it is more than plausible that individ-uals use other methods of resolving role conflict in disasters besides role abandonment. Finally, future research should be directed at how individu-als resolve role conti'ct in disaster, since many alternatives exist.
Barbara Vogt, a grduate student at the University of Tennessee, is doing a very comprehensive stedy of evacuations of special f acilities. As l
an adjunct professor at the Univerity of Tennessee,I am on her dissertation committee. I askM her what she has found so f ar. She said that in general
i m
O about twice as many people show up to evacuate special f acilties (nursing 1
homes and hospitals) as there are people who need to be evacuated from !
l them.
Finauy, James H. Johnson, Jr., a witness for Suffolk County sarlier in these proceedings, has published a 1985 article, "Role Conflict in a Ra-diological Emergency: The Case of Public School Teachers." in the Journal l of Environmental Systems 15(1) (1985). This article is based on a survey during normal times of the behavioral intentions of teachers in California with respect to a future, as yet unexperienced emergency. The following conclusion is made on page 83 of this article:
Almost one-third of the teachers surveyed indi-cated that, under the conditions outlined in the nuclear reactor accident scenario, other loyalties or responsi-bilities would take precedence over assisting in a full scale evacuation of schools (Table 1).
O Similarly, on page 87 of this article the author makes the following state-ment:
Nearly one-third of the teachers surveyed stated unequivocally that they would npol assist in an emer-gency evacuation of schools. A strong sense of obliga-l tion to f amily in crisis situations and concern for per-l sonal safety appear to be the most important f actors in l
distinguishing these teachers (group 2). . . .
These additional publications and research, except for Professor Johnson's, confirm the conclusions reached in our testimony in this pro-ceeding in 1983 regarding the ac'tual behavior of emergency workers and in no way suggest that those conclusions would be inapplicable to school bus l drivers. In general, these conclusions are that emergency workers who have clearly defined emergency roles do not abandon their jobs. In other l
words. role clarity f acilitates role performance.
l O
l l
l l
l O we etso conclueee in 1983 that trainine is one means ey which role clarity can be achieved. Nothing in the literature since 1983 changes this view; it is corsistent with the empirical evidence and prevailing contempo-rary theory in disaster research.
Professor Johnson, on the other hand, represents a view that is in-correct for the reasons I gave in 1983 and in this testimony.
- 8. Q. What does this mean for regular school bus drivers in an emergency at Shoreham?
A. (Miletil Although it is likely that regular bus drivers would understand their emergency job in an actual emergency, they have not yet been trained in the specifics of a radiological emergency, and consequently they have not been exposed to all the f actors known to enhance role clarity and emergency role performance.
O As a practical matter, however, this would not likely result in their abandoning school children evacuees. In a real emergency, most untrained bus drivers would undoubtedly realize what their role in a school evacuation would be because of the normative overlap between their routine daily job (driving school children to and from school in bused and their emergency function (driving school children in buses in the evacuation), and then per-form that role.
- 9. Q. Professor Cole has suggested (Deposition of Stephen Cole, Jan. 28,1988 at 61-80) that bus drivers have low commitment to their jobs. I think the im-plication is that blue-collar workers or part-time employees or women are more likely to abandon their jobs than, say, police or firemen. What is your opinion of tnis?
A. ( Lindell] Work motivation - people's willingness to expend effort to ac-complish their assigned tasks -is commonly considered to be of two types.
O The first of these is "intrinsic" motivation, which refers to rewards
I 16-i l
A V inherent in the work itself. Intrinsic motivation comes from factors such as the challenge provided by the job or from its significance - the degree to which it "makes a difference." In "extrinsic" motivation, on the other hand, the rewards comes from external inducements such as money and the social approval of others.
The Intervenors' witnesses appear to be saying that in normal cir-cumstances school bus drivers are not likely to be highly committed to their jobs because these jobs provide little intrinsic (job significance) or ex-trinsic (money or social recognition) reward for performance. But this would not 5e so in an emergency. The opportunity to play an instrumental role in removing school children from potential danger would have high sig-nificance and would be likely to earn these drivers an unusual amount of so-l cial approval. So whatever the levels of commitment to their duties these O bus drivers may have in normal situations, they are likely to have a high l
level of motivation to accomplish their tasks under emergency conditions.
l
[ Mileti) There are many different classifications or ways to categorize l
people (male vs. female, blue-collar workers vs. white-collar, part-time vs.
full-time employees, and so on). It is no surprise that sociologists have thought of an elaborate list of such distinctions and then shown that such l
distinctions correlate with tehavior.
l This approach to the study of human behavior is labeled "role theo-i ry" and is based on the premise that a person's position in a complex l stratified modern society influences his behavior. A social psychol $ cal 1
explanation or interpretation of the same premise would be, for example, that women are socialized into different roles and adhere to different val-l ues and norms from men, perceive the world differently from men, and consequently behave differently from men, i
- + - - - - <
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. ,.-_----p-.+ ,- .--- yi- w ' ' -
T-
O There is an empiricai basis for roie theorv" recareiess of wnether one adheres to a sociological or a social psychological interpretation. Typi-cally social categories such as sex and occupational status do correlate with observed variation in human behavior. These statistical correlations are of ten somewhat weak; they rarely exceed .30 or .35 at best, which suggests that the social category can explain perhaps as much as 9% to 12% of the variance in the human behavior being observed. Also, statistical correla-tions, particularly weak ones, do not constitute evidence of cause and ef-fect.
Factors such as sex (male vs. female), occupational prestige (blue collar vs. white collar), and employment (full-time vs. part-time), as well as other social categories, might well be found in any particular emergency to correlate with observed variation in behavior in a general public. For V example, these categories would likely correlate weakly with the rate at which people in the general public volunteered for emergency response work. For example, Professor Barton has showed that males volunteer more frequently than females. See Barton, Communities in Disaster, at 82-83.
The correlation of social categories with behavior does not necessar-ily hold, however, for specialized behavior of specialized populations such as emergency workers. Occupational prestige (blue collar vs. white collar) weakly correlates with volunteering from the general public for emergency work, but it does not correlate with variation in performing emergency work by emergency workers. Sex (male vs. female) does correlate with vol-unteering f rom the general public for emergency work, but it does not cor-f relate with variation in performing emergency work by emergency Q
l l
l O workers. The same is true ror empiorment status <ruti- or vart-time). rne reason is that role clarity or specification, not social category, determines the behavior of emergency workers.
In simple terms, less educated, part-time blue-couar females do their emergency work for the same reason that better educated, full-time white-collar males do: role clarity exists.
The notion that being a part-time bus driver (a blue collar worker)is just a job (particularly to women who are more inclined to be interested in other things) is not a surprising opinion. It might be expected to be found among full-time employed, well-educated males in nonemergency times.
But it is not likely to characterize the viewpoint of emergency bus drivers during an emergency, be they male or female. The reason is that emergencies re-prioritize the elements of social life and place emphasis on O those that are central to health and safety. In such a context, the social system would elevate to prime status the task of evacuating school chil-dren. What may now to some appear to be "just a %b" would take prece-dence in an actual emergency over most other routine aspects of social life.
- 10. Q. Dr. Lindell, does the literature of social psychology tell us anything about the issue of bus driver role abandonment?
A. [ Lindell) Yes it does. The literature suggests that those who are trained as bus drivers and who normally drive school children, quite aside from feeling obligated to help in an emergency, are likely to want to help. This conclusion is based on the results of studies on "bystander intervention" that are cited in most introductory social psychology texts, as well as more advanced sources, such as a book by Pillavin, Dovido, Gaertner, and Clark, Q
O Emercenev Intervention (New York: Academic Press,1981). Deaux's and Wrightsman's Social Psycholoev in the 80's, for example, contains a chapter that reviews a number of studies of bystander intervention, which can be defined as actions taken by an onlooker to help the victim of an emergen-cy. Deaux and Wrightsman, Social Psycholoev in the 80's, 4th ed.
(Monterey, Calif.: Brooks-Cole Publishing Co.,1984). Bystander interven-tion involves behavior that is voluntary and wh2ch benefits the victim more than the helper.
- 11. Q. What precisely does the research tell us?
A. [ Lindell) Research on bystander intervention has shown that people are motivated to become involved when they see that others have a need that arises from a personal emergency. This research has identified a number of characteristics of the victim, the helper, and the situation that influence whether and how the helper becomes involved.
In general, the f actors identified by this body of research are consis-tent with the idea that bus drivers are likely to be motivated to involve themselves in evacuating school children. The attributes of the victim that tend to invoke the helping response are the following:
- 1. The need is temporary and basic (i.e., the vie-tim's safety is at risk).
- 2. The victims are blameless and unable to help themselves.
- 3. The victims are attractive (especially children) rather than stigmatized (e.g., convicts).
The attributes of the helper that promote the helping response are the fol:owing:
l
- 1. The helper has the ability to act (for example.
l the helper is not ill), especially a special competence to act.
m-O 2. The heiper has a perceived oeugation to act.
These are all f actors that facilitate a response by the helper. The need to evacuate is temporary; the need is basic (safety); the school children are blameless and unable to evacuate by themselves; they are attractive; and most bus drivers would be able to act and would perceive themselves as having special competence to do so.
The last relevant factor is diffusion of responsibility. If a person fe21s that he has no more responsibility for a victim than any of a number of other would-be helpers, then his feeling of obligation to help is dimin-ished. Conversely, if a bus driver feels that alternative sources of assis-tance are not readily avauable and that there are not others who are as qualified or more qualified as he is, then he is more likely to be motivated to involve himself in contributing to a resolution of the emergency. It is likely that bus drivers whose ordinary job is to drive children would feel es-pecially qualified.
- 12. Q. Is there anything else?
A. (Lindell) Yes. In addition, as noted above, there is "extrinsic" motivation to help.
- 13. Q. What do you mean by extrinsic motivation?
A. ( Lindell) As contrasted to the "intrinsic" desire to help others, explained above, extrinsic motivation comes from the expectation of the bus driver's employer and community.
The extrinsic motivators are rewards and punishments administered by external sources. In the case of the bus companies' management, an ex-O trinsic motivation to perform arises from managers' abuity to monitor bus V
O erivers eerrorm ace or their t sxs eae wittiacaess to emiaister rewares for compliance or sanctions for noncompliance with expectations.
Another source of extrinsic motivation would come from the mem-bers of the community at large, and specifically the parer.ts of the school children. To the extent that they perceive the bus drivers as failing to act, even though the drivers have especial competence to do so, these parents are likely to be vocal in their disapproval of the bus drivers' f ailure to act.
Conversely, bus drivers who do help evacuate school children are likely to receive social approval, especially by the parents.
[Crocker, Lindell, Mileti) In a real emergency, it would not be just LILCO wanting school bus drivers to drive. Suffolk County and New York State would also be making a "best efforts" response, and they would want the
] school bus drivers to drive. The school districts would want them to drive.
The bus companies would want them to drive. And the community would want them to drive.
- 14. Q. But Professor Turner says that the community will eventually approve those who protect their own f amilies, even if that means abandoning school children (Deposition of Ralph H. Turner, Feb. 26,1988 at 27-29).
A. [ Lindell) The community may well tolerate bus drivers going to the aid of their own families. But it is hard to believe they will actually approve their f ailing to act in their area of special competence, where the bus driv-ers have a special skill.
Also, Professor Turner's analysis applies in the long run. In the short run (that is, during an accident) what will be obvious is that the bus drivers have the ability to move the children from a place of danger to a place of
,] safety. That is what would be salient at the time of the emergency.
O v (Mileti] The community's reaction would depend on the plight of the driv-er's family. The community would indeed be tolerant of a bus driver who lef t his , job to protect a f amily that was threatened in a direct, drastic way.
The community would be much less tolerant of a bus driver who lef t to be with his relatively unthreatened f amily and in doing so lef t threatened school children to shif t for themselves.
- 15. Q. Are you saying that LILCO can rely on nothing more than this tendency of bystanders to intervene in personal emergeneits?
A. ( Lindell] No, the motivation of bystanders to help is an important f actor, but there are other f actors that should be considered as well.
The studies of bystander intervention have focused largely on indi-vidual, rather than communitywide, emergencies. A comrnunitywide emer-gency requires an effective organizational mechanism by which to trans-O late high levels of individual motivation into effective communitywide action. This means there should be an effective organizational design that ine udes planning and training.
- 16. Q. Have you read Allen Barton's book Communities in Disaster (1969)?
A. (Mileti) Yes, and I do not think Professor Barton and I differ on the essen-tial points. Consider this passage frotn ttis book:
4 The results of (Medal White's study need careful checking in additional disaster situations, both to over-come the problem of eight-year retrospection and to cover systematically cases of other types, including the Texas City type, where the distribution of certainties is different. It must be emphasized that the finding of White's' study is not that "the great majority of people l
choose their organizational role over their f amily role" but that they will do so under certain conditions, v/hich l prevailed in the three tornado disasters she studied. In other types of disaster - exemplified by the Texas City O expiosioa - tne eistrievtioa or woo-ieeze oout tne needs of the f amily may be quite different in the case of an atomic attack, the visible extent of fires or the
detectable extent of radiation mirbt create a certainty of f amily danger over a wide area, similar to the Texas City situation.
A. Barton, Communities in Disaster (New York: Doubleday, 1969),120 (em-phasis in original).
The "conditions" that prevailed in the Texas City explosion are also described in Professor Barton's book:
This finding (Meda White's) contradicts the conclusion that has frecuently been drawn from the Killian study.
White finds an explanation in the unusual ecology of the Texas City disaster studied by Killian: the workers' homes were next to the dock area where the ship ex-ploded. These homes caught fire, and the workers could see that they had caught fire. The distribution of members in the typology of role conflicts was thus heavy in the direct, drastic conflict that is totally missing in White's interviews from the three tornado cities, with their long, narrow strips of destruction sur-rounded by safe areas.
O ie.=t11e-2o.
(Lindell, Mileti) We believe that the difference between Professor Barton's and Turner's conclusion that a significant level of role abandon-ment would occur and our conclusion that role abandonment would not be a problem can be accounted for by the difference in the nature of the ra-diological emergency that is being assumed. We agree with them that bus drivers might not drive buses if a radiological plume threatened their iami-lies in a "direct, drastic" way similar to that of a person seeing his own house on fire.
( Crocker, Lindell) However, to assume that such a threat would inevitably occur during a radiological emergency is quite inconsistent with l the results of reactor accident consequence analyses.
O I
l
l 1
l (Muetil The difference between the Texas City type of situation and a ra-diological emergency is this. If a worker sees his house on fire and thinks his f amily is inside, he is likely to think that there is something he could do
, to help, if he were there, that his family could not do by itself. In a ra-diological emergency, if the worker's house were immersed in a radioactive plume, the appropriate protective action would be to shelter or to evacu-ate. Most workers' families can take those actions with or without the worker's being present.
- 17. Q. How do you think the Licensing Board should resolve this issue?
A. (Lindell, Miletil Suffolk County has drawn a conclusion, br3ed on the f act that people care about their families and fear radiation and on their reading of early disaster research and role theory literature. We have a O contrary eoncien, eased on more recent and more pertinent uterature en role abandonment and upon a more accurate understanding of the nature of the radiological emergency - as portrayed by reactor accident conse-quence analyses.
The best way to resolve the dispute is to look at empirical data in light of the current literature. The history of science is replete with exam-ples of false theories that were thought to be true for a long time, until l
they fell in the face of empirical data. If one finds that many bus drivers have abandoned their jobs in real-life emergencies, it tene.s to support Suffolk County. If one finds no such thing,it supports LILCO.
O
B. E_mpirical Data
- 18. Q. Have any of you witnessed, or heard of, role abandonment in real emergencies in which you were involved?
A. ( Crocker] No. As Hurricane Gloria approached Long Island in September 1985 LILCO activated two of its emergency response organizations. The SNPS Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the Emergency Resto-ration Organization were called out in advance of 'he hurricane's arrival to wait out the storm at their duty posts. This represented approximately 120 people in the SNPS ERO and 2200 people from the Restoration Organiza-tion. Hurricane Gloria made landf all on Long Island at approximately' 10:30 a.m. By 8:00 a.m.,1115 people were stationed at 102 substations across Long Island to ride out the storm and then perform the prompt initial dam-age survey immediately af ter the storm. An 1100 additional personnel as-l l
() signed to line crews waited at their normal dispatch centers for the storm to pass. All these personnel lef t their f amilies to cope with '.he hurricane while they performed their emergency functions. As far as we know, there ,
were no cases in which LILCO personnel did not report due to f amily con-cerns.
Also, none of the approximately 46 emergency plannjng profession-als in LERIO, who have a total of approximately 176 person-years' experi-i ence, knows of any actual case of role abandonment in an emergency.
i i
( Kelly) No. As mentioned earlier in my testimony, I have been involved l
i in many natural and technological emergencies. At the state level,I never observed or heard of any instances of role abandonment. I also never heard of instances of role abandonment at the local response level.
O V
' ' ~ - - - . , . , , , _ . , _ , , , _ _ , ,
i O (tinde11) No.
(Mileti) No, except as follows. When I was inquiring about role conflict in Japan for my testimony earJ1er in this proceeding, I did hear anecdotes describing medical personnel who at first attempted to treat victims but then gave up the attempt. These stories, if true, are explained by the un-usual nature of the Hiroshima disaster. It was unusual because it resulted in almost total physical destruction. The bomb destroyed all emergency re-sponse organizations in the community. What this means is that the only emergency response available was from volunteers. Tne small percentage ,
of persons with skills relevant to the post-impact situation (for example, doctors and nurses) did volunteer to perform emergency duties, but some of them were overwhelmed and gave up the effort.
O 19. Q. Have you looked for actual cases of role abandonment?
[ Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) Yes.
[ Kelly) At LILCO's request I reviewed information on fif ty U.S. evacua-tions. I had previously collected the information for a project for another client which was unrelated to this project. For that project I narrowed the set of evacuations to 50 based on the following f actors: size, type, geo-graphic location, proximity to a nuclear power plant, special problems, and location type (population density). The goal of this narrowing process was to select 50 incidents that tended to entail large, quickly developing.
problem-laden' evacuations in densely populated areas, particularly if they occurred near a nuclear power plant.
O
l l
l l
l Af ter reviewing the documentation on these 50 cases,Iidentified 16 large-scale evacuations in which buses had been used to evacuate people. I reviewed secondary sources st.ch as the following:
r.rticles from me,}or media sources (AP, UPD local newspaper clippings af ter-action reports communications logs police / emergency services reports sociology reports A review of these secondary sources revealed no evidence that any bus driver had failed to drive. This study is documented in Attachment E to this testimony.
Since that study was completed, I have identified three additional evacuations in which buses were used, making a total of 19.
- 20. Q. Isn't it possce that there might have been cases of role abandonment that O the secondary sources didn't pick up?
A. (Lindell, Mileti] It is unlikely. Newspapers are quicg to publish reports of looting and panie even when they don't occur. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
832, at 79. Defections of emergency workers would be "news": if there were even unsubstantiated rumors of such a thing happening, the newspa-pers would likely mention it.
- 21. Q. Did you gather any other information?
A. (Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) Yes. To gather additional information, Bob Kelly and people under his supervision phoned knowledgeable people who had
. emergency responsibility at each of the 19 disasters. Two separate studies were done. The first surveyed organizational respondents and the second surveyed bus drivers who actually responded to these emergencies. The O surver iastrument use in tne first stuer u itt-nment r to tha -timons
O ne and the results of that study 46 Attachment G. The survey instrument for the bus driver study is Attachment H and its results are found at Attach-ment I to this testimony.
Of the 19 evacuations investigated,17 involved technological haz-ards and two involved natural hazards. The evacuations involved from 1000 to 300,000 people. Most of the evacuations involved the use of buses to evacuate non-school populations; although, four involved the evacuation of two to seven schools.
- 22. Q. What did the organizatior a1 respondents study find?
A. [ Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) The completed surveys of the 19 cases showed that all people who needed to be evacuated were in f act evacuated in time.
There were no instances of role abandonment by bus drivers. Pertinent O fineines inciude the followine:
There were no refusals to drive the buses by any notified bus drivers.
All bus drivers reported for duty af ter being contacted. In the Nanticoke incident, one woman was determined to drive an evacuation bus because she thought it was her civic duty -
despite her husband's protests. In Marysville, two "mechan-ics" could not physically make it to the bus yard but pro-coeded to a nearby rest horne to arsist in its evacuation, j ta we.c m o ,c ec ended 4**
With th: =c0pt!On Of one cre, & bus driverjarrived late for 0
duty. In the one excep!!On, one bus company in the Marysville incident reported that 1 or 2% of the drivers were delayed due to traffic congestion. Tu 4ht. P < a til * > i a' J '"#
j g abod wn. e 4 oc bus compW s d r .4e > w%s a l
V d r ' M S ) t h u e d. up kk beca w +hq 4 ; =+ hel pe d j
" 4 0 k <, a r t, o4 4a ~.L.cs." Tw 4hs Th . w m . a b. e ag i ub ' M J
" anee , w . r~ am.c., % a y w..a
- Iwe,.h cf.,v.u as.
l
-2 9-g g 35 j a e u c uu 4 W *"*
O -
Af ter receiving the duty call.eebus drivers helped evacuate their families before showing up for duty, despite the f act that in nine evacuations,5% to 100% of the drivers had f ami-lies in the area at risk during the emergency.
There were no reports of bus drivers not doing their job as well as they could have.
In seven of the 19 evacuations, bus drivers did not know be-forehand that they had an emergency role.
In all of the evacuations, there were enough drivers to drive evacuation buses. In Denver, rosters of evacuation bus driv-ers have been prepared as a standard emergency preparedness procedure. Bus drivers wanted to participate in evacuations and volunteered to do it.
O -
In all cases everyone who needed to be evacuated was evacu-ated.
There were a few isolated instances of problems such as traffic congestion,
, and difficulties in contacting drivers due to busy telephone circuits, but in no case did these problems have a negative impact on the outcome of the evacuation.
- 23. Q. What did you find out from the Bus Driver Interview Study?
i A. (Kelly] By the time we wrote this testimony we were able to reach 27 bus
- drivers who had participateJ in ten of the 19 evacuation cases we studied.
(Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) We found that the data collected from the bus drivers are in line with the data we collected in the organizational respon-i O eeat> stuer so ous erivers rerusee to erive buses ooriac tee evacuatioa i
l l
(G/ and only two drivers reported dcing something else before beginning their bus driver functions. As to these two drivers, the first driver reported a few minutes later and the other 20 minJtes later. We have summarized some of cJ findings below.
E ge.kul Eiguie.n of the 27 respondents had other family members at home Tea 19 when they received the activation message (Question 11). N4ao-of the Hi answered Question 7 about whether they thought their household would be threatened by the hazard agent. Seven of the respondents in this group said that the danger to their homes was either extremely or very like', -
even odds. Even with this perceived danger to their households, six .ae seven proceeded immediately with their bus driver duties Q.L. reported to
! drive or called other drivers). The one exception in this group took an extra 20 minutes to evacuate her children before reporting to drive an O evacuation bus. .
With respect to the nine respondents who did not answer the ques-tion about the perceived degree of danger to their household, we found the following:
i Two respondents said their families were closer to the impact area than they were (Question 10). Nonetheless, both went directly to the reporting location af ter being called.
- Two bus drivers said they were with their families in the impact j area at the time they received the activation cessage (Question 10).
One driver made arrangements for his f amily to evacuate and then reported to work a "few minutes" later. The other respondent said he felt a great sense of personal reponsiblity to help his f amily by O staviac at aome eut iaste e "cave instevetioa to ints) soa to
l O evacuate the f ami!y." This driver said be "felt [his) obligation (was) to drive the bus and felt (his) son could evacuate the f ami-ly."
The remaining five reported that they were with their f amiUes out-side the impact area or were closer to th p hgr felt their famides could families were (Question +o% 10). ede,.at ccoA All respondenp(.9) or-Fe.g+ Some m.o.md d protect themselves e~J fe!q! c!!her T ser.ce or some sense of respon-A sibility to stay home with their f amilies (Questions 13 and 12).
We also discovered that 12 of the 27 respondents felt that to a "great extent""those in the risk area would be protected even if (the bus drivers) did not go to help" them (Question 15). Notwithstanding this f act, au bus N,ec drivers directly reported to drive or helped caU out other drivers. 36tht of P those drivers reported even though they had famides at home (Question 11).
< O a.ae 4. s s Of these sQht, few reported even though there was a perceived threat to their household (a threat perceived as extremely or very likely or even odds) (Question 7).
Seven of the 27 drivers reported that, according to the activation message, the people who needed to be evacuated were in only slight danger or that the message indicated no clear sense of threat (Question 3).
Nonetheless, six of the bus drivers responded immediately and one driver reported r.f ter a "few minutes" (during which he prepared his family to evacuate). Of this group, four of the seven had f amily at horne and two of the four lived in the impact area (Question 10) and one felt that it was very likely that her home would be threatened (Question 7).
O
p .C.ad V 24. Q. Did you feed out anything about the level of training these bus drivers had?
A. (Kelly,1.indell, Milet1] Yes, we did. Seven of the 27 drivers said that they had received no emergency training about their evacuation bus driver role before the emergency began (Question 23). (One said he had received mini-mal training then later said he hadn't received any.) All reported to drive hc directly, or, in one case, in a few minutes. This was true even for few of the respondents who had f amilies at home.
Ten of the drivers said they had received a minimal amount of emer-gency training beforehand (Question 23). The training included first aid or CPR training (three respondents), "flood evacuation training" (one respon-dent), how to operate a wheel chair lif t (one respondent), and disaster and evacuation training by the fire department (one resoondent). One respon-O oent s se she receivee treiaiae at the ecs rarece eurine the emerceacy aae another said she was "just told (she) might have to drive." Only one re-s spondent in this category had "in-service training with filtn strips."
The remaining ten drivers said that they had received a moderate or 1
a great amount of training beforehand. This training included school evae-uation and fire drills (three respondents), use of special equipment (oxygen l
l masks and jump suits) (two respondents), and regular school bus driver training (one respondent). Others reported that they train once, twice, or three times a year.
- 25. Q. Did you look anywhere else for cases of role abandonment?
A. ( Kelly) Yes. Since November 1986 FEMA has encouraged local jurisdic-tions involved in major emergencies to evaluate the strengths and weak-I O aesses of ineir emerzeaev res90ase operatioas er compietiae Dis >>ter
Response Questionnaire (DRQ). Among other things, these DRQ's are used to report problems encountered during emergencies.
I phoned FEMA headquarters to find out whetbyr the DRQ's show role abandonment to be a significant problem in past emergencies. The person I talked to at FEMA made a quick review of the "problems" section of the DRQ's FEMA has on file and told me that he found nothing to suggest that role abandonment has been a problem.
- 26. Q. But the Intervenors will claim that radiological emergencies are different.
A. (Miletil Yes, but we addressed their theory of the uniqueness of radiation fully in 1983, Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832, at 93-98; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
1470, at 112-15, and again last summer in the Reception Centers remand l
l proceeding, LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony) at 20-23, 25-29.
l O it oae is tactiaeo to t xe inetr theory seriousir ne snouie toox at the empirical data from radiological eniergencies, Three Mile Island and Ginna being the principal candidates. (in 1983 we addressed Hiroshirna and Nagasaki as well. Cordaro et al., if. Tr. 832, at 46-51.)
Three Mile Island was perhaps the "worst case" for producing role conflict. Risk information was terrible; offsite emergency plans were poor i or nonexistent; the Catholic Church granted general absolution of sins, pre-sumably on the theory that many people would die; and the expert agency (the NRC) predicted that the reactor would explode, which probably meant
! a nuclear bomb-type explosion to many people. Yet, as we testified in 1983, there is'no evidence of role abandonment by emergency workers at TMI. Cordaro et al., if. Tr. 832, at 73-76.
lO
O 27. 9 Professors Coie, zeigier, and achnson, in tneir testimony in the seaerook proceeding, cited a number of papers about shortages of medical personnel during the Three Mile Island accident. Do these demonstrate role abandon-ment 7 A. (Mileti) Earlier in these hearings LILCO (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832, at 72, 83-85) and Suffolk County witnesses discussed several pubucations that, on the surface, appeared to reveal role abandonment by hospital workers dur-ing the Three Mile Island accident. See, for example, Christopher Maxwell, "Hospital Organizational Response to the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island: Impucations for Future-Orientated Disaster Planning," American Journal of PubUe Health 72(3h 275-79 (1982); J. Stanley Smith, Jr., and James H. Fisher, "Three Mile Island: The Silent Disaster," Journal of the American Medical Association 245(16): 1656-59 (1981); Gordon K. Macleod, "Some Public Health Lessons frorn Three Mile Island: A Case Study in Chaos," AMBIO 10(1): 18-23 (1981).
Q Other publications apparently reach the same general concl';sion.
See, for example, Dennis L. Breo, "Nuclear Scare Tests Hospital's Disaster Plan," Hosoitals. J. A.H. A. (1 May): 33-36 (1979); K. Haglund, "At Hershey:
Medical Systems Near Failure During Three Mile Island," New Physician 28(6): 24-25 (1979); E. Kuntz, "Hospitals Prepare Radiation Plans in Wake of Nuclear Plant Accident," Modern Healthcare (9 July): 16 (1979); E.
l Kuntz, "Ready to Evacuate Area? Nuclear and Chemical Accidents Test l Hospital Disaster Plans," Modern Healthcare (May): 14-16 (1979); Stanislav 1
l V. Kasl, Rupert F. Chisholm, and Brenda Eskenazi, "The Impact of the Ac-cident at the Three Mile Island On the Behavior and Well-Being of Nuclear I
i Workers, Part 1: Perceptions and Evaluations, Behavioral Responses and I Work-Related Attitudes and Feelings." American Journal of Public Health l
O 71(5): 472-83 (1951): Stanislav V. Kasl. Rupert F. Chisholm and Brenda l
i O
V Eskenazi,"The impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island on the Be- I havior and Well-Being of Nuclear Workers, Part II: Job Tension, l Psychophysiological Symptoms, and Indices of Distress," American Journal of Public Health 71(5): 484-95 (1981); William A. Weidner, Kenneth L. Mill-er, Robert F. Latshaw, and G. Victor Rohrer. "The Impact of a Nuclear Crl-sis on a Radiology Department," Radiolory 135 (June): 717-23 (1980);
William E. DeMuth, Jr., and Joseph J. Trautlein, "The Luck of Three Mile Island," The Journal of Trauma 19: 792-94 (1979); and others.
These publications do not, however, reveal role abandonment by emergency workers during the Three Mile Island accident. They document the need for emergency planning at hospitals for emergency response in which the hospital is a "Victim." At no time during Three Mile Island was there a medical emergency. Hospita) workers who were off for the week-end or in San Francisco at a convention did not abandon emergency roles by not inventing one during the accident.
Suffolk County witnesses have also pointed to a publication by the Pennsylvania National Guard (Af ter Action Reoort: Three Mile Island Nuclear Incident (Pennsylvania: Department of Military Aff airs,1979)) as evidence of role abandonment by national guardsmen during the accident.
In f act, this report states the following at page 12:
- a. Personnel. A review of personnel problems of PNG personnel revealed that an evacuation could have resulted in significant conflicts between personal responsibility to the members f amily and the individual responsibility to the PNG when mobilized to deal with the eme'rgency. This was evidenced when many Guard personnel residing in the immediate vicinity of TMI could not be contacted during the condition white of the operation. it was later learned that many person-q nel evacuated their f amilies from the area before being b notified of possible NG participation. These problems were compounded when the radius of the area to be j evacuated increased f rom five to ten and eventually 20
O b miles. Additional complications could have resulted from the confusion and frustration of a direct mass evacuation.
It is diffleult to understand how guardsmen who evacuated with their f ami-lies can be cast as persons who abandoned their emergency roles, since those roles were not activated when their evacuation occurred.
- 28. Q. Does the experience at Chernobyl tell us anything?
A. (Miletil We must make the usual caveats that (1) the Soviets do not freely make information available, (2) their culture is different f rom ours, and (3) no one of whom we are aware has done systematic research on human be-havior at Chernobyl. We can say, however, that many people were evacu-ated from the Chernobyl accident. Reportedly city buses from Kiev were
! used:
A Soviet officials began to evacuate the local population U
in the town of Pripyat about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> af ter the explo--
sion. The evacuation was carried out by 1,100 city buses brought in from Kiev,130 kilometers to the south. The town of Chernobyl was evacuated beginning '
May 2.
C. Hohenemser, M. Deicher, A. Ernst H. Hofsass, G. Linder, and E.
i Recknagel, "Chernoby1: An Early Report," Environment 28(S): 6-13, 30-43 (1986), at 13. We have been able to find no evidence that any Soviet bus driver f ailed to perform. In f act, all we have been able to find on the point is the following:
The revelation (by Pravda) that 1,100 buses were marshaled for the evacuation was coupled with the assertion that no Kiev driver refused to volunteer, and the'f act that 92,000 people were evacuated was couched in an account of the care taken of the refu-EeeS-Serge Schmemann, "Reporter's Notebook: Bit by B!t, Soviet Gets News,"
New York Times,14 May 1986, Section A, p.10, col. 3. There were also
reports of some officials shirking their duties, of firemen displaying ex-traordinary heroism, and of discontent and strikes by Estonians conscripted to decontaminate the area. But nothing that we can find suggests role abandonment by bus drivers.
- 29. Q. But if the bus drivers came from Kiev, their f amilies wouldn't have been in danger.
A. (Lindell, Miletil Yes. But, as we testified last summer, people in Kiev were advised to keep their windows closed and wash their fruits and vege-tables. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony) at 22 in the Recep-tion Centers remand proceeding (June-July 1987). We were responding to a 1
County witness's claim in her deposition (which she did not offer in her written testimony) that there had been a "near riot" at the Kiev train sta-tion. Id. at 26. Apparently people did perceive that there was a ra-O diological risk in Kiev.
- 30. Q. Newspaper articles don't count as scientifically reliable data, do they?
A. (Lindell, Mileti) No. But there are no scientifically sound, reliable reports of role abandonment in radiological emergencies. We have therefore looked for m reports of role abandonment at Chernobyl- even if they are of uncertain reliability - and still we find few or none.
l (Mileti) In the same spirit, we have looked for anecdotal accounts of role abandonment in other radiological emergencies, and again we find few re-ports at all and none that is reliable. There have been several radiological accidents: some of them may not have required an offsite emergency re-
! sponse but did require an emergency response of some sort. Examples are O the Nax reactor accident at Chaik aiver. Can ea in 1952: the winescate l
O ftre in sneland in 1957 ine st-1 accident in ieaho in 1981: the rermi unit I accident in Detroit in 1966; the Browns Ferry fire in 1975; the rupture of a cylinder of UF6 at the Sequoyah Fuels Facility in Gore, Oklahoma in 1986; and contamination by cesium-137 in Goiania, Brazil in 1987.
The only thi.ig we have found suggesting "role conflict" in these events is a popular account that a reporter interviewed a scientist who had packed his wife and children off Cten the fire broke out at the Windscale plant. See John G. Fuller, We Almost Lost Detroit (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1975), 85. For obvious reasons, we have reason to doubt even this report.
- 31. Q. Professor Cole mentioned a case of a policeman who had abandoned his l
role,
, A. [Milet!) I am aware of that case. It was so remarkable it was featured on the Phil Donahue Show.
As I recollect the television program, the policeman in question was assigned to man a desk and take phone calls during the emergency, which i was a flood in Illinois. While performing his duties, the policeman phoned home to check on his wife and two young daughters. His wife told him that the floodwaters had covered the first story of their house and were rising; she had no one to help her evacuate. The policeman called several friends i
j and relatives to help but reached none of them.
At this point the policeman asked his superior if he could leave to l
l help his wife. ,The superior (who allegedly was looking for an excuse to fire this particular pollee officer) said no. The policeman lef t anyway to help l
his f amily. Reportedly, he intended to return to work af ter helping his l
Q f amily, but when he called the station, he was told he had been suspended.
This anecdote illustrates the process people typically go through in a i
"role conflict" situation. This police officer went through the usual steps:
- 1. He called his wife. Of ten the threatened spouse is able to evacuate without help, but in this un-usual case she could not.
- 2. He called friends and relatives. Of ten there are others who can help the threatened spouse, but in this unusual case there were not.
- 3. He asked his boss if the organization could cover for him while he lef t temporarily. Usually the organization can.
In short, this case illustrates a highly improbable case in which all of the usual role conflict resolution mechanisms did not work. Moreover, the po-liceman's job (taking phone calls) may or may not have been essential to the emergency response, but it seems to have been of the type that others could cover.
O Of course, an interview of this policeman on the Donahue Show, t
with his lawyer present, does not constitute good sociological data. If the l f acts are as stated, all the case of the policeman shows is that role aban-donment sarj occur, which we have never denied.
- 32. Q. Will you summarize?
A. (Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) If you look at the empirical f acts, Suf folk County's theory of role conflict simply does not hold up, in 19 cases of nonradiological emergencies in which real bus drivers were used to evacuate real people, no reports of role abandonment were found.
In tne peacetime radiological emergencies that have been addreised in this proceeding (particularly Three Mile Island Ginna, and Chernobyl)
O there is likewise no evidence of role abandonment such as Suffolk County predicts.
C. .P_qlls
- 33. Q. Why do you say that measures of behavioral intentions (polls, for example) do not predict actual behavior?
A. ( Mileti) I have repeatedly stated in testimony in these hearings that be-havioral intentions poll data gathered in non-emergency times should not be taken as indicative of behavior in future, unexperienced actual emergencies. I will not repeat all the reasons I have already stated in prior testimony for why I hold this opinion. I would, however, like to give an em-pirical example of how pre-event behavior intentions did no_t match actual behavior when an event actually did occur.
I and several others conducted one of the largest, most elaborate, and perhaps best-funded surveys of behavioral intentions in relation to di-sasters or emergencies ever performed. This study sought to explor? the O impacts ane respoase of peopie to a scientificalir cree 1eie preeiction or warning of an earthquake. We interviewed well over one hundred organiza-tions and several hundred f amilies to ask what people would do if scientists were to predict an earthquake. Our interview techniques were detailed and complex; they went to great lengths to present people with detailed see-narios and questions about behavioralintentions.
The interviews with f amilies are illustrative. We interviewed f ami-lies as a group. Prediction scenarios were tape recorded and even visually illustrated on flip-charts. We interviewed respondents in a f ace-to-f ace l
i situation. We played the audio tapes that described the prediction at the
! same time that flip-charts illustrated the scenarios. At pre-designated points the audio and visual presentations were stopped. questions were asked, and behavioralintentions were measured.
m
. U Our study concluded that a scientifically credible earthquake predic-tion would result in large social ad economic costs for society resulting from the response to the prediction. Subsequently, a "near piedicGon" was
- actually issued. It was empirically studied by Professor Ralph Turner and colleagues to determine actual public response to this actual event. Their study did not document any behavior that supported the conclusion we had
- reached based on our behavioral intentions study. Professor Turner con-cluded, for example, that "the people of Los Angeles County showed few of the perverse effects that are of ten given as reasons for withholding soundly based but uncertain earthquake forecasts"; that there was an "absence of negative effects" (see Ralph H. Turner, "Waiting for Disaster
- Changing
, Reactions to Earthquake Forecasts in Southern California," International Journal of Mass Emerzeneles and Disasters 1(2): 333, 334 (1983)); that "the ,
O earthquake threat was not salient in relation to other everyday concerns" (see Ralph H. Turner, "Individual and Group Response to Earthquake Pre-
- diction," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake j Prediction, Unesco Headquarters, Paris, p. 7 (26 Feb.1987)); and that
"(e)xcept for a great deal of informal discussion and attention to media reports and occasional massive rumor waves, life went on as usual" (see .
Ralph H. Turner, Joanne M. Nigg, and Denise Heller Paz, Waiting for Disas- ,
! ter: Earthouake Watch in California (Los Angeles: University of California e
Press,1986), 416).
l l
There are many reasons why these two studies may have documented l a wide gap between behavioral intentions and actual behavior. For exam- -
( ple, behavioral intentions and behavior are different, particularly in regard O to emereency benavior. Also. ine prediction scenarios usee in the stuer of ,
F i
O tateatioas ettreree trom tne 9teeictioa situatioa that actu uv occurree.
Consequently, what people took into account or were thinking when they offered intentions was not an accurate estimate of what was operating in the actual situation when it wr.s experienced. But that is precisely the point.
- 34. Q. What is your assessment of the practical significance of Stephen Cole's be-havioral intention polls?
A. (Lindell, Mileti) Suffolk County appears to have concluded that the re-ported intentions of respondents can be taken at f ace value - that is, that the bus drivers do not presently intend to, nor will they in the future, drive buses to evacuate school children in a radiological emergency. We, and others, are mindful of the limitations of behavioral intentions data. As Gordon Wood has written:
Some people who claim that they would intervene in f act would do so. However, in other cases, the self-report procedure (relative measure) would yield a dif-ferent set of results from the nonreactive measure ob-tained by actually staging a crisis, if you were to ask a number of people whether they would come to the aid of an elderly person being mugged, it is likely that a number of the respondents would indicate a willingness to help. We have no idea, however, whether they actu-ally would help a victim in a real mugging. Imagine that a close relative (brother, sister) needs a kidney transplant. Would you be willing to donate one of your kidneys? Most of us are likely to say yes when the need is f ar distant (in a hypothetical situation). How many of us would actually give up a kidney? We simply do not know unless f aced with the situation.
Gordon Wood, Fundamentals of Psychological Research. 3d ed. ( Boston:
Little, Brown land Co., 1981), 35. We believe, moreover, that there are other, more plausible interpretations of these data and their relevance to the LERO emergency plan.
O 33. .. wnat are these alternative interpretations:
A. (Lindell, Mileti) One alternative explanation for these data is that the questions that were asked are assessing only the bus drivers' attitudes to-ward protecting their families. The fact that they have clear concerns about f amuy safety does not mean that they would refuse to help in an ac-tual emergency in the future.
Another alternative is that the survey questions are assessing the bus drivers' attitudes toward the utility company. The fact that the re-spondents have negative attitudes toward LILCO in normal circumstapagg does not imply that they would refuse to help children in an emerrenev.
Both the social entity (LILCO vs. school children) and the situational re-ferent (normal circumstances vs. an emergency) differ between the cir-cumstances of questionnaire administration and the circumstances under O which the action would be performed.
- 36. Q. Suppose that one were to accept the interpretation that the polls do in f act mean that bus drivers do not intend to cooperate. Doesn't this present a problem to LERO?
A. (Lindell, Milet!) Not necessarily, even if the bus drivers' current intention is to refuse to cooperate. In f act, Professor Cole's questionnaire itself has helped to communicate to bus drivers what behavior is expected of them in an emergency, and thus may help, however slightly, to clearly communi-cate the expectation that they drive an evacuation bus in a radiological emergency.
Moreover, a bus driver's present decision not to drive is not irrevers-ible. Respondents an drive (and we believe that they are likely to drive) in an emergency even if they currently are not inclined to do so. The rea-O son they would be inclined to participate in an emergency is the high
O oeeree or neinias benavior tnat nes beea oemoastretee ia emerrencies.
ranging in scope from minor individual emergencies to communitywide di-sasters involving threats to life and health, in light of the evidence we have cited regarding the strong motivations that people have for helping in a broad range of emergencies, we are extremely skeptical that the role rejection that may have been ex-pressed in order to prevent LII.CO from obtaining an operating license would be extended into an emergency situation when the health and safety of school children would be at stake.
- 37. Q. What do you think of the methodology of the County's polls?
A. [Mileti) As I testified in 1983, I believe there are several methodological flaws in the way the questions are worded and the order in which they were asked. Cordaro gLgl., ff. Tr. 832, at 89-93. The 1983 testimony is Attach-
] ment J to this testimony.
(Lindell, Miletil However, we think that focusing on such flaws in behav-ioral intention polls diverts attention from the main point, which is that such polls, no matter how well constructed, cannot predict actual behavior in future, unexperienced emergencies.
l 38. C'. . Suffolk County witness Stephen Cole has conducted another firemen survey in March 1988. Do you have any comments on the new survey?
A. (Mileti) I was provided a copy of one of the survey answer forms only a few days ago, and thus I have not had time for an in-depth review. I do
( have a few comments though, based upon a necessarily brief review.
{
O
O My first impression of Dr. Cole's new fireman survey is that it ap-pears that the sorts of factors that scientific, empirical data have shown to be the determinants or causes of behavior in emergencies could not be op-erating in this survey of intentions. As a matter of fact,it appears that no attempt was made to have them operate in this poll at all. I do believe, however, that Dr. Cole agrees that these f actors are important, because he did try to include some of these f actors in the survey he presented last summer during the OL-5 exercise hearing.
- 39. Q. Could you give us some examples of wnat you mean by this?
A. (Mileti) Yes,I can. For example, Question 26 reads as follows:
If there was an accident at Shoreham requiring the
, evacuation of people within a ten mile zone of the plant, do you think that it would be dangerous for you to spend a day working within the evacuation zone?
As this question shows, no attempt was made to simulate what would be going on during an evacuation. The respondent here doesn't have the bene-fit of the vast array of information that would be available to him during an emergency, such as EBS messages or what his supenisors would tell him.
l i Also, in answering thi' question, the respondent has no idea what he would be doing, where he would be located in the 10-mile EPZ, or whether he
! would have special protective clothing or dosimetry, all of which would in-fluence his opinion about how safe it was to be in the EPZ. To more accu-rately measure the fireman's behavioral intentions, the respondent should have been given more situation-specific f actors before being asked to make any judgment about what he thoughi he might do in the situation.
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Question 8 also has methodological flaws in it. First, this question presumes that people who have children in school will want to check on them. (Of course, we all believe that they would in absence of information about school children, but from a methodological standpoint it is incorrect to automaticauy assume this is so.) Second, this question also did not per-mit the respondents to take any other situational factors into consideration before stating their behavorial intentions. For example, the respondents weren't told that there are protective measures in place for school chu-dren.
Another flaw in Dr. Cole's most recent survey is evident in Question
- 6. This question asks the respondents what they would do first. The notion in this question of what they would do "first" precludes all other behavior (especially since the survey didn't inquire how long the "first" action would O take or what the respondents would do next). The respondent is given no opportunity to respond that he would do more than one thing, in reality, though, if a person says he would make sure his f amily was safe first, that does not mean that he wouldn't report to work a few minutes later. The re-sults from our bus driver interview study bear out this f act.
Also, Question 6 in Professor Cole's latest poll and its answers are confusing because the question has the respondent assuming at the start i
that he is already at work. But the first answer to this question has the re-spondent reporting to work. Why would the respondent pick this answer if he were already at work?
- 40. O. Suffolk County's witnesses argue that emergency planners should use opin-lon polls in planning. What is your opinion?
i O ^. ctiaeeti siteti) tr we accent their tnests we coacioee tnat 92 aaers i
should provide more personnel than are necessary to carry out an emergen-cy response because a large percentage of personnel will not be available because of role conflict. But the empirical f act, demonstrated in many past emergencies, is that there is of ten an oversupply of personnel. See Cordaro Lt_Al., ff. Tr. 832, at 17.
(Mileti) That is why I have advised against using opinion polls, at least in the wa) Suffolk County urges, for emergency planning. It is not just that they are unreliable; they are harmful. If believed, they focus the planner on the wrong problem - indeed on a hypothetical problem that is the oppo-site of what actually happens in emergencies.
[Crocker) Even in the unlikely event that regular school but drivers were l
! not available, LILCO has alternate provisions for evacuating school chil-O dren. We have provided many additional bus drivers so that, even if we as-sume many defections by regular bus drivers, we can still get the job done, as I discuss in Part ID of this testimony below, i
! Q. Apparently a number of school bus drivers on Long Island have signed s ments saying that they "cannot and will not agree to drive a sch us in the event of an accident at Shoreham." Does this mean tha e signers ould in f act not help evacuate school children in a radiol cal emergen-cy.
A. [ Lindell, etil No. It is likely that these tements, like Professor l
Cole's polls, ref t ' opposition to the u y or the nuclear plant rather than real future behavior.
( Mileti} I testiff 1983 that I had ubt that school teachers could I
be found ome forward. in advance of an emerg . v. and say they would
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(G/ e of bus drivers. That does not mean these people would not drive in emerge ' no matter what they may say now.
( Lindeu) Itis ible that the bus drivers w gned the statements are slightly less likely than o s to drive cause in a sense they have made a public "commitment" not to '
To this smau extent the soliciting of such statements may I n the public v. But this has little or nothing to do with "role nflict." More important, I wo t expect this com-mitment override the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation to -
nat I assed above.
D. Conclusion
- 42. Q. So what is your conclusion?
g A. (Lindell) Whenever I have raised the hypothetical problem of role conflict V
with people associated with offsite preparedness for emergencies at nucle-ar power plants (for example, at a workshop for emergency planning per-sonnel sponsored by General Public Utilities in the Three Mile Island area in 1985), reaction has ranged from surprise to indignation that anyone would think it would happen. Emergency planning professionals simply do not re-gard "role conflict" as a real problem in emergencies.
(Mileti) It is inconceivable to me that third-graders (for example) would be lef t on the curb with no transportation during a radiological emergency because their drivers had "role conflict" or for any other reason. I know of no scrap of erhpirical evidence that any such thing has ever happened in any emergency of any kind.
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III. LILCO'S AUXILIARY SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE
- 43. Q. Mr. Crocker, would you please give us a brief overview of LERO's auxiliary school bus driver procedure?
A. (Crocker] Yes. First of all, LILCO believes that the regular school bus drivers will do their job in an emergency. LERO provides enough LERO school bus drivers, however, to evacuate all public and private schools in the 10-mile EPZ around Shoreham in a single wave. With LERO's auxiliary school bus driver procedure, there will be a "backup" LERO school bus driv-er for every regular school bus driver. The LERO "backup" driver would drive a school bus only if a regular driver was unable to drive, or decided not to drive, during a Shoreham emergency. Also, there will be enough ad-ditional LERO auxiliary school bus drivers to drive the extra number of buses needed to evacuate all EPZ schools in a single wave. These extra O erivers are rarerree to => "pri=>ry" ' tao senooi bus erivers.
Briefly stated, LERO's procedure requires that ull LERO auxiliary school bus drivers, that is both backup and primary drivers, will be called out to help evacuate schools during an emergency at Shoreham. They will report directly to pre-designated bus yards and (1), if they are "primary" bus d-ivers, they will pick up a bus and go directly to one of the schools or (2), if they are "backup" drivers, they will inform the bus company dis-patcher that they are ready to drive an evacuation bus in place of a regular bus driver if they are needed. Once at the school, the LERO bus drivers will let the school officials in charge know that they are ready to help evacuate the school children. At the direction of school personnel, the LERO bus drivers will evacuate the children to safety.
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- 44. Q. What do you mean by a "single-wave" evacuation?
A. ( Crocker) A single-wave evacuation means that enough buses and drivers a
are allocated to each school to ensure that no driver makes more than one trip. As a result, all schools are evacuated as quickly as possible. This practice is consistent with the school evacuation plans for counties around other nuclear power plants in New York State.
, 45. Q. If LILCO believes that the regular school bus drivers will drive during a i Shoreham emergency, why did LILCO develop this procedure?
A. (Crocker) LILCO developed its auxiliary school bus driver procedure to
- remove any lingering doubt that there won't be enough bus drivers to trans-port school children safely out of the EPZ. LILCO also developed this plan so that all EPZ schools could be evacuated as quickly as possible in a single wave.
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- 46. Q. How many school bus drivers are needed to evacuate all schools in the EPZ in a single wave?
. Sei i A. [ Crocker) in all,44 school bus drivers are needed to evacuate all public l 49o 1 and private schools in the EPZ: 4e are needed for public schools,15 for parochial schools, and 24 for nursery schools.
- 47. Q. How did LILCO arrive at these numbers?
A. (Crocker) For the public and parochial schools we first determined the
! population of each school, reduced that number by 5% for daily absences, i and then further redaced the number for high schools by an additional 20%
to account foT students who would evacuate in their own cars or with someone else. Sine: the-Longwood-Jw@r-MiF. Scheci L; on spHt don.
webo-reducedits4wdem-poptdattorce,6 The final number for each school is the number of students who might need to be evacuated by bus for
that school. For nursery schools we used the student population numbers given to us by the nursery schools themselves.
Next we calculated the number of buses needed to evacuate each school based on 40 students per bus for high school and 60 students per bus for lower grades. These bus capacities are standardly applied in the indus-try. The results of these calculations are Attachment K to this testimony.
- 48. Q. Why did you reduce the school populations by 5% for daily absences and by 20% for those students using other transportation?
A. (Crocker] These assumptions are the same assumptions litigatPd during the 1984 emergency planning hearings, See Cordaro et al., it. Tr. 9154 Vol. II, at 55. LILCO believes they are still valid today. In-1%4-all-school-popula-tiens ware altn WucM by 3E for-split-sessient Since eMyane schaa! 9 on l
split =!ori 50ever ws4MuW r onlpatshM5 population numW by.
O half-in-sur-cment cele'f atians-towsmatelytefleci4ts-PC7Aatier at
- any-giver time,
- 49. Q. How many regular school bus drivers are used by the school districts to i transport students who go to schoolinside the 10-mile EPZ?
A. (Crocker) According to information LERO has been collecting over the past several months, there are approximately 301 regular school bus drivers l
contracted to or employed by the school districts to drive school buses for w gr ,im e t public and parochial schools in the EPZ.jarochial schools are figured into l
this number tecause public school districts regularly transport parochial school children. Attachment L to this testimony shows the breakdown of regular school bus drivers per school district.
Since nursery schools normally do not provide transportation for O tneir students. tERO -111 provide a11 or tneir transporation neees uniess
J they decide to provide their own. This practice is consistent with earlier revisions of the LERO Plan. Recently one nursery school told us that it would provide its own transporation during a Shoreham emergency. Thus, LERO will not provide this school any additional transportation. '
- 50. Q. How many LERO emergency worken; will be auxiliary sch:cl bus drivers?
A. (Crocker] Presently LERO is training LERO emergen1y workers to be auxiliary school bus drivers. Once the training is completeC. LERO expects
(, 0 to have 4M auxiliary school bus drivers to implement its school bus driver procedure. The number of drivers will be adjusted yearly according to cur-rent school-student populations to ensure that there are always enough bus drivers to do the job.
- 51. Q. How many of the LERO auxiliary school bus drivers live in the 10-mile EPZ?
t A. (Crocker) I don't have an exact count of the number of LERO school bus drivers who live in the EPZ. In response to an interrogatory from Suffolk County,I asked my staff to figure a best estimation of the number based on the street addresses of all LEP.O school bus drivers. Based on that count.
l l about 46 of $62 bus drivers recruited at that time live in the EPZ.
This number is conservatively high, because a LERO worker was considered to live in the EPZ if we were unsure from his address whether l he lived just inside or just outside the boundary. Of course, some bus driv-l l ers who do not live in the EPZ may have relatives who do live in it. Con-
, versely some drivers who live in the EPZ may have no f amily living in the l
l EPZ. Consequently 46 of 562 is likely to be a slightly conservative estimate of the LERO drivers who might have f amily in the EPZ.
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y O 52. Q.
509 If only 4% 6 " (P " ' are net .<d, why are there so many more when you add the numbt. rtO and regular bus drivers together?
A. (Crocker) In the interest of conservatism LERO customarily recruits more emergency workers than are needed, providing a 150% can-ou't for all of its LERO emergency worker positions. LERO's auxiliary school bus driv-er procedure has enough auxiliary school bus drivers to back up au 301 reg-o9 ular school bus drivers on a one-to-one basis. That covers 301 of the bus driver positions needed for a one-wave evacuation, which, when counting both regular and LERO school bus drivers, provides 200% coverage Ao8 for the 301 regular bus driver positions. The remaining Mf bus driver posi-tions will be covered by the rest of the LERO school bus drivers; that is, l 34A AoS en LERO drivers will fill the 144 positions. This provides 150% coverage I
j for these positions.
O 53. Q. When and how would LERO mobiUze the auxiliary school bus drivers?
A. ( Crocker) According to page U-20a of the LERO Plan, which is Attach-o ment M to this testimony, LERO wiu mobilize its school teus drivers if one of the following events occurs during an emergency at Shoreham:
- 1) LERO makes a recommendation to evacuate or shelter schools; or
- 2) A public school district decides not to dismiss i early or cancel classes when recommended by LERO.
To mobilize the LERO school bus drivers, pagers would be set off to a se-lected group of bus drivers, who in turn would can the rest of the bus driv-ers. The calltrs would instruct the bus drivers to report to their pre-assigned bus company yard. This procedure is similar to how the rest of LERO's emergency workers are mobilized.
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l a 54. Q. How will the LERO school bus drivers know where to go?
A. (Crocker) LERO school bus drivers will be trained to report directly to a pre-designated bus yard.
- 55. Q. What will they do once they get to the bus yard?
A. (Crocker) LERO auxiliary school bus drivers will serve either as "backup" or "primary" drivers. A LERO "backup" driver will go to a pre-designated bus yard that normally services an EPZ school. Once there, he wiu tell the bus company dispatcher that he is available to drive a bus if any of the reg-ular school bus drivers elect not to drive. A LERO "backup" driver will drive only if the bus company dispatcher directs him to. If the bus dis-patcher asks the LERO driver to drive, the driver will select an Assignment Packet from the LERO box, put on dosimetry, and fill out the emergency O worker dose recore form. Then he w111 oetain a bus from the eispatcher and head to the school indicated in the Assignment Packet.
A "primary" LERO school bus driver will go directly to a pre-designated bus yard that does not normally service an EPZ school and select an Assignment Packet from the LERO box. Af ter putting on dosimetry and completing the necessary forms in the packet, the LERO primary bus driv-1 er will request that a bus be provided to him according to existing con-l tracts between LILCO and the bus company. He will then drive directly to i
the school indicated in the packet.
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- 56. Q, Explain what the "LERO boxes" are and tell us where they wi11 be kept.
A. (Crocker) LERO boxes contain the Assignment Packets that will be used by the bus drivers who will drive school evacuation buses during an emer-O gency at snorenam. rne contents of the Assignment eacket is 11stee in ine i
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] "LERO School Bus Driver Procedure" which is Attachment to this testi-i mony. There will be pr separate LERO bo(for each bus yard that normally 4
serves an EPZ school and for each additional bus yard that LERO will use to supplement the number of buses needed for a single-wave evacuation.
LERO boxes wiu be stored at each bus yard or will be brought to the bus yard at the beginning of the emergency if LERO has not received permis-Gion to keep it there. Almost au boxes will be kept at the bus yards howev-1 er.
- 57. Q. How will the bus company dispatchers know what to do? <
A. (Crocker) Each LERO box will contain instructions for the bus company j dispatcher explening what he should do. Also, LERO's procedures provide I
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! that the LERO bus coordinator in the EOC w1U explain the process to him O over the anone on the day of the emereener. we aiso intene to expiain
- LERO's procedure to the bus company dispatchers beforehand.
- 56. Q. How will the drivers know when to go to tne schools?
l A. (Crocker) LERO primary school bus drivers will go directly to the schools indicated in the Assignment Packets once they pick up their buses. A back-1 l up LERO school bus driver will go to the schoolindicated in the Assignment ,
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Packet only af ter the bus company dispatcher asks for his help and assigns I
a bus to him.
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- 59. Q. How do the auxiliary school bus drivers know how to get to the schools?
A. (Crveker) All LERO auxiliary school bus drivers will be trained, like all I other LERO bus drivers, on which routes they must take. For example.
l road rallies and/or drills may be used. In addition, each Assignment Packet wiu contain a map to the evacuating school.
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O 60. Q. Wnat e tney do ar the schoois?
A. (Crocker) Once at the schools, each LERO school bus driver will report to the school personnel coordinating the evacuation and tell them that he is a
- LERO bus driver ready to drive the school children out of the EPZ. At the direction of school personnel, the LERO bus driver will help load children i onto the bus. Before leaving the school the LERO bus driver will request that a school staff member accompany the children. The regular school bus drivers will also help evacuate the schools in the same manner.
- 61. Q. Who will supervise the schcol children before and af ter getting on the bus?
A. [Crocker) Teachers and other school personnel will supervise the school children before getting on the bus in the sarne manner they do every day or
- during early dismissal. We expect that at least one teacher will accompany O the ch12eren and vrovid supervision on each bus.
j 62. Q. Then what?
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A. [Crocker) Af ter the bus is loaded, the school bus c:lvers will drive to the school relocation center designated for that schoolin the Assignment Pack-et (or proceed to another f acility, if directed to do so by the school person-nel on the bus).
i l 63. Q. How will the school personnel know what to do?
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- A. (Crocker) We continually offer training to the school districts and have repeatedly expressed our interest in discussing school evacuation plans with
! them. Furthermore, we intend to provide each school in the 10-mile EPZ
- with guidelines on what to do in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
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! Also, LERO's Public and Private School Coordinators in the EOC will talk l
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A V about what is happening. In addition, each bus driver will be able to explain the evacuation procedures to school personnel,
- 64. Q. Why do you believe LERO school bus drivers are qualified to drive school buses during a Shoreham emergency?
A. (Crocker) LERO auxiliary school bus drivers are qualified to transport school children during a Shoreham emergency because they will have the necessary New York State Class 2 operator's license and will be trained in their job-specific and other emergency procedures. We do not believe that LERO's auxiliary schcol bus drivers would need any other training to trans-port children, since the evacuation would be a one-time occurrence and since at least one teacher would be on the bus to supervise the children.
65, Q. Are regular school bus drivers approved of by the school districts in the EPZ to drive school buses?
O A. (Crocker) According to my staff, bus drivers must be approved before they can drive a bus for a particular school district, either as a regular school bus driver or as a substitute for a regular school bus driver. Various Suffolk County witnesses who are school officials have testified to this f act in their depositions.
- 66. Q. Will LERO school bus drivers receive the same type of approval? If not, why not?
A. (Crocker) No. LERO does not intend to obtain the school districts' ap-proval for its auxiliary school bus drivers. LILCO does not believe that emergency workers who are used to evacuate schools in a radiological emergency need the approval of the school districts, since they are not being employed as regular or substitute school bus drivers and will drive O senooi euses onix in the event of an emergency at snorenam. we eo not
V,a believe that the approval process was intended to apply to such an excep-tional situation. Furthermore, if the concern raised here is about supervi-sion, eacL bus will have at least one teacher on it to provide the necessary care and supervision.
- 67. Q. Do you know anything about how schools are evacuated in the counties around the other nuclear power plants in New York?
A. [Crocker) Yes, I asked one of LILCO's consultants, Mr. Richard Watts. to call all of the countics within the 10-mile EPZ's of the other nuclear power plants in New York State to find out how they evacuate schools in their EPZ's. The planners he talked with are from Monroe, Oswego, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Wayne, and Westchester counties. Mr. Watts discovered l that all counties evacuate schools in a single wave using both the school l
districts' regular school bus drivers and other available bus drivers from other bus companies that do not normally terve those schools. Mr. Watts also asked the counties if the additional "non-school" bus drivers were ap-proved by the school districts. Basically, they responded that they had
! never heard of any requirement that the extra drivers needed the school l
dist-icts' approval before driving during a radiological emergency.
- 68. Q. Why do you believe that the school districts in the EPZ will let LERO l school bus drivers transport their children cut of the EPZ during an emer-gency at Shoreham?
l A. (Crocker, Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) We believe that school authcrities will use whatever resources are available to them to evacuate their schools.
l This means that the school districts would use LERO's buses and drivers as well as their own. To take any other course of action would go against the f
best interest of the children and might endanger their health and safety. If O the school districts are concerned about adequate supervision of the
-5 9-O ch11dren on the buses, having teachers accomreny tne ch11eren resoives this concern.
- 69. Q. Will LILCO train regular school bus drivers to implement its school bus driver procedure?
A. [Crocker) LILCO has offered through the school districts to train aU reg-ular school bus drivers. This training would address emergency procedures, the drivers' emergency role as a bus driver, radiological inforr.ation, provi-sione Mr families, information about Shoreham, and the use of dosimetry.
Recently we offered the same training to the school bus drivers at two of the bus companies that service EPZ schools. That training will be coordi-nated through the bus companies. We intend to offer training through the other bus companies in the future.
Any regular bus driver who participates in LILCO's senw! bus driver O program will be compensated for his time in training and will receive an annual bonus. In an emergency these drivers would also participate in LERO's iamily tracking system, and those with iamilies living in the EPZ would be eligible to have their families stay at LERO f amily congregate care centers.
- 70. Q. What if a regular school bus driver wants to help with the evacuation but hasn't been trained in LILCO's procedures. How will she know what to do?
A. (Crocker] The bus company dispatcher will know in advance that regular school bus drivers should also use the Assignment Packets to determine what they need to do. So if the regular school bus drivers haven't been trained by LERO and want to help evacuate schools, the bus company dis-patcher will tell them to take an Assignment Packet and help evacuate the schoot eeser> bee ta it ^tso the ' tao ="xt1iary schooi b"s erivers ~tti nei9 O
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the regular drivers understand what they need to do. If there are a suffi-cient number of drivers LERO drivers may accompany regular school bus drivers on their assignments.
- 71. Q. LERO Mvers will have dosimetry. What will the regular bus drivers use?
A. (Crocker] Dosimetry will be available in the LERO boxes for all school bus drivers. Each Assignment Packet will contain two direct reading dosimeters (DRD's) and two thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLD's). LERO drivers, who will be fully trained in the use of these devices, will use the two DRD's and one of the TLD's. The other TLD will be used by the regular school bus driver who hasn't been trained in dosimetry, so that her exposure may be recorded.
In addition, each Assignment Packet will contain two potassium iodide (KI) tablets, one each for the LERO driver and the regular driver l
O who might together fulfill the bus driver assignment.
- 72. Q. If, as LILCO believes, the regular bus drivers will assist in the evacuation, what will the extra "backup" drivers do?
A. (Crocker] When all the required buses have been dispatched, the re-maining LERO backup drivers will report to the Patchogue Staging Area for l passible reassignment.
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- 73. Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
A. (Crocker, Kelly, Lindell, Mileti) Yes.
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O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before th_e Atomic Safety and Licensinst Board in the Matter of )
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ) (School Bus Driver Issue)
Unit 1) )'
ATTACHMENTS FOR f TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS M. CROCKER, (q
.~/ ROBERT B. KELLY, MICHAEL K. LINDELL, AND DENNIS S. MILETI ON THE REMANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street l P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 l
April 13,1988
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(j' "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS l DRIVERS TESTIMONY ATTACHMENTS INDEX A. Resume of Douglas M. Crocker B. Resume of Robert B. Kelly C. Resume of Michael K. Lindell D. Resume of Dennis S. Mileti C. "Role Abandonment by Bus Drivers During Major Emergency Evacuations" by Robert B. Kelly F. Interview Schedule for Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respondents G. Results of the Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respon-dents l H. Bus Driver Interview Schedule I. Results of the Bus Driver Interview Study O J. LILCO's 1984 testimony, Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 832 at 88-93.
K. "School Transportation Requirements For a One-Wave Evacua-tion" Chart L. "Regular Bus Drivers Employed By or On Contract to School l
Districts in the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ" Chart l
l M. Pages II-19 through II-21 of App. A of the LILCO Plan (Draft)
N. OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14, "LERO School Bus Driver Proce-dure" (Draft) l P
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i O DOUGtiS M. CROCxER MANAGER, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DIVISION NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SUPPORT DEPARTMENT LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY EDUCATION Stevens Institute of Technology - B.E. with Honor in Mechanical Engineering,1972 State University of New York at Stony Brook - M.S. in Marine Environmental Science,1978 Stone & Webster Radiological Safety Course Medical Aspects of Radiological Emergencies Course, New York Academy of Medicine,1983 Harvard School of Public Health,"Planning for Nuclear Emergencies," 1985 Harvard School of Public Health, "Advanced Planning for Nuclear Emergencies," 1986 EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
/~N O During the period May 1980 to the present, Mr. Crocker was generally responsible for preparing emergency plans, procedures, training programs, exercise scenarios, and other emergency planning activities. He was actively involved in ASLB licensing hearings on emergency planning. He has participated in many practice exercises and has observed many emergency plan exercises.
Mr. Crocker is presently Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager responsible for the SNPS Onsite and Offsite (LERO) Emergency Preparedness Programs. This consists of developing and maintaining f acilities, plans, procedures, training, and drill programs to satisfy NRC and FEMA requirements in support of the SNPS licensing effort. He directs a staff of 45 LILCO and consultant personnel.
From May 1986 to December 1987, Mr. Crocker served as Supervisor - Offsite Emergency Preparedness in addition to his duties as Manager of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
During the period March 1985 to June 1986, Mr. Crocker was Onsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor responsible for all onsite planning activities including the onsite portion of the 1986 NRC observed exercise.
From September 1982 to February 1985 Mr. Crocker was Project Engineer responsible for all Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. - N.Y. emergency planning projects. In this capacity, he d'rected a staff of forty-five engineers and planners in the execution of up to five simulta-neous projects for utility clients.
O Mr. Crocker 30ined Stone a wedster Enzineerine Corporation (SWEC> in Mer 1976 as en Engi-neer in the Environmental Engineering Division. Working in the EnvironmentalImpact Anal-ysis Group, his activities included the mathematical modeling of cooling tower visible
r plumes, coastal storm surge, and wave effects on shoreline intake structures. He has also O had experience with tne modeting of thermal eischarees from power vients ane with the coi-lection and analysis of hydrothermal data. His past assignments include circulating water system performance tests at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and the preparation of indus-trial energy survey reports for the petroleum refining and olefins industry. At Shoreham, Mr. Crocker was responsible for the collection and analysis of hydraulic transient data.
Prior to joining SWEC, Mr. Crocker worked as a Research Assistant at the Marine Science Research Center at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, collecting and analyz-ing oceanographic data during his graduate study f rom 1974 to 1976.
From 1972 to 1973, Mr. Crocker worked as an Estimator for L. K. Comstock and Co., Inc.,
preparing bids for electrical construction projects.
PUBLICATIONS "Radiological Protection issues Associated with the Establishment and Operation of Public Evacuee Reception Centers on Long Island," D. M. Crocker, D. P. Dreikorn, and R. J. Watts, to be presented at the Health Physics Society Annual Meeting, Boston, Mass., July,1988.
"Development and Verification of a Synthetic Northeaster Model in Application tc Coastal Flooding," Y. J. Tsai, D. M. Crocker, T. J. Burda, and F. K. Chou, Proceedings of National Symposium on Urban Storm Water Management in Coastal Areas,1980.
l Intake Screenwall Surging Caused by Wave Dynamics," Y. J. Tsal, Y. C. Chang, and D. M.
Q V "Crocker, Hydraulics in the Coastal Zone,1979.
"EN-129: Cooling Tower Visible Plume Model - User's Manual," Y. J. Tsai and D. M. Crocker, Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., April 1977.
"EM-128 - Intake Surge Model - User's Manual," D. M. Crocker and Y. C. Chang, Stone &
Webster Engineering Corp., August 1977.
AWARDS Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation's "Ten Best Papers Award," 1980.
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h DETAILED EXPERIENCE RECORD DOUGLAS M. CROCKER LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY, SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION (May 1984 to present)
Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division (July 1986 to present)
Mr. Crocker is responsible for all Nuclear Emergency Preparedness activities for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. He oversees the onsite and offsite (LERO) emergency pre-paredness programs to ensure a satisfactory level of preparedness. He is respot'sible for plans, procedures, drills, training, exercises, and facilities for the 3600 member emergency response organization. In this effort, he directs a staff of 45 LILCO and consultant person-nel. Additional duties include providing technical support and testimony in ASLB licensing hearings, coordinating with legal support organizations, and coordinating exercise activities with NRC and FEMA. During the period July 1986 to December 1987, Mr. Crocker also served as Acting Offsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor.
Offsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor (May 1986 to July 1986)
Mr. Crocker was responsible for the development and maintenance of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO). He was responsible for the LERO plan and procedures, training, drills, and f acility maintenance. He supervised a staff of twelve LILCO and consul-tant personnel. Additional duties included support of ASLB licensing hearings on emergency Os preparedness issues and the resolution of FEMA plan and exercise comments.
Onsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor (March 1985 to May 1986)
Mr. Crocker was responsible for the Onsite Emergency Preparedness Program. He directed the preparation and maintenance of: (1) SNPS Emergency Plan and Procedures, (2) Emergency Response f acilities, (3) Emergency Preparedness Training Program, and (4)
Emergency Preparedness Drill Program. He was responsible for preparations for the suc-cessful onsite portions of the first NRC observed exercise. He directed a staff of ten LILCO and consultant personnel in this effort.
Onsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (acting)(May 1984 to February 1985)
Mr. Crocker came to SNPS as a Stone & Webster employee in May 1984 to serve as an interim replacement for the departing LILCO coordinator. He was responsible for the onsite emer-gency preparedness preparations for the first NRC observed exercise. Mr. Crocker lef t Stone & Webster to work for LILCO in the same capacity.
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION. NEW YORK. N.Y. (May 1976 to February 1985)
Appointments:
l Project Engineer - 1982 O Envir "mental Engineer - 1982 Engineer - Environmental - May 1976 l
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() Emergency Planning, SWEC-NY (September 1982 to February 1985)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER, responsible for all emergency planning work in SWEC-NY, supervising a group of approximately forty-five planners.
Long Island Lighting Company (September 1982 to February 1985)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER, coordinating planning support services by SWEC per-sonnel at LILCO headquarters and the Shoreham site.
Public Service Company of Indiana (September 1982 to January 1984)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER for emergency planning for the Kentucky portions of the Marble Hill NGS emergency planning zone. He was responsible for the preparation of state and county plans, procedures and training.
State of Delaware (September 1982 to November 1983)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER, directing emergency plan, procedure, and training program development for the Delaware Department of Emergency Planning and Operations.
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (May 1980 to January 1984)
Mr. Crocker was PROJECT ENGINEER for emergency planning for the Wm. H. Zimmer Nu-clear Powcr Station in Moscow, Ohio. He was responsible for all offsite emergency plans, pa procedures, and training, and provided licensing support to CG&E during its ASLB hearings.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (March 1980 to April 1980)
Mr. Crocker was assigned to a feasibility study of alternative fuel uses in industrial boilers and f urnaces.
Long Island Lighting Company (November 1979 to February 1980)
Mr. Crocke' was assigned to the pressure and performance testing of the cooling water circulating system at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, where he was responsible for data collection and analysis.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Flood Insurance Administration
{F_I_AJ (March 1978 to December 1978)
Mr. Crocker conducted Flood Innsurance Studies for nine coastal communities in Maine. He was PRINCIPAL COASTAL INVESTIGATOR, responsible for the development of a synthetic northeaster storm model and for the a ,alysis of coastal flood clevations.
_U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Flood Insurance Administration (FIA)(June 1977 to March 1978)
Mr. Crocker was SUPPORT COASTAL ENGINEER for the Maine flood study. He was as-O sienee to nortneaster computer moeet eeveio9 ment-1 l
National Oil Company, Libya (May 1977 to June 1977)
He was responsible for a wave and surge study for intake design. Mr. Crocker determined de-sign parameters of an intake structure located on the Mediterranean Sea.
Indiana Power & Light Company (March 1977 to July 1977)
Mr. Crocker analyzed the hydrothermal characteristics of a cooling tower blowdown dis-charge into the Ohio River.
Millstone Unit No. 3, Northeast Utilities (May 1977)
Mr. Crocker conducted a hurricane surge and wave study for the design of a cooling water intake structure.
Long Island Lighting Company (January 1977 to April 1977)
Mr. Crocker participated in hurricane surge and wave analysis. He developed a computer model of intake screenwell surging in response to storm waves. He also calculated storm surge elevations caused by a modified probable maximum hurricane.
Koshkonong Units 1 and 2, Wisconsin Electric Power (January 1977 to March 1977)
He analyzed hydrothermal characteristics of a cooling tower blowdown discharge into the Rock River.
C' Mystic Station Unit No. 7 Boston Edison Company (August 1976 to Januan 1977 Mr. Crocker conducted a hydrothermal field survey and data analysis. He was responsible for a temperature and dye field survey and subsequent analysis to determine the hydrothermal characteristics of a fossil power plant once through cooling system discharge and its effects on circulation in the Mystic River Estuary.
Jamesport Units 1 and 2, Long Island Lichting Company (July 1976 to August 1986)
Mr. Crocker conducted an analysis of wave forces in the interior of the cooling water intake structure.
Montatue Units 1 and 2. Northeast Utilities (May 1976 to July 1976)
Mr. Crocker was responsible for the modification and verification of a cooling tower visible plume model. He incorporated upper air sounding data into the analysis of plumes.
State University of New York at Stony Brook (1975 to 1976)
As a RESEARCH ASSISTANT, Mr. Crocker developed computer models of tidal circulation in New York Harbor and the Peconic Estuary.
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r RESUME OF ROBERT B. KELLY EDUCATION Lesley College, M.S., Management,1984 Tuf ts University, B.A., Political Science,1980 Federal Emergency Management Agency-Professional Development Courses FEMA Courses and Seminars:
Nuclear Civil Protection Seminars Emergency Management - Introduction Radiological Home Monitoring Course Radiological Defense Officers Course Shelter Seminar Population Protection Seminar EXPERIENCE Roy F. Weston, Inc.,1987 to Present
- NUS Corporation, 1985 - 1987 Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, 1981 - 1985 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980 - 1981 Q
Roy F. Weston, Inc. - As a Senior Project Manager in the Expert Systems Department, .
is responsible for developing emergency management and community right-to-know programs for clients. Currently is managing a major evacuation database project; de-veloping functional specifications for an emergency response expert system; and work-ing on other emergency management programs.
NUS Corporation - As Supervisor of the Emergency Preparedness Section, directed the development of emergency preparedness programs for nuclear utilities, chemical plants, hospitals, and other industrial f acilities, and government agencies. Prepared emergency plans and implementing procedures and conducted capability assessments to ensure program effectiveness. Reviewed and integrated f acility and local response agency preparedness programs to ensure compatability and compliance with govern-ment regulations. Developed and presented training programs for emergency planning and response. Developed emerger.cy drill and exercise programs including scenario preparation, MSELs, exercise conduct, and evaluation reports.
Examples of projects at NUS:
- Reviewed the emergency plan for a community near a DOE f acility
- Reviewed a waste water treatment plant's emergency preparedness program Developed an emergency plan for a waste water treatment plant
Reviewed the emergency plan for a pharmaceutical plant, a chemical plant, bn and an electronics f acility Developed an industrial park emergency plan Developed an industrial eme.gency annex of a city emergency operations plan Designed exercise plans (MSEL, scenario development, etc.) for two community exercises
- Evaluated drills and exercises (community and plant level)
Developed an audit procedure for hospital emergency plans Developed an emergency public information booklet for a pharmaceutical plant Conducted a training needs analysis for a pharmaceutical plant Developed a video-based training program for a major industry association Developed and conducted a course for industrial emergency preparedness for the American Society of Safety Engineers l Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency - As Assistant Planning Director, managed profes-l sional planning office staff. Coordinated the Commonwealth's Disaster Assistance Pro-gram. Responsible for the development and implementation of the State's Comprehen-Q sive Emergency Management Plan, Emergency Broadcast System plan, and nuclear civil protection plans. Developed programs for disaster recovery activities. Developed pub-lic information and educational programs. Developed emergency management databases. Directed development of comprehensive emergency management plans and hazard analyses studies for 165 local communities.
In conjunction with local officials, developed training programs and exercises. Assisted in testing the State's radiological emergency plan. Coordinated the Agency's medical services advisory committee. Analyzed current and proposed legislation and prepared impact reports for the Director. Developed the State's Hazard Analysis Study.
As a junior planner for the State, developed support plans covering medical care, hospi-tal relocation, and transportation routes. Educated local officials through seminars and meetings. Assisted in development of radiological plans for local communities. Partle-ipated in various emergency operations including but not limited to: Lynn fire,1984 spring floods, winter storms, Salem fire and State employees strike.
l Federal Emergency Management Agency - As Emergency Management Specialist,
' worked on various disaster response and recovery projects. Coordinated in-processing i and out-processing at the Fort McCoy Cuban Refugee Relocation Camp. Served as Ver-ification Specialist during recovery operations in Texas following Hurricane Allen. Re-sponsible for review of damage survey reports and insurance settlements.
Developed af ter action reports of Cuban Refugee project for the FEMA Regional Direc-O tor.
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Assisted in the recovery program for the "Blizzard of 1978" winter storm.
O MEMBERSHIPS l
American Society of Safety Engineers Emergency Management Committee of the International Association of Fire Chiefs Association of International Disaster Experts National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management American Society for Public Administration PUBLICATIONS AND TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS "Dealing with the Media During Emergencies," HAZMAT 86 Workshop, June 1986.
"Beyond Contingency Planning: Development Strong Emergency Preparedness Capabil-ity," Presented at HAZTECH, August 1986.
"Choosing and Developing the Proper Emergency Plans for Your Facility," National Health and Safety News, November 1986.
l Presentation to the Buffalo Chapter of the American Society of Safety Engineers - De-l Veloping Emergency Plans.
Presentation to the Pittsburgh Chapter of the Association of Industrial Hygienists - De-veloping Effective Emergency Preparedness Programs.
Presentation to the Louisiana Loss Control Assocication - Developing Effective Emer-gency Preparedness Programs, i
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i MICH AEL K. LINDELL April 1988 EDUCATION Ph D Socia 1/ Quantitative Psychology, University of Colorado,1975 BA Psychology, University of Colorado,1969 PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS 1987 to Associate Professor of Psychology present Michigan State University 1987 to Adjunct Faculty Federal Emergency Management Agency present Natlonal Emergency Training Center 1986 to Visiting Associate Professor of Psychology 1987 Georgia Institute of Technology 1981 to Adjunct Assistant Professor of Psychology 1987 University of Washington 1974 to Research Scientist O present Battetie Human Aff airs Research Centers 1981 Visiting Lecturer in Educational Psychology School of Education, University of Washington 1974 Research Psychologist, K.R. Hammond Associates 1972 to Data Analyst / Computer Programmer 1974 University of Colorado 1971 to Teaching Assistant 1972 University of Colorado 1970 to Research Assistant 1971 University of Colorado PROFESSION AL ASSOCIATIONS .
i American Statistical Association Human Factors Society Society for Risk Analysis Judgment /Decisionmaking Society American Society of Civil Engineers (Affiliate Member)
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PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR / PROJECT DIRECTOR NationalInstitute of Mental Health. Consequences of naturei hazards for mental health, 5/77-2/78, $10,000.
Office of Naval Research. Eff ects of social structure, technology and job design on job satisf action, 3/77-8/80, 377,000.
Energy Research and Development Administration. Public perception and evaluation of risk associated with nuclear waste, 10/77-9/78, 850,000.
Private Corporation. Analysis of F.osition evaluation system, 5/79-12/79,
$15,000.
Department of Energy. Consumer response to gasoline shortage, 7/79-1/80, 330,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Technical assistance in implementing emergency preparedness requirements, 9/79-9/82, $355,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of licensee emergency response f acility designs, 6/81-10/81, 856,000, l
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Design assistance for NRC headquarters and regional operations centers, 9/81-3/64, 3105,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of emergency exercises at nuclear power plants, 10/81-9/82, $114,000.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Analysis of emergency staffing, 10/82-3/64,
$59,000.
Atomic Industrial f orum. Planning concepts and decision criteria for sheltering and evacuation, 8/83-5/84, $110,000.
National Science Foundation. Contingent conditions for research-based local emergency planning, 6/83-5/85, $21,000.
National Science Foundation. Behavioral response to technological hazards, 8/84-11/85, 860,000.
Westinghouse Corporation. Human f actors assistance for the Hanford Emergency Control Center, 1/85-9/85, 826,000.
Private Corporation. Toxic chemical emergency response plan, 1/86-7/86,
$44,000.
Department of Energy. Human f actors assistance for the DOE headquarters emergency operations center, 2/86-11/86, $66,000.
l Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of licensee emergency response l f acilities, S/86-9/86, $19,000.
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SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL AD HOC REVIEWS l O Academy of Management Review j
Risk Analysis Disasters International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters Nuclear Saiety Journal of Applied Psychology Professional Psychology SCIENTIFIC PEER REVIEW PANEL MEMBERSHIP National Science Foundation, Community Water Management Program National Science Foundation, Applied Science and Research Applications Directorate National Science Foundation, Earthquake Hazards Mitigation Program National Science Foundation, Decision and Management Science Program Brookhaven National Laboratory, Department of Nuclear Energy University of Washington, Department of Family Medicine Pennsylvania State Univerisity College of Medicine, Department of Behavioral Science University of Pittsburgh, University Center for Social and Urban Research University of Southern California, Institute of Safety and Systems Management National Science Foundation, Geography and Regional Science Program
! Argonne National Laboratory, Energy and Environmental Systems Division EXPERT TESTIMONY Public Forum on the Operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant sponsored by Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy Public Hearing on the Operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant sponsored by the Plymouth Board of Selectmen and Boston Edison Company Litigation of Long Island Lighting Company's Application for an operating j
license for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station conducted by the U.S.
I Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
! Dockets 50-322-OL-3 (Emergency Planning) and -OL-5 (Emergency Exercise Performance)
PROFESSION AL COMMITTEES f Committee Member--American National Standards Institute /American Nuclear i
Society Committee on Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities Conference Chair--American Society of Civil Engineers Specialty Conference on Planning for Hazardous Facilities
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Committee Member--Academy of Management Program Committee BOOKS AND CHAPTERS Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management, Lexington, MA: Health Lexington Books,1981.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Human Adjustment to Volcano Hazards, Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, in press.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Handbook of Emergency Response Planning, New York: Hemisphere Publishing, in press.
Stewart. T.R., Joyce C.R.B. and Lindell, M.K. New analyses: application of judgment theory to physicians' judgments of drug effects. In K.R.
Hammond and C.R.B. Joyce (Eds.) Psychoactive Drugs and Social Judgment Theory and Research, New York: Wiley Interscience,1975.
Earle, T.C. and Lindell, M.K. Public perception of industrial risks: a free response approach. In R.A. Waller and V.T. Covello (Eds.) Low Probability High Consecuence Risk Analysis issues, Methods and Case Studies, New York: Plenum Press,1984. .
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Communicating threat information for volcano hazards. In L. Walters (Ed.) Communication in Disaster Disseminating Bad News, in press.
JOURNAL ARTICLES Lindell, M.K. and Stewart, T.R. The effects of redundancy in multiple cue probability learning. American Journal of Psycholorv 1974, jl,393-398.
Lindell, M.K. Cognitive and outcome feedback in multiple cue probability learning tasks. J_ournal o of Experimental Psycholorv Human Learning and Memorv 1976, 2, 739-745.
2 Lindell, M.K. Interpretation of the R index in regression models of judgment.
Educational and Psychological Measurement 1978, 31, 69-74.
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! Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Psychological consequences of natural disaster.
Mass Emergencies 1978,3,105-115.
Lindell, M.K. and Drexler, J.A., Jr., Issues in using survey methods f or
- measuring organizational change. Academy of Management Review 1979, 4,13-19.
Lindell, M.K. and Drexler, J.A., Jr., Equivocality of f actor incongruence as an indicator of type of change in OD interventions. Academy of -
O weaazemeat aevie- isso s. los-to7-
l Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. Evaluation criteria for emergency response plans O in radiological transportation Journal of Hazardous Materials 1980,3, 335-345.
Linden, M.K. and St. Clair, J.B. TUKKNIFE A jackknife supplement to canned statistical packages. Educational and Physchological Measurement 1980, 40, 71-74.
Perry, R.W., Greene, M.R. and Lindell, M.K. Enhancing evacuation warning compliance suggestions for emergency planning. Disasteg 1980, 4, 433-449.
Greene, M.R., Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. The March 1980 eruptions of Mt. St.
Helens: Citizen perceptions of volcano hazard. Disasters 1981, 1, 49-66.
Drexler, J.A., Jr. and Lindell, M.K. Training / job fit and worker satisf action.
Human Relations 1981,34, 907-915.
Southwick, L., Steele, C., Marlatt, A. and Lindell, M. Alcohol-related expectancies defined by phase of intoxication and drinking experience.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psycholorv 1981, 42, 713-721.
Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Threat perception and putilic response to volcano hazard. Journal of Social Psychology, 1982,11),199-204.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R. Individual reponse to emergency preparedness planning near Mt. St. Helens. Disaster Management,1950, 3,5-11.
Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Crisis communications, ethnic differentials in interpreting and responding to disaster warnings. Social Behavior and Personality, 1982,1_0,97-104.
Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C. How close is close enough: public perceptions of the risks of industrial f acilities. Risk Analysis, 1983, 3, 245-253.
Houts, P.S., Lindell, M.K., Hu, T.W., CIeary, P.D., Tokuhata, G. and Flynn, CeB.
The protective action decision model applied to evacuation during the Three Mile Island crisis. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 1984, 2, 27-39.
Lindell, M.K. and Barnes, V.D. Protective response to technological emergency risk perception and behavioralintention. Nuclear Safety, 1986, 21, 457-467.
Southwick, L., Steele, C. and Lindell, M. The roles of historical experience and '
construct accessibility in judgments about alchoholism. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1986, 1_0, 167-186.
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i O xartez. J.D. ane tinde11, M.x. Piannine for uncertainty: the case of locai disaster planning. Journal of the American Planning Association,in press.
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O tinde11, M.x. and eerry. R.W. Waraine mechanisms in emereener response systems. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, in press.
l OTHER ARTICLES Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R. Mount St. Helens: Washingtonians i' View Their Volcano. Hazard Monthly, 1980, 1(2), 1-3.
Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R. Flood Warning: How People React Af ter the Warning. Hazard Monthly, 1981, 1(11), 1-6.
Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. Nuclear power plant emergency warning: how would the public respond? Nuclear News, 1983, 26, 49-53.
Lindell, M.K. Review of "Warning and Response to the Mt. St. Helens Eruption" by Saarinen and Sell. Disasters,1985, j,230-232.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. Source Credibility in Volcanic Hazard Information. Volcano News, 1986, ,2.2(12), 7-10.
PRESENTATIONS Lindell, M.K.,1976. A_ssessment of social values in nuclear waste distual.
Western Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K. and Maynard, W.S.,1976. Interchange of technical inforn;ation and public_ beliefs in energv decisionmaking. Western Psychological Association.
Drexler, J.A. Jr. and Lindell, M.K.,1976. Training / Job fit and worker satisf action. Western Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1978. Jackknife, ridge and ordinarv least squares estimators of regression parameters: a monte carlo comparison. Psychometric Society.
Lindell, M.K. and Drexler, J.A., Jr.,1978. Issues in using survev methods for measuring organizational change. Western Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1978. Ecual vs. differential predictor weights: testing hypotheses and estimates with restricted regression models. Psychometric Society.
Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K.,1979. Predisaster planning to promote compliance with evacuation warnings. National Conference on i
l Hurricanes and Coastal Storms.
Lindell, M.K., Earle, T.C., and Perry, R.W.,1979. Radioactive wastes: public attitooes toware eisoosai raettities. American Nuciear society.
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Lindell, M.K.,1980. Ridge and ordinarv least squares estimators of relative O
v weights in regression analysis. Psychometric Society.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R.,1980. Race and disaster warning response. Pacific Sociological Association.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R.,1980. Consistency of attitudes and behavior related to nuclear power. Western Psychological Association.
Greene M.R., Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K.,1931. Citizen perception of public action. Western Political Science Association.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene. M.R.,1981. Individual response to emergency preparedness planning. Western Social Science Association.
Lindell, M.K., Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R.,1981. Social and osvcholorical f actors affecting evacuation decisionmaking. American Psychological Association.
McGuire, M.V., Lindell, M.K. and Walsh, M.E.,1981. Law enforcement response to an investigative innovation. American Psychology Law Society.
Perry, R.W., Greene, M.R. and Lindell, M.K.,1981. Evacuation behavior during the May 18th eruption of Mt. St. Helens. Pacific Sociological Association.
Bolton, P.A., Perry, R.W., Lindell, M.K. and Greene, M.R.,1981. Hazard O experience and warning response of older persons. Gerontological Society of America.
Earle, T.C. and Lindell, M.K.,1982. Public perceptions of it'dustrial risks.
Society for Risk. Analysis Workshop on Low Probability-High Consequence Risk Analysis.
! Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C.,1982. How close is close enough: public perceptions of the risks of industrial f acilities. Society for Risk Analysis l
Workshop on Low Probability-High Consequence Risk Analysis.
Lindell, M.K.,1982. Judgments, values and the management of conflict over nuclear waste. First International Conference on Social Impact Assessment.
Lindell, M.K.,1982. _D_evelopment of a design for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's emergency operations center. Human Factors Society.
Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W.,1982. Protective action recommendations: how would the public respond? American Nuclear Society.
l Lindell, M.K. and Southwick, L.L.,1982. An analysis of information integration using free response data. American Psychological Association.
O Southwick, t.t., tinee11 M.x. ene Earie, T.C.,1982. Attituee poterizetion in pubMc issues: the roles of cognitive complexity, evaluative consistency and issue importance. Washington State Psychological Association.
Hansvick, C. Archea, J., Hanson, H., Keating, J., Lindell, M.K. and Wise, J. A.,
U^. 1983. Desitninc for personal control in hazards and disasters.
Environmental Design Research Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Analysis of emergency staffint for nuclear power plants.
Human Factors Society.
Lindell, M.K., Moeller, P.A. and Renner, M.S.,1984. Offsite respons_e considerations for appropriate protective actions. American Nuclear Society.
Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W.,1984. Social psychological processes and personal risk assessment. Society for Risk Analysis.
Lindell, M.K.,1984. Communicating risk information to the public: a review of research on natural hazards. NSF/ EPA Workshop on Risk Communication.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Tukey's "jackknife" in theory and in practice. American Psychological Association.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Decision criteria for sheltering or evacuatint medical f acilities in radiolocical and hazardous matierals incidents. Association for the Advancement of MedicalInstrumentation.
O saoat couasts ^ao ornea 'screats Lindell, M.K.,1983. Perception of risk at nuclear waste disposal sites and power plants. Lecture for Pacific Lutheran University Center for the Study of Public Policy.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. Lecture to University of Washington Department of Environmental Health and Nuclear Engineering.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Design of emergency response f acilities. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1984. Emergency staffing. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1984. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Protective action decisionmaking. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
G U Lindell, M.K.,1985. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
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Lindell, M.K.,1985. Social and political aspects of nuclear power plant l emerceaev oi=aaiaz ae itn eavsics society snort course oa smerreacr O Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Social response to the Mt. St. Helens eruptions. University of Washington Extension Course on Mt. St. Helens.
Lindell, M.K.,1385. Emergency management planning principles for large-scale emergencies involving technological and natural hazards in developed and developing nations. Administrative Staff College of India Workshop in Risk Analysis in Developing Countries.
Lindell, M.K.,1986. Concerns about offsite response in a nuclear power plant emergency. GPU Nuclear Annual Training Workshop for TMI Area Emergency Response Agencies.
Lindell, M.K.,1987. Public Response Considerations and Public Information.
Federal Emergency Management Agency National Emergency Training Center Short Course on Evacuation Planning and Response Simulation.
Also given in January 1988 and May 1988.
Lindell, M.K.,1988. Disaster Psychology. Federal Emergency Management Agency National Emergency Training Center Short Course on Multi Hazard Planning (given in February and May).
O TECHNiCAt REeORrS Over 40 technical reports to governmental and corporate sponsors of grants and contracts. Titles available on request, reports available through the Battelle <
Human Aff airs Research Centers Technical Library.
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i ACADEMIC VITA OF DENNIS 5. MILETI s_j March, 1988 PERSONAL Office:
Department of Sociology Hazards Assessment Laboratory
, Colorado State University Clark Hall Fort Collins, Colorado 30523 Colorado State University (303)491-5951 or 6045 Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 EDUCATION University of Colorado, Boulder: PhD, Sociology, 1974 California State University, Los Angeles: MA, Sociology, 1971 University of Calif ornia, Los Angeles: BA, Sociology, 1968 SPECIALIZATIONS Complex Organizations, Applied (Hazards and Policy), Nethods APPOIN'IMENTS 1974-date Faculty, Department of Sociology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins (1985-date, Professor; 1978-1985, Associate Professor; 1974-1978, Assistant Professor).
1984-date Director, Razards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins.
O 1986-date Adjunct Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
1981-year Policy Analyst, Seismic Safety Commission, State of California, Sacramento (on leave from university).
1978-1979 Invited Instructor, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chautauqua Short Course Program.
- 1975-year Visiting Assistant Prof essor, University of Southern California, Graduate School of Public Administration, Intensive Seminar Program.
1971-1972 Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of Colorade, Boulder.
AWARDS 19S3-1984 Alumni ilonor Faculty Award, Colorado State University Alumni hssociation for excellence in teaching, research and service 1981-year Cited in Outstanding Young Men of America 1978-1977 Cited for excellence in teaching, research and service by the Dean, College of Arts, Humanities and Social R:iances MEMBERSHIPS American Sociological Association, International Sociological Association, Pacific Sociological Association, Midwest Sociological Society, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, National Coordinating Council on Emergency
( Management, Western Social Science Association
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RESEARCH GRANTS AND COh"IRACTS l O 1987-1988 Associate Investigator, "Preparation of a Model Response Plan for the Three Mile Island Reactor," Public Education 1 and Warnings Group, i.ubcontract from Clark University for the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund. l 1987-1988 Principal Investigator, "Research Applications for Emergency Preparedness," contract for Public Service Company of New Hampshire.
1987-year Associate Investigator, "Socioeconomic Impacts of the Proposed High-Level Radioactive Waste Site at Hanford, Washington," Risk Assessment Team, subcontract from Social Impact Assessment, Inc. for the State of Washington.
1987-year Principal Investigator, "Public Perception of Seismic Risk in Santa Clara County," grant from the Bay Area Regional Earthquake Preparedness Project and the California Seismic Safety Commission.
1986-1987 Coprinicpal Investigator, "Warning Systems: A State of the Art Review," subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
1984-1985 Associate Investigator, "Evacuation Liability Issues,"
subcontract frce Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the U.
S. Department of Energy.
Principal Investigator, "Assessment of Human Stress 1984-1985 l
Impacts from the Livingston Trait Derailment and Chemical Emergency," contract for Illinois Central Gulf Railroad.
1984-1985 Associate Investigator, "State-of-the-Art Assessment:
Evacuation," subcontract form Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
1984-1985 Associate Investigator, "International Study of Dir. aster Impact on Domestic Assets," subcontract from the University of Georgia for the National Science Foundation.
1983-198e Principal Investigator, "Restarch and Applications for Emergency Preparedness," contract for Long Island Lighting Company (rectivated for 1987-1988).
19f3-1984 Principal Investigator, "Intended and Forgotten Audiences for Emergency Warnings," quick-response grant from the Natural Hazards Research Applications and Information f Center.
1982-1983 Associate Investigator, "Organizational Intarface for Nuclear Reactor Emergency Preparedness," subcontract from
! Oak Ridge National Laboratories for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1981-year Principal Investigator, "Nuclear Razard Warnings and Emergency Evacuation Preparedness," contract for Pacific Gas and Electric Coepany. '
1980-1983 Principal Investie.2 tor, "Local Land Use Policy Decisions, Colorado State University Experiment Station.
O i'29-1982 eriacieel 1 ave ti9 to=, - vior 1 ^ ge=ts of th rh -
Mile Island Incident and Re-start," contract for General Public Utilities via Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.
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1977-1980 Principal Investigator, "Migration Impacts of Non-s metropolitan Areas in the West," Colorado State University Experiment Station.
1977-1979 Principal Investigator, "Adoption and Organizational Implementation of Policy for Land Use Regulations," grant from the National Science Foundation.
1975-1977 Coprincipal Investigator, "Socioeconomic, Organizational and Politice1 Consequences of Earthquake Prendiction,"
grant from the National Science Foundation.
1972-10'.'4 Research Sociologist, "Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards," grant from thi National Science Foundation.
COMMI*r' FEE MEMBERSHIPS 1987-year Expert panel on Disaster Research and Planning at the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Resurch at the State University of New York at Buffalo.
1984-1986 National Academy of Science, National Research Council, Comission on Engineering and Technical Systems, Comittee on Natural Disasters 1584-1988 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Comission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, Board on Earth Sciences, Subcomittee on Earthquake Research.
1984-1986 National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health (V9 Service, Centar for Mental Health Studies of Emergencies, Advisory Panel.
1983-year National Science Foundation, U.S. Delegate on Earthquake Prediction Ref.sarch to Japan, International Scientific Exchange Section.
1983-1986 Front Range Consortium on Natural Hacards Studies, Colorado State University, University of Colorado, University of Denver.
1983-date International Sociological Association, Research Committee on Disasters.
1982-1983 Pacific Sociological Association, Nominations Comittee for the Standing Committees for 1983.
1982-date Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Chair, Comittee on Social Science Research, Berkeley.
1981-1983 U'.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Advisory Panel on the Earthquake Studies Program.
1981-1982 Pacific Sociological Association, Program Comittee for the 1982 Annual Meetings in San Diego.
1981-1982 Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, Threat and Reconstruction Comittees, State of California, Sac ~amento.
1980-1981 Governor's Science and Technology Advisory Council:
Comittee on the Relocation of Uranium Mill Tailings, State of Colorado.
O 1929-vear xmerican Asso=1ation for the Advan=ement of Science.
Comittee cn Intergovernmental Research and Development on Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness, Washingten, D.C.
a A a 1976-1978 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, co-t= =to= oa So= tot =^aic 1 Sv=t == - co-itte o=
O Socioeconomic Effett5 of Earthquako Prediction, Washington, D.C.
BOOKS, _MONCGRAPH5 AND CHAPTERS Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. 1988. "Pinnning and Implementing i Warning Systems." Pp. 204-218 in Mary Lystad (Ed.) Mental Health Response to Mass Emergencies. Lar chmont , N.Y.: Brunner-Mazel .
Tapay, Nanita E., Alan C. Early and Dennis S. Mileti. 1987. "Irrigation Organization in the Philippines: Structure and Ef f ectiveness of National '
Comunal Types." Pp. 209-221 in Harry K. Schwarzweller (Ed.) Research in Rural Sociology and Development. Volume 3. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc.
Mileti, Dennis S.1987. "Stress f rom Risk Uncertainties." Pp. 123-128 in Vincent T. Covello, Lester B. Lavo, Alan Moghissi and V.R.R. Uppuluri (Eds.)
Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Decision Making. New York: Plenum Press.
Mileti, Dennis S.1987. "Socio)ogical Methods and Disaster Research." Pp. 57-70 in Russell R. Dynes, B. de Marchi and C. Pelanda (Eds.) Socioloev of Disasters: Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Research. Milan, Italy:
Franco Angeli Libri.
Sorensen, John H., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1987. "Programs that Encourage the p Adoption of Precautions Against Natural Hazards: Review and Evaluation."
( Pp. 208-230 in Neil D. Weinstein (Ed.) Taking Care: Understanding and Encouraging Self-Prot ective Behavior. New York: Cambridge.
Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. 1987. "Natural Hazards and Precautionary Behavior." Pp. 189-207 in Neil D. Weinstein (Ed.) Taking Care: Understandine; and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior. New York:
Cambridge.
Cochrane, Hall and Dennis S. M11eti. 1986. "The Consequences of Nuclear War:
An Economic and Social Perspective." Pp. 381-409 in F. Sclo=n and R.Q.
Martson (Eds.) The Medical Implication of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.:
National Acadeesy Press.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Joanne Nigg. 1986. "Social Science Earthquake Investigations." Pp. 167-188 in Scholl (Ed.) Lessons Learned frott Recent Eartheuakes. Berkeley: Earthquake Engineering Pesearch Institute.
Williams, Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1986. "Inclusion of Social Variables in Models of Risk Assessment." Pp. 375-379 in Geotechnical and Geohydrological Aspects of Waste Management. Baston Rottendam.
Marwell, Christine C. (Ed.) 1985. ' Experiences and Extrapolations f roc Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Pp. 427-467 in M.A. Harwell and T.C. Hutchinson (Eds.)
l Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War Volume II: Ecological and l
AgriculturalEffects. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
l Hartsough, Donald M., and Eennis S. Mileti. 1985. "The Media in Disasters."
Pp. 282-294 in J. Laube and S. Murphy (Eds.) Persp % ,ves in Disaster
, Recovery. Norwalk, Cennecticut: Appleton-Century .W.'t s ..
Screnson, John, Janice Hutton knd Dennis S. Mileti. 19 % ' Institutional Management of Risk Information Following Earthquah Fredictions.*
Pp. 913-924 in K, Oshida (Ed.), Earthquake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra Scientific Publicers for UNESCO. Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li l
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Huaying (Ed.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology. Beijing,
( China Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 119-126.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen. 1984. "Social Factors Affecting the Response of Groups to Earthquake Prediction." Pp . 6 49-658 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthquake Prediction. Tokyo: Tarra Scientific Publishers f or UNESCO. Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology. Beijing, China: Institute of Geophysics, State Seisnological Bureau, pp.17-22.
Hutton, Janice, Dennis S. Mileti and John Sorensen. 1984. "Factors Affacting Earthquake Warning Syste= Ef f ectivenss." Pp. 947-956 in K. Oshida (Ed.),
Earthquake Prediction. Tohyo: Terra Scientific Publishers for UNESCO.
Reprinted in Song Shouquah and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology. Beijing, China: Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 139-143.
Mileti, Dennis S.1982 "A Bibliography for Graduate Research Methods."
Pp. 249-255 in Russel Schutt, Alan Orenstein and Thoodore C. Wagenaar (Eds.). Research Methods Courses: Syllabi, Assignmanis and Projects.
Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen. 1981. Earthcaske Prediction Response and Options f or Public Policy. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mutton, Janice, John Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti. 1981. "Earthquake Prediction and Public Reaction." Pp. 129-166 in T. Rikitake (Ed.).
Current Research in Earthquake Prediction. Boston Reidel Publishing Company, Tokyo: Center for Academic Publications.
"Planning Initiatives f or Seismic Hazard Mitigation."
()Mileti,DennisS.1981.
Pp . 4 4-53 in J . I s enberg ( Ed . ) . Social and Economic Impact of Earthquakes on Utility Lifelines. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1979. Technostructures and Interorganizational Relations. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.
Committee on Socioeconomic Ef f ects of Earthquake Prediction,1978. A Program of Studies on the Socioeconomic Ef f ects of Earthquake Prediction. Washington, D.C.: National Acade=y of Sciences - National Research Council.
Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Ronald Perry. 1976. Organizational Kent State University Response to Changing Community Systems Kent, Ohio:
Press.
Mileti, Dennis S., Thomas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas. 1975. Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1975. Natural Razard Warning Systems in the United States.
Loulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph 12. Portions reprinted in Joseph Perry and Meredith Pugh, Collective Behavior: Response to Stress, 1978.
Erickson, Neil, John Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti. 1975. Landslide Hazards in the United States: A Research Assessment. Boulder : Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1975. Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation in the United States.
Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Ayre, Robert, Dennis S. Mileti and Patricia Trainer. 1975. EarthquakeBoulder: and Tsunari Hazards in the United States: A Research Assessment.
Institute of Behavioral Science.
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ARTICLES O Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. 1987. "Deterinnatts of Organizational Ef f ectiveness in Responding to Low Probability Catastrephic Events,"
Columbia Journal of World Business. XXII (1): 13-21.
Sorensen, John H., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1986. "Decision Making Uncertainty in Warning System Organizations," Mass Emergencies and Disasters (accepted and forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1985. "The Effects of Legitimacy on Goal Change and Formalization in Organizations," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 22(1,2): 33-53.
M11eti, Dennis S. 1985. "The Human Equation in Earthquake Prediction and Warning," Policy Studies Review 4(4):725-733.
Sorensen, John H., and Dennis 5, Mileti, and Emily Copenhaver. 1985. "Inter and Intraorganizational Cohesion in Emergencies," Mass Emergencies and Disaster 3(3):27-52.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1985. "Emergency Role Performance in Disaster Response Organizations," Environmental Sociology (42):6-10.
Mileti, Dennis S., Donald Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick Hufnagel. 1984.
"The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study in Behavioral Indicators of Human Stress, "Ma_ss Emergencies and Disasters 2(1):89-114.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1984. "Role Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency Workers,"
Emerger. y Management Review 2(1):20-22.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1984. "Earthquakes and Human Bahavior," Earthouake Spectra 1(1):89-106.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. "Societal Comparisons of Organizational Response to Earthquake Prediction: Japan vs the United States." Mass Emergencies and Disasters 1(3):399-414.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. "Public Perceptions of Seismic Hazards and Critical Facilities," Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 72(6)13-18.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1982. "Differentiation in Organizations," Social Forces 60(4):1172-1175.
! Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "Structure and Process in the Implementation of Public l Policy," Political Science Review 21(1):1-34.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "A Review of Research on Public Policy Adoption," Public Administration Review (accepted and forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S., Doug Titruner and David F. Gillespie. 1982. "Intra and Interorganizational Determinants of Decentralization," Pacific Sociological Review 25(2):163-183.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen. 1981. "The Multidimensionality of Organizational Size," Sociology and Social Research 65(4):400-414. 1981 "Heterogeneous Samples in l Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti.
Organizational Research," Sociological Methods and Research 9(3):327-388.
l Mileti, Dennis S. 1980. "Human Adjustment to the Risk of Environmental Extremes," Sociology and Social Research 64(3):327-347.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1980. "Determinants of Planning in Organizations," Administrative Science Review 10(3):21-32.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1980. "Organizatienal and Technological Interdependencies," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 17(3-4):132-158.
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Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry and Dennis S. Mileti. 1980. "Stress and p/
s_ Transformation," Journal of Social Research 21(2):139-147.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen. 1979. "Structure and Decision Making in Corporate Organizations," Sociology and Social Research 63(4):723-744.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1979. "Action and Contingency Postulates in Organizations-Environment Relations," Human Relations 32(3):261-271.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Patricia Harvey. 1978. "Correcting for the Human Factor in Tornado Warnings," Disaster Preparedness 2(February):5-9.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Elizabeth Morrissey. 1978. "Technology and Organizations: Methodological Deficiencies and Lucunae," Technology and Culture 19(1):83-92.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1978. "Organizational Technology and Environment Adaption- Manipulation," Scottish Journal of Sociology 2(2):205-219.
Raas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1977. "Socioeconomic and Political Consequences of Earthquake Prediction," Journal of the Physical Earth 25(4):283-293.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1977. "Earthquake Prediction and its Consequences," Calif ornia Geology 30(7):147-157, 1977. Revised and reprinted in San Francisco 20(4):60-68, 1978.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and J. Eugene Raas. 1977. "Size and Structure in Complex Organizations," Social Forces 56(1):208-217.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1977. "Technology and the Study of Organizations: An Overview and Appraisal," Academv of Management Review 2(1):6-19. Reprinted in Readings on How Managers Manage. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1976. "An Integrated Formalization of Organization-Environment Interdependencies," Hunan Relations 29(1):80-100.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. "Organizational Adaptions to Changing Cultural Contingencies," Sociological Inquiry 46(2):135-141.
Gillespie, David F., Roy Lotz, Dennis S. Mileti and Ronald Perry. 1976.
"Ristorical and Paradigmatic Dif f erences in the Use of the Goal Concept,"
International Review of History and Political Science 8(30):1-14.
Gfillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. "A Refined Model of Dif f erentiation in Organizations," Sociology and Social Research 60(3):263-278.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. "Earthquake Prediction and Other Adjustments to Earthquakes,' Bulletin of _the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 9(4):183-194.
Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie, Roy Lotz and Dennis S, Mileti. 1976.
"Attitudinal Variables as Estimates of Behavior," European Journal of Social Psychology 6(1):74-90.
Ronald Perry and David F. Gillespie. 1975. "The Analytical Mileti, Dennis S.,
Use of Case Study Materials in the Study of Organizations," Sociological Inquiry 45(4):72-50.
l Mileti, Dennis S., and Elwood M. Beck. 1975. "Explaining Evacuation i Symbolically: Communication in Crisis," Communication Research 2(1):24-49.
(, Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry, Dennis S. Mileti and Roy Lotz. 1975.
"Organizational Tensions and Decentralization: The Interactive Effect on Member Commitment," International Journal of Group Tensions 5(2):26-37.
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Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie and Dennis S. Mileti. 1974. "Collective Stress p' and Coununity Transformation," Human Relations 27(8):767-788.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1974. "Change Ratios in Age-Scientific Percent Contributions to Fertility: A New Method with Applications to the United States,"
Pacific Sociological Review 17(1):3-26. First Prize, student paper competition, Pacific Sociological Association, 1974.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1974. "An Integrative Approach to the Study of Organizational Technology, Structure and Behavior," Current Sociology 23(1):189-200.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1974. "System Stress and the Persistence of Emergent Organizations," Sociological Inquiry 44(2):111-119.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Larry Barnett. 1972. "Nine Demographic Factors and Their Relationship Toward Abortion Legalization," Social Biology 19(2):43-50.
TECHNICAL REPORTS Screason, John H., Barbara M. Vogt, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1987. Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Research. Report prepared for the ?ederal Emergency Management Agency. Knoxville: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Steven Helmericks. 1987. Public Perception of Earthquake Risk During 1976 In Santa Clara County. Report prepared for the Bay Area Regional Earthquake Preparedness Project and the California Seismic Safety Connission.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice R. Mutton. 1987. Initial Public Response to the 5 April 1985 Parkfield Earthquake Prediction. Boulder: Natural Hazards Research Applications and Information Center, University of Colorado.
Mileti, Dennis S., Randal G. Updike, Patricia A. Bolton, and Gabriel Fernandey.
1986. Recommendations for Improving the Existing Warning System for Possible Nevado del Ruiz Volcanic Eruption, Colombia, South America.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
Mileti, Det.nis S., John H. Sorenson and William Bogard. 1985. Evacuation Decision Making Process and Uncertainty. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Report TN-9692.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1985. Stress Impacts of a Technological Emergency: An Unobtrusive Indicators Study of Livingston Train Derailment. New Orleans:
Lecle, Kelleher.
Popkin, Roy, Dennis S. Mileti, Barbara Farhar-Pilgrim, and John Shefner. 1985.
Unmet Needs of Disaster Victims in the United States. Fort Collins:
Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
Review Panel of the National Earthquake Razards Reduction Plan.~ 1984. Na t iona__1_
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program: Five Year Program Plan. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Sor en s en, J . , E . Copenhaver , D . Mileti and M . Adler . 1984. Organizational Interf ace in Reactor Emergency Planning and Resoonse. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cor:cission, NUREG No. CR-3524.
Law Enforcement Applications Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. Human Response Scenarios:
and Media Implications. Sacramento: California Division of Mines and Geology.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. Organizational Behavior and Interorganizational Relations: Imolications for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencices and Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
i l \ Preparedness.
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Mileti, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough and Patti Madson, 1982. The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study of Behavioral Indicators of Human Stress.
Washington, D.C.: Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Arthur Svenson. 1981. Earthquake Predictior-Warning Response For Emergenry Organizations to the Prediction .Terminclogy. Van Nuys: Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project.
Santopolo, Frank, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1980. Impacts of Population Growth in
. Agricultural Colorado Committees. Fort Collins: Colorado State University Experiment Station Bulletin.
Committee on Fire Saf ety and Disaster Preparedness. 1979. Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Hutton, Janice, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1979. Analysis of Adoption and Implementation of Com= unity Land Use Regulations for Floodplains. San Francisco: Woodward-Clyde.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. Socioeconomic Impact of Earthquake Prediction on Government, Business and Community. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1976. Interorganizational Relations and Community Service Delivery Systems. Boulder: Center for Action Research.
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BOOK REVIEWS
()Kileti,DennisS. 1984. "A Review of Social and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes by Barclay G. Jones and Miha Tomazevic (Eds.). Ithaca Program in Urban and Regional Studies, 1983. Mass Emergencies and Disasters (forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "A Review of Unequal Care:
Interorganizational Relations in health Care by M. Milner, Jr., New York: Columbia University Press, 1980." Social Forces 60(3):943-944.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "A Review of Whistle Blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation by Alan Westin (Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981."
Sociology: A Review of New Books 7(2).
Mileti, Dennis S. 1980. "A Review of Aftermath: Communities After Natural Disasters by H. Paul Friesema et al. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979 and After the Clean-Up: Long Range Effects of Natural Disasters by l
James Wright and Peter Rossi et al. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979." Journal of the American Planning Association (October):484-485.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1976. "A Review of A Sociology of Organizations by J.
Eldridge and A. Crombie. New York: Int er na t ional Publica t ion s , 1975 . "
contemporary Sociology 5(6):784.
PROCEEDINGS Sorensen, John H. 1987. "Public Warning Needs." Pp. 9-75 in Paula Gori and l Proceedings of Conference on the U.S. Geological
! Walter Hays (Eds.) Paper Survey's Role in Hazards Warnings. Reston: U.S. Geological Survey.
presented at the February,1987 Conf erence on Hazard Warnings, Denver.
{\
i Pp. 36-56 Mileti, Dennis S. 1980. "Human Response to Earthquake Prediction."
in Walter Hays (Ed.). Proceedings of the Conferences on Earthquake Paper U.S. Geological Survey.
Prediction Inf ormation. Menlo Park:
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presented at the January, 1980 Conference on Earthquake Prediction O Mileti,Information, Dennis S.,
Los Angeles.
and Janice Hutton. 1978. "Social Aspects of Earthquakes."
Pp. 179-192 ife Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Microzonation. San Francisco: National Science Foundation. Paper presented at the November, 1978 Conference on the State of the Art in Microzonation for Earthquake Hazards Reduction, San Francisco.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1978. "Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction on State Policy." Pp. in Proceedings of the National Conference on Earthcuake Related Hazards. Lexington, Kentucky: Council of State Governmeants.
Speech presented at the November,1977 Conf erence on State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Boulder.
OTHER PUBLISHED COMMENTS Mileti, Dennis S. 1987. "The Fatal Flaw in Flight Sl-L: Events Leading to the Ill-Fated Challenger Launch," Spectrum 24(2):36-51.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1986. "Disaster Survival," Alumnus Quarterly 62(1):6-7, 20.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1934. "The Character of Traffic in an Emergency," Bulletin 6(1):4-5.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. "Disasterous Warnings," Oni (March):74,44,152.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "Hazards Reduction Work: The Next Era," National j
i Hazards Observer 6(4):1-2. Reprinted in Earthcuake Information Bulletin
! 14(2):60, 1982.
l Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "Sociological Aspects of Earthquake Prediction,"
Earthquake Information Bulletin 11(3):102-105.
Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1977. "Earthquake Prediction Response,"
Time (January 24):83.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1977. "Earthquake Prediction: Is It Better Not To Know?"
Mosaic 0(2):8-14.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1977. "Social Hazards of Earthquake Prediction," Science News 111(2):20-21.
Maas, J. Eugene, Thoc.as Drabek and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. "Individual and Organizational Response to Threat," Mass Emergencies 1(4):247.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1976. "Social Scientists and Applied Research," The American Sociologist 11(4):220-221.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1974. "Response to Research and National Needs," Footnotes 2(October):6.
CONFERENCE PAPEFS Mileti, Dennis S. 1987. "Disaster Prevention and Mitigation During i
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction," paper presented to the International ,
Research and Training Seminar on Regional Development Planning for Disaster i
Prevention spsonsored by the United Nations Center for Regional Development, Tokyo: October.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Joanne Nigg. 1987. "Adjustment to Natural Hazards and Disasters," paper presented to the Section on Environmental Sociology, O Roundtable Discussion of the American Sociological Association, Chicago:
August.
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Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. 1986. "Determinants of Organizational j O Effectiveness in Responding to Low Probability Catastrophic Events," paper presented to the Crisis Analysis Models Session, International Conference on Industrial Crisis Management, New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York City: September.
Mileti, Dennis S., and James Goltz. 1986. "Social Response to the Parkfield Prediction," paper presented to the Parkfield Prediction Experiment Session of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia:
May.
Cochrane, Hall, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1985. "Vulnerabilities of Medical / Health Care Systems to the Eff ect of Nuclear War," paper presented at the Symposium on the Medical Implications of Nuclear War, National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Session on Medical Resource Needs and Availability. Washington, D.C.: September.
Mileti, Dennis S., and R. Gary Williams. 1985. "A Sociclogical Perspective on the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities," paper presented to the Social and Economic Effects of Public Perceptions Session of the Sy=posium on Waste Management, Tuscon: March.
Mileti, Dennis S., Rick Hufnagel and David Gillespie. 1984. "Regulation of the Fire: Toward a Theory of Consequences," paper presented to the Complex Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, San i
Antonio: August.
Mileti, Dennis S. "Stress from Risk Uncertainties," invited paper presented to the Social Aspects of Risk Uncertainties Session of the Society for Risk Analysis, Knoxville October.
1984. "Social and Political Obstacles to the Use of O Mileti, Dennis S. Nonstructural Flood Loss Mitigation Measures," paper presented to the American Society of Civil Engineers, San Francisco: October..
Mileti, Dennis S. 1984. "Why People Take Precautions Against Natural Hazards,"
! paper presented to the Conference on Encouraging Self-Protection Behavior, Rutgers University: July.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1984. "Sociology in Litigation: Applications of Disaster Research," paper presented to the Sociology of Disaster Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle: April.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. "Social Impact and Use of Earthquake Prediction-Warnings," paper presented to the US-Japan Seminar on Practical Approaches to Earthquake Prediction and Warning, Tokyo: November.
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Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, Dennis S. Mileti, and Debra Cornelius. 1983.
"Structural Deter:cinants of Constanity Adoption of the National Flood Insurante Program," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Lexington: July.
Mileti, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick Hufnagel. 1983.
"The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study of Unobtrusive Indicators of Human Stress," paper prssented to the Disasters and Hazards Research Gession of the Midwest Sociological Society, Kansas City: April.
Hufnage', Rick and Dennis S. Mileti. 1983. "Organizational and Environmental Catastrophe: Factors Affecting Organizational Response to a Predicted l
l l
Earthquake," paper presented to the Disasters'and Hazards Research Session of the Western Social Science Association, Albuquerque: April.
Mileti, Dennir, S. 1982. "Earthquake Prediction Response: Cultural Comparisons f h Between Japan and the United States," paper presented to the Disaster Research Session of the International Sociological Association, Mexico City: August.
1982. "Influencing Corporate Decisions on the Use of OMileti,DennisS.Microzonation Information," paper presented to the Third International Conference on Microzonation, Seattle June.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "Earthquake Prediction and Warnings: The Human Equation," paper presented to the Conf trance on Hazards Reisearch, Policy Development, and Implementation Inventives: Focus on Urban Earthquakes, Policy Research Center at the University of Redlands, Redlands: June.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "Public Perception of Seismic Hazards," paper presented to the Seismological Society of America, Anaheim: April.
Williams, Gary, Frank Santopolo and Dennis S. Mileti. 1980. "Perception of Growth Impacts in Energy Impacted Coasnunities," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Ithaca: August.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1980. "Planning Initiatives for Seismic Hazard Kitigation,"
paper presented to the Conftrance on Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquakes on Critical Lifelines of the American Society of Civil Engineers, San Francisco: May.
Timmer, Doug, and Dennis 5, Mileti. 1980. "Interorganizational and Structural Determinants of Decision Making," paper presented to the Session on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee, Williams, Gary, Dennis S. Mileti. 1980. "Community Growth and Impacts," paper presented to the Western Social Science Association, Albuquerque April.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1980. "Human Response to Carthquake Prediction," paper presented to the Status of Knowledge Session of the Conference on Earthquake Prediction Information, Los Angeles: January.
j Williams, Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1979. "Perceptions of Growth Impacts in O o#-x trogorit a co1or eo, e e r er at e to ta z=e =t> s s to= or trne Conference on Regional Migration Trends, St. Louis: October.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Gary Williams. 1979. "Resident Perceptions in Growth Impacted Western Agricultural Communities," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Vermont August.
Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Stan Eitzen. 1979. "The Epihenominality of Organizational Size," paper presented to the Session on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee:
April.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice R. Mutton and John Sorensen. 1979. "Social Factors l
and Respon a to Earthquake Prediction," paper presented to the Internaticaal Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris: April.
( Hutton, Janice R., Dennis S. Mileti, and John Sorensen. 1979. "Factors Affecting Earthquake Warning System Effectiveness," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris April.
Sorenson, John, Janice R. Hutton and Dennis S. Mileti. 1979. "Institutional i Management of Risk Information Following Earthquake Predictions," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice Hutton. 1978. "Social Aspects of Earthquakes,"
paper presented to the State of the Art Session of the Second International Conference on Micronzonation, San Francisco: November.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1978. "Organizational Size, Complexity and Decision Making," paper presented to the Organizations
/q Session of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco:
j k/ September, i
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l Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1978. "Corporate Size as Work,"
O e eer eressat a to tae Or ani=atica of Worx Session of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco: Sept ember .
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1978. "Action Postulates in Organization-Environment Relations," paper presented to the Organizations-Environment Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha April.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis 5, Mileti. 1978. "Size and Organizational Differentiation," paper presented to the Formal and Complex Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Spokane: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Patricia Harvey. 1977. "Correcting for the Human Factor in Tornado Warnings," paper presented to the Conf erence on Severe Local Storms of the American Meteorological Society, Omaha: October.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1977. "Organization and Environment Adaption-Manipulation," paper presented to the Organizational Relations Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago: September.
Hutton, Janice R., and Dennis S. Mileti. 1977. "The Uses and Abuses of Scenarios in Policy Research," paper presented to the Social Policy Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago: September.
Gillespie, David F. , and Dennis S. M11eti. 1977. "Organizational Growth and Managerial Efficiency," paper presented to the Social Organization / Formal / Complex Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1977. "Organizational Manipulation and Adaption to Complex Environments," paper presented to the Complex Organizations Session of the Midwest Sc:iological Society, Minneapolis:
April.
(
> Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and J. Eugene Maas. 1976. "Size and Structure in Complex Organizations," paper presented to the Organizational Change Session of the American Sociological Association, Netw York City:
August.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1976. "Learning Theory and Disaster Warning Response," paper presented to the Issues in Environmental Analysis Session to the American So:iological Association, New York City: August.
Maas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. "Consequences of Earthquake Prediction on Other Adjustments to Earthquakes," paper presente:i to the Australian Academy of Science, Canberra May.
"A Methodology for Future Mileti, Dennis S., and J. Eugene Maas.1976.
Collective Events," paper presented to the Collective Behavior Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis: April.
Gillespie, David F. , and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976. "Operations Technology and Organizational Structure," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis: April.
Haas, J. Eugene and Dennis S. Mileti. 1976.
- Assessing the Consequences of Earthquake Prediction," paper presented to the Social Risk Session of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Bostons February.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1975.
"Technological Uncertainty in Organization-Environment Relations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco: August.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1975, "A Resolution of taco # tite ==ies net eea si=e co=et itr =$ the ^*=i#istretive ce eo"eat O in Organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago: April.
l r~s Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1975. "Technology and the Study of :
Organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Victoria: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1975. "An Interaction Model for Organization-Environment Relations," paper presented to the Interorganizational Relations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie. 1974. "A Formalization of Organization-Environment Dependencies," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose March.
Farhar, Barbara, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1974. "Value and Role Issues for the Involved Social Scientist," paper presented to the Applied Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose: March.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1973. "Drowning: A Communications Disease," paper presented to the Mass Communications and Public Opinion Session of the American Sociological Association, New York City: Au gust .
Mileti, Dennis S., and Sigmund Krane. 1973. "Response to Impending System Stress," paper presented to the What Do We Know Session on Human Behavior in Disaster of the American Sociological Association, New York City:
August.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1973. "A Paradigm and Sociology of Knowledge for Theories of Natural Law," paper presented to the Theory Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee: April.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1972. "Response to Kazards Warnings," paper presented to the
() Organizational and Community Response to Disaster Seminar at the Disaster Research Center of the Ohio State University, Columbus July.
SPEECHES AND GUEST LECTURES "Factors to Consider in the Dissemination of Public Information Regarding Recent Scientific Evidence Concerning Earthquake Risk in California," Meeting of the National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council, Menlo Park, California:
F ebruary, 1988.
"Current Knowledge on Communicating Hazards and Risk Information," Workshop on Continuing Actions to Reduce Potential Losses from Earthquakes Along the Wasatch Front, Utah, Salt Lake City: December, 1987.
"Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Semituir by General Public Utilities, Forked River, New Jersey: September, 1987.
"Human and Social Aspects of Kazards Mitigation," Colorado Society for Natural Hazards Research, Denver: Stept ember , 1987.
l "Have We Gotten Any Better at Informing and Educating the Public About Risks?"
l Kazards Research and Application Workshop, Boulder July, 1987.
I i
"Overview of Current Knowledge About Communicating Kazards and Risk Information,"
Workshop on the U.S. Geological Survey's Role in Bazard Warnings, Golden, l Colorado February, 1987.
1 l
1 t
I "Industrial Crisis Response," Fluid Mechanics and Wind Engineering Program, College of Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins: November, 1986.
"Emergency Preparedess and Mitigation Measures: The November 1985 Colombia Nevada del Ruiz Volcano Eruption," Comittee on Natural Disasters, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.: October, 1986.
"Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquake Predictions," Los Angeles City Earthquake Prediction Workshop, Asilomar, California: October, 1986.
"Armero, Columbias What are the Lessons for Hazards Management in the United States," Plenary Session, Hazards Research and Applications Workshop, Boulder, Colorado July, 1986.
"Public Response Elements for Flood Warning Emergency Preparedness," Plenary Session, Conf erence on What Have We Learned Since the Big Thompson Flood, Boulder. Colorado: July, 1986.
"Social Aspects of Risk Comunication," Conf erence on Corcunications in Emergencies, Wyoming Disaster and Civil Defense Division, Cheyenne: April, 1986.
"Earthquake Prediction: A General Overview," Emergency Preparedness Commission for the Cities and County of Los Angeles, Carson, California: April, 1986.
aanue1 seetia9 of the O What no we xaow Adout ammea exevier esa Eartheuexes, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, San Francisco: February, 1986.
- Social Aspects of the Parkfield, California Earthquake Prediction," Annual Meeting of the American Geophysical Union, Session on Parkfield Earthquake Studies, San Francisco: December, 1985.
"Socini Impacts and Lessons from the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction," Earthquake Prediction Warning and Response System Workshop, Governor's Office of Emcrgency Services, Asilecar, California: July, 1985.
"How Well Do Traditional Warning System Strategies Deal With Today's Natural and Technological Hazards?" Plenary Session, Invitational Workshop on Hazards Research and Application, Boulder, Colorado July, 1985.
"Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation, Middletown, Pennsylvania: May, 1985.
"Social Aspects of Risk," Risk Analysis Seminar, Department of Industrial Engineering, Stanf ord University: February, 1985.
"Comununicating Engineering Information to Public Officials," Social Applications Session, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Seattle: February, 1985.
l "Social and Political Obstacles to the Use of Nonstructural Flocd Loss Mitigation October, 1984.
' Measures," American Society for Civil Engineers, San Francisco I
"Warnings: Applying Research in the Private sector," Plenary Session on Hazards 9em at'
- a turi =9 rieta.
rch dW m #t or tur 1 a = re.
O ReResearch Applications Workshop, Soulder July, 1984.
4 "Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar for County Consnissioners of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, GPU Nuclear Corporation, Harrisburg: March, 1984.
"The Uses of Earthquake Prediction-warnings," Colloqium on Earthquake Prediction Research in the US, Earthquake Research Institute, University of Tokyo: November, 1983.
"Human Response in Disastars," American Red Cross, Mile High Chapter, Boulder 4
Region, Boulder: July, 1983.
"Integrated Emergency Management: Challenges and opportunities," Plenary Session of @e Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder July,
- 1983.
"Public Response to Flood Disasters," Conference on the Need for Teamwork in Managing Flood Hazards, Association of State Floodplain Manager, Sacramento:
April, 1983.
i "Natural Hazards, Disasters and Public Policy," Environmental Management Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles: April, 1982.
"Myths of Disaster Response," Earthquake Planning Conference for Business and Industry, Los Angeles: May, 1982.
"Coenunicating Lessons Learned from Social Science Research on Earthquakes,"
Workshop of Identifying and Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes," Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los Altos December, 1982.
"Social Causes of Earthquake Prediction-warning Response: Implications for the Design of California's Warning System and Information Dissemination," Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Van Nuys: October, 1981.
"Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards: What Have We Learned and What Problems Demand Purther Attention," Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1981.
"Disaster Reconstruction: Patterns to Guide Planning," Governor's Task Force for Earthquake Emergency Preparedness, Coercittee on Long Range Reconstruction, Sacramento, July, 1981.
"Socio-cultural Dimensions of Earthquake Risk," Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthq0akes, General Assembly, Sacramento: May, 1981.
In Health Sciences O c =terorganizational Relations t r vaiv r ter or coto: ao. o =v and Service Delivery Systems,"
' octod r. i'io-
"Social Response to Earthquake Prediction: Local Policy Issues," Southern O Californi Emer9eaev Services assoc:.ation. ao teselloPebruarv. 198o.
"Human Response to Weather-borne Hazards Warnings," Department of Atmospheric Sciences, Colorado State University: October, 1979.
) "Natural Hazards, Disasters and Social Research," Department of Sociology, University of Denver: December, 1980, 1979.
4 j "Measuring Implementation of Public Policy for Floodplain Land Use Controls,"
i Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder August, 1978.
l "Socioeconomic Ef f ects of Earthquake Prediction and State Policy," Conf erence on
]
State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Soulder: November, 1977.
I "Population, Resources and Policy for Social Change," College of Natural
' Resources, Colorado State University: September, 1977; February, 1978; February, 1980.
"The Behavier of Government and Corporate Organizations in an Earthquake Prediction," American Society for Public Administration, Colorado Chapter, 1 Denver: April, 1976,.
l "The Social and Economic Aspects of Scientifically Credible Earthquake i Predictions," California State Seminar on Emergency Preparedness and Earthquake j
Prediction, Palm Springs: June, 1976.
"Preparing to Make Use of Earthquake Predictions," Emergency Preparedness Consnission for the County and Cities of Los Ang?les, Montebello February, 1976.
"The Social Organization of Hazard Warning Systems," Engineering Foundation Conference on Decision Making for Natural Hazards, Pacific Grover March, 1976.
! "Briefing on the Likely Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquake Prediction,"
Governor's Confarance Room, Sacramento: May, 1975; Mayor's Conference Room, Los l Angeles: October, 1975.
I "Social, Economic and Legal Aspects of Earthquake Prediction," General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, Granoble September, 1975.
l "Earthquake Prediction and Its Implications for Emergency Preparedness," Center l
for Consounity Studies, Tokyo: September, 1975.
"Social lapacts of Earthquake Prediction: Implications for Policy," California l
j Water and Power Earthquake Engineering Forum, San Francisco: April, 1975.
OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE I
Organizer and Presider O 5 tea ea ta Sociolo v or oi it r ^^#u t a ti=9 or ta ^ ric a Sociological Association, New York City: August, 1986; Session on Nuclear Power, Third International Congress on Emergencies, Washington, D.C.: May, 1985; i
1 l
j April, .
( G Session on Applied Sociology, Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle:
V 1984; Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Methodological Approaches in the Study of Health l l
Care Delivery Systa=s, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Earthquake Hazard Reduction: Is the National Earthquake Hazard J Reduction Program Meeting its Congressional Mandate, Seventh Annual Workshop on Natural Hazards Research Applications, Boulder July, 1982; Session on Disasters and Cataclys=st Can Sociology Help, Pacific So:iclogical Association, San Diego:
April, 1982; Session on Collective Behavior, American Sociological Association, New York: August, 1980; Session on Complex Organizations, Pacific Sociological Association, San Francisco: April, 1980; Session on Complex Organizations, Western Social Science Association, Tempe,1976.
Discussant Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Societal Response to Hazards, American Sociological Association, San Antonio: August, 1984; Session on Public Response to Earth Science Information, Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1980; Session on Warning Systa=s, National Conf erence on Natural Hazards, Boulde: June,1976; Session on Warning Systems, National Conf erence on Natural Hazards, Boulder: July, 1975; Session on Disaster Relief nnd Warning Systems, Nationa.1 Conf erence on Natural Hazards, Estes Park: June, 1973.
Participant O Workshop on Research Applications of the National Earthquake Hazards Red Program in the Western United States, U.S. Geological Survey, Denver Septer.ber, 1987; R wiew Panel on Disaster Research and Planning, National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University of New York at Buf f alo August, 1987; Use of the Crisis Response Conclusion Retrival System, University of Pittsburgh Center for Social and Urban Research, Pittsburgh: De:er.ber, 1985; Panel on Disaster Research, Its Funding and Future, American Sociological Association, San Antonio August, 1984; Review Panel, Corresponding Member, Task Group on Social and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes, National Acade:7 of Sciences, National Research Council, Cocr:ission on Sociotechnical Systems, ro: Recent Washington, D.C.: 1982; Workshop on Disseminating Lessons Learned fDecember l
Earthquakes, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los Altos:
1982; Tennessee Valley Authority Flood Plain Evaluation Panel, Boulder:
November,1982; Earthquake Prediction Warning Task Force Workshop, Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Asilocar: December, 1981; Symposium June, on Earthquake Prediction, Preparedness and Human Response, San Fernando:
1976; Seminar on Disaster Research, Colorado State University, Fort Collins:
February, 1975; Symposium on Complex Organizations:
Research and Applications, Western Social Science Association, El Paso April, 1974.
Editorships Mer.ber of the Editorial Advisory Board for Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 1986-date; Associate Editor for social science, Earthcuake Spectra, Journal of
\ the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 1984-date; Corresponding Editor, Organizations and Occupations, Newsletter of the American Sociological Association, Western Region 1984-85; Corresponding Editor on Hazards and l
l L
~ 19 -
Disaster, Environmental Sociology, Newsletter of the Section on Enviro:unental Sociology of the American Sociological Association, 1981-1985; Guest editor, special issue on Environmental Stress, Threat and Social System Response, Mass Emergencies 1(4): 247-346, 1976.
Testimony Nuclear Regulatory Coanission in the matter of emergency planning at the Stabrook nuclear plant, Concord: November, 1987 through March, 1988; Nuclear Regulatory Coamission in the mattar of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suffolk: May through July,1937; December 1983 through June 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Connission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shearon-Harris nuclear Power plant, Raleight June and November, 1985; Nuclear Regulatory Connission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suffolk: December, 1983 through June, 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Coanission in the matter of emergency planning at the Wolf Creek generating station, Burlington, Kansas: January, 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Coanission in the matter of pre-emergency public education and information for emergency planning at the Waterford Three nuclear reactor, New Orleans: February, 1983; Suffolk County Legislature, State of New York, in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suf folk: January,1983; Nuclear Regulatory Comission in the matter of emergency planning at the Diablo Canyon nuclear reactor, San Luis Obisbo January,1982; Senate Subcocnittee on Science, Technology and Space in the matter of the National Earthquake Kazards Reduction Act, Washington, D.C.:
O April,1960; Nucinar floating nuclear Regulatory plants Comission on tourist behavior,in the matter Bethesda: of the May, impact 1977 of 1978.
and July, Legislative and Program Reviews Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, U.S. Congressional Panel, Federal Ersergency Management Agency, 1983-82; Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of the U.S.
Geological Survey, 1988, 1982; Final Regulations for Floodplain Management and Protection of Wetlands, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Register 176(45):59520-59538, 1980; Applied Research Program Evaluation, National Science Foundation, 1979-78.
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- O Role Abandonment by Bus Drivers ,
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i Prepmd by:
f Robert B. Kelly i l Senior Project Manager Roy F. Weston, Inc.
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I i 1-i j I. Purpose l
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- II. Methodology i 3
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- V. Appendices l 1
8 i A. List of F1hy Major Evacuations :
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Purim The purpose of this repon is to summarize reseanh findings conceming role abandonment by c bus drivers during ernergencies. AdditionaDy, do:urnentation of fifty major U.S. evacuations was C reviewed in order to identify in:idents in which buses were used as a means of transponing evacuees out of the the endangered area, and to identify cases where bus drivers refused to panicipate in the evacuation.
Methodology A wide range of dn:uments on the general topic of evacuation as well as incident specific evacuation experiences were reviewed.
In order to accomplish the objective ofidentifying and summarizing research findmgs conceming role abandonment ofbus drivers, the following sources were consulted:
- Federal agency publication centers and libraries, including:
Federal Emergency Management Agency
- FEMA's Ernergency Management Institute Library Depanment of Transportation Nationa] Technical Infonnation Service
+ ne Natura] Disaster Resource Referral Senice (PO Box 2208, Arlington, VA)
+ ne Natural Hazards Research Information and Application Center of the University of Colorado l
+ De Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware
. Penn State University WESTON staff also reviewed case histories and documentation of fifty major U.S. evacuations which have occuned since 1980.1 nese case histories contain one or more of the following:
+ anieles from major media sources (AP, UPI);
- loca] newspaper cli
. after action repons;ppings;
. communications logs;
- Police / Emergency Senices repons;
+ sociology reports; and
+ others ne primary question asked during the review of these eva:uation case histories was: were buses used to transpon people out of the endangered area, and if so, did bus drivers refuse to assist in the evacuanon? ne results of this secondary source analysis are also presented in the following section.
4 1 No:e Data on these cases were collected for an ongoing,in-depth study of eva:uasons for arcther chent. In th:2 stJdy, secondary sources along with some interviews will forTn the basis of a compreheraive da: abase of mayor
- evruauons.
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F*mdings Several studies have addnssed the issue of role abandonment by emergency workers. Some of Q this resear;h is sumrrwized in a document entitled,
- Planning Concepts and Decision Criteriafor Sheltering and Evacuation in a Nu: lear Power Plant Emergency."2 A releverst excerpt from this study staten "A corresponding concem sometimes expressed by the public is that emergency response personnel will abandon their jobs in order to arotect themselves, their families or their property. However, Dynes ats stated that in disasten "abandonment of orgaruzational roles sitnply does not occur"(Dynes,1974, p.153). In his analysis of the reasons for the absence of role abandonment, he etaphasizes the o two groups of mechanisms suggested by Banon (1969)peration of ne first group, pnority mechanisms, are established by training memben of emergency organizations to give first priority to their jobs and by
, making organizational membership visible (especially through uniforms) and by the strength of pnmary, group loyalues among organization members that would make the individ ual feel peno,nally responsible to his or her colleagues, as well as to the communtry at large. The second set consists of avoidance mechanisms. These operate when members of the ernergency organization come from outside the affected area (and, thus, families are unaffected) and when they have few or no family ties within the area Avoidance mechanisms also operate when mernbers of emergency organizations
- t. ave unequivoca] information about the extent of the affected area that indicates that their families are not threatened, have made prior p artingements for their families to take protective action without their assistance or have established communication with their families to verify that they are safe."
The study goes on to say:3 "Section 4.2.4 noted that designated emergency workers (e.g.., police, l fire and emergency services personnel) do not abandon their roles ,
during disasters, it is important to recognize, however, that this con:lasion does not automatically extend to a group that might be referred to as ernergency auxiliary personnel. These can be dermed as those members of "emergency relevant" organizations (those possessing resources that may be needed in an emergency) or community relevant organizations" (those with an orientation toward community service, see Dynes,1974, p.18) who may be needed to l perform spectne emergency tasks. Bus drivers, for example, could be 1
classified within this group. Although they may be needed to assist in l eva:uating residents of affected areas dunng a nuclear power plant emergency, bus drivers could not be assumed to have developed priority and avoidance mechanisms to the same degree as designated
- LirAcil, M.. Bolton, P.. and Perry. R. (1985), Phnnine Concepts and Derisien Criteri2 for $be! tenne ed hsrustien in n Wetes Power Phmt Emercen L AIF/NT.SP 031.Nabonal Environmental Studies Program of the Ammi: Indusmal Forum, Washington D.C., July 1985, pp. 410 to 4 20, 3 Ibid p. 516 2
emergency workers. As a result, special provisions may need to be made in order to assure their availability in a nuclear power plant emergency. This can be acheived by special trainin O >=le ia the e= rseaer resroa>e errort ta thistr==taishouid describe the nature of the radiation hazards to which the emergency aaitioa g that explains their auxiliary personnel might be exposed, emphasize the measures that will be taken to avoid exposure, and explain the procedures and equiptnent that would be used to monitor the magnitude of the exposures if they do occur. Finally, emergency auxiliaries should be infortned of actions that will be taken to assist their families in taking arotective action, if their homes are located in an affected area.
%cedures. plutned in advance of an emergency would be expected to be particularly effective in avoiding the types of role conflict that could potentially resuh in role abandonment."
Sorenson, Vogt, and Mileti,in their 1987 study entitled, "Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning andResearch,"4 wrote:
"Mileti (1985) has recently examined the concept as first conceptualized by Killian (1952) and later discussed by Moore (1958), Fritz (1961),
Bates et al. (1963), Dynes (1970), Barton (1969), and Quarentelli (no date). The prevailing line of thought on role conflict is that, while people likely will experience conflict between famijy and organizational responsibibties, roles are rarely abandoned, and performing multiple roles does not jeopardize emergency duties, i Mileti (1985) concludes that when ernergency work roles are "cenain" n perhaps through training, emergency workers do not abandon work U roles to attend to roles involving intirnate relationships. When emergenev work roles are not "certain", than role conflict can occur, and would be workers could attend to personal or family duties before attending to emergency duties."
ney went on to say:5 "Role abandonment has been a controversial issue for some hazards.
1 Research suggests that total role abandonment has not been prevalent in disasters and certainly has not been dysfunctional in organizational behavior. Some people have hypothesized that role abandonment would be greater and likely problematic in a nuclear power plant accident or during a nuclear war threat. This remains somewhat i
speculative. Reweh suggests that in the former case, there may be an increased potential for conflict and role strain, but emergency functions would not be threatened. In the latter case, the issue is highly uncertain."
i i
4 Sorenson, J., Vergt. B., and Mileti D. (1987). Evarustion An assetement of Phani9e and Retw-h. Fe&nj i Emergercy Management Agency, Wuhington D.C..Juj y ,1987, p. 90.
5 Poid p.147 O
3 i -
l Cne Historier In a miew of repor:s, articles, and other documents concerning fifty major U.S. evacuations, it was reported that in 16 cases, buses were used to transpon people from endangered areas, ne other cases did not report the use of buses in the evacuation, however this does not mean that they were not used. Dere were no documented cases of bus driven not cooperating or refusing to drive the buses.
De sixteen evacuation incidents that reportedly used buses during the evacuation were:
Dals f "im 11A11 Cagg Numbe erEmuset 3 March 87 Nanneoke PA Metal Plant Fire 14000 12 June 85 Pine Blun AX Train Deradment 12000 20 February 86 Marysville CA Flood 20000 29 August 85 Pinellas County FL Hurn=ane Elena 300000 12 April 87 Pittsburgh PA Train Derailment 17000 4 September 85 Canton OH Chemical Plant Explosion 2000 29 May 86 Springfield MA Chemical Spill 10000 4 August 85 Checotah OK BombTransprtadon Accideru 6000 14 November 85 Maldert WY Chemical Plant Explosion 6000 6 May 82 Supenor WI Chemical Plant Explosion 10000 4 April 83 Derner CO Train Derailment 9000 29 March 85 Greenfxki MA Tmin Deradment 2000 11 December 82 Taft LA Chemical Plant Explosion 17000 28 May 87 Woodbum N Wharehouse Acculent 5000 14 April 87 Gary N Chemical Tank Leak 2000 MA Q 3 April 80 Somerville Train Yard Acesderu 17000 Conclusions In conclusion, existing research and an examination of recent major U.S. evacuationt suggest that bus driven would probably not abandon their role during an evacuation and that through traming and planning, this possiblity can be minimized.
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Appendix A FIFTY MAJOR EVACUATIONS Date Location it Cawee tvece 870324 he ticoae PA metet Plant Fire 14000 850716 Ceese testas IA Fire
- Sewete freetsomt Plant 20000 86000. It Peterseweg FL Chasical Ptamt Accisont 6400 MC70t pianisaweg Om freim Derettaent 421211 faft PSC LA Chamical Piet (Aaleelm 17000 85 %24 Anamein CA Warene w e Fire 7500 850708 Sam Luis 00ispo CA Forest Fire 10000 870414 Cary is Store,e fare Lost 2000 8509N Canten on D anical Plant Accieset 2000 870422 Pittsewegm PA Train Derailment 5100 870528 Woockarm it frunJet. Accleent 5000 870412 Pittscn#pm PA frein Derelleent 17000
&R529 Sp*tngfield mA Chemical Scitl 10000 851029 eev 0 teena LA mwericane swan 6000 850926 Oceem City e Me ricere Cleria 50000 850429 >Imeties comty FL M e rieene ILone 300000 85C321 Plainfiele sJ frrsportation Accleemt 4250 40403 sauervit te mA frein fore Accleomt 1?D00 860630 SeeJumt fI mwerieame 8ervite 30000 851114 hateen W Cheelcel Ptamt Isalesien 6000 850925 Care Com ty at awaricane Clerts 3?000 8508% Checotom at 8se Iastesien 6000 850612 Pine Btwff At Traim BeretLeomt O 450902 Laplace LA #wericam tiene 12000 15000 V M 1Z31 Little Rect At f reim Ca* Leet 25 00 870404 minst .
e Chanical weremame tsatessen 15000 431118 Lym mA Fi re 5600 130816 mounten fr awaricane Alicia 42000 820928 Livingstem LA frein persilment 3300 800005 Caguschristi TI pericane Alten 400000 MiD16 Colwunds ou D M te Threat 1500
&60609 San Antonio it Traim DePatteset 1700 86C220 marysvi!Le CA Fleed 20000 840909 JecyL L Canty CA h ericone Dieme 14500 421131 Crerge CA Chatical Plant tactosi e 3000 821112 trvire CA Chemicet Ptemt Accleomt 2000 820506 Seerior wl chemical Planttaptosign 10000 870725 Avon is et f emaer Lose 2500 87M10 tevrecce mA FLsees 3600 M 1010 ting of Prussie PA Caseline Pipe betwee 3000 851We Bey Caety FL nerizome cate 200C 35C308 Poeata IL Floose 3000 i
83 M k Denve* C0 freim DersiLeemt 9000 8706C2 Caertete om fremsport. Accleoet 2500 86C225 Saline al Cheatcal Sollt T',Luene 2000 850810 Soeingfiete me Ircustrial Accleent 3000 850703 Co=nington PA Chemical spiti 2600 850524 mollywees FL Cmtseine fama n etwee 5000 85C329 Creenfiste mA Traim De*ailmeet 2000 840902 Deema at unamown 10000 i
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1 Appendix B O RtrtRtsCEs 1
Son:nson, J., Vogt, B., and Mileti, D. (1987), Evacuation An Assessment of Plannine and Resereh. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington D.C., July,1987.
Lindell, M., Bolton, P., and Perry, R. (1985), Plannine Concerts and Decision CriteHa for Shelterine and Evacuation in a Nucles, Power Plant Emereenn. AIF/NESP 031, National Environmental Studies Propsm of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Washington D.C , July 1985.
Barton, A. (1969), communities in Disaster. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Bates, F.L., et al. (1963), *De So-ial and Psveholorical Consecuences of a Narumi Disaster.
National Research Council Disaster Study 18. Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
Dynes, R. (1970),0-canized Behavior in Disaste s. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath.
Fritz, C. (1961), "Disasters," pp 651694 in Menon and Nisbet (eds.), Contem o-a v social Problems. New York: Hueoun.
Killian, L. (1952),"The Significance of Multi poup Membership in Disasters," American Joumal of Sociolorv (January): 309 314 Mileti, D., Sorenson, J., and Bogard, W. (1985), Evacuation D cision M&ine Process and Unre-raintv. ORNL TM 9692. Oak Ridge Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
O Moore, H. (1958), Tomadoes Over Texas. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
Quarentelli, E.L. (no date), "Structural Factors in the Minimization of Role Conflict: A Reexamination of the Significance of Mulople Group Membership in Disaster" (preliminary paper 49). Cola:nbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, Ohio State Uruverstry.
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE BUS DRIVER STUDY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONDENTS O .
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l Incident Location Interviewer Name Job Title Phone Number
() READ:
name).
Hello, my name is (insert I'm calling from the research firm of Weston, Inc. in West Chester, Pennsylvania. We are doing a study of emergency evacuations, and the (insert name) emer-gency that occurred in your community has been chosen for study.
I'd like to ask you some questions about the emergency and the evacuation. Is now a good time to talk; if not I can call back at a more convenient time.
There are several kinds of questions '! will ask you. If you l
don't know an answer, please feel free to say so; in cases where you don't know an answer to a question I'd very much apprc:iate it if you could give me the name and number of someone who might know.
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A. The first set of questions I will ask you are general ques-tions about the evacuation that took place as a result of l
(')
\_/ the (hazard agent) on (date).
- 1. Whet was the time of impact? By this I mean what was the time at which the (hazard agent) actually became a direct threat to public safety? [ Verify that for hazard release, this is time of release, not time of initiatino event, such as derailment, if these took place at different times). AM/FM
- 2. Did the evacuation take place before, during or after im-pact?
Before After During (Explain) 1 l
I Mixed (Explain)
G V
3a. Did emergency response personnel and/or public officials have any advance warning prior to the impact?
No (go to 4)
Yes (go to 3b) 3b. How much time was there between the first notification of emergency personnel and/or public officials and the time of impact? : (hours / minutes) l l
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l yry_ . _ _ - . - - - ---- . - , _ . - - . - - - - . - - - , -
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- 4. When did the evacuation begin and when'did it end?
%- Becin End
! Time Day Month t
Year
- 5. How large was the geographical area that was evacuated?
square miles 6.- How many people were there in the area that needed to be evacuated?
number of people l B. READ: The next set of questions are about the people who needed to be evacuated by evacuation buses.
O~
7 How many people in total needed to be evacuated by bus?
number of people f B. How many schools needed to be evacuated by bus?
number of schools
- 9. How many school children needed to be evacuated by bus?
t number of school children f (}
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, - - - - - - - , , ,,-e -
n, ,, ,,,n, -, --,, . -- -, - - - - - . . , -,-w-- - - , - . , . ,-w--c-- -- -
- 10. Excluding school children, where were the people who needed to be evacuated by bus located? (Record and define each
(]) type of location)
C. READ: The following questions concern the mobilization of bus drivers to drive evacuation buses during the er.ergency.
- 11. How many buses were used to evacuate people?
number of buses
- 12. How many bus drivers were thought to be needed to drive I evacuation buses when bus driver mobilization began?
number of drivers
- 13. How many bus drivers were attempted to be contacted?
number of drivers
- 14. Of these, how many were actually contacted?
number contacted l 15. Why couldn't all bus drivers be contacted? (Explain)
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- 16. Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage refused to drive evacuation buses during the emergency?
(~}
percentage (if "O," go to 18)
- 17. Why did these drivers refuse to drive evacuation buses dur-ing the emergency? (Explain)
- 18. Did any of these refusals occur because bus drivers were concerned about the safety of their family?
No Yes (What __% ) (Explain)
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- 19. Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage did not re-fuse to drive evacuation buses, but simply did not report for work?
percentage (if "o", go to 21)
- 20. Why didn't these drivers show up? (Explain) l ()
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- 21. Did any of these "no-shows" not report for driving because l they were concerned about the safety of their family?
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No Yes (what %) (Explain) l l
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- 22. Of those bus drivers contacted who did show up tc rive evacuation buses, what percentage showed up late? (That is, they took noticeably longer to arrive than would be expected given the distance from their house to the bus yard.)
percentage (if "O," go to 24)
- 23. Why did those drivers show up late? (Explain) l l
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- 24. Did any of th<> bus drivers who showed up lete do so because of concern about the safety of their family?
No Yes (what %) (Explain) l 1
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- 25. What was the length of delay in reporting for driving evacu-ation buses among drivers who were concerned about the safe-O ty of their family?
- a. Longest delay ( hrs; minutes)
- b. Shortest delay ( hrs; minutes)
- c. Average delay ( hrs; minutes)
- 26. Did any evacuation bus drivers help to evacuate their family before showing up for duty to drive evacuation buses?
No Yes (what %)
- 27. Did any person volunteer to drive evacuation buses (by vol-unteer we mean people who did not have evacuation bus driv-ing as their job before the emergency began)?
No Yes (how many ) (Explain who t?.ey were) l l
l D. READ: The questions which now follow address the perfor-mance of the bus drivers who actually did drive evacuation
' buses during the emergency.
- 28. What percentage of the drivers who actually did drive evacu-l ation buses did not do their job as well as they could have?
percentage (if "O," go to 30) l l
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- 29. What sort of problems did these drivers have? (Explain) o d
- 30. Why did'they have these problems? (Explain)
- 31. Did any of the drivers who did drive evacuation buses have any problems because of concern about their family's safety?
No
! Yes (what %) (Explain)
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- 32. Approximately how much time did evacuation bus drivers spend in the evacuation zone driving evacuation buses?
- a. Longest stay ( hrs; minutes)
- b. Average stay ( hrs; minutes)
- c. Shortest stay ( hrs; minutes)
) .
l E. READ: The next set of questions address the kind of things that evacuation bus drivers might or could have thought as they drove evacuation buses.
- Ma, D;d any b us drive.rs make. mo rt'. Om one, frip into 4kec.vac.udlon oved l O No I - ve.
Don'+ knew
_ N o answer
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- 33. Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they l rT themselves were in danger during the time that they were
(_/ driving buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't think they were in danger.
Yes, they did think they were in danger. (What %)
(Explain why)
- 34. Do you know if any evacuation bus driver thought that they would receive adequate forewarning of any danger to them-selves were.it to occur during the time that they were driv-ing buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't expect adequate forvarning (explain why)
Yes, they did expect adequate warning (what %)
(]) (Explain why)
- 35. Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they could personally detect any danger to themselves without relying on specialized equipment during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't think they could personally monitor (Explain why)
Yes (what %) (Explain why) f l
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f3 36. Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they
(_/ could easily reach safety if the hazard impacted where they were during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
No, they didn't think they could easily reach safety.
(Explain why)
Yes (what %) (Explain why)
F. READ: The next few questions concern some background fac-tors about all the bus drivers who were contacted and asked (either successfully or unsuccessfully) to report for evacu-ation bus driving duty during the emergency.
- 37. What percentage of these potential bus drivers had families in the area at risk during the emergency?
percentage (if "O," go to 38)
- 38. What percentage of these families were capable of acting without assistance from the family member who was needed to drive an evacuation bus?
percentage G. READ: The next two questions focus on the training, if any, of evacuation bus drivers that occurred before the emergency we have been discussing occurred.
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- 39. Did evacuation bus drivers receive any kind of emergency training about their evacuation bus driver role before the
-(]) emergency began?
No Yes (what % of drivers received the training)
(Explain the training)
- 40. Did evacuation bus drivers know before the emergency began that they had the role of evacuation bus driver in an emer-gency like the one experienced?
No Yes (what %) (Explain how known)
()
H. READ: There are only two questions left.
- 41. Were there enough bus drivers to drive evacuation buses in the emergency?
No (what % were available) (Explain why) f i
Yes (Explain why) __
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- 42. Did everyone who needed to be evacuated by evacuation bus O set out in time?
No (what % did not) (Explain why)
Yes (Expl. tin why)
Thank you very much for your help. I appreciate it very much.
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ATTACHMENT G h
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() Results of the Bus Driver Study for Orcanizational Respondents People familiar with the emergency operations during 19 major evacuations were surveyed for this study. Respondents included emergency managers (i.e., fire chiefs, police, civil defense of-ficials, etc.) who were interviewed for basic information about the emergency (usually questions 1-10) and bus company officials (i.e., owners, managers, dispatchers, etc.) who were interviewed to answer the remaining questions.
The evacuation cases and the number of emergency managers and bus company officials interviewed are listed below:
- Emergency # Bus Company Case Manacers Officials 0 1
- 1. Canton 1
- 2. Pittsburgh 1 1 2
- 3. Superior 1
- 4. Malden 1 1
- 5. Checotah 1 1 1
- 6. Pine Bluff 2
N 7. Springfield 1 2
- 8. Greenfield 2 1
- 9. Nanticoke 1 1
- 10. Taft 2 1 1
- 11. Denver 1
- 12. Somerville 1 1
- 13. Elkhart 1 1 2
- 14. Gary 4
- 15. Marysville 1 1 2
- 16. Pinellas 2
- 17. Miamisburg 1 1
- 18. Hicksville/Woodburn 1 1
- 19. Minot 2 The Questions and Results:
- 1. What was the time of impact?
Morning (6:00 am - 11:59 am) 5 Afternoon (12 pm - 5:59 pm) 6 Evening (6:00 pm - 11:59 pm) 3 Night (12:00 am - 5:59 am) 4 1
No ansv&r 0
CV AC,M A TI N
({) 2. Did the imp:ct take place before, during or after impact?
Before 4 During E After 5 i No answer 1
- 3. Did emergency response personnel and/or public officials have any advance warning prior to the impact?
No 13 Yes 5 No answer 1 3b. How much time was there between the first notification of emergency personnel and/or public officials and the time of impact?
Minimum - No advance warning Maximum - From 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to 4 days (Pinellas).
- 4. When did the evacuation begin and when did it end?
() The date and time of the evacuations varied.
- 5. How large was the geographical area that was evacuated?.
Smallest area -
.5 mile radius Average - 2-20 square miles Largest area - 280 square miles
- 6. How ma'ny people were there in the area that needed to be evacuated?
Minimum - 1,000 (Malden)
Maximum - 300,000 (Pinellas)
- 7. How many people in total needed to be evacuated by bus?
Minimum - 0 (At Pine Bluff people were loaded onto buses but not evacuated)
Maximum - 5,000 to 10,000 (Pinellas)
- 8. How many schools needed to be evacuated by bus?
Minimum -
0 Maximum - 7 (Springfield)
1
- 9. How many school children needed to be evacuated by bus?
{])
Minimum -
0 Maximum -
6,000
- 10. Excluding school children, where were the people who needed to be evacuated by bus located?
Nursing homes, shopping malls, hospitals, a barrier is-land, elderly housing, mobile home parks, old age homes, a b*.ach area, residential areas, a college, a housing project, apartment complexes, a manufacturing plant, and business districts.
- 11. How many buses were used to evacuate people?
Minimum -
3 Maximum -
235 (Pinellas)
- 12. How many bus drivers were thought to be needed to drive evacuation buses when bus driver mobilization began?
Answers varied from "I can't remember" or "Don't know" l
to between 2 and 240.
(]) 13. How many bus drivers were attempted to be contacted?
Answers varied from "don't know" to "only those on duty were contacted" to between 3 and 80.
- 14. Of these, how many were actually contacted?
Answers varied. Ansvers to question 14 are most rele-vant when taken together with ansvers to question 13.
In the 12 cases that had reported firm numbers for both questions, one case reported that more drivers were ac-tualy contacted than the number of drivers attempted to be contacted primarily because a number of drivers vol-unteered after their normal routes were disrupted.
In 3 cases, fever actual contacts were made than at-tempted due to the reasons stated in response to ques-tion 15.
The remaining 8 cases reported actual contact with all l
attempts. Respondents in other cases either could not l
recall or did not know.
()
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(g 15. Why couldn't all bus drivers be contacted?
Reasons varied, but included: not home, Easter, out of town, phone busy, radio system problems, vacation peri-od, and that some drivers were already out on the road.
- 16. Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage refused to drive evacuation buses during the evacuation?
No one in any of the cases studied refused to drive evacuation buses.
In the Taft case, a discrepancy exists because there was a report of testimony about the role abandonment of two or three drivers. The emergency coordinator, his assistant, and the transportation officer do not recall :
any instance of bus driver abandonment.
- 17. Why did these drivers refuse to drive evacuation buses dur-ing the emergency?
N/A
- 18. Did any of these refusals occur because bus drivers were concerned about the safety of their family?
N/A
- 19. Of those bus drivers contacted, what percentage did not re-fuse to drive evacuation buses, but simply did not report for work?
All drivers reported for work in all cases, with two minor exceptions in the Marysville evacuation. Ac-cording to the information on the Marysville case two "mechanics could not physically reach the bus yard,"
presumably due to flood waters damaging access roads.
Since they were unable to reach the bus yard, the two mechanics proceeded to a nearby nursing home to help in its evacuation.
- 20. Why didn't these bus drivers show up?
See answer to question 19 above.
- 21. Did any of these "no-shovs" not report for driving because they vers concerned about the safety of their family?
N/A O
r3 22. Of those bus drivers contacted who did show up to drive V evacuation buses, what percentage showed up late? (That is, they took noticeably longer to arrive than would be expected given the distances fro.m their house to the bus yard.)
None of the drivers "showed up late" in 16 of the 19 Cases.
One bus company in Marysville reported that 1-2% showed up late due to traffic congestions. This particular company utilized about twenty drivers so presumably the respondent meant 1 or 2 drivers, not 1 or 2% of the drivers showed up late.
During the Pinellas evacuation, about 10% of one bus company's drivers showed up late because they first helped "take care of family."
One bus company in Miamisburg reported that 0% or an unknown number of drivers showed up late. In responne to question 24, the respondent stated that "1 or 2 peo-ple who had to get families situated first" showed up late.
- 23. Why did those drivers show up late?
O See answer to question 22 above.
- 24. Did any of the bus drivers who showed up late do so because of concern about the safety of their family?
See answer to question 22 above.
- 25. What was the length of delay in reporting for driving evacu-ation buses among drivers who were concerned about the safe-ty of their family?
In the Pinellas case the delay caused by drivers re-porting to work late ranged from 20 minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> with an average delay of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
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2.i . Did any evacuation bus drivers help to evacuate their family Q' before shoving up for duty to drive evacuation buses?
No -
15 cases Don't Know -
2 cases Yes - 2 cases Three to five drivers evacuated their families first during the Miamisburg evacuation.
One driver in the Woodburn/Hicksville evaucation evacu-However, this was before the ated his f amily first.
evacuation order was given and before the report calls vent out to the drivers.
Even though Pinellas respondents said that 10% shoved up late in answer to question 22, they responded no to this question.
- 27. Did any person volunteer to drive evacuation buses (by vol-unteer we mean people who did not have evacuation bus driv-ing as their job before the emergency began)?
Yes -
10 No -
9 O In the Checotah case, the respondent answered yes to this question but that was because the drivers were not paid.
- 28. What percentage of the drivers who actually did drive evacu-ation buses did not do their job as well as they could have?
All cases - 0%
- 29. What sort of problems did these drivers have?
While all cases reported 0% to question 28 above, some t
respondents reported problems such as traf fic jams, confusion as to where to go or what to do, confusion of law enforcement about access to evacuation areas, peo-ple wanting to take possessions with them, and flood waters impeding the roadways.
- 30. Why did they have these problems?
Most ansvers to this question were n/a.
j While all cases reported 0% to question 28 above, a few respondents provided the following:
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At the Superior evacuation, traf fic j ams were created
() because parents went to pick up their children.
During the Columbus evacuation, there was a lack of communication early on among the police, disaster ser-vices, and the bus company. This was corrected later by placing a transit company supervisor in the EOC.
- 31. Did any of the drivers who did drive evaucation buses have any problems because of concern about their family's safety?
No -
17 Yes -
2 During the Greeafield evacuation, half of the drivers heard rumors and were scared for families, apparently because the exact nature of the incident and the threat was not known. ,
During the Pinellas evacuation, officials told drivers they could leave to go home and take care of their fam-ilies if they so desired. About 1% did so.
- 32. Approximately how much time did evacuation bus drivers spend in the evacuation zone driving evacuation buses?
(}
Minimum -
10 minutes Maximum -
30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> 32a. Did any bus drivers make more than one trip into the evacua-tion area?
No - 2 '
Yes -
13 Don't Know - 1 n/a -
1 No Answer -
2
- 33. Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they themselves were in danger during the time that they were j
driving buses in the. evacuation zone?
' No -
13 Yes - 5 l
Don't Know -
1 O
, . . , _ , - , . _ _ , _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ ~ _ _ _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ - - _ , - - - - - . . - - _ _ _ _ -
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- 34. Do you know if any evacuation bus driver thought that they
((~S
> vould receive adequate forewarning of any danger to them-selves were it to occur during the time that they were driv-ing buses in the evacuation zone?
No -
1 Yes -
18
- 35. Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they could personally detect any danger to themselves without I relying on specialized equipment during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
No -
7 Yes -
10 Don't Knov -
2
- 36. Do you know if any evacuation bus drivers thought that they could easily reach safety if the hazard impacted where they were during the time that they were driving buses in the evacuation zone?
i No -
11 Yes -
15 Don't Knov -
3
({}
- 37. What percentage of these potential bus drivers had families in the area at risk during the emergency?
5 0% -
E cases 1%-50% -
6 cases 51%+ -
37 cases Unknown -
5 cases
- 38. What percentage of these families were capable of acting without assistance from the family member who was needed to drive an evacuation bus?
0% -
0
, 1%-50% -
0 51%+ -
6 Unknown -
8 n/a -
5 In two cases, Pine Bluff and Taft, the respondents said, in response to question 37, that none of the bus drivers 1ived in the area. Here they said that most (greater than 51%) of the families could act without assistance from the bus driver.
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) 39. Did evacuation bus drivers receive.any kind of emergency training about their evacuation bus driver role before the emergency began?
No -
10 Yes -
9 In Marysville, some bus companies reported yes while others reported no. This case was considered a yes in this summary.
- 40. Did evacuation bus drivers know before the emergency began that they had the role of evacuation bus driver in an emer-gency like the one experienced?
No -
- r 8 Yes -
1-? Il In Marysville, some bus companies reported yes while others reported no. This case was considered a yes in this summary.
- 41. Were there enough bus drivers to drive evacuation buses in the emergency?
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> All cases - yes
- 42. Did everyone who needed to be evacuated by evacuation bus get out in time?
All cases - yes In Pittsburgh, there were some refusals but all who wanted to get out by bus were evacuated, i
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O BUS DRIVER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE INCIDENT LOCATION Ih"TERVIEWEE NAME ,,
JOB TITLE Pi!ONE NUMBER READ: Hello, my name is (insert name).
I'm calling from the research firm of Weston, Inc. in West Chester, Pennsylvania. We are doing a study of emergency evacua-tions and the (insert incident)
O emergency that occurred in your community during I'd like to ask (insert date) has been chosen for study. Is you some questions about the emergency and the evacuation.
now a good time to talk? If not, I can call back at a more con-venient time.
Your name was provided to me as a person who drove buses during this emergency. Is that correct?
Yes No (if no, de not proceed, thank them for their time)
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A. READ: The first set of questions I will ask you are about fl s> your "activation message." By "activation message" I mean the request you received in which you were specifically asked to drive an evacuation bus during the incident.
- 1. Who did you receive this message from?
- 2. Where were you told to report?
- 3. Which of the following statements best describes the degree of threat to those in the risk area - that is, those who needed to be evacuated - as it was described in the activation message?
People in the risk area are in severe danger.
People in the risk area are in moderate danger.
(]) People in the risk area are in slicht danger.
There was no clear sens.e of threat in the message.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
l 4. Which of the following statements best describes the degree l of urgency - the need for immediate - action as it was de-scribed in the e.ctivation message?
You are needed nov.
You will be needed soon.
You vill be needed later.
You may be needed later.
There was no clear sense of urgency in the message.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
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B. READ: The next set of questions I will ask you are about
\ emergency information that you might have received prior to the activation messace.
- 5. Were you aware that there was an emergency prior to receiving your activation message?
No (skip to 10)
Yes
- 6. How did you find out about the emergency?
- 7. As a result of the information that you received prior to the activation message, how likely did you think it was that your home would be threatened by the (hazard event)?
Extremely likely Very likely
(])
Even odds Very unlikely Extremely unlikely l ___
(Do not read) I don't remember
! 8. Did veu or the members of your household take any protective action prior to receipt of your activation message?
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Continued normal activities Sought add.itionel information l
Prepared to evacuate One or more household members evacuated Other (specify) l O
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- 9. How much time was there between:
)
When you first found out about the emergency, and when you received your activation message?
hours / minutes C. READ: The next set of questions I will ask you are about your reactions to the activation messace.
- 10. Where were you located at the time of the impact? By this I mean where were at the time the (hazard agent) actually became a direct threat to public safety?
With family in impact area.
With family in periphery.
With family outside area.
___ Separated from family, family closer to impact.
l Separated from family, respondent closer to impact,
- 11. What members of your household were et home when you re-ceived the activation message?
Self Spouse Number of children under 18 Number of other dependents (specify)
Number of others (specify) ,
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(]) 12. To what extent did you feel a sense of personal responsibil-ity to help those in your household by staying home to help them cope with the emergency?
Great extent Moderate extent Minimal extent Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
- 13. To what extend did you feel that the members of your house-hold would be protected even if you did not stay to help I
them?
Great extent Moderate extent Minimal extent Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
- 14. To what extent did you feel a personal responsibility to help those in the risk area by reporting for duty to drive an evacuation bus?
Great extent Moderate extent l Minimal extent l
l Not at all I
I (Do not read) I don't remember.
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- 15. To what extent did you feel that those in the risk area
(]) vould be protected even if you did not go to help them?
Great extent Moderate extent Minimal extent Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
- 16. After you received your activation message, did you do any-thing other than proceed directly to the location where you were told to report. (Do not read alternatives).
No, I went directly to the reporting location (go to 17).
Yes, I tried to get additional information.
i Yts, I helped my household prepare to evacuate.
() Yes, I took other actions (specify)
- 17. If you did take any actions between receiving your
. activation message and arriving at your reporting location, about how much more time did you take than would have been l
required if you had proceeded directly?
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hours and minutes f
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D. READ: The next set of questions I will ask you are about Os your reactions during the time you were driving an evacua-tion bus.
- 18. How would you describe the sense of threat that you experi-enced during the time that you were in the risk area?
I was in severe danger.
I was in moderate danger.
,___ I was in slicht danger.
I had no sense of threat whatsoever.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
- 19. To what extend did you feel thet you would receive adequate forewarning of any danger to yourself during the time that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
Very great extent.
Moderate extent,
(])
Minimal extent.
f Not at all.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
- 20. To what extent did you believe that you would be able to de-tect any danger to yourself by means of environmental cues such as sights, sounds or smells?
Very great extent.
Moderate extent.
! Minimal extent.
Not at all.
(Do not read) I don't remember.
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- 21. To what extent did you believe that you could easily reach
(). safety if the hazard impacted where you were during the time that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
Very great extent.
Moderate extent.
Minimal extent Not at all (Do not read) I don't remember.
- 22. Were you or any members of your family injured as a result of this emergeney?
.?szily member injured. State relationship to respon-1 der.:.
Respor. dent injured.
.araly members uninjured.
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(} E. READ: Thn. next set of questions I will ask you are about any advance preparation that you might have received re-garding your role as an emergency evacuation bus driver.
- 23. To what axtent did you receive any kind of emergency training about your evacuation bus driver role before the emergency t49sr.?
Very gree: extent.
Moderate extent.
Minin31 extent.
Not at all (Go to 23).
(Do no t read) I don't remember.
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- 24. What type of training was this?
({}
- 25. Did anyone tell you before the emeroency beoan that you might be asked to drive an evacuation bus during an emergen-cy?
No (Go to 25).
Yes.
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- 26. Please explain who told you, when they told you, and what you were told.
i F. READ: The next question is about the "lessons learned" from your experience.
O 27. Are there any lessons that you think would be valuable to pass on to planners so that they could prepare better plans, procedures and training for emergency evacuations?
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I only have one more question that I would like to Q G. READ:
ask you.
- 28. How old were you during the time of the emergency?
Under 20.
20-44.
45 plus.
DO NOT READ: Belov mark the sex of the respondent.
Male l
Female Thank you very much for your help. I appreciate it very much.
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Results of The Bus Driver Interview Study
)
As a follow-up to the Bus Driver Study for Organizational Respondents, LILCO talked with individual bus drivers who re-sponded to ten of the 19 emergencies addressed in the previous study. Twenty-seven (27) bus drivers were surveyed who had par-ticipated in 10 of the 19 evacuation cases. The evacuation cases and the number of drivers surveyed are listed below:
- Bus Drivers Surveyed Case 10
- 1. Marysville 1
- 2. Greenfield 2
- 3. Malden 3
- 4. Taft 1 ,
- 5. Canton l 1
- 6. Miamisburg 4
- 7. Springfield
(]) 2
- 8. Pine Bluff 1
- 9. National City 2
- 10. Hicksville l
The Questions and the Results:
l 1. Who did you receive this message from?
Activation messages were received from co-workers, transportation supervisors, bus dispatchers, transpor-tation directors, emergency coordinators, sheriff's de-partments, over the television, and by word of mouth, j
- 2. Where were you told to report?
Drivers were told to report to one of the following places: bus garages, nursing homes, senior citizens' homes, downtown areas, central offices, command cen-l ters, and police stations.
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- 3. Which of the following statsments best describes the degree O of threat to those in the risk area - that is, those who needed to be evacuated - as it was described in the activation message?
12 People in the risk area are in severe danger.
_1 People in the risk area are in moderate dcnger.
_1 People in the risk area are in slicht danger.
_1 There was no clear sense of threat in the message.
_1 I don't remember.
- 4. Which of the following statements best describes the degree of urgency - the need for immediate - action as it was de-scribed in the activation message?
21 You are needed nov.
_1 You vill be needed soon.
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_0 You will be needed later.
_0 You may be needed later.
(])
_1 There was no clear sense of urgency in the mes-sage.
_1 I don't remember.
- 5. Were you aware that there was an emergency prior to j
receiving your activation message?
t l 12 No 11 Yes
- 6. How did you find out about the emergency?
l Answers included: over the radio or scanner; on the television; by supervisor, word of mouth, or passerby; from friends; or by actually seeing the threat.
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- 7. As a result of the information that you received prior to Oe the activation message, how likely did you think it was that vour home would be threatened by the hazard event?
_1 Extremely likely
_1 Very likely
_2 Even odds
_2 Very unlikely
_2 Extremely unlikely
, 8. Did you or the members of your household take any protective action prior to receipt of your activation message?
_1 Continued normal activities
_1 Sought additional information
_5 Prepared to evacuate l _1 One or more household members evacucted f
O 1 other
- 9. How much time was there between: When you first found out about the emergency, and when you received your activation message?
Answers ranged from a few minutes (most ansvers) to about 1-3 hours and in one case 3 days.
- 10. Where were you located at the time of the impact? By this I mean where were (you) at the time the hazard agent actually became a direct threat to public safety?
t
_2 With family in impact area.
_1 With family in periphery, l
11 With family outside area.
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_4 Separated f rom f amily, f amily closer to impact.
_1 Separated from family,, respondent closer to im-pact.
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_4 O 11. What members of your household were at home when you re-ceived the activation message?
_f Self 12 Spouse 10 Number of children under 18
_2 Number of other dependents
_1 Number of others
_2 N/A
- 12. To what extent did you feel a sense of personal responsibil-ity to help those in your household by staying home to help them cope with the emergency?
_1 Great extent ,
_2 Moderate extent 8 Minimal extent i
11 Not at all
_1 N/A one person who responded "not at all" said she took her family with her. Another who responded "minimal ex-tent" said "family (vas] already out and safe."
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- 13. To what extend did you feel that the members of your house-l i hold would be protected even if you did not stay to help them?
19 Great extent
_2 Moderate extent
_0 Minimal extent
_} Not at all
_1 N/A
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- 14. To what extent did you feel a personal responsibility to
\ help those in the risk area by reporting for duty to drive an evacuation bus?
21 Great extent
_2 Moderate extent
_0 Minimal extent
_0 Not at all
- 15. To what extent did you feel that those in the risk area vould be protected even if you did not go to help them?
12 Great extent
_1 Moderate extent
_f Minimal extent
_5 Not at all Comments: "duty to go and help;" "Felt he was needed I to insure the safety of the residents. Did not think
(]) about the situation."
! 16. After you received your activation message, did you do any-thing other than proceed directly to the location where you were told to report.
22 No, I went directly to the reporting location.
_0 Yes, I tried to get additional information.
i _1 Yes, I helped my household prepare to evacuate.
I 3 Yes, I took other actions (specify).
The driver who helped his household prepare to evacuate said that only took a "few minutes." The driver was with his family (spouse and one child) in the impact area at the time he received his activation message.
Those that took other actions did the following: two l
made phone calls to get out other drivers, and the l
other evacuated her children (which took 20 extra i minutes) because she did not want to leave them alone.
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- 17. If you did take any actions between receiving your
() activation message and arriving at your reporting location, about how much more time did you take than would have been required if you had proceeded directly?
One respondent said 10 minutes, one said 15 minutes, and the respondent who helped her family evacuate said she took 20 extra minutes.
- 18. How would you describe the sense of threat that you experi-enced during the time that you were in the risk area?
_2 I was in severe danger.
5 I was in moderate danger.
_1 I was in slicht danger.
_9 I had no sense of threat whatsoever.
_1 N/A one did not respond because was not in risk area but in "standby area."
l l n 19. To what extend did you feel that you would receive adequate V forevarning of any danger to yourself during the time that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
11 Very great extent
_2 Moderate extent
_1 Minimal extent
_1 Not at all
. Comments: "Never thought about it - bus had communica-tions;" used radios; "3 times got wrong information -
Drivers were telling police what was going on."
- 20. To what extent did you believe that you would be able to de-tect any danger to yourself by means of environmental cues such as sights, sounds or smells?
11 Very great extent
_f Moderate extent 2 Minimal extent O _f Not at all l
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- 21. To what extent did you believe that you could easily reach p)
(_ safety if the hazard impacted where you were during the time that you were driving a bus in the evacuation zone?
11 Very great extent
_f Moderate extent
_2 Hinimal extent
_2 Not at all
_2 N/A Comments: "Never thought about this, had an obligation '
to evacuate the residents and was concerned about only this." One person who responded "not at all" said that she "didn't think of ability to reach safety."
- 22. Were you or any members of your family injured as a result of this emergency?
Family member injured. State relationship to re-
- _0 spondent.
_0 Respondent injured.
{])
22 Family members uninjured.
- 23. To what extent did you receive any kind of emergency training about your evacuation bus driver role before the emergency began?
_2 very great extent
_3 Moderate extent 11 Minimal extent
_1 Not at all
- 24. What type of train.ng was this?
Seven drivers reported receiving no training before the evacuation. Others received minimal training such as first aid, CPR, and how to operate a wheel chair lift.
Others received more training, to include school evacu-ation and fire drills, use of rpecial equipment, and regular school bus driver training. Some reported training occurred once, twice, or three times a year.
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(-) 25. Did anyone tell you before the emercency becan that you
\_/ might be asked to drive an evacuation bus during an emergen-cy?
11 No 11 Yes
- 26. Please explain who told you, when they told you, and what you were told.
Respondents indicated that they were told by their su-pervisors, emergency planning councils, school boards, or at routine meetings concerning evacuation. One re-spondent answered that she was told to be "always pre-pared" to transport school children during an emergen-cy. Another indicated that he was told that his "primary role" during an emergency is to evacuate school children.
- 27. Are there any lessons that you think would be valuable to pass on to planners so that they could prepare better plans, l
procedures and training for emergency evacuations?
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Comments included that the evacuations vent well; ev-erything was perfect; "that those in charge did an ex-(~) cellent job;" that radios should be used to keep driv-ers posted; have drills once a week; let drivers knov which routes are best to take; that it would help if drivers were told what the emergency was all about; communications is most important. One said that it l took too long to get out because there Vere only two
\ main roads out of risk area.
- 28. How old were you during the time of the emergency?
_0 Under 20 11 20-44
_2 45 plus Breakdown of Respondents by Sex:
i 2 Male
, 11 Female O
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LILOC, Nevcmbor 18, 1: 53 i
UN!"ED S~A~ES OF AMERICA NUOLIAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board
)
In the Matter of )
) Dockst No. 50-322-OL-3 LONG ISLAND LIGE~ING COMPANY ) (Emsrgency Planning
)
Proceeding)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1)
CORDARO,
~IS~IM0h? OF MAT ~FEW C. G. JOHNSON, LLIAM RUSSELL R. OYNES, W:JOHN E. SCRENSEN, MILE ~I, DENNIS S.
AND JOHN A. WEISMAN~LE ON BEHALF OF
( ~EE LONG ISLAND LIGE~INO COMPAhT ON PEAS EMER0ENCY PLANNINO CON ~EN"ION 25 PURPOSE .
~~he interveners ' Contention 25 is entitled "Role Con-Thecontend.ionallegesthat " R: '. e .
fl:, e t of Emergency Workers."
sign:, fic ant nur.be r s
. creates the possibility that conf 1:.ct . . f their families of emergency personnel vill look to the needs o l ding them-or others for which they have responsibility (inc u to their designated selves) Fefore they report (if at all) d to a request 4
emergency response positions or othe:v:,se respon by LILOC for assistance."
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In general, then, a poll is unnecessary (1) because
(])
it is not a valid and reliable instrument for pre-dieting future behavior, (2) because it would ne:
upgrade the list of factors a plan should address, (3) because a plan is mostly based on the actions M of organizations, and (4) because past experienes suggests that emergency workers perform their as-signments.
This is not te say that particular types of surveys might not make important centributions to emergency planning. For example, a survey could be used to identify people who are willing to perform volun=
0 teer emergency work. The people identified by the survey could then be given an emergency role and trained. Also, a survey could be useful to help identify facts important to know about for plan-ning: f o r ex ample , the identification of people with special evacuation needs.
- 68. Q. Mr. Johnson and Dr. Mileti, have you reviewed the County's survey of bus drivers and volunteer firemen in Suffolk County?
A. (Johnson, Mileti) Yes.
(2)
- 69. Q. What is your opinion of that survey? Does it have O any shortcomings?
/o /7 A. (Johnson, Mileti) Questions . through FI on the survey instrument for volunteer firemen and Quer-
-f tions -)T on the survey for school bus drivers are the same as questions 11-16 and 19 of the Coun-ty's survey of the public in general, and thus are subject to the same criticisms as have been men-tiened for those questions in LILOC's written tes-l timony on Contention 23.
Question, of the survey of volunteer firemen is l
as follows:
O Je'. Assuming that the Sheraham nucle-ar power plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are inter-ested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an ac-cident at the plant. Suppose l
that you were at work on a week-
' day morning and there was an ac-cident at Shoreham. Everyone living within 10 miles of the plant was advised to evacuate.
Volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation.
What do you think you would do first?
! l = first, you would report to the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the evacua-tien zon W
.( ) 2 = first, you would make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone j W 3 = first, you would leave the evacuation zone to make sure that you were in a safe placey edt, 4 = first, you would do something else (specify) .
The response categories to this question are nei-ther mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Also, the
- question itself tends to confuse respondents by I asking what they think they would do "first." A l volunteer fireman could both check to see that his or her family was safely out of the evacuation zone
! () '
and also help with firefighting and evacuation in
- the evacuation zone. It is conceivable that a vol-untaer fireman could be working outside of the I
so-called evacuation zone when an accident took place. No ef' fort was made to determine if the vol-unteer fireman does in fact normally work outside the 10-mile evacuation zone.
U Question p{ states as follows:
I3 )MI. Ifatthere was arequiring Shoreham nucleartheaccident evacua-tion of people within a ten mile zone, how dangerous'do you think l
I it would be for you to spend a l
day working within the evacuation -
zone?
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It is impossible to determine what is meant by the Q
term "spend a day working within the evacuation zone." If this was meant tei mean a 24-hour day, an 8-hour day, or somewhere in between, it should have been so stated. The way the question is worded now would be subject to different interpretations by different responders, i
Question JZ of the school bus driver questionnaire states as follows:
. .. Suppose that you had completed your morning run en ; ed.;;'. d:7 and '
there was an accident at Shoreham.
Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate.
Q Schoolbus drivers were expected to help evacuate school child.ren. What t
do you think you would de first?
Nst, I wedd "L. fg 5Y iI W 8d N
- 1. , report, to duty so that you could pick up school children in the eYg p evacuation zone and d::.ve them to W * # E-a she1:ar.
bst,5 dM N i
- 2. q: :: make sure that v as E manser: vere es,w . fhT.ilyy cat = e we a > z -a
- 3. $ leave the uvacuation zone to make sure that '43, _*ere in a safe place. a Waa
?v>h*l wedd
- 4. do sonething else .
(Pluse specify)
Once again, the suggested response categories are Also, i
neither trutually exclusive nor exhaustive.
O
if evervene were advised to evacuate, why would
(])
school bus drivers be expected := help evacuate The : re : .T:.c: a p p l y - - -" r -
school children?
P-"- y st - ey ti: . 1: _ f -l e 10 Question , asks "how dangerous" does the respon-dont think it would be to spend "several hours" driving school children out of the evacuation ene.
The term "several" in this question leaves much to the imagination of the school bus drivers.
Finally, a serious problem with the survey is that >
it was self-administered; that is, respondents were given the survey instrument and asked to complete
(])
it. It is very possible that the respondents' an-swers to particular questions were influenced by information or questions that occurred later in the qu e s ti ennaire'.
7C. Q. The County polled the opinions of volunteer firemen. What firemen were polled?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle). The poll was done by phone to 291 firemen at Miller Place, Ridge, Rocky Point, i
t Sand Beach, and Riverhead.
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- 71. Q. What were the firemen told to assume?
A. (Cordaro, Weismantle ) Among other things, they were told (in Question 18) to suppose that volun-tear firemen were expected to help with the evacua-tion.
- 72. Q. Have these volunteer firemen been assigned a clear role in helping with an evaeuation?
A. (Cordaro, Weismantle) No.
- 73. Q. Did emergency workers abandon their amergency roles .
during the Ginna steam generator tube rupture inci-dent en June 25, 1982?
A. (Weismantle) No, not at all, as indicated in the NRC report on the Ginna accident, NURIG-0909 (At-tachment 8). ,
F. The "Uniquene ss" ef Radiatien
- 74. Q. What is your opinion of the County's theory that radiological emergencies are "unique," so that ex-perience with, for example, hurricanes and floods l
provides little guidance?
1 A. [ Dynes, Mileti, Sorensen). The ability to transfe-the principles of human behavior in emergencies is
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ATTAC10EliT K O
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O O O SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION REQUIRDfENTS FOR A ONE-WAVE EVACUATION i
SCHOOL EUSES WWD DRIVERS 2
SCHOOLS POPULATION 5% 1 20% NEEP"D FOR ONE WAVE Shoreham-Wading River Central School District 170 -
8 = 162 3 Brlarcliff 274 -
13 = 261 5 Miller Ave.
498 25 = 473 8 S-W River Mid. -
S-W River High 788 -
39 = 749 - 150 = 599 15 (40 per)
Wading River 386 -
19 = 367 _7 Total 38
==
Rocky Point School District Jos. A. Edgar 550 -
27 = 523 9 900 -
45 = 855 15 Rocky Pt. El.
400 -
20 = 380 7 Rocky Pt.-Jun.
-Sen. 800 -
40 = 760 - 152 = 608 16 (40 per)
Total 47
==
Longwood Central School District 1,27F -
63 = 1,212 21 Ridge El.
SG- -
40 = 766 13 l W. Mid. 151. E1.
991 49 = 942 16 Coram E1. -
17 Walters El. 1,042 -
52 = 990 Longwood Jun./f%tak 2,680 -
134 = 2,546 2 ',27 9 - 22'43 1,879 -
93 = 1,786 - 357 = 1,429 36 (40 per)
Longwood High Total 4W, i%
er.
O O O SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS POPULATION 5% I 20%
2 NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE SCHOOLS Miller Place School District N. Country Rd. 425 -
21 = 404 7 Muller Prim. 786 -
39 = 747 13 Sound Beach 600 -
30 = 570 10 Miller Pl. High 807 -
40 = 767 - 153 = 614 16 (40 per)
Total 46
==
Port Jef ferson School District Pt. Jef f Jun. 289 -
14 = 275 5 Pt. Jeff E1. 563 -
28 = 535 9 Vandermeulen High 1,150 -
57 - 1,093 - 218 = 875 22 (40 per)
Total 36
,=
Consewogue School District Clinton Ave E1. 492 -
24 = 468 8 Consewogue Sen. 1,355 -
67 - 1,288 - 257 = 1,031 26 (40 per)
Terryv111e El. 402 -
20 = 332 7 J.F. Kennedy 589 -
29 = 560 10 Total 51
==
Patchogue-Medford School District f
Eagle El. 814 -
40 = 774 Total g3,
1 O O O SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS POPULATION 5% I 20%
2 NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE SCMDOLS Riverhead Central School District Riley Ave. El. 331 -
16 = 315 6 j Pulaski Str. El. 544 -
27 = 517 9 Riverhead Jun. 755 -
37 = 718 12 Riverhead High 1,019 -
51 = %8 - 193 = 775 20_ (40 per)
Total 47
==
- l 4
- South Manor School District
- South Street 500 -
25 = 475 8 I
Dayton Ave. 425 -
21 = 404 7 i Total 15
==
1 Mt. Sinal School District Mt. Sinai Ei. 960 -
48 = 912 16 Mt. Sinal Jun. 854 -
42 = 812 14 Total 30
==
- BOCES Mid-Island Arena 5(a.m.) - 0 = 5 1 (a.m. t. p.m.)
22(p.m.) - 22 l
Total 1 Final Total 449 4*no NOTE: Little Flower Union Free School District is not listed here because LI; 7 treats the one school in its dis-trict as a special facility since its students live there and the school does .ot have its own transportation.
O .
O O SCHOOL BJSES AND DRIVERS SCHOOLS POPULATION 5% 1 20%2 NEEDED FOR ONE WAVE Parochial Schools St. Isidore 2&3 M - -H ti = -222 A5 3 5 Infant Jesus 369 -
18 = 351 6 N. Shore Christian 207 -
10 = 197 4 Total 15
==
Nursery Schools Alphabetland Child 50 -
O = 50 1 Enrichment Center Brookhaven Country 45 -
0 = 45 1 Day School Central Brookhaven 75 -
0 = 75 2 Head Start Coram Child Cara 50 -
0 = 50 1 Center Harbor View Nursery 16 -
0 = 1G 1 School Just Kids Early 120 -
0 = 120 , 3 Childhood Learning Center Middle Island Nursery 13 -
0 = 13 1 School Neighborhood Nursery 12 -
0 = 12 1 School Rainbow Cottage 14 -
0 = 14 1 Riverhead Cooperative 12 -
0 = 12 1 Nursery School Sea Port Pre-School 20 -
0 = 20 1 St. Anselm's Mursery 38 -
0 = 38 1 School St. John's Pre-School 17 -
0 = 17 1
O O O SCHOOL BUSES AND DRIVERS SCHOOLS POPULATION 5% I 20%
2 NEEDED FOR ONE MAVE Sound Beach Pre- 19 -
0 = 19 1 School Co-op Step-by-Step Early 30 -
0 = 30 1 Learning Center Tots'n Toys Pre- 35 -
0 = 35 1 School Learning Center Trinity Lutheran 50 -
G = 50 1 l Nursery School
]
Wading River 32 -
0 = 32 1
- Cooperative Play School Whispering Wonders 50 -
0 = 50 1 Pre-School i World of Children 60 -
O = 60 2 t
Pre-School 100 -
0 = 100
( sim.sner (summer pop.) pop.)
l Total 24 l
4 I
Reduction for daily absences.
2 Reduction for those who drive to school or ride with someone who drives 3
to school - for high schools only.
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T REGULAR BUS DRIVERS EMPLOYED BY OR ON CONTRACT TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE SHOREHAM 10-MILE EPZ Number of Regular School Districts School Bus Drivers Shoreham-Wading River 30 Central School District Rocky Point School District 26 Longwood Central School District 94 21 Miller Place School District 14 Port Jefferson School District Comsevogue School District
- 21 l
Patchogue-Medford School District
- 11 47
( ') Riverhead Central School District
- 10 l South Manor School District 27 f Mt. Sinai School District
- These school districts have schools located both inside and outside of the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ.
1 O
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P AT ' CHMENT F O
Draft For a complete summary of each organization , and its ransportation and relocation plans , refer to the Evacuation P cedures of this Appendix.
Schools -
This section covers public and private schools , including nurse. schools, which are listed in Section IV of thi Appendix.
fficials of public and private schools loc ed in the 10-mile Em rgency Planning Zone (EPZ) as well as s , ocls located outside the Z but with students who live in th EPZ have the responsibility in a radiological emergency of .oviding their students with th . best possible protection, are are three general alternatives aval ble to provide for the fety of the children during an emergency. The first alternatd e is an early dismissal, whereby all students ould be returned o their homes. The second alternative is e.vacuati n, whereby al students would be relocated to reception centers outs'de the 10 ile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The third alternat.ve is eltering students at their schools until conditions are a for the children to either return home or be relocated. The be
] nature of the emergency , pl alternative will depend on the t e nditions, weather conditions, and time of day. The specific course f action recommended for each l emergency classification is discuss below, l In the event f an emergency, schools in session will be notified of any Aler or higher emergen v classification by the l
Emergency Broadcas System and by telepho e. Each public school district, paroch al senool, and nursery sch ol in the EPZ will have a tone alert r eiver which will automatical < activate and trans=it the EBS messy e. The EBS message will advise e schools to implement pecific protective actions and may co sin general informat' n about the condition of the plant , radi logical condit ns, etc. In addition, each school district uper.acendent and i dividual in charge of the private schools in the EPZ vill be l
i con acted by telephone by either the Public Schools Coo inntor or P .vate Schools Coordinator te vorify that the EBS =essag was j
eceived and to receive requests for additional assistance.
l O
II-19 Rev. 5 l 4
I 4
11 13 EE:mj1rev10 14 While LERO will advise the school officials on what protective actions should
(]14 17 18 taken, e final decision lies _with the School District Superintendant and private chool gd-20 ministrato. . LERO will broadcast EBS messages announcing the protective a ions taken 21 by each schoo trict and private gehool.
23 24 If an Alert o her emergency classification is declared when chools are in the o protective action recommendation has n given to the public, 25 process of opening, an 26 school officials will be adv to have arriving buses return th . gtudents to their homes, and to have students who do n t normally use buses return h e in their usual manner. If 28 30 !chool is not in session and an Al t or higher emergency _lassification is declared, school in the EPZ until the emergency is 31 officials will be advised to cancel el es for all sch 33 terminated.
l
! 34
_1f an Alert or Site Area Emergency is clared while !chools are in session, schools 35
- iti de a evisee to ais m iss th eir ato oe ots ear 27 11 av schoot eistrictintor=> tra o that l
O se they gre not implementing early dism , then LER will mobilize the LERO school bus l 37 drivers for all schools. If a parochi or pursery school orms LERO that they are not im-39 ed buses Irom the Patchogue 40 plementing early _ dismissal, then ERO will mobilize the n 42 Staging Area as a special disp tch. .
l 43 If schools within e EPZ are still in session when a protectiv action is recom-44 l advised to take l l 45 mended for the gener public in any grea of the EPZ, the schools will 1 o action is rec-46 the same protecti e action. That is,if some combination of sheltering and 48 ommended for e general public, then the gehools would be advised to shelter nd put their for the l 49 buses on gt dby. If some combination of sheltering and evacuation is recommen 51 general ublic, then the schools would be advised to evacuate to the School Relocatio Cen-52 ters If schools are in the process of opening, then they will be advised to implement sh -
54 t .ing or evacuation, as appropriate, when their students arrive.
56 56 II-20 Draft 56
l 0
7 ,
8 I 9
57 pon a decision by school officials to evacuate schools in the EPZ, school children 58 will be tr ported by bus directly to one of two centers outside the EPZ that have .
59 designated relocation centers: the Nassau Coliseum or the Nassau Community 11ege.
61 Facilities at th Coliseum and the Community College are adequate to accom ate all of 62 the apporixmately 8,000 children enrolled in public and private schools in e EPZ. Some 64 schools, however, ha made arrangements to use gther f acilities as rel ation centers.
66 67 School districts on ong Island provide bus transportation f approximately one half 68 of their students. School dis 'ets _also provide some transport ion for parochial schools.
70 Private schools provide minim transportation. Thus,in t gvent of an emergency 71 requiring evacuaticn, school distri in the EPZ would unable by themselves to evacuate 72 all students at the same time. To pro de for the c ability of a "one-wave" evacuation, 74 LERO has arranged with various bus som anies Long Island to obtain "first-call" rights to gnough additional buses so that when co ned with buses already provided by the 75 O schools, all school children could be gvac ated - one "wave" of buses. The number of buses J 77 f 78 required is based upon 40 high school udents per us or 60 elementary !chool students per 80 bus.
81 82 LERO will provide ad tional trained auxiliary bus rivers to ensure that all neces-RO bus drivers will be pre-assign to designated bus yards and 83 sary buses are manned.
atically if an evacuation is recommen or if any public school dis-84 will _be mobilized aut trict does not im ement early _ dismissal while schools are in sessi . Bus drivers will pick 86 88 up dosimetry d school assignments at the bus yards. This gquipme
- will be either stored l
at the bus ard or brought by a LERO school bus driver to the bus yard. ERO bus drivers 89 vallable to drive LERO-supplied buses and any regular gehool bus f " which a regu-90 will _
92 lar ver is not available. The plan provides enough LERO bus drivers to ens e 150 per-93 ent of total bus driver needs.
97 11-20e orert t
O 8794 1 97
( 97 l
l l
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i Students will be transported by bus to a pre-assigne ocation either at the Nassau Coliseum or the Nassau Commund y
(]) C 'lege where they will wait to be picked up by their pare.ts or gua. inns. LEP.O bus drivers will park their buses and a sist teach rs and parents at the school relocation centers.. Regular bus drivers will proceed to the EVDF for monitoring and, f necessary, decontam stion .
In ose situations where school offic is have pre-designated elocation facilities on their vn, LERO will provide transportation a sistance to these facilitie as requested.
l Those scho is outside the EPZ wh ch have students living in the school the EPZ vill be requeqted to retain the e students at whentheschooldayend(,ifanyprot tive actions are recommended for the general public id any area o the EPZ.
Schools N rse.
Nursery schools will advised to implement the same protective actions as the p lie d private schools for each l
I l
l II-20b Rev. o
i
- mergcaer classification and recommended protective action. .
t e nursery schools are advised to evacuate the children to e-cep ion centers, LERO will provide the necessary transoort tion.
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II-21 1
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OPIP 3.6.5 i Page 63 of 75 Attac ent 14 O- Page 1 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE
- 1. Upon 11out LERO School Bus Drivers should re rt to bus yard design ed on callout sheet. Listen to WPLR 9.1 FM) or other EBS rad station for emergency status. The callout sheet also indicates if you are a primary or backup dr var.*
- 2. At bus yard proceed to the bus yard . dis tcher's office.
Inform the b yard dispatcher that:
a) There is Shoreham emergency an that you are a LERO School Bus river.
b) You have a cu rent New York ate Class 2 Driver's License.
c1) (If you are a b kup drive You are availabl if nee children d to drive a bus to support an evacuation of the choo or accompany a regular school bus driver.
(If you are a primar driver)
([) c2)
Request that a bus e signed.to you.
- 3. After a bus has been signed o you, obtain an Assignment Packet from the LERO ex. (Th LERO box will either be s tored in the bus yard dis etcher's of ce or brought by one of the LERO bus drivers) . If accompanyi g a regular bus driver, pick a packet for that us drivers regu ar school assignment. If all packets hav already been taken, report to the Bus Dispatcher at e Patchogue Staging ea.
l 4. Ensura the A signment Packet contains:
a) One 0 200 mR Direct Reading Dosimete (DRD) b) On 0-5R DRD c) e Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) d) Two KI tablets Emergency Worker Dose Record Form (OPIP 3.9.1, Act. 2) f) Emergency Worker Bus Driver Badge
() g) Bus Lease Receipt Form (OPIP 3.6.4, Atc .14) h) Directions to School
- See definition on page )(of 3 Draft A
t OPIP 3.6.5 Page 64 of 75 O Att heent 14 Pa 2 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (Continued) i) Dirac ions to School Relocation Cent j) Directi s to the EWDF k) Directions to Patchogue Staging rea l 1) School Reloca ion Center Area iagram m) School Relocati Center Lo ation Assignments n) School Children Lo Out rc o) LERO School bus driv
- procedure O P) otractio=s to the r q) Pen or Pencil
- 5. If you heard that a eneral emerg cy has been declared, swallow one KI tab t. If you are iding a bur. with a Regular Driver provide he with a KI tablet f she has received dosimetry traini .
- 6. Fill out Part of the Emergency Wotker ose Record Form.
Check both D s to ensure they are readin betweer. zero and 207.
of full sea . If necessary zero the dosi ter us,ing a dosime.ter arger in the box. Enter the rea ings in the column marked "Ip tial" in Part II of the Emergency orker Dose Record Form. Kfep all 3 parts of this form with you.
- 7. Clip b th DRDs and the TLD to your outer clothing n the upper part f your body. Read DRD's every 15 minutes.
- 8. Pr ary Bus Drivers should examine the assigned bus a d fill o t Bus Lease Receipt Form. Leave Pink Copy with the s yard l 1spatcher,
- 9. Proceed to the designated school. Identify yourself to a school staff member and inform them you are available to ass st O in evacuating the school if needed.
- 10. When directed by school personnel assist in loading children.
/ Request that a school staff member accompanies the children.
Draft
OPIP 3.6.5 Pa 65 of 75 O A achment 14 ge 3 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (Continued)
- 11. Take the ildren to the designated relo ation center, unless told diffe nely by the school staff m ar. The school repreaantati e has final say on the b destination.
- 12. Provide the se col representative w h the School Relocation Center Location ssignments and th School Children Log Out i Form.
- 13. Upon arrival at the School Re1 ation Center drop off children at the location desi ated on he School Relocation Center Area
, Diagram, i
- 14. Park the bus and take th eys with you.
(]) 15. Proceed to the School R o ation n Center Assignment Station Center Area Maps and pick up an shown on the School Re cat assignment packet. .
- 16. Perform the assignm t identifihd in the packet.
- 17. When told that yo r job is comple d by a School Relocation Center Staff me- er, proceed to th EWDF. ;
- 18. At the EWDF, rn in your dos tmetry, we copies of Emergency Worker Dose ecord Form and the Yellow opy of your Bus Lease -
Receipt Fo .
- 19. Return to the Bus Yard.
s Lease Receipt
- 20. Prima Bus Drivers fill out Part II of Give the th completed form Form. Ensure that you sign the form.
to t bus company dispatcher before leaving th bus yard.
NOTE: If you have any problems contact the Special acilities Evacuation Cr ordinator at the EOC at .
O Draft
OPIP 3 6.5 Page a of 75 Atta ent 14 O- Pa 3a of 3 l
! LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (Continued) t De finitions
! Primary Driver - LERO School Bus Driver who rives a bus from a bus yard that does not no ally provide buses to chools within the EPZ.
Backup Driver - L 0 School Bus Driver who drives a bus from a bus ard that normal provides buses to schools w!th the EPZ. Th drivers will drive buses when rected by t bus yard dispatcher or accomp y the reg ar driver.
Reguisr Driver - A bus dri er wh regularly drives school buses on a daily ba s. An employee of the Bus Company or School Dist t.
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- - _ _ _ _ . . , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - . _ _ ,_ . _ _ , . . - _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ , . . . . _ _ _ - - _ ~ . _
r a
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION V
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) (School Bus Driver Issue)
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY ON THE REMANDED LSSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS
- 1. Q. Please state your name and business address.
A. [Crocker] My name is Douglas M. Crocker. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company,131 Hoffman Lane, Central Islip. New York 11722.
O 2. Q. Please state your professional qualifications.
A. (Crocker] My professional qualifications and background are detailed on i pages 1 and 4-5 of our earlier testimony, Testimony of Crocker, et al. on the Remanded Issue of ' Role Conflict' of School Bus Drivers, dated April 13, i 1988. My resume is Attachment 1 to that testimony.
l
- 3. Q. Would you briefly describe the purpose and scope of this supplemental testi-mony?
A. (Crocker] This testimony does three things: 1)it replaces Attachment M (draf t pages 11-19 through II-21 of the plan) and Attachment N (draf t OPIP 3.6.3, Attachment 14) to our earlier testimony on "role conflict" with At-tachments O and P, respectively, which contain the Revision 10 versions of
, those pages and procedure, 2)it describes the changes that were made to l O those eraf t portions of tne pian, and 3)it describes two aeditionai changes in Revision 10 that effect LERO's school bus driver program.
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- 4. What is Revision 10 of the LERO Plan?
A. (Crocker] Revision 10 is the most recent update of the LERO Plan. It in-corporates the FEMA RAC's comments on Revision 9 and addresses some of the concerns raised by the Frye Board in its initial decision on the 1986 Shoreham exercise. Revision 10 will be distributed to the Board and all parties within the next two weeks. Those portions of the LERO Plan that are attached to this testimony and that are discussed here are the same portions that will appear in Revision 10.
- 5. What changes have been made in Revision 10 that are different from that contained in Attachments M and N to your earlier testimony?
A. (Crocker) Revision 10 makes one change to the plan pages in Attachment M. That is, page II-20a of Revision 10 now states LILCO's understanding l that some regular school bus drivers take their buses home during the O school ear. it furtner states titCOs beitef thet tnese erivers. et a mini-mum, will return their buses to the bus yard to pick up their own vehicle before evacuating 11 they decide not to drive during a Shoreham emergen-cy.
Revision 10 also makes some minor changes to the LERO School Bus Driver Procedure, OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14, which is Attachment N to LILCO's earlier testimony. Generally, it elaborates on what each LERO school bus driver will do if called upon to evacuate schools. It also states that each bus should be loaded with 2 students per seat for high school and 3 per seat for elementary and junior high. These additions to the procedure conform with what I said in my earlier testimony. The procedure also states LERO's intention to provide each regular bus driver who has not re-ceived LERO training with KI (potassium lodide) and a TLD for her use if 1
. . I
one of our drivers accompanies her on the bus. (11 the regular driver drives alone, then she would receive the complete assignment packet herself.)
- 6. Are there other changes in Revision 10 that affect LILCO's approach to its school bus driver program?
A. (Crocker] Yes, there are two other minor changes. First., LERO has de-cided to provide 21 extra LERO drivers to evacuate the Longwood Mid-die / Junior High School. See OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 3a (Rev.10). In Revi-sion 9 of the Plan we provided only enough drivers to transport half of the student population, since this school is on split ses!, low Ne have since de-cided, however, to provide enough drivers to evacuate the total student population at this school, because there is a small window of time when all of the students are at the school at the same time.
The other change in Revision 10 afIects how LERO would provide transportation for handicapped studets who attend school in the EPZ. If O
schools are in session. LERO's Revision 9 procedures provide that the LERO school coordinators in the EOC will call each school district and private school to see what action the schools intend to take and to see if they need assistance. Under Revision 10, they will also ask each school district and private schools if they need any special vehicles to evacuate handicapped i
students. See OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 1 (Rev.10). If the schools do need special vehicles, LERO will dispatch ambulettes to the schools to evacuate l
the handicapped students.
l
- 7. Does this conclude your supplemental testimony?
A. [Crockee) Yes.
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Attachment O e
,3 For a complete summary of each organization, and its
\J transportation and relocation plans, refer to the Evacuation Procedures of this Appendix.
Schools This section covers public and private schools , including nursery schools, which are listed in Section IV of this Appendix.
Officials of public and private schools located in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) as well as schools located outside the EPZ but with students who '.ive in the EPZ have the responsibility in a radiological emergency of providing their students with the best possible protection. There are three general alternatives available to provide for the safety of the children during an emergency. The first alternative is an early dismissal, whereby all students would be returned to their homes. The second alternative is evacuation, whereby all students would be relocated to reception centers outside the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The third alternative is sheltering students at their schools until conditiens are sa fe for the children to either return l
home or be relocated. The best alternative .zill depend on the nature of the emergency, plant conditions, weather conditions, and time of day. The specific course of action recommended for each emergency classificaticn is discussed below.
In the event of an emergency, schools in session will be f
j notified of any Alert or higher emergency classification by the Emergency Broadcast System and by telephone. Each public school district, parochial school, and nursery school in the EPZ will have a tone alert receiver which will automatically activate and transmit j the EBS message. The EBS message will advise the schools to implement specific protective actions and may contain general i information about the condition of the plant, radiological conditions, etc. In addition, each school district superintendent and individual in charge of the private schools in the EPZ will be contacted by telephone by either the Public Schools Coordinator or Private Schools Coordinator to verify that the EBS message was received and to receive requests for additional assistance.
()
l 11-19 Rev. 5
While LERO will advise the school officials on what protective actions should be taken, the final decision lies with the School District Superintendant and private school administrators.
LERO will broadcast EBS messages announcing the protective actions taken by each school district and private school.
If an Alert or higher emergency classification is declared when schools are in the process of opening, and no protective action recommendation has been given to the public, school officials will be advised to have arriving buses return their students to their homes , and to have students who do not normally use buses return home in their usual manner. If school is not in session and an Alert or higher emergency classification is declared, school officials will be advised to cancel classes for all schools in the EPZ until the emergency is terminated.
If an Alert or Site Area Emergency is declared while schools are in session, schools will be advised to either cancel school or dismiss their students early. If any school district informs LERO that they are not implementing the recommended action, then LERO will mobilize the LERO school bus driver for all schools.
If a parochial or nursery school informs LERO that they are not implementing early dismissal, then LERO will mobilize the needed buses from the Patchogue Staging Area as a special dispatch. l l
If schools within the EPZ are still in session when a protective action is recommended for the general public in any area
- of the EPZ, the schools will be advised to take the same protective action. That is , if some combination of sheltering and no action is l recommended for the general public, then the schools would be advised to shelter and put their buses on standby. If some combination of sheltering and evacuation is recommended for the general public, then the schools would be advised to evacuate to the l School Relocation Centers. If schools are in the process of opening, then they will be advised to implement sheltering or evacuation, as appropriate, when their students arrive.
II-20 Rev. 10
_. - ~ _ .__
1
-s Upon a decision by school officials to evacuate schools in
- the EPZ, school children will be transported by bus directly to one of two centers outside the EPZ that have been designated as relocation centers: the Nassau Coliseum or the Nassau Community College. Facilities at the Coliseum and the Community College are adequate to accommodate all of the approximately 28,000 children
< enrolled in public and private schools in the EPZ. Some schools, however, have made arrangem:nts to use other facilities as relocation centers.
School districts on Long Island provide bus transportation for approximately one half of their students. School districts also provide some transportation for parochial schools. Private schools provide minimal transportation. Thus, in the event of an emergency requiring evacuation, school districts in the EPZ would be unable by themselves to evacuate all students at the same time. To provide for the capability of a "one-wave" evacuation, LERO has arranged with various bus companies on Long Island to obtain "first-call"
( rights to enough additional buses so that when combined with buses already provided by the schools, all school children could be evacuated in one "wave" o f buses . The number of buses required is based upon 40 high school students per bus or 60 elementary school students per bus.
It is often the case that the regular school bus drivers take their buses home during the school day. In the case of an evacuation, these buses will be mobilized by the low yard dispatcher. Even if the regular school bus driver decides not to drive their bus during a Shoreham emergency it is presumed (s)he would return in the bus to the bus yard to pick up her personal car; thus making the bus available for a LERO bus driver.
LERO will provide additional trained auxiliary bus drivers to ensure that all necessary buses are manned. LERO bus drivers will be pre-assigned to designated bus yards and will be mobilized
( automatically if an evacuation is recommended or if any public l II-20a Rev. 10
. . o-----_-__---_----------_----
school district does not implement early dismissal while schools are
()- in session. Bus drivers will pick up dosimetry and school l
assignments at the bus yards. This equipment will be either stored at the bus yard or brought by a LERO school bus driver to the bus yard. LERO bus drivers will be available to drive LER0-supplied buses and any regular school bus for which a regular driver is not available. The plan provides enough LERO bus drivers to ensure 150 percent of total bus driver needs.
Students will be transported by bus to a pre-assigned location either at the Nassau Coliseum or the Nassau Community College where they will wait to be picked up by their parents or guardians. LERO bus drivers will park their buses and assist teachers and parents at the school relocation centers. Regular bus drivers will proceed to the. EWDF for monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination ,
h In those situations where school of ficials have
(~i/
s pre-designated relocation facilities on their own, LERO will provide ,
transportation assistance to these facilities as requested.
l l Those schools outside the EPZ which have students living in the EPZ will be requested to retain those s tudents at the school when the school day ends, if any protective actions are recommended l for the general public in any area of the EPZ.
Nursery Schools Nursery schools will be advised to implement the same protective actions as the public and private schools for each A
V II-20b Rev. 10
t . ..
emergency classification and recommended protective action. If the nursery schools are advised to evacuate the children to reception centers, LERO will provide the necessary transportation.
6 0
4 O
II-21 Re v. 3
Attachment P OPIP 3.6.5
() Page 63 of 75 Attachment 14 Page 1 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE
- 1. Upon callout LERO School Bus Drivers should report to bus yard designated on callout sheet. Listen to WPLR (99.1 FM) or other EBS radio station for emergency status. The callout sheet also indicates if you are a primary or backup driver.*
- 2. At bus yard, proceed to the bus yard dispatcher's office.
Inform the bus yard dispatcher that:
a) There is a Shoreham emergency and that you are a LERO School Bus Driver.
b) You have a current New York State Class 2 Driver's License, c1) (If you are a backup driver) l You are available if needed to drive a bus to support an evacuation of the school children or to accompany a regular school bus driver.
O
(/ c2) (If you are a primary driver) l Request that a bus be asc4gned to you.
- 3. After a bus has been assigned to you, obtain an Assignment Packet from the LERO box. (The LERO box will either be stored in the bus yard dispatcher's office or brought to the bus yard by one of the LERO bus drivers) . If accompanying a regular bus driver, pick a packet for one of that bus driver s regular school assignment. If all packets have already been taken,
, report to the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area.
l Directions to the Patchogue Staging Area are contained in the LERO box.
- 4. Ensure the Assignment Packet contains:
a) One 0-200 mR Direct Reading Dosimeter (DRD) b) One 0-5R DRD i
l c) Two Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) d) Two KI tablets l
e) Emergency Worker Dose Record Form (OPIP 3.9.1, Att. 2)
(]) f) Emergency Worker Bus Driver Badge
- See definition on page 3a of 3 l
l Rev. 10 l
1 l .
. . OPIP 3.6.5 Page 64 of 75 Q~T Attachment 14 Page 2 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (continued) g) Bus Lease Receipt Form (OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 14) h) Map to School
- 1) Map to School Relocation Center j) Map to the EWDF k) KI Manufacturer's Brochure
- 1) School Relocation Center Area Diagram m) School Relocation Center Location Assignments n) School Children Log Out Form
() o) LERO School bus driver procedure p) Suffolk and Nassau Road Atlas q) Peas or Pencils
- 5. If you have heard that a general emergency has been declared, swallow one KI tablet. If you are riding a bus with a Regular Driver provide her with the second KI tablet and ask her to read the KI brochure.
- 6. Fill out Part I of the Emergency Worker Dose Record Form.
Check both DRDs to ensure they are reading between zero and 20%
of full scale. If necessary zero the dosimeter using a l
[ dosimeter charger in the box. Enter the readings in the column l marked "Initial" in Part II of the Emergency Worker Dose Record Form. Keep all 3 parts of this form with you.
! part of your body. Read DRD's every 15 minutes. If riding the l bus with a regular driver provide the second TLD to her.
- 8. Primary Bus Drivers should examine the assigned bus and fill out Bus Lease Receipt Form. Leave Pink Copy with the bus yard dispatcher.
O Rev. 10 l
l s :
1 OPIP 3.6.5
()
Page 65 of 75 Attachment 14 Page 3 of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (continued)
- 9. Proceed to the designated school. Identify yourself to a l school staff member and inform them you are available to assist in evacuating the school if needed.
- 10. When directed by school personnel assist in loading children.
Ask them to fill each bus completely (2 per seat for high school, 3 per seat for elementary / junior high) . Request that at least one school staff member accompanies the children.
- 11. Take the children to the designated relocation center, unless l told differently by the school staff member. The school representative has final say on the bus destination.
- 12. Provide the school representative with the School Relocation l Center Location Assignments and the School Children Log Out Form. Ask the school representative to fill out the log out O- form.
- 13. Upon arrival at the School Relocation Center drop of f children l at the location designated on the School Relocation Center Area Diagram.
- 14. Park the bus and take the keys with you.
- 15. Proceed to the School Relocation Center Assignment Station I shown on the School Relocation Center Area Maps and pick up an assignment packet.
- 16. Perform the assignment identified in the packet. l
- 17. When told that your job is completed by a School Relocation l Center Staff member, proceed to the EWDF.
i 18. At the EWDF, turn in your dosimetry and two copies of Emergency
! Worker Dose Record Form. If two drivers were on the same bus, have the Dosimetry Recordkeeper fill out a Dose Record Form for the driver who did not fill one out previously.
- 19. Primary drivers should also turn in the yellow copy of the bus lease receipt form.
O Rev. 10
OPIP 3.6.5
/^i Page 65a of 75
\> Attachment 14 Page 3a of 3 LERO SCHOOL BUS DRIVER PROCEDURE (continued)
- 20. Return to the Bus Yard.
- 21. Primary Bus Drivers fill out Part II of the Bus Lease Receipt Form. Ensure thnt you sign the form. Give the completed form to the bus company dispatcher before leaving the bus yard.
NOTE: If you have any problems contact the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator at the EOC at .
De finitions Primary Driver - LERO School Bus Driver who drives a bus from a l
bus yard that does not normally provide buses to schools within the EPZ.
n Backup Driver - LERO School Bus Driver who drives a bus from a
(,)
bus yard that normally provides buses to schools within the EPZ. The drivers will drive buses when directed by the bus yard dispatcher or will accompany the regular driver.
! Ragular Driver - A bus driver who regularly drives school buses on a daily basis . An employee of the Bus Company or School District.
l l
l l
(2)
Rev. 10
i LILCO, May 6,1988 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1)
Docket No. 50 322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLE-MENTAL TESTIMONY and LILCO'S SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY ON THE REMANDED ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS were served this date upon the following by telecopier as indicated by one asterisk, by Federal Express as indicated by two asterisks, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
James P. Gleason, Chairman ** Adjudicatory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing 513 Gilmoure Drive Board Panel Decket Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline **
A tomic Safety and Licensing Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
- Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North East-West Towers, Rm. 427 11555 Rockville Pike 4350 East-West Hwy. Rockville, MD 20852 Bethesda MD 20814 Herbert H. Brown. Esq.
- Mr. Frederick J. Shon ** Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J. Letsche. Esq.
Board Kirkpatrick & Lockhart U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South Lobby - 9th Floor East-West Towers, Rm. 430 1800 M Street, N.W.
4350 East-West Hwy. Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Bethesda, MD 20814 Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- Secretary of the Commission Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Attention Docketing and Service Special Counsel to the Governor Section Executive Chamber U.S. NLclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 1717 H Street, N.W. State Capitol Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, New York 12224 Atomic Safety and Licensing Alfred L. Nardelli, Esq.
Appeal Board Panel Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 120 Broadway
] Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 3-118 New York, New York 10271 1 * -.
,..,-,J
k' -
!]
George W. Watson, Esq.
- Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq. Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Evan A. Davis, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq.
Stephen B. Latham, Esq. " Suffolk County Attorney Twomey, Latham & Shea Building 158 North County Complex 33 West Second Street Veterans Memorial Highway P.O. Box 298 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Riverhead, New York 11901 Dr. Monroe Schneider Mr. Philip McIntire North Shore Committee Federal Emergency Management P.O. Box 231 Agency Wading River, NY 11792 26 Federal Plaza New York. New York 10278 O
Jonathan D. Feinberg. Esq.
New York State Department of Public Service, Staff Counsel Three Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223 f
Star $ Q [
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: May 6.1988 O
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ --_A_-_--_
19432 1 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: The State has no 2 objection subject to those qualifications.
3 JUDGE GLEASON: Yes. I apologize, Mr.
4 Zahnleuter. I look at you as one at times. I know 5 you are separate.
6 MR. CHRISTMAN: Thank you, Judge 7 Gleason. With that, the witnesses are available for 8 cross-examination.
9 JUDGE GLEASON: Let me take up a 10 technical matter. It would be very, very helpful, 11 Mr. Christman--I say this to other parties, 12 too--when we have extensive changes like this, minor 13 or major, if we are given the changes ahead of time
{} 14 and all the parties--and we can save ourselves a lot of time when we get into a proceeding like this.
15 16 MR. McMURRAY: I might also add, Judge 17 Gleason, it would be proper, if it is known just a 18 couple days ahead of time, that the party be given 19 notices of the changes. Some of the changes were 20 substantial changes and substantive changes. I have 21 prepared based on testinony that is no longer there.
22 JUDGE GLEASON: I agree with you, Mr.
23 McMurray. Without characterizing the dimensions of 24 the 278, it really is not fair to all parties to 25 have to deal with this thing on the day of hearing O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
_ _ . _ . . . . . . . . . .....-..s
t 19433 I
~g 1 itself.
(J 2 MR. CHRISTMAN: We will certainly do 3 tht A in the future.
4 JUDGE GLEASON: Thank you.
5 All right, gentlemen. The witnesses 6 are available for your cross-examination.
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 3 BY MR. McMURRAY:
\
9 Q. Mr. Kelly, you are a new player in this 10 game so let me start with you first.
11 You work for the day F. Weston, Inc.
12 company. Is that right?
l 13 A. (Kelly) Incorporated. Correct.
() 14 Q. Does it have anything to do with 15 emergency planning?
- 6
. A. (Kelly) The oonsulting firm is 17 involved in a wide range of environnental areas, one 18 of which is emergency planning.
19 Q. Are you the sole emergency planner at 20 Weston?
i 21 A. (Kelly) No. There are a numoer of I
22 people who have emergency planning experienca l 23 s#031ar to my own.
24 Q, The issue we are going to be 25 .s. t least for the rest of today, is role COi:P ti ~ ,.DED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
f 19434 1 conflict. Have you ever studied or evaluated the 2 issue of role conflict prior to being hired by 3 LILCO?
4 A. (Kelly) To a small extent, this was 5 part--this issue was addressed on another study I 6 was doing for another client.
7 Q. What study is that?
8 A. (Kelly) It is a study of evacuations 9 that ec are performing for another client.
10 Q. Was role conflict specificelly one of 11- the issues you were asked to address with respect to 12 that other client?
l 13 A. (Kelly) The other study was more 1
() 14 broadly based than just this issue and only, I 15 believe, two elements of the entire study addressed 16 that. Those specifically were one question that we 17 tried to get answers on in that study concerning
! 18 school bus drivers abandoning their roles, if you 19 will. Another question addressed emergency 20 organizations, role abandonment.
21 Q. Was the asue role abandonment because 22 of role conflict or just role abandonment, peried?
I 23 A. (Kelly) Basically, the questions asksd 24 if e!.ther hhese emergency organizations or l 25 specifically on the other question, the school l
l
($)
COMPUTER AIDED TRANS:;RIPTION/ keyword index a
19435
{} l 2
buses, failed to parform their roles, their emergency functions. It was primarily role 3 abandonment.
4 Q. For that study, I believe you lookel at 5 50 emergencies. Is that correct?
6 A. (Kelly) 52.
7 Q. 52. And in those, how many involved 8 bus drivers?
9 7.. (Kelly) I believe, 19 in total.
10 Q. Basically, for this testimony, you are 11 looking at the same data base that you compiled for 12 your other clier.t, is that correct?
l 13 A. (Kelly) Initially, that's correct. We
() 14 looked at that data base.
15 Q. Have you ever read the literature on 16 role conflict prior to being hired by LILCO?
17 A. (Kelly) I have read numerous disaster 18 research books that I know contain information on 19 that, but I didn't specifically read that because of 20 role conflict.
21 . Q. Well, is this an issue that you were 22 aware of as emergency planning concern prior to 23 being hired by LILCO?
24 A. (Kelly) Not really, because it was 25 never really an issue in any other cases that I was COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index j
19436 e
(~ 1 involved in that I cah recall.
s 2 Q. You say you have been retained as a 1
3 consultant by LILCO to collect data on bus drivers. .
4 I take it from your previous answers that you have 5 also, aside from collecting that data, tabulated 6 that data?
7 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
8 Q. And, now, the data we are talking about 9 now are survey deta? Correct?
10 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
11 Q. Did you also interpret that data in any 12 way?
f 13 A. (Kelly) Yes. I looked at that and
() 14 tabulated it and looked for interesting items, along 15 with the other two people who were involved in that 16 survey.
17 Q. Did you actually compile the raw data 18 or did you have someone else do it?
19 A. (Kelly) We had a number of people at 20 Weston that actually talked to the individuals that 21 we interviewed.
22 Q. We will get into that more later.
23 Did your study for your other client 24 involve at all the behavior of emergency workers?
25 You may have said it involved role abandonment in O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
f d
19437 G 1 general.
O 2 A. (Kelly) Role abandonment of bus 3 drivers and generally role abandonment by emergency 4 organizations. But that was the extent.
5 Q. Why was your other client concerned 6 specifically about bus drivers and then in general 7 other emergency workers?
8 A. (Kelly) They--we were retained by this 9 client to look at ovacur.tions to help determine what 10 factors ma.ke for successful evacuations. One of 11 those issues just happened to be role abandonnent 12 and that was suggested by the client.
i 13 Q. Why did the client specifically select i
() 14 bus drivers as a specific group to be looked at?
15 A. (Kally) They had suggested in their--I 16 believe it was probably contained in their request 17 for proposal, a number of items that were to bo 18 looked at, and that was one of them. To be honest 19 with you, I never really requested why that specific 20 item was there as opposed to any other ,; tem.
21 Q. Was there a suggestion that bus drivers l
l 22 might be more susceptible to role conflict than 23 other emergency workers?
l 24 A. (Kelly) That was never discussed.
l l
25 Q. But,.nevertheless, they were singled i
A l %-)
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
t_
19438 1 out as a group to be looked at?
2 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
3 Q. Dr. Lindell, on page three of your 4 testimony, you state that you have conducted three 5 types of research, two of them risk perception and 6 warning response, seem fairly specific to me. Tha 7 third one is emergency planning. Dc.es your research 8 on emergency planning include any specific research 9 on role conflict?
10 A. (Lindell) No. The research that is 11 referenced there has to do with the factors that 12 induce local organizations or actually communities l
13 to become involved and make commitments to become 14 involved in emergency planning. So, the answer is
(~}
15 in that, we did not specifically look at role i
16 conflict.
17 Q. Just below that, you talk about 18 emergencies in which you have performed--in which 19 you have personally collected data. Did any of the 20 data that you gathered in these emergencies deal 21 with role conflict?
22 A. (Lindell) No, it did not. We were 1
23 looking at how people responded to evacuation 24 warnings. We also collected some add 3tional 25 information about how energency personnel responded.
l l
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index L_ .
19439 1 We did not specifically ask questions about role
)
2 conflict because we had read the literature at that 3 time and there was no indication that role conflict 4 was a problem.
5 Q. You are talking about the literature 6 such as you have cited in your testimony by Dr.
7 Mileti and others?
8 A. (Lindell) That is correct.
9 Q. Have you ever done any data collection 10 on role conflict?
11 A. (Lindell) We have not--I had not 12 previously gone out and asked questions specifically l
13 about role conflict. When we talked to people in l
l
() 14 these evacuations we asked questions of the 15 organizational informants as to what problems they 16 had. In none of those cases did people volunteer 17 the information that they had experienced role 18- conflict to the degree that it resulted in role 19 abandonment.
20 Q. They didn't volunteer it but you didn't 21 specifically ask about it; correct?
22 A. (Lindell) That's correct.
l 23 Q. Mr. Crocker, you mention on page four 24 that you didn't participate in emergency response to 25 Hurricane Gloria. Did you experience role conflict?
l
() COMPUTER AIDED TBANSCRIPTION/ keyword index l
1
19440
- 1 A. (Crocker) No, sir. The day before the 2 hurricane I was up at the Ginna Station in New York 3 City. In fact, I was observing their annual 4 exercise with the NRC. We caught the last plane in 5 and a lot of these arrangements had already been set 6 up before I even landed. I was effectively out of 7 action.
8 Q. You state that you volunteered Jo serve 9 in LILCO's restoration efforts, et cetera. Your 10 efforts were post-impact. Correct?
11 A. (Crocker) Yes. The day after the 12 hurricane. We were struggling to recover from a I We needed every able body.
13 large amount of damage.
(} 14 15 It was after the hurricane had passed.
You also mentioned an event in Q.
16 Massachusetts as a result of a blizzard. Did you 17 play any emergency role in that incident?
18 A. (Crocker) No. I would characterize 19 myself as victim in that one.
20 Q. Were you evacuated?
l
' 21 A. (Crocker) No. Evacuees were relocated 22 to where I was.
23 Q. You were a victim because you didn't 24 want any evacuees where you were?
25 A. (Crocker) Well, they were pretty nice COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
-- _ - . . , _ , _ . - - - - _ _ , ___,m_,
19441
{} 1 2
people but we worin snowed in for the better part of a week. We weren' t allowed to drive. The National 3 Guard had essentially taken over the town. It was 4 half fun and half very annoying.
5 Q. You were not an emergency worker in 6 that?
7 A. (Crocker) I clearly was not.
8 Q. Mr. Kelly, you state you have been 9 involved in emergency responses to several natural 10 and technological emergencies. Is that correct?
11 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
12 Q. Were any of those radiological 23 emergencies?
() 14 A. (Kelly) No, with the possible 15 exception of a nuclear weapon threat that may have 16 occurred shortly after I joined--I was involved its a 17 discussion of that, and I don't know if it was a 18 post-accident, but that did not require any major 19 emergency response by anyone other than the Federal 20 Government.
21 But to answer your question more 22 directly, for the most part, no, none of these were 23 radiological incidents.
24 Q. Was the incident you were talking about 25 regarding the nuclear weapon one of the incidents O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19442 i 1 listed here on page four of your testimony?
bg 2 A. (Kelly) No, it was not.
3 Q. You were involved more in discussions 4 with other people about it?
5 A. (Kelly) That's correct. The State was 6 notified that the incident occurred. But beyond 7 that, they had no involvement.
8 Q. What was the nature of your role in the 9 other emergencies you set out here on page four?
l 10 A. (Kelly) Okay. Starting with the Lynn 11 firo, in 1982 I received a call from the night 12 person at the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency who 13 was relaying a message to me from the Deputy of
() 14 Defense Director to report to the emergency 15 operations center due to a large fire in Lynn, 16 . Massachusetts, which he characterized as being a 17 conflagration similar to what happened in Chelsea,
- 18 Massachusetts, about 10 years before, j 19 I went to the emergsney operation 20 center. I was the first person to report. This is 21 the State headquarters, by the way, located in 22 Framingham, Massachusetts.
23 At that time I contacted the Deputy l
24 Director. He asked, as I recall, that I get in 25 touch with the local authorities as well au the O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
19443
{ 1 2
Secretary of Public Safety for the state.
have asked me to notify some other state-level He may 3 officials but I can't recall specifically. And 4 essentially at that point I was receiving 5 information about the emergency, passing that along 6 to other officials. That was--that started around 7 2:00 a.m. By about 7:00 a.m., as I recall, the fire 8 was not out--nowhero near being out but it was 9 relatively under control or was about to be under 10 control, and we started working towards the issue of 11 collecting data about the damage. We went up to 12 Lynn later on that morning to collect additional 13 information.
() 14 To shorten this up, eventually I was 15 responsible for collecting all the data and 16 justifying to FEMA that a presidential disaster 17 declaration was required for that area and the 18 . President did declare that area a federal disaster 19 area.
20 Q. Let me follow up on that. Was any of 21 your data collection concerning the behavior of 22 emergency workers?
23 A. (Kelly) No. It principally dealt with 24 damages that were incurred, although part of the 25 request to the President must contain information O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
i
u O
19444
.g 1 about the emergency response. Before the President
[}
2 can grant a disaster declaration, he has to be 3 certain that to the best of the state's and local's 4 ability, they responded appropriately, did all they 5 could, and that federal funding was now necessary 6 for recovery.
7 Q. But you weren't specifically gathering 8 information on role abandonment?
9 A. (Kelly) No. I would never have asked
, 10 that question.
11 Q. Let me see if I can shorten this up a 12 little bit.
13 In any of these emergencies, were
() 14 evacuations involved?
15 A. (Kelly) To some extent, I believe, 16 winter storm may have involved some evacuation of 17 people due to utilities being out. They needed to 18 get into a shelter with heat and so forth. The 19 floods out in the western part of the state also 20 involved some evacuations. The State employee 1
21 strike did not involve an evacuation. Lynn, of 22 course, did involve evacuation. Salem, 23 Massachusetts, I believe, involved a small 24 evacuat ion . The Cuban refugee program, which was
( 25 when I was working with FEMA, I don't know if I
\ .
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
19445 1 would classify that as an evacuation. It was a 2 relocation of Cubans from Cuba to the United States.
3 Then Hurricane Alan had involved an evacuation. I 4 believe it was a spontaneous evacuation as opposed 5 to an ordered evacuation. But the portion that I 6 dealt with was the recovery program.
7 Beyond that, there may have been other 8 of that small-scale evacuations that could have 9 occurred with other emergencies that would occur on j 10 a daily basis. For instance, a small chemical spill l 11 that we were notified of on a highway may have 12 invol' red a small evacuation of people but State 13 resources may not have really been required in those
( ;) 14 situati.ons.
15 Q. For any of these emergencies that you 16 have said involve some sort of evacuation, were 17 evacuations by bus drivers involved? ,
i 18 A. (Kelly) I can't be certain that they 19 were or were not used. I don't know.
20 Q. Why didn't you determine that so that 21 you could decide to include it or not include it in 22 your data base?
23 A. (Kelly) Well, the question was 24 directed at our experience with real emergencies, 25 and that is what the answers were directed at.
l (
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index t
t 19446 1 Q. My question is, for the wonk you have
}
2 done for LILCO, why have you not included these
, 3 emergencies--
4 A. (Kelly) Oh--
5 Q. --in that data base?
J 6 A. (Kelly) None of those emergencies, 7 with the exception of Lynn, were in our original set e
8 of data that we collected from which the study we 9 did for LILCO grew out of. For instance, the floods 10 in Massachusetts weren't part of our data set, nor 11 were any of the others.
- 12 Q. Dr. Lindell, let me go back to the 13 emergencies you set out on page three. Did any of
() 14 those involve evacuations of people by bus?
15 A. (Lindell) No. The closest they came 16 to evacuation by bus were the only multi-occupant i
17 vehicles that were used other than personal vehicles l 18 took place in Snoqualmie, Washington, where they 19 used a fire truck.
- 20 Q. Dr. Mileti, on page six of your i
21 testimony you discuss eruption of a volcano in 22 Colombia, South America. Was role conflict one of 23 the issues you were researching there?
24 A. (Mileti) We went to do as l
l 25 comprehensive post-impact assessment as we could, l
f
() COMPUTER AIDED TRAMSCRIPTION/ keyword index
19447
{) 1 2
and if we got data on something we took account of it. We didn't explicitly look for role conflict.
3 There wasn't an evacuation, which was the problen.
4 Q. There was no evaculttion?
5 A. (Mileti) That is shy so many people 6 died in that event.
1 7 Q. I take it the emerguncy workers who 8 helped in the post-impact stage were mostly from
- 9 outside the area?
l l 10 A. (Mileti) Well, there were several 11 categories of emergency workers. Some of them were 12 the people who happened to survive. But that was 13 coincidental, just the people who lived on the
() 14 fringe of the townf and that was volunteering in 15 obviously an ad hoc response.
16 There also was response by emergency 17 workers, for example, from the Red Cross, which in l
18 that country has a very different role than it does 19 in this country. It has a very active role in 20 disaster management as opposed to just taking care 21 of victims. And those persons, some of them 22 mobilized and responded in--after the news that the 23 volca.no had erupted but they didn't get to town from l
l 24 where they were going in time. They came from i The people in the Red 25 neighboring communities.
(O
~/ r COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIP"ION / keyword index l
l
\
i l
19448 Cross in the cities that were inundated all died.
{}. 1 2 Q. You speak in the first full paragraph 3 about collection of primary field data on topics 4 related to emergency planning. What primary field 5 data have you collected on role conflict?
6 A. (Mileti) I have only actually 7 purposefully asked questions about role conflict 8 and/or role abandonment in two emergencies. They 9 are coincidentally both radiological emergencies, 10 the first being Three Mile Island, and I presented 11 in my testimony in reference to role conflict the 12 results of that study back here in '83 or 13 thereabouts. And then again in assessing, way after
() 14 the emergency but nevertheleas with actual victims 15 or people who knew many of the victims, the issue of 16 role performance, role conflict and role abandonment 17 as it might have occurred or did occur in reference 18 to the bombing of Hiroshima.
19 JUDGE GLEASON: In reference to what?
20 HITNESS MILETI: The bombing of 21 Hiroshima, a study I did while I was in Japan. So ;
22 it is only in those two events, as I recollect, that 23 I actually asked questions about that issue.
24 Q. Let me just go to the firet item. If 25 you could refresh our recollections, briefly tell us O COMPUTER AIDED TRANUCRIPTION/ keyword index ;
l i
19449 1 what the study was that you did at TMI?
2 A. (Mileti) I wanted to find out if any 3 organizations that responded to the Three Mile 4 Island incident had any employees who abandoned 5 their job--that is, didn't show up for work. And I 6 was doing that research because I thought it would 7 be interesting information to have in getting ready 8 to write testimony on this issue in these hearings 9 for Shoreham.
10 And I had a graduate student, 11 therefore, decide--he was one who spent a good deal 12 of time helping me do my original field work of the 13 emergency and post-impact stress team when I was
() 14 working for GPU, assessing the impacts of the 15 emergency--I had him decide what organizations were 16 relevant, thinking that would make the data base 17 seem more legitimate because I was going to present 18 it in thin setting. I thought he might appear more l 19 bias-free from your point of view, for example.
20 And I sat down and helped him develop 21 an informal--I guess a form checklist of the kinds ,
22 of questions to ask when he called up organizations. ,
23 I gave him a handful of instructions. For example, f
24 when you call the organizations, try to find 25 somebody who is not so high up in the bureaucratic O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l I _ _.
19450
{} 2 1 structure that they don't know about the work that actually goes on and not so low that they don't know j 4
3 about how other workers are working, and simply to 4 ask those key informants whether or not people who 5 worked in the organization did or did not come to 6 work during the accident at Three Mile Island.
7 As I recollect, one of the 8 organizations he got data on didn't, to any of us,
! 9 when you cross-examined me on it, didn't seem 10 relevant to emergency work, but that is because he 11 chose it. I forget which department it was. Others l
12 seemed to be very relevant to emergency work. We 13 found by and large that most people went to work,
() 14 who had a jcb.
i 15 It was that kind of study. It was I 16 certainly not the kind of study that lends itself to l
17 statistical analysis or it wasn't a randomly 18 selected study. It was just to find out on a dozen 19 cr more so organizations that went through Three 20 Mile Island in that area of the country, whether or 21 not employees went to work. We didn't interview 22 employees. We interviewed people who knew whether 23 employees were there or not.
24 I'm sorry. Did your question also 25 include the study in Japan?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index L ,, _ . _ .____.___._ _ _ __.
19451 1 Q. Not yet.
2 You int.orviewed, or your graduate 3 student interviewed people who you thought would 4 know whether people abandoned their roles or not, 5 right?
6 A. (Mileti) Yes. He interviewed 7 organizational respondents to speak for the 8 organization in reference to the number of workers 9 who did or didn't come to work.
10 Q. And what assurances do you have that 11 the people interviewed actually had the information 12 that was requested?
13 A. (Mileti) Well, I would hope that--it
(} 14 is hard for me to recollect precisely what I told 15 him in terms of determining who to talk to. I would 16 hope that whoever he talked to were the right people s
17 to talk to and if they weren't, that they might have 18 said they didn't know. So, I have the assurances 19 that I might have in reference to the behavior of a 20 potential Ph.D. in the department.
21 It is possible he may have been able to 22 find more appropriate respondents than the ones that 23 he did, but I hope that he was able to discern 24 between people who were making things up, which I 25 don't believe people did, t. hat he in fact got in O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION /koyword index
19452
{} 1 2
touch with people who would be able to speak on behalf of the organization.
3 Q. Couldn't respondents give as much 4 information as they have but still not have all the 5 relevant information regarding whether role 6 abandonment happened?
7 A. (Mileti) I suppose--I am famous for 8 saying anything la possible, especially in reference 9 to human behavior, so of course that is pos91ble.
10 But I don't think that the respondents, if they were 11 saying "X amount of our employees came to work and X 12 amount. didn' t, the normal absentee rate is" 13 whatever, that they would be pulling that
() 14 information out of the air.
15 Q. Well, were there respondents who did 16 not know how many people responded and how many 17 . stayed home?
18 A. (Mileti) I don't know. It is 19 possible. But the assignment that I gave the 20 graduate student was that if that happened, he was 21 talking to the wrong organizational informant and he 22 should have found out who to talk to until he could 23 find out what went on in that organization.
24 Q. After he collected the data, did you do 25 anything to assure yourself that he had spoken to
{ (
! COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index L
l 19453 1 the right people?
2 A. (Mileti) Not after. I thought I did 3 it before by selecting a graduate student that I 4 thought could perform the job adequately.
5 Q. Other than that, you didn't do anything 6 to assure yourself that he had done the job right?
7 A. (Mileti) No. I didn't do second 8 checks or do the study myself. As I recollect 9 saying in 1983, I was too busy writing testimony on 10 this case which is why I didn't do the study myself.
11 Q. Were bus drivers involved at all in 12 evacuating people at Three Mile Island?
13 A. (Mileti) Well, it depends on how you
() 14 define "evacuation." The Governor's advisory was And the 15 issued at 12:30 on Friday afternoon.
16 information from th's Governor's advisory was 17 dissemina~edc to schools. Schools were closed. And 18 I presume that schools use buses.to send people home 19 in response to hearing that the emergency was going 20 on and that an evacuation advisement was issued, in 21 that there were a lot of schools there. Many were 22 in somewhat rural areas. One would have to presume 23 that buses were used. But I wouldn't onsider that 24 an evacuation. Well, it wasn't--well, in a way it 25 was an evacuation of the school. What it was was an O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
L 19454 1 early dismissal of the schools.
[}
2 I am not sure if buses were used for 3 any of the other people who left the Three Mile 4 Irland area. 144,000 people left. Odds are pretty 5 good sonebody was in a bus of some sort but it 6 certainly wasn't the kind of evacuation that would 7 use buses.
8 Q. There wasn't an organized evacuation by 9 bus?
10 A. (Mileti) I certainly have no l
l 11 organization on that at all. The people--there were 12 people getting ready to potentially evacuate a very 13 large area, and a good many evacuation plans were
() 14 put together on the spot. Off the top of my head, I 15 don't remember if any of them involved buses but I 16 would be real surprised if they didn't. But I don't 17 think that plan was implemented. Beyond the 18 potential use of buses to close the schools, I don't 19 believe buses were involved.
20 Q. I think you mentioned earlier the
- 21 -possibility of early dismissal of schools. Is that
! 22 something you are certain of or are you speculating?
! 23 A. (Mileti) Not a possibility of early 24 dismissal of schools. Schools closed on Friday, 25 closed early. They closed in response and after O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19455
(~T 1 hearing the Governor's advisory issued at 12:30, J
2 early afternoon, that broadcast--I was interviewing 3 for a couple of hours the school principal at the 4 high school and he broadcasted the Governor's 5 advisory over a loud speaker in the different 6 classrooms. They definitely closed before normal, 7 probably three o' clock or whatever. They closed the 8 schools early.
9 Q. Did the organizations called by your 10 graduate student include any of the bus companies 11 providing these bus drivers?
12 A. (Mileti) I don't believe so. I would 13 be willing to say no.
() 14 Q. Do you know whether anybody has looked 15 into whether or not those bus drivers--were any of 16 those bus drivers evacuated with their families 17 rather than participating in the early dismissal?
18 A. (Mileti) I don't know that anyone has 19 gathered data on that. I wish you asked me that 20 question in a deposition. I probably would have 21 done it.
22 Q. Maybe that is why we didn't ask.
23 Q. You say there were about 12 24 organizations? Do you recall?
25 A. (Mileti) I don' t remember precisely.
l l
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19456
{} l 2
I would have to look at my testimony from the 1983 or '84 hearings here on this issue. It could have 3 been half a dozen. Could have been as much as a 4 dozen. It was thereabouts.
5 Q. Did the organizations called include 6 any hospitals?
7 A. (Mileti) Again, I would have to look 8 at the record in this case. I don't remember the 9 organizations that he called.
10 Q. How many respondents responded for each 11 organization? Just one?
12 A. (Mileti) Again, I don't remember. I 13 would have to look at the record. It is possible.
() 14 And I would presume that some respondents were the 15 wrong ones and additio.ial phone calls would have to 16 have been made. I don't remember the details. It 17 has been about five to six years.
18 MR. CHRISTMLN: I'm sorry, Chris, I 19 didn't want to interrupt. I think I can find copies l
20 of our ' 83 testimony, which is what Mr. McMurray is 21 cross-examining on, Judge Gleason. If that would l 22 help or if it would help develop the record for Dr.
i 23 Mileti to look at it before answering the questions, 24 it has been quite a while since we filed the 25 testimony and since it was cross-examined on in 1983 l
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1
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and '84.
JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. McMurray--
3 MR. McMURRAY: I have no objection, but 4 I don't see a need for it right now.
5 JUDGE GLEASON: All right. Continue. ,
6 Q. Were the data collected by your 7 graduate student ever published anywhere?
I 8 A. (Mileti) No.
9 Q. I take it that more work would have to 10 be done before those data would be publishable?
11 Would you agree?
12 A. (Mileti) No, I totally disagree. And l 13 I tell this--it turns out, it is very easy to l
() 14 publish in the social sciences. The variable that 15 is sigreificant is the quality of the journal you get 16 to publish in. The data from this study, wl.ich is i 17 interviewing key organizational informants about the 18 behavior of an organization in an emergency, could 19 h6ve been readily published or still could be 20 readily published as a research note. It wasn't an 21 elaborate enough study to call or make into a l
22 journal article, bu'. it certainly could be a i
23 renearch note.
! 24 Q. Have the data that were collected ever I
25 been verified by anyone?
l CE) !
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i l
l i
19458 Well, I have already said
{} 1 2
A. (Mileti) that I didn't do anything along those lines after he 3 collected his data. I don't know of anyone else who 4 may have. I certainly haven't been involved in 5 that, as I have already said.
6 If I just might add to that, it did 7 happen that a few months ago I encountered a report 8 from the National Guard in Pennsylvania and--the 9 National Guard was one of the organizations that he 10 interviewed, now that I recollect. Wo ended up in 11 'our testimony saying that they reported no role r
12 abandonment during Three Mile Island. James 13 Johnson, Jr., I think Stephen Cole and Don Zeigler,
() 14 some of your witnesses at Seabrook suggested the 15 National Guard was an organization in which there 16 was role abandonment. So when I encountered this 17 roguo report from the National Guard, I wanted to 18 see whether I thought it confirmed what I said in 19 the hearings versus what they said at Seabrook. It 20 clearly confirmed what I said at these hearings.
21 Q. Is that the excerpt you have in your 22 testimony here?
23 A. (Mileti) As I recollect, there is 24 reference to that National Guard study in this 25 testimony, but let me check.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19459 1 JUDGE GLEASON: Do you have a page
{
2 reference, Mr. McMurray?
3 MR. McMURRAY: I think that is what Dr.
4 Mileti is looking for, sir.
5 JUDGE GLEASON: I realize that.
6 MR. McMURRAY: I am not about to ask 7 questions on it right now.
8 MR. CHRISTMAN: Sir, it is on page 35 9 and 36 of the testimony.
10 WITNESS MILETI: Yes, Mr. McMurray.
11 That is the report I was talking about.
12 Q. We will ranch that later.
l 13 You mentioned a study done at
() 14 Hiroshima. Could you please describe how that 15 involved questions about role conflict?
16 A. (Mileti) Yes. It was purposefully 17 done specifically to study nothing other than role 18 abandonment amongot emergency workers in the 19 aftermath sf the bombing of Hiroshima. It turned 20 out that I was going to Japan for a conference at 21 the time LILCO first hired me to address this issue.
22 And much to my surprise they said that they would 23 pay the costs of me doing a study of role 24 abandonment in the aftermath of Hiroshima. When I 25 finished the conference, I went there first, to ga O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
- x
19460 1 to--I did stay on.
i}
2 What I--this was gathering data 3 afproximately 40 years after the event, and there is 4 an issue of how well people can remember, of course.
o 5 But nevertheless, I was provided with the 6 opportunity to talk to some people.
7 It turns out that a good friend of mine
.. -a 8 named Professor Nakano who used to teach at Tokyo 9 University, now retired, he is familiar with most of 10 the people who survived in Hiroshima, because what 11 happened after that bomb was that many of the 12 survivors didn't have family left, and Japanese 13 society, given how it is structured, totally
() 14 excluded them not because so much--although it 15 included--they went through the bomb, but they had 16 no intimates to then introduce them into society.
17 You can't get married unless you have a father to l
18 arrange it, et vetera. Very different kind of 19 society.
20 Well, Nakano opened up his house and i
21 said he would sponsor all the survivors from the 22 atomic blast and, in essence, became their parents.
23 At one point in time almost all of the survivors 24 literally were in his home. He helped introduce 25 them so they could get back into the mainstream of O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index ;
I
19461 1 Japanese life.
}
2 Other stories could be spun having 3 little to do with what you asked.
4 I asked him as far as Professor 5 Nakano--I said that--Professor Abe and Kazama and a i
6 few other social scientist also there if they could i 7 help arrange for me to talk to some au vivors. One 8 of the thingo I spent most of my timo doing was 9 talking to Professor Nakano because he knew the 1 1 10 people that were survivors. He kne,w most of the i
11 tales, et cetera.
4 12 So I interviewed him and talked to him 13 extensively. Also, I interviewed approximately--not
{
4
() 14 many, as I recollect, in the no!.ghborhood of only 15 half a dozen actual survivors, with trenclators, 16 'that I stranged. Wasn't an elaborate study but it
) 17 was certainly more information than I had before I 18 went to Japan as to what happened, which I think is 19 informative because it adds a lot more insight than
- 20 we have in in our record, basically Lipton's book.
i 21 I haven't published that data yet--you didn't ask.
22 Q. Are you planning on it?
j 23 A. (Mileti) Yes. I have a sabbatical 24 coming up and I will wri*:e the book I always wanted 25 to write and that will to the theme of that chapter.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCBIPTION/ keyword index
19462 1 Not the disaster but the things I learned from it.
{}
2 It is more useful to publish that limited data in 3 that way than a journal article.
4 Q. What conclusions did you draw about 5 role and and at Hiroshima?
6 A. (Mileti) Well, in general, it was hard 7 to consider that role abandonment occurred in that 8 most of the organizations if not all the emergency 9 response organizations in Hiroshima blew away.
10 There were none left. There were, however, strong 11 tales, and I pursued this because there were tales 12 in our literatura about people 13 becoming--normlessness or withdrawn or wandering
() 14 around aimlessly in the aftermath of the bombing, 15 and also that that occurred with hospital workere.
16 And there were, in~-I don't remember 17 right now if it was Hiroshima or Nagasaki--I think 18 in both but I have to qualify that. I don't 19 remember--there was a group of hospital workers, 20 nurses and doctors both, only perhaps a small 21 percentage of those who resided in, let's just say 22 it was Hiroshima, who immediately assembled in a 23 junior high school or grammar school to set 24 up--volunteered, albeit, they had their role before !
25 the emergency, but their organization disappeared
(
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
5
19463 1 when the bomb exploded. They set up a headquarters
- 2 to service people who woulch be hurt. And they 3 worked very diligently and very hard.
I 4 And it was the typical altruistio 5 response we observe so o?! ten in emergencien, But 6 they simply became overtshelaed. After it became 7 grossly clear that thera was no way that they cou3d 8 accomplish any good, that there were thoucands upon 9 thousands of victims stor a handflul of doctors and 10 nurses, and they indesd did give up at that poirt.
11 I think that is food for an inter 9 sting 12 theoretical yarn tht t I would ldho 26 spin in 7ay 13 book.
() 14 Q. Did ,5ou collect any data regarding what 15 percentage of all doctors and nurses who survived in
, 16 that area volunteered and went to that school and i
j 17 participated?
I 18 A, (Mileti) No. I didn't collect--I i
19 didn't collect quantitative data. There was no--you l
! 20 could put numbers on any qualitative sociological 21 data. That is usually what we do when we want to 22 call it quantitative, but it is still really 23 qualitative data. I didn't ask people to try to 24 estimate that. I would have had--At would have been 25 an extremely elaborate study that I don't think I O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index t
I
19464
{} 1 2
would have trusted in the long run. I simply asked how many people was--was there an altruistic 3 response?
4 There also are a few publications that 5 document the all-pervaciveness of the death of the 6 public health communities after those bombs. In a 7 qualitative way I can make a quantitative judgment 8 that a handful of nurses and doctors was just about 9 all that were left.
10 Q. You don't know, really, whether those 11 who went to the school to participate in serving the 12 community in a medical way was a large proportion or 13 small proportion of those who survived? Is that t 14 correct?
15 A. (Mileti) I would have to say I can 16 only answer that question as I just did, and that is 17 qualitatively, that I would make 'he c judgment that a 18 handful of them were the only ones left and at least 19 a handful of them showed up in this one high school 20 or junior high or grammar school or whatever it was.
21 Q. What would be the basis for your 22 judgment?
23 A. (Mileti) Documented records that 24 detail what percentags of the people who were nurses 25 survived the explosion in Hiroshima as well as the O COM2 UTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION /keywcrd index
19465 1 percentage of doctors that survived in both areas.
(V~) '
2 That kind of information is catalogued in extreme 3 detail. And I think, taking those records about how 4 many people survived in those helping categories and 5 then pitting that against the qualitative stories 6 about how nurses and doctors did try to come ,
7 together and help, volunteering, of course--there 8 was no organization left. It was blown up--leads me 9 to conclude that most people tried. That 10 explanation is consistent with the generic findings 11 from disaster research.
12 Q. Have you actually looked at those t
l 13 records to determine how many doctors and nurses did i
() 14 survive?
15 A. (Mileti) I have looked at the records i
16 that detail that information, yes. There is a book 17 published in this country that is a summary of svery 18 report that has ever been done that would be of 19 interest to social scientists as well as, I suspect, 20 physical scientists, that catalogs those
! 21 percentages. That was one of the first things I did 22 before I started doing my (nterviews, was buy that 23 book when I was in Tokyo.
24 Q. How many doctors and nu* eses did i
25 Survive?
I O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
-4 - & - --<.---,94-,.
', 19466 T 1 'i A. (Mileti) In Hiroshima or Nagasaki?
k'~/
~
2 Q. In Hiroshima. Concentrate on 3 Hiroshima.
4 A. (Mileti) I would have to look it up.
5 Q. Have you made a comparison of those
. 6 numbers against those who did report?
7 A. (Mileti) I did when I was in Japan 8 doing this report. I haven' t done it recently. I 9 can do it right now if you like.
! 10 Q. Do you have the book?
11 A. (Mileti) Yes.
12 Q. Why don't you do it at the lunch hour.
j 13 A. (Mileti) Carrying all these references
() 14 around has made a difference.
15 Q. We will do that at the lunch hour.
- 1G <
MR. CHRISTMAN: I want to make sure the 17 question is real, real clear if we are going to do 18 this research so we don't come back with the wrong 19 answer.
20 JUDGE GLEASON: Do you have any l 21 misunderstanding as to what question you are looking 22 up the answer for? I thought it was precisely what 23 percentage of the doctors survived in Hiroshima.
24 Is that right, Mr. McMurray, how many 25 doctors survived?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19467
/~T 1 MR. McMURRAY: How many doctors D abrvived, and from that I would like us to be able 2
3 to find out what percentage reported to perform 4 medical services. I understand that this can 5 probably be done from a book Dr. Mileti has brought 6 with him. I don't think we should waste the board's 7 time having him search right now for that. We can 8 do it at lunch hour.
9 JUDGE SHON: I think Dr. Mileti may 10 have put it a little differently than you did. What 11 you are searching for, as I understand it, is the 12 number of doctors and nurses who survived and the 13 fraction thereof who reported for duty. Is that
() 14 right?
15 MR. McMURRAY: Correct. Not the 16 proportion who survived.
17 JUDGE SHON: Not the fraction that 18 survived and the number that reported for duty, but 19 the other way around.
20 JUDGE GLEASON: Is there any 21 misunderstanding in your mind?
22 WITNESS MILETI: I think I am confused 23 now. I thought I was clear before we attempted to 24 clear it up. I apologize. I am to find out the 25 percentage of doctors that survived--
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19468 1 MR. McMURRAY: No. The absolute 2 number.
3 JUDGE GLEASON: The number.
I 4 WITNESS MILETI: The number of doctors 5 that surrived.
6 MR. McMURRAY: And purses.
7 WITNESS MILETI: And nurses? Number 8 of doctors who survived and the number of nurses who 9 survived?
10 MR. McMURRAY: Correct.
11 WITNESS MILETI: That is it?
12 MR. McMURRAY: Then we would like a 13 comparison with how many actually showed up at that
() 14 school, so what percentage of those that survived 15 showed up at the school.
16 WITNESS MILETI: As I recollect 17 caying, I based that on the qualitative data I 18 collected when I was there. I am happy to look to 19 see if there are quantitative estimates as well in 20 the book that I reviewed.
21 Q. You are telling me you don't know the 22 actual number who went to report?
23 A. (Mileti) I am telling you, to the best 24 of my recollection, I recall that there is a table 25 in the book I have brought with me that estimates--I O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
, .
- 41 i .,
f 19469 1 don't remember if it is number or percentage, but a 2 quantitative estimate of the number of doctors who a
3 survived and even the nurses who survived, I 4 believe, in either or both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
5 I suspect, but I don't recollect for 6 sure, that there may be some quantitative numbers 7 about how m ny engaged in helping behavior after the 8 bomb, who then eventually stopped doing that, but I 9 remember clearly saying that I was basing my 10 judgment on the qualitative data about how many of
]
11 them engaged in helping behavior when I was talking 12 to the people who experienced the event and 13 Professor Nakano in Japan.
() 14 Q. What I would like to find out is 15 whether there is any quantitative basis for your 16 qualitative judgment.
17 A. (Mileti) Happy to look.
18 JUDGE GLEASON: Is this a good place to 19 take a recess?
20 MR. McMURRAY: Sure.
21 JUDGE GLEASON: We will stand in recess 1
22 until 1:30.
] 23 (whereupon, a luncheon recess was 24 taken.)
25 AFTERHOON SESS ION O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
i
- 19470
{} l 2 JUDGE GLEASON:
(1: 15 p.m.)
All right gentlemen. I 3 apologize for being six minutes late. You may 4 proceed.
5 MR. McMURRAY: I want to note, Judge 6 Gleason, we have put before the board and given to 7 the parties a list of matters we would like to ;
8 discuss for reconsideration later this afterncon.
9 E'AdINATION BY MR. McMURRAY:
- 10 Q. Dr. Mileti, before we broke for lunch, 11 we were going to look up aome data; is that correct?
J2 A. (Mileti) That is correct.
13 Q. Have you done so?
() 14 A. (Mileti) Yes, I have.
15 Q. I believe the first question put on the
, 16 table was the number of doctors and nurses who !
17 survived the Hiroshima atomic bomb blast.
18 Do you have that information?
i 19 A. (Mileti) Yes.
20 In the document I reviewed, I had to 21 calculate those numbers, because I was given the 22 numbers in the book that were casualties and the l l
23 percantage of the profession that they represented.
24 There were 270 physicians in that 25 profession in Hiroshima. 90 percent were casualties j
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
i
q 19471 1 and I estimated, therefore, that 30 were survivors.
2 There were 650 nurses that were casualties, which I 3 represented 93 percent of the nursing profession. I 4 estimated that that would mean 124 nurses survived.
5 Q. Did anybody check your calculations to 6 make sure you did them right?
7 A. (Mileti) Yes, but it was ma. I did 4
8 them twice.
9 Q. Could you tell me what the name of the 10 document is from which you got the figures, from 11 which you calculated these figures?
12 A. (Mileti) It is a book entitled 13 "Hiroshima and Nagssaki, the Physical, Medical and
() 14 Social Effect of the Atomic Bomb."
15 Q. Who is the author?
d i
16 A. (Mileti) The author was the Committee 17 for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused By 18 the Atomic Box in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Let me 19 see if there are people named.
20 Q. I think that is sufficient. Thank you.
21 You stated that a handful of physicians 22 and nurses reported to a school of some sort in 1
23 Hiroshima after the blast; have you been able to l 24 pinpoint any better the number who actually did 25 report to perform medical services?
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
i
i 19472 1 A. (Mileti) Based on the review that I
{
2 did at lunch, I was unable to locate in this 3 document any reference to any number regarding how 4 many physicians and nurses volunteered for emergency ;
5 work in Hiroshima after the bomb.
1 6 Q. Do you believe that those data are in 7 that book?
8 A. (Mileti) I'd have to say that I don't 9 believe that, because I had made a list of the pages 10 on which I thought anything might be relevant for 4
11 the notion of role conflict, and I examined all l
i l 12 those pages at lunch and found no reference to that.
13 Q. Other than your statement that a
() 14 handful of doctors and nurses reported, do you have t
15 any quantitative date that that would help us to 16 determine exactly how many reported?
17 A. (Mileti) Not in reference to 18 Hiroshima, no.
19 Q. Nagasaki?
20 A. (Mileti) There were data in reference 4
21 to Nagasaki, yes. .
j 22 Q. Do you know what those data are?
23 A. (Mileti) Yes. I did write them down.
l 24 Q. What are they?
, 25 A. (Mileti) In Nagasaki, the. data in the i
- (1) l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l l
1 l
~ - . . _ _ , _ _ . . . _ - _ _ _ - . _ - . _ . . _ _ - . _
19473 1 reference document was that--
2 Q. Is this the same reference document?
3 A. (Mileti) Yes.
4 --was that there were 70 doctors in 5 that profession prior to the bomb going off. 20 6 were dead, 20 were injured, and that left 30 who 7 were not dead and not injured by the bomb in 8 Nagasaki. In that reference document, the only 9 quantitative reference to them doing emergency work 10 after the bomb went off, is the following quote at 11 page 382: "Leaving hardly 30 to help."
12 Q. But it doesn't state whether they did i 13 help or not?
() 14 A. (Mileti) That is all it says in 15 reference to those 30.
l 16 Q. Did it say anything about nurses in i
17 Nagasaki?
18 A. (Mileti) I don't remember. I was just 19 looking at the data for Hiroshima. It was only 20 inadvertent that I took the data down in reference i 21 to Nagasaki about doctors.
22 Q. On page six of your testimony, you 23 state that you and others completed a report called 24 "Interface in Reactor Emergency Planning and 25 Response" for the NRC. Do you see that?
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
r I
~ .
19474 1 A. (Mileti) Yes, I do.
2 Q. Did this document at all pertain to 3 role conflict?
4 A. (Mileti) Not to my recollection. As I 5 recall, it applied to the degree to which off-site 6 emergency organizations that would be involved in an 7 emergency response were participating in developing 8 plans and the type of plans they were develvping and 9 whether or not they would represent a cohesive 10 response.
11 Q. You state also that you also engaged in 12 some nonacademic practical applications of emergency 13 planning knowledge. This is on page six, by the
() 14 way. You say, for example, "I have consulted with 15 about a half-dozen utilities on the topic."
16 Has your consulting services with these 17 utilities included expert witness testimony?
18 A. (Mileti) Some of it has and some of it 19 hasn't.
20 Q. Out of how many of the half-dozen 21 utilities have you appeared as an expert witness?
22 A. (Mileti) I recollect two for whom I 23 did not appear as an expert witness. And so, all 24 the others.
25 Q. Have you ever testified against the O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
)
i 1 .
~
j
~ ;
d 19475
~ '
, 1 position taken by a utility in a NRC licensing
{
j 2 proceeding?
! 3 A. (Mileti) No, I haven't. But I have 4 worked for the TMI Public Health Fund through Clark l 5 University, which is a-group of intervenors, and 6 evaluated the warning system and public education
! 7 ' aspects of emergency planning for that nuclear--that i 8 operating nuclear reactor. I have no idea if that 9 will end up in litigation, j
l 10 Q. So, you haven't testified on behalf of
). 11 that intervonor group yet in a NRC licensing 1
. 12 proceeding?
13 A. (Mileti) I haven't been invited to. I
}
j i
() 14 have no idea whether I would say "ye's" or "no."
15 Q. So, is it fair to say you have 16 testified as an expert witness in NRC licensing 17 proceedings for four utilities--that is a half-dozen 18 minus the two you know you didn't appear as an i
! 19 expert witness for?
l 20 A. (Mileti) That math is correct, but I 1
! 21 would have to list the ones to make sure whether it 22 was four or five or what have you, that I actually
] 23 did--
l 24 Q. It could be more than four?
l 25 A. (Mileti) It is possible.
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l i
19476 1 I said about half a dozen. It could be
{
2 seven, could be five. I have them listed on my
- 3 professional qualifications.
i 4 Q. Mr. Kelly, let me get back to you. On 5 page seven of your testimony you state that you have 6 developed and conducted emergency. training programs 7 and conducted capability assessments and hazard 8 analyses studies. Do you see that?
9 A. (Kelly) Yes, I do.
10 Q. You have also, as consultant, developed 11 industry and community emergency preparedness plans /
12 'is that correct.
13 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
() 14 Q. In developinj these industrial and 15 community emergency preparedness plans, how have 16 these plans, if at all, taken account of role i
17 conflict?
18 A. (Kelly) I don't think they address the 19 subject that specifically. The plans do address 20 resource management and coordination of resources, 21 including human resources, to take care of whatever 22 needs might arise during emergency. But the issue 23 of role conflict, well, it was not an issue in these l
24 cases.
25 Q. Well, you also mention training i
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19477
/~T 1 programs. In the course of your work in developing O
2 and running training programs, does any of your 3 training include steps to alleviate potential role 4 conflict?
5 A. (Kelly) The courses--well, two courses 6 that I call to mind, one I conduct for the American 7 Society of Safety Engineers, and another one, which 8 I will be conducting for George Washington 9 University, they are general in nature. They do 10 review lots of different planning guidelines, 11 including NUREG 0654.
12 To be honest with you, you just don't 13 talk about it all that much in these courses, if at
() 14 'all. I just don't recall talking about it.
15 O. I think earlier you said that you do 16 discuss resource management; is that right?
17 A. (Kelly) In the plans, that's correct.
18 Q. Are any of those steps the kind of 19 steps that should be included in an attempt to 20 alleviate role conflict?
21 A. (Kelly) The procedures are written 22 flexibly enough where if some group needed to be 23 evacuated and they needed bus drivers, tnis 24 procedure could handle that type of issue, that type 25 of problem.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19478 1 Q. Let's step back. What procedure are 2 you talking about?
3 A. (Kelly) The resource management 4 procedures. If there were problems, requests for 5 resources would come inte a contrsi operating, 6 omergency operating center. And at that point, 7 local officials would refer to various lists of 8 emergency resources they might have and apply 9 whatever resources they need to that particular 10 situation.
11 If you are talking about a school that a
12 will need evacuation, buses, bus companies are
! 13 generally listed in resource management plans, so 1
() 14 they could call up the appropriate bus companies and 15 dispatch buses to evacuate thee? people.
16 Q. Does this procedure include any way to 17 account for the possibility that bus drivers, some
- 18 bus drivers, may not be available?
19 A. (Kelly) Not specifically.
20 Q. Does it take into secount any steps to 21 assign bus drivers so that they would be unlikely to 22 experience role conflict if asked to perform?
23 A. (Kelly) Training programs or the like?
24 Q. Well, that may be one.
25 A. (Kelly) In these cases that you are O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19479 1 referring to, I don't believe that was addressed, j 2 no.
l 3 Q. What are the types of emergencies that 4 you are referring to here that you have developed
! 5 plans and training programs for?
6 A. (Kelly) Okay. As far as the emergency i
! 7 training programs that I have conducted, as I 8 mentioned, American Society of Safety Engineers, 2
9 George Washington University. I developed a course f 10 based on those courses for a former employer, and 11 they periodically conduct that course for industrial 12 clients.
l 13 Q. Excuse me. Let me follow-up on that.
14 Does it pertain to any particular kind 15 of accident?
16 A. (Kelly) It is a course on 17 comprehensive emergency management, so that would 18 ' include all forms of hazards.
19 Q. Including radiological accidents?
20 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
21 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt 22 you. Go ahead.
23 A. (Kelly) In Massachusetts there were a 24 number of seminars that I would prepare presentation 25 for, for local civil defense directors and other O COMPUTER AIOED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19480 1 local officials. And I can't recall any of those 2 that had role conflict, per se.
3 Now, the next sentence, about 4 developing emergency preparedness plans, dealt with 5 a variety of industries. We were developing 6 emergency plans, as you are probably aware, the 7 industry is required to develop the detailed plans 8 that the nuclear industry is required to develop. I 9 feel pretty certain that none of those get into any 10 specifics about bus drivers and role conflict.
I 11 Q. You say bus drivers or role conflict?
12 A. (Kelly) Or role conflict.
1 13 Q. So, other than the work you did
() 14 previously with the 50 emergencies for your prior
- 15 client and the work you have done for LILCO, role 16 conflict is not an issue that you deal with; is that 17 correct?
18 A. (Kelly) I would say that that's 19 correct because it is not an issue.
20 Q. Gentlemen, let's get into some of the
, 2.1 literature that you have cited--
l
- 22 A. (Kelly) Excuse me. There were, of i
i 23 course, radiological plans that I worked on in the l 24 state of Massachusetts that probably did contain 25 information on bus drivers, more specific than I had C:)
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
i L . .
4 19481 [
l outlined. .But I was not involved in those 2 particular aspects of the plan. I just wanted to {
1 t 3 clarify that, because that was another paragraph you l l
~
, 4 didn't refer to. j 5 Q. Mr. Kelly, you are going to have to 6 Neop your voice up.
7 A. (Kelly) Sorry. Did you hear me? ;
l 8 Q. Not the last part of your sentence.
I 9 A. (Kelly) You were referring to that one l 10 paragraph and that is what I directed my response
! 11 to, but I didn't want it to be misleading. There 12 are other plans that I worked on that did involve l 13 radiological--well, nuclear power plants in the l
() 14 state of Massachusetts, and those, I believe, 15 probably dealt with school bus drivers more 16 But those were not portions of the
) specifically.
j 17 plan that I was ever involved in.
1
- 18 Q. So, you didn't have occasion to address l 19 the possibility of role abandonment by bus drivers i
l 20 with respect to those plans?
21 A. (Kelly) That's right. To the best of l
l 22 my recollection it wasn't an issue there either.
l 23 Q. Dr. Lindell, on page eight of your i 24 testimony you cite a publication of yours, published l 25 by the Atomic Industrial Forum, entitled "Planning 1
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index j
I l
l I
19482 1 Concepts and Decision Criteria for Sheltering and 2 Evacuation In a Nuclear Power Plant Emergency."
3 Do you see that?
4 A. (Lindell) Yes, I do.
5 Q. Let's go to attachment A of the LILCO 6 testimony.
7 A. (Lindell) Which attachment?
8 Q. Did I say A? Attachment E.
9 Let me ask Mr. Kelly first: Mr. Kelly, 4
4 10 what is attachment E?
11 A. (Kelly) Attachment E is a report I 12 developed for LILCO.
13 Q. This was developed by you as part of 14 your work for LILCO in connection with these i
(])
15 proceedings. Correct?
I 16 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
17 Q. And on page two, and going over to page 18 three, Mr. Kelly, you have excerpted parts of the 19 article that I just referenced by Mr. Lindell. Is 20 that correct?
- 21 A. (Kelly) That is correct.
l 22 Q. Dr. Lindell, let me refer you to this 23 excerpt. Actually, it is two excerpts from 24 different parts of tte article. The excerpt 25 addresses role conflict, doesn't it?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
i t
19483 !
1 A. (Lindell) Yes, it does.
! 2 Q. And the article itself was written by !
l 3 you with Ronald Perry and Patricia Bolton? j 4 A. (Lindell) That's correct.
I !
5 Q. Ronald Perry is a noted expert in i 4
6 emergency planning, isn't he?
< i 7 A. (Lindell) I guess he is. ;
8 Q. Who is Patricia Bolton?
9 A. (Lindell) Patricia Bolton is also a
)
j 10 noted expert in emergency response and disaster 11 research.
j 12 Q. I take it here that tl.e discussion, i 13 based upon your earlier answers--the discussion in 14 these excerpts is based on a survey of the
- (])
15 literature and not on field studies conducted by ,
4 ;
16 ,you. Is that correct?
17 A. (Lindell) That's correct.
i !
j 18 Q. And it is based on much of the j 1
! 19 literature which is cited in your testimony by Dr. ;
) 20 Mileti and Russell Dynes, Warren Kelly and others. !
i s 21 Correct? f 22 A. (Lindell) That's correct. Most of the t
23 ,
direct citations in that report go to Russell Dynes' ,
24 book, "Organized Behavior and Disasters."
t 25 O. Let's start on page two of attachment COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index ;
i i
i
j 19484 1 E. The excerpt first mentions Dynes stating that 2 role abandonment does not occur. Do you see that?
)
j 3 I believe it is the second sentence, l 4 A. (Lindell) I see that, yes.
5 Q. The article then notes that Dynes gives I
6 two primary reasons for this, one being priority 7 mechanisms and the other being avoidance mechanisms.
8 Is that correc'i 9 A. ( o v.11) That is correct.
10 Q. Thr, priority mechanisms come from, I i 11 think you say in the excerpt, training members of l
l 12 the emergency organizations to give 4 'ority to 13 their emergency jobs. Correct?
14 A. (Lindell) That's correct.
15 Q. And also doing such things like making
- 16 organizational membership visible, like wearing 17 uniforms, right?
19 A. (Lindell) That's right.
l 19 Q. You also--the other reason given by l
20 Dynes is avoidance mechanisms. The first avoidance 1
j 21 mechanism given in the excerpt is having members of i
(
22 the emergency organization come from outside the 23 affected area, where they will have few or no family 24 ties within the area. Have I stated that correctly?
25 A. (Lindell) Yes, you have.
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
1948J 1 Q. And they also operate--avoidance 2 mechanisms will also operate, it says here, when 3 members of the emergency organizations have 4 unequivocal information about the nature of the 5 emergency. Is that right?
6 A. (Lindell) That's also correct.
7 Q. By "unequivocal," that means very clear 8 and certain information, correct?
9 A. (Lindell) Yes.
10 Q. Where they have made prior arrangements 11 with their families to take protective actions i 12 before the emergency, right? That is another l
13 avoidance mechanism?
i
() 14 A. (Lindell) That is another avoidance 15 mechanism, yes.
! 16 Q. And another one is the establishment of 17 communications with their families to verify that 18 they are safe. Correct?
19 A. (Lindell) Yes.
l l 20 Q. Now, after going through all of that, l
1 21 your article in another section,' which is also 22 excerpted below, then makes a distinction between 23 designated emergency workers and what you call 24 emergency auxiliary personnel.
25 Isn't that correct?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19486 1 A. (Lindell) Yes, we did make that 2 distinction.
3 MR. CHRISTMAN: Judge Gleason, I have 4 to object to further questions along this line. Wa 5 have gone 15 minutes now reading these two passages 6 that are already in the record with very litt30 7 being added to them, and I don't think that is 8 appropriate for cross-examination. So I object to 9 the further questions asking the witnesses to simply 10 read what is already in the record w.thout asking 8
11 questions about it.
12 JUDGE GLEASON: I presume Mr. Christman 13 'is heading somewhere, so let's give him a chance to O 14 vroceee-15 Q. As an example of emergency auxiliary 16 personnel, you cite specifically bus drivers. Isn't 17 that correct, Dr. Lindell?
l 18 A. (Lindell) That is correct.
19 Q. And with respect to emergency auxilj,'.ry 20 personnel such as bus drivers, you state that it is l 21 important to recognize--let me backup.
22 You first note that in the previous 23 section you said that designated emergency workers 24 do not abandon their roles, but that with respect to l
25 emergency auxiliary persenne7., including bus O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTIOli/ keyword index
19487 l
\
f- 1 drivers, this conclusion does not automatically 2 extend to that group. Isn't that what this says?
3 A. (Lindell) That is exactly what that 4 says. You cannot assume automatically that it 5 exter:ds to that group.
6 Q. So that there must be special 7 provisions, as you state on the top of pago 3, that 8 need to be made in order to assuie their 9 availability in a nuc3ca-c power plant emergency.
10 Correct?
11 A. (Lindell) I think the wording in the 12 text says "special provisions may need to be made."
l 13 Q. And under what conditions would they
() 14 not need to be made.
15 A. (Lindell) If the bus drivers have a 16 prior experience in responding to emergencies, which 17 as we found out in a number of instances is the 18 case.
19 Q. You mean in other disasters?
, 20 A. (Lindell) Yes.
21 Q. You are not talking about the Shoreham 22 bus drivers specifically?
23 A. (Lindell) No. As a matter of fact, I 24 was thinking of other examples, such as Drabek found 25 in Denver where bus drivers were used on a number of O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 1
v 19488 1 occasions, and as we subsequently found out in our 2 data collection, that bus drivers in Denver are 3 routinely used and, as a matter of fact, even 4 volunteer to take part in evacuations.
5 Q. That is because they are on a special 6 roster. Isn't that correct?
7 A. (Lindell) They volunteer for the 8 roster.
9 Q. They volunteer for a roster prepared 10 before emergencies, correct?
11 A. (Lindell) That's right. In Denver, 12 that is the case.
13 Q. You don't know whether there is a
() 14 roster similar to that containing names of local bus 15 drivers that LILCO would expect to perform in a 16 Shoreham radiological emergency, do you?
17 A. (Lindell) Could you repeat the 18 question?
l 19 Q. Is there a similar roster that exists 20 here on Long Island, applicable to the LILCO bus 21 drivers that LILCO would expect to perform in a 22 radiological emergency at Shoreham?
23 A. (Lindell) I am afraid I have no 24 knowledge of that.
25 JUDGE SHON: Mr. McMurray, I would like O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
19489 1 a little clarification of that immediately prior
}
2 question.
3 When you said "LILCO bus drivers," did 4 you mean the school bus drivers who were originally 5 at issue, or the LILCO LERO personnel whom LILCO 6 then selected? Because in a sense, if it is the 7 latter, they are, per se, are they not, a 8 specialist?
9 MR. McMURRAY: Yes, sir. I think I 10 didn't speak clearly. I thought I said local, and
- 11. maybe I should avoid using that word at all.
12 JUDGE SHON: You said "local"?
l l 13 MR. McMURRLY: I thought so. I may
() 14 have said LILCO.
15 JUDGE GLEASON: I understood you to say 16 "LILCO."
17 Q. Since we are confused--
18 A. (Lindell) I thought you said "local."
19 I didn't assume you said LILCO. I know LERO does i 20 have lists of bus drivers.
21 Q. Let's all assume, please, for the rest 22 of the day, if I am talking about bus drivers, I am 23 talking about the non-LERO, local bus drivers who l
24 drive school buses for the various school districts 25 in the EPZ. Is that understood?
t' V) COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
~
l 19490 1 A. (Mileti) Yes.
2 MR. McMURRAY: Thank you, Judga Shon.
3 I'm sorry to cause the confusion.
4 JUDGE SHON: Fine. Thank you.
5 Q. Among the provisions which you suggest 6 for assuring the availability of bus drivers, other 7 than the roster that you have just mentioned, is 8 also training. Is that correct, Dr. Lindell?
9 A. (Lindell) Yes. We suggested training.
10 Q. We will get to training later, but let 11 me ask you this first. I will ask you and then if 12 Mr. Crocker wants to jump in, he can.
I
- 13 Do you know whether or not any training
() 14 has bcen offered to any of the local bus drivers 15 that LILCO expects to perforta in a radiological 16 emergency?
17 A. (Lindell) My understanding is that 18 training has been offered to all the bus companies.
19 Q. Do you know whether there has actually 20 been any training of any of the local bus drivers?
21 A. (Lindell) I couldn't speak as to 22 whether there actually has been training of the 23 local bus drivers.
24 Q. Mr. Crocker, has there actually been 25 training of any of the local bus drivers?
i l
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTIGN/ keyword index l
i
19491 1 A. (Crocker) There have been meetings 2 held with some of the bus drivers employed by the 3 local school bus companier. Training is scheduled 4 to take place--it should begin within the next few 5 weeks. I am not sure of the exac.t date.
6 Q. What school bus companies are those?
7 A. (Crocker) To my recollection, the 8 Seaman Bus Company, S-E-A-M-A-N; Suburbia Bus 9 Company.
10 Give me a moment and I will look 11 something up.
12 (Pause . )
13 We made offers to the Adelwerth,
() 14 Riverhead, Harbor View, Seaman, Medibus and Suburbia We have 15 Bus Companies, and United Bus Company.
16 received responses from some of them and we are 17 setting up training for them. Responses are still 18 outstanding for some of the others.
19 Q. Let me ask you this: Of the bus 20 companies you just named, which have accepted 21 training for their bus drivers?
22 A. (Crocker) Okay. Seaman, Medibus, and 23 Suburbia. We believe we will be doing training i 24 there. We have had verbal responses, but we don't 25 have the paper yet. The reet we are still waiting O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19492
, 1 to hear.
2 Q. Have any of them declined to accept 3 training?
4 A. (Crocker) There is three bus companies 5 or organizations that don't talk to us at all. That 6 is Adelwerth, Riverhead and Harba - View. We sent 7 them the letter. No response. I interpret that as 8 a declination.
9 Q. How many more are outstanding, did you 10 say?
11 A. (Crocker) We covered six out of seven 12 companies I mentioned. There is one more that is 13 outstanding. L
{} 14 Q. What bus company is that?
15 A. (Crocker) United Bus Company.
16 Q. You haven't heard anything one way or 17 the other from them?
18 A. (Crocker) Not in writing. I know my 19 staff talks to all these bus companies, but basic 20 conversations have been towards offering the l
21 training, setting up the meeting to discuss it.
1
! 22 Q. Have they verbally accepted training, i
23 talking about United?
24 A. (Crocker) My sense is they have 25 expressed an interest.
O COMPUTER AIDED TIUWSCRIPTION/ keyword index l
i 19493 j m s 1 Q. But you can't say they have accepted?
2 A. (Crocker) I can't say they have 3 declined nor accepted. They want to talk to us 4 about it.
5 Q. Of the bus companies you have noted 6 here, what proportion of the student population 7 within the EPZ do they bus?
8 A. (Crocker) These--if I understood what 9 you asked me--these companies, in the aggregate, 10 transport a nominal hundred percent. There may be a 11 few outliers, but these are essentially the main bus 12 companies in the EPZ.
13 Q. You say you believe that Suburbia has 14 accepted or you are not sure?
{}
15 A. (Crocker) My understanding Urom my 16 staff is that they will accept the training. The 17 . notes here say that we have got a couple of 18 acceptances from individual drivers. We expect to 19 get more.
20 Understand, this is happening as we 21 speak, so the returns are still coming in.
22 Q. Well, have you been in touch with 23 individual bus drivers or with the bus companies?
24 A. (Crocker) The approach we take is we 25 go to the bus company management and we meet with l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index I
l
L i l
19494 I 1 them and discuss what we propose to do. Typically, O 2 at that point, we prepare flyers that either the 3 company management distributes for us or, you know, 4 we might have a representative there to do the 5 distributing for them.
6 So, we approach the management first 7 and with their consent, we make materials available 8 for the bus drivers and then either the bus company 9 will collect the material for us or--that is l
10 generally what they all do.
l
, 11 Q. Does the flyer ask the individual bus l
i 12 driver to send something back to you to say that he 13 or she is interested?
(~ 14 A. (Crocker) Yes. What it does is it V) 15 says--it describes the program and says, "If you are 16 interested," I recollect a check off box, "you 17 return it to your bus company management."
18 Q. How many of those fliers have you 19 received?
20 A. (Crocker) The fliers have a yes or no l 21 check. Okay? I am not sure what the total is. At 22 Seaman--I can't tell from these numbers, Chris, how I
23 many I have received back in terms of just sheer 24 paper.
! 25 Q. How many yes's and no's have you got?
i COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
I 19495 1 A. (Crocker) That I can answer. At 2 Seaman we have got 18 yeses. I don't know how many 3 no's. I don't know if they all responded. But the 4 yeses are 18.
5 Q. Is it that you don't know whether there 6 are any no's or that you don't know how many there 7 are?
8 A. (Crocker) I don't know that there are 9 no's. I would be surprised if there were none. I 10 just don't know how many we got.
31 Q. What about for Suburbia? Have you 12 gotten any--
13 A. (Crocker) Suburbia, that is just 14 starting. We have got--two said yes so far, but the
[}
15 forms are just begining to come in. It is like 16 predicting the results of an election from the first 17 hour.
18 Q. Do you have any no's yet?
19 A. (Crocker) There is no indication here 20 of any no's. I may have. I just don't know.
21 . Q. Do you know how many bus drivers Seaman 22 Bus Company has that are school bus drivers for the j 23 schools in the EPZ?
l 24 A. (Crocker) They have approximately 60.
l 25 Q. How many does Suburbia have?
l (:) COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
19496 1 A. (Crocker) Approximately 130.
2 Q. It seems you have some information with 3 you. Why don't we get the rest. How many do 4 Adelwerth, Riverhead, Harbor View and United have?
5 A. (Crocker) This is a different piece of 6 paper. Remember, we haven't been able to engage 7 these organizations in conversation.
8 Q. What about United? You had that in a 9 completely separate category, i 10 A. (Crocker) United, I don't have a total l
11 for bus drivers. I can probably give you the lower 12 threnhold by figuring out how many buses they have.
l 13 Q. Let's not engage in that kind of O 14 o 1c.=1 tio=- vou ao#'t *=o wo =v du ariver-15 they have; 16 A. (Crocker) I don't have it right here.
17 Q. Can you tell me what proportion of the 18 school pcpulation Seaman and Suburbia transport?
19 A. (Crocker) You are asking me what 20 fraction of the EPZ school population each of these 21 bus companies carry?
22 Q. Seaman and Suburbia together, do you 23 know what proportion--
24 A. (Crocker) I have to do the 25 calculation.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19497
{} 1 2
Q. Do you havu the information in front of you that would get you to the calculation.
3 A. (Crocker) I have the information. In 4 about 10 minutes time I could do it. I would have 5 to rummage around a little bit.
6 MR. CHRISTMAN: Judge Gleason, may I 7 ask Mr. Crocker do the calculation?
8 JUDGE GLEASON: I would rather not. He 9 can supply it at a subsequent time period. All of 10 the questions in the last 10 minutes could have been 11 answered by a yes, he could supply it and it would 12 take a lot less time. I realize it is an important 13 area, but there are more expeditious--
0 14 wa acavaa^r: e i oa1r ia ene 1 e 15 minute or two I realized he had all this information 16 written down.
17 Q. Let me get back to you, Dr. Lindell.
18 The last sentence of your excerpt says 19 that "procedures planned in advance of an emergency 20 would be expected to be particularly effective in 21 avoiding the types of role conflict that could 22 potentially result in role abandonment." Do you see 23 that.
24 A. (Lindell) Yes.
25 Q. You did state, did you not, the words
(
! COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19498 1 "could potentially result in role abandonment,"
%)
2 right.
3 A. (Lindell) Yes, I did say that.
4 Q. So that without some of these special 5 provisions, there is a greater likelihood, yo+2 would
- 6 agree, would you not, in role abandonment among 7 school bus drivers, wouldn't you?
8 A. (Lindell) Well, I would say that these 9 kinds of procedures woul6 be helpful. I don't know 10 that they are necessary, but if they were provided, 11 then the low probability of role abandonment could 12 be further reduced. That may be from one in--one in 13 100 to one in 500.
14 Q. Where did you come up with those
[
15 fractions, Dr. Lindell?
16 A. (Lindell) I am giving those as 17 examples of they could be further reduced.
18 Q. You already stated that bus drivers 19 could not be assumed to have developed priority and 20 avoidance mechanisms to the same degree as 21 designated emergency workers. Right?
22 A. (Lindell) That is right. They cannot 23 be assumed to have developed them.
24 Q. So that without those mechanisms, you 25 cannot have assurance that those bus drivers will
() COMPUTER AIDED TRAMSCRIPTION/ keyword index
19499 7-1 not experience role abandonment. Correct?
\~) 2 A. (Lindell) Say that again, please?
3 Q. Without the existence of these special 4 provisions we have been discussing, you cannot have 5 assurance that the bus drivers will not experience 6 role conflict which could result in role 7 abandonment?
8 A. (Lindell) No, sir. It is without the 9 mechanisms, without the priority and avoidance 10 mechanisms, you can't and be assured. If you 11 undertake these training programs, then you increase 12 the probability that those mechanisms will act. But 13 they may not need to have the training programs in 14 order to develop the mechanisms.
15 As I said before, they may develop them 16 on the basis of past experience. So there are other 17 ways in which they can be developed other than by 18 simply the training programs.
19 Q. You are talking about training programs 20 as enhancing whatever priority and avoidance 21 mechanisms may already exist. Is that right?
22 A. (Lindell) That is correct.
I 23 Q. Let's talk about that, then. One of 24 the avoidance mechanisms that is noted in your 25 excerpt is choosing members of the emergency COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l u
19500 1 organization from outside the affected area. Isn't 2 that correct?
3 A. (Lindell) That is correct.
4 Q. With respect to the bus drivers at 5 issue here today, do you know whether or not they 6 have been chosen from outside the Shoreham EPZ?
7 A. (Lindell) I don't know whether they 8 have been chosen from outside the Shoreham EPZ.
9 Q. Do you know what proportion of those 10 bus drivers live in the EPZ as opposed to those who 11 live outside the EPZ?
12 A. (Lindell) I don't know what proportion 13 live inside or outside the EPZ.
14 Q. Mr. Crocker, do you know how many of
(])
15 the local bus drivers live within the EPZ?
16 A. (Crocker) These are the ones employed 17 by a normal school bus company?
18 Q. By a normal school bus company.
! 19 A. (Crocker) How many live--
20 Q. --within the EPZ.
21 A. (Crocker) I don't have a figure. I' d 22 say a large fraction of them do.
23 Q. But you don't have the figures?
24 A. (Crocker) No. It is not a question we 25 have pursued.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
19501 1 Q. Is there a reason why you haven't d('N 2 pursued that?
3 A. (Crocker) I didn't think anybody would 4 ask me.
5 Q. Let's go to priority mechanisms, Dr.
6 Lindell.
7 One of the priority members is training 8 members of the emergency organization to give first 9 priority to their jobs. Isn't that right?
10 A. (Linde l. ) That is one.
11 Q. You don't know whether any of the local
- 12 bus drivers have been given that kind of training 13 with respect to emergencies, do you?
l
() 14 A. (Lindell) No, I don't.
15 Q. Another is the wearing of uniforms. Do 16 you know whether the local school bus drivers wear 17 uniforms?
18 A. (Lindell) They wear school buses. In 19 that sense, they are very distinctive.
20 Q. Do they themselves wear uniforms?
i 21 A. (Lindell) They don't wear articles of 22 clothing that are uniform across all members of the 23 organization, that I know of. The point there is--
24 Q. Have you ever heard of anybody except l
! 25 Dr. Mileti, referring to a school bus as uniform?
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19502 1 A. (Lindell) I don't think he's ever 2 referred to a school bus as uniform that I know of.
3 Q. I seem to remember that answer before.
4 Maybe I am wrong. !
5 A. (Mileti) I don't recollect it, I have 6 to admit.
7 Q. Let's go, also, to making prior 8 arrangements with families. Dr. Lindell, are you 9 aware of whether any of the local school bus drivers 10 have made prior arrangements with their families for 11 what they would do in the event of a radiologic 12 emergency at Shoreham.
13 A. (Lindell) No, I don't. But I wouldn't
() 14 be surprised if they have, since it is very common 15 experience for people in, for examplo, the area 16 .around Mount St. Helens to have made arrangements, 17 and these aren't people that have any kind of 18 emergency responsibilities. They have made 19 arrangements within their own families to evacuate 20 separately in case they are separated.
21 Q. I am asking about your specific 22 knowledge about the school bus drivers here on Long 23 Island. Do you know whether they have--have you 24 made any contact with the local school bus drivers 1
l 25 or made any inquiries to determine whether or not (3)
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19503 73 1 they have made prior arrangements?
U 2 A. (Lindell) No, I haven't contacted 3 school bus drivers within this area.
4 Q. Mr. Crocker, have you made any contact 5 with local school bus drivers, other than what we 6 have already discussed, to determine whether or not 7 they have made prior arrangements?
8 A. (Crocker) In terms of other than we 9 have discussed, the answer is no. But as part of 10 what we have discussed, the information we give 11 these drivers is, "We are going to train you in 12 this, that, this, and the other thing."
13 One of the things we do is talk about 14 the LERO family tracking system, which we make
}
15 available to them. We also make available the LERO 16 family reception center. In other words, how to 17 communicate with their families and where their 18 families can go in an emergency. So we, in 1
19 training, talk to them about the very issues. Has 20 it happened yet? No, it hasn't.
21 Q. That assumes the bus drivers take the 22 training. Correct?
23 A. (Crocker) Yes. If they are not there, 24 it is hard to tell them that.
25 Q. By the way, Mr. Crocker, it may not be COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19504 ,
1 possible for you to do it in a break, but when you 2 have an opportunity, I would like you to find out 3 the number of bus drivers who said that they would 4 not accept training from LILCO, either from Seaman, 5 Suburbia or any other bus company, if you would 6 provide that information.
7 A. (Crocker) People who responded in the 8 negative? Is that the same thing you wanted me to 9 do before or--I just want to make sure I get this 10 right.
11 JUDGE GLEASON: It was the same 12 question he asked you about five minutes ago. Is 13 that right, Mr. McMurray?
() 14 MR. McMURRAY: No. This is a different 15 question. The percentage of the school population 16 within the EPZ that is transported by these two bus 17 companies who have agreed to accept training for 18 their drivers. I think that is what I asked. before.
19 This is a totally different question.
20 A. (Crocker) I understand.
21 Q. How long have your fliers been out to 22 the Seaman Bus Company.
23 A. (Crocker) I would say three weeks to a 24 month.
25 Q. How about to Suburbia Bus Company?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19505 1 I will cut this short. Were the fliers 2 sent out to all bus companies at the same time?
(Crocker) 3 A. No, the were not. The way 4 the sequence went, we would set up an appointment 5 with the manager of each bus company, discuss the 6 issue and then the materials would follow. So it 7 depended when that first meeting was. It's been 8 scattered over the last six weeks, perhaps. Some of 9 it is ongoing now.
10 Q. Then let me ask you, for Suburbia, when 11 did the fliers go out?
12 A. I'd say roughly two or three weeks ago.
13 Q. And you have only received two yes's in 14 that time?
(])
15 A. (Crocker) My staff says so far they 16 have met with one group of drivers, which was 12.
17 In this caes, Suburbia wanted us to go talk to 18 assemblies of drivers at various convenient 19 locations. The person I have handling this, met 20 with a group of 12 drivers and this was roughly two 21 or three weeks ago. Of those 12, we have got 2 22 yes's back. And he indicates he hasn't received all 23 the forms back yet and says, "I expect all 12 to say 24 yes." But I don't have those forms yet, i
l 25 Q. So, those sessions with those bus l
l O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
I 19506 1 drivers, that wasn't a training session, that was an 2 attempt to get them to accept the training?
3 A. (Crocker) It was an explanation of I l
4 what the flyer meant and to answer questions.
5 Q. Would you also suspect that a large 6 fraction of the bus drivers residing in the EPZ also 7 have families?
8 A. (Crocker) We haven't asked, but I 9 think it is a reasonable assumption.
10 Q. Let's turn back to page nine, of the 11 testimony. There, Dr. Mileti, you talk about the 12 essential point being that emergency workers who 13 have a clear perception of their emergency roles, do 14 those roles or those jobs in an emergency. Do you
(}
15 see that? It is in the answer to question seven.
16 A. (Mileti) Yes, I see it.
17 Q. You have written in the past, haven't 18 you, that it is important that this clear perception 19 be prior, exist prior to the emergency. Isn't that 20 right?
21 A. (Mileti) I don't remember writing i 22 that. However, I am willing to say that I believe 23 in emergency planning. One of the reasons I believe 24 in emergency planning is so that people have an idea 25 what they are supposed to do. So it doesn't sound
( COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l,-- - - - , _ . . -.- , - - , .-
19507 7s 1 like something I would not have written.
(- I will accept that.
2 Q.
3 I think in other places you discuss 4 "role clarity." Can you define "role clarity"?
5 A. (Mileti) In a general, broad stroke 6 definition, the notion is simple. Letting people 7 k ow ahead of time that they have a job to perform 8 in an emergency, as opposed to not telling them.
9 That is a very general, lay definition. And I 10 certainly am capable of making it more sophisticated 11 sociologically and subdividing it up until a lot of 12 little parts. But the bottom line is simply that.
13 Q Well, it has to be more than telling
{} 14 15 them, isn't it?
don't they?
First, they have to understand it, 16 A. (Mileti) If we were discussing role 17 clarity in reference to what we are trying to 18 achieve, we would be suggesting a multitude of 19 things and, therefore, a multitude of more things.
20 For example, an initial subdivision would be to 21 distinction between having the person understand 22 what their job is and then addressing the skills 23 they might need to be able to perform that job. So, 24 one could then subdivide role clarity into parts 25 that tell people that they have a job, and then go O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
r -
19508
~
1 beyond that and address what you might want them to 2 understand about how to do that job.
3 Therefore, what one might address in 4 terms of this generic concept, role clarity could 5 vary from role to role.
6 Q. So, I am correct in saying it is not 7 just simply a matter of telling somebody, but they 8 also have to understand what their role is. Right?
9 A. (Mileti) Oh, one would hope that if i
10 you had a training program, that is, in fact, what l
l 11 it was accomplishing, yes, as well as giving them 12 the skills to be able to do it. Some roles you 13 might have the skills before you train them, because
() 14 they do that every day anyway. Other roles might be 15 something they don't do normally and then you have 16 to give specific training.
17 Q. And would you please tell us what 18 factors affect role clarity?
l 19 (Pause . )
l 20 Q. Let me backup a second. You said role 21 clarity is telling somebody that they have a role in 22 an emergency. Can you define it from the point of 23 view of what is in the emergency worker's mind, what 24 they have to go through to experience role clarity?
25 A. (Mileti) I am not sure I understand
)
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19509 1 the question, but let me try to provide an answer 2 anyway.
3 Q. Well I want to make sure you 4 understand the question.
5 How do you know when a bus driver is 6 clear on his role, his emergency role?
7 A (Mileti) I was going to say I presume 8 you mean his emergency role.
9 If I were attempting to, as I would in 10 any training program, let all emergency workers 11 understand their role before the emergency, I would 12 provide them first with the information that they 13 are expected to perform that job and then the l
14 details of how they might go about actually
(])
15 performing that job, so that they understood, among 16 other things--this is in my '83 testimony, I am 17 sure--not only that they have a job, what is 18 expected of them, but in addition to that how their i 19 job relates to overall emergency response. I have i
20 always totally agreed with and supported emergency 21 planning.
L 22 But the specifics from role to role in 23 the emergency would vary. There are some roles, 24 emergency response roles, that are almost identical 25 to what people do on a normal basis. What you'd O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index L
19510 r^ 1 need to do to impart role clarity in that case would b) 2 be a lot less than what you'd need to do to impart 3 role clarity were you asking people to engage in 4 ~ emergency response activities that were much loss 5 like what they do on a normal workday. Then the 6 mechanism you might use to implement that goal or 7 objective would certainly vary.
8 Q. We will get to that point later because 9 1 think you do address it in your testimony.
10 Isn't it also important for purposes of 11 role clarity that there not be role confusion; that 12 is, that the emergency worker is receiving 13 conflicting signals about what he or she is expected 1
f'T J
14 to do in an emergency?
15 A. (Mileti) That is an interesting 16 hypothesis. I don't know of anybody who has studied 17 it.
18 Q. Let me ask you this: If an emergency is worker is beiny told by one organization that he or 20 she is expected to respond in a radiologic 21 emergency, told by another organization, perhaps the 22 one he or she works for, that there is no such f
l 23 expectation, then that could affect role clarity, l
! 24 couldn't it?
25 MR. CHRISTMAN: Objection. Lacks a
( 6 t
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19511 f^g 2 foundation in the record.
O E MR. McMURRAY: Judge Gleason, I think 3 it is clear what the foundation is here. There is 4 testimony before the board right now by school 5 administrators that, in fact , they would not expect 6 their drivers to drive because of role conflict.
7 Now, that is public testimony and it demonstrates 8 that these bus drivers are receiving conflicting 9 signals which could affect their role clarity.
10 JUDGE GLEASON: I guess where I am 11 getting hung up, Mr. McMurray, is your question 12 about role conflict and role clarity. If somebody 13 has role clarity, then how does role conflict get 14 into it? Certainly it is almost the antithesis of
(}
15 it, the opposite of it, the negation of it. I don't 16 even understand the answer that was given, that it 17 is an interesting thesis. I don't know where this 18 is driving at. Maybe you can enlighten me.
19 MR. McMURRAY: It is Dr. Mileti's 20 thesis that where there is role clarity, there will 21 be no role conflict. I am trying to establish under 22 what circumstances there will not be role clarity so 23 ue can establish under what circumstances one could 24 expect role conflict.
25 JUDGE GLEASON: That is a much clearer
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- . _ - - , - - ,__ _ - - - - - . ~ - , - , - - - - --- -.,,-,e. . . . - - - , , ,
19512 l 1 way you just put it than it was put before, w
2 MR. McMURRAY: I am doing 3 cross-examination, Judge. It is easier for me to 4 tell you than it is to do it on cross-examination.
5 Now that everybody is clear on where we are going 6 maybe it will come out a lot clearer.
7 JUDGE GLEASON: Please proceed.
8 Q. Dr. Mileti, it is true, is it not, that 9 you would expect that where one's emergency role is 10 not clear, that there is a greater likelihood that a 11 clearer role--for instance, assisting one's 12 family--might be performed first?
13 A. (Mileti) In general--let me just say
(} 14 three things--
15 Q. I would like a "yes" or "no" answer.
16 A. (Mileti) I am willing to say yes, but 17 I need to qualify it so it is clear. I apologize.
18 I typically qualify and then say "yes" or "no". But 19 yes, in general.
20 First I want to say it is not my thesis 21 that role clarity leads to know role conflict. I 22 think evarybody that goes through an emergency is 23 going to have role conflict and that what is 24 relevant is whether that will manifest itself in 25 terms of role abandonment or not in terms of whether l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
I l
19513 1 they do their emergency or not.
2 Role conflict is something that 3 permeates all of social life, even as we sit here 4 many of us are, I am sure, experiencing role 5 conflict. In fact, the evidence is that, if 6 anything, emergencies reduce role conflict because 7 they reduce competing demands on the individual.
8 But that is another story.
9 Q. The point you are making, I think, is 10 . that we are using the term "role conflict" loosely 11 cnd should be using the term role abandonment.
12 A. (Mileti) If we are talking about 13 behavior and talking about whether emergency workers 14 will do their job or do something else, for example,
(])
15 be with intimates, then we need to talk about role 16 abandonment, a very different concept than the 17 psychological or sociology feeling of being pulled 18 in two directions at one time. Experiencing that 19 ~tampe of mental conflict that one does in emergency, 20 while doing their emergency job. I don't want to 21 split hairs, but I think that is a longstanding 22 distinction in this litigation, particularly at 23 Shoreham.
24 With that discourse, I have forgotten 25 the question I said I wanted to say yes to and then O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
19514 1 qualify it.
2 Q. That is fine.
3 A. (Lindell) It may help if I explain the 4 opposite of role clarity is role ambiguity, where 5 you don't understand what the expectations are.
6 Role conflict is different from role ambiguity or
- 7 role clarity.
8 MR. McMURRAY: Thank you, Dr. Lindell.
9 That does help.
10 Q. Dr. Lindell, let me follow-up on that.
11 What sort of factors could lead to role ambiguity?
12 A. (Lindell) People could experience role 13 ambiguity if they have--if they find themselves in a
(} 14 situation in which they have no--which is different from one they ordinarily experience, so they have no 15 16 clear idea of what is expected of them in that kind 17 of a situation. That is a situation of role 18 ambiguity.
19 You have never been in the situation 20 before, you don't know what the expectations are for 21 you in that situation. It seems imperative to take 22 some action, but you don't know what is the i 23 appropriate thing to do under the circumstances.
l l 24 Q. Could role ambiguity come from the l
25 circumstances I hypothesized before, where you are O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19515 1 getting conflicting signals as to whether you are or 2 are not expected to perform an emergency role?
3 A. (Lindell) No. If you are getting 4 . conflicting signals, that is role conflict. What 5 happens is, role ambiguity would be if people are .
6 not telling you what they expect of you.
7 Q. If you are getting the conflicting 8 signals--
9 A. (Lindell) People are communicating to 10 you that they want you to do different things. That 11 is role conflict.
12 Q. That is role conflict? You are"talking 1 '
13 about--when you talk about that, you are talking
() 14 about between the family and the emergency role.
I 15 Correct?
16 A. (Lindell) That is one example.
17 Q. If you are in a situation where one 18 organization is telling you you are expected to 19 respond and another is telling you you are not 1 4
20 expected to respond, isn't it likely that there will l 21 be less role clarity in such a case?
I 22 MR. CHRISTMAN: I object that. That 23 hypothetical has no foundation in the record.
24 MR. McMURRAY: I already established 25 the hypothetical. l COMPUTER AIDED TR$11SCRIPTION/ keyword index l
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19516 1 JUDGE GLEASON: It is established.
2 Objection is denied. Proceed.
3 A. (Lindell) Could you repeat the 4 question now? >
5 Q. In circum. stances where someone is ,
6 receiving conflicting cignals as to whether or not 7 he is expected to perform--that is, r.no organization 8 is telling him he is or should perform and another 9 is telling him he doesn't have to perform--couldn't 10 that lead to less role clarity?
11 A. (Lindell) No. That leads--if you are 12 talking about the present situation when you are 13 talking about before an emergency occurs, then that
() 14 is role conflict. If the person is motivated to 15 comply with the expectations of both parties and 16 those parties are giving mutually inconsistent or 17 mutually incompatible--communicating mutually 18 incompatible expectations, that is a situation of 19 role conflict.
20 Q. That's right. But couldn't it also 21 lead to less clarity about what one's role should 22 be?
23 A. (Lindell) It leads to uncertainty as 24 to which action should be taken. That is not the l
25 same as role ambiguity or lack of role clarity, to
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19517 1 define it with the other pole of the continuum.
2 Q. Isn't it possible that in light of that 3 ambiguity--that is, the conflicting signals--at the 4 time of the emergency, the bus driver might not have 5 a clear idea of what his or her emergency role 6 should be?
7 A. (Lindell) The bus driver would have a 8 clear idea of what the alternative emergency roles 9 should be. The question is which role they will 10 follow through on.
11 Q. And, therefore, it is not as likely 12 that they would perform the emergency role as it 13 might be if the role was clear, if that ambiguity 14 didn't exist? Correct?
(]}
15 A. (Lindell) No, that is not correct.
16 Now you have shifted from talking about prior to an 17 emergency to performing an emergency role.
18 Q. I am talking about if, before the 19 emergency there are these conflicting signals, at 20 the time of the emergency we just established, you 21 said the question is which of those roles they would 22 perform. Correct?
23 A. (Lindell) At the time of the 24 emergency, the question is which of the actions they 25 would take.
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
1
19518 1 Q. In this case, whether they would go to 2 their families or whether they would perform their 3 emergancy roles. Right? Isn't that the whole issue 4 here, whether they would perform their emergency 5 roles, drive the bus, the school children, or ;
6 whether or not they would go to their families? t 7 A. (Lindell) Yes. But you are talking ,
8 about two different things. You are talking about 9 prior to the emergency and then during the 10 emergency. There are different factors operating 11 during the emergency. As Dennis just said a few 12 minutes ago, during an emergency things baccme much 13' simpler because people are focused on real demands f
{) 14 of the incident and they experience less role conflict because there is an emergency consensus.
15 16 Q. Wait a second. Dr. Lindell, didn't wo 17 just establish with Dr. Mileti that it is important 18 that the roles be clear prior to the emergency?
19 A. (Lindell) It is desirable that the 4
20 roles be clear prior to an emergency, but in order ;
21 for a person to take action, to take effective j 22 action, it only needs to be clear at the time that 23 the action is about to be taken what the appropriate 24 role is.
25 Q. Fine. Good.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19519 1 Now let's assume that there is that 2 ambiguity at the time of the emergency, that the bus 3 driver has received conflicting signals and that 4 ambiguity has not been cleared up. Isn't it more 5 likely that the bus driver would respond to his 6 family than would otherwise be the case?
7 A. (Lindell) Well, if you are talking 8 about behavior in an emergency, I don't think that 9 ,
that is the case because, as we have said earlier in 10 the testimony, people have a motivation to help in 11 emergencies.
12 Q. Wait a second, Dr. Lindell. You 13 , already established that role clarity is important
{} 14 for alleviating role abandonment.
postulated a situation where that role clarity is I have just 15 16 muddied up because of ambiguities.
17 A. (Lindell) No. You said it is role 18 clarity. Every time you described that as role 19 clarity I have corrected you and said that that was 20 role conflict. You keep on coming back and then 21 ignoring what I have said is the appropriate 22 interpretation.
23 Q. Let's not make this a semantic game.
24 Where there are those conflicting 25 signals at the time--they have existed prior to the O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19520 1 emergency and not been changed up to the time of the 2 emergency. Isn't it more likely that the bus driver 3 would opt for the family role than would be the case 4 if the ambiguition had been cleared up?
5 A. (Lindell) Mr. McMurray--
6 Q. The conflicting information had been 7 cleared up.
C A. (Lindell) You are talking about two 9 entirely different situations, one prior to an 10 Smergency and one during an emergency. What happens 11 in emergencies is that people choose to help.
12 JUDGE GLEASON: I believe his answer 13 is, Mr. McMurray, it isn't necessarily so.
14 MR. McMURRAY: Judge Gleason--
15 JUDGE GLEASON: Is that correct? Is 16 that your answer?
17 MR. McMURRAY: We have conflicting 18 testimony on the record. We have his testimony 19 about how it is important to have role clarity prior 20 to the emergency. Now Dr. Lindell is saying it 21 doesn't matter. I would like to clear that up.
22 JUDGE GLEASON: I don't think that is 23 what he said. Go ahead, Dr. Lindell.
24 WITNESS LINDELL: What I said is that l
25 it is important--I say that it is important to have i
(
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19321 1 role clarity--that is, that people need to know what 2 it is to do in those circumstances and how to do it 3 at the time the action is required. It is desirable 4 to establish that prior to an emergency. The reason 5 it is desirable to establish that prior to an 6 emergency is because people feel more comfortable 7 about knowing in advance that they have made 8 provisions that there is the assurance that people 9 will--that bus drivers, that Red Cross volunteers, 10 that police and fire will perform the rcles they are 11 sxpected to perform--that is, to engage in the kinds 12 of behaviors they are expected to perform when the 13 emergenc/ comes.
r~N 14 What happens is that in an emergency, U And the question is, 15 people tend to want to help.
16 'can they help effectively? That means that they do 17 the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
18 In order to insure that the greatest good is done i 19 for the greatest number of people--that is, to have 20 an effective emergency organization, then it is 21 desirable to communicate people's expectations about i
22 what it is that various members of the emergency 23 response organization are expected to do during an 24 emergency.
25 Q. Isn't it possible that where there is O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index t
i 19522
{} 1 2
not that clarity prior to the emergency, that s'ou may get a lotter number of bus drivers responding to 3 the emergency to drive school children?
4 A. (Lindell) Okay. You have come to a 5 question that I can say yes. Yea, it is possible 6 that if you don't engage in a training program prior 7 to an emergency, that it is possible that there 8 might be fewer bus drivers or other emergency 9 auxiliaries or emergency personnel that engage in 10 the behaviors that are expected of them by other 11 members of the emergency response organization.
12 Q. And isn't it also true that you would 13 expect a lesser number if some of the other
() 14 avoidance mechanisms are r.ot in place? For 15 instance, if the bus drivers are drawn largely from 16 the impacted area? Isn't it likely you would expect 17 a lesser number to be able to report?
18 A. (Lindell) That is possible if the 19 families are not capable of taking care of 20 themselves or if, more exactly, the bus drivers 21 believe that their families are not taking care of 22 themselves.
i 23 MR. McMURRAY: Judge Gleason, it has 24 been traditional in past proceedings--I don't know t
- 25 how you want to run this, to have two brief breaks O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19523 1 in the afternoon, of 10 minutes.
2 JUDGE GLEASON: Let's take a 10-minute 3 break now.
4 (Brief recess.)
5 JUDGE GLEASON: You want to proceed, 6 Mr. McMurray?
7 BY MR. McMURRAY:
8 Q. Dr. Lindell, you haven't had any 9 conta';t with any of the bus drivers for the local 10 school districts, have you?
11 A. (Lindell) No, I haven't.
12 Q. Do you expect to have any?
j 13 A. (Lindell) No, I don't.
() 14 Q. Dr. Mileti, have you had any contact 15 with them at all?
16 A. (Mileti) Not since I went to school on 17 Long Island, but that was 30 years ago.
18 Q. Do you expect to have any?
19 A. (Mileti) No, I don't.
20 Q. Dr. Lindell, you can't say at this time 21 whether or not the school bus drivers are clear 22 about their roles in a Shoreham emergency, can you?
23 A. (Lindell) About all I can say at this 24 point is that it would seem to be that it is clear l 25 to them that somebody doesn't want them to drive in l
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19524 ,
1 an emergency. And so I guess in that sense there 2 has been some role clarity that has been established 3 for them as to driving a bus in an emergency.
4 Q. Well, you don't really know whether or 5 not the bus drivers know that they have any role at 6 all, do you, in a Shoreham emergency?
7 A. (Lindell) Well, as I understand, I 8 can't remember whether this testimony le in or out .
9 or the evidenc,e is in or out, but it is my 10 understanding that a number of them were asked to 11 sign statements saying that they wouldn't. And I 12 think that pretty clearly conveys to them that 13 somebody thought that they should, h 14 Q. Now, that number--let's put aside those With respect to the 15 who signed that statement.
16 remaining bus drivers, you don't know whether they 17 have any idea that they have a role in a Shoreham 18 emergency, do you?
19 A. (Lindell) No, I don't know.
20 Q. Now, is it also a factor in determining 21 whether or not there will be role abandonment 22 whether or not bus drivers have accepted their l
- 23 emergency roles?
l 24 MR. McMURRAY: Let ths record note Dr.
25 Mileti just conferred with Dr. Lindell.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19525 1 A. (Lindell) Actually, Dr. Mileti is just 2 as qualified to answer the question as I am.
3 JUDGF. GLEASON: There is nothing wrong 4 with members of the panel conversing wi&.h each 5 other. That is why we nave the panel presentation.
6 MR. McMURRAY: I understand that. But 7 it is also important, .I think, to let the record 8 m gef,l'ect there was such a conference for tfhatever 9 value.
10 WIANESS L3NDELL: I have forgotten--
11 (Record Read.)
12 A. (Lindell) Yes. It is important that l
13 during the emergency that they would have accepted 14 the role of driving a school bus.
(])
15 Q. Is there any indication that you know 16 of that the bus drivers may not accept that role?
17 A. (Lindell) No reliable indication.
18 Q. Any indication at all?
19 MR. CHRISTMAN: Cbjection. I think 20 counsel is trying to get Dr. Lindell to say 21 something W)out those statements that have been 22 stricken from the evidence.
23 MR. McMURRAY: He already--
24 JUDGE GLEASON: He already has. I 25 admonish the witness, as of now the ctatements
. C) l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 1
L
19526 .
r 1 concerning those bus drivers is not in the record.
U' 2 There will be some argument later that will attempt 3 to have it reconsidered. I suggest that you not 4 refer to that testimony at a11.
1 5 WITNESS LINDELLI Yes, sir. I was 6 just--I had seen them before and I couldn't remember 7 whether that was something that was in the record or 8 not in the record. It was a little confusing.
9 Q. If there is not that acceptance at the 1
10 time of the emergency, though, you would agree that 11 there could be role abandonment. Is that correct?
12 A. (Lindell) Yes. i i
13 Q. Dr. Mileti, let me ask you, can you say 14 at this time whether or not there is role clarity
(})
15 among the bus drivers with respect to their 16 emergency roles? ,
17 A. (Mileti) No, I can't. I have no 18 empirical evidence on which to base such a judgment. ;
19 Q. Let's go to the next page. -
20 on page 10, I think there is an excerpt ,
21 from Drabek which then excerpts Dynes and 22 Quarantelli. I believe that is your testimony, Dr.
i 23 Mileti. In fact, this excerpt does discuss disaster 24 research center interviews conducted by Dynes and 25 Quarantelli? ,
I COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index E
19527 1 A. (Mileti) It se md as it part of it 2 does and part of it doesn't.
3 Q. The paragraph that starts ID 2.5, that 4 deals with Disaster Research Center interviews.
5 Isn't that correct?
6 A. (Mileti) Yes, it says it deals with 7 2,500 interviews of organizational officials. But 8 it also says "in our experience," so it may include 9 something beyond that. It definitely talks about 10 that many interviews.
11 Q. I am just trying to establish, these i 12 are the Disaster Research Center interviews that we j 13 have discussed in the past, right? That is the 14 basis for this excerpt?
(])
15 A. (Mileti) It appears that way to me but
. 16 I can't say for sure. It sure looks that way.
17 Depending on what you mean by "our having discussed 18 before."
19 As I recollect the discussion of the 20 Disaster Research Center interviews that we engaged 21 in in 1983 and/or the beginning of ' 84--I
! 22 forget--when we were talking about that, was a 23 subset of their data base. And I am not sure if it 24 is identical to what Drabsk is refe:encing when he 25 citea Quarantelli and Kelteer (ph.) .
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\
19528 l 1 Q. I will just ask you follow-up 2 questions.
3 With respect to the interviews 4 referenced in this first paragraph, do you know 5 whether the interviews specifically included 6 questions designed to inquire into the existence of 7 role conflict?
8 .,, A. (Mileti) I honestly don't remember.
9 Q. In the next paragraph, again quoting 10 Dynes and Quarantelli, there is an item in 11 brackets, number one--strike that.
12 There are three items set out 13 describing why role abandonment is not found
(} 14 empirically. The first is that the total role 15 structure thus becomes more coherently organized 16 around a set of value priorities and at the same 17 time irrelevant roles which could produce strain are 18 eliminated until the emergency is over. Do you see t
19 that?
20 A. (Mileti) Yes, I see that.
21 Q. It is not your tettimony, is it, that I 22 if one's family is perceived to be in danger, that i 23 nevertheless that family role becomes irrelevant?
24 A. (Mileti) No. I don't think anyone, l 25 even Dynes and Quarantelli, would say a role becomes COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19529 m 1 irrelevant. What they were discussing here was the 2 shifting of priorities amongst the various 3 activities a society is engaged in, and an emergency 4 comes along and reprioritizes them. Therefore, we 5 say things like the sale of durable goods fall off.
6 People close those kinds of shops. First priorities 7 are those roles that go toward helping people 8 preserve life and limb and the second priority is 9 the preservation of property, et cetera.
10 Q. Preservation of life and limb including 11 your own families?
12 A. (Mileti) Any other human beings, of 13 course including your own family. This is the basic 14 shift that is observed in emergencies, that, for
(])
15 example, makes me feel confident that that is why we 16 have never seen, in all of the history of all the 17 emergencies I know of in this country, people ending 18 up abandoning a group of people--I call in my 19 testimony--third graders abandoned on the 20 curb--evacuating school children raises a very high 21 priority, with or without emergency planning.
22 Q. You say such role abandonment has never 23 been seen?
24 A. (Mileti) To the best of my knowledge, 25 I know of no case in the history of this country, O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19530 1 and I mean from 1776 forward, where anyone has left 2 school children on the curb whether or not there was 3 emergency planning.
4 Q. I am talking about role abandonment.
5 You are saying it has never occurred among emergency 6 workers?
7 A. (Mileti) I didn't say that. Rolo 8 abandonment has occurred amongst emergency workers.
9 I even have a case detailed in my testimony. It is 10 an outlying kind of event.
11 Q. I just wanted to make sure I was clear 12 on your testimony, 13 The second item deals with--because of i
(} 14 acsurances that organizational members on duty will 1 15 ' remain, other organizational members not on duty 16 have the reassurance that they have time to check 17 personal and familial damage and also to engage in 18 limited amounts of nonoccupational role behavior l 19 before reporting.
20 I would like to ask you how that factor 4
21 is at all applicable to the local bus drivers and to 22 the issue we have here.
23 (Pause.)
j 24 Q. Let me back up and state this another I 25 way. My problem with this in, this seems to talk i
d i
! COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index !
1 I I I
~ - - - <
19531 1 about shift duty. That is, where there are people 2 on duty and other people off duty, that those people -
t 3 off duty will have a sense that the people on duty 4 can handle it so, therefore, there will not be the ,
5 type of role conflict or role abandonment we are 6 discussing.
7 But the school bus drivers don'*, work 8 in shifts. They work at specific times. I am just t 9 wondering whether this factor has any applicability 10 at all in this case, in this proceeding?
11 A. (Mileti) Let me reread it and I would 12 be happy to answer your question. t 13 This factor is talking about
() 14 organizations that have multiple shifts. And it is 15 presuming and telling about an observation from ,
16 prior emergencies in which those shifts not at work 17 are assured that the organization for which they 18 work are able to--is able to accomplish its 19 emergency job without them, thereby freeing them up.
20 It is a role conflict abatement mechanism, if you 21 will.
t 22 Q. My question is, does this have any 23 applicability here where there is not such shift 24 work?
25 A. (Mileti) I don't know how bus drivers t
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19532 -
i drive buses on Long Island. I don't know if there 2 are shifts or not. I can only answer that it may 3 have applicability and it may not have applicability 4 depending upon the school bus driver organizations 5 as they are structured on Long Island.
6 Q. That is not something you are familiar 7 with, though?
1 8 A. (Mileti) No. I am not familiar with '
9 it.
10 Q. The third item is that family units can 11 make internal allocative decisions, et cetera. Does 12 that have any applicability here?
13 A. (Mileti) Yes, I think it does. This
() 14 is talking about what actually goes on with actual 15 people in actual emergencies. What it is 16 suggesting, for example, is what we have always 17 observed or typically observed and how emergency i 18 workers deal with opting between family roles and 19 emergency response rolen.
20 And that in, the presumption is not, 21 empircally, what I think this contention has as its l 22 premise, and that is that you pick one role versus l 23 the other. But rather, if you are a male emergency j 24 worker, for example, it turns out that you can 25 discover, and do in the context of an actual
(
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
.- , ,----r.- - . , , , . , , - ,,----,--n,
19533 1 emergency, that your wife remains a competent human 2 being and can engage in a protective action like 3 drive a car, or we could call it evacuation, even in 4 an emergency. And that can free the husband up to 5 go do his emergency job. l 6 or if the emergency worker is a woman, 7 to discover that the husband is competent.
8 Q. These school bus drivers work during 9 the day. Correct?
I 10 A. (Mileti) I presume they work whenever 11 school is open.
12 Q. During the day, right?
13 A. (Mileti) Most of the schools I know
() 14 are during the day.
15 Q. It is true, isn't it, that most of the 16 school bus drivers we are talking about within the 17 EPZ are women?
18 A. (Mileti) Yes. I have that impression 19 although I don't have the data in front of me.
20 Q. Let's assume that if you will.
21 It is also a likely assumption that if 22 they have familier and they have husbands, that 23 those husbands work. Is that correct?
24 A. (Mileti) I think that is the norm in 25 this society, yes. There certainly could be an O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19534 1 exception.
2 Q. And it could be likely also that the 3 husbands may be at work at some distance from the i 4 home? Isn't that right?
5 A. (Mileti) I think that is a ,
6 possibility. Yes.
7 Q. And it is also possible, is it not, l 8 that these families have children who are at home?
9 A. (Mileti) I presume the children who 10 are sick or too young to be in school themselves. )
11 Q. In other cases there would be children 12 in school?
13 A. (Mileti) One would presume most of the
- () 14 time the children would be in school.
Then it could be possible, couldn't it, l
15 Q.
16 that it would be the bus driver, the woman in this 17 case, who would be the one closest to home and most i 18 available to help in an evacuation, isn't that
\
19 right, of the family? ,
i 20 A. (Mileti) Well, in the typical sense I
21 and for the typical family, no one would be at home.
i 22 The wife--the husband is away at work and the kids i
23 are in school. So, no one is at home. But I 24 presume that there is a smaJ1 subset of persons who 25 have a husband not at work or a husband at work who O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
19535 .
i 1 34y have children who aren't in school, who aren't 2 with a babysitter and are home alone. It just ;
I 3
3 doesn't seem--I don't believe what I just said. i
^
t 4 4 Q. Let me try and clarify this, i L
5 Isn't it possible there are situations l 6 where there are going to be people at home, people ;
i 7 who cannot necessarily take charge of the situation, ;
8 minor children, and therefore that the bus driver 9 would noed to tend to the needs of the family first 10 rather than to her emergency role? f 11 A. (Mileti) If what you are asking me is !
I 12 do kids play hookey, I bet they still do. l 13 Q. Or minor children who aren't in school?
14 A. (Mileti) I can't imagine a woman
(])
l 15 leaving preschool-age children home alone. It i
16 seems--or a man, for that matter, doing that.
17 Therefore, they would be with someone who occupies,
, 18 in a role relationship to that young preschool-aged
! 19 child, a role of not superiority but leadership--I i
! 20 have forgotten the technical word. I'm sorry. And j
j 21 that that person could tend to the safety of the l
22 child or engage in a conversation with the mother if j 23 she is at home, for example, as you hypothesized, or i
24 the mother could, as is the case in many j 25 emergencies, take the kid with her on the bus.
l l
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19536 1 Q. Let me go back to the first thing you 2 said. Isn't it possible that even though there 3 might be somebody at home, a bebysitter or whatnot, r
4 that that person either is not capable to engage in 5 evacuation or that the bus driver nevertheless wants 6 to be the one who gets the faml1.y out of the EPZ?
7 A. (Mileti) Anything is possible. Given 8 all the parameters you have imposed on that 9 scenario, I would have to say the likely 10 representative, theoretically, very, very small 11 subportion of the population of bus drivers. But, 12 of course, it is possible that you can come up with 13 such a configuration in a human population.
14 Has there been any sort of attempt, Mr.
(]) Q. I 15 Crocker, to determine, among the school bus drivers, 16 who might have circumstances at home that would !
17 require them to respond home first?
18 A. (Crocker) None that I am aware of.
19 Q. Do you intend to make any attempt to 20 determine which bus drivers might face circumstances 21 that would increase the chances that they would 22 abandon their roles because they had family members 23 at home who needed to be taken care of?
l 24 A. (Crocker) No. I don't think we are 25 going to do that. We are going to train anyone who
)
COMPUTER AIDEC TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index ;
L l
1
1 19537 l u
1 is willing to accept the training.
q) 2 Q. Don't you think it would be a prudent
]
3 inquiry to attempt to determine who might face such 4 circumstances so that there would be an avoidance i
. i l 5 mechanism in place; those people would not be ;
6 expected to drive and you might have other drivers l
{
2 7 fulfilling the role? ,
e i 8 A. (Crocker) Because circumstances, as i I 9 Dr. Mileti said, change, I expect that some bus 4
s L 10 drivers on occasion might find they have a child at i i 11 home that is not normally there. But perhaps most
! 12 of the time the child is healthy and they are in
{ 13 school. I don't think I am going to go to each bus [
1
() 14 driver and make detailed inquiries into their family 1 15 relationships.
i ,
i 16 Q. Why not? You apparently, at least at a }
l l 17 couple of these bus companies, have already made ;
i j 18 contact with them. It would be an easy matter to i'
19 attempt to determice who might face circumstances j j 20 that would lead to role abandonment. Why not g J
i 21 attempt to determine who would face those f
22 circumstances and alleviate the problem?
l' ,
l e 23 MR. CHRISTMAN: Objection. That !
t j 24 question is excessively argumentative. ,
25 JUDGE GLEASON: Sustained. Let's move !
i I i
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i !
l l
u_..-..________,._,_,__, _ . _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _ . _ , . _ - _ _
19538 1 on. You asked the question three different times.
<-}
v 2 He's answered.
3 Q. Dr. Mileti, let me ask you, do you 4 think that it would be prudent to attempt to inquire 5 which bus drivers might face circumstances that 6 would possibly lead to role conflict and role 7 abandonment?
8 A. (Mileti) Well, I think it would be--if 9 one did that, I' d call it prudent. I think it would 10 be, in the general scheme of things, quite a waste 11 of resources. I don't think it is necessary that it 12 is done. You well know that LILCO has, for its own 13 bus drivers, a large percentage of backup people. I
(} 14 forget what percentage but it is perhaps as high as I can't conceive that that many peoplo 15 50 percent.
16 would have kids at home, alone.
17 I think that addressing the notion of 18 role conflict as it would play out in real i
19 emergencies among real people as the emergencies 20 were experienced is, in my opinior. and as T would 21 catalog it and have catalogued it before, down with 22 the list of myths that are problems, that are 23 nonproblems, that characterize real emergencier in 24 terms of being able to get an effective emergency 25 response.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
13539 1 It is possible for persons to have role O 2 conflict; indeed, likely. It is unlikely you would 3 observe many people abandoning their roles. That is 4 what the historical record tells us. And it goes
~
5 down with the myths that people panic, et cetera. I 6 would rather see those resources if they are 7 available for emergency planning address something 1
8 that has in history shown to surface as a potential S problem in an emergency.
10 Q. But Dr. Lindell has cited in his i
4 11 articic an important avoidance mechanism, which is 12 drawing workers from outside of the impact area. Do
- 13 you think that is not a worthwhile pursuit?
14 A. (Mileti) No. That wasn't Dr.
j 15 Lindell's words. Those were Russell Dyne's words.
, 16 Those words came from the end of an academic piece 17 that he wrote that he said, "Okay, now, if I were 18 sitting down and trying to think of all the things 19 planners could do if they wanted to address this, 20 this 16 what they should do."
21 And there have been some places--Long 22 Island, to be honest with you, is the only placo I 23 know of whero people have labored to try to address 24 those kinds of problems in putting emergency plans 25 together. From a practical point of view, it has O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19540
{) 1 2
never occurred in the history of the country where an emergency organization has not been able to do 3 its emergency job in a real emergency.
4 Q. Let me ask you this. Are you saying 5 that in no other emergency has there been an attempt 6 to draw emergency workers from outside the impacted 7 area so that there would not be role abandonment?
0 A. (Mileti) No. I didn't say that. What 9 I said was--
10 Q. I am asking you, do you believe that is q 11 true? Have there been other instances where 12 emergency workers have been drawn from other areas 13 in order to avoid role abandonment?
() 14 A. (Mileti) It was done in the original 15 LERO plan put together here on Long Island, but only 16 in an attempt by the persons at LILCO in charge at 17 the time to do what it felt--they felt they needed l 18 to do because of Suffolk County's concerns.
5 i
19 Q. You can't think of any other instances, 20 any other emergencies where role abandonment did not 21 occur specifically because the bus drivers or l
22 whomever were pulled from areas outside of the 23 impact area?
j 24 A. (Milcti) I don't know of any 25 emergencies where that's--where that has occurred.
W O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
j
19541 1 I know there have been some persons who have made 2 recomme....dations analogous to those lines in 3 reference to emergency planning for nuclear exchange 4 with the Soviet Union- you know, explosion. But 5 that is a category of emergencies apart from the 6 kind we are talking about here. And those were 7 recommendations.
8 Q. Do you know whether or not any of the 9 survey data compiled by Mr. Eelly indicate that in 10 certain circumstances, certain emergencies, bus 11 drivers were specifically pulled from areas outside 12 the impact area so that there wouldn't be role l 13 abandonment?
l l
(} 14 A. (Milati) No, I don't. You would 15 probably have. better luck asking Mr. Kelly. He 16 compiled all that data. But if that does exist, 17 what I would say is that is possibly because 18 somebody who was managing that emergre.cy perceived l 19 that that was a potentia 3 problem. The police in i
20 emergencies always, for example, brag that because 21 they cordoned off an area they prevented looting.
l l 22 They think they were successful at that. But l
23 looting tends not to occur in emergencies, either.
24 Q. But it means that to the extent it 25 occurred--we haven't gotten into that yet--an O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19542 1 emergency manager felt it was a prudent thing to do t'
2 to pull the emergency workers from outside the area 3 at risk?
4 A. (Mileti) That may well be. And there 5 are emergency managers across this land that to this 6 day emergency broadcast system messages say to their 7 public, "Don't panic." And there have been examples 8 of emergency where falling prey to these myths about 9 human behavior in emergencies have actually hurt l
10 emergency response.
11 Q. You think it is a bad idea to pull 12 emergency workers from outside the impact area in 13 order to avoid role abandonment?
l.
14 A. (Mileti) I don't think it is
[} '
15 necessary. I think if somebody wants to do it, make
! 16 a planner happy, let him do it. Would the emergency 17 response still get done if he didn't do that? My 18 best judgment and the judgment of anyone who l 19 reviewed the empirical record of emergency response, 20 I think would have to say it is unnecessary.
21 Q. Doesn't that extend on the nature of 22 the impact or ;ze of the impact area, the nature of 23 the disastar and how many of the emergency workers' l
24 families are impacted by the disaster?
25 A. (Mileti) Given the list of hazard O CO*WUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l 1
19543 1 characteristics you have given me, nature of the O 2 impact was certainly one. If we were talking 3 about--the answer to your question is yes, however, 4 what happened in Hiroshima, for example, they blew 5 up all the emergency response organizations and 6 therefore emergency response would have had to have 7 come from outside.
8 Q. Mr. Crocker, I asked you earlier 9 whether you could get some data. Have you had a 10 chance to get those data yet?
11 A. (Crocker) I'm sorry. My understanding 12 was not during the break but overnight.
13 Q. I was just asking whether you have been 14 able to do it over the break.
15 A. (Crocker) In 10 minutes I didn't even 16 attempt it. I wrote it down to make sure I would do 17 it.
l 16 Q. Let's go to page 12--actually, on page 19 11 is another excerpt from Dynes, Marchi and 20 Penanda, Sociology of Disasters. Again, Dr. Mileti, i
l 21 this excerpt discusses the Disaster Research Center 22 interviews. Isn't that correct?
23 A. (Mileti) As I recollect, the answer is l
24 yes. And in fact, I think this perhaps is more 25 focused on what we discussed in ' 83 and ' 84. But O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
i l l
19544 1 that is answering a question you asked 10 minutes
(^T 2 age.
3 Q. In the middle of the indented paragraph 4 on page 12, it says, "In the first sample of 443 5 persons who held positions in emergency relevant 6 organizations"--do you see that?
7 A. (Mileti) Yes. ,
8 Q. Are you aware of whether any of those 9 443 persons were school bus drivers or bus company 10 officials?
11 A. (Mileti) To the best of my 12 recollection, although I can't say for sure, they 13 were not school bus drivers.
14 Q. How about bus company officials?
15 A. (Mileti) To the best of my 16 recollection, they were also not bus company 17 officials.
18 Q. They were things like fire chiefs, 1
1 19 mayors? ,
20 A. (Mileti) I'd have to look to say for 21 sure. I am sure they included the likes of, but
! 22 perhaps I can't say beyond a shadeu of a doubt 23 whether they were limited to.
24 Q. Again, with respect to this paragraph,
! 25 you don't know whether the data that they were l
l
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l I_
19545 1 compiling was the result of any questions
! 2 specifically designed to determine whether role 3 conflict occurred or not?
4 A. (Mileti) I think Russell--excuse 5 me--Russell Dynes described that in '83 and '84 to 6 you all and I would hate to have the record rest on 7 my recollection of what he said at that time.
8 But my recollection of what he said at 9 that time is that they had open-ended questions in 10 which they were asking the people "What happened?"
11 in a probing way. You might call it a focus group 12 except it wasn't a group. With persons--included in 13 that were "What were the problems you encountered?"
() 14 and so on and so forth. There was certainly the 15 potential for that to raise to the surface.
16 I can't say and it would be my best 17 guess that there were not explicit questions about l 18 role conflict, which is a psychological phenomenon.
l l 19 Ic is possible there were questions about role 20 abandonment but I can't say for sure.
21 Q. On the bottom of the page there is an i
22 excerpt from an article by Sorensen of--V-o-g-t--
23 A. (Mileti) It is pronounced Vogt, l
24 spelled V-o g-t.
25 Q. --and Mileti, called "Evacuation and O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
~
I l
19546 7
1 Assessment of Planning and Research." And their k'-) 2 conclusion is stated. Part of the conclusion is 3 that in a nuclear power plant accident research 4 suggests that there may be an increased potential 5 for conflict and role strain.
6 Do you see that?
l 7 A. (Mileti) Yes, I do.
8 Q. Could you explain why there would be an 9 increased potential for conflict and role strain?
10 A. (Mileti) John and I--
11 Q. John Sorensen?
12 A. (Mileti) Yes. Excuse me. Doctor 13 Sorensen and I were pulling together findings. We 14 reviewed all the research record. There is not any 15 pointed research or specific piece of research that 16 would lead to this conclusion. In thinking about 17 what nuclear power plant emergency planning is--in l 18 my judgment, the most sophisticated, the most 19 intricate, the most involved emergency planning that 20 I know of, that more persons are being involved in 21 it, that more jobs are being specified, et cetera.
22 It seemed clear to us that the 23 potential for role conflict to occur might indeed be 24 higher in a nuclear power plant emergency. But the 25 net effect of that is not that it would cause more l
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19547 1 role abandonment, as we go on to say. But, rather, O 2 that there is just so many more people involved and, 3 therefore, if you did nothing but count heads of 4 emergency responders you would have to say the 5 potential for it might increase.
6 Q. What are the factors of a radiologic 7 emergency that lead you to this conclusion?
8 A. (Mileti) I just told you what they 9 were.
10 Q. Is one the raature of the hasard?
11 A. (Mileti) No. The characteristics that 12 we thought of when we put this sentence together 13 were those that I just said.
14 Q. Coulo .t also be because of the nature
(
15 of the hazard that there would be an increased 16 potential for conflict?
17 A. (Mileti) I'd have to say yes in answer 18 to that question. However, that is also true if it 19 were a fire or if it were a tornado or if it were a 20 hurricane or earthquake prediction. That is, it 21 would depend on whether or not the hazard was one in 22 which a person perceived during the emergency that 23 their family's life was threatened in a way that 24 death could occur. For example, a burning building
! 25 with the family still in it--and that the other i
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l.__________
19548 1 person, the person who has the potential for role 2 abandonment or who is experiencing role conflict, 3 perceives that they could go and help accomplish 4 something at the family unit that could not 5 otherwise occur, 6 Q. Is it because with respect to a nuclear 7 accident it is more likely that there might be the 8 perception that the family is endangered than, for 9 instance, in the case of a fire, which can be seen?
10 A. (Mileti) No. Again, I have already 11 said what the factoru were that led us to make this 12 conclusion. There are many other hazards that are l 13 also not visible.
14 Q. When you stated that you have given us
)
15 the factors--and frankly, maybe I didn't understand 16 it. Maybe you gave them and I didn't understand it.
17 All I think I heard were some generalities. I am l
18 trying to figure out what specific factors there are 1
l 19 about a nuclear accident plan that would lead to l
20 increased potential for conflict and role strain?
21 A. (Mileti) Specifically, the general 22 factor as you characterized it, that I answered was i 23 emergency planning for nuclear power plants is more l
24 intricate and more sophisticated than any kind of l
( 25 emergency response that I know of. And as a l
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19549 1 consequence of that, more people are involved and 2 more people are doing more things. Since more is 3 going on, there is a greater potential for conflict.
4 Q. Are more people involved because the 5 potential area of impact is greater thsn in many of 6 the disasters, for instance, that were looked at in 7 Mr. Kelly's survey?
8 A. (Mileti) In general, the potential for 9 impact is not larger for nuclear power plant 10 emergencies as they are planned for--that is, with 11 the 10 mile EPZ. Some natural events have huge 12 impact areas. No. I said it is because of the 13 infinite detail that goes into emergency planning
() 14 that just simply doesn't exist in emergency planning 15 for other hazards I know of.
16 Q. You know, the 19 emergencies that Mr.
17 Kelly looked at, isn't it true that the vast 18 majority of them have a smaller impact area than the 19 10 mile EPZ?
20 A. (Mileti) I honestly don't know.
21 Q. You haven't looked at that data?
22 A. (Mileti) I have looked at the list. I 23 have looked at both the organizational data on the 24 original questionnaires--the photocopies of the l 25 original questionnaires--as well as the bus driver O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19550
- 1 interviews on the original qu'estionnaires. But I 2 didn't have the perceived need to recollect how 3 large the impact zone was.
~4 I did talk to him about how many people 5 were evacuated.
6 Q. Do you have anything more to say, Dr.
7 Mileti? I saw you conferring with Dr. Lindell. I 8 thought he was giving more you could answer.
9 A. (Mileti) He did tell me something. I 10 could say it now as more of an answer. But it was 11 providing more information about what Dr. Kelly did.
12 Dr. Kelly--Mr. Kelly is probably better qualified to l 13 represent what he did than my interpretation of what 1
14 he did.
15 Q. Mr. Kelly, isn't it true t'h$t the vast 16 majority of the 19 emergencies that you looked at 17 had impact areas much smaller than the 10 mile EPZ 18 at Shoreham?
19 A. (Kelly) If I could refer you to 20 Appendix G, page two, this is a summary of the data.
- 21 .We can look at each individual case. It says the 22 smallest area was .5 miles and the largest one being 23 280 square miles. I believe the 280 square miles l 24 was due to a hurricane--Hurricane Elaine that in l
25 Pinellas County, Florida. It does say the average l
l O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index I
l
(
19551 I was between 2 and 20 square miles. We can go
[\
2 through the cases and get exact figures if you'd 3 like.
4 Q. Well, you do have the data regarding 5 the impact area, the size of the impact area for 6 each. Emergencies you looked at. Right?
7 A. (Kelly) That's correct.
8 Q. Do you have it tabulated as to how 9 many--in how many of those evacuations the impact 10 area was smaller than 10 miles in radius?
11 A. (Kelly) I believe, a quick count, 14 12 who responded to that, three--two--sorry. Two were 13 larger than a 10 mile radius.
(-)
\_/
14 Q. That is the Marysville flood and the 15 Hurricane Elaine. Correct?
16 A. (Kelly) It is--Oh. In Pinellas County 17 it was--the response was 100 to 280. I think it was 18 the difference between two people answering the l
19 question. In Woodburn there was 20 mile down-wind 20 radius. In Marysville I don't believe we had an 21 answer. No estimate was provided.
22 Q. I don't want to dwell on that. We are 23 going to address your surveys later.
24 Dr. Mileti, on page 13, you cited a 25 study by Barbara Friedman. She says, "In many O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
[
4 l
19552 1 respects Mileti's argument is similar and agreeable O 2 with the work done by Barton some 20 years earlier."
3 Do you see that?
4 A. (Mileti) I remember that statement. I 5 don't see it right now.
6 Q. Page 13, 4th line.
7 A. (Mileti) Yes. I see it. Thank you.
8 Q. What article was she talking about?
9 A. (Mileti) I think, in general, she was 10 talking about the current controversy regarding 11 whether or not role conflict exists in emergencies 12 and the fact that in the contemporary world,
.l
- 13 particularly at nuclear power plants--although she l
14 doesn't reference them--that it has been raised as l 15 an issue.
16 She is also talking about, I believe, 17 the controversy--not really controversy, but the l 18 first generation of research on role conflict, as I 19 characterized it in my '83 '84 testimony, and the 20 subsequent research on role conflict or abandonment 21 in emergencies.
22 If one looks at the historical record, 23 the field of disaster research was originally called 24 social disorganization, because all the sociologists 25 thought things would be disorganized by emergencies.
1 I
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index I
i
19553 1 They went out and, as you might guess, interpreted O 2 what they saw in that way. And there are--and I 3 cited them in my testimony, as well as in 4 publications that I have referenced here--half a 5 dozen or so of the old original National Academy of 6 Science reports that document rola abandonment or 7 conflict. In fact, one of them, Fred Bates, said f 8 there was no role conflict; everyone opted for 9 family roles.
10 That, compared to compared to what 11 sociologists in the mainstream of disaster research 12 are saying today--and that is as characterized by 13 Dynes, Quaranielli, myself and others, Drabek, et 14 cetera, is that role abandonment is not a problem.
l 15 I think she is saying this controversy that appears l
. 16 apparent in the field puts--and her effort was to 17 try to impose some consistency on it and say, "Okay 18 old boys, old salty dogs, here's what is really 19 going on. I, an insightful young person, have these 20 new things to say."
21 In the context of that, she is saying, 22 my point of view, in her view, as she interprets 23 Allan Barton's point of view, having read his book, 24 are identical. To be honest, tongue in cheek, sho l 25 is saying what Mileti published, which was really l
l O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19554 1 from my testimony here in ' 83 and ' 84, is nothing O 2 new. "He is just mouthing what I think Barton 3 says." That is how I would interpret that.
4 Q. Have you spoken to Friedman about what 5 she meant by this passage?
6 A. (Mileti) Yes. In fact, I got to know 7 her--in fact, there was awhile she was going to come 8 to Colorado State to work on her Ph.D. I was trying 9 to talk her into coming there to work with me. She 10 got her Master's Degree at Disaster Research Center 11 in Delaware and then decided to go, I think, to 12 Pennsylvania.
l 13 Q. Have you spoken to Professor Barton as 14 to whether or not ho agrees that your views are 15 similar?
(
16 A. No , I absolutely have not. I would 17 suspect that he'd say they aren't, because that is 18 what he said in his deposition.
i 19 Q. What I am trying to get at, was she 20 pointing to a specific argument that you were making 21 in support of your views on role conflict, or was 22 she talking about your views in general being the l
l 23 same as Barton's in general?
1 I 24 A. (Mileti) As I recollect it, I think 25 here she was talking about role clarity.
I COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index t
l l
19555
- 1 Q. What did she mean when she said your 2 argument was similar to Barton?
3 A. (Mileti) Well, let me get her article 4 and look at it before I answer the question. I can 5 tell you specifically rather than if I recollect'.
6 MR. McMURRAY: So we don't waste time, 7 if you want to take the second break, Judge Gleason?
8 JUDGE GLEASON: All right. We will 9 take 10 minutes.
10 (Brief recess.)
11 JUDGE GLEASON: We will go for another 12 20 or 25 minutes and then we will suspend the
, 13 witnesses for the day and let you argue your motion l
l ~T 14 here. Then we will adjourn overnight and recess for (Q
15 tomorrow.
16 Go ahead.
17 Q. Dr. Mileti, Friedman did make the l
l 18 conclusion, didn't she, that more research would be l
19 useful on role conflict and whether it results in l
20 role abandonment?
l l 21 A. (Mileti) It is possible. I don't 22 recollect. I do recollect that she made the l 23 conclusion that future research should be directed 24 at how individuals resolve role conflict and 25 disasters, since many alternatives exist. And that l
l Cl)
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
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19556
, 1 is calling for research that would address the 2 potentially many ways that people resolve it.
3 Q. Including, among others, role 4 abandonment?
5 A. (Mileti) Just a moment. I want to get 6 a clear reference to her conclusion.
7 (Pause.)
8 She makes many conclusions. One 9 conclusion, the fifth according to the way I counted 10 them, is that, "the point is that if we assume role 11 conflict exists during disasters at a significant 12 level, then we must turn research in the direction 13 of determining how individuals resolve it."
14 However, let me also reference what I 15 have called her fourth conclusion when I read her 16 document. It is as follows: "In other words, it 17 would seem more plausible that during disasters 18 individuals use other methods of resolving role 19 conflict besides role abandonment."
20 I think she was saying that as she read 21 the literature and looked around contemporary 22 society, that people are debating whether role 23 abandonment exists or not, and what sociologists 24 should really focus on, since role abandonment 25 occurs really very infrequently, is the mechanism l O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
19557
,- 1 whereby role conflict, the psychological phenomenon kJ 2 is resolved.
3 Q. She says it is more than plausible that 4 individuals use methods in resolving role conflict.
5 Other than role abandonment, she is not stating role 6 abandonment is not a possible resolution of role 7 conflict, is she?
8 A. (Mileti) Role abandonment 9 theoretically is a resolution of role conflict. I 10 don't know what she had in mind, but I would hope
. 11 that she would recognize role abandonment, which is 12 just opting for one role, as a mechanism that 13 theoretically can get you out of a conflict
(
14 situation.
/}
15 Q. And 'she was not saying that role 16 abandonment would not occur, was she?
17 A. (Mileti) I would hope that she 18 wouldn't be saying that. We have never said that.
19 I have never said that role abandonment couldn't 20 occur.
21 By the way, I did find that passage you 22 asked me about.
23 Q. I was just going to ask you about that.
24 A. (Mileti) For your information, it is 25 on page 17 of her article, and is a very short CE)
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19558 1 passage where she compares me to Allan Barton. I )
1 C:) 2 think it probably would be best if I just read it. .
i 3 "In role conflict and abandonment in 4 emergency workers, Mileti 1985, makes the strong 5 argument that although an individual may experience 6 psychological role strain, this does not result in 7 role abandonment in disasters if emergency workers 8 are provided before an emergency with a clear idea 9 of what would be their emergency role.
10 "In addition, Mileti argues that 11 Killian's earlier work specifically supported this 12 notion of role certainty results in the elimination 13 of role Moandonment. In many respects Mileti's 14 argument is similar and agreeable with the work done 15 by Barton some 20 years earlier."
16 By the way, she is referencing my 17 reference to Killian's earlier work. His earlier 18 work that has been popular in these hearings is the 19 1952 article. And I am sure she is referencing my 20 reference to his 1954 article, although she doesn't 21 have his '54 article in her references.
22 Q. In your testimony on page 13, you also 23 mention work done by a graduate student, Barbara 24 Vogt, who stated that, in general, about twice as 25 many people show up to evacuate special facilities O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
i 1
19559
)
1 as there are people who need to be evacuated from 2 them.
3 Do you see that?
4 A. (Mileti) Yes.
5 Q. Do you know what disaster she is 6 evaluating?
7 A. (Mileti) I did. I don't remember 8 which emergency she is evaluating today. I can say 9 that her data base was gathered according to the 10 following concepts: She wanted to investigate the 11 evacuation of special facilities from every major 12 evacuation in this nation in the course of the last 13 seven years, I believe, from 1980 or '81 forward.
() 14 And her data base was from that entire population.
15 She did develop a list of all of those 16 emergencies, and I can see that list. But I don't 17 remember any of them today.
18 Q. Do you know what kind of workers she 19 was studying.
20 A. (Mileti) She was studying the 21 evacuation of special facilities and, therefore, 22 would have studied anybody that helped work to 23 evacuate special facilities.
24 Q. Do you know whether school bus drivers 25 was among the population that she reviewed?
O b COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19560 1 A. (Mileti) My best guess is that the 2 answer to that question is that she did not study 3 school bus drivers, because she was studying ths 4 evacuation, as it says in my testimony, of nursing 5 homes and hospitals. I just don't think that school 6 bus drivers would end up evacuating or helping to 7 evacuate nursing homes and hospitals, although it is 8 not inconceivable. I wouldn't expect it in her data 9 set.
10 Q. Do you know whether any of the 11 disasters that she was looking at were radiological 12 emergencies?
13 A. (Mileti) Given the parameters of how 14 she defined her population, which was from--at the 15 earliest, 1980 forward, I don't know of any 16 large-scale evacuations in this country that 17 involved radiation as the hazard in that time 18 period. So I would be surprised if she turned one 19 up.
20 Q. Further down on that page, you discuss 21 an article by James Johnson, which apparently was a 22 survey regarding the intentions of teachers in 23 California with respect to a future as yet 24 unexperienced emergency.
25 Can you tell me what kind of emergency O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19561 1 Dr. Johnson was studying?
2 A. (Mileti) This was a hypothetical 3 emergency, one that did not occur but that was 4 speculating to occur in the future about, as I 5 recollect, an evacuation at the Diablo Canyon 6 Nuclear Power Plant.
7 Q. Hypothesizing an accident at Diablo 8 Canyon; is that correct?
9 A. (Mileti) As I ree:ollect, hypothesizing 10 an accident there and asking teachers whether or not 11 they intended to participate in helping to evacuate 12 their school children.
13 Q. Other than Professor Johnson's article,
() 14 is it your testimony that there are no other 15 publications or research which support the county's 16 view on role conflict and role abandonment.
17 A. (Mileti) No. There are other 18 publications. And--
19 G. Let me limit my question. I don't want 20 to go back to Killian and those. I am talking about 21 in, say, the last decade or so that supported the 22 county's view of role conflict.
- 23 A. (Mileti) Yes, there are and I have 24 them referenced in my testimony.
l l 25 There are perhaps as many as a dozen O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
.. ~
l 19562 1 publications that James Johnson, Jr . , for example, 2 presented at the hearings at Seabrook about the 3 behavior of hospital workers and the National Guard, 4 et cetera, that--well, the National Guard 5 publication doesn't, but other doctors have 6 published assessments of how they interpreted what 7 went on at hospitals during the accident at Threo 8 Mile Island as what he chooses to label and I know 9 was in the county's evidence in this case, presented 10 as evidence of role abandonment by what he chose to 11 call emergency workers.
12 I think if you stretch the definitions, 13 which I don't agree with for reasons I am sure you
() 14 are familiar with, I t:ould have to say that there 15 were those.
16 Q. Other than the other publications you 17 discussed further on with respect to hospital 18 workers at TMI, is it your testimony that there are 19 no other publications which support the county's 20 view on role conflict other than Professor Johnson's 21 here?
22 A. (Mileti) Not to the best of my 23 knowledge, except it is possible, although I don't 24 think that it is true. I think it is possible that 25 Dr. Johnson may have published another article or so O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19563 1 on the topic from the same data if not comparable 2 data. But I would have included it in this. I 3 presume the answer to your question is yes, although 4 it is possible that something existed that I don't 5 know about. I try to do comprehensive literature 6 reviews but you always miss one. I hope I didn't.
7 Q. On page 15, the answer to question 8, 8 Dr. Mileti, you note that the regular bus drivers 9 .have not yet been trained. Dr. Mileti, you can't 10 state at this time, can you, that there is any 11 assurance that all the bus drivers ever will be 12 trained?
13 A. (Mileti) I sure can's, no. I nave no I
() 14 idea. That is way outside my area of influence.
15 Q. But you say that they have not been -
16 exposed to all the factors that are known to enhance 17 role clarity and emergency role performance. Do you 18 see that?
19 A. (Mileti) Yes.
20 Q. Now, maybe this is the way I should 21 have approached this question before. What are the 22 factors known to enhance role clarity?
23 A. (Mileti) That people first know that ,
24 they have a job. I apologize for not remembering 25 the list. As I recollect, as you ask the question I (
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword indox
'*re-- - c-. ,,...-,n, - , , , . . -
19564 1 now, it reminds me of three things I talked about in 2 '83 and '84. That is without a doubt the first one:
3 When to do it and how to do it.
4 Thank you, Mike. I will put on the 5 record that he helped me.
6 Q. I'm sorry. Can you restate that?
7 A. (Mileti) What to do--that they know 8 they have the job, when they are supposed to do it 9 and how to do ic. On occasions, sociologists can 10 talk in simple English.
11 Q. You would agree, wouldn't you, that the 12 absence of training could have some effect on 13 whether or not people would abandon their roles?
14 A. (Mileti) I think that if in the i
O 15 generic sense people weren't trained, didn't know 16 they had an emergency job, it wasn't apparent to 17 them in the emergency as a consequence of that, that 18 they had an emergency job, that without a doubt that ,
19 could result in their not doing that emergency job ,
20 in the emergency. However, I could not label that 21 role abandonroent. How could you argue they ,
l 22 abandoned an emergency job they didn't know they l
23 had.
24 Q. Well, if they had been given an f 25 indication that they have a role, for instance, O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
)
19565 1 through listening to testimony like this or i
(1) 2 whatever, but they haven't been trained, they don't 3 know specifically what job they are supposed to do, 4 when to do it or how to do it, wouldn't that affect 5 whether or not they would abandon their roles?
6 A. (Mileti) It depends on what kind of 7 job we are talking about. If we are talking about, 8 as we are, bus drivers, it is my opinion, as stated 9 here, that their job--they drive buses. They drive 10 buses to and from school with children in them. And 11 that without an emergency plan--if you went back to 12 1976, before TMI f before NUREG 0654 and Department 13 for Emergency Plans, those bus drivers are going to 14 have an idea--it is going to occur to them because
(% 3
%)
15 of the normative overlap between what they do every 16 day, taking kids back and forth to school, that if 17 they hear that the EPZ is going to be evacuated, it 18 will occur to them that they need to go to the 19 school and get the kids. That is why I believe we 20 have not ever seen kids abandoned in any emergency 21 we have had.
22 That doesn't mean in my opinion that I 23 would say we should ignore role clarity. If we are 24 engaging in planning, we might as well do planning 25 right. The whole point of planning is to specify O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index t
I
19566
(~T 1 what are the jobs that need to get done.
V 2 If we went back to the era of the 50's, 3 when the National Research Council was first doing 4 its disaster research, we'd find communities in 5 which people ended up doing something else in 6 response to an emergency, not because they were 7 worried about their family, but largely because they 8 didn't know they had an emergency job. And that 9 largely is the data base, by the way, on which 10 Barton's book rests.
11 Q. Are you saying the absence of training 12 had no effect on whether or not bus drivers will 13 abandon their roles?
() 14 A. (Mileti) I will think it could 15 potentially have an effect in the sense that they 16 may not know what others might think they should 17 know or how they should do their job. They 18 certainly know how to drive a bus. They certainly 19 would have a strong sense that they are the people 20 who have the bus, who could get the kids out of the 21 school. And I think that they would define in that 22 situation the need for them to get the kids out of 23 the school.
24 Q. How do you know they wouldn't think 25 that LILCO is supposed to get the kids out of the O
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
19567 1 school?
2 A. (Mileti) That is a possibility.
3 Q. You don't know whether or not they 4 think some other plans might have been made for the 5 children, do you?
6 A. (Mileti) That is also a possibility.
7 And it has been typically manifested in emergencies 8 that have that kind of uncertainty Iant to it. That 9 is one of the main reasons why more people show up 10 to do certain emergency tasks rather than having no 11 people show up to do certain emergency tasks, and 12 tying this concept back to the notion that some 13 things in emergencies simply surface that no one can 14 keep from surfacing to the top of the social system 15 as high priority, and 7etting children evacuated 16 will do that.
17 I feel confident in saying that of all 18 the role conflict, role abandonment, roles we could 19 be arguing the one to be least concerned about in my 20 opinion is getting children out. If there were 21 species of humans who didn't care about children, 22 they would die out.
23 Q. But you already said that it is 24 possible that bus drivers could think that LILCO has 25 already made a plan for it.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19568 1 A. (Mileti) That is likely. To be on the O 2 safe side, I would suspect more just show up, just 3 in case LILCO didn't.
4 Q. You haven't diJcussed this with any of 5 the local bus drivers, have you?
6 A. (Mileti) No. I am basing my judgments 7 solely on the empirical record of human behavior in 8 actual emergencies.
9 Q. You are speculating as to what they 10 might do even if they were untrained. Correct?
11 A. (Mileti) You can call it speculating.
12 I prefer to make--to characterize it as me. king a 13 prudent judgment based on the scientific technique, gS 14 Q. What scientific technique are you
\_/
15 referring to?
16 A. (Mileti) Well, the scientific method 17 is, you have a hypothesis, in a sense, and then you 18 look at data. And you either accept or reject your 19 ' hypothesis. The hypothesis in reference to how 20 people behave in emergencies, we can hypothesize a 21 role like bus drivers won't drive evacuation buses 22 to get children out of a hazardous area and then 23 look at the empirical record of actual data and see 24 if there are any scraps of evidence for that, and I
- 25 think that there isn't.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19569 1 0 It is possible also that the local bus ;
O 2 drivers, especially those with children, might go to 3 the schools to pick up tneir own children, their own 4 family?
5 MR. CHRISTMAN: Objection.
6 JUDGE GLEASON: Let him answer it, f
7 A. (M11eti) You know you can always get 8 out of mt--when you ask is it a possible question, 9 about human behavior, yes. If you can think it up 10 in reference to human behavior, it is possible that i
11 sometime, someplace, somebody is going to engage in 12 that behavior. But the question really becomes in
, 13 sociology one of is it probable or is it likely.
I 14 What would you guess the model or normative response 15 might be? So, yes, I agree. It is possible. I 16 don't think it is probable.
17 Q. Is it your testimony that even if bus 18 drivers were untrained, they didn't know where they 19 were supposed to take the children, didn't know what i
20 routes they were supposed to take, they didn't even 21 know if they were supposed to take the children, l 22 that nevertheless all of them would show up at the i
23 schools with their buses?
24 A. (Mileti) There are so many parameters 25 to that question, I could almost make it a question i
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
l l
19570 1 in reference t o each of them. My testimony is that O 2 of all the groues of--
3 Q. I would like an answer to that question a
4 that I asked, Dr. Mileti.
5 A. (Mileti) Can I have it read back, then 6 because I think it did contain many questions 7 JUDGE GLEASON: Read the question.
G (Record read.)
l 9 A. (Mileti) And the answer to your l
10 question, I wouldn't expect that all of them would 11 show up. I would hypothesize that given the 12 parameters of that question, that there is a 13 probability that less than all of them would show 14 up. However, I would also hypothesize that enough 15 of them would show up to get the school children 16 ovacuated.
- 17 Q. Do you know how many it would take to l
l 18 get the children evacuated?
19 A. (Mileti) No, I don't. I am resting 20 that on the basis of my judgment or interpretation 21 or reading of the historical record of emergencies 22 in this nation that we have experienced with and 23 without emergency plans, that there has never in the l
I 24 history of the country been an organization that has 25 beer unab.'.e to do what it was supposed to do in an O COMPUTHR AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l l
1
I 19571 1 emergency because of role abandonment or role 2 conflict or role stress, whatever label we want to 3 use.
4 Q. And there never has been a radiological i
5 emergency in this country, has there, where school 6 . children have had to be evacuated by school buses, 7 has there?
8 A. (Mileti) Not in the sense that you 9 phrased your question. But there was the 10 evacuation--the closing of schools at Three Mile 11 Island.
12 Q. Which you haven't studied.
13 A. (Mileti) No, I did spend a couple of
() 14 hours interviewing one school principal. What I 15 didn't ask in that interview years ago, was whether
, 16 or not school buses were used. I am just presuming 17 that they were.
18 And you're right. I am happy to say 19 there hasn't been a radiological emergency in this i
20 nation for n9 to study. I hope I never get the data i 21 and we never get to test the hypothesis. But I am I
22 willing to make the judgment, the only prudent one a 23 scientist could make on the basis of the empirical i 24 record.
25 By the way, none of this me&ns that I
(
COMPUTER AIDED TRAb"SCRIPTION/ keyword ine.ox i
I
i 19572
, 1 think emergency planning should not go on. I do l
( 2 support emergency planning efforts.
3 Q. Let's go to page--well, &,his is an okay 4 place to stop, Judge.
5 JUDGE GLEASON: All right. Gentlemen, 6 we appreciate your testimony today. You are excused l 7 r4 witnesses.
8 Mr. Miller, are you going to spesk on 9 the motion, or who is?
10 We have before us the motion by Suffolk 11 County asking the board to reconsider its decision 12 with respect to motions to strike testimony of the 13 Brodsky, et al., witnesses, filed by the applicant.
14 MR. McMURRAY: Judge Gleason, Mr. i 15 Miller and I have this whole bus driver issue
! 16 divided between us. I am going to address those 17 that deal with the role conflict testimony of i
18 Professor Cole and the others.
19 JUDGE GLEASON: All right.
20 MR. McMURRAY: There are just two items 21 we want to address. The first one deals with the 22 testimony that was stricken regarding the Friday 23 board's decision. That is number one on page two.
24 JUDGE GLEASON: One and two. All I 25 right.
l l
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index I
l l
m ,.___ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . , _ _ _ I
19573 1 MR. McMURRAY: On page two. In your 2 decision it was Item A--sorry. B1A6.
3 JUDGE GLEASON: Did that refer to both 4 of them?
5 MR. McMURRAY: No, sir. The other one 6 we want to address with respect to Cole, the Cole 7 testimony, is the striking of the testimony about 8 the signed statements by the bus drivers.
9 Let me first address the Exercise 10 Board's findings.
11 JUDGE GLEASON: The Friday board 12 decision is referenced in Brodsky testimony and also 13 in Cole testimony. Are you going to cover both?
(} 14 MR. McMURRAY: Yes. I will cover both.
15 It is the same argument.
16 JUDGE GLEASON: Can you give me the 17 reference in our decision to the Cole testimony if 18 you have it?
15 MR. McMURRAY: Yes. In the Cole 20 testimony it is page 25--
21 JUDGE GLEASON: I don't mean that. I t
22 mean our decision, l
23 MR. McMURRAY: What page in your 24 decision?
25 JUDGE GLEASON: Yes, i
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSORIPTION/ keyword index 1
19574 1 MR. McMUPRAY: It is on page two of 2 your order of May 9th. Item B1A6.
3 JUDGE GLEASON: What was the one on the 4 first one, Brodsky? I have that as B1A6.
5 MR. MILLER: I am a '6 as organized as 6 Mr. McMurray. I have not made the correlation to 7 your order.
8 JUDGE GLEASON: Okay. Go ahead Mr.
9 McMurray. I will find it somewhere.
10 MR. McMURRAY: Both my arguments on 11 these matters will be brief. With respect to the 12 Exercise Board findings, the board has ruled that l
13 those findings are irrelevant. I would first like
() 14 to ask the board for clarification as to why it--
15 JUDGE GLEASON: I am not going to 16 clarify any more at this point. I am going to 17 listen to arguments and come back tomorrow. You 18 make the argument. You made the motion to strike.
i 19 I will let the other parties respond to it and then i
20 I will respond it to it in the morning.
21 MR. McMURRAY: My only point, Judge 22 Gleason, is it is difficult to try to impress the 23 board why the evidence is relevant when we have 24 nothing more than the board's ruling that it is 25 relevant. I am trying to tell the board why we O .
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~ _ __
19575 1 believe this is relevant.
O 2 As you heard today, there has been a 3 lot of discussion about training and whether 4 training can be given to bus drivers and whether 5 training will alleviate role conflict. LILCO makes 6 much of the fact that training will alleviate role 7 conflict and is an important factor in reducing role 8 abandonment.
9 Now, the Friday board decision casts 10 serious doubt upon LILCO's ability to provide that 11 training. The Friday board decision found LILCO's 12 training program to be fundamentally flawed. That 13 cast doubt on LILCO's ability to provide the i
14 training to the bus drivers which would eliminate 15 role abandonment. Therefore, the Friday board's 16 decision is very relevant to whether or not, in a 17 radiological emergency at Shoreham, there would be 18 role abandonment.
19 These witnesses are perfectly capable 20 of reading a decision and drawing conclusions based 21 on their expertise from that decision. The decision 22 tells them that the training program raises 23 questions about whether or not LILCO is capable of 24 alleviating role conflict and role abandonment.
25 That is the point which we make with respect to the l
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
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19576 1 Exercise Board findings and why it is so relevant to
('N
\~ 2 the issue beforo the board at this time.
3 I have nothing further to say on that 4 but I will respond to questions if the board has 5 any.
6 JUDGE GLEASON: Do you care to respond?
7 MS. LEUGERS: Yes. The Friday decision 8 is mentioned twice; once in the Brodsky and once in i
9 the Cole testimony, where they give their 10 conclusions, their conclusions about what the 11 significance of the Friday decision is. It is a 12 legal decision. It requires expertise, legal 13 expertise to interpret what this decision means, 14 especially when you are generalizing it from one 15 situation to another.
16 It broadly talks about LILCO's training 17 but it does not talk about training of regular 18 school bus drivers, which is what the testimony went 19 towards this morning in response to the questioning 20 by Mr. McMurray, nor does it go to the training, any 21 unique aspects of the training, that LILCO school 22 bus drivers would be rec <aiving. Any legal 23 interpretation is best left to the lawyers to argue 24 in their findings at some other point.
25 That it, basically what we have to say COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19577 g-) 1 about that.
(./ .
2 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Bachmann?
3 MR. BACHMANN: The staff agrees with 4 counsel for LILCO primarily on the idea that this is 5 essentially legal nrgument. It really has no place 6 for witnesses of this sort to be making that sort of 7 testimony.
8 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: May I state, on behalf 9 of the State, that the State supports the County and 10 also, I note that there have been numerous 11 references in testimony to the PID, which itself is 12 a legal decision from a board.
13 JUDGE GLEASON: To what? I'm sorry.
(} 14 MR. ZAHNLEUTER:
Initial Decision, PID.
The PID, the Partial 15 It is referenced PID in the 16 testimony quite often. That runs contrary to the 17 position LILCO is taking now that legal decisions 18 ' require legal expertise to interpret. There are 19 numerous places where LILCO's nonlegal witne'sses 20 rely on the Partial Initial Decision.
21 MR. McMURRAY: We have already had l
22 reference today, Judge Gleason, to NUREG 0654 by one-l l 23 of the witnesses. That is basically a legal >
24 document--
25 JUDGE GLEASON: I thought you were i
i O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 1
19578 1 through, Mr. McMurray?
2 MR. McMURRAY: I'm sorry. May I please 3 speak, Judge Gleason?
4 JUDGE GLEASON: Yes.
5 MR. McMURRAY: Thank you.
6 We had reference to NUREG 0654 by more 7 than one witness. That is a legal document of 8 sorts. We did not object, because it is the kind of 9 document that one would expect an expert to be able 10 to draw conclusions from. The same with a Partial 11 Initial Decision by a board. An expert should be 12 able to read it and draw conclusions from the facts I
l 13 that are stated in that decision.
() 14 The Friday board is not pure legal 15 argument. It states many facts. And the 16 fundamental fact there is that LILCO's training l
l 17 program, not just training for any particular group, 18 but training program, is fundamentally flawed.
13 Thank you.
I 20 MR. BACHMAN: Judge Gleason, may I have 21 a brief word?
( 22 JUDGE GLEASON: Go ahead.
l 23 MR. BACHMAN: I object to Mr.
24 McMurray's characterization of NUREG 0654 as a legal 25 document. That is a document used as guidance in O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l l
i 19579 1 emergency planning. It is not designed to be used 2 essentially by las.yers. It is designed to be used 3 by professional emergency planners. So I really 4 object to his characterization of that as a legal 5 document.
6 JUDGE GLEASON: Let's hear Mr. Miller 7 on number two.
8 MR. McMURRAY: I'm sorry. I still have 9 the signed statements by the bus drivers to address.
10 That is number--
11 JUDGE GLEASON: You have number two?
12 MR. McMURRAY: I will also address 13 number two.
() 14 Here the issue is whether or not 15 testimony regarding signed statements by 225 bus 16 drivers that they will not drive buses in a 17 radiological emergency at Shoreham should be 18 admitted. This is probably the most probative 19 evidence that we can have in this proceeding. It 20 comes directly from the emergency workers--I should 21 say auxiliary emergency workers, that LILCO has 22 unilaterally designated to drive buses in an 23 emergency without asking them.
24 Those who are aware that LILCO has 25 designated them, or some of these who are aware, O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19580 1 have stated that they will not drive. They have not O 2 accepted that role. That is extremely important for 3 this board to weigh in assessing the issue of 4 whether or not there will be sufficiest bus drivers 5 in the event of an emergency at Shorehem.
6 Now, there are issues as to whether or 7 not these statements constitute hearsay. Hearsay is 8 admissible in these NRC proceedings. As we have 9 stated, some of the school administrators can 10 provide information regarding the bases for these 11 statements and their reliability. And it seems to 12 me at a ninimum that this board should hear what 13 they have to say before ruling to strike the t
14 testimony regarding those statements.
15 LILCO, remember, took the opportunity 16 to address these statements. LILCO wasn't 17 blind-sided by these statements. It addressed them 18 in its testimony and was able to deal with them.
19 Now, the board should now be able to weigh the 20 testimony provided by LILCO rather than ignoring 21 what is the truth, which is that 225 bus drivers 22 have said they will not drive.
23 JUDGE GLEASON: Ms. Leugers?
24 MS. LEUGERS: Your Honor, LILCO still 25 believes that any reference to the bus drivers' O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19581 1 statement should be stricken from the 2 testimony--should remain not part of the testimony 3 for several reasons. There is a lack of foundation.
4 The witnesses are not qualified to support this 5 testimony. And it is not just that it is hearsay.
6 It is unreliable hearsay.
7 We laid this out well in our motion to 8 strike, but I will touch on each of the three 9 reasons very briefly. The lack of foundation 10 problem is due to the fact that LILCO has not been 11 made privy to who these drivers are or to who talked 12 to these drivers to get them to sign these 13 statements, how it was done, under what conditions
(} 14 15 these individuals were asked or even coerced to sign these statements.
16 Also, we don't know if people refused 17 to sign these statements and since they refused 18 their statements were thrown away or there was no 19 tabulation upon keeping these statements.
20 The witnesses are not qualified to 21 support these statements not only because there is a 22 lack of fcundation, but they are not aware, from 23 what we have discovered in depositions of several of 24 the witnesses, they aren't aware of these bus driver 25 statements or where they came from.
l (
COMPUTER AIDED TPANSCRIPTION/ keyword index t
(-
l 19582 1 In answers to interrogatories we i
2 proposed, we put to Suffolk County and New York 3 State, they gave very vague answers about where 4 these statements came from and who the members of 5 the public were that provided these statements. And 6 I believe that their answers to interrogatories were 7 part of our motion to strike.
8 Because of these factors, it falle into 9 the category of unreliable hearsay. Hearsay is 10 admissible, but not in conditions such as these.
11 The one last point that Mr. McMurray 12 said was that we could cross-examine their witnesses j 13 to find out about the reliability of the statements.
, 14 Specifically in their response to our motion to 15 strike, they mentioned that Suffolk County witness 16 Rossi could be asked and he could give his knowledge i 17 on it. Well, we asked him that during his 18 . deposition and we had never seen those statements.
19 For the reasons I have stated, LILCO 20 believes that those statements should remain not a I 21 part of the record.
22 MR. BACHMANN: I will defer to Mr.
i 23 Zahnleuter at this time and go last.
24 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Zahnleuter? Sorry, 25 I should have asked you.
l
(:) COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19583
() 1 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: The State supports the 2 County on this motion, too. I would like to add 3 that LILCO's complaints about unreliability of these 4 statements can also be applied to some of the 5 testimony we heard today from Mr. Crocker, where he 6 talked about the bus drivers who had agreed with 7 LILCO to conduct--to participate in training. We 8 don't know much about the circumstances that 9 surrounded the inquiries that LILCO made about the 10 willingness of bus drivers to accept training.
11 JUDGE GLEASON: Was that not on 12 cross-examination?
13 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: It arose this morning 14 in response to questions by Mr. McMurray and without 15 objection from counteel for LILCO.
16 JUDGE GLEASON: Proceed.
17 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: We know very little I 18 about the circumstances that the drivers were 19 questioned about. As Ms. Leugers said, whether they 20 were asked or coerced, the testimony seems to be in 21 the same category. It is just that it comes out in 22 LILCO's favor, whereas these signed statements from 23 bus drivers como out against LILCO's favor. The 24 reliability is equal in both instances and I think 25 that the Government would be prejudiced by allowing O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19584
() 1 testimony favorable to LILCO to be allowed into the ,
1 2 record but not testimony favorable to the 3 Government. l 4 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Bachmann?
5 MR. BACHMANN In answer to a comment 6 made by Mr. Zahnleuter, I would certainly suggest 7 that if a witness responds on cross-examination you 8 sort of have to take him as you get him. I don't 9 think that analogy is at all apt.
10 Going to the heart of the objection to
. 11 this testimony, that it is unreliable hearsay, while 12 it is true that these administrative hearings, a 13 certain amount of hearsay by necessity must come in, 14 especially under expert testimony, I think this is 15 pushing it way beyond the bounds of what would be 16 acceptable hearsay evidence. We are not dealing 17 with experts here. We are dealing--at least that 18 part of their testimony they are not testifying as .
19 experts. I believe and the staff believes that this c 20 is, was, continues to be unacceptable hearsay 21 evidence.
22 JUDGE GLEASON: Number two?
23 MR. MILLER: Judge Gleason, I wf.ll try i
24 and keep this very brief. The easy one, whj i 25 unfortunately is not listed on the two page document i COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19585
() I that we prepared during the course of the day and
' 2 gave to the parties and the board, appears on page 3 13 of the County's testimony, where I believe--and I 4 assume inadvertently the board struck roughly two 5 lines of the County's testimony which was not moved 6 to be stricken by LILCO or the NRC staff. Those 7 lines would be lines 16 through 18 on page 13 of the 8 County's testimony, the sentence, "Our remaining 9 three public schools are all located close to the 10 ten-mile EPZ boundary line." Those lines I believe 11 should not fall in the scope of the passage that was 12 stricken--
13 JUDGE GLEASON: I think in the--
O 14 MR. MILLER: It didn't catch that one.
15 JUDGE GLEASON: Was there reference to 16 it?
17 MR. MILLER: No.
18 JUDGE GLEASON: I just made a mistake 19 and I figured it wasn't worth striking it or leaving l
20 it in, so I ignored it. Do you agree with tha; 21 conclusion?
22 MR. MILLER: No , sir. I would like to 23 get the sentence back in.
24 There was another one you did catch, t
25 Judge Gleason.
(~)
v i COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 4
19586
() 1 JUDGE GLEASON: This I didn't make a 2 reference to, I know.
3 MR. MILLER: It is page 13, lines 16 4 through 18, the sentence right before the passage 5 that was stricken pursuant to motion.
6 JUDGE GLEASON: Unfortunately, I don't 7 have the Cole testimony here.
8 MR. MILLER: This is the Brodsky.
9 JUDGE GLEASON: What page was it?
10 MR. MILLER: 13. Next-to-last sentence 11 of the first full paragraph.
l 12 JUDGE GLEASON: "We feel it is
! 13 unrealistic to assume."
( 14 MR. MILLER: That was stricken pursuant 15 to LILCO motion to strike, "Our remaining three 16 public schools," LILCO did not move to strike that 17 nor did the staff and I believe it should be back in 18 - the testimony.
19 JUDGE GLEASON: If that is the case, 20 then it would be.
1 21 Do you agree, Ms. Leugers?
22 MS. LEUGERS: Yes, your Honor. From my 23 reading of the sentence it appears to be merely a 24 description of the school district, the makeup of 25 the school district, and we would have no objections
( COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l l
i 19587 l
() 1 to that.
4 2 JUDGE GLEASON: That sentence would be 3 re.tnserted into the testimony.
l l'
4 MR. MILLER: Thank you.
t 5 The remainder of those were matters !
6 stricken pursuant to motions to strike.
7 JVDGE GLEASON: Froceed. l a
8 MR. MILLER: The next matter I will ;
9 lump together as what I will call opinion statements ;
10 by the County school official witnesses regarding -
l l
11 whether or not LILCO's plan to evacuate the schools 12 would, in fact, be implemented by the schools
- i
~13 themselves. Those are the five items listed on the 4
1'
() 14 first page of the document we prepared today, items f 15 2A through 2E. Specified on that page are the 16 particular page numbers and the lines of those pages [
t ;
17 where the testimony was stricken.
18 JUDGE GLEASON: I can state very I 19 simply, Mr. Miller, that those are stricken because ,
l 20 they are really outside the scope of the issue
- 21 before us and, therefore, they are irrelevant to our 22 proceeding.
I 23 MR. MILLER: Judge Gleason, let me just
! 24 see if I can understand. Maybe we can reach an i
25 understanding on this one. Your ruling did indicate l
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
,--w---,----,------nc---- 4~, , .-- - - - ,,w-w-r-n. --vn.,. - - - - - -
g---~ -,
19588 O 1 that ea ** r ' eao riv e 9 ericx a 2 because the board considered them to be irrelevant 3 evidence. I guess I can only say that what we have 4 before the board as far as I am aware is a plan by 5 LILCO to evacuate the schools in part relying upon 6 resources available to the schools--that is, school 7 buses--and in part relying on school bus drivers j 8 normally under contract or employed by the schools.
i 9 And, in any event, relying upon the schools 10 themselves to say they would in fact implement 11 LILCO's plan.
12 The testimony presented by the County
! 13 in many ways and for many reasons sets forth the 14 reasons why LILCO's plan, as far as the school I 15 administrators are concerned, is an unworkable plan l 16 and could not be implemented in a way to adequately 17 protect the safety of the children that attend EPZ 18 schools. The school administrators give the j
19 reasons, ample reasons as to why they would not 20 implement LILCO's plan and then state in a very f 21 precise fashion in these five passages stricken by l
l 22 the board that they wot id not implement LILCO's plan i
j 23 or permit LILCO to implement that plan by putting l 24 their school children on buses driven by LILCO I 25 employees.
l l
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
+
19589
(') 1 It seemed to me, Judge Gleaso., that 2 that is the heart of the isana before the board.
3 LILCO has a plan but that pla.7 is completely 4 dependent upon the school officials within the EPZ 5 saying they would permit LILCO to implement that 6 plan. The school officials have stated to the 7 contrary. They will do so next week when they 8 appear before the board under oath, that they would 9 not implement LILCO's plan. And I have to believe t
10 that that is relevant evidence and squarely inside i 11 the scope of the issues before this board and should 12 therefore be admitted into evidence.
13 JUDGE GLEASON: Go on to number 14 three--excuse me. I'm sorry. Mr. Zahnleuter?
15 MR. ZARNLEUTER: I will simply state 16 that the State supports the County's position.
17 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Christman?
18 I'm sorry.
19 MS. LEUGERS: That's okay.
20 In addition to the board's reasons that 21 were given in the errata sheet, LILCO feels these 22 five statements should be out because they challenge 23 NRC's NU Regulation discussing the best efforts of 24 local governmental entities and state entities. And 25 as Suffolk County has repeatedly told LILCO, school O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19590 r
) 1 districts are separate political entities and they 2 have no control over them whatsoever. As such, they 3 also are bound by the NRC NU Regulation that 4 requires that they use their best efforts. Also, 5 there is a presumption that they will use the 6 utility plan to help respond in an emergency at 7 Shoreham.
8 As such, these five statements 9 challenge that by saying they, as counsel 10 characterized themselves, the statements say they 11 refuse to implement LILCO's school plan. That goes i
12 directly contrary to the new NRC regulations.
13 MR. BACHMAN: Staff would support l
14 keeping these things stricken. We believe that 15 these statements are just so far out of the scope of 16 the proceeding defined by the Appeal Board in j 17 ALAB-832 and by this board, that it really doesn't 18 bear much discussion.
- 19 JUDGE GLEASON
- Number three.
20 MR. MILLER: Number three is what we 21 call the witnesses' statement regarding the 22 protective action they would in fact take. In 23 arguing this, Judge Gleason, it does tie back into j 24 the one previously argued, the statements regarding 25 the school's refusal to implement LILCO's plan. I l
l l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 4
P 19591 ,
() 1 think it is important, Judge, to address some of the f
2 comments made by Ms. Leugers regarding the new rule.
3 I will do so in the context also of this affirmative 4 response made by the witnesses that the board had 5 stricken.
6 The board's ruling on the motion to 7 strike indicated the board considered the evidence ;
r 8 irrelevant. It did not tie that ruling into the new .
9 Commission rule. I am not sure that is the basis ,
10 the board used to strike the evidence. But assuming ;
11 for the moment that it was, the board first must l 12 recognize that the new rule applies to actions by 13 state and local governments. i
( 14 Under the argument just made by Ms.
15 Leugers, the sewer districts of New '.'ork State would 16 be governmental entities that would have to follow a 17 utility plan because they are independent political 18 entities under New York State law. That was not the 19 purpose of the new rule and there is no way to read 20 that rule to reach that reason or rationale effered 21 by Ms. Leugers.
22 Secondly, l' must point out,, Judge 23 Gleason, that these school witnessee have provided 24 ample reasons as to why they would not follow and 25 implement LILCO's school plan for evacuating the O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19592
() 1 school children. This is not a case where the r 2 schools are simply saying "we would never do it,"
l 3 without offering reasons and justification and 4 rationale to the board to consider. Many of the 5 reasons that have been offered have been stricken by 6 the board but the reasons have been offered, ample 7 reasons still remain in the testimony. And in 8 addition, this ties into this fourth point about the 9 affirmative statement and the response that would be 10 taken by the schools that was stricken.
11 The school officials have also offered 12 in their testimony en pages 70 and */1 very 13 particular, very precise statements as to how they 14 would, in fact, deal with the Shoreham emergency 15 given the situation they believe they would face !
16 with role conflict among the known bus drivers. We 17 believe that that affirmative statement made by the 18 witnesses offered by the County should also be 19 reviewed by the board. That statement states what 20 the school districts believe they would do r.nd how 21 they would attempt to do it. ,
22 JUDGE GLEASON: In other words, they 23 are expressing their best efforts in that statement?
24 MR. MILLER: That is their best I
25 efforts, Judge Gleason. That is right.
l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19593
() 1 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Zahnleuter, are you 2 up?
3 MR. ZAMNLEUTER: We support the County.
4 JUDGE GLEASON: Ms. Leugers?
5 MS. LEUGERS: Judge Gleason, first I 6 must confess that I hadn't come totally prepared to 7 re-argue our motions to strike so what I have 8 prepared has been since lunchtime, in between. I 9 did have some time hunting down all the reasons for i
10 some of the arguments that were made. It appears 11 from looking at this one again, in particular, the 12 emphasis here in this litigation is the adequacy of 13 LILCO's plan to use its own school bus drivers to
( 14 evacuate the schools. It does not go to responding 15 to school districts' absolute refusal to use LILCO's 1
16 plan and to work with LILCO and then to do something 17 totally different that isn't adequate. In that
! 18 sense, it is out of the scope of this proceeding.
! 19 JUDGE GLEASON: Anything to add, Mr.
- 20 Bachmann?
3
! 21 MR. BACHMANN: Just the fact that this 22 is a very narrow issue on romand and I think this 23 is--this type of testimony is impermissibly broad in 24 the scope of what we are supposed to be trying.
25 JUDGE GLEASON: Number four?
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
. . ~ . -
19594 1
I 1 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir. Number four, 2 Judge Gleason, very briefly, ties into the last two 3 arguments I have made. Number four refers to a Mt.
4 Sinai School District resolution that was passed in j 5 1988 specifically in response to LILCO's new school 1
6 proposal. That resolution, of course, was not one 4
3 7 of the resolutions that was in issue back in the 8 1983-84 planning litigation. Again, it is specific 9 to this proposal before the board. Therefore, I I 10 assume it must be relevant to the issues before the i
l 11 board and we believe, therefore, should be admitted 12 or readmitted back into evidence. That is also j 13 Attachment 11 to the County's testimony. I am not 14 sure the arguments really differ, if the board wants 15 to go around the horn hare.
16 JUDGE GLEASON: Is what you are saying l
17 it must be relevant because the board has already 1
l 18 considered it previously?
19 MR. MILLER: Just the opposite, sir. I l
l 20 am saying this resolution was enacted this year,
- 21 1988, by the school district, It goes specifically 22 to LILCO's new school proposal for evacuating school 23 children. I guess what I am saying, Judge Gleason, 24 is that if the board agrees with my arguments that I
25 statements by the schools regarding the fact that l COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
l 19595
() I they would not implement LILCO's plan, if the board 2 agrees that is relevant and that the affirmative 3 statements of the schools should come in, this 4 should come in as well.
4 5 JUDGE GLEASON: It is really the same 6 issue?
7 MR. MILLER: I believe so.
8 JUDGE GLEASON: I believe the answers 9 are the same.
10 MS. LEUGERS: All I would add is the 11 resolution does not go to evaluating LILCO's school 12 bus driver procedure. That is all I would add to 13 that.
() 14 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Zahnleuter?
15 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Are you asking me to 16 diseass Dr. Ha-kin's testimony at this point?
17 JUDGE GLEASON: No. I am just asking i
18 what your comment is with respect to the Mt. Sinai 19 resolution in the 1988 testimony.
20 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: On the aprt of the 21 State, again, we support the County.
22 Also, I would like to add that if a j 23 school district is not willing to accept help in any 24 form from LILCO, then the LILCO plan's adequacy has 25 to be viewed in that light. It is a relevant 1 COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
t l i 19596 ;
{
() 1 inquiry to know whether or not the recipient of 3 2 LILCO's planned help will, in fact, accept it. It 3 is a situation somewhat different from a state and 4 county entity in this case because LILCO's plan does j 5 not thrust help on top of the state and county as i
6 LILCO does intend to send bus drivers to the schools 7 in the county.
1 8 JUDGE GLEASON: I am not so sure it is 9 not part of the same argument, but let's not argue i 10 that.
11 Mr. Bachmann?
12 Thank you for your comments.
13 MR. BACHMAN: The staff has 14 essentially the same statement made before. It is 15 far beyond the scope of the romand issue.
16 MR. MILLER: Judge Gleason, the fifth 17 issue, the Port Jefferson students, which is page 18 39, lines one through four, I am assuming there mue j 19 be some misunderstanding here and I will try to 20 clarify.
l 21 All this testimony states by the board i
J 22 member from the Mt. Sinai School District is that 23 school district, which is within the EPE, has a
- 24 number of students, approximately 500 or so, that 1
l 25 attend the Port Jefferson School District's high 1
1
(:)
] COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19597
() 1 school, which is also within the EPZ. Now, LILCO 2 moved to strike this on the basis that we were 3 trying to relitigate the EPZ boundaries. That just 4 mskes no sense. Both districts are within the EPZ.
5 It is a mera factual statement by the witness, Mr.
6 Petrilak, that some students attend another school 7 district. But both districts are within the EPZ and 8 therefore those school children are at risk and must 9 be planned for.
10 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Zahnleuter?
11 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Again, Mr. Miller's 12 argument makes sense and we support the County.
l 13 JUDGE GLEASON: Ms. Leugers?
. 14 MS. LEUGERS: Judge Gleason, I must 15 confess, at the time we moved to strike these four 16 lines of the testimony it wasn't clear to me that
[
17 the students they were talking about were being 1
18 transported to a school inside the EPZ. I thought 19 they were being transferred to a school outside the 20 EPZ.
21 JUDGE GLEASON: That is the way I 22 interpreted it myself.
23 MS. LEUGERS: With the understanding 24 they are students being transferred to another l 25 school inside the EPZ, we have no problem leaving it
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
19598
<s
(_) 1 in. That situation is covered by LILCO's plan 2 anyhow, so it is taken care of.
3 JUDGE GLEASON: Do you have any problem 4 with that, Mr. Bachman17 5 MR. BACEM4NN: To the extent the Port 6 Jefferson High School is actually inside the EPZ, wo 7 have no objection--
8 JUDGE GLEASON: That is what Mr. Miller 9 said. I assume it is factual.
10 The board's ruling on that part of the 11 motion ** pertaining to lines one through four, page l 12 39, will ce reversed and that testimony will be 13 introduced into the record.
14 MR. MILLER: Thank you. .
15 The sixth item on our document we 16 prepared, I believe, again, this may be a point of 17 clarification by the board. That refers to, on page 18 28, lines five to seven, a reference to role 1
19 conflict that cou.o be experienced by school 20 personnel, including bus drivers. In ruling on 21 other motions to strike made by LILCO, the board l 22 denied motions to strika relating to statements by 23 our witnesses that there would likely be role 24 conflict among school personnel, including bus 25 drivers. This one, for some reason, was stricken l
COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index 1
l
19599
() 1 and I am assuming it was inadvertent by the board.
2 JUDGE GLEASON: I believe it was in 3 reference to just that part that refers to role 4 conflict affecting school personnel. That was 5 supposed to be stricken. Is that correct, Ms.
6 Leugers?
7 MS. LEUGERS: Just to the school 8 personnel and not the bus drivers.
9 JUDGE GLEASON: Does that clarify, Mr.
10 Miller? Even though I presume the ruling carried 11 the whole sentence out, it just was referring to the 12 reference to the school personnel.
13 MR. MILLER: I understand the board's O)
\- 14 ruling. With that clarification, then, there is I
l 15 really nothing to pursue on that one. You can't 16 really just put the bus drivers back in and make it 17 make any sense, so I will drop that. But I will 18 carry right into item seven because that does still 19 ** recourse of the ruling regarding role conflict 20 issues applying to school personnel other than bus
( 21 drivers.
22 I think, Judge Gleason, the best way to 23 try to handle seven in a shorthand fashion is to say 24 I listed four items, A through D, which I would like 25 reconsideration on. These items all go to, in my
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
{
i
19600 r
(_)/ 1 opinion, reasons provided by our school officials as 2 to why they would not implement LILCO's plan. Now, 3 there are other reasons, some of which were stricken 4 by the board. I am not going to reargue all those.
5 I will not argue anything not listed on the page.
6 The four particular reasons that 7 parents would want and would attempt to reunite with 8 their children: That there would be role conflict 9 among school personnel, in particular school 10 teachers; that LILCO's proposed reception centers 11 for school children are not available to those 12 school children under matters made clear by the 13 Nassau County Government; and for other reasons 14 reception centers pose problems for our school 15 officials; and no provision for monitoring or 16 decontaminating school children.
17 Those are four particular reasons 18 offered by the witnesses as to why they would not 19 implement LILCO's plan to evacuate school children.
20 It must be understood, I believe, that 21 what the witnesses are attempting to do in this 22 testimony is not in any way to relitigate issues 23 previously litigated before licensing boards on the 24 Shoreham proceeding. We are not trying to revisit 25 issues regarding accuracy of reception centers, to O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19601 (m
(,) 1 revisit issues as to whether or not teachers will 2 experience role conflict. What we are stating is 3 the opinion of school administrators within the EPZ 4 that there are particular reasons why LILCO's plan 5 would not work.
6 I think, viewed in that light, it is 7 not fair to cast attempting to relitigate or res 8 judicata as LILCO is attempting to say. It is more 9 fair to say the opinions are being offered by our 10 witnesses to support their expert opinion and back l
11 up the factual conclusions they have reached that 1
1 12 LILCO's plan for evacuating school children could l 13 not be implemented.
14 JUDGE GLEASON: Fundamentally, you are 15 saying you are not trying to litigate the reasons 16 but you are simply citing the reasons or the 17 witnesses are citing the reasons why they won't l
18 implement LILCO's plan.
19 MR. MILLER: That is exactly right.
20 Just to clarify--
21 JUDGE GLEASON: I don't think we 22 mentioned res judicata.
23 MR. MILLER: No. Your order striking 24 these passages was based upon them being outside the 25 scope. LILCO's motion mentioned res judicata.
O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l
19602
() 1 To clarify, because, again, I am afraid 2 the job I did on this piece of paper is not as 3 thorough as it could have been, perhaps I should 4 give to you the particular lines referenced as well 5 as pages for some of these matters.
6 JUDGE GLEASON: All right.
7 MR. MILLER: 7-A, the parents' desires 8 to reunite with their children, page 28, lines 10 9 through 12. Page 54, line 18 through page 55, line 10 2. And page 64, line 19 through page 65, line 2.
11 7-B, likelihood of role conflict 12 amongst school teachers would be those passages 13 stricken at page 52, line 15 through page 53, line
<,g LILCO's 14 4. And page 54, lines 3 through 4.
l 15 proposed reception centera for school children, 16 passages were stricken at page 53, lines 5 through 17 20, page 55, lines 3 through 8, page 56, and 18 attachments 13 and 14.
19 JUDGE GLEASON: Excuse me. 13 and 14?
20 MR. MILLER: Attachment 13 and 14.
21 JUDGE GLEASON: 55, lines 3 through 8 22 and then--
23 MR. MILLER: Attachments 13 and 24 14--sorry. And page 56.
1 25 JUDGE GLEASON: All of page 56?
() COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
l WW
19603
() 1 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir, essentially.
2 Item D, provision for monitoring 3 decontaminating school children, is page 54, lines 8 4 through 17.
5 JUDGE GLEASON: .'ou have one to 6 go--wait. Mr. Zahnleuter?
7 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Given the 8 qualification that this is the rationale of the 9 witnesses' testimony and consistent with what the 10 Government has argued already here today, the State 11 supports the motion.
12 JUDGE GLEASON: M3. Leugers?
13 MS. LEUGERS: I have several comments 14 on what Mr. Miller has said. First, 7-A, which is 15 parents' desire to unite with children has already 16 been litigated and found in LILCO's favor that it 17 would not be a problem. Likelihood of role conflict 18 among teachers also was found in LILCO's favor not 19 to be a problem. T eption centers has been 20 litigated and specir.: ally excluded from this 21 hearing because this is a narrow remand issue we are 22 hearing strictly going to the procedure to use 23 school bus drivers, LERO school bus drivers to 24 evaluate. Monitoring and decontamination of school 25 children is a reception center issue, something that O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
19604
() 1 happens after you pick up the children and go 2 through--what you have to go through to evacuate the 3 children.
4 Mr. Miller says even though they are 5 not trying to relitigate the issue, they do bring 6 them all up. I think of prime importance is the 7 first two, reuniting with children and role conflict 8 of school teachers. What Suffolk County wants the 9 board to do here is to allow their witnesses to come 10 forward and argue based upon these facts that they 11 claim are facts, which this board has found are not 12 to be assumed as facts and has fout:d contrary that 13 we are not to assume that these types of situations 14 exist. In essence, Mr. Miller would like his 15 witnesses to get up here and testify about facts 16 that we have already litigated and found do not 17 exist. Therefore, they should not be allowed to use 18 that as a basis for evaluating LILCO's plan. It is 19 a faulty basis and not reliable as such.
I 20 JUDGE GLEASON: Because why?
l
! 21 MS. LEUGERS: Because they are relying 22 on facts, specifically, saying that reunite--parento 23 wanting to reunite with their children, and that 24 there will be ro)e conflict of school teachers, they 25 are arguing that those are facts to be contended O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index l
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() 1 with when this board has already decided these are 2 not problems, we don't have to be concerned about 3 this.
4 JUDGE GLSASON: That is your res 5 judicata argument.
6 MS. LEUGERS: That is because it 7 already has been litigated. Mr. Miller is claiming 8 that they are not trying to relitigate it. I am 9 saying what they are trying to do is sneak it in the 10 back door by saying we are not litigating it but we 11 are going to assume facts contrary to what this 12 board has found, and that is improper.
13 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Bachmann?
14 MR. BACHMANN: Whatever assertion 15 counsel for intervenors may make as to the use of 16 this particular testimony, once it has been 17 accepted, if it becomes unstricken and is accepted 18 in, it then becomes part of the record, which is 19 cluttered up enough, I think, at this point. These 20 things are definitely beyond the scope of the narrow 21 reme.nd issue and simply should not be on the record.
22 JUDGE GLEASON: One to go, Mr. Miller.
23 MR. MILLER: I would like to say in 24 very, very brief response that I have full 25 confidence ir. this board's ability to make judgments O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
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() 1 about reasons offered by witnesses and I would rely 2 on the board to do so. I think these matters that )
3 we just argued, if anything, go to the weight of the 4 evidence to be attributed by the board. And I think 5 the board can make those judgments.
6 On the last item, Judge Gleason, the 7 conclusion which essentially was stricken in its 8 entirety, pages 78 and 79. My reading of the 9 board's May 9th ruling is that this testimony was 10 stricken because it was considered irrelevant and 11 outside the scope of the issue before the board and 12 also because it appeared to be unacceptable hearsay.
13 I don't understand how the testimony could be 14 outside the scope of the issues or irrelevant, 15 because essentially what the question asked and what 16 the witnesses testified to concerns their 17 understanding of what other EPZ school district's 18 have said and indicated what action they would take 19 in response to LILCO's proposal to evacuate school 20 children.
l 21 It must be recognized by the board that 22 they will be seeing next week eight very high-level 23 school official witnesses on behalf of Suffolk l 24 County. Superintendents, directors of l
25 transportation, school board members. Those people l
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19607 i s, / 1 routinely meet with one another, they talk with one 2 another, they discuss matters with one another, 3 including LILCO's plan for evacuating the school 4 children. We could have brought in, Judge Gleason, 5 26 witnesses covering all the districts and all the 6 boards of education and all the school 7 superintendents. That is something we could have 8 done, I think. But we recognize there is a limit to 9 the number of witnesses to throw before the board.
10 We chose those witnesses that we believe would be 11 representatives of not only their school districts l 12 but also other districts and state the views of I
l 13 other districts within the EPZ.
t 14 I do not believ. that is unacceptable 15 hearsay. Surely through board questioning and 16 cross-examinatior the parties can determine the 17 weight to be attributed to the testimony. So I l 18 believe that testimony should come in, including the 19 references to the resolutions of other school 20 districts, resolutions which are in the evidentiary l 21 record and make clear that the EPZ school districts l 22 do not support LILCO's plan, much less its plan for i
23 evacuating the school children within the EPZ.
I 24 MR. ZARNLEUTER: For the reasons 25 stated, the State agrees with the County.
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19608 r)s
(_ 1 JUDGE GLEASON: Ms. Leugers?
2 MS. LEUGERS: Judge Gleason, as I am 3 reviewing the conclusion that runs two pages, it is 4 really a mishmash of all different types of issues 5 the board has excluded for a variety of reasons. It 6 is hard to respond to them as one. For example, it 7 talks not only about what other school districts 8 will do, it talks about early dismissal, talks about 9 the bus driver statements, it talks about role 10 conflict of teachers. There is a whole lot of 11 different issues here that we have already i
12 discussed.
t i
13 As to the issues Mr. Miller has raised 14 already, first he argues I believe that the school 15 district representative should be allowed to talk 16 about what they think the other school districts 17 would do. It is clear from looking at these two 18 'pages that they are talking aboat what they think 19 they would do because they just have a general l 20 feeling about what they would do. It doesn't say 21 they have sat down and talked to everyone, asked 22 their opinions of LILCO school bus driver procedure 23 specifically. Again, this is a narrow issue going l 24 to the adequacy of LILCO school bus driver l
1 25 procedure, not whether you can evacuate schools and O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
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(')
(_) 1 not whether reception centers or any other issue you 2 wanted to pull in. It is a very specific issue 3 here.
4 Also, we asked not all the witnesses 5 but many of the witnesses in their depositions who 6 they represented and a couple of them--I can't 7 represent how many, but a couple said they represent 8 their school district. We also asked every single 9 one of them, I believe, if they had talked to any 10 other school district and asked them their opinion 11 of LILCO's procedure and all of them, as far I 12 remember at this point, all of them said no.
13 Also, we repeatedly tried through 4 14 discovery to get some information about the other 15 school districts through Suffolk County, and Suffolk 16 County has repeatedly said these are separate 17 political entities and we have no control over them.
18 Even when we tried to get information through their 19 own witnesses that made those same claims. Now it 20 is hard to understand how they are coming forward 21 and saying they speak for all of them when earlier 22 they couldn't even get any information from them.
23 Again, the resolutions go to just broad 24 statements that they will not work with LILCO. They 25 do not focus on the school bus driver procedure that O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index
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() 1 we are here litigating. Not only does it go to my 2 argument earlier about challenging the rule, but not 3 specific to the issue in this remand. For those 4 reasons I think these two pages should remain 3 stricken.
6 JUDGE GLEASON: Mr. Bachmann?
7 MR. BACHMANN: The staff agrees with 8 the board's characterization of the testimony in the 9 May 12, 1988 order where the board stated that the 10 testimony was irrelevant evidence, unacceptable 11 hearsay and outside the scope of the issue and the 12 staff agrees with that characterization.
13 MR. MILLER: Judge Gleason, a point of k- 14 clarification. I think it may be obvious but just 15 to make sure, the depositions of these school 16 witnesses took place last January and early 17 February, and I think it is rather obvious that 18 school officials that were depoc9d at that time 19 certainly could have talked with other school 20 officials from other school districts since that 21 time. Again, I think it goes to the weight to be 22 offered the testimony. The board and, of course, 23 LILCO can make inquiry of these witnesses as to 24 discussions they have had and what has been said to 25 them. The board can attribute the weight they think O
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19611 i (). 1 is appropriate to the testimony.
2 JUDGE GLEASON: Gentlemen, thank you--
3 MR. CHRISTMAN: I have a letter for you 4 on EBS.
5 JUDGE GLEASON: You can pass that out 6 to us.
7 That will conclude the session for 8 today. We will recess until tomorrow morning at j 9 nine o' clock.
10 (Time noted: 5:30 p.m.)
11 12 14 15
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22 23 24 25 O COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION / keyword index i
gg 1 CERTIFICATE V
2 3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
5 Names LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY 6
(shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) 7 Docket Number: 50-322-OL-3 8 Place: Hauppauge, New York 9 Date: May 16, 1988 10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and, 13 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction
[')
s-14 of the court reporting company, and that the transcript,is a 15 true and accurate becord of the foregoing proceedings.
16 /5/ 10rlo n he o un 17 (Signature typed): Debra Stevens 18 Official Reporter 19 Heritage Reporting Corporation 20 21 22
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Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l .- -- - -
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