Text

Revised Proposed Final TS Pages for License Change Application ECR 97-02809,incorporating end-of-cycle Recirculation Pump Trip Sys at Units 2 & 3
	ML20151Y384
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	09/14/1998
From:	; PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20151Y381	List: ML20151Y378; ML20151Y384;
References
	NUDOCS 9809180216
	Download: ML20151Y384 (31)
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Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) l END OF CYCLE The E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil i

l control oil pressure drops below the pressure l

switch setpoint to complete suppression'of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is r.casured.

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LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a.

Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or l

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2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or i

not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.

Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; c.

Total LEAKAGE l

Sum of the identified and unidentified l

LEAKAGE; d.

Pressure Boundary LEAF & E LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod.

It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area i

98o9180216 9eo914 associated with the unit length.

DR ADOCK 05000277 p

PDR (continued) l PBAPS UNIT 2 1.1-3 Amendment No.

E0C-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation l

LC0 3.3.4.2 a.

Two channels per trip system for each E0C-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure; and 2.

Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip j

Oil Pressure-Low.

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l b.

The following limits are made applicable:

1.

LCO 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION l

RATE (APLHGR)," limits for inoperable E0C-RPT as specified in the COLR; and 2.

LC0 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"

limits for inoperable E0C-RPT as specified in the COLR.

l APPLICABILITY:

THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------

l Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

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l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months l

inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

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QB A.2

NOTE---------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is l

the result of an i

inoperable breaker.

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Place channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months trip.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-31a Amendment No.

1

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) l-CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One or inore Functions B.1 Restore E0C-RPT trip 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months with EOC-RPT trip capability.

capability not maintained.

1 C.

Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion recirculation pump Time not met.-

from service.

QB C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to < 30% RTP.

SL'RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability.

l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-31b Amendment No.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 24 months Allowable Values shall be:

TSV-Closure: s 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure -Low:

2 500 psig.

SR' 3.3.4.2.3 Perform' LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months including breaker actuation.

SR 3.3.4.2.4 Verify TSV--Closure and TCV Fast Closure, 24 months

-Trip Oil Pressure -Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP.

SR 3.3.4.2.5

NOTE-------------------

Breaker interruption time may be assumed from_the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.

Verify the E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24 months on a is within limits.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.4.2.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.

60 months.

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.PBAPS UNIT 2-3.3-31c Amendment No.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS f

B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs.................

B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.0-7

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B 3.0 LIMITING-CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE RFQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY B 3.0-10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS.............. B 3.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 Peactivity Anomalies............... B 3.1-8 B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1-13 B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1-22 B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators.......... B 3.1-29 B 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control B.3.1-34 B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System B 3.1-39 B 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1-48 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

....... -B 3.2-6 8 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)

B 3,2-11 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.2 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation B 3.3-36 l

'B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3-45 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................

B 3.3-58 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation..

B 3.3-65 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System..............

B 3.3-76 B 3.3 4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation-B 3.3-83 l

B 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation...

B 3.3-91a thru B 3.3-91j B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation................

B 3.3-92 l-B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................

B 3.3-130 L

B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-141 B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-169 B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System Instrumentation B 3.3-180 8 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation B 3.3-187 B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RFS) Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3-199 (continued)

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PBAPS UNIT 2 i

Revision No.

L

l E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The E0C-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from turbine trip or generator load rejection transients and to minimize the decrease in core MCPR during these transients.

The benefit of the additional negative reactivity in excess of that normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle reactivity considerations.

Flux shapes at the end of cycle are such that the control rods insert only a small amount of negative reactivity during the first few feet of rod travel upon a scram caused by Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low or Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure.

The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity.

The E0C-RPT instrumentation, as shown in Reference 1, is composed of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TSVs or fast closure of the TCVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt power from the recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set generators to each of the recirculation pump motors. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an E0C-RPT signal to the trip logic. When the RPT breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The E0C-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT.

Each E0C-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function; thus, either two TSV-Closure or two TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate.

If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip.

There are two E0C-RPT breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two E0C-RPT breakers for each recirculation (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91a Revision No.

I EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND pump, and the second trip system trips the other E0C-RPT (continued) brea.ker for each recirculation pump.

APPLICABLE The TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 SAFETY ANALYSCS, Pressure-Low Fune.tions are designed to trip the LCO, and recirculation pumps in the event of a turbine trip or APPLICABILITY generator load rejection to mitigate the neutron flux, heat flux, and pressurization transients, and to minimize the decrease in MCPR.

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the turbine trip and generator load rejection, as well as other safety analyses that utilize E0C-RPT, are summarized in References 2, 3, and 4.

To mitigate pressurization transient effects, the E0C-RPT must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation of closure movement of either the TSVs or the TCVs.

The combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fuel bundle power more rapidly than a scram alone so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded. Alternatively, APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHCR multiplier, MAPFAC, of LCO 3.2.1,

" AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR) (LC0 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)")

for an inoperable E0C-RPT, as specified in the COLR, are sufficient to allow this LC0 to be met.

The EOC-RPT function is automatically disabled when turbine first stage pressure is < 30% RTP.

E0C-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

The OPERABILITY of the E0C-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions, i.e., the TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions.

Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.4.2.3.

Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated E0C-RPT breakers.

Each channel (including the associated E0C-RPT breakers) must also respond within its assumed response time.

Allowable Values are specified for each E0C-RPT Function specified in the LCO.

Trip setpoints are specified in the plant design documentation. The trip setpoints are selected (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91b Revision No.

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE to ensure that the actual setpoints do not exceed the SAFETY ANALYSES, Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

LCO,'and Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the APPLICABILITY trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is (continued) acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setting is not within its required Allowable Value.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.

The setpoints are compared to i

the actual process parameters (e.g. TSV position), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds l

the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., limit switch) i changes state.

The analytic limit for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Function was determined based on the TCV hydraulic oil circuit design.

The Allowable Value is derived from the-analytic limit, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoint is determined from the analytical limit corrected for l

calibration, process, and instrumentation errors, as well as i

instrument drift, as applicable. The Allowable Value and trip setpoint for the TSV-Closure Function was determined by l

engineering judgment and historically accepted practice for i

similar trip functions.

The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and l

Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basas.

Alternatively, since the instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation, with the instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the' APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR l

multiplier, MAPFAC, of LC0 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR l

HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR.) (LC0 3.2.2,

" MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow this LCO to be met. The appropriate MCPR operating limits and power-dependent thermal limit adjustments for the E0C-RPT inoperable condition are specified in the COLR.

Turbine Stoo Valve-Closure Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited.

Therefore, an.RPT is initiated on TSV-Closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from l

closure of these valves.

E0C-RPT decreases peak reactor 1

power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceedec' during the worst case transient.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91c Revision No.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation r

B 3.3.4.2 t

BASES APPLICABLE Turbine Ston Valve-Closure (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSIS, LCO, and Closure of the TSVs is determined by measuring the position APPLICABILITY of each valve.

There are position switches associated with each stop valve, the signal from each switch being assigned to a separate trip channel.

The logic for the TSV-Closure Function is such that two or more TSVs must be closed to produce an E0C-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function.

Four channels of TSV-Closure, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an E0C-RPT from this Function on a valid signal.

The TSV-Closure Allowable Value is selected to detect imminent TSV closure.

This E0C-RPT Function is required, consistent with the safety analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP. Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure-High and the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Scram Clamp Functions of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-Low Fast closure of the TCVs durin9 a generator load rejection results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The E0C-RPT decreases peak reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient, Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the electrohydraulic control fluid pressure at each control valve. There is one pressure switch associated with each control valve, and the signal from each switch is assigned to a separate trip channel.

The logic for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function is such that two or more TCVs must be closed (pressure switch trips)

(continued) l

) PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91d Revision No.

t

i E0C-RPT Instrumentation l

B 3.3.4.2 BASES l

APPLICABLE Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio Oil Pressure-Low l

SAFETY ANALYSIS, (continued)

LCO, and l

APPLICABILITY to produce an E0C-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first l

stage pressure.

This is normally accomplished l

automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first i

stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function.

Four channels of TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an E0C-RPT from this function on a valid signal.

The TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

This protection is required consistent with the safety analysis whenever THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP.

Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure-High and the APRM Scram Clamp Functions of the RPS are adequate to maintain the necessary 4

safety margins.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to EOC-RPT instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable E0C-RPT instrumentation channels provide i

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appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable l

channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable E0C-RPT instrumentation channel.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91e Revision No.

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES.

ACTIONS 6.,1 (continued)

With one or more channels inoperable, but with E0C-RPT trip capability maintained (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases),

l the EOC-RPT System is capable of performing the intended l

function. However, the reliability and redundancy of the i

E0C-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single

' failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the E0C-RPT System to perform the intended function. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to L

restore compliance with the LCO. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of l

an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is provided to restore the inoperable channels (Required-l Action A.1).

Alternately, the inoperable channels may be l

placed in trip (Required Action A.2) since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow i

operation to continue. As noted, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable channe is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may not adequately compensate for the inoperable i

breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it -

l will not open).

If it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable l

channel in trip would result in an RPT, or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker), Condition C must be entered and.its Required Actions taken.

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-Ll Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining E0C-RPT trip capability. A Function is l

considered to be maintaining E0C-RPT trip capability when L

sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the E0C-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculation pumps can be tripped.

This-requires two channels of the Function in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the associated E0C-RPT breakers to be OPERABLE.

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L (continued) l PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91f Revision No.

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EOC-RPT Instrumentation 8 3.3.4.2 l

BASES l

j-ACTIONS nil (continued)

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient time for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account i

the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the E0C-RPT instrumentation during this period.

It is also consistent with the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time provided in LC0 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for Required Action A.1, since this instrumentation's purpose is to preclude a thermal limit violation.

C.1 and C.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 30% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Alternately, for an inoperable breaker (e.g., the l

breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open) the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service, since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL l

POWER to < 30% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly l

manner.and without challenging plant systems.

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SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that REQUIREMENTS when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains E0C-RPT trip capability.

Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be l

returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumpe will trip when necessary.

l (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.3-91g Revision No.

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EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 REQUIRENENTS (continued)

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis of Reference 5.

SR 3.3.4.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.

This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.4.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function.

Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel (s) would also be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91h Revision No.

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 j.

BASES l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR ensures that an E0C-RPT initiated from the TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint.

Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid.

If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at a 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine i

bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are l

considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass).

If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgement l

and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.4.2.5 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criterion is included in Reference 6.

A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.

This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are sheet and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the areaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.

i (continued)

I PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.3-911 Revision No.

i

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, the 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of. instrumentation components that cause serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

SR 3.3.4.2.6 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time (arc suppression time plus time to open the contacts) is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test.

The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty cf performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers.

REFERENCES 1.

UFSAR, Figure 7.9.4A, Sheet 3 of 3 (EOC-RPT logic diagram).

2.

UFSAR, Secticn 7.9.4.4.3.

3.

UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.2.4.

4.

NEDE-24011-P-A, " General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," latest approved version.

5.

GENE-770-06-1-A, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-0f-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"

December 1992.

6.

Core Operating Limits Repo'rt.

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-91)

Revision No.

L.....

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1-1 1.1 Definitions 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors...................

1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times....................

1,3-1 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY....

3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS...............

3.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 3.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies................

3.1-5 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY 3.1-7 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1-12 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators...........

3.1-15 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control 3.1-18 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1-20 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves.

3.1-26 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2-1 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) 3.2-1 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) 3.2-2 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) 3.2-4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3-1 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.3-1 3.3.1.2 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation 3.3-10 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3-16 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation.................

3.3-22 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation...

3.3-24 3.3.3,2 Remote Shutdown System...............

3.3-27 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation 3.3-29 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation..... 3.3-31a thru 3.3-31c 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3-32 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation.................

3.3-44 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-48 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3-55 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System Instrumentation 3.3-59 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 3.3-61 3.3.8.2

' Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring.....................

3.3-66 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 i

Amendment No.

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

END OF CYCLE The E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (E0C-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

1 1

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a.

Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or

2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.

Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; c.

Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; d.

Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod.

It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.

(continued)

I PBAPS UNIT 3 1.1-3 Amendment No.

j EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.4.2 a.

Two channels per trip system for each E0C-RPT i

instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure; and 2.

Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low.

M b.

The following limits are made applicable:

1.

LC0 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," limits for inoperable E0C-RPT as specified in the COLR; and 2.

LC0 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"

limits for inoperable E0C-RPT as specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY:

THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

g A.2

NOTE---------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.

Place channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months trip.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-31a Amendment No.

m._

_...._. _._-_ _._ _ _ __ ____._._ _ ____ _ _.__.. _....~.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation t

4 3.3.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) i-

~ l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One or more Functions B.1 Restore E0C-RPT trip 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months with EOC-RPT trip capability.

capability not maintained.

a C.

Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion recirculation pump

~ Time not met, from service.

.QB C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to < 30% RTP.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function' maintains E0C-RPT trip capability.

_l SURVEILLANCE-FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days 4

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3.

3.3-31b Amendment No.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

.l.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 24 months Allowable Values shall be:

TSV-Closure: s 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low:

a 500 psig.

'SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months including breaker actuation.

l SR 3.3.4.2.4 Verify TSV--Closure and TCV Fast Closure, 24 months-Trip 011 Pressure--Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

L SR 3.3.4.2.5-

NOTE-------------------

L Breaker interruption time may be assumed

.from the most-recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.

l Verify the E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24 months on a is within limits.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.4.2.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.

60 months l

l l,

j.;

l 1

l t

a PBAPS UNIT 3

-3.3-31c Amendment No.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.0 SAFETY _ LIMITS (SLs)....................

B 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs................. B 2.0-1 i

B 2.1.2.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.0-7 B 3.0-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY B 3.0-10 i

B 3.1 REACTIVITY. CONTROL SYSTEMS..............

B 3.1-1.

B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

B 3.1-1 B-3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies...............

B 3.1-8 B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY B 3.1-13 i

B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times B 3.1-22

'B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........... B 3.1-29 B.3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control B 3.1-34 B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System B 3.1-39

.B 3.1.8 Scram Dii. charge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1-48 B 3.2 -

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 AVERAGE' PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO'(MCPR)

B 3.2-6 8 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)

B 3.2-11 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.2 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation B 3.3-37

'B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3-46 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation................ B 3.3-59 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation..

B 3.3-66 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System...-...........

B 3.3-77

'B 3.3.4.1 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation B 3.3-84

-B-3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation...

B 3.3-92a thru 8 3.3-92j B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation................

B 3.3-93 B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation................

B 3.3-131 B 3.3.6.1

. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-142 B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3-169 B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System Instrumentation B 3.3-180 B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation B 3.3-187 B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3-199 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 i

Revision No.

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.4.2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (E0C-RPT) Instrumentation

- BASES BACKGROUND The E0C-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump j

trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from turbine trip or generator load rejection transients and to minimize the decrease in core MCPR during these transients.

The benefit of the additional negative reactivity in excess of that normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle reactivity considerations.

Flux shapes at the end of cycle are such that the control rods insert only a small amount of negative reactivity during the first few feet of rod travel upon a scram caused by Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low or Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)-Closure.

The physical phenomenon involved is that l

the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity.

I The E0C-RPT instrumentation, as shown in Reference 1, is i

composed of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TSVs or fast closure of the TCVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt power from the recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set generators to each of the recirculation pump l

motors. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an EOC-RPT signal to the l

I trip logic. When the RPT breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The E0C-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT.

Each E0C-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each l

Function; thus, either two TSV-Closure or two TCV Fast i

Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate.

If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip.

There are two E0C-RPT breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two E0C-RPT breakers for each recirculation j

(continued) j PBAPS UNIT 3-B 3.3-92a Revision No.

4

+

g-

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND pump, and the second trip system trips the other E0C-RPT (continued) breaker for each recirculation pump.

APPLICABLE The TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure-Low Functions are designed to trip the LCO, and recirculation pumps in the event of a turbine trip or l

APPLICABILITY generator load rejection to mitigate the neutron flux, heat flux, and pressurization transients, and to minimize the decrease in MCPR.

The analytical methods and assumptions i

j used in evaluating the turbine trip and generator load rejection, as well as other safety analyses that utilize E0C-RPT, are summarized in References 2, 3, and 4.

j To mitigate pressurization transient effects, the E0C-RPT must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation of closure movement of either the TSVs or the TCVs. The i

combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fuel bundle power more rapidly than a scram alone so that the Safety l

Limit MCPR is not exceeded. Alternatively, APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multiplier, MAPFAC, of LC0 3.2.1,

" AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the 1

I MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR limits (MCPR.) (LC0 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)")

for an inoperable E0C-RPT, as specified in the COLR, are sufficient to allow this LC0 to be met. The E0C-RPT function is automatically disabled when turbine first stage pressure is < 30% RTP.

E0C-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Poln./ Statement.

The OPERABILITY of the E0C-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of t'ie individual instrumentation channel Functions, i.e., the TSV-Closure and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions.

Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.4.2.3.

Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated E0C-RPT breakers.

Each channel (including the associated E0C-RPT breakers) must also respond within its assumed response time.

Allowable Values are specified for each E0C-RPT Function specified in the LCO.

Trip setpoints are specified in the plant design documentation. The trip setpoints are selected L

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-92b Revision No.

1 m

1 I

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE to ensure that the actual setpoints do not exceed the SAFETY ANALYSES, Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

LCO, and Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the APPLICABILITY trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is (continued) acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setting is not within its required Allowable Value.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameters (e.g. TSV position), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., limit switch) changes state. The analytic limit for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Function was determined based on the TCV hydraulic oil circuit design.

The Allowable Value is derived from the analytic limit, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoint is determined from the analytical limit corrected for calibration, process, and instrumentation errors, as well as instrument drift, as applicable. The Allowable Value and trip setpoint for the TSV-Closure Function was determined by engineering judgment and historically accepted practice for similar trip functions.

The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a function by Function basis.

Alternatively, since the instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation, with the instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multiplier, MAPFAC, of LC0 3.2.1, " AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), the MCPR operating limits and the power-dependent MCPR 1 Nits (MCPR,) (LC0 3.2.2,

" MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow this LC0 to be met.

The appropriate MCPR operating limits and power-dependent thermal limit adjustments for the EOC-RPT inoperable condition are specified in the COLR.

Turbine Stoo Valve-Closure Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited.

Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TSV-Closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from closure of these valves.

E0C-RPT decreases peak reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-92c Revision No.

E0C-RPT Instrumentation j

B 3.3.4.2 5

BASES i

f 1

APPLICABLE Turbine Stoo Valve-Closure (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSIS, i

LCO, and Closure of the TSVs is determined by measuring the position APPLICABILITY of each valve. There are position switches associated with 2

each stop valve, the signal from each switch being assigned to a separate trip channel.

The logic for the TSV-Closure Function is such that two or more TSVs must be closed to j

produce an E0C-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first i

stage pressure. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function. Four channels of TSV-Closure, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an E0C-RPT from this Function on a valid signal.

The TSV-Closure Allowable Value is selected to detect imminent TSV closure.

This EOC-RPT Function is required, consistent with the safety analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is a 30% RTP.

Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure-High and i

the Average Po w Range Monitor (APRM) Scram Clamp Functions i

of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

j Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-Low fast closure of the TCVs during a generator load rejection 4

results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TCV Fast i

Closure, Trip 011 Pressu'

_ow in anticipation of the i

transients that would re.

from the closure of these valves. The E0C-RPT decreues peak reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR.SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.

)

Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the electrohydraulic control fluid pressure at each control valve.

There is one pressure switch associated with each control valve, and the signal from each switch is assigned

-to a separate trip channel.

The logic for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Function is such that two or more TCys must be closed (pressure switch trips) 4 t

i (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92d Revision No.

4 4

e

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trio 011 Pressure-low SAFETY ANALYSIS, (continued)

LCO, and i

APPLICABILITY to produce an E0C-RPT.

This Function must be enabled at 1

THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP as measured at the turbine first stage pressure. This is normally accomplished

)

automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function.

Four channels of TCV Fast i

Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an E0C-RPT from this Function on a valid signal.

The TCV Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure-Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

l This protection is required consistent with the safety analysis whenever THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

Below 30% RTP, the Reactor Pressure--High and the APRM Scram Clamp Functions of the RPS are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to E0C-RPT instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Acticns of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Conditi,on. However, the Required Actions for inoperable E0C-RPT instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channel s.

As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable E0C-RPT instrumentation channel.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92e Revision No.

l

[

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2

(

l BASES ACTIONS M

(continued)

With one or more channels inoperable, but with E0C-RPT trip capability maintained (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases),

the EOC-RPT System is capable of performing the intended function. However, the reliability and redundancy of the L

EOC-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single l

failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the E0C-RPT System to perform the intended 1

function.

Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to l

restore compliance with the LCO. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low orobability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is provided to restore the inoperable channels (Required Action A.1).

Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in trip (Required Action A.2) since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore i

capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. As noted, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may not adequately compensate for the inoperable l

breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open).

If it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an RPT, or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

M Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to-be maintaining E0C-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the E0C-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculatien pumps can be tripped.

This requires two channels of the Function in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the associated E0C-RPT breakers to be OPERABLE.

P (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92f Revision No.

1 E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES l

l l

ACTIONS R d (continued)

The 7 hour8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months Completion Time is sufficient time for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the E0C-RPT instrumentation during this period.

It is also consistent with the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for Required Action A.1, since this instrumentation's purpose is to preclude a thermal limit violation.

l C.1 and C.2 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 30% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Alternately, for an inoperable breaker (e.g., the i

breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open) the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service, since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL l

POWER to < 30% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

i l

SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that REQUIREMENTS when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for L

performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated l

Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains E0C-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel most be returned to OPERABLE strtus or the applicable Condition L

entered and Required Actions taken.

This Note is based on the reliability analysi: (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform.hannel Surveillance.

That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary.

i L

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-929 Revision No.

l

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEII. LANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 REQUIF.EMENTS (centinued)

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis of Reference 5.

SR 3.3.4.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.4.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel (s) would also be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-92h Revision No.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES

(

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.4 l

REQUIREMENTS l

(continued)

This SR ensures that an E0C-RPT initiated from the l

TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low I

Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL l

POWER is a 30% RTP.

This involves calibration of the bypass j

channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint l

methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint.

I Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER a 30% RTP to ensure i

that the calibration remains valid.

If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at a 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV-Closure and TCV Fast Closure,- Trip 011 Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel l

can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass).

If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met with the i

channel considered OPERABLE.

l The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgement and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.4.2.5 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the l

accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criterion is included in Reference 6.

{

A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.2.6.

This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact L

that the breaker is not routinely cycled.

4 r

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-921 Revision No.

I i

E0C-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required.

Therefore, the 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components that cause serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

SR 3.3.4.2.6 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time (arc suppression tih.. Aius time to open the contacts) is provided to the E0C-RPT LiSTEM RESPONSE TIME test.

The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty of performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers.

REFERENCES 1.

UFSAR, Figure 7.9.4A, Sheet 3 of 3 (E0C-RPT logic diagram).

2.

UFSAR, Section 7.9.4.4.3.

3.

UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.2.4.

4.

NEDE-24011-P-A, " General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," latest approved version.

5.

GENE-770-06-1-A, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-0f-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"

December 1992.

6.

Core Operating Limits Report.

2 PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.3-92j Revision No.

.

ML20151Y384

Text

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