ML20217G753

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Proposed Tech Specs Re end-of-cycle Recirculation Pump Trip Sys at Plant
ML20217G753
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/20/1998
From:
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20217G751 List:
References
NUDOCS 9804020508
Download: ML20217G753 (26)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:1 _1.-- l 1 ATTACHMENT 2 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 DPR-56 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES 25 Attached Pages 9004020'500 980320 PDR ADOCK 05000277 P PDR

-/ l TkBLEOFCONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1-1 l '1.1 ' Definitions 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors................... 1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times.................... 1.3-1 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 l 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY.... 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS............... 3.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 3.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies *................ 3.1-5 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY 3.1-7 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1-12 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........... 3.1-15 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control 3.1-18 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1-20 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves. 3.1-26 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2-1 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) 3.2-1 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) 3.2-2 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) 3.2-4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3-1 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.3-1 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation..... 3.3-10 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3-16 { 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................. 3.3-22 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation... 3.3-24 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System............... 3.3-27 m 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without-Scram Recirculation M m Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation 3.3-29 h, 3.3.5.1 Enliirgency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3-3 Fe > 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................. 3.3-44 # 3.3.6.1 Primary containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-4 V 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-5 V 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation 3.3-5 F 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 3.3-6 F 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring..................... 3.3-66# _ = %,392. 60Eck C.gcle lhow k>fm /b (continued) p Op ( Ett.-(&PY) T n$fM Mf% PBAPS UNIT 2 1 Revision No. \\

. e TABLE OF CONTENTS 'l . 1. 0. USE AND APPLICATION 1.1-1 1.1 Definitions 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors................... 1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times.................... 1.3-1 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY.... 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS............... 3.1-1 ~ 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)..........;..... 3.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies................ 3.1-5 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY 3.1-7 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1-12 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........... 3.1-15 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control 3.1-18 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1-20 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves. 3.1-26 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2-1 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) 3.2-1 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) 3.2-2 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) 3.2-4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION................... 3.3-1 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.3-1 l 3.3.1.2 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation 3.3-10 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3-16 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................. 3.3-22 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation... 3.3-24 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System............... 3.3-27 % e 3. ' r 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation

cArge, Jump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation 3.3-29 w --

3.3.5.1 Eme'rgency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3-3P 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................. 3.3-44 ~ ' 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3... 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-56 ' 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation 3.3-W 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 3.3-64 ' 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System Monitoring........(RPS) Electric Power 3.3 - M,t)[.Lrst of DE /h2va&% 6mp (continued) PBAPS UNIT 3 Amendment No.

Definitions 1.1 - 1 IN 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQU NT I-131 conversion factors used for this calculatio ( nued) be those listed in [ Table III of TID-1 AEC,1962, " Calculation of Distan ctors for Power and Test Reactor Sites" those listed in Table E-7 of Regulatory e 1.109, Rev. 1, NRC, 1977, or ICRP , Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Ta tied, " Committed Dose Equivalent in Ta rgans or Tissues per Intake of Unit ty"]. EMERGENCY COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time in rval SYST CCS) RESPONSE from when the monitored sarameter exceed s ECCS initiation setpoint at tie channel s r until ~ the ECCS equipment.is capable of' rforming its safety function (i.e., the y es travel to their scharge pressures reach 'p 8 y N [ k. g required positions, pu I their reouired valu ,etc.). Times shall include diesel generato arting and sequence loading M [ delays, who pplicable. The response time may be meas

  • by means of any series of sequential, q

ing, or total steps so that the entire I ove onse time is measured. END OF CYCLE The EOC RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE (the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME rom when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil 3 control oil pr ops below the pressure l { switch setpoin o complete suppression of the electric arc b ween the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The () response tine may be measured by means of any i ! series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that_the entirA response time is measure exc ptlor the breaker arc suppression t me, which is not measured but is validated to conform to the manufacturer's design value. ISO SYSTEM The IsutAftun smfrRf5PONSM hat R SE TIME time interval from when the monito rameter exceeds its isolation initia setpoint at the channel sensor until solation valves travel to their requir sitions. Times shall include diesel or starting and sequence loading del , where applicable. The response time may measured by means of any series of sequential', (continued) 96$95 UNIT '1()) - AMENOMEW tJO, 1.1[ 7 A m A u/r/:: 6 mW

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.41 2. (FQ 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION p s; 3.3.4./ End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation 7. a. Two channels per trip system for each E0C-RPT LCO'3.3.4./ instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE: I. Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure; and 2. Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low. LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," 1 its IA)S6er for inoserable E0C-RPT as specified in the COLR, re ma p

2. @ nun 3

+ ( APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER 30 % RTP. A ACTIONS _____________________________________ NOTE------------------------------------ Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours inoperable. OPERABLE status. I E i A.2

NOTE---------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker. Place channel in 72 hours trip. (continued) m_ P % tiNn h gyn,,6s ac,, e -BWRf4-SW / -Rertf 0 /s/sii~ wymm e m

1 b, The following limits are made applicable: \\ LCO 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," limits for -inoperable Ecc-/W T- ~ as specified in the COLR; and m. T l0.$ $ $ E

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EOC-RPT Instrumentation c 3.3.4 / 2. ACTIONS (continued) "~ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours with EOC-RPT trip capability. capability not m QB MQ \\ B.2 Apply the MCPR limit hours f for inoperable I EOC-RPT as specified MCPR limit for { inoperable EOC-RPT in the COLR. not made applicable. j a C. Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours associated Completion recirculation pump Time not met, from service. 98 C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours to < 3 % RTP. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains E0C-RPT trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 2 SR 3.3.4./.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days (continued) POAt5 M, UNLT' 2 (,S] p,h,njmtg gy, 3.3-M Rev 4 0E n7/05 - r

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.I L 5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY = SR 3.3.4.I.2 Calibrate the trip units. [92) days

  • 1 3.3.4.f.f Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The onths SR Allowable Values shall be:

TH y _ _ _7 closed; and dl0fo TSV-closure:g TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low: , y psig. ,3 3.3.4.[h Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST kmonths SR including breaker actuation. qq %9 SR 3.3.4.// Verify TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, N months Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions are not M bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30(%RTP. 't 7,5 SR 3.3.4.//

NOTE [-----------------

Breaker interruption} time may be assumed from the most recent perfonnance of SR 3.3.4./ g Verify the E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME onths on is within limits. a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ] SR 3.3.4.)/ Determine RPT breaker erruption 60 months time. fUQWZT" 2-{,5) Arrn<stm<d No. M 3.3-y[ M

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs.................. B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.0-7 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION-FOR OPERATION (LCO)JAPPLICABILITY... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 -SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY B 3.0-10 'B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.............. B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies.... B 3.1-8 B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1-13 B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1-22 B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........... B 3.1-29 B 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control B 3.1-34 B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control-(SLC) System B 3.1-39 ~ B 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1-48 8 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) B 3.2-6 B.3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) B 3.2-11 2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.1 Reu. tor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation B 3.3-1 j B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation.... B 3.3-36 B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3-45 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................ B 3.3-58 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.. B 3.3-65 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System.............. B 3.3-76 B 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation e, B 3.3-83 Emd_PumpTrip(ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation N rgency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 3.3.5.1 Instrumentation................ B 3.3-F F B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................. B 3.3- # B 3.3.6.1 Primary. Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-H t ~ l" B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-W B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation B 3.3-W B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power'(LOP) Instrumentation B 3.3-l W B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power ~l-Monitoring B 3.3-1 % s (continued) =- ,H > $yV) Oh [$e W'O'* k"P ( Thp ( EW.-Rpd.Tr6bWA LPBAPSLUNIT.2 i Revision No. 1

{ TABLE OF CONTENTS , B 2.,0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs................. B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.0-7 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY B 3.0-10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.............. B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies............... B 3.1-8 B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1-13 B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1-22 B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........... B 3.1-29 8 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control B 3.1-34 B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System B 3.1-39 B 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1-48 83.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) B 3.2-6 B 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) B 3.2-11 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION................... B 3.3-1 8 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation B 3.3-1 l B 3.3.1.2 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation B 3.3-37 8 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3-46 8 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................ B 3.3-59 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.. B 3.3-66 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System.............. B 3.3-77 B 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation j 6. J ump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation B 3.3-84 [+, $n,. B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) ) 'I Instrumentation................ B 3.3-9 F C B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................ B 3.3-F B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-F B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-169 v B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation B 3.3-1 W B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation B 3.3-C B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring......'............ B 3.3-199~ (continued) ~- 3, y,2 Fnd of Cyde f&ur A f%p Thp (Eu-fGT) Insty" PBAPS UNIT 3 i diiient No. 224 evision No. 17

EOC-RPT Instrumentation ./ B3.3.4/ 2.._ Mh B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.4.7 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The EOC-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power p resultina from turbine trip or generator load rejection f tr n ntf'to provloe aaottionar. i n tc cwe%rma_Lm.rv i g gn;n.,, y afety mits (SLs). g [ thedews in the additional negative reactivity in excess of cure A1CFR d# sop Th normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle @ tradem a reactivity considerations. Flux shapes a't the end of3ycle are such that the control rodsjiiily not be able to mRwM 1 (TnaT. thermal Tinitts are maintained b3/inserther""' '- # 8,'

  1. 3 negative reactivity curing the first few feet of rod travel am "$,1,.

upon a scram caused by Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low or Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity. The EOC-RPT instrur..entation, as shown in Reference 1, is composed of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TSVs or fast closure of the TCVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt power from the recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set generators to each of the recirculation mo_ tors. JThe channels include electronic equipment (e.g., rip units) that compares measured input sianals with e-established setpoints.jWhen the.setpoint 1s exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an EOC-RPT signal to the trip logic. When the RPT breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The EOC-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT. Each EOC-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function; thus, either two TSV-Closure or two TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate. If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip. There are two EOC-RPT breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two EOC-RPT breakers for each recirculation (continued) '" $' -53 B 3.3 M/Ciss e us umr zw

w. c a m

COMMON FOR 6%C$ fM6S

EOC-RPTInstrumentatio/n B 3.3.4. 2. BASES BACXGROUND pump, and the second trip system trips the other EOC-RPT (continued) breaker for each recirculation pump. n__ (mgst tny CQctmW on mC t'R} APPLICABLE The TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure-Low Functions are designed to trip the i LCO, and recirculation pumps in the event of a turbine trip or ) APPLICABILITY oenerator. load rejection to mitigate the nautron flux. heat /M dlux.__andtoressurujTransients, and td%ncrease the margin y ,pintsm To the MCPR 59 The analytical methods and assumptions und n evaluating the turbine trip and g_ener tor load rejection g [as well as other safety analyses ttfat ' nsure EOC summarized in Refere'nces 2, 3,_and_4. git,line To mitigate pressurization trans n effects, the E0C-RP must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation closure movement of either the TSVs_ or the TCVs. he combined effects of this trip and a scram red e fuel bundle power more rapidly than a scram alone, resulting in an increased margin to the MCpR SL. Alternatively, MCPR limits for an inoperable EOC-RPT, as specified in the COLR, are sufficient to mitigate pressurization transient effects. The EOC-RPT function is automatically disabled when tur ine t first stage pressure is < [40%) RTP. EOC-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. I The OPERABILITY of the E0C-RPT is dependent on the '1 7 M" AnpacsNaml OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel & TCV M* $g/ Nunetiony Each Function must have a required number of Th p W f'*' OPERABtE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints fu M "o hin _the _spyified Allowable Value _of SR13__.4.y.7 actual setpoint is calibrated consi_ stent with applicabl etpoint methodology assumations.f tnannei UVLHABILll also includes the associated E0;-xvi creakers. Each channel (including the associated EOC-RPT breakers) must also res and within its assumed response time. 5 Allowable Values are speciMr each E0C-RPT Function specified in the LCO. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required ERT C L Allowable Value. The nominal setpoints are selected to ( ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value i (continued) {S/%W B 3.3-sucrur wes Poe

,;..r, INSERT' B X_ The combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fu ndle power more ra ythan a scram alone so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not emeeded. Altemathely, APLHGR limits (power- -/. dependent APLHGR multiplier, MAPFAC, of LCO 3.2.1,' AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR \\. lirnits (MCPR,) (LCO 3.2.2, ' MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)') for an inoperable EOC-RPT, as specified in the COLR, are sufficient to allow this LCO to be met. The EOC-RPT. /- 'N . function is automatically disabled when turbine first stage pressure is < 30% RTP. j J oe i 1 I i

l x / Allowable Values are specified for each EOC-RPT Function specified in the LCO. Trip f" setpoints are specified in the plant design documentation. The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the actual setpoints do not emeed the Allowable Value between successive f CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the trip / setpoint, but wthin its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if ts actual 4 trip setting is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those j / predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared tc the actual process parameter (e.g. TSV position), and when the measured Output value of the process parameter emeeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., limt switch) changes state. The analytic limit for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip OH Pressure-Low Function was determined based on the TCV hydraulic ou circuit design. The Allowable Value is derived from the analytic limit, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoint is determined from analytical limit corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors, as well as instrument drift, as applicable. The Allowable Value and trip setpoint for the TSV Closure Function was determined by engineering judgment and historically accepted practice for simHar trip functions. f' ~ ~._. ~ [bb l ?

j.,

'/ EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.7 2. jn BASES APPLICABLE between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. ' Operation with a SAFETY ANALYSES, trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip LCO, and setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.. APPLICABILITY Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the (continued) analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analysis.in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the Function. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual 1 process parameter (e.g., TSV position), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting i values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the i analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner } provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined f.- 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted h d f The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and f Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by ( Function basis. ternatively, since this instrumentation protects against a-MCPR SL violation, with the instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2) may be applied to allow this LCO to be met. The MCPR penalty for the g gr EOC-RPT inoperable condition is specified in the COLR. C Turbine Stoo Valve-Closure Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. 4 Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TSV-Closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from closure of these valves. EOC-RPT decreases eactor power a and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that e MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient (continued) c ? Dgu M f ]} - 3 m h See ner sue, em

I 1 i INSERT D tively, cince the instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation, with the \\ [ instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR x / multiplier, MAPFAC, of LCO 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE ( (APLHGR)'), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR,) (LCO 3.2.2.

  • MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)*) may be applied to allow this LCO to be met.

The appropriate MCPR operating limits and power dependent thermal limit adjustments for the h EOC-RPT inoperable condition are specified in the COLR. v l.

.t E0C-RPT Instrumentation B3.3.4/ 1 7;, BASES. APPLICABLE Turbine Ston Valve-closure (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, Closure of the TSVs is detsp@Rhy )_asuring the position LCO, and of each valve. There aredtwo~separa} position switches APPLICABILITY associated with each stop valve, tria signal from each switch being assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for-the TSV-Closure Function is sucj that wo or more TSVs must be losed ta nroduca an s F nct n must w ab ed at THERMAL WE P. -This is normally .TM66 accomplished automatically by pressure transmitters sensing 6 turbine first stage pressure; therefore, to consider this Function OPERABLE, the turbine bypass va ves must r MshuTHE_RMAL 20WER 2 30% RTP ur chann TSV-CloWre, with two c nne s in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The TSV-Closure Allowable - - _Value is selected to detect imminent TSV closure. ~ required, consistent with th safety analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL _ POWER 30% RTP. Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Yessel steam _uomer gress re--High pand the _ Average Power Range Honitor (APRMgFixed_._ Neutron _ _ Flux-Hio6) Functions of the Reactor Protection system (RPs) ~~"D'r&dequate to maintain the necessary safety margins. p W l* Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-Low Fast closure of the TCVs during a generator load rejection results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must y be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TCV Fast u Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The EOC-RPT decreases'6eactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient. pg Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the electrohydraulic control f1 i pressure a each con valve. There is one pressure ransmit_

m.ined wit I

s each control valve, and the signaT Trom each ffransmidw s I assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TCV ~ Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function is such t two or more TCVs must be closed (pressure ransmi e rips) (continued) s -~~- SE6 FTf5T 64-A4w -- m

y $61 T& ~~.n ~~ - m This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER a: 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this ) Function. / l ~ ~ (%--._. -s J

1 ~ EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.Y A de BASES s APPLICABLE Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-Low SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued) LCO, and 7 - i e ~ APPLICABIL gggduce an _E_ C-RPT.y is Function must be enabled a 0 'HEIMAL'P6WER 2 3 . This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure transmitters ! sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, to consider this Function OPERABLE, the turbine bypas ws val es must_ remain shut _a THERMAL POWERJ 30% RTP.your channels or u,v Tast Closure, p vii rressure-cow, with two channels in each trip 7.A5 6 system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure [" that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-L'ow Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure. I This protection is required consistent with the safety' J analysis whenever THE WER isA30M% R Pelow ) 30% RTP, the Reactor-sfAyeam uomeiPressure-High and I AP fixeo nwL v.., iux-n tunctions of the RPS are (# maintain the y safety margins. 4 ACTIONS Reviewer's Note: Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use l the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as / required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the < j( topical report. ~ A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to EOC-RPT instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channel. (continued) B3.3[ & av/ ' u-1 f 1 s-SEE Fisr &ssES 1%6

l j 2~hn er?T F -~ ~. ~'~ This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER ) 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure.. This is normally accomplished automatically by pres 2: f i ( s opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function. -( i

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B3.3.4{ .d :* BASES ACTIONS. A,d ,/ (continued) ,/ With one or more channels inoperable, but with C-RPT trin-capability maintained (refer to Required Actio B.1((nd B.2 Bases), the E0C-RPT System is capable of perfo ng tie intended function. However, the reliability and ' redundancy of the E0C-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the EOC-RPT System to perform the intended function. Therefore, only a-limited time is allowed to restore compliance with the LCo. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diver'e Functions, and the low probability of ~ s an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT, 72 hours is t provided restore the inoperable channels (Reauired Action A.1 or apply the EDC-RPI inopera )le MCPR limitJ Alternately,7nrinoperapie channels may >e placeo in wip (Required Action A.2) since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to t accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. As noted, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may. not adequately compensate for the inoperable breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open). If it is not desired to place the channel in trip I (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an RPT, or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken. B.1 and B. is Required Action B.1$id'B.2 ntended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the E0C-RPT System will generate a trip signal .from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculation pumps can be tripped. This requires two channels ~of the Function in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the associated EOC-RPT breakers to (continued) __ c Ifod CTC > B 3.3 'n~ 5Es entsi &wa /%oe

EOC-RPT Instrumentaticn .L B3.3.4.y .2. 5h BASES. ACTIONS. B.1 (continued) v be OPERABLEfor in tnp. Alternately, Required Action B.2 Frequires T.no MCPR limit for inoperable EOC-RPT, as specified This also restores the margin Q' in the COLR; to be applied. o MCPR assumed in the safety a The 2 hour Completion Time is sufficient time for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of'the EOC-RPT instrumentation during this period. It is also consistent with the 2 hour Completion Time provided in nstrumentation's pu,ed Action A.1, since this .2.2 for Requir LC rpose is to preclude a CP violation. 3,2,10rd C.1 and C.2 Y i With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not d'# #

  1. D met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 30% RTP within M'~ b 9-h*#

Alternately,fthe associated recirculation pump may h inogen)/,t.$uA { 4 hours. oe removed from service, since this performs the intended W$ Pt Will 00Is0Ph. Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on operating function of the instrumentation. The allowed Completion t experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 30% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. i g~~ _ -__~ w ~ SURVEILLANCE Reviewer's Note: Certain Frequencies are based on approved REQUIREMENTS topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as _ required by the staff SER for the topical report. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up.to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That (continued) ~ M B3.3[ ' E M07/9_L h see var sees ree L

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B3.3.4./ 1 BASES ~ SURVEILLANCE analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance REQUIREMENTS does not significantly reduce the probability that the (continued) recirculation pumps will trip when necessary. 7. SR 3.3.4.f 1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended functi_on.fAny setpoint adjustment shall be sistent wun Tne assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. s ~ The Frequency of 92 ' days is based on reliability analysis of Reference 5. ^ SR 3.3.4.1.2 Calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.4.I.3. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 92 days is based on assumptions of the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) and on the methodology included in the determination of the trip setpoint. g - ~- SR 3.3.4.// CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. (continued) + - ~ ~ B3.3[.

  • 18aa/j nW7 Sd fir 6f PMSES #M0E E.

1 EOC-RPT Instrumentation ~ '5 B 3.3.4/ 4 2-1 di BASES -l 11 p SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.f.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS / The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a$ month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. 'h3 SR 3.3.4./.f The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel (s) would also ba inoperable. t he nth Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surve 11ance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these co zonents usually pass 1. the Surveillance when performed at the ' onth Frequency. ] 2,Y 2.M g SR 3.3.4.V.E uffG libranm This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed at THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid. If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at 2 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the (continued) = s-- ~ - ~ B3.3[ pna/n7tn&#- 4 (V ' Dao ~ ME FI67 g g, g g -

~ EOC-RPT Instrumentation I,' d..,, B3.3.4./' i ~2.- M _ BASES '2 4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3. 3. 4.I. 5' (continued) REQUIREMENTS nonbypass condition, this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE. frtgtugd/ D / e Frequency of 18 months has shown that channel bypass Th ailures between successive tests are rare. g >f ' G#7 f SR 3.3.4.f f i & &nWii 4 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or eq'ual to the maximum values assumed in the t%nt ' g;yn/f accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance #rTreria are3 included in Reference 6. F e, p+n us) % A Note to t urveillance states that breaker interruption time may be as med from the most recent performance of-S .4.1. his is allowed.since the time to open the on er energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact g,,M,<b that the breaker is not routinely cycled. OC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on nth STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Response times cannot be etermined at power because operati final actuate devices is required. Therefore, t nth Frequency is 24 consistent with the typical industry re ueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components that cause serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. '2-6 SR 3.3.4.71 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time (arc suppression time plus time to open the contacts) is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty of -performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers. 1 1 (continued) Ao-u tD na m7lsy- ~ B 3.3 _w,.e-See rust u ses t i

EOC-RPT Instrumentation ~. B 3.3.4pV -4*% b9 A Shtst 343 ~ ffjwy BASES (continued) [ Qj UFSAR,Figurek EOC-RPT o ic diagram). REFERENCES 1. ^ /A.H.% g, q J 2.4 gFSAR,Section 2. OFSAR,Section[4F1 - 1 8.1. 6. 1 3. 4 1 and 7.6 1 y 5. GENE-770-06-If " Bases For Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For ected trumenta ion Technical Specifications," ~ ebruary_19 um 6. -r:=, Sei= r:.e.::. corr 05:4mh \\ 1-m ng) g @l ) -f-@ y bi'It; b0 D yp&fgf f hi N 5 W k W Y pue1," hted ogre & vvsim-4 ..-~ B3.3-JU1/ Q ey 1_ h /n?/ SEE Frp sess fwg4 l h}}

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