ML20092B987

Proposed Improved Tech Specs

ML20092B987
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	08/28/1995
From:	PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20092B941	List: ML20092B936 ML20092B987
References
NUDOCS 9509120201
Download: ML20092B987 (42)

Text

._

PC1Vs 3.6.1.3 i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.3 ------------------NOTE-------------------

Not required to be met when the 6 inch or 18 inch primary containment purge and 18 s inch primary containment exhaust valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

Verify each 6 inch and 18 inch primary 31 days containment purge valve and each 18 inch primary containment exhaust valve is closed.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 ------------------NOTES------------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

3. Not required to be performed for test taps with a diameter s 1 inch.

Verify each primary containment isolation 31 days manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

1 (continued) i t

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.6-13 Amendment No. 210 9509120201 950828 PDR ADDCK 05000277 P_ . _ . . PDR

- - - - - - - ./

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.4.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for PCIVs outside primary containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added '

assurance that the PCIVs are in the correct positions.

Three Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls.

Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. A third Note states that performance of the SR is not required for test taps with a diameter s 1 inch. It is the intent that  !

this SR must still be met, but actual performance is not '

required for test taps with a diameter s I inch. The Note 3 .

allowance is consistent with the original plant licensing )

basis, j (continued) 1 l

i l

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-25 Revision No. 0

/

I PCIVs B 3.6.1.3  ;

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5  ;

REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that '

post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as " prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are  :

open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.6 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, '

must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.6.1.3.7 i

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual valve in the i SGIG System required flow paths provides assurance that the i proper flow paths exist for system operation. This SR does  !

not apply to valves that are locked or otherwise secured in (continuen PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-26 Revision No. 0 l

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ,

5 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking or securing. This SR does i not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it 4

involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not

' apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The 31 day Frequency is based on .

engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct i valve positions. ,

I SR 3.6.1.3,8 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate j

OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.9.

The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

i SR 3.6.1.3.9 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the

, specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

l The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.10 d

Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM i (continued) i PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.6-27 Revision No. O

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS f FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.1 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a unit outage since .

isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt the normal operation of many critical  !

components. Operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability  :

standpoint. &

SR 3.6.1.3.11 This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to the isolation position on a simulated instrument line break signal. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform so that predicted radiological consequences will not be exceeded during a postulated instrument line break event. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power for some of the EFCVs, operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when  ;

required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.6).

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-28 Revision No

1 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.3 ------------------NOTE-------------------

Not required to be met when the 6 inch or 18 inch primary containment purge and 18 inch primary containment exhaust valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

Verify each 6 inch and 18 inch primary 31 days containment purge valve and each 18 inch primary containment exhaust valve is closed.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 ------------------NOTES------------------ ,

1. Valves and blind flanges in high l radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that i are open under administrative l I

controls.

3. Not required to be performed for test taps with a diameter s 1 inch.

Verify each primary containment isolation 31 days manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

(continued) l PBAPS UNIT 3 3.6-13 Amendment No. 214 I

' PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES t

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

' valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.4.

' SR 3.6.1.3.4 i

This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

' Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for PCIVs outside primary containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the PCIVs are in the correct positions.

Three Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation

areas to be verified by use of administrative controls.

Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the J

probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have i been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are 4 open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. A third Note states that performance of the SR is not required for test taps with a diameter s 1 inch. It is the intent that this SR must still be met, but actual performance is not required for test taps with a diameter s 1 inch. The Note 3 allowance is consistent with the original plant licensing I basis.

(continued) l l

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.6-25 Revision No. 0 1

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES

SURVEILLANCE SF 3.6.1.3.5

. REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that i

post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside I the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as " prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the

' probability of their misalignment is low.

1 J Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and i access to these areas is typically restricted during a MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have

been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are j open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.6 4

The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on i operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR ' 3.6.1.3.7 Verifying the correct alignment for each manual valve in the SGIG System required flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked or otherwise secured in (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.6-26 Revision No. 0

1 i

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

~

BASES 4  ;

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS position, since these valves were verified to be in the

correct position prior to locking or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it ,

involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not  ;

apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned,

' such as check valves. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural '

controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

3.6.1.3.8 SR ,

Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each i automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate ,

! OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closu e isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.I.3.9.

1 The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate

! in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the l

safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this

" SR are in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

[

SR 3.6.1.3.9 t

l Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrats OPERABILITY.

The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV wil' isolate

! in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in

' the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within j 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

1 i

SR 3.6.1.3.10 i Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation

signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position i

on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM (continued) i PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.6-27 Revision No. 0 4

. - l PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.1 overlaps this SR to provide ,

i complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a unit outage since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow ,

i and disrupt the normal operation of many critical i components. Operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass this Surveillance when ,

performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the l

Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability i standpoint.

1 SR 3.6.1.3.11 4

This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is

); OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to the isolation position on a simulated instrument line break signal. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform so that predicted radiological I 4 consequences will not be exceeded during a postulated

. instrument line break event. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power for some of the EFCVs, operating experience has shown that these components will 3

j usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the i 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded i to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

4 i

j j

SR 3.6.1.3.12

' The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.6).

(continued) l PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.6-28 Revision No. O i

i r-- r *w +-w-ear

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.6.1.3: PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVs)

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued)

M4 Proposed Action F is a new Specification which was added in the event any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in Modes 4 and 5. The plant must be placed in a condition in In this case, suspension of which the LC0 does not apply.

operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs) is required to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential fission product release.

Suspending an OPDRV may result in closing the RHR SDC isolation valves. Therefore, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve (s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve. This is a new requirement and as such is an additional restriction on plant operation.

M3 An Action is proposed to be added for one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for MSIV leakage not within limit. This Action will require the penetration to be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If not isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> then a shutdown should commence and the plant is required to If this be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Technical condition would presently exist, the current Specifications (3.7.A.3) require that the primary containment be declared inoperable and allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore it or the plant is required to be in Hot Shutdown (MODE 3) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The current Technical Specifications would allow 23 more hours than the proposed Technical Specifications to restore primary containment. This proposed change represents a more restrictive change and is consistent with NUREG-1433.

Requirements were added. These M6 Eight Surveillance (SRs) surveillances will:

• Verify SGIG System header pressure; e Verify 6 inch and 18 inch primary containment purge valves and 18 inch primary containment exhaust valves are closed and blocked to restrict opening to less than or equal to the required maximum opening angle; PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 10 Revision 0 e

_ _ ._ _.__.__. _ . - . _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES .

ITS 3.6.1.3: PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVs)

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE ,

M

• Verify PCIV manual valves and blind flanges that are located outside and inside primary containment and are required to be i (6 cont'd) closed are closed. (For PCIVs outside primary containment, a note has been provided that exempts test taps with a diameter ,

s 1 inch from the verification. The provision of this note is  !

consistent with the PBAPS current licensing basis. It is i still the intent that the SR must be met, but actual performance is not required. The test taps covered by this .

note consist of at least one valve and a cap such that sufficient redundancy exists to maintain primary containment OPERABILITY in the event of a mispositioned valve or missing cap. Additionally, the occurrence of test tap valve misalignments has been rare at PBAPS.), 1 e Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge, and remove and test them; and

• Verify SGIG lineup.

These SRs provide the means of ensuring the PCIVs are Operable and able to perform their safety function which is to provide primary Surveillance containment isolation. The addition of new Requirements constitutes a more restrictive change.

M7 An Action is proposed to be added when one or more penetration flow ,

paths with one PCIV inoperable for penetration flow paths with only '

one PCIV. This action would require the penetration to be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or the plant should be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. If this condition would presently exist, the current Technical Specifications (3.7.A.3) require that the primary containment be declared inoperable and allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore it or the plant is required to be in Hot Shutdown (MODE 3)

The current within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Technical Specifications would allow 20 more hours than the proposed Technical Specifications to restore primary containment. This  ;

proposed change represents a more restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

Ma This change proposes to add Actions to verify the penetrations which were isolated remain isolated every 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment and prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days, for isolation devices inside primary containment. The 31 days is reasonable because the valves 11 Revision 0 PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 t

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.6.1.3: PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVs)

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M are operated under administrative controls and the probability of (3 cont'd) their misalignment is low. The frequency for valves inside l containment is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the valves and other administrative controls ensuring that valve misalignment is an unlikely possibility. These Actions are modified  !

by a note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

M, This change adds details on isolating instrument line penetrations with excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and purge and exhaust isolation valves. This change will require that the penetrations be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve cr blind flange. This requirement adds details to an Action which constitute a more restrictive change.

This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

Mw This change adds acceptance criteria to the Surveillance Requirement which requires an Operability test of the instrument line EFCVs.

The acceptance criteria added requires that the EFCVs actuate to the isolation position on a simulated instrument line break signal. The addition of acceptance criteria which did not previously exist in Technical Specifications to a Surveillance Requirement constitutes a more restrictive change.

The note which specifies that isolation valves closed to comply with Mu the Actions may be opened under administrative controls was revised i

to make an exception to primary containment purge and exhaust

' isolation valves. In this case, the valves should not be allowed to ,

be opened because of the gross breach of containment situation which could exist.

Mu The frequency for performing the closure time testing for power operated and automatically initiated valves is being changed from "at least once per operating cycle" to "In accordance with the IST Program." Since the current IST Program requires testing of some PCIVs every quarter, this change is more restrictive.

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 12 Revision 0

- . . _ l

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.6.1.3: PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVs)

TECHNICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS R3 The list of the PCIVs will be relocated to a licensee controlled ,

document. This is consistent with the guidanti . ovided for PCIVs l I

in Generic Letter 91-08 and consistent with NUREG-1433. Any changes to these tables will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

R2 Not used.

R3 The requirement, specifying the PCIVs be demonstrated Operable prior to being returned to service after maintenance on or replacement of j the valve, actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a l cycling test, and verification of isolation time, will be relocated to post maintenance procedures. Any time the Operability of a '

system or component has been affected by the repair, maintenance, or replacement, post maintenance testing is required to demonstrate Operability of the system or components. Explicit post maintenance Surveillance Testing has therefore been deleted from the Technical Specifications and will be relocated to the appropriate licensee  !

controlled document (e.g., a general statement in the maintenance control procedure). This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

R4 Not used.

R3 The details of the surveillance specifying that all normally open q power operated isolation valves (except for the MSIVs) shall be )

fully closed and reopened will be relocated to the plant procedures implementing the requirements of the IST program. Any changes to this requirement will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

R6 The current requirement for power to be < 75% to perform MSIV isolation time testing will be relocated to the plant procedures implementing the requirements of the IST program for MSIV stroke timing. Any changes to this requirement will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

R7 The requirement to exercise the main steam line power-operated isolation valves by partial closure and subsequent opening will be relocated to the I;T program and the procedures implementing the IST program. Any changes to this requirement will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

Ra The requirement specifying the LLRT for the large containment ventilation isolation valves be compared to the previously measured leak rate to detect excessive valve degradation will be relocated to PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 13 Revision 0 l

l l

N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 3.6--CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (M , M , M3 , M4 , M w 32 Labeled Comments / Discussions for 3 I/S 3.6.1.3) s, 6M ,7 M s, M , M,, 33 M , M , and M M operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs)

(4 cont'd) is required to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential fission product release. Suspending an OPDRV Therefore, an may result in closing the RHR SDC isolation valves.

alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve (s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR

' to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve. This is a new requirement and as such is an additional restriction on plant operation.

Ms An Action is proposed to be added for one or more penetration flow

' paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for MSIV leakage not within

- limit. This Action will require the penetration to be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed i

J manual valve, or blind flange within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If not isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> then a shutdown should commence and the plant is required to If this be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 withincurrent 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Technical the i condition would presently exist, Specifications (3.7.A.3) require that the primary containment be declared inoperable and allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore it or the plant is required to be in Hot Shutdown (MODE 3) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The current Technical Specifications l

8 would allow 23 more hours than the proposed Technical Specifications to restore primary containment. This proposed change represents a more restrictive change and is consistent with NUREG-1433.

Requirements were added. These

. M6 Eight Surveillance (SRs) surveillances will:

i e Verify SGIG System header pressure; 4

e Verify 6 inch and 18 inch primary containment purge valves and 18 inch primary containment exhaust valves are closed and blocked to restrict opening to less than or equal to the required maximum opening angle;

• Verify PCIV manual valves and blind flanges that are located 2

outside and inside primary containment and are required to be closed are closed. (For PCIVs outside primary containment, a

- note has been provided that exempts test taps with a diameter s 1 inch from the verification. The provision of this note is consistent with the PBAPS current licensing basis. It is i

a 19 Revision 0 PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 4

g . , _ .,, , , _

2

)

i NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 3.6--CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i

JfCHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (M , M , M3 , M , M3 , M6 , M7, M , M,, M3o , Mn, and M u Labeled Comments / Discussions j 3

for 3.6.1 M still the intent that the SR must be met, but actual performance is not required. The test taps covered by this (6 cont'd) note consist of at least one valve and a cap such that i

sufficient redundancy exists to maintain primary containment i

OPERABILITY in the event of a mispositioned valve or missing ,

cap. Additionally, the occurrence of test tap valve l misalignments has been rare at PBAPS.);

1

• Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge, and remove and test them; i e Verify SGIG lineup.

I These SRs provide the means of ensuring the PCIVs are Operable and l

able to perform their safety function which is to provide primary containment isolation. The addition of new surveillance

! Requirements constitutes a more restrictive change.

i Mr An Action is proposed to be added when one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for penetration flow paths with only ,

l one PCIV. This action would require the penetration to be isolated  !

i J

within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or the plant should be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. If this condition would presently exist, ,

the current Technical Specifications (3.7. A.3) require that the l) primary containment be declared inoperable and allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore it or the plant is required to be in Hot Shutdown (MODE 3) 1 l

' within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The current Technical Specifications would allow 20 more hours than the proposed l This j Technical Specifications to restore primary containment.

proposed change represents a more restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

i M3 This change proposes to add Actions to verify the penetrations which were isolated remain isolated every 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment and prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days, for isolation devices inside primary containment. The 31 days is reasonable because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of i their misalignment is low. The frequency for valves inside containment is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the valves and other administrative controls ensuring that valve misalignment is an unlikely possibility. These Actions are modified PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 20 Revision 0 l 4

1

. -, e~-

l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 3.6--CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (M3 , M,, M3 , M4 , M 6 7 3 M,, M3 o, M,3, and M ia Labeled Comments / Discussions for ITS 3.6.I .3) 3, M , M , M ,

M by a note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high (acont'd) radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

M, This change adds details on isolating instrument line penetrations with excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and purge and exhaust isolation valves. This change will require that the penetrations be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated eutomatic valve, closed manual valve or blind flange. This requirement adds details to an Action which constitute a more restrictive change.

This change is consistent with NUREG-1433.

M io This change adds acceptance criteria to the Surveillance Requirement which requires an Operability test of the instrument line EFCVs.

The acceptance criteria added requires that the EFCVs actuate to the isolation position on a simulated instrument line break signal. The addition of acceptance criteria which did not previously exist in ,

Technical Specifications to a Surveillance Requirement constitutes a more restrictive change.

M 33 The note which specifies that isolation valves closed to comply with the Actions may be opened under administrative controls was revised to make an exception to primary containment purge and exhaust isolation valves. In this case, the valves should not be allowed to be opened because of the gross breach of containment situation which could exist.

M 12 The frequency for performing the closure time testing for power operated and automatically initiated valves is being changed from "at least once per operating cycle" to "In accordance with the IST Program." Since the current IST Program requires testing of some PCIVs every quarter, this change is more restrictive.

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 21 Revision 0

AC Sources-0perating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.8.1.3 -------------------NOTES-------------------

1. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the I manufacturer. j

2. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.

3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.

4. This SR shall be preceded by and immediately follow, without shutdown, a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.7.

5. A single test will satisfy this i Surveillance for both units, with synchronization to the Unit 2 4 kV emergency bus for one periodic test and synchronization to the Unit 3 4 kV emergency bus during the next periodic test. However, if the test is not performed on Unit 3, then the test shall be performed synchronized to the Unit 2 4 kV emergency bus.

Verify each DG is synchronized and loaded 31 days and operates for 2 60 minutes at a load 2 2400 kW and s 2600 kW.

SR 3.8.1.4 Verify each day tank contains 2 250 gal of 31 days fuel oil.

SR 3.8.1.5 Check for and remove accumulated water from 31 days each day tank.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.8-8 Amendment No. 210

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 1

LC0 3.8.3 The stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air l 1

subsystem shall be within limits for each required diesel  ;

generator (DG). l j

i I

APPLICABILITY: When associated OG is required to be OPERABLE.

i ACTIONS

....................................-NOTE------------------------------------- -

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each DG.

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION One or more DGs with A.1 Restore fuel oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> A.

. fuel oil level level to within

< 31,000 gal and limits.

> 27,500 gal in e storage tank.

4 i

B. One or more DGs with B.1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> lube oil inventory inventory to within

< 350 gal and limits.

> 300 gal .

One or more DGs with C.1 Restore fuel oil 7 days C.

stored fuel oil total total particulates to particulates not within limit.

within limit.

(continued) h PBAPS UNIT 2 3.8-25 Amendment No. 210

-m- - -

_ ~ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ __-- ~-_ _ _ _ _ _

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

, 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days SR 3.8.3.1 2 31,000 gal of fuel.

Verify lube oil inventory is 2 350 gal. 31 days SR 3.8.3.2 Verify fuel oil properties of new and In accordance SR 3.8.3.3 with the Diesel stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, Fuel Oil the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program Verify each DG air start receiver pressure 31 days SR 3.8.3.4 is 2 225 psig.

Check for and remove accumulated water from 31 days SR 3.8.3.5 each fuel oil storage tank.

3.8-27 Amendment No. 210 PBAPS UNIT 2

,,,_(_,:_. .w w&-auew+=.-=~--

• * ~ ~ ~ * ' ~

. - - . - - . _ . . . - -. _ - . _ = . . - - . _ . . - -

f AC Sources--Operating

, B 3.8.1

! BASES 1

2 SURVEILLANCE- SR 3.8.1.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is adequate for a minimum of I hour of DG operation at full load. The level, which includes margin to account for the unusable volume of oil, is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period. '

,i I SR 3.8.1.5 i

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the 4 necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling.

e In addition, it eliminates the potential for water l entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and j

breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking

' for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance frequencies are consistent

< with Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not

- necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this -

Surveillance.

l '

4 SR 3.8.1.6 4

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil

' transfer pump operates and automatically transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. ,

It is required to support continuous operation of standby l power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that i

(continued) 4 4

4 PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.8-23 Revision No. 0

f Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

. B 3.8.3 BASES I ACTIONS A11 (continued) With fuel oil level < 31,000 gal in a storage tank (which j includes margin for the unusable volume of oil), the 7 day fuel oil supply for a DG is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. These circumstances may be caused by events such as:

a. Full load operation required for an inadvertent start while at minimum required level; or

b. Feed and bleed operations that may be necessitated by increasing particulate levels or any number of other oil quality degradations.

This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses j

required prior to addition of the fuel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to declaring the DG

> inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that procedures will

)

be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low

. probability of an event during this brief period.

Bd

' With lube oil inventory < 350 gal, sufficient lube oil to support 7 days of continuous DG operation at full load conditions may not be available. However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required volume prior to declaring the DG l

inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the

• fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during

1. this brief period.

(continued) 4 PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.8-51 Revision No. 0 1

[ P k-M 9$N - -

4 . . .

AC Sources--Operating

, 3.8.1 1

4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

- SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY \

! i SR 3.8.1.3 -------------------NOTES-------------------

1. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recomraended by the i manufacturer.

2. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.

' 3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one OG at a time.

4

' 4. This SR shall be preceded by and immediately follow, without shutdown, -

a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.7.

5. A single test will satisfy this

- Surveillance for both units, with synchronization to the Unit 3 4 kV emergency bus for one periodic test and synchronization to the Unit 2 4 kV emergency bus during the next periodic test. However, if the test is not l

performed on Unit 2, then the test shall be performed synchronized to the Unit 3 4 kV emergency bus.

r Verify each DG is synchronized and loaded 31 days

' and operates for 2 60 minutes at a load 2 2400 kW and s 2600 kW.

i Verify each day tank contains 2 250 gal of 31 days

SR 3.8.1.4 fuel oil.

d 5

Check for and remove accumulated water from 31 days SR 3.8.1.5 each day tank.

(continued) 3.8-8 Amendment No. 214 PBAPS UNIT 3

- .= .

e

' Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 l

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.3 Diesel fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3

The stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air J

LCO 3.8.3 4

subsystem shall be within limits for each required diesel generator (DG).

l APPLICABILITY: When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

__..______..__..._______..........---NOTE-------------------------------------

- Separate Candition entry is allowed for each DG.

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A.1 Restore fuel oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> A. One or more DGs with fuel oil level level to within

< 31,000 gal and limits.

> 27,500 gal in storage tank.

One or more DGs with B.1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> B.

lube oil inventory inventory to within

< 350 gal and limits.

> 300 gal .

C.1 Restore fuel oil 7 days C. One or more DGs with stored fuel oil total total particulates to particulates not within limit.

within limit.

(continued) 3.8-25 Amendment No. 214 PBAPS UNIT 3

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

. 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days SR 3.8.3.1 2 31,000 gal of fuel.

Verify lube oil inventory is 2 350 gal. 31 days SR 3.8.3.2 SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil properties of new and In accordance stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with the Diesel with, and maintained within the limits of, Fuel Oil the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program Verify each DG air start receiver pressure 31 days SR 3.8.3.4 is 2 225 psig.

Check for and remove accumulated water from 31 days SR 3.8.3.5 each fuel oil storage tank.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.8-27 Amendment No. 214

- o =

AC Sources--Operating c B 3.8.1

< BASES

" SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 REQUIREMENTS

(continued) This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is adequate for a minimum of I hour of DG operation at full load. The level, which includes margin to account for the unusable volume of oil, is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons.

! The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in

' fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the 4

! necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling.

' in addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation,

' ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and j

breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and l

i provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel i

oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9). This SR is for i

preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not i

necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that 4

accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

SR 3.8.1.6 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and automatically transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank.

It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.8-23 Revision No. 0 l

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS M (continued) With fuel oil level < 31,000 gal in a storage tank (which includes margin for the unusable volume of oil), the 7 day fuel oil supply for a DG is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. These circumstances may be caused by events such as:

a. Full load operation required for an inadvertent start while at minimum required level; or

b. Feed and bleed operations that may be necessitated by increasing particulate levels or any number of other oil quality degradations.

This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses A

required prior to addition of the fuel oil to the tank.

period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

M With lube oil inventory < 350 gal, sufficient lube oil to support 7 days of continuous DG operation at full load conditions may not be available. However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required volume prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

(continued) 8 3.8-51 Revision No. 0 PBAPS UNIT 3

unu S A yL 3.9.l.

V PBAPS g u-: := =::= = :=:e @ -: = :: a 2 = c = : c g l

4.9 AUXILIARY E ~ TRICAL SYSTE 3.9 AUXILIAR ELLLTklCAL STEM ApplicabFlity f

plicability/

• Applies to he auxiliar Appli to the perio e tes ng requirement of electric power syst .

th auxiliary ele rical Objec ve: stems.

equate Objective:

T assure an pply rf e ctrical power Verify th op. abilit for opera on of those of the x111ary systems equired for s ety. electr al system f $p ification: So ficatj_on: o A. xiliary ectrical uxiliary lle rical Ecuipment /

Ecuipmeny

'~

)

1. 0 ;m ', 0.. . e;;,r; ...; h hhd, i The reactor shall not ce made) critical unlessfall of the foll Off;'.t; C'.r n ' ;

,*y g 3 -conditions are satisfied:

hm.c.TS g d (fd __

+: 'Esch of the required X(Two(pysnaii i ...e e en::W @ independent circuits

. circuits cetween the offsite stag.i.i between the offsite LCO LBI.a. f transmission network transmission network and the onsite Class if and M sdistribution system are operable. og3.gjg the onsite Class distribution IE system E! The four diesel generators shall be shall be: -

MO 33.1.b operable pno snere shall be a statsu rbr 10s,000 callons of diesel fue ah Verified OPERABLE

' at least once per

%n titLJ Each operable diese)

M b 7 days by verifying h- ki2g LCO 3 geneistor shall have; V 3t M"b correct breaker alignments and Lc0 J.B.I.dj ,s indicated power g3g,g[.fAieparatedayt&nk cont a minimum

1. 1. 4 b b.u. 0- 4 ( C' 350 pgM R 3.W b h 8D 3 D. V. 'A $sparate ruel storag tana with a minimum of Qog'W ol d ' i 2tl,000 callons of fuel -A '

f0emonstrated OPERABLE at least once Mk dn.dl per 24 months A A separate fuel transfer by transferring, y yg,g,g peop, manually and S' gg 38,1,93 automatically, the (b CTS e*ftIB) tid

.2' phe unit 4kV emergency buses Qtyt.uc source) from the normal W b Ow ,-4 ku and tha 480V emergency

1040 tenters are energized, circuit to the Y gy3 .g ,g, g, QJ ,

alternate circuit.

Opb e #: The four unit 125V batterie and tneir chargers shall be NcE D M W g g able.1 ha.Om...... Q M3 p ITS 3.BN, h-A p..._.a =. :n. :n. m m : =

%g_7 q u

- ' ~ ' - - - - - ' ' ---- - - -____________ _

1

- . - 3.8.1 ,,,,

EfMittiiG CCsD;7IOC TO'l OPEtAtttR h b h50RVE-ftt.nnCE REMRimini5 4.9 '

3.9 ARY ELECT L SYST LIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

""  ;' Appl ableity: Applicability / .

lies t the auxil y Applies he periodic electr .a1 power ten. testi requirements of l th x111ary electri  :

l O ective: stems.

' / Objective

• To ass an adequJ supp of elect operatio al power f those f

Ve fy the operabil f

ystems r tred for safety. the auxiliar f electrical tem.

ecification: Spe ication:

@ - Auxiliary ectrical

.K / Auxiliary Ele rical A

( Ecuipment / Equipment Im Halu i,1 u.A 3 The reactor shall not be made) -1. L;E  ;; i ,eer; er4 h critical unlessFall of the following eff:tt: Ct-: it:

(Lu* CTS P ag) conditions are satisfi E wo @ p tully tJ 5 rd;SD .E (Eschoftherequired circuits Detween the offsite independent circuits transmission network and CR 33,[ g between the offsite g gggA i the onsite Class 1E a transmission network and (distributionsystemareoperable. the onsite Class 1E S 38 LB distribution system LCO t.B.i* b 2', the four diesel generators shall be g shall be:

o erahltJand there shall ce a alminujm r- so 08.000 gallons of diesel fuel / - .a'. @erifiedOPERABLE

'len site./~Each operable diesel .at least once per generator shall have: g.-- g)7 days by verifying w LCO 3.8.l.c.

) Y  % orrect breaker tco 3,g alignments and

,af separate day tank 3g c taidng a minisus indicated power

' SE3814 o JM (auces of fuel, M s. '

/ ava11ao111ty. A D

zsc M

,M i seWr' ate fuel storag cm b %, Q tank with a minisue of S R S.B L 8 ITs 2.B3,FJ ,g, g u 28,000 gallens of fuel ,x (Demonstrated OPERABLE 0;q, % A g at least once  ;

Iper 24 months i s e, 3,3,g,g, pl{Aseparatefueltransfer by transferring, SR. manually and 4'

(%cT 5. DUS) { pump. 33,l.8 automatically, the M g

start up -rre

,M lIne un n say eeergency buses from the normal h O'"""'" M and the 480V emergency load centers are energized. , circuit to the 4-alternate circuit.

IT$

The f our unit 125V batteries )

3 *E ' g'k' #.

and their chargers shall be / hg g g 3,gj,g OM toperable.1 g _.._e

.' L A-_n; Z . !!2, !?', "

h. On ' . % % Cby p .M;t rr s 2.B.v. b c w - op w. h 7g AD s

.n

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.8.1: AC SOURCES-0PERATING ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES (continued)

A3 Proposed SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.13, and SR 3.8.1.19 will be modified by a Note allowing an unplanned event to satisfy the requirements of these SRs. This assumes that the data collected is sufficient to satisfy all required acceptance criteria. Since these i tests are currently performed using simulated signals, explicit recognition that these tests can also be satisfied using an actual signal is an administrative change because a test without pre-lube or warmup is a more realistic test so the change constitutes permission to perform a more realistic test. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE H, Proposed Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-0perating, will be applicable at all times in Modes 1, 2, and 3. This applicability is more restrictive than existing Specification 3.9.A which requires '

that "the reactor shall not be made critical unless" the specified AC sources are Operable and associated Surveillances Requirements met. This is also more restrictive than existing Specification 3.9.B which requires that the Required Actions for inoperable equipment must be implemented "Whenever the reactor is in Run Mode or Startup Mode with the reactor not in a Cold Condition" and the applicable requirements of existing Specification 3.2.B. The proposed change establishes requirements for the Operability of AC sources consistent with the Operability requirements for the functions that these AC sources are required to support including the Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Primary Containment Isola-tion. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

M2 Proposed SR 3.8.1.4 will require verification every 31 days that each DG day tank contains at least 250 gallons of fuel oil.

Existing Specification 3.9.A.2.a requires that the day tank of each Operable DG contain at least 200 gallons of fuel oil but has no requirement for periodic verification. SR 3.8.1.4 provides verification that sufficient fuel oil (including margin to account for unusable volume) to operate the DG for at least one hour is available at the DG so that operators will have time to identify and PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 2 Revision 0

DISCVSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.8.1: AC SOURCES-0PERATING TECHNICAL CHANGES - HORE RESTRICTIVE M, respond to the failure of a fuel oil transfer pump. Additionally, (cont'd) this SR ensures that the fuel oil transfer pump is maintaining the day tank level above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

H3 Proposed SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.16, SR 3.8.1.18, and SR 3.8.1.19 have the potential to cause perturbations to the Electrical Distribution System that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Therefore, these SRs will be modified by a Note that states these SRs shall not be performed if the associated unit is in Mode 1 or 2 or Modes 1, 2, or 3 (for SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.16, SR 3.8.1.18, and SR 3.8.1.19).

However credit is allowed to be taken for unplanned events that satisfy these SRs. The Note is intended to ensure that the unit most affected by the test is shutdown when the test is performed.

Performing these SRs while the unit most affected by the test is shutdown is consistent with current practice; however, the explicit statement of this requirement constitutes a more restrictive change.

This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifica-tions, NUREG-1433.

M4 Proposed SR 3.8.1.2 and existing Specification 4.9. A.I.2.a.3 both require that the DG starting demonstration test be performed once every 31 days and whenever demonstration of DG Operability is required. Both the proposed and the existing specifications are modified by Notes that allow the use of engine pre-lube and gradual acceleration (slow start) as recommended by the manufacturer in However, proposed order to minimize stress and wear on the DGs.

SR 3.8.1.2 will be modified by a Note that requires that if the gradual warmup procedure is not used (i.e., fast start), then the acceptance criteria for time, voltage and frequency associated with the fast start in proposed SR 3.8.1.7 must be applied to SR 3.8.1.2.

This change ensures that any start performed in accordance with the fast start procedure must meet the acceptance criteria for a fast start. This ensures that problems with DG starting capability are identified as soon as possible and that DG starting data is collected in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9 is accurate. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

3 Revision 0 PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3

I DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.8.1: AC SOURCES-0PERATING l

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued)

Proposed SR 3. 1.3 and existing Specification 4.9. A.I.2.a.5 both Hs require that each DG be synchronized with an offsite source and operated at full load for at least 60 minutes. Proposed SR 3.8.1.3 includes a Note that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid loss of multiple DGs concurrent with a loss of offsite power. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

He A new SR has been added to ensure the test override feature is functioning properly. This feature is scheduled to be installed by Fall 1995. This SR is consistent with NUREG-1433 and is an additional restriction on plant operation.

M7 Proposed SR 3.8.1.9 (largest load rejection), SR 3.8.1.10 (full load rejection), and SR 3.8.1.14 (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load test) all verify DG capabilities required during a loss of offsite pcwer. In each case, the DG can be tested while synchronized with offsite sources. The proposed SRs will require that these tests be performed at a power factor corresponding to the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience (< 0.89 lagging). However, if grid conditions do not permit the DG to operate at the required power factor, SR 3.8.1.14 may be conducted with the power factor as close  ;

as possible to the specified value. Additionally, a Note was added to SR 3.8.1.14 recognizing that momentary transients in DG loading l or power factor will not invalidate the test. These changes make l the test more representative of the conditions expected during an i i

accident and is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifi-cations, NUREG-1433.

M.

Proposed SR 3.8.1.15 and existing Specification 4.9.A.1.2.g.5 both verify DG hot restart capability by attempting a DG restart within 5 minutes after completing the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> full load run. If the hot  !

i restart test is not completed immediately following the full load run, both the proposed and the existing specifications allow the DG hot restart to be performed after a shorter run. The existing specification (Note c) requires initial conditions based on operating the DG for "I hour or until operating temperature has stabilized." Proposed SR 3.8.1.15 will require that the DG be l operated at full load for greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, a period based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

4 Revision 0 PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3

I i

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES l ITS 3.8.1: AC SOURCES-0PERATING I

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued)

M.

Proposed SR 3.8.1.12 and existing Specification 4.9.A.1.2.h.2 both test DG response to an ECCS actuation signal without loss of offsite power. However, proposed SR 3.8.1.12 will also verify proper plant response by requiring verification that " Permanently connected loads remain energized" and " Emergency loads are energized or auto-connected through individual load timers to the offsite source."

This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifica-tions, NUREG-1433, and the PBAPS design.

Mo i Proposed SR 3.8.1.20 and existing Specification 4.9. A.1.2.i both require simultaneous starting of all four DGs every 10 years. The existing specification requires that the DGs " accelerate to at least 855 rpm (57 Hz) in less than or equal to 10 seconds" whereas the proposed specification will require that all four DGs achieve the nominal voltage (4160 V) and frequency (58.8 Hz) within 10 seconds. ,

This change is more restrictive than current requirements.

M,, The proposed Required Actions for one offsite circuit inoperable and one DG inoperable (without the Conowingo Tie-Line available) will be modified to include a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any ,

single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. l This new restriction is intended to prevent exceeding the assump- I tions regarding allowed out of service times for an AC source as a result of sequential inoperabilities of a DG and offsite source.

This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifica-tions, NUREG-1433.

M t2 Certain equipment needed to meet Unit 2 accident analysis is powered from the Unit 3 AC Electrical Power System and certain equipment needed to meet Unit 3 accident analysis is powered from the Unit 2 AC Electrical Power System. Currently, the AC sources of the other unit are required since the definition of Operability requires the normal and emergency power sources to be Operable. To make the .

Technical Specifications more user friendly, the required sources of l the other unit have been added. Since the AC sources of the other i unit are now described, the current LC0 and Actions for AC source.s j have been modified to address this addition. The Actions for the other unit's AC sources have been made consistent with those of the ,

one unit. However, specifying an explicit allowed out of service time for the other units AC sources make this an additional PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 S Revision 0

- _ - - __ _ _ _e -= _a;=_r_ _-_- - rz ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _

i . . * ,

d DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.8.1: AC SOURCES-0PERATING TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M2 restriction on plant operations. In addition, proposed SR 3.8.1.21 (cont'd) and a Note to the Surveillance Requirements have been added to

' ensure that the other units AC sources are properly tested and that the proper SRs are applicable for each units AC sources.

d M,3 Existing Specification 3.9.B.2 allows plant operation to continue with two offsite sources inoperable "provided the four diesel generators and associated emergency buses are Operable, all core and containment cooling systems are operable and reactor power is reduced to 25% of design." Under identical conditions, proposed LC0 3.8.1, Condition C, will allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore all but one required offsite circuit to Operable status or enter Condition F (Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />). This change is 4

consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93, Availability of Electrical Power Sources, and the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

i Mu Not used.

Hsi Existing Specification 3.9.B.4 has an allowable out of service time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for the simultaneous inoperability of one DG and one offsite source. Proposed LC0 3.8.1, Condition D, will reduce the

allowable out of service time from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> consistent with the recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.93, Availability of ,

AC Sources. The basis for the Regulatory Guide 1.93 recommendation is that individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite Electrical Power System and the onsite AC Electrical Power System and this configuration is highly susceptible to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the redundancy, capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

Me i The calibration frequency of the individual load timers has been reduced from once per 5 years to once per 24 months. This calibra-tion will now be performed during SR 3.8.1.18. This change is 2

necessary to ensure that sufficient time exists for the diesel generators to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions, regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. The 24 month frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This change represents an additional restriction on plant operation.

6 Revision 0 PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3

-m

' V&nra '

OYIIll."MC[ E 0"lEMMI!- M g

• i.i^iliin6 r CUnO4 6 40n3 ICE W AN '

4.3 AWAiLi4Ri ELE (ini(AL ji5i[#

5.3 avligikru 26dviniUL 3i3IEM Od , aA h A a,.

• 3.?'3, bW 9 6anA ADDlicability ,

ADp l icaD11 I ty ;

f

'. ;,: Applies to the periodic ' y

- Applies to the auxiliary testing requirements or ,l:

electrical power system, t the auxiliary electrical ' Y ,C-systems.

Object'3 : 3 )

Objective: . *:

To assure an adequate i supply of electrical power ,

Verify the op. ability i for operation of those systems required for safety, of the auxiliary electrical system.  !

YU<

/

s Specification:

I Specification:

Auxiliary tiectrical_ A. Auxiliary Electrical t

c fCM A. Equipment Eouiormt 4 vi

=

gdg /IM-reactor snas > not ce u.ade)

) 1. Diesel Generators and Offsite Circuits

' VF Lr$tical unbtssfall of the following

" conditions are satisfied:

1. Each of the required \

dl. Two physically independent independent circe:ts ',

BON h ~

1 circuits between the offsite transmission netwcrk and between the offsite transmission network ar.:;

)

the onsite Class IE the onsite Class IE distribution system are operable. distribution system /

shall be: /

4 (2. The

.w four diesel cenerators shall be enerable andithere shall be a simimum 3 l

a. Verified OPERABLE l

^

'q g ('of 108,000 gallons of diesel fuel on site. Jagn 9pera e at least once per 7 days by verifying WM P't } dirner4 tar /sh'a11/ ha've ~

correct breaker

-J 20 b A separate cay tanx alignments and /

a. indicated power f containino a minimum availability. \

of 200 cahont of fuel, 3

separate fuel storage T C 3lr. S.

4.

tana with a minisum of ,8gg g

/

'b.

/

Demonstrate'd OPERABLE f

gallons of fuel. l per nh by transferring,

[0 ., .. A separate fuel transfer pump.

manually and gg - c automatically, tN start-up souret uM /T. The unit 4kV emergency cua and tha 480V emergency from t.he norsa'i l p gg' circuit to the y, (,'-df. c er.ters are e .ergind.

• alternate circuit.

4.

i_ ,, The four unit'"'"

":,:"t/""'"' 126V " betteries*  % o_ w %

/.. m ss r, i TS 3 7. y y. h. . , . . -Op.,

CL ;uu p %.tA s-ct<A- 173,179 AUG 0 21953

-217-Amendment No. Id

'Ry. I of 22 s N -

g

. . spubb a.%.1L unit 2

' T5d 4 9 3 - 24 5"'"!: LLf ::: 2:^":".:.S.!  ?

7u ryuc mun!T

i: 70; 6RRAT = ,

' 4. 0 . 0. . ; Gv..y .. JT se '  !

(Each f the re sh utred diesel ated ge rators I be demons -

i ERABLE: ,

e m ~

a.Inaccordancewiththe}

frequency specified in Qverg al d. _

l 4.9.A.1.2.1 by:

s y---

.7 erifying the fuel level f

'in the fuel storage tan Mh' ~

~~ ~

8R %A'kl o Tne volume or rue g1 i gg4 n5Re. I 31, C0 0 dag

• 0 3*S' '2. Verifying the fuel

- ~ ^ p\) transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day fuel tank *

% Dsss m s m .f & 3. Verifying that the diesel b 'ns 111,Ar s ,%-

can start' and g)ei gradually accelerate to synchronous speed with generator voltage and

-

• frequency at 4160 410 volts and 60 1.2 HZ.

4. Verifying that the diesel, ~

h can be synchronized, gradually loaded' to an indicated 2400-2600* kw and can operate with this load for at least 60 minutes. .

5. Verifying the diesel *

! generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency

busses.

f '

F d ith the manufacturer's recom.endations

'This test shall be conducted in accor ance w i

regarding engine pre-lube and warmup and, as ' applicable, loading and shutdown.

'This load band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine.

Loads in excess of this band for special testing, under direct monitoring by the l

manufacturerorsystemengineer,ormomentaryvariationsduetochangingbusload j shall not invalidate the test. _

' ( .--

~218- foy Z of '2.2-9 4

i 8 unra--

l ' '

. ' ** 5 pec,Ee d .~ liL 9. S Si,o o -TS M U-2 4 b Nbt$b3'Jmy,m pi[T!Mc cou0!vynue w noE9 TMH _ =

. .a.a g f;- ,

.. . , ~ ...... e,

6. With fuel oil in one of the diesel (6.~ Hone g

generator main storage tanks an!'dh or not in conformance with eg ,t h u g '

6JFv'e f lance Recuirement 4.9.A.I.2.

implement the following:

- h ..

m, a a m ,s Asonate Ine main storage tant from yg -

De system, with the associated ,

diesel generator being supplied from /\

one of the remaining storage tank * ,000 W ithin 8. hours, and f .

% Esfablis_h_ and maintain a minimum o G0F.000) allons

~ of dieset fuel oil r threfDmain storage GS.M** b in the tanks within Qhours, and

% ne fuel oil n the other jsample three ain storage anks and c i conf .ance with pecificati g3

,and

f. .A.I.2.e wi in 24 L2

'tk. ce the u ceptable f41 et mm -- M.

t accept fuel 2ndreturn the o n g ,.lk'A

(* b G 3 A r C.

stor e tank to service within 7

=1- .

CdA, days crylace Ine reacwon t.oih  % kn A 43 AN k F QDginnwn within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.] 1- -

c6 .A ug%.kJ %

Acc3)eratedjesting of th ~IEti I la*>& % y .

?"':r#1 {preratorsAs not recui .s

7. No 7, with one oFthe 4kV emergency Dusses or 480V emergency load centers Mkis b required by 3.9.A.3 not energized, i declare the associated equipment g3 I inoperable and take the appropriate

• action for that system. ,

Reenergize the bus within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followingj Q24 hoursy With the conowingo line inoperable 8. Verifyonce/monththe

8. operability of the conowingo for 15 days, .atify the NRC. ,

line.

h%

LM ' A M ' ** * **

• P '

t e % "I ,"h y, ,Q3'  ;

-zzab_ m 2.g 'l Ac 3 _,_ g..g

• • 'D pp a e 22.

s

. . . Mx:':= CO!TIOZ TZ 0"!".'.'?0" ' h - % = : LL'"" " M"!acM!y m ,

Ydb.0, " = L:""" :L: in: AL ;Y;T ".* C ,/Jt '

LI".*Y L: '" ",L Sy:::M_

n.s.s cue m a.a, w o u.,. a 1 m ., n -

,m , u. u , , n r .

7m n w 1 nr.

pA Applies to the periodic Applies to the auxiliary

~

electrical power system. testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical l Obiective: systems.

To assure an adequate Objective:

supply of electrical power for operation of those Verify the operability d 3 systems required for safety. of the auxiliary electrical system. <g }

• s geification: Specification: d A. Auxiliary Electrical iE A. Auxiliary Electrical 3 _cuipment E

. Equipment js '

t35 A d%

,m -

'LN.naugid]J in e reactor snail not be mace

1. Diesel Generators and Offsite Circuits p

. 14 ;' t.;e. A L iceitical un1.<d all of the following "{

Iconditionsaresatisfied:

iwo pnysically incepencent 1. Each of the requir D QCk1 ' ,. independent circuits g . circuits between the offsite between the offsite ud '"*p, M 1'ransmission network and

.n.,,a , the onsite Class IE transatssion network and  ;

)

districution system are operable. the ensite Class 1E j g- 7~~Thefourdieselceneratorsshallbe dis *ribution system shall be:

1 l

,.-.,= v rocerable enf there shall be a minimum feJ'b'4 7of108,000 callons of diesel fuel 't. Verified OPERABLE 2

d 5=' '78 r y Lon site._Jtjcn pperjtoi; c)esel Qat least cece per mb Gingtrayor Aaly haee:J 8 7 days by verifying correct btenker l g' A separate cay tanx ' alignments and ontaining a minimum indicated power 2nd galle'v of fuel. _aveilao111ty.  !

I i A separate fuel storage l

tank with a minimum of I f A

5' M*L I gallons of fuel, L,,_ Demonstrated OPERABLE 5 t, cc o , at least once &

kn.u(rr-v- 2:) per 24 months

. e separate ruei transrer . by transferring, u . - nually and htomatically,the The unit 4kV emergency buses ' start-up source nd tne 480V emergency , 3, ,, ,, ,,,,, j from the normal oad centers are energiz @ 4 f,, y.r't circuit to the 3.f.

7 oo+,s,3 b nate circuit.

p.' ene tour unit uW batterie uAy nd their chargers shall be " tanu.. .t'.L r,s x:n p rable.F M4, oe s~ y** % M6021sn

-217 Anminent No. 732, 176, 182 Rp 12. of 2.1-(v --s i

l

• Unit 3 b.*.. .TSCL c)3.Ly

. Ws.f'A 3%S F%F9

!""" !:U.% : i'GU IRCU.:NIC

F

T

::: CO::0 T:0:0 Tb OP:ff!T _

CO. b '.1 (Ove ...o J}

OA 2. Each of the ge rators sha reg ' be red diesel demons ted ERABLE:

L

.- l l

a. In accordance with the e.w311 fregaency specified in M1 -

(_4_. g . A. I .2.1 by:

% Verifying 9the fuel level s's ? P y.4

'in the fuel storage tank, St. L T S.1 vosume of t g \

M 31,ce t>

' ' " 2. Verifying the fuel d'b transfer pump starts and s# ?M 17 ~ transfers fuel from the storage system to the day fuel tank.

3. Verifying that the diesel T can start

• and gg , p. 4 ' P gradually accelerate to b W 1T l, " AC. 4- synchronous speed with ope.A3 generator voltage and frequency at 4160 410 V .

volts and 60 1.2 HZ.

4. Verifying that the diesel,. - .

m can be synchronized, Up

"# gradually loaded

• to an indicated 2400-2600* kw and can operate with this load for at least 60 minutes.

5. Verifying the diesel u.

generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.

J F

'This test shall be conducted in accordance with the manuf acturer's reco regarding engine pre-lube and warsup and, as applicable, loading and shutdown.

i

'This load band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine.

Loads in excess of this band for special testing, under direct m

~

shall not invalidate the test.

-218- pay G .F 2.2.

.g eee 4

SURVEILLA3;; g:;g:nrunna

• 1-lHFHiiG CGhDITIO;G TUR OF RAiiGH ^

b si,oco g

3.9.B (Continued) m,"

4.

c.

b- 6. With fuel oil in one of the diesel <m g ,4 S'"44 J generator main storage tanks > M,4 =

available or not in conformance with (surveiiiance xecairmont

4. u ,2.e.

ddb c.,

h 8 implement the following: -

Ccp isuiate cne main storage.cank trom <i _

the system, with the associated -  %.\q u ad.4M g,4;g4%

diesel generator being supplied Yrom 4 g. 4, g ., 7 4 1, one of the remaining storage tanks g,,,j k C within R hnure- and ~5 ), oc o k Establish and maintain a minimum of "t callons of diesel fuel oil dvd. h '9 4 e(oiner thrgfbmain, storage n

tanks within Q hours, and g i in cn otnev

c. amp e Ine uen thr e main stor especi tankscationand ca i -}f c forman e wi urs ,- nd.- .

~

4.9.A.]. .e w hin 24 - - -

. . - - - -=r..-.------.

e~ e TVel A #g

% Ke

~

EU '

echeudLd'e ta ndj7eturnthe 1pyg -]~ g 4, ~ ~ ~

stora _g Q,J,u f days,ge i orylacetank to service sue rescror Yn Lom] 6thfn-~7]' 49 r,, g wpite within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />sJ Ig W 4 m%,.J,J re, L

M

1. o e i .

p 2.

7. None M" .3 <

f7. witnoneorIne4KYemergencycusseN l

' or 480V emergency load centers required by.3.9.A.3 not energized, declare the associated equipment f inoperable and take tt;e appropriate -

action for the system.

g g,%, g4 .

Reenergizethebuswithin24hoursorT TT13.p ,"og4,3,3._gyj;,,7 in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following

(

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />._f

8. Verify once/ month the With the Lonowingo line inuperaDie operability of the conowingo (B. for 15 days, notify the NRC. line.

)

M3 G b m..n.A 4 cl. A 0""W 0

1. n S'E/ nAC f f-%- -220b-Op.d ' c 22 *f 22-F

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 3.8.3: DIESEL FUEL OIL, LUBE OIL, AND STARTING AIR TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE Mi Existing Specification 3.9.A which governs the diesel generators (DGs) and associated support systems (fuel oil storage and transfer, lube oil, and starting air) requires that these systems must be Operable or "the reactor shall not be made critical." Proposed Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-0perating, will require that the DGs be Operable at all times in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and proposed Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, will require that the DGs be Operable at all times in Modes 4, 5, and whenever irradiated fuel is moved in the secondary cantainment. To support this increase in the Applicability of requirements for the DGs, proposed Specifica-tion 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air, will require that DG support systems be Operable "when associated DG is required to be Operable." This change adds additional times and conditions when the DGs and support systems must be Operable and it constitutes a more restrictive change. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

M2 Existing Specification 3.9.A.2 establishes the requirements for the minimum cumulative onsite inventory of diesel fuel oil at > 108,000 gallons with > 28,000 gallons per Operable DG. Proposed Specifica-tion 3.8.1 will eliminate the requirement to maintain 108,000 gallons of fuel on site and will require > 31,000 gallons in the storage tank associated with each Operable DG. Proposed LC0 3.8.3 establishes 31,000 gallons of fuel oil as the minimum required fuel oil necessary to support 7 days operation at anticipated post accident loading and establishes 27,500 gallons of fuel oil as the minimum required to support 6 days of DG operation at anticipated post accident loading. With 4 tanks at 31,000 gallons, the anticipated cumulative post accident fuel consumption of 108,000 is satisfied with considerable margin. The increase of the minimum fuel oil inventory in each storage tank from 28,000 gallons to 31,000 gallons is intended to increase conservatism and to account for unusable oil in the tank. LC0 3.8.3 also establishes action requirements at 27,500 gallons of fuel oil which is a conservative value for the volume of fuel oil required to support six days of DG operation at the anticipated post accident loadings.

The requirement to maintain a minimum fuel oil volume in the storage tank associated with each Ourable DG eliminates the option in Specification 3.9.B.6 that al'iows a DG to be considered Operable for 7 days when its fuel transfer pump is aligned to an adjacent storage tank. The reasons for these changes are discussed below.

17 Revision 0 PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3

l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 3.8--ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

' TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE (continued)

(M , M2 , and M3Labeled Comments / Discussions for ITS 3.8.3) 3 Mi Existing Specification 3.9.A which governs the diesel generators (DGs) and associated support systems (fuel oil storage and transfer, lube oil, and starting air) requires that these systems must be Operable or "the reactor shall not be made critical." Proposed Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-0perating, will require that the DGs be Operable at all times in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and proposed Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, will require that the DGs be Operable at all times in Modes 4, 5, and whenever irradiated fuel is moved in the secondary containment. To support this increase in the Applicability of requirements for the DGs, proposed Specifica-tion 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air, will require that DG support systems be Operable "when associated DG is required to be Operable." This change acds additional times and conditions when the DGs and support systems must be Operable and it constitutes a more restrictive change. This change is consistent with the BWR Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433.

M2 Existing Specification 3.9.A.2 establishes the requirements for the minimum cumulative onsite inventory of diesel fuel oil at > 108,000 gallons with > 28,000 gallons per Operable DG. Proposed Specifica-tion 3.8.1 will eliminate the requirement to maintain 108,000 gallons of fuel on site and will require > 31,000 gallons in the storage tank associated with each Operable DG, Proposed LC0 3.8.3 establishes 31,000 gallons of fuel oil as the minimum required fuel oil necessary to support 7 days operation at anticipated post accident loading <nd establishes 27,500 gallons of fuel oil as the minimum required to support 6 days of DG operation at anticipated post accident loading. With 4 tanks at 31,000 gallons, the  !

anticipated cumulative post accident fuel consumption of 108,000 is satisfied with considerable margin. The increase of the minimum fuel oil inventory in each storage tank from 28,000 gallons to i I

31,000 gallons is intended to increase conservatism and to account for unusable oil in the tank. LC0 3.8.3 also establishes action requirements at 27,500 gallons of fuel oil which is a conservative value for the volume of fuel oil required to support six days of DG operation at the anticipated post accident loadings.

The requirement to maintain a minimum fuel oil volume in the storage tank associated with each Operable DG eliminates the option in Specification 3.9.B.6 that allows a DG to be considered Operable for 7 days when its fuel transfer pump is aligned to an adjacent stcrage tank. The reasons for these changes are discussed below.

13 Revision 0 )

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 l

l I