ML20083L881

Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring Sys Licensing Rept

ML20083L881
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	04/30/1984
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20083L874	List: ML20083L870 ML20083L881
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM GL-82-28, NUDOCS 8404170391
Download: ML20083L881 (22)

Text

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Enclosure to BG&E letter to NRC Dated April 10,1984 i

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System Licensing Report April 1984 4

4 8404170391 840410

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Table of Contents Section Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 1.1 Purpose 1 1.2 Summary of Activities 1 1.3 Basis for RVLMS Instrument Selection 1 2.0 SYSTEM FUNCTION AL DESCRIPTION 2 2.1 Reactor Vessel Coolant Inventory Measurement Functional Objectives 2 2.2 Functional Performance During Accident Conditions 2 3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION 3 3.1 Sensor Design 3 3.2 Cabling 4 3.3 Signal Processing. Display and Alarm Equipment Design 4 3.3.1 Display 4 3.3.2 Alarms 5 3.3.3 Signal Processing 5 4.0 SYSTEM VERIFICATION TESTING 5 5.0 QUALIFICATION 6 5.1 Sensors 6 5.2 Cabling - 6 5.3 Signal Processing, Display and Alarm Equipment 7 6.0 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 7 Figures 3-1 H3TCS Sensors, Processing, Display 3-2 H3TC Sensor with Splash Shield 3-3 H3TC Probe Assembly 3-4 H3TC Probe Location 3-5 H3TC Probe Support Tube Assembly 3-6 H3TC Sensor Electrical Diagram 3-7 H3TC Processing Configuration ATTACHMENT (1) NRC Generic Letter 82-28 Checklist REFERENCES

1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose In response to NRC Generic Letter 82-28, this report describes the design of the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System to be installed in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 pursuant to NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2.

l.2 Summary of Activities l

i As discussed participated inin theReference Combustion(B),Engineering Baltimore Gas & Electric Owner's Company Group (CEOG )(BG program& E)for has i

evaluation of instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling in acordance with N UREG-0737, Item II.F.2. An outline of the CEOG evaluation of response i characteristics of instrumentation under conditions of Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) was initially discussed with the NRC staff at a meeting in Bethesda, Maryland, on May 28, 1980. The CEOG program for evaluation of ICC instrumentation is described in Ref erences (C) and (D).

In Reference (A), the NRC stated that the generic C-E H3TCS is "... acceptable for tracking reactor coolant system inventory and provide (s) -an enhanced ICC instrumentation package when used in conjunction with core exit thermocouple systems and subcooling margin monitors designed in accordance with NUREG-0737 and operated within approved emergency operating procedure guidelines." In Reference (E), BG & E stated its intentions of installing the Combustion Engineering, Inc. (C-E) Heated Junction Thermocouple System (H3TCS) as the reactor vessel inventory measurement system for the Calvert Cliffs plant. Reference (F) provided the installation schedule for this system. The H3TCS is designed to meet the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) guidance for ICC Instrumentation in accordance with NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2, and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3. The details of the initial design activity for the C-E H3TCS were discussed with the NRC staff at a meeting in Bethesda, Maryland on March 4,1981.

1.3 Basis f or RVLMS Instrument Selection -

The result of initial studies by the CEOG associated 'with ICC instrumentation are -

documented in Reference (G). These studies have been based on the objective to indicate the aproach to, the existence of, and the recovery from ICC. Following an evaluation of several possible sensor systems for a complete ICC detection system, the studies determined that a three element system would meet the objectives for ICC detectiom (1) Subcooled Margin Monitor; i (2) Heated Junction Thermocouple System; and (3) Core Exit Thermocouple System.

1 i

This report concerns the heated junction thermocouple sub-system of the planned ICC detection system for the Calvert Cliffs plant.

The'RVLMS/H3TCS portion of the ICC detection system displays, trends, and logs the H3TC sensor outputs to enable the operator to monitor reactor vessel level (inventory) '

during conditions associated with the approach to and the recovery from ICC.

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2 2.0 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

2. i~ Reactor Vessel Coolant Inventory Measurement Functional Objectives During an ICC event caused by loss of coolant inventory (e.g., small break loss of coolant accident), the reactor coolant system (RCS) remains subcooled until enough coolant is lost to reduce primary system pressure to that corresponding to saturation temperature.

The RCS remains at saturation conditions until sufficient coolant is lost to lower the two-phase level to the top of the active core. The function of the RVLMS is to provide a direct reactor vessel inventory measurement during the approach to ICC when the two-phase coolant level in the reactor vessel is decreasing, and during subsequent recovery. 1 The parameter which is measured is the collapsed liquid level above the fuel alignment plate. The collapsed level represents the amount of liquid mass which is in the reactor vessel above the core. Measurement of the collapsed water level was selected in preference to measuring two-phase level, because it is a direct indication of the water inventory while the two-phase level is determined by water inventory and void fraction.

The level range extends from the top of the vessel down to the top of the fuel alignment plate. The response time is short enough to track the level during small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) events. The resolution is sufficient to show the initial level drop, the key locations near the hot leg elevation and the lowest levels just above the alignment plate. This provides the operator with adecpate reactor vessellevel indication to track the progression of an ICC event due to coolant inventory loss during approach to and recovery from the event and to monitor the consequences of his mitigating actions or the ability of automatic equipment to function.

2.2 Functional Performance During Accident Conditions Reference (I) discussed the response of the H3TCS to loss of inventory accidents (e.g.,

LOCA) with and without - reactor coolant pumps running. The performance characteristics of the H3TCS during a variety of reactor transient scenarios (i.e., small break LOCAs, steam line breaks, and steam generator tube ruptures) were evaluated on a best estimate basis. The results of this investigation showed that the HJTCS can provide significant information about the status of the liquid inventory above the fuel alignment plate when the reactor coolant pumps are not in operation.

Furthermore, although the collapsed liquid level display is biased when the reactor coolent pumps are operating during a transient, the H3TCS still provide important information on the trend of linuid inventory in the reactor vessel. As such, the H3TCS fulfills the NRC Regulatory i.97, Revision 3, guidelines to detect the trend of voids in the reactor coolant system with the reactor coolant pumps running.

While References (D) and (1) provide a more detailed explanation of the consequences of the loss of a HJTC sensor assembly, it can be said in summary that such a failure would have minimal effect on the ability to detect an approach to ICC (in the interval _where -

the H3TCS is required to operate) since:

The H3TCS includes two identical channels of instrumentation;-

..- For each H3TC probe assembly, at least two'HJTC sensor assemblies -

indicate upper head level, which would indicate the first vessel inventory decrease; The HJTC sensors are spaced close enough (especially in the three areas of-importance: upper head; hot leg nozzle; and immediately above the fuel alignment plate) that f ailure of one sensor would have minimal effect on inventory tracking resolution; E  ;

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The operator has other instrumentation at his disposal to detect the approach to ICC.

It has been concluded that the H3TCS can provide meaningful information to the operator from the onset of reactor vessel inventory loss during the approach to and recovery from ICC. The H3TCS also provides an effective indication of the results of corrective actions taken by the reactor operator.

3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION THE C-E H3TCS has been selected as the basic RVLMS instrumentation system to meet the functinnal objectives described in Section 2. The Calvert Cliffs plant specific design of the H3TCS is described in this section, which addresses (1) sensor design; (2) cabling; and (3) signal processing, display, and alarms.

Firgure 3-1 is a functional diagram for the H3TCS. The system consists of two safety grade channels from sensors through signal processing equipment. The outputs of the processing egalpment feed channelized safety grade displays and trend recorders in the control room and displays on the signal processing cabinets. In addition, outputs are provided for use in the plant's safety parameter display system (SPDS) currently under development. The SPDS will provide the primary display for the H3TCS.

3.1 Sensor Design The H]TC system measures reactor coolant liquid inventory with discrete H3TC sensors located at different levels within a separator tube ranging from the fuel alignment plate to the reactor vessel head. The basic principle of system operation is detection of a temperature difference between adjacent heated and unheated thermocouples.

As pictured in Figure 3-2, the H3TC sensor consists of a Chromel-Alumel thermocouple near a heator (or heated junction) and another Chrome!-Alumel thermocouple positioned

away from the heater (or unheated junction). In a fluid with relatively good heat transfer properties, such as water, the temperature difference between the adjacent thermocouples is very small. In a fluid with reitively poor heat transfer properites, such '

as steam, the temperature difference between the thermocouples is large.

1 Two design features ensure proper operation under all thermal-hydraulic conditions.

First, each H]TC is shielded to avoid overcooling due to direct water contact during two phase fluid conditions. The H3TC with the splash shield is referred to as the H3TC

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sensor (See Figure 3-2). Second, a string of .H3TC sensors is enclosed in a tube tha

separates the liquid and gas phases that surround it.

The Calvert Cliffs H]TC probe asemblies are of the " Full Length Probe" design, housed within a separator tube inside a CEA shroud. .Of the eight H3TC sensor assemblies in each probe assembly, two are located above the CEA shroud,in the upper area of the -

reactor vessel closure head, and one more is located near the top of the CEA shroud.

Three other H3TC sensors are located near the top, centerline and bottom of the hot leg nozzle elevations, respectively.- A seventh sensor is located approximately egildistant

between the bottom hot leg area sensor and the lowest sensor, which is located less than one foot from the top of the fuel alignment plate.

l The separator tube creates a collapsed liquid level tht the HJTC sensors measure. .This  !

t collapsed liquid level is directly related to the average liquid fraction of the fluid in the l

4 reactor head volume above the fuel alignment plate. This mode of direct in-vessel sensing reduces spurious effects due to pressure, fluid properties, and non-homogeneities of the fluid medium. The string of H3TC sensors and the separator tube is referred to as the H3TC instnament.

The H3TC System is composed of two channels of H3TC instruments. Each H3TC instrument is manuf actured into a probe assembly. The probe assembly includes eight (8)

H3TC sensors, a seal plug, and electrical connectors (Figure 3-3). The eight (8) H3TC sensors are electrically independent and are each located at different levels from the reactor vessel head to the fuel alignment plate.

Each H3TC probe assembly is housed within a support tube assembly installed within the reactor vessel. Figure 3-4 describes the representative locations of the two support tube / probe assemblies. The support tube assemblies, shown in Figure 3-5, are installed within vacated Part Length Control Element Drive Mechanism (PLCEDM) shrouds in the upper guide structure. The upper pressure boundary of the applicable PLCEDM nozzle is modified to f acilitate the H3TC probe assembly penetration through the reactor vessel.

3.2 Cabling The cabling and connections for the H3TCS are channelized, Class IE safety grade cabling from the H3TC signal processing cabinets, and to the safety grade displays and trend recorders. The cabling frm the sensors to the signal processing cabinet pass not only the individual H3TC signals, but also the H3TC heater power.

The two seperate H3TCS channels are powered from separate reliable Class IE power sources.

3.3 Signal Processing, Display and Alarm Equipment Design 3.3.1 Display The SPDS will provide the primary H3TCS display. The backup display will consist of a seismically qualified Class IE light array located in the control room. Lights corresponding to each discrete H3TCS sensor location are driven via contact outputs of the H3TCS cabinets. The lights continuously indicate HT3C sensor being covered or uncovered, as determined by the H3TC processing equipment.

An additional display is also provided on each H3TC signal processing cabinet, to be used for detailed information and system diagnostics. The following information can be presented on the H3TC digital display on the processing cabinet:

(1) Percent liquid inventory level above the fuel alignment plate derived from the eight discrete H3TC positions.

(2) Unheated junction temperature at eight positions.

l (3) Heated junction temperature at eight positions.

(4) Temperature difference between heated and unheated junctions at eight (5) System diagnostic information.

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5 Class IE trend recorders are also provided in the control room for each H3TCS channel, to provide reactor vessel inventory tracking capability in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3. The trend recorders are driven via analog outputs from the H3TCS processing cabinets.

1 3.3.2 Alarms t

l Both channels of H3TCS processing cabinets provide contact outputs to the plant 1

annunciator system to alert the operator (1) that _the collapsed reactor vessel water level has f allen below the top H3TC sensor; or (2) that there is a malfunction in the RVLMS.

, Malfunctions of which the operator will be aware include H3TC processor malfunction, H3TCS cabinet power f ailure, or a questionable H3TC sensor signal.

3.3.3 Signal Processing

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The H3TCS signal processing cabinets are located in the switchgear rooms of the auxiliary building.

J The processing egaipment for the H3TCS performs the following functions:

i (1) Determine if liquid inventory exists at the H3TC positions. The heated and unheated thermocouples in the H3TC instrument are connected in such a way that

! absolute and differential temperature signals are available. This is shown in Figure 3-6.

When water surrounds the thermocouples, their temperatures and voltage output are approximately equal. V (A-C) on Figure 3-6 is, therefore, approximately zero. In the absence of liquid, the thermocouple temperatures and output voltages become unequal, causing V (A-C) to rise. When V (A-C) of the individual H3TC. rises above a predetermined setpoint, liquid inventory does not exist at this H3TC position.

(2) Determine the maximum upper plenum / head fluid temperature from the top three unheated thermocouples. The temperature processing range is from 100,F to 1800,F.

(3) Process all inputs and calculated outputs for display.

. (4) Provide an alarm output contact to the plant annunciator system when an H3TC sensor detects the absence of liquid level.

(5) Provide control of heater power for proper H3TC output signallevel. Figure 3-7 shows a single channel design which includes the heater power controller.

(6) Provide an analog output for liquid inventory level above 'the' fuel alignment plate.

, 4.0 SYSTEM VERIFICATION TESTING The H3TC system has been specifically developed to indicate liquid inventory above the core. Since it is a new system, extensive testing has been performed to assure that the l H3TC system will operate to unambiguously indicate liquid inventory above the core.

4 The testing was divided into three phases:

Phase 1 - Proof of Principle Testing (Reference (3))

Phase 2 - Design Development Testing (Reference (K))

Phase 3 - Prototype testing (Reference (L))

6 The first phase consisted of a series of five tests, which have been completed. The testing demonstrated the capability-of the H3TC instrument design to measure liquid level in simulated reactor vessel thermal-hydraulic conditions (including accident conditions). The five tests which constituted the Phase 1 proof of principle testing program are:

Test 1 - Autoclave test to show H3TC (thermocouples only) response to water or steam.

Test 2 Two phase flow test to show bare H3TC sensivity to voids.

Test 3 Atmospheric air-water test to show the effect of a splash shield.

Test 4 High pressure boil-off test to show H3TC sensor response to reactor thermal-hydraulic conditions.

Test 5 - Atmosphere air-water test to show the effect of a separator tube.

The Phase 2 test program consisted of a series of steady state and transient tests under single phase and two phase fluid conditions with an H3TC probe assembly. Fluid conditions that the probe might be exposed to were simulated. The Phase 2 tests verified that the H3TC probe assembly is capable of measuring water inventory in a ' reactor. l vessel.

i The Phase 3 test progrm consisted of high temperature and pressure testing of the manufactured prototype system H3TC probe assemebly and processing electronics. This test program verified the H3TC prototype performance under simulated accident conditions that could exist in a reactor vessel.

5.0 QUALIFICIATION i

5.1 Sensors-The in-vessel sensors meet the NUREG-0737 Appendix B guidelines for palification.

The sensor design is consistent with the NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2 guidelines, including the clarification thereof. Specificially, the H3TC probe assemblies are designed such that they meet the appropriate stress criteria when subjected to normal and design basis accident loadings.

5.2 Cabling The out-of-vessel portion of the H3TC probe assembly consists of the pressure boundary seal . plug and short sections of mineral insulated cables from . each sensor, with -

hermetically sealed attached connector halves. This out-of-vessel portion of the probe assembly is environmentally and seismically qualified to Class IE criteria in accordance with NUREG-0588 and IEEE Standards 323-1974 and 344-1975 spidance for a harsh environment. The qualification envelopes the design basis accidents for Calvert Cliffs as described in the Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

. References (M) and (N) describe the methods used to meet the qualification criteria for the H3TCS.-

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7 The in-containment cabling, connections, and containment penetrations for the H3TCS will be seismically and environmentally qualified in accordance with NUREG 0588 and IEEE Standards 323-1974 and 344-1975 guidance, for a harsh environment. The out-of-containment cabling and connections will be qualified to those standards.

l 5.3 Signal Processing, Displays, and Alarm Equipment The Class IE safety related H3TCS cabinets and cabinet displays are cpalified in accordance with NUREG-0588 and IEEE Standards 323-1974 and 344-1975 guidance for a

, mild environment. References (M) and (N) describe the methods used to meet the

qualification criteria for the H3TC signal processing cabinets, including the cabinet j mounted display.

t The operator's light array display in the control room and the trend recorders for the

! H3TCS will be qualified.

i 6.0 OPER ATING INSTRUCTIONS a

Plant specific emergency operating procedures for use of the information from the

RVLMS/H3TCS will be developed taking into account recommendations from the C-E Generic Emergency Procedure Guidelines, CEN-152. Revision 2 of this generic document is currently being prepared for the C-E Owners Group and is expected to include Emergency Procedure Guidelines for the RVLMS/H3TCS.

Calvert Cliffs procedures will be modified to include material associated with the use of RVLMS/H3TCS prior to the system being declared operable.

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CONIAINMENT AUXILI/,RY BUILDING C0iiTROL ROOM i

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HJTC SENSOR ELECTRICAL DIAGRAll

HJTC & r CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SENSORS (8) SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND & ALARM AflNUllCIA10R LOGIC CONTROLS r TREND RECORDER

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FIGURE 3-7 HJTCS PROCESSING CONFIGURATION l (ONE CHANNEL SHOWN)

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Attachnent 1 Page 1 NRC GENERIC LETTER 82-28 CHECKLIST NLREG-0737, ITEM II'.F.2. , REQUIREMENTS REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MCNITORING SYSTEM For: Calvert Clif f s Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 &-2 Docket Nos. : 50-317 and 50-318

Operated By

Bal timore Gas and Electi rc Canpany Item Reference Deviations Schedule (Sections refer to this report)

1. Description of the proposed system including:

a. a final design descrip- Section 3 Yes-Note 1 Complete tion of additional instru-mentation and displays;

b. detailed description of G No Canpl e te existing instrumentation systems;

! c. description of canpleted Section 3 No Canpl e t e

! or planned modifications.

• 1

2. A design analysis and evalu- Sections No Canpl e te i ation of inventory trend in- 2&4 1 strunentation,-and test data to support design in item 1.

i 3. Description of tests planned. Sections No Canpl et e and results of tests 4&5 canpleted for evaluation, i qualification, and calibra-tion of additional instru-nentation.

4. Provide a table or descrip- For Reactor No Canpl ete tion covering the evaluation Vessel of confornance with Level NUREG-0737; II'.F.2, Attach- Monitoring nent 1, and Appendix B (to System only be reviewed on a plant Sections I specific basis) &2

Attachnelt (1)

Page 2 l 5. Describe canputer, software Sections Yes - Complete and display functions associ- 2 & 3 . Note 1 l ated with IOC nenitoring in l the plant.

l

6. Provide a proposed. schedule Sections No Canpl ete for installation, testing, 4&5 and calibration and imple-mentation of any proposed new instrunentation or in-formation displays.

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7. Describe guidelines for use Section 6 No Canpl e t e of reactor coolant inventory tracking system, and analyses used to develop procedures.

8. Operator instructions in Section 6 No Canpl e t e energency operating proce-dures for IOC and how these procedures will be nodified when final nonitoring system is ingl enen t ed.

9. Provide a schedule for ad- i ditional submittals required i l

C-E H]TC System I l

Discuss the spacing of I & D and No- Complete '

the sensors fran the core Sections al i gnnen t pl a te to the top 2.2 and 3.1 of the reactor vessel head.

How would the decrease in resolution due to the loss of a single sensor affect the ability of th systen to detect an approach to IOC7

Attachment (1)

Page 3 NRC Generic Letter 82-28 Checklist Appendix B (of NUREG-0737, II.F.2) Requirements Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring Systen Item Reference Deviations  !

1. Envi romnental qual i f icat ion Section 5 No

2. Single failure analysis I&D No Sections 2.2 & 3.1

3. Class IE power source Section 3.2 No

4. Availability prior to an accident I,D+L No

5. Quality Assurance O, H No

6. Continuous indications Section 3 No

7. Recording of instrument outputs Section 3.3.1 No

8. Identification of instrunents Section 3 No

9. Isolation Section 3 No

Attachment (1)

Page 4 Note to Attachment (1) l (1) The BG&E reactor vessel level monitoring system (RVLMS) l differs from the C-E generic heated junction thermocouple system l (H3TCS) in terms of the control room display. The BG&E RVLMS includes a light array in the control room for each HJTCS channel, to indicate H3TC sensor being covered or uncovered; whereas the generic C-E H3TCS would provide a digital display for each channel. The BG&E RVLMS considers the control board mounted Class lE display as a backup display, with the primary display design.being developed as part of the plant's safety parameter display system (SPDS). SPDS Information will be provided as part of BG&E's response to NRC Generic Letter 82-33.

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Baltimore Gas.and Electric Company ,

i Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Untis 1 and 2 j Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System  !

Licensing Re ort i

April, 1984

! r i REFERENCES 4

(A) Letter from D.G. Eisenhut (NRC) to All Licensees of I

, Operating Westinghouse and C-E PWRs (Except Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 2 and San Onofre Units 2 and 3, Dated December 10, 1982,

Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System (Generic Letter No. 82-28).

l (B) Letter from A.E. Lundvall, 3r. (BG&E) to D.G. Eisenhut

(NRC), Dated December 31, 1981, "Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power i Plant, Units 1 & 2, Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Response to j NUREG-0737

) (C) CEN-185, " Documentation of Inadequate Core Cooling

, Instrumentation for Combustion Engineering Nuclear Steam Supply

Systems," Combustion Engineering, September, 1981. ,

(D) CEN-181, " Generic Response to NRC Questions on the C-E Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation," Combustion Engineering, i

September 1981. '

i (E) Letter from A.E. Lundvall, Jr. (BG&E) t o 3 .R . Mi l l e r ' (BRC) ,  !

l Dated August 30, 19J3, Calvert Cl1 ifs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 2 Nos. 1 & 2; Dockets Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Reactor Vess21 Level

Monitoring System".

(F) Letter from A.E. Lundvall, Jr. (BG&E) to 3.R. Miller (PRC) ,

Dated October 26, 1983, "Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, i

Units Nos. 1 & 2; Dockets Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Reactor Vesse! ,

Level Monitoring System".

(G) CEN-il7, " inadequate Core Cooling - A Response to NRC IE

Bulletin 79-06C, Item 5 for Combustion Engineering Nuclear Steam Supply Systems," Combustion Engineering, October, 1979.

j (H) CENPD-210-A,- Revision 3, " Quality Assurance Program, A De s t:r i p t i on o f the C-E Nuc l ea r 5 team Su pp l y Sy s t em Qua l i t y i Assutance Program," Combustion Engineering, November, 1977. ,

i i~ (I) Letter f rom K.P. Baskin (CEOG) to D.M. Crutch f leid (betc), '

i dated June'1, 1982, " Response to Questions on C-E Heated Junction Thermocouple."

I - -

Bal tirriore . Gas and Elect r ic Company Calvert'ClIfis Nuclear Power Plant .

..., . Units 1 and 2 Reactor Ve~ss61.Cevel Monitoring System Licensing, Report April,1[984 REFERENCES (continued).

(3) CEN-185, Suppl. 1 , " H J T C P h'a s e i Test Report," Combustlon '

Engineering, November 1981.

(K) CEN-185P, Suppl. 2-P, "HJTC Phase 2 Test Report," Combustion Engineering, November 1981.

(L) CEN-185P, Suppl. 3-P, "H$ated Junction Thermocouple, Phase til Test Report," Combustion Engineering, September 1982.

(M) CEN-99(S), " Seismic' Qualification of NSSS Supplied

• Instrumentation Equipment," Combustion Engineering, August 1978.

(N) CENPD-255-A, Revision 03, " Environmental Qual'lfication of Class IE Electrical Equipment," Combustion Engineering, December.

1983.

4 (0) BC&E Calvert Cl1 ifs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2,  !

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section IB - Quality [

Assurance Program. '

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