ML20205F639

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Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Deleting Requirement for Refuel Platform Fuel Grapple Fully Retracted Position Interlock Currently Required by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.9.1.1
ML20205F639
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/29/1999
From:
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20205F630 List:
References
NUDOCS 9904060341
Download: ML20205F639 (7)


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l-ATTACHMENT 2 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 DPR-56 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES Attached Pages Units 2 and 3 i

3.9-2 Bases 3.9-1 Bases 3.9-3 i

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9904060341 990329 PDR ADOCK 05000277 P

PDR

Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of 7 days the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs:

a.

All-rods-in, b.

Refuel platform position, c.

Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel

loaded, w

- - ~

w d.

Refuel platform fuel grapple fully retracted position, d ' t.

Refuel platform frame mounted auxiliary hoist, fuel loaded, G., f.

Refuel platform monorail mounted hoist, fuel loaded.

l PBAPS UNIT 2 3.9-2 Amendment No. 210

I Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 I

'B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks l

r BASES 1

l BACKGROUND Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling i

equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

Design criteria. require that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core suberitical under cold conditions (Ref.1).

The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor suberitical in cold conditions during all fuel movement' activities and accidents.

One channel of instrumentation is provided to sense the position of the refueling platform, the loading of the refueling platform fuel grapple and the full insertion of all control rods. Additionally, inputs are provided for the lo ng of the refueling platform frame mounted auxiliary ois, the loadin of the refueling i fom monorail on mounted hoist and the fu r rac ion of e tuer rapp With the reactor mode switch in the shutd_wn or re ue ng o

position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment and prevents operating the equipment over the reactor core when-loaded with a fuel assembly.. Conversely, the refue n e uipment located __over I

the core and loaded with fuel rte ue _grapp1_e not fully' j

u

'nserts a control rod withdrawa lo'ck in the React P l

anual Control System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

(continued!

1 I

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PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.9-1 Revision No. 0

)

j

Refueling Equipment Interlocks i

B 3.9.1

  • BASES (continued)

LCO To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded with i

any control rod withdrawn.

]

To prevent these conditions from developing, the all-rods-in, the refueling platform position, the refueling-i platform fuel grapple fuel loaded, the refuelina platfom ancf frame mounted auxiliary hoist fuel loaded,kthe refueli plat om monorail mounted hoist fuel loadef,,'iind the l

e ue ng pm. rom ruel ra m e ruity retracted position

{

r r qu r o

F N These inputs are j

combined in logic circuits, which provide refueling s

equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that I

1 could result in criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5.

The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel-head is on, and in-vessel fuel movements are not possible.

Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS Ad With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply.

In-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn).

Suspension of I

in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

(continued) l PBAPS " NIT 2 B 3.9-3 Revision No. O i

l

Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 I

, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of 7 days the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs:

j a.

All-rods-in, b.

Refuel platform position, c.

Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel

loaded, d.

Refuel platfor7muel grapple ful y retracte

d. /.

Refuei piatrorm frame mounted i

auxiliary hoist, fuel loaded, j

6,/.

Refuel platform monorail mounted hoist, fuel loaded.

i PBAPS UNIT 3 3.9-2 Amendment No. 214

Refueling EquipmGnt Interlocks i

B 3.9.1 J

-i B 3.'9-REFUELING OPERATIONS

.B 3.9.1. Refueling Equipment Interlocks e.

BASES BACKGROUNO.

Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the ' refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

Design criteria require that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref.1).

The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions during all fuel movement activities and accidents.

One channel of instrumentation is provided to sense the position of the refueling' platform, the loading of the refueling platform fuel grapple and the full insertion of all control rods. Additionally, inputs are provided for the hois 'g of the refueling platform frame mounted auxiliary n

he loapcof the refueli_ng p1_atform monorail mounted hoistf and th ritractinn o_t N grappl.

i Qn With the reacter mode switch in t e shutdown or rerueiing position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to detemine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment and prevents operating the equipment over the. reactor core when leaded with a fuel assembly.

Conversely, the refueling eauipment located ov the core and loaded withCithdravar brock in thr neacwrel or the_f u

'nserts a control rod w

~

anual Control System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

1 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3-B 3.9-1 Revision No 0 E

r Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued) l l

t l

LCO To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded with any control rod withdrawn.

To prevent these conditions from developing, the all-rods-in, the refueling platform position, the refueling platform fuel grapple fuel loaded, the refuelina platfo

(\\

frame mounted auxiliary hoist fuel loaded,$the refuenng drW platfom monorail mount oist fuel-1oad a

e e ue ng a orm 3e grapp e u racted position n

s e re to De urtnABLE. These inputs are combined in logic circuits, which provide refueling-equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that could result in criticality during refueling operations.

l APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5.

The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, ?nd 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and in-vessel fuel movements are not possible.

Therefore, the refueling-interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES-ACTIONS A.1 With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable, the unit must be placed in a l

condition in which the LCO does not apply.

In-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

(continued)

I PBAPS UNIT 3-B 3.9-3 Revision No. O