Text

Transcript of FEMA 880615 Public Meeting in Patchougue,Ny Re Util.Pp 1-131
	ML20154D118
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	06/15/1988
From:	; Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	;
References
	NUDOCS 8809150156
	Download: ML20154D118 (131)
	v • d • e

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3 MR. HUSAR: Good evening, ladies and 4 gentlemen. My name is Ihor W. Husar. I am the 5 Chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee for 6 the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II, t 7 New York. 8 Before we begin, I would like to go 9 over some administrative announcements to include 10 some ground rules for the proceeding we are about 11 to undertake. What we would like to do this 12 ovening in connection with this public meeting--and 13 6 we have asked people as they were coming in to get 14 a sheet of paper that allows every one of you 15 sitting out there to state a question or comment 16 you would like to make so that we can give everyone 17 an opportunity to be heard, whether it is a I ( 18 question, comment or statement to make. 19 We have people available that will 20 collect these sheets of paper with the information 21 that we would ask you to put on that, individuals j. 22 who are about the room with green arm cands. l As we 23 speak and if you have already filled the sheets 24 out, please raise your hand and we will have people i 25 circulating that will collect these sheets of CnMD11Tro *Then *"'""a"''-

l ~ { Q) 1 + -d 3 2 paper. These sheots of paper will be passed 3 forward and as we make the presentations, they will 4 be collected and sorted and we will try to arrange 5 these sheets of paper so they can be best responded 6 to by the people in the best position to answer 7 these questions. 8 The purpose of the meeting--before we 9 begin that, I would like to introduce the people 10 here on the dais sitting next to me. First of all, 11 Mr. John Weismantle. He is the vice-president of 12 resources and development. Seated next to him is 13 Mr. Charles De, /e rio, manager, nuclear operations 14 and support department. Sitting next to him is Mr. 15 John Leonard, vice-president, nuclear operations. 16 Sitting at the far end is Mr. Ron Bellamy from the 17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 18 This FEMA proceeding is being 19 memorialized in the form of a transcript and 20 therefore will be made part of the permanent 1 record i 21 for the FEMA files on the Shoreham Nuclear Power 22 Plant station. A transcript of this proceeding 23 will be made available, as well as the exercise, 24 post-exercise assessment report when published and 25 will be available at the Shoreham-Wading River I

r 1 r A 4 2 Public Library on North Country Road. 3 FEMA will not have copies of either 4 the transcript or the post-exercise assessment 5 report available to the public at large but will 6 make them available not only at that libra y but 7 also, once this information is docketed with the 8 NPO, made.available through normal procedures for 9 such information. 10 The purpose of this public roeeting is 11 four-fold. One, te acquaint the members af the 12 public in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant h ,)5 / 13 at Shoreham of the contents of the off-site plan 14 and what the conduct of the joint exercise which 15 tested the plan is.' Two, answer any questions 16 about FEMA review of the plan and the exercise. 17 Three, receive suggestions from the public 18 concerning improvements or changes that might be 19 necessary. Four, describe to the public the way in 20 which the plan is expected to function in the event 21 of a real emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear power 22 plant Station. 23 The policies and procedures for review 24 and approval by the Federal Emergency Management 25 Agency of off-site radiologic emergency response

L 2w ks 1 m db 5 2 plans and preparedness for coping.with off-site 3 effects of radiological emergencies which may occur 4 ' at the commercial nuclear power facilities are 5 established in FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350, entitled 6 "Review and Approval of State and Local Radiologic 7 Emergency Plans and Preparedness." The evaluation 8 of the ade,quacy of the off-site emergency pianning 9 for nuclear power plants at the operating licensee 10 review stage where state and/or local governments 11 decline to participate in off-site emergency 12 planning is spelled out in Nuclear, Regulatory / 13 Commission Final Rule Change, same subject, dated 14 November 3, 1987. 15 The guidance for review and approval 16 of utility-only plans is contained in Interim 17 Supplement 1 to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18 document 0654/ FEMA Rep 1, Revision 1, dated 29 November 1, 1987. That document is entitled 20 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 21 Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 22 Preparedness in Support of a Nuclear Power Plant. 23 This is commonly referred to as the criteria for 24 utility off-site planning and preparedness. 25 Factored into this evaluation in an C O M fA WiPf2 8 B N R *

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s- ? 2 Sable will be ready to complete his evaluation and 3 forward his recommended finding to FEMA 4 headquarters when all three components of the FEMA 5 rule process are complete. 6 There are three components to the 7 regional director's recommendation of finding regardinghff-siteplansandpreparednessregarding 8 9 a site which has applied for an operating license 1 { 10 with the Nuclear Regulatory Com;aission. 1 A t _ 11 recommended finding regarding the off-site plan, a 12 \\.O post-exercise assessment report evaluating a joint 13 exercise, and a summary of concerns or ~ ' i 14 recommendations identified during public meeting. 15 That is what this particular meeting is all about. 16 Mr. Sable will forward that 17 recommendation to FEMA headquarters after the 18 publication of the final post-exercise assessment 19 report. FEMA headquarters will review the 20 recommendation and transmit their final 21 dotermination to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 22 What we would like to do now is 23 establish a format for the rest of the ( 24 presentations. What we would like to do is to have 2G a discussion of the plan and, after discussion of

(D 1 v. 8 Mk 2 the plan by the presenters here on the dais, we 3 will have discussion,-impressions of how the 4 exercise went. In order of the presentations, we 5 will have the discussion of the off-site plan, the 6 local emergency response organization plan given by 7 Mr. Charles Daverio. He will be followed by me, and I will'give an evaluation of that 8 plan as it 9 was formally submitted through the NRC to FEMA for 10 review. 11 After discussion of the plan, we will 12 then have presentations regarding the exercise, 13 (' first the on-site, by Mr. Bellamy, followed by a 14 discussion of the on-site by Mr. John Leonard, and 15 then a discussion of the off-site' aspects of this 16 exercise first by Mr. John Weismantle, followed by 17 providing impressions of how we thought me, the 18 exercise went from the FEMA perspective. 19 Having said that, what I would like to l 20 do now is turn the microphone over to Mr. Daverlo. 4. 21 MR. DAVERIO: Good evening. As 22 mentioned, I am Charles Daverio, manager of nuclear 23 department operations at Shoreham. One of my 4 ( 24 responsibilities is emergency planning. My 25 function here tonight is to give an outline and

I 1 \\,f E 9 2 overview of the emergency plan titled "The Local 3 Emergency Response Organization." This p3.an and 4 its associated implementing procedures delineates 5 all the response activities at a local level that 6 are needed in reaction to an incident at the clant. 7 The plan describes the ability to respond at a 8 local leve,1 absent state and county participation 9 in the planning effort. The procedures contain 10 detailed information and are used in implementing 11 that plan. ~ S 12 Just to give you a little bit of )" i 13 history, when suffolk county and New York State 14 refused to continue their planning effort for 15 Shoreham, the LERO effort began and the plan was 16 developed as an interim measure for licansing of 17 the nuclear power plant. The LERO plan and its 18 procedures call for immediate notification of 1 19 Suffolk County and New York State of an emergency 20 at Shoreham. Although not involved in the planning 21 process, it is assumed, as Mr. Husar just 22 explained, that suffolk county and New York Stato 4 i 3 23 would respond and exercise their best effort to ( 24 protect the citizens of New York State and Suffolk 25 county during a radiological emergency. ( ranwr

1 e 10 "E 2 LERO is a volunteer organization 3 similar to that of the Rod Cross, will offer 4 support, advice, assistance to those officials in 5 making and implementing effective action 6 recommendation. The plan indicates the role of the 7 agencies involved and the roles of all other 8 outside agencies to accomplish stated objectives. 9 Tha plan also describes the coordination of the 10 response within this organization structure. 11 Federal guidance for preparation of a 12 radiological emergency plan is given in a document (('."-) 13 entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation 14 Lf Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 15 Preparedness in Support of a Nuclear Power Plant. 16 That is long for a short term, NUREG 0654 document 17 FEMA Rep 1. This document has jointly been issued 18 by NRC and FEMA and is used throughout the country. 19 Within the scope of the plan, there 20 are two major emergency planning zones. One of 21 these is the plume exposure pathway zone and the 22 other is the ingestion pathway zone. The plume 23 zone is an area sur.ounding the station which is ( 24 approximately 10 miles in circumference. The 25 principal exposure sources for the pathway are COM PIITFD hm

1 e 11 -A 2 whole-body exposure to gamma radiation from the 3 plume and from deposited material and inhalation 4 exposure from passing radioactive plume. The land 5 surrounding--the land area of the Shoreham plume 6 exposure pathway is totally in Suffolk County, 7 covering an area approximately from Port Jefferson to Riverhe'd and on the south bnunded by Sunrise 8 a 9 Highway. 10 To facilitate planning this 10-mile 11 area is further subdivided into distinct planning 12 areas. There are 19 zones within this 10-mile I 13 (. planning area. The boundary of each of these ^ zones s 14 was chosen based on easily identified roadways or 15 political boundaries to which affected individuals, 16 including transients, could relate their 17 activities. Each zone is then given an alphabetic 18 designation, A through S. 19 Within the 10-mile zone there is also 20 two smaller rings, two and five miles, measured 21 radially from the plant which have been maintained 22 and designed to allow additional flexibility 23 depending on meteorological conditions and ( 24 radiological conditions at the plant. 25 The ingestion pathway, by contrast, is (enMpttTrn n inrn

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12 2 that area encompassed by a radius of approximately 3 50 miles from the station. T%is is an area, in 4 general, bounded oy the Queens /Nassau border, to 5 Montauk Point and north to Hartferd in Connecticut. 6 The principal exposure from this pathway would be 7 the ingestion of contaminated water or food such as 9 milk, fresh vegetables or aquatic foodstuffs. 9 Turning to the organization itself, 10 the Local Emergency Response Organization is an 11 organization of more than 3,000 LILCO employees, { 32 consultants and support orgenizations trained to 13 respond to a radiological emergency at the Shoreham \\ 14 site. The purpose of this organization is to help 15 protect the health and safety of the public during 16 any incident. 17 In addition to LERO members, other 18 organizations have been trained to help support 19 this response. Private ambulances and ambulettes 20 will help move people who require special 21 transportation. LERO ambulance and health 22 facilities and hone coordinators at the emergency 23 operation center will coordinate these activities. 24 Local bus companies have been contracted with to 25 provide vehicles to assist in the evacuation of the

O 2 ~ -4 13 2 general public and school children within the 3 10-mile emergency planning zone. These services 4 will be coordinated through LFRO's evacuation 5 coordinator, t the transportation support coordinator 6 and bus coordinator again at the local emergency i 7 operations, center. 8 During a radiologic emergency,'the 9 Federal Aviation Administration would help by 10 restricting aircraft activities in the vicinity of ~ 11 the Shoreham site. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard will /) 12 be providing notification of the water portion of ('- 13 the 10-mile emergency planning zone. 14 The Department of Energy, with their 15 facilities at the Brookhaven National Lab, will i i 16 provide independent radiological assessment and I I 17 dose assessment services--radiological accident and. 5 18 dose assessment services. I If necessary, DOE 19 facilities at other government laboratories--Bedes, i 20 Argon, Oak Ridge--will provide supplemental i 21 assistance. 22 American Red Cross will open, manago 23 and operate congregate care centers for evacuees 24 who need shelters. Evacuees will be directed to 25 the centers from the LERO evacuee reception I .n

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<"N k 1 s, 14 2 centers. 3 Turning for a second to how the plan 4 works, LERO has developed a set of plans and 5 procedures for handling these--entitled "Local 6 Off-Site Emergency Response Plan and Its 7 Implementing Procedures." The procedures give 8 guidelines,to emergency workers on how to handle 9 and develop and implement appropriate protective 10 actions for the general public in coordination with 11 state and county officials. ~ 12 ((O Turning first to emergency 13 declaration, in NUREG 0654, the Nuclear Regulatory 14 Commission and FEMA have established a uniform 15 classification system which is used at a bundred 16 nuclear power stations throughout this country. 17 This system directs the plan operators to declare 18 one of four emergency levels automatically if 19 specific readings on plant gauges and system 20 indicators are reached. From the least to the most 21 severu, these four emergency levels are Unusual 22 Event, Alert, site Area and General. While all 23 four levels require immediato notification of ( 24 government officials, only the general emergency 25 represents a situation that might require

s* _) 1 15 E 2 recommendations of protective actions to the 3 general public. 4 The director and manager and--the 5 director, manager of local response and five other 6 senior LERO coordinators are notified of any 7 emergency declaration, even Unusual Events 8 occurring t Shoreham. Director of local response 9 will also contact state and county officials to 10 notify them of emergency and offer LERO's 11 assistance as a volunteer organization. Other LERO 12 members are notified and mobilized at either an 13 Alert or Site Area, depending on the level and need 14 for their assistance. 1$ once we have started the activation, 16 an accident assessment is conducted to determine if 17 protective actions should be recommended for 18 residents within the 10-mile emergency planning 19 zone around Shoreham. The first step of this 20 assessment is to evaluate the Shoreham plant and 21 weather conditions for initial reactions to the 22 accident. LILco and Department of Energy personnel 2? stationed at the Brookhaven National Lab will send 24 out monitoring teams to measure radiation levels if 25 required. Their findings would be evaluated by \\

IC4 1 16 I 2 LERO and additional DOE people at the Brookhaven 3 National Lab and will, along with other 4 information, pass down from the plant at the local 5 emergency operations center in Brentwood. 6 This evaluation would include 7 calculations to predict the effects of radiation 8 releases t,o the public within the 10 miles a's well 9 as predicting any ingestion pathway problems. The 10 predictions are based on recommendations from the 11 Environmental Protection Agency protective action 12 guidelines which are used throughout the nation. 13 Once the effects are compared to these protective t 14 action guidelines, a decision will be made on what 15 protective action might be taken. The results of 16 that assessment, though, are presented to the 17 director and other government officials, who will 18 then determine the appropriate protective actions 19 for residents. These may include sheltering or i 20 evacuations, and protective actions in the 21 ingestion pathway may include recommendations 22 regarding food, milk and livestock feed control. 23 Whenever a protective action () 24 recommendation is made, the 89 sirens mounted 25 throughout the 10-mile emergency planning zone w'.11

w. 1 17 5 2 be sounded and an Emergency Broadcast System 3 message will be aired to tell the residents what 4 action they should take. 5 Residents l living within the 10-mile 6 emergency planning zone would have received a 7 public emergency procedures brochure telling them 8 when they hear the siren for about three minutes 9 they should turn to an emergency broadcast station. 10 If a siren did fail to operate, 11 vehicles with public address units would drive 12 through the zone and provide alerting through that k ) 13 s. message. (, 14 organizations where a large number of 15 people are located, such as hospitals, schools, 16 nursing homes and major employers, have been given 17 tone-activated radios which automatically turn on 6 18 when an EBS broadcast is sent out. LILCO--LERO 19 also notifies the U.S. Coast Guard to insure that 20 offshore areas are notified as necessary. 21 Helping people evacuate, we would have 22 160 traffic guides stationed at 130 predetermined 23 traffic control points to assist and monitor the 24 flow of traffic out of the 10-mile emergency 25 planning zone during an evacuation. We station 19

F (,o}r 1 / 18 A 2 LERO road crews at points within the zone to help 3 remove impediments to evacuation and to provide 4 gasoline to those who need it; 333 LERO bus drivers 5 who drive routes within the zones to be evacuated 6 to transport residents who do not have their own 7 means of transportation. LERO will also send out busesahdover160ambulancesandambulettesas 8 34 9 needed to assist in evacuating health care and 10 other special facilities within the 10-mile 11 emergency planning zone. LERO has compiled a list -s 12 of handicapped, aged and other residents who need (]-{ 13 special assistance in evacuating. The LERO plan s 1,4 provides for the appropriate transportation 15 assistance for these residents also. 16 All schools or school districts are 17 kept up to date on conditions at Shoreham. In the 18 event of an accident, they are advised to begin 19 emergency procedures at the earliest possible 20 stage. At an Alert level emergency, the second 21 lowest of the four classifications, schools would 22 most likely be advised to enact early dismissal 23 programs. This is a precautionary measure taken to (} 24 reunite families in case an evacuation is later 25 recommended.

.(k6 1 7 19 ^ 2 If sheltering is the recommended 3 protective action, children will be brought inside 4 and sheltered in the school buildings. If 5 evacuation is recommended, children would be taken 6 to relocation centers outside the 10-mile emergency { 4 7 planning zone. LILOO has more than 550 bus drivers 8 ready to pyovjda transportation to schools in the 9 avant that school evacuation is required. These 10 bus drivers are available to supplement the regular 11 school bus drivers who normally service the ~ r~ 12 schools. O} gk,. 13 Information about school protective 14 actions, again, would be broadcast over the 15 Emergency Broadcast System. Public evacuee and 16 reception centers have been established at LILco 17 operation facilities in Hicksville, Roslyn and 18 Bellmore, with over 200 monitoring personnel there 19 to assist. If radiological monitoring is 20 necessary, the public will be instructed to go to 21 one of these centers via the Emergency Broadcast 22 System again. Evacuees will be monitored and, if 23 necessary, decontaminated at these facilities. 24 Monitoring and decontamination of special 25 facilities populations is also carried out at other _ _ _ ~

1 e 20 --s 2 LILCO facilities. 3 Evacuees who need shelter--evacuees 4 who need a place to stay should go to one of these 5 three evacuation reception centers where they will 6 be monitored and given directions to a Red Cross i 7 congregate care center. At that center evacuees J 8 will be provided with food, shelter and other 9 services as required. d 10 That gives you a broad overview and 11 quick overview of the plan. Turning to its status, G 12 we have provided to the NRC and, through them, to ( _ 13 FEMA, Revision 9 of the LERO plan, which has been 14 reviewed by their Regional Assistance Committee, as 15 I understand it. They had comments. We have i 16 provided a Revision 10 to the NRC and to FEMA for 4 e 17 their review which addressed some of their comments. i f 18 on Rev 9. That's essentially where the LERO plan j 19 review stands at this point. t i 20 { l Thank you. i 21 MR. HUSAR: What I would like to do at l { j 22 this time is to give a chronology and the steps 1 23 that were taken for the plan review and also the 24 evaluation of the plan review, i 25 As Mr. Daverio mentioned, there is a

O(_) 1 e 21 2 Revision 9 to the plan that was generated and was 3 reviewed. On February 16, 1988, our regional 4 office in New York received a sequest frcm our 5 national headquarters to conduct a review of 6 Revision 9 to the Local Emergency Response 7 Organization plan. A preliminary review dated 8 March 17th,of Revision 9 was conducted by FINA 9 Region II regarding our process and a preliminary 10 review was distributed to the Regional Assistance 11 Committee. 12 Now, I might pause here and describe a } 13 little bit what the Regional Assistance Committee 14 is. The Regional Assistance Committee is an 15 association of experts in a number of faderal 16 agencies that provide expert and technical 17 assistance in the preview process for plans as well. 18 as for the evaluation of exercises. It includts 19 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a member, 20 Department of Transportation, Department of 21 Agriculture, Environmental Protection Agency, 22 Department of Energy. It includes also the Food 23 and Drug Administration. 24 These agencies have a representative 25 that sits on this Regional Assistance Committee,

4 1 22 d 2 chaired by me. I, as the RAC chairman, coordinate 3 the plan review effort, technical assistance effort 4 and also plan implementation, which we observe 5 during exercissa and we provide a rcport on the 6 implementation of that organization's plan. 7 FEMA Region II, therefore, had met t 8 with LILCQ representatives on April 8, 1988,' and 9 received the utility's proposed actions to resolve 10 the items that we found in a preliminary review of ( t 11 the plan that needed correction. Detailed review 12 F comments on Revision 9 of the plan were received (( 4 ~ 13 from the Regional Assistance Committee members and 14 were consolidated into an updated review document i 15 dated April 21, 1993. Then the Regional Assistance I 16 Committee, chaired by FEMA Region II, was he1.d in 17 our office to finalize the plan review comments of 18 Revision 9 and a i record of that meeting was 19 transcribed. i 20 In a memo, a memorandum dated May 6th, i 21 sent from the FEMA Region II regional director, I i 22 Jack M. Sable, to FEMA headquarters, he transmitted 23 the recommended finding of the inadequacies and l () 24 also the areas that require attention to FEMA ~ 25 headquarters. This memorandum contained the I

>m 1 23 A 2 identification of planning inadequacies that had to 3 be corrected. So, the FEMA evaluation included 17 4 planning inadequacies out of the 136 planning 5 elements evaluated in NUREG 0654, FEMA Rep 1, which 6 is the plan criteria guld,ance. J 7 F3MA Region II recommended a negative 8 finding on* Revision 9 of the LERO plan in Mr. 9 Sable's memorandum dated May 6, 1988 to Grant 10 Peterson of FEMA headquarters. He is the director '~ 11 of state and local program support. () 12 In this memorandum Mr. sable stated (( g 13 that the plan does not provide reasonable assurance i 14 that adequate protective measures can be taken in 15 the event of a radiologic emergency at Shoreham. 16 Planning for the exercise can go forward for two 17 reasons, however, as the ne'orandum states. First,- 18 LILCO has provided tFa 41 Assistance i 19 L Committee with proposed plan changes to address 20 these inadequa cle:s that were incorporated into 21 Revision 10 prior to the exercise. Eleven plan 1 22 inadoquacios require relatively minor changes of 23 these 17. Six inadequato elemo9ts require 24 substantive revisions, and fivo inadequacies--that j 25 is, provisions for communication with New York i

(O),- 1 m 24 E 2 State, public information program for residents, 3 transients and the agricultural community, written 4 agreenents for first-call commitments with bus 5 companies providing supplementary buses for 6 onc wave evacuation of the schools will not be 7 exercised. 8 The remaining inadegtscy was resolved 9 by corrections made to tt.u l"RO procedures as 10 submitted as part of Revision 10 prior to the 11 exarcise and was demonstratad during the exercise 12 Dx_- without any significant problem. 13 t The Nuclear Regulatory Commissic.n made s. 14 a formal request for FEMA to review Revision 10 on 4 15 May 28, 1988. Since it would not be possible for a 16 full Regional Assistancs committee review to take 17 place in the time available prior to the axercise, 18 FEMA Region II staff pertormed a cursory .. view. 19 Based on the review, FEMA determined the remaining 20 inadequacy as corrected--was corrected--excuse 21 .--to - *ufficient degree to permit a successful 2? in the exercise. '. ic.) 23 \\ At this time, what I would like te

(

24 m-is to have a di cussion o'f that exercise, [ s t a r s.. ig with the on-site portion, j } Bellamy. l

r 1 25 A 2 MR. BULLAMY: Good evening. My name 3 is Dr. Ronald R. Bellamy. I am the branch chief of i 4 'the facility's radiologica) safety and safeguards 8 s 5 branch for Region I of the United States Nuclear 6 Regulatory Commiscion located in Philadelphia, 7 Pennsylvania. In that capacity I have the 8 responsibility for the management of the NRd's 9 inspection of emergency prepareJness programs for ( 10 licensed facilities in the northeast part of the i 11 United States. f~} 12 There are very specific regulations ,(\\_.. ;) 13 and laws that govern the licensing' of fission 3 14 nuclear power plants in the United States. In the 15 area of emergency preparedness, these laws require 16 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to make a finding 17 of reasonableness. That is, a finding that, and I i t 18 quote, "there ja reasonable assurance that adequate I 19 protective measures can and will be taken in the 20 event of a radiologic emergen y,a. 21 This finding is based on a number of 22 factors and input. First, it is based on the NRC 3 23 review and evaluation of the on-site portion of the 24 liceusee's emergency plans and their participation 25 in exercisea and drills. becond, it is based on

1 E., 26 2 input fJom the Federal Emergency Management Agency 3 with respect to the plans for the off-site 4 emergency response, as Mr. Husar has discussed for 5 you. Third, input from FEMA with respect to the 6 performance of all off-site organizations during a 7 full participation emergency preparedness exercise. 8 It is important to realize and' 9 emphasize that the regulations require the NRC to 10 consider these inputs, but it is the Nuclear ) 11 Regulatory Commission that is legally responsible . O for making a finding of reasonableness, 12 as I have <p(.. 13 already stated, prior to a license being issued for s. s 14 any nuclear power station to go above five percent 15 power. No such finding is necessary for a licensee i i 16 to operate its plant up to five percent power. 17 Here at Shoreham, a five percent license van issued 18 July 3, 1985. i 19 During the past several years,. the 20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission has performed 21 numerous evaluations and inspections of emergency 42 preparedness activities at the Shoreham Nuclear l 23 Power Station. The principal inspecticns were an 24 emergency preparedness program appraisal conducted 25 in September 1982. This was a seven-person l

4 ' fD \\_) 1 N

7 2

multi-disciplinary team that in effect praised the 3 licensee's status. The effort was most concerned 4 witt an evaluation rather than an inspection 6nd 5 uncovered numerous areas for improvement and 6, deficiencies. A follow-up inspection was conducted t 7' in December 1983 that closed out these 8 deficiencies. 9 An inspection was conductsd of the 10 February 1986 exercise. Published reports by the 11 Huclear Regulatory Commission and i. the Federal ! (~' 12 Emergency Management Agency presented the status at ,p ' A_ 13 that time. The NRC reported licensee performance 14 is generally sound, whereas five off-site 15 deficiencies were ide.7tified. First, a failure to 16 in a timely manner to a traffic impediment. respond 17 second, insufficient copying capability at the 18 emergency news center. Third, bus drivers were 19 late in being dispatened. Fourth, wrong bus routes 20 were followed. Fjfth, untimely dispatching of 21 traffic guides. 22 The NRC also observed an on-site 23 exercise in November 1987. This routine, announced 24 amergency preparedr.ess inspection ar. ' obscrvation 25 of LILCO's annual emergency exercise, which was

l 1 28 2 performed on November 18, 1987,' uncovered no 3 violations of federal regulations and allowed the k 'NRC to conclude that the licensee on-site emergency 4 5 1 response actions were adequate to provide 6 protective measures for the health and safety of ( 7 the public. This report, which is in the local i 8 public document room, was f issued over my signature 9 on November 30, 1987. 10 i In conjunction with the discharge of I 4 11 these licensing responsibilities that t I. do reside i 12 with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC has ( }(\\ 13 conducted these numerous inspections at Shoreham s s } 14 and also observed the full participation exercise i i i 15 held here at Shoreham last week, June 7, 8 and 9, ? 16 1988. Both the NRC and Federal Energency i { i 17 Maaagement Agency reviewed the lic9nsee's proposed I 4 [ I 18 scenario prior to the exercise and 2nsured the 19 scenario would adequately test LILCo's response. { 20 l By this I mean both the on-site LILCo staff and l } 21 off-site } LERo plan as we already had discussed this { i j 22 evening. 5 i 23 A team of eight NRC highly-trained and ) A4 spec'ialized emergency preparedness expert.s. f i 3-p 75 including an NRC supervisor and the NRC senior t i k

f 1 29 i ^ 2 resident inspector, which is stationed full time at f 3 Shoreham, inspected the performance of LILCO. 4 These individuals observed every significant 5 activity of the LILCO emergency response personnel. i 6 Inspectors were stationed in the control room at l 7 the start of the exercise at 0430 in the morning. 8 They also inspected the activation and operation of 4 9 the on-site technical support center and i 10 operational support center and the off-site 11 emergency operations f acility and the emerge.ncy 12 news center. We also accompanied off-site 7 / 13 radiological monitoring teams into the field. 4 6 l 14 The areas observed by my inspectors 15 included the ability to recognize and correctly 16 classify emergency conditions, the ability to 17 promptly notify cognizant authoritics who may be L 18 involved in emergency response, the ability to 19 notify the licensee's emergency response staff and 20 then to activate the emergency response facilities j 21 in a timely manner, the ability *c formulate and l l 22 imp 4ement actions that could mi. gate further E i 1 23 damage to the plant, the ability to perform dose 24 assessment and to make appropriate, timely 25 protective action recommendations, the ability to i ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~

O,. 1 30 -A 2 communicate ef fectively between various emergency 3 response facilities and the ability to control the 4 emergency response. i 5 The NRC's detailed, in-depth technical 6 review and inspection showed that no significant 7 deficiencies were identified. t There were minor 8 weaknesses. observed. These included, f i rs t,' t a l 9 hypothetical dose projection was not made in a timely manner due to a calculational error. 10 11 Second, the technical spokesperson at the emergency 12 news center did not fully explain technical issues (- 13 raised for certain specific questions. 14 In addition to identification of these 15 areas where licensee improvement is warranted, t 16 several strengths were observed. First, there was i 17 very good command and control of the various 18 emergency response facilities. Second, licensee l i 19 l personnel were exceedingly knowledgeable, well i 20 organi:ed and well trained. Third, the duties that ( 21 these licensee personnel performed were all i i 22 performed in an exceptionally professional and 5 23 Y competent manner. Finally, protective action 24 i recommendations were prompt and conservative and i i 25 utilized such factors as the appropriate evacuation l t [ . ~,., -, - - - - -. -. - - .,-,,.,,,,-c,--,,-_.- ann-_,.-- _,_,n_,_v.

- - - - - ~ 1 7f 31 -A 2 time estimates and sheltering versus evacuation 3 doses and criteria. 4 An inspection report of these 5 activities will be issued under my signature within 6 approximately one week of today's date and a copy 7 will again be located here in the local public 8 document r,o o m. That report will specifically 9 include our conclusion, which is that the NRC's i 10 conclusion for the licensee's on-site capabilities 11 indicate that during the June 7th, 8th, and 9th 12 b }< emergency preparedness exercise at the shoreham 13 station, the I s. licensee performed in a manner that 14 demonstrated their ability to protect the health 15 and safety of the public in the event of an 16 accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. 17 Thank you very much. 18 MR. HUSAR: Dr. Bellamy will be 19 followed by John Leonard, vice-president, nuclear 20 operations. 21 MR. LECNARD: TF- < you. Good 22 evening, ladies and gentlemeti. 23 As a vice-president of nuclear 24 operations, I was pleased to lead a capable and .e 25 proficient group in the conduct of this graded

i () 1 e 32 ~A 2 emergency preparedness exercise. This group 3 consisted of personnel who manage the plant, the 4 technical support center and the emergency 5 operations facility as well as some people in the 6 emergency news center. Some of the leaders are L 7 here--Jack,Nataro from the technical support 8 center Ed' Youngling, one of my key assistants; Dr. 9 Stukakis, in the radiological assessment area. l 10 Two of the three teams we have in this 11 group performed in the exercise, one under the very 12 capable direction of response manager, Bill \\ fs 13 Muesler, vice-president of electric operations; the ~ 14 other, under my direction. 15 The drill started at 4:29 in the r 16 morning with an Unusual Event that finally I 17 escalated into a General emergency wherein both the 18 plant and the surrounding environments were exposed I [ 19 to a radiological release. When the general 20 emergency was announced, protective action [ 21 recommendations were made within a period of seven i minutes. This is 10 less than half the time allowed i 23 us by the regulatory requirements. These [} protective action recommendations were well 24 v thought 25 out in advance, discussed with the emergency t

e 1 e 3) 2 director at the technical support center, 3 formulated with key personnel in the emergency t 4 operation facility and were based on present 5 conditions at the plant, expucted conditions at the 6

plant, present and future meteorological 7

conditions,. 8 In the culmination of the activities 9 which resulted in these recommendations, I found 10 all members on this team performed their duties in 11 a rapid and proficient manner and gave me very good 12 support. \\) ,l'.* 13 As an example, at the plant during the 14 period of this drill scenario, 46 separate repair 15 teams were sent on major repair tasks in order to I 16 return the facility to a stable condition. When it ( 17 was required that unnecessary personnel br. L 18 evacuated from the site for their own protection, 19 t this was accomplished and. personnel were accounted l l. 20 for in 28 minutes. i 21 t To the extent practical, none of the I 22 actions taken at the plant were simulated. As an I 23 example, when water connections were to be hooked t (]) e 24 up, the exact hoses n< connecting ap(purtenances t L s. 25 were used. k' hon radiological decontamination en I t

1 c.d 34 2 the site required equipment such as bulldozers, 3 these were procured and dirt was moved. In 4 performing these actions the plant personnel 5 demonstrated not only proficiency but a will to do 6 the job right. 7 At the emergency operations

facility, 8

personnel remained in continuing support of the 9 plant. External electric power sources were 10 located and arrangements made to bring them to the 1 11 staging area of the plant. Support for plant 12 activities were contir.ually discussed. [ 13 Priorities were assigned to tasks 14 between the technical support center and emergency 15 operations facility. Aid was requested from 16 various resources by actual phone calls and 17 messages. ..s a specific examplo, I was in personal la contact with the vice-president in charge of the 19 recovory effort at Three Mile Island. He stated 20 that he would have a core physicist and two 21 chemical engineers at Shoreham within six hours. 22 They were experienced in nanaging a damaged reactor 23 core and insuring its safety. O 24 The emergency operations facility, 25 technical support center and emergency news center

o l 1 O( 35 2 actively performed for a period of three days. It 3 included shift changes of large numbers of people 4 which were accomplished successfully. Coordination 5 of radiological control aspects were carried out 6 utilizing plant, emergency operation facility and 7 other radiological personnel involved in the drill. 8 Team 2, under Mr. Muesler, provided continuing 9 support and backup in radiological analyses to our 10 LERO organization during the days following the 11 simulated accident. 4 12 Careful and considered measures were [}. 13 utilized by this team in declassifying the event 14 and allowing recovery to begin in the plant and in' 15 the supporting ' departments in the office of nuclear 16 operations. 17 I was personally very proud to work 18 with this group and as a former commanding officer i i 19 ot' two nuclear submarines, having served as the 20 engineering and training officer of a submarine 21 flotilla in charge of training up 20 submarines. I 22 can honestly say I would be proud to have this 23 group of both men and women serve with me under O-si equally arduous conditions in the service. 24 25 Thank you.

() 1 36 A 2 MR. HU4AR: For impressions of how the 3 LERO organization performed, I would like to have 4 at this time Mr. John Weismantle, vice president of 5 resource and development, present his remarks for 6 you. 7 MR. WEISMANTLE Thank you. As was 8 mentioned before, this is the second federally 9 graded exercise of the LERO organization. The 10 first one was run in February of 1986. I mention 11 that because I will do a brief comparison of the O scope of this exercise versus the one conducted a 12 ,,I 13 i ( sw little over two years ago. Besides talking about 14 the scope of this exercise, I want to discuss some 15 things we have done since that exercise in the LERO 16 organization to improve its performance. While we 17 feel our performance in the February '86 exercise 18 was good, we think it is even better in this 11 19 exercise, and I will tell you how that was 20 accomplished. Finally, I will conclude with some 21 remarks on our performance last week. 22 Two years ago, the exercise we had was 23 a one-day exercise. It involved the testing of a 24 ) single shift in LERO. This time around we believe 25 our exercise was larger than any other exercise

1 r !L 37 2 ever run in this country in terms of actual I 3 participation of local resources. From 4:30 a.m. 4 on June 7th until about 4:00 p.m. on June 9th, when 5 the exercise was terminated, we had over 2,300 LERO 5 personnel participate. As with on-site, there was t 7 very little that was simulated. Most activities a were actua'11y performed short of mandatory public 9 participation. Two-and-a-half years ago, as a 10 comparison, there were about 1,100 participants in 1 11 the exercise. 12 In addition, we were faced with a i c g, J 13 number of unique challenges. This is the first s ~~ 3 14 exercise ever run in this country to supplement 1 15 one. That is, it is the first exercise where a ( 16 utility had to demonstrate its ability to interface i 17 with governments who were non-participants in the 18 planning process. That was a big challenge. In 1 19 addition, we had over 11 facilities participate for 20 all three days. And on the second day, when a 21 special school evacuation demonstration was 4 4 22 conducted, another 23 facilities participated. i 23 ) FEMA had about 66 evaluators here this i 24 time over the three-day period'as compared to about 25 38 two-and-a-half years ago. We had more

('( 1 s'- 38 4 2 objectives to meet. J6 out of the 37 generic 3 objectives were objectives for this exercise. 4 So, we were faced with a very big 5 challenge. Now, since the last exercise, we did 6 make a number of changes in the LERO plan and the 7 LERO organization that addressed some areas that were identified previously by FEMA. 8 Among these 9 were the following: First, we spent a little more 10 time concentrating in field worker training, in 11 training of the bus drivers, traffic guides, rad 12 monitors, route alert drivers, evacuation route eRJ [7 13 spotters and so forth. That group comprises over 14 half our orgariv.ation. In addition, we revised 15 come procedures to assure that we could implement 16 the mobilization of our field workers more swiftly 17 than in the past. We revised procedures, we 18 revised some physical arrangements at our staging 19 areas who process and dispatch these field workers. 20 Further, we concentrated on 21 communications, improving and emphasizing lateral 22 communications and vertical communications of all 23 sorts, focusing on the unusual and the unexpected, 24 O 25 such as impediments and other so-called free play eventualities that TEMA tests us with and which it C n M pit T P R A T n r h tO A " e e n ' "* ' a" '"

5-i ( ),. 1 39 i 2 is important that we perform well in a real 3 emergency. 4 Finally, we also focused in on the i 5 operations at the emergency news center. Mention 6 was made of copier failures. They were flawless i 7 this time around. But more than that, we beefed up 8 the staff,there and provided a more diverse' group i 9 of talented people, and that paid off as well. 10 As far as the exercise itself goes and 'l 11 our performance is concerned, I have to qualify my ~ 12 remarks by saying they are very preliminary. It { i f,, 13 was a vary complicated exercise, as you can i 14 appreciate. It is going to take FEMA a while to i i 15 complete their evaluation and, internally, it will t 16 take us some time. However, we can reach some t 17 tentative conclusions and I will present those to [ 18 you today. I will do it mainly by reviewing 19 i operations at the major facilities and then talking 20 a little bit about field operations. 21 First, at the EOC we were faced with f 22 several challenges that were more severe than 23 usually tested. Instead of having two traffic ( 24 l '()- impediments to deal with, as we had last time, we ( 25 had four impediments, diverse in nature, at diverse i

b () 1 40 d 2 geographical points that were responded to. We 3 believe we responded to them in an excellent i ' manner, very promptly. We utilized the resources I 4 S at our disposal in the EOC, including a traffic 6 engineer, to analyze what needed to be done, 7 promptly communicated that to the field where field 12 { 8 traff.ic guides were relocated for rerouting.' We i 9 believe we handled all four of them in a very good 10 manner. 11 In addition, the communications of 12 those impediments within the EOC to the ENC and so 'g. )k'( 13 forth was done very well. i i l 14 Command and control, we feel, i 15 throughout the three days was excellent. We had i 16 crisp briefings. It was clear who was in charge at [ 17 the facilities, and overall team effort was shown. 18 Protective action recommundations, we believe, were 19 done in a timely manner, even though we were faced l 20 with the challenge of ccmmunicating our ( 21 recommendations to state and county simulators in d i 22 command cell and persuading them that i our 23 recommendations were sound. They didn't just 24 nassively sit by. ' hey challenged us, and the l i t 25 burden was on ts. l ~ - L

1 e 41 A 2 Those protective action 3 recommendations were done independently, with input 4 ' from the on-site organization but with an 5 independent analysis in each cares. And I believe 6 we demonstrated our ability to integrate ths 7 necessary resources to come up with sound 8 protective. action recommendations. 9 Finally, the overall equipment and 10 facilities, we believe, was excellent at the EOC. 11 We have included some additional equipment and 12 materials there to facilitate the emergency 13 response, and we believe we demonstrated their use. A 14 At the ENC, whose function it is to 15 interface with the media, we believe we 16 demonstrated accurate and timely flow of 17 information to the public on the major facets of la our emergency response and aven some of the more 19 minor details, we had technical experts available 20 who participated in press briefings and in 21 developing and issuing press releases. 22 At the staging areas, we demonstrated 23 the ability to promptly brief, equip and dispatch 2'4 i() field workers. This time around, with the changes { 25 in procedures and the stream-lining of some i 1

j 1 r d' 42 2 operations there, we were able to mobilize all 3 traffic guides in the field, in place, within about 4 a 20-minute period after the recommendation for an 5 evacuation was made to the general public. That 6 gives us n margin of about 40 minutes from the time 7 needed to do that in order to assure a controlled 8 avacuation'-that is, an evacuation--an optimum i 9 avacuhtion with all traffic guides in place, 10 stream-lining traffic line. 11 At the reception centers we monitored 12, and demonstrated monitoring and processing of e 13 s evacuees. We feel we did that in a very good 14 manner. The monitoring was done professionally and 15 the processing of people was done expeditiously. 16 We also demonstrated the ability to communicate 17 from the reception centers to the Eoc and command 18 i and control remaining at the EOC, 19 In the school evacuation 20 demonstration, which took place on Wednesday the 21 Sth, we mobilized about 500 bus drivers, plus other 1 22 personnel. Those personnel went to about 23 other 23 locations, most of them bus companies, picked up i 24 equipment--or in the case of those that didn't pick 25 up the equipment, used their own vehicles--and s AW

e 1 43 'd 2 drove a multitude of routes to schools, simulating 3 the evacuation of school children to the Nassau 4 Coliseum or Nassau Community College, and then we 5 dispatched some of those buses back to the 6 Hicksville reception center to show how we could 7 take potenplally contaminated school children for 8 monitoring'and decon as a precautionary measure. 9 The overall school evacuation drill went very well 10 and involved not only our personnel but personnel 11 from a bus company that services one of the school 12 districts. x 'g[ 13 Finally, as far as field operations is 14 concerned, we mobilized a total of about 900 people 15 who reported to staging areas and were dispatched 16 into the field. These are traffic guides, bus 17 drivers and field monitoring people. We believe is they demonstrsted--and they were closely 19 scrutinized by FEMA. They demonstrated superior 20 knowledge of their job functions. They 21 demonstrated a dedication to their job and good 22 knowledge. 23 I would just like to conclude by (]) 24 saying, as John Leonard said for the on-site 25 peon.'e, I am proud to serv-r LERO. LILCO's

e 1 Ab 44 2 management is proud of LERO's performance. We 3 believe all LERO personnel demonstrated an extreme 4 dedication under difficult circumstances, were 5 enthusiastic about their job and demonstrated their 6 knowledge of their jobs across the board up and 7 down the line. 8 Thank you. 9 MR. HUSAR: What I would like to do 10 is, at this time, to present first impressions on 11 behalf of FEMA of this three-day exercise that 12 [O occurred last week. 13 Before I begin, I would like to kind s 14 of lay the framework of how we came to the exercise 15 from the time we first started the preparation. 16 Based on a request from TEMA 17 headquarters, Mr. Sable, my regional director, 18 authorized me to proceed with the conduct of the 19 ~ recent three-day joint exercise held June 7th, 8th 20 and 9th. The scenario approved by TEMA and the NRC 21 was designed to test 33 of the 36 FEMA standard' 22 objectives. Three of the objectives that were not 23 avaluated, based on preplanned agreement, included 24 the followingt General public distribution 25 administration of potassium iodide. That was

1 45 2 objective 17. Off-hours, unannounced exercise, 3 objective 36. And the observation of congregate 4

care facilities, which is objective 22.

5 Objective 37, which is capsulized as 6 the demonstration of the capability of the utility 7 off-site response organization personnel to 8 interface with the non-participating state and 9 local governments through their mobilization and 10 provision of advice and assistance, was added to 11 this exercise and that was evaluated. 12 O-This latter objective was accomplished fu 'f 13 through a FEMA control cell representing i 14 non-participating governments. The role of the 15 FEMA control cell was to take all calls from the 16 LERO players, record their requests or 17 notifications, ask for clarification of their calls 18 if warranted and provide authority to implement 19 each recommended protective action on a 20 case-by-case basis. 21 The role of the control cell was not 22 to second guess what non-participating governments 23 might or might not do in each case for assistance 24 for approval. 25 As was mentioned earlier, this was a

O k_) 1 ^f i 46 2 three-day exercise. As was mentioned earlier, it 3 tested on the first day the plume exposure pathway 4 concerns, on the second day, ingestion pathway 5 concerns, on the third day, recovering re-entry 6 concerns. 7 The first day of the exercise focused 8 on a simul *ated population at risk in a 10-mile 9 emergency planning zone. The second day focused on 10 protective actions decision-making and { 11 demonstrating--protective action decision-making ( 12 and demonstrations regarding ingestion pathway. ,i 13 The third day focused on recovery and re-entry .s 14 activities. TEMA Region II fielded 66 federal 15 evaluators for this exercise. A number of 16 demonstrations were conducted out of sequence based 17 on prior agreement with LERO exercise controllers. 18 out-of-sequence demonstrations were due to FEMA 19 resource constraints. 20 In order to adequately overses the 21 e xe r :tise, I, as chairman of the Regional Assistance 22 Committee, used a mobile telephone to keep in touch 23 with FEMA evaluators at key locations. Evaluators 24 ) used two-way vehicle radios to communicate with 25 exercise controllers regarding the pro,gress of the i

1 f 1 47 2 exercise.- As preplanned, one exercise objective 3 was not evaluated during the three-day period. 4 This FEMA objective, objective 31, involves 5 performing many calculations to come up with total 6 population exposure. Results of these 7 calculations, along with supporting documeatation, 8 will be provided to FEMA for review and avaiuation 9 by LERO. The evaluation of that submission will be 10 published as a supplement to the post-exercise 11 assessment report. 12 The Qs following facilities and functions h> [ 13 were evaluated over the three-day period. ~ The LERO 14 emergency operation center, the warning point, 15 emergency news center room or control, Emergency 16 Broadcast System, emergency operation facility, l 17 acts and assessment at the emergency operations 18 center, Brookhaven office field monitoring 14 19 capability, 36 general population bus routes, 40 20 school population bus routes, all three staging 21 areas, Port Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverbecdt all 22 11 transfer points, 18 mobility impaired vehicle 23 routes, also including the homebound and curbside 24 pickups; O. the school relocation center, all three 25 radiologic reception centers which are located at enMputro arnen toutmooom'o^*^^

'.().,, 1 '2 5-48 2 Bellmore, noslyn and Hicksville, respectively 3 3 traffic impediments, 30 traffic contra. paints, 3 4 alert routes, 16 hearing-impaired route 5 notifications, two hospitals--that is Brunswick 6 Hospital and Mid Island Hospital; the emergency 7 Worker dec,ontamination facility and a 8 decontamination trailer operations. The 9 decontamination trailer operations were one of the 10 ones run out of sequence on day two. t 11 Sie.ulated Coast Guard boating alert 12 \\ and the use of Teledyne, l ) Inc., which is the primary .(_ 13 radiological lab for the LERO organization.

w

. g 14 I will now provide some first 15 impressions regarding how the exercise went. 2 As 16 stated by Mr. Weismantle regarding h's evaluation j 17 of the exercise, FEMA's evaluation of the exercise la is still ongoing. It will take a while for us to t 19 sort through all evaluations by the i 66 evaluators ( 20 so these are just first impressions. There is no 21 closure on any if the creas I are about to mention 22 but these are imprescions nonetheless. 23 Emergency operations center: We 24 observed that it was a well-controlled facility for 25 security. The facility was appropriately situated

e-d 49 2 with status boards, maps, key event logs, dose 3 assessment boards, et cetera. The facility was 4

capable of sustained operat ns in a 24-hour 5

environment for a continuous period of time. 6 Briefings were conducted on a regular 7 basis. LERO did,an excellent job in demonstrating 8 the ability to maintain staff on a continuous 9 24-hour basis. The overall management of LERO was 10 very good. All information received from the 11 emergency operations facility was promptly shared. ~ 12 The LERO director clearly was in command and 13 coordinated decision-making throughout tt,e (- s. ( 14 three-day exercise. 15 overall public information 16 coordination staff demonstrated the ability to 17 provide necessary information to the public at risk-18 in a timely manner. The FEMA prompt notification 19 standard was met in the required 15 minute time 20 period. The Emergency Broadcast system criteria 21 were met by the radio station WPLR. Transportation 22 and traffic coordination in emergency operations 23 center worked well. () 24 At the emergency news center, it was 25 an excellent facility with the appropriate

Y% 1 ( 50 1 2 logistics to perform that function. There was an 3 adequate demonstration of the procedures by the 4 players in the emergency news center. Mobilization 5 and reporting was timely. Frequent briefings by 6 the spokesperson in charge was effected. 7 Coordinati n of ingestion pathway and recovery 9 8 re-entry issues in the news center with the 9 emergency operations center was well handled. 10 There were some concerns. Labeling ~~ 11 and updating of status boards-The LERO EBS 12 procedures need to be improved. Length and format L (s 13 of EBS messages, the posting of internal and

\\

14 distribution was not particularly timely. j 15 Procedures need to be updated for updating and 16 posting visuals that were used throughout the a i 17 exercise to keep the emergency news center staff 18 informed. 19 There were insufficient phone lines 20 and instruments for the federal and state 21 organizations that are to be represented in 22 emergency news center. 23 Rumor control: Rumor control was well 24 demonstrated. c The system, including district 25 office and call boards, operated efficiently. The

e 1 51 ( 2 bus evacuation, which included also general 3 mobility impaired comments are as follows: 4 Management, direction and control of bus operations 5 from the emergency operation center at Brentwood 6 was excellent and in accordance with the plan. 7 Buses allocated to all transfer points was timely. 8 Radio communication between transfer points'and the 9 emergency operations center were flawless. A total 10 of 97 buses ran routes and arrived at the 11 Micksv111e reception center. Mobility impaired - 15 12 curbside pickups at Patchogue went well. In ( 13 general, the bus operation ran extremely well. The 14 transfer points were run professionally and in i 15 accordance with the plan requirements. 16 Staging areas: The staging areas were 17 set up quickly and effectively. Staging area 18 coordination was established promptly after the 19 person in charge arrived. Communications worked 20 smoothly. Dosimetry briefings went well, special 21 attention was given to fenale staff. 22 Field dispatch of buses with drivers 23 went well. Route alerting for notification of 24 hearing impaired went well. Traffic control point 25 guides demonstrated a high level of training and

1 c A-52 2 knowledge of their duties. Radio communications 3 contributed to effective traffic control and 4 management of the evacuation. 5 The Brookhaven office field 6 monitoring: The Brookhaven operations, accident 7 assessment e.nd field monitoring teams coordinated functions Eell and demonstrated their skills a 4 9 effectively. 10 Teledyne, the primary radiological 11 lab, displayed excellent radiation protection, 12 contamination control and records keeping.- t (t!. 13 Taladyne is a full-scale radioanalytic laboratory j ( I ) 14 with capability of measuring all l types of samples 15 with high precision with known geometries. 16 Reception centers: We are talking i 17 about Roslyn, Hicksville and Bellmore. The 18 mobilization and activation was well coordinated. 19 Setup of the reception centers went smoothly. Some 20 reception center members need more training on t i 21 decontamination procedures. f 22 Emergency worker decontamination I ( 23 "acility: Approximately 600 LERO school bus () 24 drivers and their vehicles were directed to the 25 i Hicksville reception center for decon processing. l l i I@MD fl5? fchf?fc31 Cf411N1mmn wzm

1 1 53 2 This activity was part of the out-of-sequence 3 i demo.istration on day t'.to of the exercise. The 4 facility was adequate. Monitoring and 5 decontamination personnel demonstrated adequcte i 6 techniques. The monitoring activity dealt with 7 monitoring,40 emergency workers by 15 individuals 8 at a rate of about 90 seconds for a sustained 9 period of time. 10 Medical drill: Two medical drills 11 were evaluated, one on the first day and one on the ( () 12 second day. In summary, with the two hospitals, t f (s-13 the two hospitals were evaluated, s one June 7th and 14 the other June 8th. The evaluation was to 15 ascertain emergency room staff and their skills to 16 treat a contaminated and injured person or persons. 17 It was to ascertain the skills of the ambulance 18 personnel in treatment of a contaminated injured i 19 patient. 20 There were some problem areas 21 identified at the hospital by the staff, the 22 hospital staff: Inappropriate handling of 21 contaminated injured individuals. There is a need 24 for additional training at both hospitals. 25 Demonstrated skills on the part of ambulance

1 ~, $d 54 2 drivers were good. 3 The emergency operations facilityt 4 The facility was adequato. The space and supplies 5 were certainly adequate. ylsuals were designed 6 well and displays were maintained promptly. Access 7 control was noteworthy. Mobilization and 8 activation,of the LERO staff was timely. Regular 9 briefings were effective and timely. 10 Communications was excellent and plume dose a 11 k projections were conducted in accordance with the l 12 LERO plan. ) \\ < k 13 I k ^*r-This now concludes the FEMA 14 impressions regarding how the exercise went. I 15 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: How about the 16 32 sirens that-- 17 MR. HUSAR: Full report will not be 18 available for 60 to 90 days. Once the report is 13 published, we will in the report identify all areas 20 observed and our' evaluation of the areas and also 21 our recommendations for corrective action. 22 What I would like to do now is restate 73 what was mentioned by me earlier regarding the ( 24 procedure we would like to follow for giving 25 everyone an opportunity who would like to either

si 1 55 tw 2 ask a question or make a comaent. 3 l What we would like to do is to have 4 the sheets that were available at the door, if you 5 haven't done so already, to be given to the people 6 with green arm bands to collect them and bring them 7 forward. What we will do is to acknowledge each 8 individual'and give an opportunity for that' person 9 to come to the mike, to ask a question, make a 10 comment. We would like to allocate no more than 11 five minutes per individual so everybody in the J) 12 room can have an opportunity to ask a question or ) (S 13 make a comment. se lt I would ask at this time that the 15 sheets be passed forward and give us a moment or 16 two to compile these and we will get to every 17 individual who has a question. 18 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Would you 19 like us to ask a question-- 20 MR. HUSAR*: Characterize the kind of 21 question you have so we know who the best person is 22 up here to answer. 23 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Who it is 24 directed to? 25 MR. HUSAR: Yes. In characterizing

e 56 A 2 the kind of question, not necessarily the specific i 3 question. We would then know who would be in the 4 best posi. tion to answer the question. t 5 As we are waiting for the sheets to be 6 brought forward, I would like to make reference to f 7 an earlier remark I made regarding the composition 8 of the Regional Assistance Committee. i I think I 9 may have left out one or two members so I would 10 like to enter that into the proceeding at this time 11 and give you a listing of all the federal agencies I e' g 12 i (% represented on the Regional Assistance Committee, i 13 so that I don't hear any bad remarks that I have 14 not given due recognition. t 15 The National Weather Service, J, 16 Department of Interior, Department of Energy, 17 Department of Transportation, Environmental i 18 Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration and I ) 19 also U.S. Department of Agriculture. All our f 20 members that sit on the Regional Assistance 23 Committee, whose role it is to provide technical I 22 t assistance in the development of plans and 23 development of capabilities as well as evaluate the () 24 response organization's ability *to implement their 25 plans during exercises and drills. . b O M .r-

4 c- ) 57 2 First I would like to acknowledge Mr. 3 Robert Hux. Sir, where are you? If you would come 4 up to one of the mikes available, we would all like 1 5 to hear your question and hopefully we can answer 6 your question completely. 7 i MR. HUX: My question is, considering I 8 the collapsa thet is going on in the bridges, the 9 railway systems and general transportation grid q 10 going on in New York State, what is required to 11 transmit the number of people that would be ( 12 involved in an actual evacuation of everyolie within 13 v the evacuation route on Long Island? And what 14 upgrade in the transportation system would be i s 15 needed for that and what industrial capability and 16 associated electrical power generation would be [ 17 required for that to actually function? I 18 MR. HUSAR: The way I understand your l 19 question, sir, it relates to capacity and condition l j 20 of the road network to handle an evacuation. i I { 21 don't think I am in a position to give an 22 evaluation of the condition of the road network, r 23 O but certainly the road network that would be used i 24 is in the plan. I 25 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: What about t

I ) 1 58 2 the sirens? 3 MR. HUSAR: And that the condition of 4 that road network is something that local 5 government would be in the best position to assess. 6 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: They already 7 said it was,n't adequate. Walt a minute. 8 MR. HUSAR: Sir, we certainly would 9 like to give you an opportunity to speak. Wo-- 10 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Wait your 11 turn. [) 12 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Why don't you (. 13 save some seals? 14 MR. HUSAR: The condition of the road 15 network is certainly something that needs to be 16 evaluated if the e are problem areas. FEHA is not 17 aware that there are conditions in the road network. 18 tha.t are in the plan that may requirn chtnges in 19 the plan to redesign or reconfigure the nutwork for 20 evacuation if that should be necessary. 21 Sir, I don't know if I have answered 22 your question directly but we have a member on the 23 Regional Assistance Committee from the U.S. I ) 'x / 24 Department of Transportation. Any matters, 25 certainly, regarding transportation and evacuation

i L I 1 59 -s 2 would be concerns that he would deal with if those 1 i 3 matters are brought to our attention. We would, in i 4 turn, coordinate this with the U.S. e Highway ( 5 Administration. Certainly, if there is a need, f 3 6 based on the assessment and recommendation to 7 re-examine.the evacuation routes, we would then a a provide th*at information to LERO t so they could take I ) 9 that appropriate action. i 10 MR. HUX: My point in asking the [ j~ 11 question is to emphasize that in an actual 12 evacuation, as is being discussed, the idea of { .' ) 13 actually shutting down and not generating power d-i 14 from this facility gets you in a position with what I i 15 do you actually do when the transportation grid of s l 16 the areas involved break down? Its order to rebuild { i 17 those you nead electrical power generating ?' la 1 capability that you don't have if such a facility 19 were to be actually shut down, okay, in order to 20 actually support your industrial capability to i 21 rebuild the infrastructure. t j 22 i MR. HUSAR: Are you stating that if ( \\ 23 l 1h there was an emergency at the plant, that power I v 24 would not be available for resider,ts in the i i l 25 community? Is that what you are basing your t i 1 1

i 60 -A 2 statement on? 3 MR. HUXt No. I am saying, if you 4 have to rebuild large 1 mounts of infrastructuring 5 in the event of bridge collapses and stuff like 6

that, that means you need a certain amount of 7

electrical power generating capability in order 8 just to sypport the industry in the area. The 9 people saying shut down the plant are sort of i 10 putting them in an untenable situation from the l-11 standpoint of the evacuation procedure itself. i ~ 12 O.' MR. HUSAR: Thank you. (k -t 13 Een'a-Mai Franz? 14 MS. FRANZt i also wanted to make a 15 comment. Since the plant was constructed according 16 to fede'eal regulations, has been inspected, tested 17 and declared ready for operation and looks like now 18 that the emergency plan was successful or the drill 19 was successful, is there anything else that has to 20 be addressed before the license can be issued? 21 MP HUSARt I can only speak from the 22 FEMA perspective. Based on our rule--I mentioned 23 earlier in my remarks that we will take the pinn ( 24 review evaluation and the post-exercise assessment 25 report comments, along with concerns and statements _ m __n

1 e 61 ~ s 2 that are made here and memorialized in the 3 transcript. Our regional director will evaluate 4 thet and provide his recommendation to FEMA 5 headquarters, which in turn will provide a final 6 finding to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 7 once it is in the hands of the Nuclear 8 Regulatory Commission, the commis'sion will then 9 decide--will take that into account and examino the 10 finding and make a decision with respect to the ~ 11 licensing. ('} 12 MS. FRANZt The drill was really the (v. 13 last step in the licensing process? 14 MR. HUSAR: Well, I can only speak to 15 our rule. This information will be provided to the 16 Nuclear Regulatory Commission and they will make a 17 final determination. I can't speak for any other 18 aspects of the preparedness that might need to be 19 addressed outside of the scope of FEMA's 20 involvement. 21 MS. WEISMANTLE: I could perhaps add, 22 thete is ongoing litigation on certain plan items. 23 There is also certain other tests of the prompt 24 notification system that will have to be run, the -6 25 prompt notification system consisting of the

f'h R) 1 / 2 issuance of a public information brochur G2 e and the 3 sounding of the sirens and a message broadcast t i 4 o 1 the public. There may be some other details,

too, 5

but those are the major ones. 6 MS. FRANZ: I just wanted to make a 7 comment th,at I feel, as do many hundreds of I a thousands of Long Islanders here, that the plant i 9 should be licensed as quickly as possible and that 10 the decision, which should be based on tech i n cal 11 I judgments, should not be influenced by political \\ ((L,e 12 gains. - '[ 13 MR. HUSAR: Miss Kinberly Heilig? i 14 j MS. HEILIGt I have a number of t 15 } questions. I don't know which you are referring to 16 { at the moment. If you want to give it to me, I can 17 read it. 18 Apparently there were a number of t 19 sirens that did not operate properly or did not i 1 20 operate at all as the drill began. i I would like to 21 know how can LILCO even hope to evacuate persons in 22 a real--that is, an unplanned energency--if they 24 had more than ample time to plan for n pseudo ,25 emergency? ~

O, 1 i 63 A 2 1 MR. WEISMANTLE: Regarding the sirens, 3 I will address that. In fact, I was going to 4 address it in my remarks and was diverted at that 5 point. 6 You are right. There was a sounding l 7 of the sirens once on the morning of June 7th and i 8 about two-thirds of them failed to sound. 5 couple 9 of things on that. Number one, one of the I i 10 objectives was not to actually test the sirens, per '~ 11 se. It was to coordinate the setting of the sirens (~} 12 with an EBS message.

(C:'i 13 Number two, we had and we demonstrated 1

i 14 route alert drivers going out into the field. And 15 they are in our plan to notify the public where L 16 sirens fail. As a matter of fact, we actually got i 17 some messages back from traffic guides, although 18 this wasn't a formal part of our plan, that pr(tty 19 rapidly let us know we had a problem. 20 At that point, we would have resounded l 21 them again, but since it wasn't an exercise i ? i 22 i objective and since we had to follow the t 23 instructions of the controllers in terms of which 1 24 sirens failed and to dispatch drivers to that, we i 25 didn't go forward with that. i l

j i i Q 1 I 1 64 -s 2 However, starting that afternoon, we 3 did conduct an investigation of what had happened, 4 since two weeks previously, whtin we sounded thes, 5 we got 87 out of 49, which is a better-than-average i 6 result. What turned up was two things: one, a 7 slightly slow activation of the system itself. \\ 8 There are a number of processes that are followed 9 to get t a message out to each of the sirens via 10 radio. That was a little slower than we would have ( 11 liked. Number two, some timers on the sirens l i O themselves, 12 once we did field inspections, had (I') 13 drifted from their set points. I 14 So, in the space of two days we 15 inspected the 89 sirens, we adjusted the set points ( 16 of the timers, and then on Friday morning, at about 'l { 17 10:30, we went through the whole procedure again 18 and got 86 of the 89 l sirens working properly. 19 MS. HEILIG How many days later? 20 r MR. WEISMANTLE: Two days later. As I } i 21 said, if this was a l real emergency, we would have 22 attempted to resound the sirens very carefully and 23 they would have worked. It wasn't part of this

([)

{ 24 oe3ective or wasn.e a-- I ~ i 25 MS. HEILIG: Wouldn't one think that t

s 1 '( 65 2 was one of the most fundamental-- 3 MR. WEISMANTLE: Oh, yes. It is 4 ' fundamental. And that is why we conducted the 5 investigation. 6 MS. HEILIG: And this drill was 7 planned for a very long time. It seems if a something 11ke that can go wrong when it is'a 9 planned emergency and it takes two days to get them 10 going, it seems to--three days--it seems to 11 me--that is very serious. We cannot know what kind {Q ' 13 12 ( of malfunction we will have. 4 MR. WEISMANTLE: We are concerned, 14 too, which is why we proceeded to do a thorough 15 investigation rather than not, then. We are going 16 to look at the whole siren system again in more 17 detail now that the dust has settled from the la exercise. 19 MR. HUSAR: If I could explain FEMA's 20 role in the prompt notification system? Mr. 21 Weismantle is correct that FEMk.'s interest was not 22 to determine the operability of the sirens during 23 the exercise. FEMA is going to make an evaluation 24 of the operability in the near future. e This was 25 not a requirement for the exercise.

1 "A 2 66 MS. HEILIG It was not a requirement 3 for this exercise? 4 MR. HUSAR: No. What we had required 5 in the exercl<se is to test the system to see that 6 from the time a protective action decision was 7

made, that that decision could be communicated to a

the public'via the Emergency Broadcast system. 9 Because this plant is not licensed and because we 10 have not submitted a fi.nal finding to the NRC 11 regarding the capability of the off-site 12 preparedness and to make a determination with .(v 13 respect to adequate s s reasonable assurance, this 14 acoustical evaluation will be performed in the near 15 future. Once that evaluation is completed, that 16 will become part of the FEMA report. 17 subsequent to that, although not la required for this process, there will also be a 19 survey conducted by TEMA to test the public 20 education with respect to the public information 21 brochure. The public information brochure is 22 currently under review by TEMA. Once it is 23 returned to LILco for corrective action, it will ( 24 then be distributed a'.d then a survey will be 25 conducted to ascertain knowledge of the public e...... .o ~ _, _ - - _ _ - ~. _.

e-i I f 67 2 regarding the procedures for prompt. notification. i 3 MS. HEILIG: So the sirens will be ' ratested after LILCO has a chance to correct the 4 1 5 problem? l 6 MR. HUSAR: That is correct. 7 MS. HEILIG: So a spot check, though, t 8 is like not a good test? i 9 The other thing I wanted to ask you, f 10 we are all aware that last year the NRC approved a 11 rule change in order that LILCO not be required to i 12 ( m, have local and state cooperation. We are e.'Aso f ' \\-f) 13 aware that Frank Petrone resigned from (EMA after 14 the last drill becauso he would not certify that 15 the emergency plan was--that he could amoure the t l 16 health and safety of the people of Long Island. It seems to me that the federal i 17 I i I is government has a stake in terms of getting this i l 19 plant licensed. Could you please comment on that, 6 20 why it seems like TEMA is bending over backwards to { t 21 approve this plant, when the most fundamental things go wrong with the plan and people are still f 22 1 l 23 saying, "It was a wonderful drill, it was a ( 24 wonderful drill"? We start to wonder, i 25 MR. HUSAR: My response to your I I l enMDitTFD A f h r n T D h u c e n t a* ' a * * * *..

F 1 64 Al 2 question is as follows: Congress provides certain 3 authorities to the executive branch. The executive 4 branch of government, of which FEMA is a part, has [ 5 got a rule that it follows, its regulation. In h 6 accordance with the Rule 44 CFR 350, we have a i I i 7 i responsibility for off-site radiologic emergency i a preparedne'ss. t l 9 MS. HEILIG But you change the rules t 10 whenever-- g-11 MR. HUSAR No. Our rule is not 12 changed. i l\\' 13 MS. HEILIGt The bAC changed the rule 14 i in terms of local and state participation so your { 15 rules don't really mean anything, bactuse I know if i t I 16 LILCo doesn't pass the rule, the rules change so i 17 they are able to pass it. 18 Can you comment on what I addressed? 19 MR. HUSAR: I am trying to. t 20 Under our rule, we provide a 21 determination of reasonable assurance to Nuclear I 6 22 Regt:1atory Commission upon request or part of our f 23 process when the governor of a state submits the O 24 plans for initial review. In this instance, under 25 the memorandum of understanding between FEMA and I l I

i I e -s' 69 2 i Nuclear Regulatory Commission we were asked to ~; i 3 review a plan. We did. We were asked to evaluate i i 4 an exercise and we did, so we are just following { 5 our regulation. 6 Next question, please? ) 7 Thank you very much. I would ask that { s we 2.imit y*our time to about five minutes per v a 9 individual, so unless you have one other question 10 we would like to give the other people who have i 11 submitted their sheets for qugstions to give them { 12 time to speak and to ask questions. Okay? ? c 13 t ( MS. HEILIG okay. I don't feel my j <5, -~ t 14 questions were answered adequately but I will yield 15 the floor. t 16 MR. HUSAR: Thank you. 17 1 Mr. Paul Lozowsky. 4 I 18 MR. LOZOWSKY: My nana is Paul 19 Lozowsky and I am representing an organization 20 called November Coalition, composed of 21 approximately 10,000 business owners and also a t j 22 handful of basically residential rate payers. r What .l 23 we are saying basically applies to whether you own I ( ) 24 a business or you basically own a home or rent a I ~~ 25 home, for that matter. 4 - - - ~ ~

%-) 1 70 mL 2 First, I would like to thank the LILCO 3 employees because they took a lot of garbage fron 4 the public when it should have been directed 5 towards the management. They did a good job during 6 Hurricane Gloria with the equipment they had 7 available, but it wasn't the fault of the 8 enployees.' It was the fault of the nanagement that 9 put all their noney into Shoreham. It is 80 10 percent of LILCO's assets. Any business that has 11 80 percent of an asset tied into a nuclear plant is {} 12 obvicusly severe!v mismanaged and certainly doesn't 13 deserve. to operate on Long Island. That is one 14 point I certainly wanted to mention. 15 Another point-- 16 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: How about a 17 question? 18 MR. LO20WSKY: I an doing what I am 19 told, giving hell to people who deserve it. That 20 certainly must bc the rederal Emergency Management 21 Agency. 22 To nake it less than five minutes, 23 what is demanded from whether it be the Governor of \\ (" { \\_- 24 the State of New York, or for that matter the NRC, 4. 25 is that the rate payers on Leng Island have a (

l e r [1. 1 -I 2 right, just as all business people have a right to 3 provide a safe environment for employees and 4 customers plus a decent price. It is our belief 5 that you don't have to bw a traffic engineer to 6 know that on Long Island you simply cannot evacuate 7 Long Island in a timely fashion, especially five 8 hours. The' roads are closed. There is constantly 9 overturried trucks on the Long Island Expressway, 10 constantly overtur.1ed trucks on Sunrise Highway. 11 The roads are bad. You can't evacuate, period. I 12 wish you would get inao your mind--maybe you should c' ) 13 travel the roads of Ltag Island to get the point. 14 The point is, you cannot evacuate Long Island in 15 five hours, period. 16 Ho'tever, Three Mile Island taught us 17 that it takes more than 10 miles to move the 18 people--people will evacuate further out, okay. 19 there will be a backlog of traffic and the people 10 in Southampton area, especially east, will be 21 trapped with no place to go and they will be stuck. 22 Studies have proven if you can't evacuate in five 23 hours and there is a serious accident at () 24 Shoreham--and I think LILCo has the capability of 4 25 doing it--as much as 35,000 lives could be lost. enuentos ruuarmt

(h 1 E 72 2 short-term deaths and other lives could be lost, 3 long-term deaths. 4 You definitely have to question 5 yourself about the sirens. They should have worked 6 and didn't work, and you have to examine your 7 conscience and you should also think about being 8 held responsible if any deaths do happen if, God 9 forbid, LILCO gets a license for Shoreham and has 10 an accident. 11 Just another couple of points. We ask 12 the NRC to immediately stop licensing. We ask TEMA ( -y 13 to immediately withdraw all attempted tries to--for 14 this evacuation. We certainly ask Cuomo--we thank 15 him for his support, but the idea is whether we 16 have LILCO or whether we have LIPA, public power 17 system, we cannot be responsible for to percent of la LILCO assets called the Shoreham mistake. We 19 believe public power is not a bad way to go. If 1 20 LIPA has to eat the Shoreham Plant. Long Island 21 will be bankrupt. We ask and remind Cuomo that he 22 did say LILCO should eat Shoreham and rate payers 23 should not. It is time for Cuono to let Peter ( 24 Bradford know that all funding for Shoreham must 25 stop.

t 1 I 73 2 l We are paying 30 percent et our t 3 monthly bills for Shoreham and we demand an end to j l i 4 the funding and a decent price and reasonablo rate, k i i 5 Also, we ask Mr. sekneer(ph) to stop this attempted 2 farce or b'asically step down and find somebody who 6 7 can do the job. s I appreciate your time. 9 MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much. l 1 10 Ginny Levin? ? f i-11 MR. LozoW. SKY Please don't let Lont t 12 Island down. s_ > i {,.., 13 MS. LEVIN: dhat is the lead radio { t i 14 station? 15 MR. MUSAR: There are two radio 16 stations in the plan, WPLR, New Haven, Connecticut i 17 and.tCBS, New York City. L k, 18 I MS. LEVIN: Which is the lead I 19 station? i 20 MR. WEISMANTLE: Essentially, WPLR has ( 21 indicated they would be withdrawing once we get a s t 22 full power license. WCBS is in the plan. That is 23 lead-- 24 MS. LEVIN: Which is the lead station [ 25 right now? . + -.. ~ -

l I \\ + i 1 e-74 1A 2 MP. WEISMANTLE: Let me try to answer i 3 the question. The-- i 4 MS. LEVIN: The question is, which is 5 the lead station right,now? l 6 i

MR. WEISMANTLE:

Right now I would l 7 have to say PLR is. WCBS, as the plan indicates-- 4 L MS. LEVIN: I thought they indicated-- 9 i MR. WEISMANTLE: I would like to L 10 finish. 'f l 11 MS. LEVIN: WXXX in the scenario? o 12 MR. WEISMANTLE --is the lead station \\'i 13 for the southeast regional New York EBS network. 1s 14 MS. LEVIN: I have another question. I' 15 MR. WEISMANTLE That is a network 16 that includes about 30 stations on Long Island and 17 the Suffolk County Executive and the Governor both e la have the ability to initiate that network with { 19 CBS /AM as the lead. i r 20 MS. LEVIN: Is FEMA going to continue ( ( 21 aiding and abetting thrc Atomic Safety Licensing 22 Board going on, talking about the hearings? If so, i I 23 why? Isn't FEMA supposed to be doing evaluating of () 24 its own instead of sitting there encouraging that 25 nonsense? 1 I i l MCTIDOOn f\\DCO LN mn-. .r. __-._.---,-J

f i \\ i ([). 1 75 i I 2 HR. HUSARt rederal Emergency. I Management Agency is following its rule-- 3 4 t l SPEAXER TROM THE FLo0R Excuse me. t 5 Can you stand up? I 6 I MR. HUSARt The rederal Emergency i 7 Management Agency is followino t.te rule that has 8 been given.'to it by Con'ress the function'of the g 9 rederal Emergency Management Agency with respect to l i 10 off-site radiological emergency preparedness is l 1 I i 11 provide an evaluation of the adequacy of state and 12 local governments surrounding nuclear power plants ks-[ 13 to deal with a nuclear power plant accident. We 14 provide that evaluation determination to the 15 Nuclear Regulatory commission and we are performing f 16 that fur.ction. 17 MS. LEV 1Hf Did I understand you to f la say you are evaluating the state and local 19 governments? Are you not evaluati.19 LILeo's part? 20 i MR. HUSAR There has been a recent 21 rule change to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 22 rule-- 23 MS. LEVIN oh. You are good at i 24 those, aren't you? l 25 MR. HUSAR:,And we are fo11cving our l l cnM DUTre a f nen *o u.cea a---

3 ~' s t .bi ). u-3 76 -4 2 "charge. ' And in connection with the memorandum of 3 understanding, to provide an evaluation of the I 4 plan, provide an evaluation of the implementation t I i-5 of that plan by the off-site emergency response 6 orgt.nization. 7 MS. LEVIN: Does the recent rule V 8 change hav4 a name or number? 9 i MR. HUSAR: Yes. It does have a name 10 and number. 11 1 MR. BELLAMY: I believe the rule 12 change you are referring to is a change to Appendix 13 C to 10 CFR, Part 50 of the United States Code of 14 Federal Regulations. That is a Congressional r j 15 document-- ( 16 MS. LEVIN: (Inaudible) Wa3 there an f 17 acronym in there or more of the usual bombast? 18 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Mind your t 19 manners. i t 20 MS. LEVIN: The likes of you is 21 teaching me manners? 22 I MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much for 23 your tire. ('% 24 MS. LEVIN: I'm corry. I would also '-( 13 Shoreham should be put into operation immediately 14 to prevent brownouts and blackouts. Also, I urge 15 the NRC Commissioner, Mr. Sek(ph), he should not 4 16 assign the Shoreham license over to Mr.

Cuomo, 17 Governor Cuomo, or New York State, as this is also its necessary for the national security of our country.
19 Furthermore, one pound of uranium 20 releases the heat equivalent of 1,300 tons of coal. 21 Depending on what fuel oil you use, whether it is 22 bunker 6, which has a different BTU value and a 23 higher BTU value than any of the other fuel oils, ( 24 like number two, same viscosity, everything 25 included--we would save an awful lot of trade s_u e.an + a =
r_. * *__
r~s k" 89 s -A 2 defici't money by using uranium and not importing 3 expensive oil. 4 Also, while I was working at the tima, 5 after we made the first successful element, 6 nuclear--nuclear element, it was determined, when 7 Long Island Lighting was charging 3.4 cents per 8 kilowatt, this same electrical energy, one silewatt 9 of electricity could have been manufactured with 10 nuclear energy for the cost of .4 cents per 11 kilowatt hour. So, no matter how you slice it, you 12 hear a lot of things and read lot of things where 13 getting rid of Shoreham, your energy was going to y ~ 14 be cheaper. Now it is coming out that it is going 15 to be more expensive than ever before. ^ 16 Plus the fact, taking into account all 17 the acid rain that this fossil fuel is going to 18 produce, people will die. You won't have to 19 evacuate the island. They will die just'from the 20 acid rain. Ask the fishermen that go fishing the 21 amount of fish that are dying off each year. It is 22 unbelievable. 23 So, therefore, I, as myself, who have 24 worked with it and one of my poors over there that ,L 25 works for Brookhaven Labs, this is a very, very coMPUTra ATnen tonnennva-'a" "
(. t \\ j'. 1 m 90
(
2 important step. We are going forward, we are not 3 going backwards. To destroy over $5 4 billion--people got to be sick, if not crazy. 1 5 MR. HUSAR: Thank you, sir. 6 Jeanne Kacprzak? Am I pronouncing it 7 correctly? 8 MS. KACPRZAK: No, but not a Idt of 9 people do. i 10 Most of my questions have been , y 11 answared, but what comes to my mind in this whole g-s 12 thing is, in general,,the evacuation procedures for 'N_/*j 13 ( ,q any kind of accident on Long Island seem to be r 14 difficult. Under this condition that the state and 15 local government has refused to participate, would 16 that qualify the LERO organization to be more 17 responsive in an emergency? And also, it is 18 brought to my attention that not too far away from 19 here, in Connecticut, there is an operating nuclear 20 plant and I don't think there is any emergency 21 procedures to evacuate Long Island in the case of a 22 problem over there. I 23 can you answer those? 24 MR. WEISMANTLE: As a matter of fact, s. 25 there is a part of Long Island within the 10-mile I
b 'l 1 s /- 91 2 zone.of the Millstone Point plan, Fishers Island, 3 end Suffolk County evidently has emergency 4 procedures to evacuate that island in the event of 1 5 an accident at Millstone. In addition to that, as 6 was mentioned earlier, we exercised ingestion 7 pathway on Long Island and that is, by regulation, 8 plans have'to be in place for a 50-mile zone. When 9 you look at the map of Long Island, virtually 10 every--95 percent-plus location on Long Island is 11 within a 50-mile zone of one or more nuclear 12 ) plants--Indian Point, Millstone, Haddam Neck, < /(h)) 13 Connecticut Yankee, I guess. Presumably, New York i 14 State has ingestion pathway plans to take care of 15 the eventuality of an accident at those plants in i 16 terms of its impact on Lorig Island. i 17 MS. KACPRZAX: Can you clarify the i 5 18 50-mile radius plan? I don't understand. l { i 19 MR. WEISMANTLE: Every nuclear plant 3 20 is required to have a plan that goes out to 50 21 miles. The first 10 miles are what is 22 conventionally known as an evacuation plan--that 23 is, you have to have preplanned plans for [) 24 U evacuation of the general public and special i 25 l facilities within 10 miles. In addition to that, l c nu pwrro a f nen n o u'cra v --a.- ~ c- +-
s I i \\_/ e 92 2 from 10 miles to 50-mile radius, you must have 3 plans that could be implemented to protect the 4 public via contamination of foodstuffs, water or 5 milk or whatever. And those are required to be in 6 place for the areas of up to 50 miles around 7 operating nuclear plants and every plant trying to 5 8 gain an operating license. 9 What most people don't realize is, 10 Indian point plant is actually closer to Nassau 11 County than the Shoreham Plant is, to the closest 12 point,in Nassau County. ], 13 g MR. HUSAR: Thank you. 14 Michelle Santuntonio? 15 MR. SANTUNTONIO: At the start of the 16 hearing or whatever you want ta call it, two of the 17 people on the dais said they assumed the state and 18 local governments would participate in attempting 19 to follow the plan put forth by LILCO. I would 20 like to know, on what do you base that assumption? 21 It seems as though they already said under oath 22 that they would not participate. So, either you 23 are wrong or our elected officials tre guilty of 24 perjury. Can you address this issue? 25 MR. HUSAR: Yes, sir. I. mentioned
1 93 N 2 earlier the fact that with the NRC rule change and, 3 hopefully, my colleague from the Nuclear Regulatory 4 commission will correct me if 7 am wrong--there 5 were certain planning assumptions that were 6 provided in this rule change. And I read off the 7 three planning assumptions that would allow the 8 review and* evaluation of plans and, subsequently, 9 the determination of the people, the emergency 10 response people in implementing thoss plans, allow 11 that process to take place. } 12 So, it is vt in the rule-making that ,{- 13 allows, that provides for these three planning 14 assumptions. And these are planning assumptions in 15 rule-making. These are not statements by 16 individuals here on the dais. This is in the i 17 rule-making. 18 MR. SANTUNTONIot In that case, all of 19 your assumptions are erroneous because not only 20 have the state and local officials already said 21 that they would not participate in this evacuation 22 plan, but the people who are supposed to drive the 23 buses to evacuate the childron and who in fact will ( 24 have physical possession of those' buses at the time 25 of any accident have also said that they will not L
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-\\ A e 94 46 2 participate and evacuate children from camps or 3 schools or anywhere else. And the police officers, t 4 Suffolk County Police Officers, who woJ1d have the 5 t only legal authority to direct traffic here have 6 also said that they will not participate. And 7 they, incidentally, reported that there were 41 8 accidents,' not 4. That is a factor of 10 9 difference. 4 10 Do you people take these things into 11 account at all? j 7-s 12 MR. WEISMANTLE: Yes, we do. As a g 13 matter of fact, besides the fact it is a 14 regulation, what has been found in other i 1 15 emergencies is that governments perform their 16 traditional role. There is a law that says 17 governments must respond to emergencies. In New 4 a 18 York State, I guess it is Article 2-B or some such 19 citation. We found even at Shoreham, actually, j 20 governments have responded to bomb threats, for 1 21 instance. There has been numerous bomb throats 22 where suffolk county police have actually responded 23 and stayed in contact and actually sent people to ( 24 the plant until it was clear that there was no 25 bomb. As a matter of fact, the day of the exerciso 4 4 w
l 'us's, 1 95 k 2 at an unusual event, we believe that New York State 3 actually racpocJtu to that to the extent of taking 4 down the infornation thro _gh th. air normal channels, 5 by the p.opi wno are norms 11y arsigned to do that. 6 hG d..'fUNTONIO: 7t was not an actual 7 event, t..ough. It k.is a plail0$d drill. 8 MR. WEISMANTLE: LJt me finish. We 9 think it is just common sense and proven by actual 10 responses es Shoreham and other emergencies that 11 governments will respond. There is no question 12 about that. ( 13 s MR. SANTUNTONIO: I am not saying that 14 the gvvernments of the county of Suffolk and State 15 of New York will be remiss and abandon their 16 citizens at a time of radiological emergency at 17 this plant. I am merely pointing out that your is basic assumptions for this drill are erroneous by 19 the testimony of our elected representatives. 20 MR. WEISMANTLE: I think that 10 just 21 rhetoric. 22 MR. SANTUNTONIO: What about the other 23 issues I have raised? ( 24 MR. HUSAR: Sir, if you can restate 25 your question, I am not sure that it was phrased in
(_,, 1 96 2 the-- 3 MR. SANTUNTONIO: How do you 4 reconcile--claim there were only four accidents in 5 the evacuation area and the suffolk County Polica 5 reported over 407 7 MR. WEISMANTLE: I-- 8 MR. SANTUNTONIO Are you drawing 9 these numbers out of a hat? How did you come about 10 with that number or did you make it up just to be 11 convenient? I am asking because I want to know 12 where you got the number. 13 MR. WEISMANTLE: I can't address where 14 FEMA got the number for the drill, but I can 6 15 address what the record shows as far as accidents 16 in the 10-mile zone-- 17 MR. SANTUNTONIOt In the midst of a la radiological emergency. 19 MR. WEISMANTLE: What the record shows 20 is that in the midst of normal traffic conditions, 21 the average number of accidents over a per!.od of 22 about five or six hours is four. 90 to 95 percent 20 of those, statistically, would not affect the ( 24 evacuation at all because they would be tender 25 benders where people could pull over to the side of
4 1 97 2 the road. 3 When experts look at other 4 ' evacuations, including Three Mile Island, including 5 evacuations associated with propane, the danger of 6 propane explosion, which we experienced on Long 7 Island but,was experienced in a much bigger way i about eigh't or ten years ago in canada, 8 they find 9 that actually the accident rate goes down when 10 roadways are filled to their capacity. People are i 11 driving at low speeds, there is less chance of an l 'v) 12 accident. Most accidents happen at night and when ( ,g 13 people are driving at higher speeds. So, actually, t 14 we were-- 15 i MR. SANTUNTONIO: I disagree. I l 16 disagree with that assessment. And I think the 17 statistics from the suffolk County Police 18 Department will bear me out on that. I have to 19 Gay, I don't think you live around here or drive i i 20 around here. i 21 MR. WEISMANTLE: Oh, yes, I do. 22 MR. HUSAR: Sir, your five minuten are i 23 up. Thank you very much. 24 Mr. Robert O'Connor? i 6 s 25 i MR. O'CONNOR: I don't even know where L {
,m 1 98 2 to start. I am a little discouraged. I came here 3 tonight hoping to hear the evacuation procedures 4 explained. I live close by to the plant. I an 5 discouraged because I don't feel they have been 6 explained at all and I feel I am part of some kindi 7 of charade and I don't want to be that. I don't 8 want to be part of it. 9 I was thinking that we need the rumor 10 control bureau that you talked about, thut operated 7 11 so well for LILCO, because 80 percent of Suffolk } 12 County, who is against the opening of this plant, .t , ',[ 13 are not, I don't think, equally represented here 14 tonight. I think there is a rumor going around 15 that the plant is not going to be opened. I really 16 vish we had the resource of yout-efficient bureau. 17 The other thing is, it seems that I 18 think that the rules do seem to change. You talk 19 about the sirens. And I hear that, okay, over 66 20 percent of them don't work. Then what I hear you 21 say is, you tell me why they don't work and that 22 they are going to be reset. And they were reset 23 an3 subsequently they did work. That doesn't seen 24 to be what a test is all about. A test is either ~ 25 they worked or didn't. Not they didn't and this in
e 1 y t 99 -s 2 why so now we will do it again when no one is 3 around. That seems absurd. Again, what is a test 4 about? 5 The people have talked about the 6 traffic conditions and things being maybe endemic 7 to this area. First of all, I had trouble 8 following--I was hoping for an explanation of what 9 was going on ar.d I had some trouble even following. 10 To use your language--I got here late and I almost [ 11 co 3n't get here to intsrface with you and hear ) 12 about how well the briefings went because of ({ 13 traffic impediments. I almost could not get here. 14 And that is your language. 15 I think that is an outrage. The other 16 thing is, as I said, I don't want to participate in 17 a charade and I came here hoping to hear a lucid is explanation of what an evacuation plan is about, 19 not about free play eventualities and traffic 20 impediments. It doesn't make sense to me. I don't 21 knov what you mean and I question whether you know 22 what you mean. Especially when we are talking 23 about, in your scenario there were 4 accidento and 24 2 suffolk County Police say they are over 40. 25 Sonething there is not coinciding. It is a
I I-s) m 1 100 t ? 'A 2 contradiction end I don't know what you are doing i 3 on paper. It doesn't seem to have been addressed. 4 I just tried to write notes. I don't t t 5 feel too prepared to be able to do this. t - 6 live really close to the plant and I I l 7 t traffic is,so bad on a normal--on a normal day that i 1 l 8 ) I have trouble crossing 25A within 10 to 15 9 minutes, just to cross from north to south, 10 forgetting about getting on it and driving I 1. 11 anyplace. I sit there because there is no traffic k 12 light. So I don't know what area you are l i !r T N. _g' 13 examining. I really--I really don't. I i 14 l My faith is really shaken. I am ( 15 actually embarrassed. I had some faith in what you 16 people were doing and it is totally gone. And j 17 you're looking as it, you know, you kind of don't l l l 14 believe, but I came here, I think, in good spirit. l 19 And that spirit has been lost for me as I have sat t [ 20 through these hearings. i { 21 [ I see rule--changes being made in the I i I t 22 rules when they don't work. I heard, before the a i j 23 I whole Shoreham thing, I heard, in the last seve'ral l 24 j months, how Shoreham was essential to what I would s. 25 call our national insecurity, our people called it I \\ I
1 101 -A 2 our national security. Then I pick up The New York 3 Times saying it is over, the piant is not closing. 4 I hear from the nuclear industry quotes that it 5 doesn ' t mat':ar. It seems like, well, now that the 6 people have spoken up, one of the few times in my 7 lifetime I can remember that people in a local area 8 have stood up and said "no" to the Federal 9 Government, that now it is like, well, but that 10 wasn't important anyway. That seems to me like 11 another changing of the rules. 12 I just want to.say, I think that it is 13 very, very important what the people in this county x s 14 have done, how hard they have worked to get their 15 voices heard. And I hope you hear it and I hope 16 you remember it. 17 MR. HUSARt Thank you very much, sir. 18 Dennis Ruppert? 19 MR. RUPPERTt Thank you very much for 20 hearing us tonight and for this presentation going 21 on here. I would just like to thank everybody for 22 coming down, all those pro and those who are 23 against. I think that those that are against have 24 been nlainformed for many years, whetner you ~ 25 believe it or not. You can sit back and realize
E f e' 1 ~r
- E 102 2
that. I have been a part of the shoreham situation 3 for a good portion of my life, even before I even 4 worked there. 5 Excuse me, young lady. I was quiet 6 while you talked. jPlease be quiet while I talk. 7 I hope you people all enjoy the coal 8 plants and gas plants you have and I hope you enjoy 9 the high rates you will have also if this place 10 doesn't run. 'If it does run, I will be a strong 11 back right against it to work and do what I can to [} 12 work and make it a safety plant. I was part of the (M;, 13 drill, I have been proud of the drills for the last 14 four years or so and I will do anything I can until 15 evacuation plans or the management changes that. I 16 thank you very much--thank you very much for my 17 time. Thank you. 18 MR. HUSAR: Mr. Frank Petrone? 19 MR. PETRONE: Thank you for your 20 hospitality. 21 I was hoping that I would be here 22 tonight and I would be able to speak to various 23 types of audiences, including L1LCO employees, 24 because as in the past, and right now, too, I do i. y 25 give you credit--I have to give you credit for
g O 1 103 d 2 going through with this. 3 There is something that I think we all 4 hoped to accomplish over the last several days, and 5 that was to see that an agreement would be signed. 6 I would have hoped, as someone who took this work 7 very seriously, who doesn't particularly call it a 8 farce, that we would have had some sort of 9 moratorium on the tactics that have been going on 10 over the last soveral months. 11 I don't think LILCO appreciates them. 12 I certainly know that, speaking for Suffolk County, s_ <we (,I 13 we don't appreciate them. I think everyone wants 14 to see a resolution to a major problem, resolution 15 that has split a community in more than half, that 16 has split a community amongst families, that has 17 split a community within their school districts and. 18 that has split a community within even their own 19 homes. 20 We had hoped that this would be 21 resolved before this meeting would be attended. 22 But I have to speak and I hope it is the last timo 23 I have to speak on Shoreham, because I believe that ] 24 if this agreement is forged and that plant closes, -4 25 that everyone, once again, can do the important
a l 1 e 104 2 things that they are supposed to be doing, and that 3 is working together in one community as a team. 4 Yeah, there are brownouts, there are blackouts that 5 are coming. No one is denying that. There 6 certainly are hurricanes. There are all sorts of ~ 7 things we a,re going to face. It is not going to be 8 solved through a LERO plan. It is certainly not 9 going to be solved by a county government alone. 10 I have to speak, though, on some of ~ 11 the points that I spoke on two years ago, because 12 it has been heard and in some cases it hasn't been ( i\\ 13 heard. This LERO plan is not adequate to protect 14 the public. At this point in time, you must 15 realize that the basis for an emergency plan in not i 16 only the coordination of the various elements of 17 that plan, which, number one, is tremendously I 18 lacking--it was alluded to that there was a siren 19 breakdown, or two or three or four. That is the 20 case. We don't have a notification system for this 21 public and we don't know if the backup system truly 22 works. And who cares if it is part of the 23 scenario, because the scenario is only written to 24 deal with things that take place that are planned. 25 That was a beautiful, free-play I
f) 'M., 1 105 'N 2 experience and I certainly hope that FEMA is going 3 to utilize it as a free-play experience to see 4 whether or not there is an adequate notification 5 system. 6 If we look at the plon, tha public 7 hasn't been informed. They don't know what an EPZ 8 is. They have no idea. You may all know, but they t D certainly don't. The public information piece has i 10 never gone out. True, it is perhaps not part of 11 the planning of today to have that done and I am [^) 12 sure that LILco intends It') to have that to the public, 13 i .,4 and I *>ouldn't even take offense in terms of what 14 i type of brochure it would be. But it isn't here. 15 The public is not ready. The public doesn't even I 16 know what is happening other than the controversy i 17 that exists. i \\ 18 Simulation is another issue. We 4 always use simulation in exercises. 19 We do it all 20 the time in fire drills in schools. But we 21 simulate the decision makers. We want to know who 22 mskes those decisions. This exercise could have r 23 been table-topped out of Washington, D.C., where O 24 the County Executive resides, because basically i i si 25 that is what happened. True, there wasn't the
AU 1 'e 106 -s 2 participation. The governments refused, 3 Connecticut has refused, Westchester has refused, 4 the Red Cross has refused. Many entities refused 5 to play. But what are we evaluating? How could 6 someone else can make a decision for the people who t 7 are truly going to have to make the decision if 8 there is truly an emergency? 9 This is pre-Three-Mile Island. Even 10 at Three Mile Island, governments attempted to make- [ 11 decisions. What we are facing ourselves with now ) 12 is something that is exceptionally incomplete and (' 13 assumptions that have been made, whether you call 14 them through rule changes or not, the assumptions 15 are still made that the government would follow the 16 LILCO plan. And that is not true. The governments 17 have said they would not. 18 My main message and what I would like 19 to really conclude on, is the fact that any 20 exercise that takes place--and I took this program 21 very seriously and I worked my butt off at Indian 22 Point to make sure it worked. I took it extremely 23 seriously. O But what we evaluated was preparedness. 24 We never evaluated based on assumption. There was 4 25 never an assumption made in any power plant that I
O 1 wr N' 107 2 could recall. And if there wasn't participation, 3 it was dealt with head on. And if it meant going 4 back and if it meant not doing it, it wasn't done. 5 But the problem we face here today is 6 that we are trying to create something that ~ isn't. 7 I am not even saying that we are going to point i 8 fingers at anyone. But there is not a level of 9 preparedness in this county. If somethir.g happened 10 at Shoreham and everyone's good intentions wara 11 there, God help us because there is no level f of 12 preparedness that, number one, you can measure, no ) 13 less count on. 14 Thank you very much. 15 MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much. Maria Branco? i 16 17 MS. BRANCO: Hl. Maria Branco. I 18 I work at the nuclear power station. I dedicated 13 19 years of my professional career to it. I married i 20 into a family which started in this town as a 21 matter of fact, 200 years ago, James Rourke, 22 shipwrecked off the shores of Fire t Island and was 23 brought to this town with his children by the t 24 cooperation of ss' local residents who were prepared ( 25 these sorts of energencies in those days. I It ]
sU N-1 108 'd 2 was a local activity, not Suffolk County, not'the 3 town. The people. 4 4 What people? And I am very proud of 5 my colleagues. We are here, most of us are not 9 6 LERO. Most of us are Shoreham employees. We are 7 dedicated.' It is not the salary. Believe me. We 8 are doing it because we want to and we belle've in 9 this form of energy. I live downwind from the 10 Northport power station. I am not criticizing 11 LILCO, of course, but I would rather have Shoreham 12 .t because I know Shoreham. And I don't know )\\ 13 fossil-fueled plants all that well. I am afraid of 14 them, it is true, and so are r.y fellow residents in 15 the back. FEMA, NRC. We are working. We are I 16 working hard. We want this plant. My neighbors 17 now want this plant because I have talke.d to them 18 for all these years. 19 I have educated people and I believe 1 20 have done that in good faith. I have tried to 21 educate many more. Some of them won't listen. 22 There has been misinformation. One of my i I 23 colleagues got up and spoke. There is 24 misinformation. We want to stop that. I want to ~ 25 stop the fear also. I don't know how to do it. I
A 1 109 'Y-2 would like cooperation. 3 Mr. Petrone pointed to a very good 4 point. Maybe he is right from the point of view of 5 Suffolk-wide, the whole county. It is true we are 6 not coordinated. Here we are, LERO, LILCO. Where 7 is suffolk' county? Where is the Governor? We 8 really have to give the incentive to the 9 governments to play with us, to plan with us and 10 eventually, if anything happens, to work with us. 11 200 years ago it worked for James Rourke. We are 12 still here. My husband is around. Lots of .k M g 13 children everywhere. I have two. It can work on 4 14 this island again. It can work because of the 15 people here and because this government will still 16 believe in us when we operate. 17 Thank you. 18 MR. HUSAR: Mr. Hanns Streuli? 19 MR. STREULI: There is a tendency to 20 discredit opponents of the Shoreham Plant. We are 21 misinformed. Ten years ago I was 100 percent for 4 22 Shoreham. I am 100 percent against it now and I
O hate being a shoreham opponent.
I hate having to 23 24 come out here and speak up in this way. The only 25 reason I do this is because I am convinced that l
1 110 ' A-2 LILCO and FEMA are not doing their job in this 3 respect. 4 There is not enough concern for the 5 safety of people. There is not enough corevern for 6 a whole range of other things. I have a personal 7 file at home which would allow me to, in a 8 shortcut, 'give you a half hour presentation 'with S all kinds of information from United Nations 10 findings to anything else. And I do that because 11 it seems to me that the stations, the authorities 12 who should be in charge of that, are not doing Ik / 13 this. We are not all an articulate group but some 14 of us are very well read. It is not that we lack 15 the information. 16 I joined when I heard that a 17 45-year-old woman was arrested, and I called her up. 18 when her address was in the newspaper end I asked 19 her, "How could you do a stupid thing like this at 20 your age?" And I spent about an hour with the lady 21 and in the course of that I was given titles of 22 several books and after I had read those, studied 23 them, I all of a sudden realized that a lot of 24 vital information is kept from ti.a public. If you c 25 people would all know better you would probably be ~... --
O U 1 111 'A 2 opponents, too. 3 Tonight I am faced with a charade. 4 What is going on here is other than I expected. I 5 thought FEMA would be more open to the concerns of 6 everybody. It reminds me of an eagle scodt 7 project. It is quite cute and everybody really 8 feels they have to applaud what is going on'but it i 9 has nothing whatsoever to do with reality. j 10 I am teaching on J.ong Island--can you 11 people imagine that in my school district, in my [) 12 building, we would hold a fire drill during a light \\ } 13 drill and because the principa1 decides because it _s 14 is kind of a bit cool we are just deciding 15 precisely how everything has to be done. You watch 16 carefully and so on. But since people will catch j l 17 pneumonia we are going to stay in our classrooms. I L 18 There has never been such a thing as t 19 long as I have been teaching. Every single kid, 'I 20 whether in the bathroom or at the nurse, is getting 21 on the outside. We don't even care what the 22 principal is doing and all kinds of administrators. i 10 23 It is the people, the kids who are going out there 'I 24 who we want to watch because if there is just one 1 -w 25 someone going in the wrong direction, everything
l fm (-) 1 wr 112 2 gets messed up and this thing is not safe. We check how long does it take until everybody is out, 4 et cetera. If you don't do this with that drill, 5 the drill is really worthless. 6 I am surprised that nobody brought up 7 those failing sirens. It struck me as being very 8 strange. I'm sorry. Wnen the drill was described 9 as being so successful--maybe I have a hearing loss 10 but I didn't hear anything about the sirens. When 11 somebody brought it up among che opponents, it was a (s_, 12 played down as if it was really unimportant and -q \\ ,,i 13 wasn't even necessary that they were part of it. 14 In my opinion it is a crucial thing. It is just 15 symptomatic of the failure of the drill that halt 16 of the sirens did not work, period, regardless of 17 how you explain it away. 18 In my opinion, FEMA has the job to 19 evaluate the drill properly. I say I have a 20 hearing loss. When I came first, then I thought 21 the moderator was a high official of LILCO because 22 he described that drill and what happened as if it 23 were his own personal project. I wish that this 's 24 would change and that you people pay attention to M 25 what the concerns of all the people in Long Island
s-, i 113 'A 2 are because I don't see that here. I am very 3 scared about the fact that this whole project is 4 just going to be railroaded through. I hope that 5 you people will give the opponents' verston some 6 thought and you evaluate that drill in a proper way t 7 so that we are ne'. f aced with the fact that we get impression's that FEMA is just an arm of the' Nuclear 8 1 9 Regulatory Commission and trying to get that plant 10 licensed as soon as possible. 11 Thank you. 12 MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much. vv {, 13 For those of you who may not have had 14 an opportunity or chose not to till out the sheet, 15 what I thought we would do is to see if anybody who 16 has not spoken as of this time has any comments or 17 questions to make, statements to make or questions 18 to ask, so that those thoughts, those comments, t 19 those questions could be memorialized in this 20 transcript. 21 Yes, sir? 22 MR. McCOMB I turned in a sheet. I 23 am ready to talk. Arthur McComo. 4 24 MR. HUSAR: Yes, sir. s l -~ 25 MR. McCOMB: Did you find it? i t ,. ~ n_. - _ - -. - _,
/~%l., 1 114 -s 2 MR. HUSAR: Go right ahead, sir. 3 MR. McCOMBr Arthur McComb, Lake 4 Ronkonkoma. And la years ago, more than 18 years 5 ago, I started attending all of the hearings that 6 ellowed the public to speak and I spoke whenever I 7 was allowed to. I started out by representing an 8 organization in my community and an organi ation of 9 clubs, a chairman in both cases. x 10 Now, in view of the fact that LILCO 7 11 has unanimously voted to sell Shoreham for a 12 dollar, this is all moot. However, I want to read ,,( 13 soroething to memorialize into the record, as you 14 mentioned, Mr. Chairman. 15 A bumper sticker I saw, "If you don't 16 like the way I drive, stay off the sidewalk," could 17 have been said by LILCO and NRC as they usurped 18 local government to license Shoreham's fission i 19 nuclear plant. Lest we forget, nothing has changed 20 the horror of a fission nuclear accident. Just one 21 meltdown, just one core coolant failure and we face 22 gamma ray death, sudden and painful and the rest i 23 live on impregneted with radiation damage for (), 24 future cancers forever, for structures and real .4 25 estate to be excluded from loss benefits bring l l [
O 1 s, 'N 115 2 dollar-wise insurance companies. Assets will face 3 wipeout by the radiation plume. 4 Incidentally, I at this point, I pu: 5 out a book which listed all my steps for 18 years, 6 in the letters and so forth, 1 and put it together in 7 a book, "piume is doom." 8 Bad weather adds to ugly consequences. 9 Land, highways and structures are made indefinitely 10 unusable. Devastation would reign. Chernobyl was [ 11 our latest warning. We still have r o safe disposal I) 12 of dangerous radioactive waste matter. ( 3 13 .,4 NRC is promotional, not regulatory, 14 and always has been, like its predecessor, the 15 Atomic Energy Commission. Promotion was so blatant 16 that by 1975 the name was changed. But that is all 1 17 that changed. NRC and Feds and LILCO conspire to 11 18 block local constitutional responsibility as to i 2 19 health, safety and general welfare from known i 20 fission N-plant flaws. 21 How much more nonsense and vicious 22 attack can we the public take? How much more prime 23 time TV can we vi t eh overflowing with wonders of ) 24 the golden parachute clique paid for by rate 4 25 payers? How many presidential lies, as in Reagan
, s-1 116 s 2 and Hodell campaign letters promising never to open 3 Shoreham over local opposition, to elect Carny 4 congressman from the Shoreham area can we stomach? 5 Surely we were suckered to foot the bill. 6 LILCO, NRC, Feds-prompted, has cost us l 7 locally millions in legal defense which continues 8 ad infinitum. When to stop it? 9 Government of people started at the 10 Magna Carta. Must we corner King John again at [ 11 Runnymede? 18 years of force feeding us, the ) 12 public is overdue for regurgitation. ( 13 Have you looked at your useless homo 14 insurance policy lately? N-pl' ant ac;ident damage 15 is excluded from coverage. Will Newsday ever turn 16 180 degrees in editorial policy r.nd blast the 17 goldea parachutists? It is everdue. 18 The 12/7 1970 editorial headed "What's 19 the hurry," says LILCO Legan construction before 20 the end of the hearings, that AEC radiation 21 standards are high enough to cause cancer, that 22 they are more concerned with promotion than safety 23 and that it is both promoter and licensor. Today 24 much documentation still supports Newsday. - 4. 25 Newsday's 6/6/88, page 3, says, "Half a million is
1 .n I Y l 1 i 117 2 to go on an evacuation exercise and FEMA to spend l 3 an unknown amount and we know the public will pay. t 4 We always do." t l l 5 Thank you for your time, gentlemen. i 6 At least we got a chance to air it. k \\ 7 { MR. HUSAR: Thank you, sir. t 4 Is there anyone at this time who would 9 like to make a statement or comment? 10 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I gave my 5-11 paper to some LILCO employee who said he'd bring it 12 1 up there and obviously he didn't. { (' 13 I don't want to Urlticize LILCO ~. l 14 employees because I think that they have done an i 15 excellent job in providing power for Long Island i 4 16 over the years. I do criticize and I think many 17 people are directing their anger at th a management i 18 of LILCO in pushing their business-with-blinders l 19 attitude and pushing Shoreham. I think a lot of { 20 people who are against Shoreham are not I 1 6 21 specifically against the LILCO employees, who are ( 22 our neighbors. t 23 Getting a little bit--get back to the i 24 evacuation planning system that we have here, I L 25 don't know if FEMA is aware of what is going on.
/% LJ 1 d 118 2 This came out of Long Island business about two 3 years ago, comparing the road situation here on 4 Long Island with other areas of New York State. A 5 number of road miles per square mile, New York 6 State, excluding Long Island, has 2.1. Long Island 7 has about 6.7. In the vehicle registrations per 8 square mile, New York State, excluding Long' Island, 9 has 148. Long Island has 1,215. 10 Vehicle registrations per road mile, 11 New York State has 70. Long Island has 181. (' I{ S ) 12 We are talking about Westchester, 13 talking about the Indian point area. Westchester 14 has a population of 1.9 million. Long Island has 15 2.6. But Westchester has 18 percent more road 16 miles, 2,385 extra miles and more than 2.5 times 17 the area of Long Island. Long Island has more than 18 twice the road miles per square mile, 66 percent 19 more vehicle registrations per mile of road and 267 20 percent more vehicle registrations per square mile. 21 You add these factors and you also add 22 these two major truck accidents which have rx 23 happened, one after the 1986 drill where a tire \\ 24 blew out on a mayonnaise truck and caused the 25 backup of about 10 miles for five hours; also, one
l l 1 i 119
sk 2
this year where a driver had e sneezing fit, 3 overturned and caused another 10-mile backup. 4 I t hink things like that is what TEMA 5 should be looking at. The reality. This is 6 realism. 7 Thank you. 8 MR. HUSAR: Thank you very much. 9 12 Is there anyone else here who would 10 like to ask a question, make a comment, make a ~~ 11 statement? ) 12 If not--yes, sir? 13 4 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I'm sorry. 14 My English is not too good. I came from Taiwan. I 15 have been working for Atomic Power Company for 17 16 years, half of the 17 years in a nuclear power 17 station. Fron the first year up to now, already 15 18 years. 19 I wanted to say I think first every 20 private money--every company's money, a part of the 21 country, we sort of think $5 billion is also the 1 22 whole country's money, you know. We cannot vaste 2: $5 billion. We still need $1 billion to the 24 conmissioner and it is too wasteful. Everybody sl 25 knows today our United States country, the economy
s 1 ( 120 i N 2 is going down. If we are so wasteful, you know, 3 one by--one of these planes got--the whole economy 4 'will be shaken down even more. Today our 5 (unintelligible). We can't waste so much monny. 6 Actually, nuclear power station is not 7 so dangerous as you might think. Take French, for a instance. Do you know how much power it is' 9 generated from nuclear power stations in French? 10 More than 60 percent. In Japan, 32 percent. In 11 Taiwan, 33 percent. I am from Taiwan. 12 Wa never experienced any accident. It 13 is very safe. 14 I'm sorry. I have a lot to say but my 15 English is not too good. It is making me nervous. 16 Thank you for your encouragement. 17 I wanted to say, there are so many 18 redundant water systems. First I talk to the 19 Chernobyl accident. I mean--sorry. 20 The type of reactor involved in the 21 Soviet Union Chernobyl accident is entirely 22 different design from U.S. commercial reactor. In 23 lots of important safety features bJilt into U.S. 24 plant. d Additionally, society institutional and 25 management approach it in the Soviet Union are
i 1 ~ 121 s 2 quite different than in the United States. Does 3 anybody know what is the difference between our 4 commercial nuclear power plant and the difference 5 between these two? Anybody know? I want to tell 6 you. 7 There are five major differences, a First, they don't have containment. They don't 9 have a primary containment. Our U.S. plant have a 10 shield, primary containment. Second, reactor 11 stability. U.S. plant chain reaction eensen when 12 cooling water is lost. That mean we have a i 13 negative void of coefficiency. It is fail-safe, 14 not like Chernobyl. It fails dangerously because 15 the chain renetion speeded up when cooling water is 16 lost. 17 The third reason, reactor control. 18 our control only takes two seconds to three seconds 19 to get--but Russian Chernobyl takes 20 seconds to 20 get(unintelligible) 21 rnur, the automatic safety, U.S. 22 operators cannot--our operators cannot disarm the 23 automatic safety system which are shutting down the 24 reactor. Soviet Union's reactor could disarm - 4. 25 automatic safety system while the reactor still was i
t 1 122 2 running. 3 Number five, you know the moderator, 4 ve use water. We use graphite as a primary 5 moderator. Graphite is combustible. It can catch 6 on fire but water cannot catch on fire, so you 7 don't have,to worry about this kind of accident a like at chernobyl. 9 You vorry too much. There are so many 10 redundant systems of water in the reactor. 11 i The emergency response drill is just [) 12 man-made. I mean, Congress made a procedure before > + <J 13 we can get a license. It is not a necessary from 14 my point of view. I have so many years experience. 15 I am sure I know. There is no accident that could ) 16 happen. You know, how many reasons can cause a 17 reactor shutdown? 17 of them. Any kind of high 18 pressure, high-- 19 MR. HUSAR: Sir, I'm sorry. The 20 allotted time is about up. Could you conclude your 21 remarks? Certainly we would like to give 22 opportunity to others who may have remarks to make 23 them at this time. ,O 24 SPEAKER: I think--I got to say 25 something, you know, something more. ~r~~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~~
I l l 1 123 N 2 I want tell you-~ 3 SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: I don't want 4 to hear it. 13 5 SPLAKER: Because you don't know. How 6 can you fight anything you don't know about it? I 7 MR. HUSAR: Sir? 8 SPEAXER: When I said that you' t i 9 might--I get no radiation, no 10 radiation--(unintelligible) 11 MR. HUSAR Sir, I'm sorry. We are 6 12 going to have to cut you off. You have exceeded '~,i 13 your allotted time. Thank yov very much, sir. 14 MR. JACOBY: I am Oceg Jacoby. I do 15 work for the LERO organization. I guess you back 16 there are going to hear a few things. I heard l i 17 people coming up here and talking to me about i 18 thousands of people instantaneously dying. I would i 19 like to have a reference on that. I would like to L 20 have reading material on that. I will read this l i 21 material. Just as you said you have read this i t = 22 material. I also will read this material and make 23 my own lecision for myself that these thousands of l ( J., h 24 people have died. 25 As far as Chernobyl is concerned, 31 cgrJpttTro M nr>m ^
s' 1 I h, 1 124 -d 2 people known record have died. You are also L 3 comparing reactors that have nothing to do with our i 4 reactor. You are comparing apples to oranges. At ( 5 the very same point, at the very same point--hold e i 6 on a second. t 7 SPEAKER TROM THE FLOOR: You do your s homework- 9 MR. JACOBY: I have. I have operated I 1 10 i operators the past 12 years. I know about it. You l 11 t never stepped near a building. t 12 l ( As mest of the people here can see, l 13 ,j some people that are against nuclear power do ask i 14 questions and are not willing to listen to the { 15 answers to their own questions, let alone finding 16 out 'or real what the real story is, they make accusations that cannot even be based up by fact. i 17 la They are not even listening to their own answers to { 19 their own questions. 20 l SPEAKER TROM THE FLOOR: I am willing ( 21 to listen. 22 MR. JACOBY: You were not even 23 listening to me speaking now. You are ( 24 interrupting. I 25 SPEAKER TROM THE FLOOR: You are i enw Dittr o ainen ent.sean'a-'a" ^ ' ^ - - ' - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~1
6 1 125 d 2 berating me personally. 3 l MR. JACOBY I feel the same way. 4 There are people in the room--I am also a Long 5 Island citizen and I also pay taxes and my taxes 6 are also going to this here drill and they are also 7 going to other useless things, as far as you are 4 concerned.' But as far as I am concerned, this is l 9 not a useless thing. 10 This is--what we have here is we have 11 people that are willing to prove that an emergency l-I 12 plan does work and in fact it does work. In fact, 13 it does work. The material will be common 14 k'nefladtt. You will be able to educate yourself on
15 the go2ngs'on of'the drill yourself on your own 16 tihe, readirg it in the library.
This would be 17 common ',nowledge. You should take this time to get 6 18 an education and find out, without just making 19 conjecture and talking about thousands of people 20 died without any basis in fact, I would like you to 21 educate yourself and then make a decision on 22 whether you like it. 23 Thank you very much. 24 MR. HUSAR: Thank you, sir. 25 We have about five more minutes that
l ( _ /, 1 126 -A 2 we have allotted for this particular public 3 neeting. Anyone else that would like to ask a 4 question or make a comment? 5 MR. HADDON: My name is Mark Haddon. 6 I also work at the Shoreham Plant. I have a 7 question for the NRC member. I haven't heard too 8 much from fou tonight. 9 What I would like to know is, sir, if 10 you have that FEMA report in front of you right now 11 and everything on it was positive and Mr.
Leonard,
,/ 12 w,) If the NRC were to hand you a 25 percent or a full ,j 13 power license right now, first of all, how long 14 would it take, with that favorable report in front 15 of the NRC, to issue either license, 25 percent or 16 100 percent--just an esti. mate is all I am asking 17 for. And Mr Leonard, will Shoreham ever operate 12 right now, if you do have license in front of you. 19 in your opinion, sir? 20 MR. BELLAMY : Let me try first. It is 21 unusually difficult to try to core up with an i 22 estimate of whet you asked for. We are under no 23 timetable whatsoever to issue a license to the r 24 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. There will be no 25 HRC decision made until we receive the FEMA report,
1 127 s-' 2 as Mr. Husar has indicated, until we digest all 3 that information in the report, until we can make a 4 reasonable assurance finding as I discussed earlier 14 5 and then we make a recommendation to the five NRC 6 commissioners in Washington, D.C. as to whether we 7 think, we at the staff level, think a license 8 should be issued to that plant, to this plant. 9 The decision as to whether Shoreham 10 would get an operating license, whether that be 25 11 percent or 100 percent, will be made by 1 hose five 12 commissioners in Washington, D.C. I cannot speak I -) 13 for when such a decision might be made. 14 MR. LEONARD: I will attempt to answer 15 the second part of the question. Rather than give 16 you my opinion, I would like to give you the facts 17 and restate something the chairman of the board 18 said. I assume you were at one of his meetings at 19 Shoreham. 20 He has stated and he has been 21 consistent throughout the last six months that this 22 company is on three tracks. One is we are going to 23 actively pursue the licensing of Shoreham. Two, we ("} 24 are going to negotiate with the State. Three, we L l 25 are going to deal with the offers that the Long i 1 (*O M Dff T r p &Tnrn t o g s t e r. n, n.,......
O 1 128 2 Island Power Authority makes. He has done that, he 3 has been consistent. 4 Now, we are right now actively engaged 5 in licensing the plant. That is why we had the 6 emergency preparedness exercise. That is why we 7 are going forward with other things, the hearings. 8 We are doing that because part of the negotiation 9 agrees that we will continue to actively license 10 the plant. I am not an attorney and I am giving it 11 to you in layman's--the way I interpret things. 12 We he.ve agreed that we will sell the 'I 13 state of New York the Shoreham Nuclear Power 14 Station for one dollar and they can do anything 15 they want with it. They can demolish it, they can 16 mothball it, anything they want to do with it. 17 How, those negotiations, however, depend on a lot 18 of things. After they are signed by LILeo and the 19 State of New York, there are a lot of other 20 signatures that have to occur. For instance, there 21 are a lot of provisos that have to come to pass, 22 such as the company must be granted an investment 23 rating, investment grade rating. I am not a 24 financier, either. .. i But that means that such things 25 as somehow, some settlement has to be arrived at in
i i i r i 1 129 -+ 2 .the Suffolk County RICO suit because we don't f think j 3 that with that big a cloud hanging over the i 4 company, that that car. be granted the company. ( 5 The Governor apparently--and I say I i + 6 apparently because I am not privy to what the 7 Governor says officially. I just read things in i ) a the newspaper as you do. He wants the State ( 9 Legislature to fully ratify--the State Assembly and 10 Senate to fully ratify this negotiated agreement. i L 11 Whether that comes to pass, I honestly can't tell 6 12 you. '5 13 j, So, we don't knew how these things are l 14 going to turn out. We are going to do all these i 15 three things in good faith. If we got a license 16 during the negotiations, we would not operate the i 17 plant because that would be bad faith. But it we { 18 get a license and the negotiations unravel, we t 19 will, of course, operate the plant. I 20 MR. HUSAR: The time is now 10:00 p.m. 21 We are reaching the end of the allotted time as 22 noticed in the papers for this public meeting. We f 23 will entertain one more comment or question. 24 2 SPEAKER TROM THE FLOOR: Hello. I do 25 have a couple of concerns I would like addressed. 8 1
o O i g 130 '9 2 I do work at Shoreham. I do work for LILCo. I do 3 live within the 10-mile zone. I have a wife and 4 two children. My concern is not with LILCO or with 5 Shoreham. My concern is with both suffolk county 8 6 and New York State. I would like them to address, 7 A, how they intend to evacuate me and my family in a the event of an accident in Millstone, which I am 9 within the 50-mile zone. Two, I would like to know 10 from both New York State, who--their absence on 11 this board--and Suffolk County on this board is 12 k.) evident--how they will effectively answer how they ,,q. 13 participated by employing the National Guard to 14 evacuate people at the Indian Point plant when they 15 will not participate in evacuating LILCo's shoreham 16 facility? 17 Thank you. 18 MR. HUSAR: We have come to the end of 19 this public meeting proceeding. Thank you very s 20 much for your participation. 21 (Time noted: 10:05 p.m.) 22 24 25
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i 1 131 -s 2 CERTIFICATE 3 4 5 I, DEBRA STEVENS, a short. 3d reporter 6 and notary public within and for the State of New 7 York, do hereby certify that I reported the a proceeding's of the TEMA Public Meeting on June 15, 9 1984, and that this is an accurate tlanscription of 10 what transpired at that time and place. 11 12 i fn > YJw a s - e ( 13 Debra Stevens, 14 shorthand Reporter 15 16 17 18 i 19 20 21 22 23 COMPUTER Af Drn ten'ser N=- -}}

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